[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index ][Thread Index ]

Fwd: SPECIAL RAP ON MYANMAR, GA 98 (r)



Subject: Fwd: SPECIAL RAP ON MYANMAR, GA 98 (PART 2)


>REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON MYANMAR
>
>PART 2 OF 2  (FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION)
>*********************************************
>
>C.  Death in custody
>
>27. The Special Rapporteur continues to receive reports
>indicating that torture and ill-treatment, including beatings,
>in prisons and interrogation centres continue to be a common
>practice. In addition, sanitary conditions are critical, and
>there is a lack of medical attention. Moreover, the
>authorities continue to refuse the International Committee of
>the Red cross (ICRC) access to prisons and places of
>detention. In these circumstances, the Special Rapporteur is
>not surprised to continue to receive information to the effect
>that several prisoners have died in prison, including several
>members or sympathizers of the NLD. 
>
>28. Since June 1996, several NLD members or sympathizers have
>died in jail as a result of torture and poor treatment.
>
>29. In his report to the General Assembly (A/51/466, para.
>77), the Special Rapporteur reported on the death in custody
>on 22 June 1996 of Mr. James Leander Nichols, who had been
>arrested in April 1996 for illegal possession of
>communications equipment (telephones and fax machines) and
>sentenced to three years imprisonment on 18 May 1996. He had
>allegedly been deprived of sleep during long interrogations
>prior to his death. Mr. Nichols was 65 years old and suffered
>from heart problems and diabetes. The Myanmar authorities, in
>a press statement issued on 16 July 1996, denied that he was
>tortured and stated that he died from natural causes, due to a
>stroke and a heart attack. However, the Special Rapporteur has
>recently received additional information from a former
>detainee who, in May 1996, was serving the final year of
>a seven-year prison sentence in Insein Prison in a cell close
>to the one where Mr. James Leander Nichols spent his last
>days. According to that prisoner, Mr. Nichols had been
>interrogated by officers for six consecutive days. Upon his
>arrival, he was reportedly forced to sit in a Poun-San
>position   i.e., to sit cross-legged on the floor with his
>hands on his knees, back straight and head bowed. During
>interrogation sessions he is said to have been forced to stand
>up for hours. Each time, he is said to have been taken away by
>officers with a hood over his head. Once he reportedly came
>back to his cell at Insein Prison with swollen legs and a
>puffed face after having been subjected to four days of
>interrogation. Despite the fact that he was suffering form
>acute dysentery and diabetes, he was allegedly not given
>either proper food or medicines. His health is believed to
>have quickly deteriorated. The last time he was reportedly
>seen by fellow inmates before being taken away by officers, he
>had swollen legs, could not walk properly, and was suffering
>from dysentery, vomiting and dizziness. It is not clear
>whether an autopsy was performed. To date, authorities are
>thought not to have satisfactorily provided a full, written
>account of events leading up and surrounding his demise.
>Clearly, a full enquiry by an independent body is called for
>in light of the new evidence.
>
>30. It is also reported that U Thein Tin, a member of the
>Yangon Township Organizing Committee of the NLD, died at
>Yangon General Hospital on 18 February 1998, following
>physical and mental torture in Insein Prison. U Thein Tin had
>been detained in Insein Prison since March 1996. He was
>charged under section 10(a) of the 1975 State Protection Law,
>which is designed to protect the country from the dangers of
>those who wish to harm it. A writer by profession, U Thein Tin
>was a former student leader during 1962 1963. He came to
>prominence during Daw San Suu Kyi's house-arrest for his
>unwavering commitment and management skills. He was well
>respected by both the leadership of the NLD and the youth wing
>of the party. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)
>claims that U Thein Tin died of blood cancer, according to a
>statement. However, other sources said that U Thein Tin had
>been tortured and his health had been deteriorating when he
>was finally admitted to hospital. He was already dying when he
>was taken to hospital, according to those sources, and the
>SPDC had long refused his requests for proper medical care. A
>Myanmar governmental spokesman confirmed that Thein Tin had
>died but denied that he had been poorly treated. He said Thein
>Tin had even been given a pardon three days before his death
>and released from his prison sentence because he had liver
>cancer. Medically, Thein Tin had been suffering from liver
>cirrhosis since 1982 and while he was serving his sentence on
>3 December 1997, the prison medical authorities had
>transferred him to the Yangon hospital, according to the
>spokesman. He also said that Thein Tin's family had been
>allowed to pay him regular visits while he was in hospital.
>
>31. Aung Kyaw Moe, 29 years old, a former student of Yangon
>Institute of Technology, who had been sentenced to 14 years
>imprisonment for his involvement in a December 1996 student
>demonstration, died in the prison hospital on 23 May 1998
>after being beaten by prison authorities, following a hunger
>strike by political prisoners at the Thayawaddy Prison, 200
>kilometres north of Yangon. On 22 May, political prisoners in
>Thayawaddy Prison staged a hunger strike to mark the eighth
>anniversary of the 1990 elections, in which the National
>League for Democracy (NLD) had won a landslide victory. The
>political prisoners made two demands: that the ruling State
>Peace and Development Council (SPDC) treat them as political
>prisoners, and that it enter into a dialogue with the NLD to
>solve the country's problems peacefully. However, the
>authorities, under instructions from the SPDC's Ministry of
>Home Affairs, rejected their demands and warned the prisoners
>to stop their hunger strike immediately. When they refused to
>do so, eight political prisoners were beaten and seriously
>injured. Afterwards, the family members of all the political
>prisoners at Thayawaddy Prison were forbidden to visit in an
>attempt by the authorities to prevent information about the
>incident from spreading.
>
>32. The following two cases illustrate the severe physical
>and mental suffering reported to have been inflicted by prison
>officials to two former detainees:
>
>    (a)   Thar Nyunt Oo, a leader of the student movement, was
>arrested in September 1990 and sentenced by the Special
>Military Court to five years imprisonment. He was detained at
>Insein Prison from September 1990 until November 1991. He was
>reportedly interrogated during the first two weeks, during
>which time he was confined to a small cell under continuous
>strong light, the intensity of which would be increased if he
>refused to answer a question. According to the information
>received, he was deprived of sleep for 60 or 70 hours at a
>time, beaten and kicked, and made to stand on his toes for
>hours at a time; meanwhile, his legs were kept in irons with
>manacles around his ankles and an iron bar between his legs.
>In 1991 Thar Nyunt Oo and other prisoners who had gone on
>strike were said to have been placed in solitary confinement
>and kept in leg irons. They were allegedly forced to stand
>with their upper bodies bent forward for up to thirty hours.
>They were reportedly prohibited from bathing for one month and
>were forced to cry and make admissions of guilt. Thar Nyunt Oo
>was transferred to Thayet Prison in November 1991 and then to
>Monywa Prison in December 1992. He was finally released in
>November 1994 and resumed his political activities. He was
>forced to flee to the border in December 1996;
>
>    (b)   Aung Khaing, a graduate of Yangon Institute of
>Technology and resident of Prone Township, was arrested in
>November 1990 for his role in the pro-democracy movement and
>sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. His sentence was commuted
>to 10 years shortly after General Than Shwe was installed in
>1992 as head of the State Law and Order Restoration Council
>(SLORC). Aung Khaing was released from prison in June 1998.
>During his eight years of detention in Insein Prison and
>Taungoo Prison in Pegu Division, Aung Khaing was reportedly
>subjected to severe beatings by prison warders, and as a
>result he developed psychological problems. Despite several
>requests from his family, the prison authorities refused to
>provide him with proper medical assistance; but instead, he
>was put in a solitary confinement cell that was designated for
>leper prisoners until his release in June 1998.
>
>
>                        IV.  Forced labour
>
>33. The Special Rapporteur continues to receive numerous
>substantiated reports from a wide variety of sources
>indicating that the practice of forced labour remains
>widespread. The phenomenon of forced recruitment of civilians
>for the purpose of portering is reportedly still practised.
>Conditions for porters are described as brutal, with forced
>marches over mountains with heavy loads.  
>
>34. Since 1955, Myanmar has been a party to ILO Convention No.
>29 concerning forced labour. Amendment or repeal of national
>legislation providing for the exaction of labour and services,
>under the threat of penalty, from residents who have not
>offered themselves voluntarily, has been called for by the ILO
>Committee of Experts for the Application of Conventions and
>Recommendations in comments regularly addressed to the
>Government since 1964.
>
>35. Following the lodging of a representation in January
>1993 by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions,
>the ILO Governing Body urged the Government of Myanmar, in
>November 1994, to ensure that the relevant legislation, in
>particular, the Village Act and the Towns Act, would be
>brought into line with Convention No. 29, as had already been
>requested by the Committee of Experts, to ensure that the
>formal repeal of the power to impose compulsory labour be
>followed up in practice and to ensure that those resorting to
>coercion in the recruitment of labour be punished. 
>
>36. At the International Labour Conference in June 1996,
>the Committee on the Application of Standards noted the
>persistent failure of Myanmar to implement the Convention.
>The complainants alleged that the Government of Myanmar had
>demonstrated its unwillingness to act upon the repeated calls
>addressed to it by the supervisory bodies of the ILO to
>abolish forced labour in law and in practice and that,
>instead, the practice of forced labour was becoming more
>widespread and that the authorities in Myanmar were directly
>responsible for its increasing use.  
>
>37. At its two hundred sixty-eighth session, in March
>1997, the ILO Governing Body decided to refer the complaint to
>a Commission of Inquiry chaired by Sir William Douglas
>(Barbados). The Commission's mandate was to consider whether,
>and to what extent, the alleged violations existed or had
>existed and to make any recommendations it deemed appropriate. 
>
>38. The Commission held its first meeting in June 1997
>to establish its rules of procedure; it held formal hearings
>of witnesses in November 1997 in Geneva. In the course of its
>inquiry, during hearings in Geneva and during its visit to the
>region, the Commission received over 6,000 pages of documents
>and heard testimony given by representatives of a number of
>non-governmental organizations and by some 250 eyewitnesses
>with recent experience of forced labour practices.
>
>39. The Government of Myanmar, which had been invited to take
>part in the proceedings, abstained from attending the hearings
>and did not authorize a visit by the Commission of Inquiry to
>Myanmar, arguing that such a visit would not contribute much
>towards resolving the case and would interfere in the internal
>affairs of the country. 
>
>40. The Myanmar authorities stated, in response to the initial
>complaint and supplementary evidence, that they were aware of
>the criticisms made by some worker delegates relating to use
>of forced labour in Myanmar and that a considerable portion of
>the criticisms relating to Myanmar were unfortunately based on
>biased and specious allegations made by expatriates living
>outside Myanmar who wished to denigrate the Myanmar
>authorities for their own ends.
>
>41. According to the report issued by the Commission of
>Inquiry on 20 August 1998, the obligation to suppress the
>use of forced or compulsory labour was violated in Myanmar in
>national law as well as in actual practice in a widespread and
>systematic manner, with total disregard for the human dignity,
>safety and health and basic needs of the people. The
>Commission concluded that the impunity with which governmental
>officials, in particular, the military, treated the civilian
>population as an unlimited pool of unpaid forced labourers and
>servants at their disposal was part of a political system
>built on the use of force and intimidation to deny the people
>of Myanmar democracy and the rule of law. The Commission also
>concluded that any person who violated the prohibition of
>recourse to forced labour in international law bore an
>individual criminal responsibility.
>
>42. The Commission's report relates "a saga" of untold misery
>and suffering, oppression and exploitation of large sections
>of the population inhabiting Myanmar by the Government, the
>military and other public officers. It is a story of gross
>denial of human rights to which the people of Myanmar have
>been subjected, particularly since 1988, and from which they
>find no escape except fleeing the country.
>
>43. In its conclusions on the substance of the case, the
>Commission stated that there was abundant evidence before it
>of the pervasive use of forced labour imposed on the civilian
>population throughout Myanmar by the authorities and the
>military for portering; the construction, maintenance and
>servicing of military camps; the construction and maintenance
>of roads, railways and bridges; other infrastructure work;
>other work in support of the military; and work in
>agriculture, logging and other projects undertaken by the
>authorities or the military, sometimes for the profit of
>private individuals. 
>
>44. The Commission also stated that in actual practice, the
>manifold exactions of forced labour often gave rise to the
>extortion of money in exchange for a temporary alleviation of
>the burden but also to threats to the life and security and
>extrajudicial punishment of those unwilling, slow or unable to
>comply with a demand for forced labour. Such punishment or
>reprisals ranged from demands for money to physical abuse,
>beatings, torture, rape and murder.
>
>45. Forced labour in Myanmar was widely performed by women,
>children and elderly persons, according to the Commission's
>conclusions, and by other persons otherwise unfit for work,
>and was almost never remunerated. 
>
>46. Porters, including women, were often sent ahead in
>particularly dangerous locations, such as in suspected
>minefields, and many were killed or injured that way, the
>Commission stated. Porters were rarely given medical treatment
>of any kind, and some of the sick or injured were left behind
>in the jungle. 
>
>47.  Similarly, on road-building projects, injuries were in
>most cases not treated, and deaths from sickness and accidents
>were frequent on some projects, the Commission stated.
>
>48. Forced labourers, including those sick or injured, were
>frequently beaten or otherwise physically abused by soldiers,
>resulting in serious injuries; some were killed, and women
>performing compulsory labour were raped or otherwise sexually
>abused by soldiers. 
>
>49. In conclusion on the subject of forced labour, the Special
>Rapporteur wishes to make two observations. First, the
>proceedings and report of the Commission of Inquiry of the ILO
>clearly indicate that the attitude of the regime in Myanmar
>towards the Commission was the same as that which the regime
>had adopted towards the Special Rapporteur, the Commission on
>Human Rights and the General Assembly   that is to say, an
>attitude of total non-cooperation, in violation of the
>obligations that Myanmar had freely undertaken under the
>Charter of the United Nations and relevant ILO Conventions.
>Secondly, the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry of the
>ILO confirm all the serious concerns that the Special
>Rapporteur has highlighted in his reports to the General
>Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights concerning the
>laws on and the practice of forced labour in Myanmar.(c) 
>
>
>                          V.  Minorities
>
>50. Since independence from British colonial rule in 1948,
>Myanmar has witnessed unresolved conflicts between some of the
>135 ethnic minorities of the country and the central
>authorities. These conflicts have given rise to insurgencies
>in several parts of the country which have resulted in large
>numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees in
>neighbouring countries. In connection with these conflicts,
>the Special Rapporteur continues to receive detailed reports
>on human rights violations committed by members of the armed
>forces (Tatmadaw). Two examples among many others may be
>cited: 
>
>    (a)   On 27 June 1998, 13 villagers, including two women
>and seven children, were reportedly killed by about 120-130
>troops of the State Police and Development Council led by
>commander Htun Nyein. The troops were patrolling and searching
>deserted villages in the countryside of Murng-Nai when they
>found the people at a farm 4 miles west of their village of
>Nawng Tao, Kaeng Tawng tract. The villagers killed belonged to
>the same extended family; 
>
>    (b)   On 29 June 1998, the same troops are reported to
>have beaten to death a man named Sai Phim who was weeding his
>farm at the deserted village of Nar Sarn, west of Nawng Phar,
>Kaeng Tawng. They buried his body in the ground at the foot of
>the steps of his farm hut, leaving his head above the ground.
> 
>51. Information received by the Special Rapporteur indicates
>that sexual violence against women, including rape, is
>frequently committed by members of the Tatmadaw with impunity.
>The victims are civilians, often ethnic minority women and
>girls, and the perpetrators are reported to come from all
>ranks within the Tatmadaw hierarchy. One example of this kind
>of violence involved a 14-year-old girl, who is reported to
>have been raped and burned alive at a farm about 3-4 miles
>east of Lai-Kha on 11 May 1998. The girl, named Nang Zarm
>Hawm, was the daughter of Loong Parn and Pa Poo from Nawng Zem
>village, who had been forced to move to Lai-Kha town in
>October 1997. On that day, Nang Zarm Hawm had gone with her
>parents to work at their rice farm, about 3 miles east of the
>town. They ran out of the paddy seeds which they were sowing,
>so Loong Parn and Pa Poo went back to town to get more paddy
>seeds, leaving their daughter at the farm hut. At that time,
>Maj Myint Than and 85-90 troops, who were patrolling the
>outskirts of the town, came to the farm and saw Nang Zarm
>Hawm alone in the hut. Myint Than asked her about her parents
>and ordered his soldiers to wait at the edge of the farm and
>arrest anyone who came to the farm. He then raped Nang Zarm
>Hawm in the hut several times during the day and at about 4
>a.m. burned Nang Zarm Hawm in the hut, and left the place with
>his troops.  
>
>52. Hundreds of thousands of persons have been forcibly
>relocated, without any compensation or assistance, to new
>towns, villages or relocation camps in which they are
>essentially detained. Forced relocations are currently being
>implemented on a wide scale in eastern Myanmar, in Shan State,
>Karenni and Karen areas. One report indicates that on 4 June
>1998, Golden Triangle Military Commander Major General Thein
>Sein (Chairman of the Eastern Shan State Peace and Development
>Council) ordered Major Hla Htwe to confiscate 13 plots of land
>and rice fields owned by villagers of King-Ka in zone 2 of
>Kaeng-Tung, for the purpose of expanding the SPDC military
>base there. The military would provide each household with a
>plot of land at a different place big enough to build a small
>house. But the villagers would have to buy them at the price
>of K 10,000 each plus an extra K 1,000 for a land survey fee.
>Furthermore, the same villagers were forced to grow crops for
>the military on the land that had been forcibly taken from
>them. 
>
>53. Forced conscription of civilians into compulsory labour
>for the military authorities, including the practice of forced
>recruitment of porters, is also one of the reasons that people
>were leaving their homes. The practice disrupts family life
>and precludes persons from carrying on their daily work in
>order to earn a living. Reports indicate that from time to
>time, SPDC troops in Kun-Hing have been forcing children of
>the villagers to do menial work in the military bases, 10-15
>boys at a time, ages ranging mostly from 14 to 16. On 20 May
>1998, children were forced to work on certain military bases
>fetching water, washing dishes, weeding grass in the military
>compounds, sweeping and cleaning trenches, feeding pigs,
>feeding chickens and ducks, washing and dusting cars and other
>vehicles, and feeding dogs. When the children were tired, the
>soldiers would scold them and beat them with sticks. Some
>parents tried to go to work in the place of their children,
>but the soldiers would not allow it. The children had to bring
>their own food for the midday meal, but the soldiers either
>ate or stole their food.
>
>54. As a result of the internal armed conflict, abuses and
>human rights violations, many people have fled to neighbouring
>countries. It is reported that the Thai border is home to more
>than 100,000 refugees, mainly Karen, Karenni and Shan. The
>Bangladesh border is home to 20,000 refugees from Rakhine
>state. The Special Rapporteur is aware that, since 1995, the
>refugee camps along the Thai border have been prone to attacks
>by troops allegedly supported by the Tatmadaw. It is further
>reported that in March of this year, another series of attacks
>occurred in the camps located along the Thai/Myanmar border.
>Although UNHCR is present in Rakhine state and in Cox's Bazar
>(Bangladesh), the Special Rapporteur hopes that UNHCR will
>soon finalize an agreement with the Government of Thailand
>regarding a presence on the Thai/Myanmar border.
>
>
>               VI.  Conclusions and recommendations
>
>
>A. Conclusions
>
>55. The Special Rapporteur has to state with regret that
>the Government of Myanmar has so far ignored the resolutions
>of both the General Assembly and the Commission on Human
>Rights. It has also displayed a total lack of cooperation with
>the Special Rapporteur and has not so far, more than two years
>after his appointment, found an appropriate time for him to
>visit the country. 
>
>56. The situation in Myanmar has not evolved in any favourable
>way since the submission of the report of the Special
>Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights at its
>fifty-fourth session. The conclusions drawn in paragraphs
>68-76 of that report (E/CN.4/1998/70) unfortunately remain
>valid. 
>
>57. Although the Special Rapporteur had hoped that a dialogue
>would finally begin between the Government and the National
>League for Democracy, including leaders of minorities, his
>hopes have not been fulfilled. The result is that the
>structure of power under the military regime remains
>autocratic and accountable only to itself and rests on the
>denial and repression of most fundamental rights.  
>
>58. The Special Rapporteur remains deeply concerned about the
>continued harassment of political leaders and the detention of
>many political prisoners. He is also seriously concerned about
>the virtual blockade of the General-Secretary of the NLD in
>her compound, about her continued vilification and the
>inability of her party to organize normal political meetings
>and functions.
>
>59. The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned about the
>serious human rights violations that continue to be committed
>by the armed forces in the ethnic minority areas. The
>violations include extrajudicial and arbitrary executions (not
>sparing women and children), rape, torture, inhuman treatment,
>forced labour and denial of freedom of movement. These
>violations have been so numerous and consistent over the past
>years as to suggest that they are not simply isolated or the
>acts of individual misbehaviour by middle- and lower-rank
>officers but are rather the result of policy at the highest
>level, entailing political and legal responsibility.
>
>
>B. Recommendations
>
>
>60. Given the refusal of the Government of Myanmar to give
>effect to the resolutions of both the General Assembly and the
>Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur feels
>constrained to repeat the recommendations made in paragraphs
>77-97 of his report to the Commission on Human Rights earlier
>this year (E/CN.4/1998/70).
>
>61. Further, the Special Rapporteur recommends that an
>independent inquiry be held into the circumstances of the
>deaths of Mr. Nichols in June 1996 and of U Thein in February
>1998, while detained in Insein Prison, in the light of any
>evidence that may be gathered from fellow prisoners and prison
>officials and, indeed any other persons, so that action may be
>taken against the individuals who may have been responsible
>for their deaths or harsh treatment.  
>
>62. Urgent steps should be taken by all governmental
>authorities to put a stop, once and for all, to forced labour
>and portering and to comply fully with the obligations of
>Myanmar under ILO Convention No. 29.
>
>63. The Government of Myanmar should, with the least possible
>delay, implement the recommendations that the Commission of
>Inquiry of the ILO recently made.  
>
>______
>Notes
>
>
>(a) A/47/651, A/48/578, A/49/594 and Add.1, A/50/568,          
>    A/51/466 and A/52/484.
>
>(b) E/CN.4/1993/37, E/CN.4/1994/57, E/CN.4/1995/65 and
>    Corr.1, E/CN.4/1996/65, E/CN.4/1997/64 and
>    E/CN.4/1998/63.
>
>(c) A/51/466, paras. 126-145; E/CN.4/1997/64, paras. 80-81,
>    108 (13) and (14); A/52/484, paras. 50-68, 152 (j) and
>    (k); E/CN.4/1998/70, para. 88.
>
>
>END OF REPORT 

Internet ProLink PC User