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INDONESIA/BURMA



Here are a news item and an article which may be helpful to people
comparing the situations in Burma and Indonesia:

1)  HABIBIE DECLARES VOTE "VALID"  (BBC Website, Tuesday, August 3, 1999) 

2)  BURMA LOOKS SET TO REJECT THE LESSONS OF HISTORY  (Jane's Intelligence
Review, 1 Aug 1999)


1) HABIBIE DECLARES VOTE "VALID" (BBC Website, Tuesday, August 3, 1999) 

Mr Habibie told party officials the results were "very clear" 

President BJ Habibie of Indonesia has declared the results of the
parliamentary election valid and binding,
nearly two months after the vote. 

"I declare the result of the ballot is legitimate," Mr Habibie told senior
members of Indonesia's leading
political parties at the presidential palace in Jakarta. 

The announcement is expected to clear the way for a presidential poll to
take place later this year, although
there is still much political horse-trading to take place before
Indonesia's next president is known. 

Mr Habibie's intervention ends more than a week of deadlock in the official
General Election Commission
(KPU) which is supposed to approve the final count. 


Political oblivion 

The declaration of the result giving the opposition Indonesian Democracy
Party-Struggle (PDI-P), led
by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the largest share of the vote had been blocked by
27 of the smaller parties in the
commission. 

Most of them had been facing political oblivion having failed to secure
sufficient votes to give them even one
seat in the country's parliament. They had rejected the result on the
grounds that alleged breaches of electoral law were not properly
investigated, but Indonesian commentators had accused the parties of
resorting to "political blackmail". 

Representatives from all the other parties and five government appointees
had all endorsed the results. The
June poll had been declared by observers Indonesia's freest election in
more than four decades. 

The incumbent president has the power to override the KPU and declare the
ballot valid after its objections have been looked into. 

Result 'clear' 

In his speech to party officials on Tuesday Mr Habibie said the result of
the vote was "very clear." 
He said the result had already been approved for those parties accounting
for more than 90% of the vote
and although there had been some violations they did not affect the result. 

The poll gave Megawati's PDI-P first place with 34% of the vote. The ruling
Golkar party came second with 22%.  

But despite the result, it is by no means certain that Megawati will become
president in November, replacing
Mr Habibie - the Golkar candidate and for years a loyal protégé of former
President Suharto. 


Presidential poll 

Under Indonesia's complex electoral regulations, the new head of state will
be chosen by an electoral college
made up of deputies in the new 500-member People's Consultative Assembly,
plus 200 regional            representatives appointed by the government. 

Of the 500 seats in the parliament, 38 are reserved for the country's
powerful military who were not allowed to
vote in the election. They are expected to have an important influence in
future political manoeuvrings as parties seek to build support for their
chosen presidential candidate. 

The system means the PDI-P will get a smaller proportion of seats in the
Indonesian parliament than it
won in votes - an expected 154 seats. 

There have also been doubts expressed amongst Muslim politicians about the
wisdom of a woman holding
the presidency. 

However observers have warned that if Megawati is not chosen as Indonesia's
next president, the
disappointment amongst her supporters could lead to renewed protests. 

****************


2)  BURMA LOOKS SET TO REJECT THE LESSONS OF HISTORY (Jane's Intelligence
Review, 1 Aug 1999)

Kay Merrill 

To the casual observer, it might have seemed that the State Peaceand
Development Council (SPDC) in Rangoon showed only a passing interest in the
collapse of Suharto's military-backed regime inJakarta. However, Burma has
long looked upon Indonesia as a rolemodel and, as Kay Merrill reports, the
country would do well to profit from the lessons that Suharto was forced to
learn the hardway. 

When President Suharto of Indonesia was forced to resign in May 1998 after
widespread and often violent demonstrations, his removal barely rated a
short wire service story on the inside pages of Burma's state-controlled
daily newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar. 

To the casual observer, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in
Rangoon showed only a passing interest in the dramatic collapse of the
military-backed regime, which had ruled Indonesia more than 30 years, and
the fall from power of a major political figure who had come to dominate
Southeast Asian 
affairs. 
  
Yet the newspaper's low-key report was deceptive. In fact, Burma's ruling
military hierarchy watched developments in Indonesia very closely, and even
drew lessons for the survival of its own 
government. 


Historical links 
  
When Burma's armed forces (the Tatmadaw) took back direct control of the
country in 1988, the new State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
looked first to China for diplomatic and military support, but it turned to
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for models of political
and economic development. 

Singapore was an early focus of attention and remains a close ally, but it
was Indonesia that held a special attraction for Burma's new military
rulers. Observing Suharto's 'New Order' government, the 
SLORC saw an example of how a military regime could achieve internal
stability and economic growth without losing international respectability
and the external assistance needed to promote further development. 
  
Burma had long felt that it had much in common with Indonesia. Both had
experienced Western colonial rule and, to a greater or lesser extent, had
fought against it. The young nationalists of both countries had supported
the Japanese overthrow of the Western powers in Asia during the Second
World War and welcomed the military training which Japan's armed forces had
provided for them. After the war, these nationalist armies led the
resistance which was mounted against the return of the colonial powers, and
leading nationalist figures in both countries later rose to wider political
prominence. Also, as newly independent Asian countries caught between the
two competing superpowers, Burma and Indonesia helped 
form the Non-Aligned Movement at Bandung in 1955. 
  
After the 1960s, there were other similarities. Burmese President Ne Win
felt a strong personal kinship with President Suharto. Both were career
military officers who had relied on loyal supporters within the armed
forces to seize power: Ne Win in 1962 and Suharto in 1966. They had both
used the army ruthlessly to consolidate their political positions and to
introduce systems of government which, while ostensibly civilian and
democratic, thinly disguised the continuance of military rule. Despite
persistent criticism of their human-rights records and accusations of
personal corruption, both leaders cherished the notion that they had
rescued their country from internal disorder and external threats,
including Chinese-backed communism. 
  
After 1988, when the SLORC was re-assessing Ne Win's disastrous political
and economic policies, Burma's new generation of military rulers was
attracted to the Indonesian concept of dwi fungsi (dual function) under
which the armed forces formally exercised both military and socio-political
roles. Such a system not only offered the SLORC an alternative to the
enormous and moribund bureaucratic structure left behind by Ne Win's
abandoned Burma Socialist Programme Party, but it also justified more
direct intervention in 
the administration of the country by the armed forces. This interest
culminated in the visit to Indonesia by a large Burmese study group led by
the SLORC's first secretary, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, in 1993. 
  
 
Modern ties 
  
Ever since Burma regained its independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw has played
a significant role in the country's government and participated widely in
both economic and social affairs. Before 1988 these activities were
constrained by the army's small size and pre-occupation with internal
conflicts. Over the past 10 
years, however, the situation has changed dramatically: Burma's armed
forces, which numbered about 186,000 in 1988, have been expanded to their
current levels, numbering nearly 400,000. In large part, this has been to
permit the army's greater use as a direct extension of the Rangoon
government - particularly in the more remote areas of the country. The
commanders-in-chief of the three services, for example, have civil
administrative functions as well as exercising their normal security roles,
as do the 12 regional military commanders and many of their subordinates.
In some parts of Burma units of the armed forces are the only signs of a
central government presence. 
  
The SLORC's attempts to create a tame civilian parliament, initially
through the means of a constitutional convention, also seem to have been
inspired by the Indonesian model. As is still the case in Jakarta, the
proposed parliament in Rangoon would have a civilian face but be controlled
by armed forces appointees and 
supporters. It would exercise certain administrative and ceremonial
functions, but real power would remain firmly with the armed forces
hierarchy. Under such a constitution, the new Burmese president would be a
former military officer (as was the case in Indonesia under Suharto). In
late 1993 the SLORC even created a mass organisation called the Union
Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), which in many ways mirrored
Indonesia's state-controlled Golkar Party. There are already clear signs
that the Rangoon regime plans to use the USDA to mobilise and co-opt the
civil population into public support for the new parliament and other state
institutions. 
  
In trying to follow the Indonesian model, however, the Burmese leadership
made a fundamental mistake: it failed to recognise that the Indonesian
socio-political system which at first seemed so attractive was in fact more
than 30 years old. It was already becoming increasingly difficult to
sustain in the much more complex 
and sophisticated Indonesia of the 1980s and 1990s. President Suharto had
belatedly recognised that he needed civilian expertise to manage a modern
economy and there were even some in Indonesia's armed forces (ABRI) who
advocated less direct involvement in national politics. The growing middle
class demanded a greater say in the management of their country.
Indonesia's impressive economic boom also proved to be illusory, based as
it was on over-confidence, nepotism and weak financial institutions.
Corruption was rife. As quickly became apparent last year, the 'New Order'
government was a lot more fragile than it appeared. 
  
In misreading the Indonesian situation so badly, however, the SLORC (and
its successor, the SPDC) may perhaps be forgiven, as President Suharto and
his supporters made the same mistake. 
  

Burma alone 
  
In the face of Indonesia's comprehensive political, economic and social
collapse, Burma's military leaders have been asking themselves whether they
need to revise their own strategy to perpetuate military rule and improve
the country's ailing economic fortunes. In the past, when such obstacles
have been struck, the 
natural course for the Burmese leadership has been to retreat into the
past. In these circumstances, attempts have been made to play down events,
including in the state-controlled news media (Suharto's overthrow last year
was publicly portrayed in Burma almost as an orderly and constitutional
transfer of power). Also, senior government figures have been quick to deny
that the experience of other regional countries is relevant to Burma,
citing its unique character and historical self-sufficiency. At the same
time, however, policies which smack of isolationism and xenophobia have
been introduced or strengthened. All the signs are that, in the wake of
Suharto's downfall, this will happen again. 
  
Despite the extreme hardships caused to the civil population by its
doctrinaire and self-sufficiency policies, Burma's military government has
always prided itself on its ability to withstand the political and economic
shocks which have shaken its neighbours. Burma has considerable natural
wealth and has enjoyed diplomatic, military and economic support from
countries such as China and Singapore since 1988. In addition, the low
level of international investment in Burma and its relative isolation from
global markets 
has spared it many of the problems which the Asian financial crisis has
caused other countries in the region. As a consequence, the Rangoon regime
has been able to survive despite sanctions imposed by the Western
democracies on trade, aid and finance, as well as persistent criticism of
its human-rights record in international fora. In some sectors, such as
defence, Burma has even become stronger. 
  
This record, backed by very strong feelings of national identity, has
encouraged Burma's military leaders to believe that their country is
relatively immune to the effects of popular movements of the kind which
have brought down autocratic regimes in places like Indonesia, the
Philippines and South Korea. In that sense at least, Burma is seen as being
more like China. In 1989, for example, the Beijing government responded to
popular demonstrations in Tienanmen Square very much as the Rangoon regime
did to widespread 
pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988. 
  
This is not to say that the SPDC is oblivious to the dangers of
demonstrations of the kind which occurred in Jakarta last year. Much like
Indonesia, Burma is a large country made up of many disparate ethnic,
social and religious groups, few of which feel any particular loyalty
towards the central government. Like President Suharto and ABRI, Ne Win and
the leaders of the Tatmadaw have long subscribed to the view that only by
having a strong national government in Rangoon, supported by loyal armed
forces, can these potentially destructive centrifugal forces effectively be
countered and the country kept together. In recent years senior 
Burmese officials have been fond of citing the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
as examples of how a weak government, without the determination or means to
enforce its will, inevitably leads to internal unrest and the fragmentation
of the country. The example of Indonesia, with its problems at the centre
and troubles in 
Kalimantan, Aceh, Ambon, East Timor and Irian Jaya, will now doubtless be
added to this list. 
  
Also, Burma's intelligence agencies have taken careful note of the fact
that the rioting which took place in Indonesia last year was greatly
exacerbated by the spiralling cost of rice. They know that the rice price
is also a very sensitive issue in Burma, which has a long history of
economic discontent rapidly becoming more overtly political in tone. As a
consequence, the SPDC is currently putting additional effort into keeping
the price of rice down through increased production, double cropping and
improved distribution systems. If it was felt to be necessary, the Rangoon
regime would probably even be prepared to restrict rice exports, despite
its critical need for foreign exchange, in order to keep the lid on renewed
popular unrest. 
  
In any case, should there be signs of a major breakdown in internal
security in Burma, then it would be dealt with far more harshly than was
the case in Indonesia. In 1988, for example, the Tatmadaw shot down more
than 3,000 unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators in the streets of Burma's
major cities. Many more 
were imprisoned and tortured. This could well happen again. Indeed,
according to one recent visitor to Rangoon, there are many senior military
officers in Burma who feel that President Suharto's greatest mistake last
year was not to crack down very hard on the protesters in Jakarta as soon
as serious demonstrations started to occur. Had he done so, their argument
runs, then Suharto would have been able to nip the disturbances in the bud
and remain in power. 
  
In making this judgement, the Burmese army officers concerned clearly
assume that, as in 1988, their soldiers would remain loyal to the regime
and be prepared to follow even the harshest orders. Yet this may not be the
case. With the massive expansion of the armed forces over the past 10 years
the Tatmadaw has lost much of 
the cohesion and professionalism which marked its earlier days. Also, in
the 1990 general elections, many in the armed forces actually voted for
Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy. As a consequence, there
are many in the Burmese democracy movement now who hope that, in the event
of another outbreak of popular unrest, at least some elements in the
Tatmadaw would behave as their Indonesian counterparts appear to have done,
and urge restraint - even in the face of a concerted challenge to continued
military rule. This possibility has also been recognised by the regime
itself, which has taken concerted measures to detect 
any signs of a mutiny. 
  
  
Lessons learned? 
  
Indonesia's collapse and Suharto's downfall offer Burma's leaders a number
of important lessons - if they are prepared to learn them. Yet the chances
are that they will either misread the signs, or come to their own
self-serving conclusions. 
  
Judged on its past record, there seems little prospect that the Rangoon
regime will follow Indonesia's lead and, reluctantly or not, investigate
ways to make the transition to a more open, democratic and civilian
government. Nor are there any signs that the SPDC will recognise, as did
Suharto, that military skills alone 
are insufficient to run a modern country in today's world. On the contrary,
the Indonesian experience seems only to have hardened the SPDC's resolve to
hang on to power and encouraged it to strengthen its isolationist and
repressive policies. The measures the Rangoon regime is now taking seem to
be formulated on the basis that if it can ignore or suppress such trends in
Burma, then the rest of the world will pass it by. 
  
Kay Merrill is a freelance author specialising in Asian affairs. 



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