The BurmaNet News: August 30, 1999

[strider@xxxxxxx]

------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------
 "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
----------------------------------------------------------

The BurmaNet News: August 30, 1999
Issue #1347

Noted in Passing: "[I]f there's a dialogue, it's a dialogue of the deaf,
because only the opposition, and foreigners, are doing the talking. The
generals talk only to themselves" - Asian diplomat in Bangkok (see FEER:
THE ARMY DIGS IN) 

HEADLINES:
==========
ASIAWEEK: WHO RULES ON THE GROUND? 
FEER: THE ARMY DIGS IN 
BKK POST: THE LADY AND THE TAPE 
AFP: MYANMAR DISSIDENTS REPORT GRENADE ATTACK 
BKK POST: PRO-RANGOON TROOPS ATTACK THAI VILLAGE 
BKK POST: SURIN WINS RELEASE OF THAIS BEING HELD 
AAI: EAST TIMOR VERSUS BURMA - WHAT NEXT?
*****************************************************

ASIAWEEK: WHO RULES ON THE GROUND? 
3 September, 1999 by Roger Mitton 

THE POWER OF MYANMAR'S AREA COMMANDERS

Yangon

"They are tough to dialogue with, but they are not dinosaurs and they wield
extraordinary power." The Yangon-based ambassador is talking about a
low-profile but high-powered group who look after Myanmar's large,
disparate, resource-rich -- and often rebellious -- regions: the area
commanders. Together with seven better-know leaders like Than Shwe, Maung
Aye and Khin Nyunt, the 12 regional general sit on the ruling State Peace
and Development Council. Their influence on national policy pales beside
that of the Yangon Hierarchy, but in the regions they rule.

"The commanders really govern the country," says a Yangon businessman. "The
cabinet is just an assembly of figureheads, perhaps with the exception of
Foreign Minister Win Aung." And the post of area commander can be a
stepping stone to greater things; junta head Than Shwe was the Pathein
based South-West commander in 1980-1985. Says a diplomat: "Area command is
the route to power."

The 12 commanders take a low profile in the capital - they rarely go there
and some avoid it as much as possible. Myeik-based Sit Maung of the Coastal
Region Command complains of too many directives from Yangon and is apt to
give them short shrift. With this independent streak, coupled with the
distance from the capital and the loyalty they receive from their men, area
commanders get respect from Yangon. They tend to be left alone, as long as
their region is stable and corruption contained. Commanders vet business
contracts, resource extraction, property development, schools, markets, and
road- and bridge building. They control police, security and intelligence
operations; no one moves in their area without their nod. This power offers
gains -- military, political and material.

In the decade since ex-dictator Ne Win's barmy socialism gave way to deal
making, junta leaders have watched their upcountry colleagues grow wealthy
and in some cases very antsy. Things came to a head in late 1997; several
commanders were "demoted" to cabinet posts in Yangon, like Kyi Aung and Saw
Lwin (now ministers for information and tourism). Their commands went to
younger men who showed more rectitude and fidelity. As well, some
commanders brought into the cabinet before 1997 were sacked for rampant
corruption. Most, like Tun Kyi and Kyaw Ba, who ran the Commerce and
Tourism ministries, had already got rich as regional commanders.

"Both Tun Kyi and Kyaw Ba often refused requests from the center when they
were commanders," recalls a government official. Timber, for instance, is a
big state revenue earner -- and a lucrative spin-off for area commanders,
who decide how much wood goes out of any region. "As the economy
languishes, area commanders are cutting deals in logging," says a diplomat.
However, Forestry Minister Aung Phone told Asiaweek: "We have no
difficulties with the area commanders. We tell them how much can be cut.
They work with us."

U.S.-based academic Mary Callahan, who has studied the Myanmar military,
believes: "Ongoing tensions between the junta leaders and the upcountry
commanders may not be resolvable by cabinet and command reshuffles. If the
center wants greater control over resources and the commanders balk, the
regime will have to find some kind of compensation for commanders to give
up their power and wealth." Some think the armed forces may revert to the
pre-1988 practice of moving the commanders around every three years.

The ultimate junta nightmare is secret collusion among commanders. Adds
another Yangon professional: "Myanmar politics has not progressed beyond
the raw power dimension. While the commanders may not have the intention,
they do have the capability to produce political change." To forestall
this, the top leaders brought all the commanders into the nation's ruling
council in late 1997.

A local editor notes: "The commanders are mostly educated, in there
fifties. They are inaccessible to media -- but not to businessmen. Their
priority is security." Many are closer to army boss Maung Aye than other
junta stalwarts, especially in the skirmish prone border areas. The
"white-collar" Khin Nyunt makes regular visits, but, says a businessman,
"Maung Aye appointed the commanders and relies on them as his power base."
Under him, the military has expanded over the past decade to around 430,000
men, deploying large regional garrisons rather than relying on a rapid
reaction force from the center.

Most of the commanders speak English, but are cautious with outsiders.
Those who are effective but prickly are consigned to less rewarding areas.
The uncompromising, long-serving Western commander Aung Htwe is in Sittwe,
" the equivalent of being posted to Kosovo," as a diplomat puts it. There
are endemic troubles in this largely Muslim region.

Other generals are viewed as future national leaders. Ye Myint, the
Mandalay-based Central commander, is said to be in line to replace
Secretary-2 Tin Oo. In the Southeast, Mawlamyine-based Myint Aung, the
youngest commander and a former top cadet, could be the next Khin Nyunt.
Indeed, for Myanmar's future leaders, the place to look is the regional
commands. However, this dominant dozen will not talk much and seems quite
happy to stay out of the limelight - for now.  

*****************************************************

FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW: THE ARMY DIGS IN
2 September, 1999 by Bertil Lintner 

Rangoon's neighbours hoped its junta would yield to 'constructive
engagement.' Instead it's gearing up for more repression. 

Burmese dissidents in exile are predicting that September 9 -- the
numerologically significant 9-9-99 -- will be the day the masses in Burma
again rise up against the junta. They base their hopes on a similarly
auspicious date 11 years ago -- August 8, 1988--when massive pro-democracy
demonstrations began in Rangoon and spread across the country, until they
were brutally crushed by the army a month later. 

Most political analysts, however, see more tangible signs that precisely
the opposite will happen: The Burmese opposition has no chance of
organizing any protests because the rulers in Rangoon have set their face
against dialogue with their opponents and are tightening their grip on the
impoverished country. Already, the government has rounded up 120
pro-democracy activists all over the country in the run-up to September 9,
according to a statement issued by the underground All-Burma Students'
Democratic Front. 

But the most unmistakable sign of the junta's intentions is the expansion
of the armed forces, especially the powerful military-intelligence
apparatus. In the late 1980s, before the August 8 uprising, Burma's armed
forces totalled about 195,000 men. Today, the number is 450,000, according
to Maung Aung Myoe, a Burmese researcher completing his doctoral thesis on
Burma's military at the Australian National University in Canberra. 

The army alone now has 422 infantry battalions supported by three artillery
divisions and one armoured division -- more than twice as many as 11 years
ago. The number of military-intelligence battalions, meanwhile, has
increased to 33 from 23 in 1988. The military-intelligence apparatus also
includes nine special departments, based in Rangoon, that look after such
areas as foreign relations, information coordination, counter-terrorism and
strategic planning. In the past decade, the government has bought vast
quantities of military hardware -- jet fighters, tanks, anti-aircraft guns,
artillery pieces, naval patrol boats -- mainly from China. 

The build-up of all this military muscle contrasts sharply with the belief
of many governments and multilateral agencies that conciliation and
mediation will persuade Burma's generals to negotiate with its democrats.
The European Union and the United States insist that diplomatic and
economic pressure will push the generals to the negotiating table. The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations argues that "constructive
engagement" with the junta will work better than sanctions and
condemnation. On an August visit to Rangoon, Australia's human-rights
commissioner, Chris Sidoti, even proposed that the Burmese government set
up its own human-rights body, modelled after a commission established in
Indonesia in 1993 when the Suharto regime was still solidly entrenched. 

Diplomats and Burma-watchers in Southeast Asia dismiss these hopes as
pious. Rangoon's leaders are military men, says an Asian diplomat based in
Bangkok. "As far as they are concerned, they have won the battle against
the democracy movement and they see no reason why they should give that up
by accepting some kind of compromise with the opposition. And if there's a
dialogue, it's a dialogue of the deaf, because only the opposition, and
foreigners, are doing the talking. The generals talk only to themselves." 

The junta has acquired increasingly sophisticated means to maintain its
grip on power. A vital part of its military-intelligence apparatus is the
information department, dubbed the "cyber-warfare centre" by
Burma-watchers. Western intelligence sources say the centre, located in the
Defence Ministry's compound in Rangoon, is the largest computer facility in
Burma. According to Desmond Ball, a professor at the ANU and an expert on
signals intelligence, the centre can intercept all sorts of telephone and
fax messages as well as e-mail and radio communications. 

International telecommunications with Burma pass through two satellite
ground stations in Syriam, a town across the river from Rangoon. Robert
Karniol, Asia-Pacific editor of Jane's Defence Weekly, says: "Perhaps two
years ago, a new capability was introduced, allowing Burma's military
intelligence to monitor even satellite phones . . . by using Inmarsat and
similar direct satellite-telecommunication systems." The equipment,
intelligence sources say, was supplied by a Singapore-based company, which
is also providing on-site training. Adds an Asian diplomat in Rangoon:
"Since Burma has no external enemies, this build-up is meant for only one
purpose: to make sure that the military remains in power and that it would
never again have to face the kind of massive, popular outburst of
anti-government sentiment it did in 1988." 

Significantly, many of the 33 military-intelligence battalions are
stationed in towns and cities in the Burmese heartland, the centre of
opposition to the regime, rather than in the frontier areas, where ethnic
insurgents were active for many years but now have been largely defeated or
marginalized. "Moreover, there are informers in every neighbourhood, every
school compound and every Buddhist monastery in the country," says a
Western intelligence source. "This makes it almost impossible even to
organize any kind of political movement, even underground cells." 

Even a collapsing economy is not denting the junta's hard line. Contracted
foreign investment in Burma has fallen to $29.5 million so far this year
from $774 million last year, according to a recent report from a Western
embassy in Rangoon. Inflation is running at 40%, with the consumer price
index for rice -- the key staple -- up an annualized 60% in February.
According to the embassy's report, plans for Burmese gas exports to
generate foreign exchange are foundering: Burma and Thailand can't agree on
payment terms for supplies from a giant gas project that is being developed
off the Burmese coast by Total of France and Unocal of the U.S. 

But the junta has an answer to the collapse of its experiment with
free-market economics: It's now putting more emphasis on raising
agricultural output than meeting the concerns of foreign investors, the
embassy report says. Foreign businessmen say visas for Burma are now harder
to get. 

The new focus on agriculture seems to be aimed at boosting paddy output and
achieving self-sufficiency in rice. The generals seem to believe that food
security, massive intelligence gathering, intense surveillance of the
population, intimidation and arrests will enable them to remain in power
indefinitely. Meanwhile, they pay lip service to outsiders' overtures --
agreeing to "consider" Australia's proposal for a human-rights commission,
for example -- while wishful thinkers continue to look for signs of change. 

*****************************************************

THE BANGKOK POST: THE LADY AND THE TAPE 
29 August, 1999 

INTERVIEW: A special correspondent runs the junta's gauntlet to meet Aung
San Suu Kyi and carry her message to the world

It was a cold and dull Sunday afternoon in Rangoon. Looking out of the
window, from the fifth floor of Yuzana Hotel on Shwegodine Road, we could
catch a glimpse of the headquarters of Burma's democracy movement, the
National League for Democracy (NLD). With its three red flags fluttering in
the wind, the NLD office stood out from the restaurants and shops nearby.

There were several white cars strategically parked near the NLD office.
Several men in longyis and white shirts were loitering in front of it;
others were sipping tea in teashops across the street.

"Hnin Hlaing Oo", our Burma contact, had warned us that the restaurants,
shops and white cars belong to the military, and the men hanging around
were from the MIS (military intelligence service).

Putting on our best innocent tourist look, and armed with a street map of
Rangoon, we spend the next three days soaking up the sights and sounds of
the city. It could be our last trip to Burma.

Our plan was meticulously laid out. We were ready. Come Wednesday, the day
of our meeting, we would watch the morning sunrise at the Shwedagon Pagoda,
have breakfast back at the hotel and leave for the NLD office half an hour
before the scheduled appointment. We would cross the street, pretend to be
tourists and "accidentally" stumble into the NLD office.

No mean feat. But as we set off from the hotel, my knees began to shake as
we hot closer to our destination. What if we were stopped at the front gate
and not allowed in? What if a car suddenly pulled up, an MI shoved us into
the back and we disappeared forever from the face of this earth? Wild
thoughts raced through my head, but there was no turning back.

In less than 15 minutes, we found ourselves in the company of NLD members.
The office was bustling with activities.

We were in safe territory, and everyone spoke the same language. We were
ushered into a room where we were to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of
the pro-democracy movement in Burma.

UP-CLOSE

Serene and almost saintly, the international media often paints her larger
than life. Winner of a Nobel Peace Prize, Daw Suu and her party occupies
the moral high ground, whereas the Burmese military generals are seen as
brutal and intolerant. Up-close, she is petite, almost fragile, and more so
on that day because she had the flu. She was barely audible but her voice
was strong and firm.

We began by asking her about the charges of inflexibility and stubbornness
that have been leveled against her on a regular basis because of the
deadlock with the military junta, the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC).

The SPDC has said it is prepared to talk to her party, but not her,
insisting that she is inflexible. Daw Suu disputes these allegations. She
explains that the NLD has agreed to lower level dialogue since 1997.

"An Asian country acting as go-between, suggested we should accept lower
level dialogue, and we said yes. However, no answer (from the SPDC).
Moreover, another Asian country suggested that we should limit ourselves to
one subject only as a beginning to build confidence. We said yes; nothing
came back."

The NLD recently compromised even further by allowing low-level talks to be
held without her.

However, the SPDC has yet to respond to this latest move. "So far, the
compromise was made on our side and the military authorities have never
shown any sign of making any compromises whatsoever. So I think it's now
time for them to prove their good faith."

But waiting for the military to do this could be a long and tedious
process. She says the NLD "is not going to sit and wait for dialogue ...we
are going right ahead with the committee representing parliament."

Last September, having waited eight years in vain for elected members of
parliament to be summoned to a formal session of the legislature, the NLD
decided to form a committee representing the parliament.

The SPDC has characteristically exacted retribution, by detraining hundreds
of NLD members until they pledged not to participate. The military junta
also organized mass rallies to denounce the NLD action.

However, this has not stopped the party. The 10-member committee
representing the parliament continues to meet regularly and has set up
committees covering everything from education to ethnic affairs to social
welfare.

RESTRICTED ACCESS

Daw Suu's image as an icon of the pro-democracy movement has done a great
deal to keep her country's plight in the eyes of the international media
and community.

Even though her party's activities are marginalized at home by a regime
that has almost complete control, she says the NLD commands considerable
influence abroad.

The West and Japan have responded to her calls to restrict aid and
investment and to generally isolate Burma, and non-governmental
organizations such as the International Labor Organization and Amnesty
International have issued stern warnings against the military's labor and
human rights record.

It is clearly important that the international media has done a great deal
to keep the NLD in the eyes of the international community.

However restrictions and vigilance on the part of the military has
prevented both journalists and diplomats from seeing her at will. Our
meeting was a case in point.

Despite her release from six years of house arrest in 1995, it is common
knowledge that Daw Suu's movements are restricted. She has to inform the
military intelligence personnel an hour ahead of time if she wants to leave
her house.

The military junta frowns on outsiders' attempts to contact her, citing it
as interference in Burma's internal affairs. To simply meet her is fraught
with difficulties.

We were in Rangoon, on a tourist visa, to meet Daw Suu. The worst that
could happen to us, we were told, was deportation. With several years of
experience arranging clandestine journeys into Rangoon, our Burma contact
Hnin Hlaing Oo, knew exactly what to do when I called her to help set up an
interview with the Lady, daughter of Burma's national hero, General Aung San.

Hnin Hlaing Oo made the initial contact with the NLD, requested an
interview on our behalf, and prepared us for the journey. She gave us a
detailed hand-drawn map and a list of instructions -- where to stay, what
to do and where to go if we were being followed by the MI.

It's safest to assume that unseen ears may be listening into any telephone
calls you make, warned Hnin Hlaing Oo, or to assume that while you are away
from your hotel room, somebody may have entered and searched it.

Fearing eavesdroppers who may report us to the military, our conversations,
with reference to the meeting, were to be carried out in code. It was
better safe than sorry. On paper, it was mission impossible.

When in Rangoon, we were totally convinced our hotel room was bugged, the
phone line tapped and everyone from the bellboy to the receptionists and
the waiter were watching our every move.

Our conversations were carried out with studied vagueness. Paranoia and
fear were the norm of the day.

Journalists and pro-democracy activists call it "Burma Head". A term
described as the state of mind when one attempts the clandestine journey
into Rangoon on a tourist visa to meet the leaders of the NLD, particularly
"The Lady".

However, despite the difficulties the democratic party faces in keeping the
Burma cause alive in the minds of the international public, Daw Suu seemed
unperturbed. She said that a solution to the extremely complex problems in
Burma will have to be fashioned primarily in Burma, rather than abroad.

"Our struggle is focused mainly on the support of our people, which is our
first priority. The help of our international community, we appreciate very
much, but that's secondary to the support of the people."

But now far is she really in touch with the ordinary Burmese people given
her isolation?

"It's not as though I am secluded from the harshness of life in Burma. I am
secluded in a sense that no one is allowed to come and see me and they can
stop me from going where I want to. But that in itself is facing the hard
reality of life in Burma."

The military has ruled Burma since 1962, after brutally crushing
anti-government protests. Years of failed socialist policies and
suppression have turned the country from "the rice bowl of Asia" into an
economic basket-case. Spending on defence, as a percentage of GDP, is twice
as high as it is on health and education combined.

As such, the country desperately needs international aid and investment. 

Nevertheless, Daw Suu entertains no doubts about sanctions, and insists
that bans and boycotts hit crony capitalism. 

But doesn't foreign investment produce jobs?

"What we are suffering from in Burma is bad governance," she says. "We are
not really suffering from lack of economic aid. Burma is not a poor
country. It's not a basket case. It's bad governance that has got us to
where we are now."

She says that the benefits of Burma's market-oriented reforms and the
influx of foreign investment in the mid-1990s only benefited those who are
connected to the government and has not spread beyond Rangoon.

In a report by a United Nations Working Group, it was noted that economic
growth has not translated into any significant improvement in the
conditions of the poor and in remote regions.

So what will her top three priorities be if and when she is able to form a
government? "Unity of the country, health and education," she summarizes.

The country has been torn apart by civil war since the end of the Second
World War. Several ceasefire agreements were signed between the military
and various ethnic groups, but most have failed.

"A bicameral system would be what a lot of people would like," she says,
"because we are a country made up of many ethnic nationalities."

Burma used to be a nation of highly educated people, most of whom have left. 

Now the country is faced with a generation of young people missing out on
education. Roughly four years worth of high school graduates are waiting to
go to universities which were closed indefinitely in 1996.

According to a UN working group report, three out of four children
nationwide don't even complete four years of primary school education. As
for healthcare, medical facilities are few and far between. Most villages
lack a clinic, requiring the sick to trek long distances to hospital.

But how would the party finance health and education? Daw Suu is confident
that when the elected party forms a government, it "will probably get a lot
of aid." However, she adds, "we will be discriminatory about how we accept
it because we understand the danger of too much aid pouring into the
country leading to it being misused."

She characteristically avoided questions about her personal life. Asked if
she had made a big sacrifice, she says "It's a choice I made. You don't
choose something and then say this is a sacrifice. If you make a choice,
that's what you decide, it's a decision, not a sacrifice." 

THE EXIT

The interview ended. We spent a total of fifty-five minutes with her. Daw
Suu's next appointment was to head an NLD women's meeting. She told us to
be careful as we got ready to leave. We left as quickly as we arrived --
but not quick enough. We jumped into a taxi and as soon as it drove off, we
were immediately followed.

Our first stop was at one of the markets in downtown Rangoon. Try to lose
the MIs in a crowded place, was one of the many pieces of advice Hnin
Hlaing Oo had given. After several taxi rides, and several market stops, we
thought we had lost them. We decided we deserved a treat. We went to one of
Rangoon's poshest hotels for a drink; to celebrate our success thus far --
and to psychologically prepare ourselves for the final journey to the
airport. 

When we arrived at the departure hall, we immediately felt the strain of
all eyes upon us. No amount of maneuvering or dodging had succeeded in
shaking off the MI. They were right on our back, now standing within view,
waiting to search our bags.

Our first hurdle was the airline check-in counter, followed by the
immigration desk. Everything went smoothly. No questions asked, no answers
needed.  Finally, the final hurdle, the customs officers. We resigned
ourselves to the inevitable.

A male and two female officers politely asked us for our passports and led
us to a room in the far corner of the building. Together with several men
in longyis and white shirts, they conducted an extensive luggage search.

Everything was taken out of our luggage -- dirty laundry, toiletry bag,
etc. They had their eyes and hands on everything; squeezing my toothpaste
tube to feel if anything might be hidden inside, screened every page of my
novel for any footnotes, listened to every single music cassette tape that
we had, forwarding and rewinding, until they were satisfied that no
interviews were recorded on those tapes. Nothing in sight was left out. All
the rolls of film they could find were confiscated.

Trying to look every bit the ignorant tourist, we asked them why they were
searching us, and what they were looking for. They simply replied, "we are
only doing our job."

When they had completed the search, the men left the room, leaving the
female officers to conduct a body search. We were told to lift our shirts
and pull down our pants, a move which seemed to embarrass them more than
us. They were extremely apologetic. They were merely doing their job. No
reference was made as to where we were that day and what we did.

The plane took off, and with us, an audiocassette tape and a roll of film.
Mission impossible was a success. We had seen Rangoon, met the leaders of
the NLD, and spoken to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Because of our mission, fear
and paranoia had been our constant companions throughout our stay. However,
it was a mere fraction to what ordinary Burmese people have to live with
every day of their lives, particularly members of the NLD.

"We are ordinary people struggling for our right to live ordinary, secure
lives," Daw Suu had told us. "The struggle for democracy in Burma gets so
politicized, but what we are fighting for in the end isn't any particular
political idea so much as the principal of good governance; the kind that
allows the people freedom and security in the right balance." 

Whether the NLD is seen to be marginalized at home or abroad, the important
thing that the opposition party in Burma has done is to create hope, or at
any rate, to strengthen and spread a hope which was formerly confined to a
few. 

*****************************************************

AFP: MYANMAR DISSIDENTS REPORT GRENADE ATTACK 
29 August, 1999 

BANGKOK, Aug 29 (AFP) - A hand grenade attack on the car of a Myanmar
military officer by unidentified assailants injured two people, exiled
students said Sunday. 

The Thailand-based All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) said the
attack took place in the capital Yangon on August 18 and injured two of the
officer's relatives. No independent confirmation of the alleged attack was
immediately available. 

The ABSDF statement said it was unclear who had thrown the grenade lobbed
from a passing car, but speculated it may have been a result of political
rivalry within the military. 

The ABSDF, part of a wider group of dissidents and opposition leaders
calling for a mass uprising against the ruling military next month, are
accused by the junta of being an armed terrorist group. 

[ ... ]

*****************************************************

THE BANGKOK POST: PRO-RANGOON TROOPS ATTACK THAI VILLAGE 
29 August, 1999 by Supamart Kasem 

Following arrest of three colleagues

One man was wounded when pro-Rangoon Democratic Karen Buddhist Army solders
attacked a border village before dawn yesterday, apparently in retaliation
for the arrest of three of their men.

About 20 armed men cross the border to Ban Rain Don Chai in Tambon Mae Dao
of Mae Sot district at about 4am and fired on shops and a border
observation post with rifles and M79 grenade launchers for nearly an hour.

Malik Nakacharn, 44, a shop owner, received a shrapnel wound in the leg and
was later admitted to Mae Sot Hospital. 

About 70 villagers fled to safety, so did three defence volunteers manning
the border observation post. 

They retreated across the border after a 200-strong force of military,
police and volunteers led by Col Chaluay Yaempocai, chief-of-staff of the
Fourth Infantry Regiment Task Force, arrived at the scene.

Villagers said the DKBA soldiers were led by Capt Win Naing who frequently
visited the village to buy motorcycles for sale in Burma.

About a month ago three Karen soldiers came to the village carrying
firearms and hand grenades and were arrested by Mae Sot police. Capt Win
Naing asked police to release his men, but they refused.

It was speculated the DKBA may have planned to take some villagers hostages
to bargain for the release of the three soldiers.

*****************************************************

THE BANGKOK POST: SURIN WINS RELEASE OF THAIS BEING HELD FOR ILLEGAL ENTRY 
27 August, 1999 by Bhanravee Tansubhapol 

Burma has agreed to the unconditional release of all Thais detained in the
country, following a request by Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan.

The decision will mean freedom for 53 Thais, detained mainly on illegal
entry and fishing charges, the Thai embassy in Rangoon said.

Nyunt Maung Shein, director-general of Burma's political department,
informed Thai ambassador Pensak Chalarak of the decision yesterday.

Mr Surin welcomed it as a sign of "growth and new direction in inter-Asean
relations", a foreign ministry spokesman said.

The minister approached all Asean members to consider an amnesty for Thai
prisoners to mark His Majesty the King's 72nd birthday. Thailand also hopes
to conclude agreements on prisoner transfers with other Asean states.

In Thailand, Burmese make up the largest group of prisoners from Southeast
Asian countries.

*****************************************************

AUSTRALIA ASIA INTERNET: EAST TIMOR VERSUS BURMA - WHAT NEXT?
20 August, 1999 

On the eve of the vote for East Timorese independence the contingency plans
have been made. Pressure both internally and internationally has been
placed on the Indonesian government to make the vote free and fair. At the
moment rallies ending with bloodshed are occurring; but it is not mass
bloodshed, and there are plenty of foreign observers on the ground. 

The possible outcomes? If the vote is reasonably fair then the assumption
is that East Timor will gain autonomy. Once that occurs there will be
another state, albeit a state of little power or consequence in the Asian
arena. The major effect of its creation will be to acknowledge that the
Indonesian government is capable of making a strong humanitarian gesture,
which it needs to do given perceptions about the cohesiveness of
Indonesia's government. In the long term it is highly difficult to foresee
how East Timor will develop after post-colonial trauma. 

If the vote becomes a violent sham, then Indonesia will be in a difficult
position to say the least. Another public relations disaster it does not
need, especially with the recent Baligate Scandal making mockery of both
the Habbibe's Golkar Party and the Indonesian markets. 

It will also -- in the light of recent rejections by the ruling military
junta in Burma to accept outside 'stabilizing' help for Burma -- make it
necessary to start some serious debate on how Asian neighbours may deal
with the more difficult countries of Asia. 

The rejection by the UN to send troops into East Timor will not be
forgotten. Offers of troops by the Americans was both encouraging and
morally brave given the situation. Japan is similarly constrained from
acting in Asia due to its history. This leaves the real issues in the hands
of neighbouring countries. 

At the moment things are holding together. We can only hope it works.

[AAI is an internet-based weekly Australia Asia affairs magazine.]

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