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The Nation (8-9-99)
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<font face="arial" size=4><b>Editorial &
Opinion</font></b><font size=3> <br>
</font><font size=5><b>Fortune fails to favour displaced Burmese <br>
</font></b><font size=3>Outspoken British minister Robin Cook's
cancellation of his trip to Thailand has robbed Burmese refugees of a
valuable opportunity to further highlight their plight at a critical
time, writes Yindee Lertcharoenchok. <br>
It came as no surprise that some Thai government agencies, particularly
the Interior Ministry, showed hesitancy about granting British Foreign
Secretary Robin Cook's request to visit a Burmese border refugee camp for
his scheduled visit to Thailand this week. <br>
Cook, who yesterday cancelled his two-day trip at the last minute due to
an emergency meeting on East Timor in New Zealand, initially planned to
arrive here later today. He had made it known that a tour of a refugee
camp would be part of his itinerary and Burma would be one of his talking
points with Thai government officials. <br>
He had requested a visit to a border camp for tomorrow, Sept 9, 1999, and
that had surprised most Thai government agencies as they are quite uneasy
about any happening on that auspicious date. <br>
Before he cancelled his trip, he was offered a compromise -- a tour of
Tham Hin, a border camp sheltering about 8,000 Karen refugees in
Ratchaburi province. That was arranged for Friday instead of the
requested ''9999'' -- the jinx date which has sent jitters down the
Burmese junta's spine for the past two months. <br>
As the 9999 ''cursed date'' closes in, the unease seems to have spread
across the common frontier and Thai security agencies are now also
bracing themselves in reaction to widespread rumour, prediction and
speculation that a mass uprising will take place across Burma. <br>
In Bangkok as well as in border provinces, Thai authorities are on alert
to prevent potential Burmese unrest or untoward violence that might occur
simultaneously. Surveillance is in effect on major urban and border hubs
of Burmese living in exile, and on their movements. Security along the
2,500-km Thai-Burmese frontier has also been beefed up, especially after
the Burmese decision to close down major crossings with Thailand last
week. <br>
As one Thai security official put it, ''the situation along the border
from the North down to southern Ranong province has been very tense in
recent weeks, and both sides have placed their troops on alert''. <br>
Whether the Burmese military regime truly believes a popular uprising
will take place tomorrow remains questionable, but it certainly has left
no room in terms of precautionary actions to weed out any sign of
political unrest. <br>
In fact, some Thai and western Burma watchers have cast strong doubt that
anything at all will happen. <br>
According to a western diplomat, Burma's 1988 pro-democracy uprising was
spontaneous and the result of decades of suppressed popular discontent
with the intolerable political, economic and social situation. This time
all those factors have not ripened to encourage the people to revolt, he
noted. Another western Burma watcher put it more clearly: ''You can't
plan an uprising.'' <br>
Interestingly, some Burma watchers agree global speculation and campaign
provocation of a 9999 upheaval might, unfortunately, play into the
junta's hands and provide it with a good pretext for a nationwide
crackdown on democratic politicians and activists of the National League
for Democracy. <br>
Some Thai government and security officers suspect Cook's border trip --
the initial requested date being on 9-9-99 -- was deliberately timed to
coincide with the 9999 event. To them, Cook's presence at the border
would have been ''a blessing in disguise'' to the democratic Burmese
movement in and outside of Burma, as well as ''sending a wrong signal''
to Burmese advocates of a 9999 upheaval. The British foreign secretary is
known as one of the strongest critics of the Burmese ruling generals and
a strong supporter of tougher sanctions against the military regime.
<br>
Cook's request to visit the camp on Sept 9 had provided Thai officials
with further concern in that the 9999 date has raised worries the world
over because computer software could have difficulty reading and
interpreting information on that particular date -- the same technical
problem as the Y2K bug. Many commercial and official flights, including
those of Cook's Thai hosts, have been cancelled for that day to avoid
potential or unexpected difficulties arising from a wrong computer
reading of the 9999 figure. <br>
For Cook and his team, their visit to the border camp could have gone
beyond giving mere moral and material support to the refugees. The
Burmese fugitives themselves would get the chance to explain their
plight, the cause of their flight across the border and their future as
they see it, particularly on being repatriated to Burma. <br>
Moreover, Cook would have had a good opportunity to learn more about
another potential ''human crisis'' arising inside Burma. As several
ethnic refugee organisations have stated in recent situation reports, a
more pressing problem that requires urgent global attention and action is
assistance for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Burmese.
<br>
These ethnic relief groups have in recent months called for assistance to
alleviate the suffering and severe food and medical shortages confronting
displaced ethnic groups uprooted from their villages and forced into
hiding along the rugged Thai-Burmese border as a consequence of the
junta's systematic relocation and forced labour policy. <br>
Their most recent rough estimate of the displaced -- in 1996-1997 -- was
300,000 Shan in Burma's northeastern Shan State, 80,000 Karenni, 300,000
Karen, and 50,000 Mon. The figures are said to have increased in the past
two years. <br>
If Cook had been able to visit the camp, no matter how briefly, it would
have provided him with a full picture of the overall condition of the
estimated 100,000 Burmese refugees and nearly a million internally
displaced Burmese, and offered a window to learn first-hand of the real
deteriorating situation in Burma and why the refugees do not want to go
home to all manner of official harassment against their own family
members and relatives<br>
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<td width=120></td><td width=300><font face="arial" size=4><b>Editorial
& Opinion</font></b><font size=3> </font><br>
<font size=5><b>An air of hope prevails in Burma<br>
</font></b><font size=3>Skeptics, calling the Burmese population
''numerilogically-obsessed'', have misinterpreted the 9-9-99 movement.
But the situation in Burma is ripe for positive social change, with or
without the four 9s, writes Min Zin. <br>
Will the people of Burma take the 9-9-99 numerical cue and participate in
a planned uprising to end military rule tomorrow? In an atmosphere of
tight control and zero tolerance of dissent, the overt call for
demonstrations may seem mere wishful thinking. However, an analysis of
the current situation shows that the 9-9-99 movement coincides with
conditions that are ripe for major social change in Burma. <br>
Skeptics, calling the Burmese population ''numerilogically-obsessed'',
have misinterpreted the movement, suggesting that opposition leaders have
called for an uprising this Thursday out of context of the true social
situation. <br>
In fact, setting that date is a practical publicity consideration in a
society where information is tightly controlled. It has also captured the
imagination of the people, both inside and outside of Burma. Moreover,
9-9-99 is not so much a leader-designated date as a manifestation of the
hope for social change of a broad base of mostly anonymous people inside
Burma. <br>
Indeed, the situation in Burma is ripe for positive social change, with
or without ''9-9-99''. The current momentum of growing dissent indicates
that the military and the opposition are approaching a final showdown.
<br>
The opposition groups calling for change have a number of factors in
their favour. The political, social, and economic situations have become
untenable. Politically, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)
has had to shift toward considering tripartite dialogue with the National
League for Democracy and ethnic leaders (the opposition's political
agenda) because its own previous priority, the National Convention, has
lost almost all legitimacy. In addition, the regime has failed to create
any lasting political solutions with the ceasefire groups, many of which
have damaged the regime politically through involvement in the illicit
drug trade. <br>
The most severe problem the military is facing is the economy. Economic
crises tend to politicise ordinary people and embolden them to call for
change. Related to this problem are the broader social problems,
including the education and health crises. The people's frustration is
understandably high. <br>
The military also has internal problems to contend with. Since the
government reshuffle in late 1997, the new SPDC structure has intensified
the power struggle among the various factions within the military, and
there is growing dissent among grassroots military men. Even if the
high-ranking officers seem to agree on maintaining the basic status quo,
they disagree on how to handle Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. <br>
That is not to say that the military is going to split soon. However, if
something like a nationwide mass mobilisation were to happen, it would be
very difficult for the generals to convince the soldiers to shoot the
demonstrators, as they did on Aug 8, 1988. When the generals gave the
order to crack down on the students during the 1996 December student
demonstration, even the riot police were reluctant to beat the students
and twice resisted the orders. The protesters will have increased
international attention working in their favour as well. In contrast, the
grassroots underground networks of students, monks and workers are
strengthening. The current increase in political activity by high school
students has encouraged long-term activists and suggests that the
movement will continue to broaden. <br>
In a recent interview with Asiaweek (June 11), Suu Kyi said: ''If you
mean would we support a spontaneous demonstration by the people for
better conditions, certainly we would. Why shouldn't we? We know that
there is a need for better conditions.'' Her statement lends considerable
legitimacy to the call for demonstrations. <br>
Mass uprisings, whenever and wherever they happen, cause a crisis of
legitimacy for the government, and a power vacuum inevitably ensues. A
mass uprising alone cannot bring about genuine positive social change
unless the people manage to fill the power void. This was the problem
that pro-democracy advocates encountered in the 8-8-88 movement when they
failed to form an interim government. Now, with last year's formation of
the Committee Representing People's Parliament (CRPP), the vital
leadership is in place to fill the power vacuum and solve the
transitional needs. <br>
The people's high expectations, based on these prospects for change, must
take into account a number of significant challenges to their
aspirations. <br>
Over the past month, the SPDC has stepped up its intimidation efforts to
preempt an uprising. Troop deployment in ''hotspots'' around Rangoon and
Mandalay have become more visible. Arrests, restrictions on gatherings,
domestic guest registration requirements, and checkpoints have all
increased. The SPDC has even threatened civil service personnel with
imprisonment if they boycott their work. <br>
The logistical challenges in trying to organise mass resistance are
significant. With universities shut down, there are very few open places
for students, who historically have led the popular movements in Burma,
to gather. Also, because of Buddhist Lent and related precepts, monks are
not allowed to travel and move freely. Communication problems also
abound. <br>
Many activists have trouble communicating because of severe government
restrictions on travel, tight control on gatherings, and suspicions of
spies. Leaders such as Suu Kyi and the CRPP are forced to use an
information network that is so slow that sometimes it causes vagueness
and a lack of guidance in operational planning. <br>
The pro-democracy forces also expect major challenges from the military
if and when people do come out onto the streets. The use of violent force
is an obvious potential response, but the SPDC may be more subtle. The
government may create communal disturbances and counter-riots to divert
attention by enflaming religious and racial tensions. Civilian supporters
of the government may be used to intimidate and suppress anti-government
protests through ''civilian'' clashes. <br>
If the SPDC begins to feel it is being backed into a corner, it is likely
to offer a fake dialogue to appease the people. In such a situation,
cosmetic concessions are likely, even more so with the UN Deputy
Secretary-General Alvaro de Soto planning to visit Burma soon. With the
growing momentum of people power in Burma, the opposition will be on
guard against such ploys, and may even be able to turn them to their own
advantage. They should raise their expectations beyond a compromise of
power-sharing arrangements and demand a full transfer of power to the
winners of the 1990 elections. <br>
The outcome has not been predetermined, of course, and the future is
unpredictable. Martin Luther King Jr noted, though, that the arc of
history bends toward justice. The Burmese opposition needs to make
preparations conducive to a mass movement. Without the necessary
preparations, even numerology is of little use. But the current prospects
for social change in Burma indicate that there is a real atmosphere of
possibility for positive social change. If the people take to the
streets, 9-9-99 will mark the beginning of a wave of change that will
wash over Burma. Whether or not the people publicly express their desires
on the given date, the high expectations for 9-9-99 will likely spill
over into the next few months and increase the pressure on the SPDC to
finally transfer power to the people.<br>
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