Thai-Burma relationship

[tykemoung@xxxxxxxxxxx]

Overview

By Lulay

The recently sour relationship between Thai government and spdc is not a 
brand-new melancholy. It is just one of the replica of the past glitches 
during a decade.

Thai-slorc relatinship is ever stabalized yet. Even constructive-engagement 
policy contributed considerable level of disputes between two parties.

When Slorc launched an attacked on a KNU strong-hold on top of Hill 401 in 
1989, the clash mounted after the slorc troops overran the hill. Actually 
the hill was in Thai territory despite the KNU's base. The slorc troops led 
by a major ruined Thai troops positioning the other side of the hill. The 
slorc refused to return the hill to Thai although Thais requested.

The tension escalated after both sides brought in army divisions along the 
border. Relying on superior air power, Thais threathened to bomb the Slorc 
troops while the Slorc troops reiterated occupying the nearest city. 
Eventually Thai King's intervention ended the dead-lock by withdrawing their 
troops from both sides and marking Hill 401 demilitarized zone.

During the Mar-nal-palaw offensive in 1991-2, the slorc was upset by the 
Thai's support to the opposition groups. Slorc's attempt to attack the KNU's 
stronghold from Thai side was crashed by Thai troops regularly. Just in one 
incident, more than 20 slorc troops killed under a cross-fire between Thais 
and KNU after the slorc troops sneaked into Thailand to attack Three-Pagoda 
Pass in Feb. 1990. In many offensives, Slorc was furious at some wondering 
155 cal. howitzer shalls that landed on their troops crossing assult lines-- 
they knew the KNU did not have 155 cal.howitzers.

There was a quasi booming relationship between Thai and slorc around 1995-7. 
Thai appeased slorc during that period.

One of the ABSDF batallion, reportedly spotting a wrong point in the map, 
stationed in Thai's princess's froest 6 kilometers from actual border. Khin 
Nyunt asked his counterparts during his visit whether Thais take care of the 
camp otherwise they will. Thais did not want another Hill 401 in the 
princess's forest. After two weeks, Thai battalions marched to the camp and 
asked the ABSDF to withdraw to the border. While the ABSDF troops were 
moving, Thais videotaped the withdraw including their demolishing barracks. 
Thai officers asked the ABSDF not to attack them while they had to push them 
to the border.

Actually Thai-slorc policy can be judged upon the activities along the 
border. The more cooperation with the opposition means the attrition of 
amiableness between Thai and slorc.

Border trade including fishery is reciprocal since dollar-starving slorc 
needs to operate its belligerent machinery upon own people and to appease 
already-maldisplined units; Thai needs profit from the trade.

The recent handling of embassy incident projects Thai's unsatisfactory 
against spdc's response during Thai's foregin minister's visit to Burma. 
Spdc refused to raise the agenda on amphetamine crisis in Thailand by simply 
saying Was are busy building drug-free zone while statistic shows 25 percent 
of student body in Ching Mai district use amphetamine. The Thai National 
Security Council announced the crisis a natinal security problem. Even Thai 
generals who used to be friendly with their counterparts spoke out their 
evidence of spdc's involvement in drug traffickig. Apathetic spdc is now 
shakened by the Thai's response on the embassy crisis.

Spdc is actually more provoking than Thais. Khin Nyunt built Ba-Yint-Taung 
statue, a Burmese king who ruined Thailand, in Kawthaung, a border town 
close to Ranong. Sometime DKBA and spdc troops sneaked into Thailand to drop 
amphetamine pills. Later not only do pro-spdc and spdc troops smuggle drug 
but they also armbush Thai rangers by chance. Sometime Thais, with great 
tolarance stemmed from economic rationality, lie the attack as DKBA or Was, 
or keep it dark to avoid embarrassment. Spdc troops shot down a Thai's 
reconnoissance helicopter last year. Even the KNU reported Thai intelligence 
about their intercepted information and existance of spdc troops in the 
area, Thais tried to cover up the incident as a deed of trigger-happy spdc.

This time, scenario projects different attitude from Thai senior officers. 
Their sharp responses to spdc are not common in Thai's upper level policy. 
Spdc has been preaching their troops about Thai's possible invasion in 
border areas. Weekly meetings in spdc army units are dominated by this 
agenda. Pompus spdc always think Thai troops as chicken. They always boast 
how Maj. Ang Kyaw wip out a Thai platoon (the hill near the incident was 
later named Bo-muu<Maj> Ang Kyaw).

Spdc expects Thai's plea to end the tension while Thai government has been 
pushed not to bow the spdc. The consequences cannot be discounted.
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