53RD'UNGA(1998):REPORT OF SECRETARY

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UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
A/53/657

Distr.: General
10 November 1998
Original: English

Fifty-third session
Agenda item 110(c)
Human Rights question: Human rights situations and reports of special
rapporteurs and representatives

SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN MYANMAR
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 21 of General
Assembly resolution 52/137 of 12 December 1997, entitled `` situation of
human rights in Myanmar", in which the Assembly requested me to continue
my discussions with the Government of Myanmar in order to assist in the
implementation of that resolution, and to report to the Assembly at its
fifty-third session and to the Commission on Human Rights at its
fifty-fiorth session.

2. As I have indicated in previous reports, I consider the role
entrusted to me by the General Assembly, and reaffirmed by the
Commission on Human Rights , as being essentially one of good offices,
in contrast to the fact-finding mandate assigned by the Commission to
the Special Rapporteur.

3. Member States will be aware from my report to the Commission on Human
Rights at its fifty-forth session (E/CN>4/1998/163) of the visit to
Myanmar, as my Special Envoy, of Mr. Alvaro de Soto, Assistant
Secretary-General for Political Affairs, which took place from 20 to 23
January 1998. During his visit, he held talks with the Chairman of the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and Prime Minister of the
Union of Myanmar, Senior General Than Shwe; Secretary-1 of the SPDC,
Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, U
Ohn Gyaw. He also held discussions with the National League for
Democracy (NLD), including its General Secretary, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
and the National Unity Party (NUP).

4. In view of development in Myanmar in July 1998, I wrote to Senior
General Than Shwe on 7 August 1998 to convey to him my wish to send a
special emissary, Tan Sri Razali Ismail, who was President of the
General assembly at is fifty-first session, to discuss matters of mutual
concern at Yangon. In his reply of 9 August 1998, Senior General Than
Shwe considered that the time was not appropriate for the visit to take
place. Subsequently, in a meeting with Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw on
the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Summit Meeting at Durban on 4 September
1998, I recommended more constant dialogue between the SPDC and the NLD,
and I again proposed the visit of Tan Sri Razali. However, the Foreign
Minister indicated that such a visit was not urgent given the progress
being made to resolve the situation that had prompted my request in July
1998.

5. On 25 September 1998, Mr. de Soto met Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw at
United Nations Headquarters in New York. During this meeting, in
response to a proposal made in July, the Foreign Minister conveyed to
Mr. de Soto his Government's willingness to receive him at Yangon as my
Special Envoy. Accordingly, he visited Yangon from 27 to 30 October
1998. During his visit, Mr. de Soto held consultations with Secretary-1
of the SPDC, Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt; Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw;
and Brigadier-General David Abel, Minister in the Office of the Prime
Minister. He also held discussions with the NLD, including its General
Secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

II. DISCUSSION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF MYANMAR

6. In the course of his two visits to Yangon and at his meeting with the
Minister for Foreign Affairs in New York, my Special Envoy discussed
with his interlocutors a range of issues that have repeatedly been
raised by the General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission in their
annual resolutions, in particular progress towards the restoration of
democracy in the light of the results the 1990 elections; the opening of
a substantive dialogue with political parties, particularly the NLD and
its General Secretary, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and with representatives of
the national races; restrictions on the function of the NLD and other
political parties; and the situation of human rights and in this
connection the need for the Special Rapporteur to visit Myanmar.

7. During his meetings with government officials, my Special envoy
stressed my desire to assist in bridging the differences that separate
Myanmar from the international community and the consequent importance
of addressing the concerns raise din the General Assembly.In particular,
my Envoy encouraged the Government to open a genuine dialogue with the
NLD as the party that had won the majority of votes and the overwhelming
number of seats at the 1990 elections, and suggested that the dialogue
which according to the Government it was holding with the national races
would be intensified and made more transparent. My envoy also suggested
that since the Government was intent on promoting an inclusive approach
towards the armed insurgent groups, some of whom had been fighting the
central Government since independence, it should also adopt a similarly
inclusive approach in the case of the NLD. In conclusion, my Envoy urged
the Government to give visible signals that it was indeed moving towards
democracy and a multiparty system, its declared goal.

8 My Envoy pointed out that the Secretary-Geeneral's mandate, being one
of discreet good offices, did not include detailed reporting on the
factual situation regarding human rights in Myanmar since that
responsibility rested with the Special Rapporteur designated by the
Commission of Human Rights for that purpose. My Envoy's visits should
therefore not be considered a substitute for those of the Special
Rapporteur, who if allowed to enter Myanmar would be able to observe the
situation in the country at first hand and report on it without having
to rely largely on outside sources for his information and also taking
into account the Government's views.

9. Following my Special Envoy's visit in February 1998, I wrote to the
Chairman of the SPDC, requesting the government to consider taking
concrete steps of the kind suggested by Mr. de Soto, such as the renewal
of a dialogue with the NLD, the amendment of laws restricting political
rights and freedoms, the release of persons in detention or imprisoned
for politically related offences and the setting of a date for a visit
by the Special Rapporteur. In response, the Government, without
addressing my suggestions, informed me that it would continue to move
forward "in a systematic way towards [the] goal of a peaceful,
prosperous, modern and developed State with a multi-party democratic
system and a market-oriented economy".

10. On the question of opening a substantive dialogue with political
parties, in particular the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Government
maintained that the negative approach of the NLD, and Aung San Suu Kyi
in particular, towards the Government's actions made it difficult to
establish contacts with that political party. The Government, however,
drew attention to the meeting between Secretary-1 of the SPDC and U Aung
Shwe, Chairman of the NLD, which had taken place on 18 August 1998.,
which it considered fruitful and which it had expected to be the first
of a series of confidence-building talks between the Government and the
NLD. However, this had not materialized because of the NLD's call, on 21
August 1998., for the convening  of the national parliament, which the
Government considered highly confrontational and potentially
destiblilzing, especially with the subsequent establishment on 17
September 1998 at the initiative of the NLD of the "Committee
Representing the People's Parliament Elected by the 1990 Multiparty
Democratic General Elections". The Government reiterated that it was not
opposed to a dialogue with the NLD provided that there was a change in
attitude on the part of the NLd and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

11. With regard to the detention of several hundred members of
parliament and other NLD members, the Government explained that the
attempt to convene the parliament had forced it to take preventive
action, but that they were being released gradually nd would be released
inmmediately if the NLD renounced its call for the parliament to
assemble.

12. On the issue of the freedomof political parties, the Government
stated that the prevalence of peace and stability throughout the country
was a prerequisite for democratization, as was progress towards
development. It pointed out that the NLD, in cooperation with some
international actors, had tried to undermine the achievements of the
Government and had attempted to incite unrest among the population with
the objective of assuming power and that the government could not
tolerate such activities, which taken to the extreme might result in
bloodshed.

13. As for the curtailment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom of
movement, the government replied that her call for a boycott of
investment and tourism and her support of sanctions had rendered her
widely unpopular, and that the decision to restrict her movements had
stemmed out of concerns for her own safety.

14. On the situation of the national races, the government declared that
its priority was to achieve "national reconsolidation" by bringing all
the armed ethnic groups "into the legal fold". To date 17 armed groups
had done so, and the Constitution being drafted, which would give
important powers to the States, Divisions and self autonomous areas and
zones, would adequately reflect their views.

15. Regarding the visit of the Special Rapporteur, the Government
reiterated that he would be invited to visit at an opportune time.

16. The NLD, for its part, reported an overall deterioration of the
situation in the country, with continued and widespread harassment
against its members and supporters, including forced resignations from
the party, arbitrary arrests, torture, suppression of freedom of
expression and association,a dn servere and enforced restrictions on
movement, as well as on other normal political activities. Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi, although not required any longer to inform the authorities
about her movements, was prevented from leaving Yangon and meeting NLD
members in the provinces. In addition, the general population were being
denied the right to education and economic development, while forced
relocation and labour continued in Myanmar on a large scale,
particularly in the ethnic minority areas.

17. The NLD leadership considered that the meeting between Chairman and
Lieutenant-General Khin Nyiunt in August 1998 had not amounted to the
beginning oaf a dialogue, and that at any rate the composition of the
delegation that would represent the NLD at such talks should be a matter
to be decided by the Central Executive Committee and was not for the
SPDC to dictate.

18. Regarding the party's call in June 1998 for the convening of
parliament -- the NLD stated that it was its responsibility, eight years
after the failure of the People's Parliament (Pyithu Hluttaw) elected in
1990 to convene to implement the will of the people and that its aim was
neither confrontation nor an attempt to assume power but to accelerate
the opening of a meaning ful dialogue withthe Government. The "Committee
Representing the People's Parliament Elected by the 1990  Multiparty
Democratic General Elections" had been empowered by 251 members of
parliament, out of a total 459 elected members still alive, to act on
their behalf in view of their inability to meet due to their arrest,
imprisonment or restrictions on their freedom of movement.

III. OBSERVATIONS

19. I must register my disappointment at my inability to report a
genuine, substantive progress on the part of the Myanmar Government in
addressing the appeals to it in repeated General Assembly resolutions,
notwithstanding my efforts, I am concerned at the deterioration in the
situation and the tensions that have arisen. I believe such efforts
should be intensified in the coming months.
/*endreport*/
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