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TOTALFINA - ELF Part 1
Updated version of
TOTALFINA-ELF MERGER: STARTING OVER WITH A CLEAN SLATE
by Francis Christophe, published in Golias magazine, France, October 1999
Part I
BLACK TIDE AND DRUG-MONEY LAUNDERING: DIFFICULT TIMES FOR TOTAL-FINA-ELF,
THE NEW PETROLEUM GIANT
The sinking of the old tanker Erika with its 30,000 tons of heavy fuel-oil,
mid-December in the north Atlantic 90 kilometers off the French coast, is a
very heavy blow to the new petroleum giant which resulted from last autumn'
s merger of TotalFina with the other French petroleum company Elf.
The black tide from Erika' s cargo being moved from a Total refinery in
France to an Italian customer of TotalFina, shatters publicly the facade of
respectability behind which the petroleum company shelters its murky/shadowy
practices in the heart of Europe as well as in Burma.
In the eyes of public opinion TotalFina will bear for long the
responsibility of this ecological disaster, even if legally the ship -owner
has to bear the consequences. Denying evidence during all public
interventions Mr. Thierry Desmarest , president of the group, has always
stubbornly pretended that in all its operations, notably in Burma, Total
exclusively employed subcontractors who offered all guarantees in the fields
of respect for the environment and social rights of their employees. This
was false for its Burmese operations, where Total' s main subcontractor is
the Burmese army, unanimously condemned by international authorities for its
massive and continuous human rights violations as well as for its drug
trafficking. It is also false for Europe: How will Thierry Desmarest manage
to convince millions of French citizens who will struggle for months with
the black tide that the owner of a 25 year old Maltese tanker which split
into two, with an Indian crew on board, had offered all guarantees?
In June 1999 a collective of Belgian politicians and NGOs had called for the
boycott of TotalFina to protest against the behaviour of the French
petroleum company in Burma. The black tide on the French coast can only
amplify this movement, illustrating these words by Abraham Lincoln: " ..you
can't fool all the people all the time".
TOTALFINA-ELF MERGER: STARTING OVER WITH A CLEAN SLATE
The PEO launched by TotalFina on July 5 - and accepted by Elf on september
13, after negociations - has been cheered unanimously for resulting in the
creation of a French petroleum giant, while ignoring that 65 % of TotalFina'
s and 51 % of Elf' s capital had ceased being French by the end of July
1999.
This merger also constitutes a huge whitewash operation, a unique
opportunity to conceal in the background, if not wipe out altogether, acts
which, whether in Africa, in Asia, or in the Court of Justice in Paris, have
seriously damaged the reputation of all parties concerned: Both French
petroleum companies and their protector, the State.
Although this regrouping was seen as a mean for the French petroleum
industry to escape potential foreign predators, it can only make it more
desirable for anglo-saxon pension funds which had previously tilted the
majority of Total's capital in their favour (according to the New York Times
on August 29 1999). While acting in the name of national interest Thierry
Desmarest will remain the person who, with the support of the minister of
finance, made the entire French petroleum industry as one single block,
available to foreign investors. However, in order to reassure new
shareholders once and for all, a major facelift is necessary.
ELF = TOTAL + EVA JOLY
The need for a whitewash operation appears obvious for ELF, largely because
of the mediatic impact of investigations by judge Eva Joly which had
followed a complaint by the then incoming director Philippe Jaffre against
his predecessor Loïc Le Floc-Prigent, for abuse of social funds. This
spectacular process aimed at breaking with practices which had been common
before the privatisation of ELF but would not however bring them to an end.
This requested intrusion of the judicial process, followed closely behind by
the media, rapidly brought discredit upon the company, and opened a real
Pandora's box. During the instruction, lists of beneficiaries of undue gifts
were published; Several were imprisoned, including the former director;
Roland Dumas, former minister of foreign affairs, then President of the
Constitutional Council, came under investigation and finally accepted to
take leave from his high functions. On the other hand not a word filtered
through to the main media regarding the fundamental role played by ELF in
the civil war which has been bleeding and devastating Congo Brazzaville
where for the last three years ethnic cleansing has been practiced with a
zeal visibly doped and financed by petroleum.
However, though contrasting with such somber revelations about ELF, the
image of knight in shiny armour carefully cultivated by Total' s Thierry
Desmarest cannot make illusion: If one were to look for similar networks of
hidden financing practices by the Total group, one would indeed find
subsidiary/daughter companies which serve the same functions as critics
found with ELF. If a judiciary inquiry was ever conducted into Total ' s
actions in Burma, it would not fail to show that the leadership of the
French petroleum company is not sheltered from potential investigations on
complicity to ethnic cleansing, forced labour and drug-money laundering.
Those responsible within UNOCAL, Total's American minor associate in the
Yadana gas project, have been indicted by the Los Angeles Federal Court
following complaints by Burmese refugees native of the area where Total has
built the pipe-line with support from the French government and from
President Chirac personally.
THE BURMESE FIASCO : DRUG TRADE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Early July 1999 Bernard Amaudric Du Chaffaut, a former director of
international affairs for ELF, assumed his new functions as French
embassador in Burma. As if he already enjoyed diplomatic immunity in his
post of high responsibility within ELF the future ambassador slipped
comfortably through the judiciary net which had aimed to close on those
who, like his colleagues Andre Tarallo and Alfred Sirven, used to control,
with Loïc Le Floc-Prigent, the many paths of ELF's financial flux.
At the foreign affairs ministry, the Total-Elf merger was a done thing, even
before the PEO began..
A heavy task awaits the expert in petroleum diplomacy, the task of trying to
avoid further infection of Total' s Achilles' heel (according to financial
analysts) : its close collaboration with the Burmese narco-dictatorship.
Neither Bernard Pottier, his predecessor in Rangoon, nor Thierry Desmarest
have managed to curtail the flow of information about the many forms of
support by Total to the military dictatorship. To such an extent that Nobel
Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the democratic movement,
was quoted in a front-page article in Le Monde (1996 ) accusing the
petroleum company of being the "strongest support" of the illegitimate
rulers in Rangoon.
Total' s investment in Burma, the largest so far in this country which is
the world' s largest heroin supplier, remains below 1% of the company' s
turnover. Yet the defence of Total' s presence in Burma has been for the
last four years the focus of over half the director' s interventions in the
general assembly and fully mobilizes the company' s communication sector
without managing to prevent the launching in Belgium of a European boycott
of the company in protest against its collaboration with the Rangoon junta.
In defence of its operations in Burma Total states that it does not
contravene any French, European or international law; Now all laws
criminalize drugs traffic and laundering of income thus generated. When
facing accusations against the company' s Burmese partner MOGE (Myanmar Oil
and Gas Enterprise, a drug-money laundering tool for the Burmese army
leaders) its management simply replies "it is not our duty to determine
whether the Burmese state entreprise for exploitation of hydrocarbons is -
or is not - involved in drugs traffic and in money laundering". Neither
Total nor its American partner UNOCAL, nor MOGE, have ever sued media or
books which explicitely accused them of participating or being accomplices
to drug traffic and /or drug-money laundering.
Why is it that companies which are so concerned with their image have never
tried over three years to end by an appropriate judiciary process this very
defamatory campaign?
Mr Desmarest prefers to declare that he is "happy and proud of what we do in
Burma" and to boast, in the general assembly of shareholders, that Total
brings (injects?) legal resources into the Burmese economy which is visibly
short thereof... the essence of money laundering!
According to the French OGD (i.e geopolitical drugs observatory), and its
confidential newsletter, La Depeche Internationale des Drogues (the
International Drugs Despatch) of October 1994, the contract between Total
and its Burmese partner MOGE makes the French petroleum company an
instrument of drug-money laundering. The mechanism is simple: Cash payments
by Total to its Burmese associate are used to trigger a laundering process
for much greater amounts. This system permits justification of funds spent
by the SLORC (acronym adopted by the junta, for State Law and Order
restoration Council) later renamed SPDC (State Peace and Development
Council) for several purchases of weapons.
This is a simple, almost primitive, process named laundering by simple
piling. An operator owns amount X of dirty money which he must return to the
legal circuit. He simply must have in hand amount Y of lawful origin,
obviously smaller than X, to trigger the pump. SLORC, which did not
initially need a more sophisticated method, just practiced this simple
piling with a single source of lawful money: Payments by Total to MOGE (The
French petroleum company acknowledges a payment of 15 million dollars as
bonus fees). Every time the Rangoon regime needs to justify the origin of
sums paid to suppliers, the SLORC representative asserts that this money is
indeed from Total.
Never has any member of Total's management attempted to dispel this
accusation of complicity to drug-money laundering. When asked about the
"symmetry" between payments by Total and much larger amounts paid out by
SLORC to buy helicopters from Poland, then under the leadership of Lech
Walesa, another Nobel Peace Prize laureate, the spokesman only replied that,
having links only with the MOGE, Total can in no way be involved in the
arms trade.
The osmosis between MOGE, a state company, and SLORC's opaque financing
network is not taken into account. Asserting that Total deals only with MOGE
is, in the Burmese context, a denial of reality. Total' s behaviour and the
behaviour of its local representatives in Burma establish this clearly: In
this country, and for any kind of presence, there is only one interlocutor,
a single associate: SLORC. The Burmese military intelligence supplies Total
with interpretors and supervises all recruitment of local manpower; The
Burmese army is in charge of security at the work site, which in Burma is
understood in an extensive sense geographically and in every respect.
Total formally denied making use of forced labour, whether directly or
through its subcontractors; now its main subcontractor (in terms of number
of staff ) is the Burmese army, whose permanent and widespread use of forced
labour has already been documented, particularly in the area of the Yadana
pipeline, as has been its practice of ethnic cleansing. The widespread use
of unpaid forced labour caused the International Labour Organisation (ILO),
in an unprecedented move, to de facto exclude the junta from its proceedings
in 1998. On the other hand several testimonies coincide in describing the
monthly cash payments made by Total to the ten, or so, heads of batallions
stationed in the pipeline' s protected zone, the supply of vehicles and
fuel, and the use of Total' s helicopters for purely military purposes :
transport of men and supplies as well as observation.
All these evidences of compromise with a illegitimate regime hated by the
vast majority of the population and such financial collaboration with the
narco-junta tarnish Total's image, make it a target for law-suits as
accomplice in crimes against humanity and drug traffic...to no avail. The
gas was to flow to Thailand from July 1998 according to contract. In fact,
severely hit by the financial crisis, the Thai customer has not completed
the building of the Rachaburi power generating plant as of September 1999.
Yet this is the sole potential user of a Burmese gas whose quality and price
do not compete with Thailand's own supply, already in excess of its present
needs. The accounts published last summer of Total group' s Burmese
subsidiary show cumulative advance payments to the MOGE of over 800 million
French Francs. Could the regime have escaped bankruptcy without this -huge
in the Burmese context- injection of funds ? Through what network were these
funds moved ? Is it legitimate that the French taxpayer might have to pay
-through the COFACE = French Insurance company for external trade- for
strategic mistakes by the leadership of a private company with majority
foreign ownership ?
THE BURMESE HANDICAP
>From their first explorations into Burmese territorial waters, Total' s
management was fully aware of the problems the company would face in getting
involved in this country. It would have been hard to ignore the tactics used
by the SLORC to gain and maintain power: The massacre of tens of thousands
of unarmed civilians, the annulment of free parliamentary elections, the
continuing house-arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, and the unrelenting countrywide
harassment of elected members of the National league for Democracy as well
as students, monks and union members representing a civil society which had
believed in the promise of free elections.
Total' s management was also well aware of the new means of acquiring
income, which the military regime had resorted to, financially tight as it
was with the escalation of military spending, cessation of foreign aid and
general incompetence. Laying their hands on drug money, wiping out the last
remaining teak forests of continental Asia and widely using unpaid forced
labour, had not sufficed in balancing out their debts.
In 1991, when plans for the exploitation of the Martaban gulf gas fields
were drawn up, there was no longer any doubt. The main operator of the
Yadana gas field would have to evacuate production via a pipeline towards
Thailand, the only potential client in the region. (First victim of the
Asian financial crisis, Thailand is still, to this day, unable to receive
Burmese gas). Before reaching Thailand, the pipeline inevitably passes
through a significant land area which has not been controlled by Rangoon
since Burma' s independence.
Rapidly the French negotiators could see a rigid attitude in their Burmese
counterpart: No question for the SLORC to enter any dialogue with the Karen
rebels who had for the past 40 years controlled a long stretch of land next
to the Thai-Burma border.
Business relations with the Rangoon regime excludes any form of contact with
the opposition, be it the population at large and its wishes for an open
democracy, or armed "ethnic" groups involved in open warfare for several
decades in en effort to obtain a true federal system, as was written in the
first constitution of the country.
In order to make themselves fully understood SLORC's generals made it clear
to their business partners that any contact, official or not, direct or not,
between contractors and the political opposition would not be allowed. It
would be penalised by the cancellation of current contracts, without
compensation, and the indictment of the company' s representatives for
"intelligence with the enemy".
In the case of the Yadana gas field, the operator's room for manoeuvre was
significantly reduced: To throw oneself into this adventure has an
inevitable consequence: to side whole-heartedly with the regime, and its
illegitimate hold on power, despite the resounding victory of democrats in
the 1990 elections. It also meant counting on a military victory of the
SLORC against the Karens.
In this fifty year old conflict, siding with the Rangoon government did not
necessarily mean supporting a fast end to the fighting. The contracts for
the supply of gas could well be at risk from fighting in a terrain
favourable to guerilla forces.
When Total decided to offer its services for the exploitation of the Yadana
gas field, its management knows that it can trust the Karen threat will have
been eliminated before the pipeline works begin. This trust cannot rest only
on the declared plans of the Burmese military, whose past and present
battles against the Karens have not reached the announced results. SLORC's
secretary one, general Khin Nyunt, head of military intelligence, had
announced the fall of Manerplaw, the Karen headquarters, in summer 1992,
while this happened only, after betrayal by some Karen units, in 1995...
In its preparations for its Burmese project Total has indeed been supported
by the French "special" services which, directly or through private
"security" companies and consultants have assessed the situation according
to their particular criteria. Without hesitation they lent a hand to the
Burmese army in order to achieve their aim: To eliminate any threat in the
pipeline area, a stretch of land striding the pipeline over a width of tens
of kilometers either side.
End of Part I
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