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BurmaNet News: February 4, 2000
- Subject: BurmaNet News: February 4, 2000
- From: strider@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2000 05:31:00
=========== The BurmaNet News ===========
February 4, 2000
Issue # 1454
=========================================
Noted in passing:
1. "Burma, which has a serious drought, dropped to second place [among
world heroin producers], but will likely rebound quickly when the
weather improves."
George Tenet, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (See CIA: PREPARED TESTIMONY
OF GEORGE J. TENET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE)
2. "Saturday--Sunny; Sunday--Sunny; Monday--Sunny;
Tuesday--Partly cloudy."
Current weather forecast for the Shan State (See
http://weather.yahoo.com/forecast/Kengtung_BM_c.html)
=========
Headlines
=========
Inside Burma--
CRPP: ON RATCHABURI INCIDENT--"TERRORISM ONLY BREEDS TERRORISM"
CRPP: ON RATCHABURI HOSPITAL GUNMEN--"KILLING THEM COLD-BLOODEDLY
REFLECTS BRUTALITY AND EXTREME LACK OF COMPASSION"
BBC: EAST TIMOR INVITES BURMESE DISSIDENTS
SHAN: SA SOUTH CONFIRMS OF WANTING TO NEGOTIATE
ASIAWEEK: MYANMAR: WHAT A BASH!
===
International--
XINHUA: POLITICAL FEATURE: THAI POLICY TOWARD MYANMAR REFUGEES
BACKFIRES
GREENWIRE: THAILAND: FOREST CHIEF UNDETERRED BY DEATH THREATS
BURMA DEMOCRATIC ACTION GROUP (Australia): FIFTH AUSTRALIAN CITY ADOPTS
SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAW
ASAHI SHIMBUN: SOME OVERSTAYERS GET CASE-BY-CASE VISA APPROVAL
JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE: 6 MYANMAR SOLDIERS DETAINED IN THAILAND
DAILY STAR (Bangladesh):11 MYANMAR CITIZENS HELD IN CTG [Chittagong] FOR
SMUGGLING CATTLE
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY: CHINA'S EXPORTS TO MYANMAR, JAN.-NOV. 1999
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY: CHINA'S IMPORTS FROM MYANMAR, JAN.-NOV. 1999
THE DAILY STAR (Bangladesh) AMBASSADOR TELLS CTG CHAMBER
PROPER PLANNING NEEDED FOR BOOSTING BORDER TRADE WITH MYANMAR
===
Addendum--
CIA: PREPARED TESTIMONY OF GEORGE J. TENET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
=========================================
To contact The BurmaNet News--
Email: strider@xxxxxxx
Voice mail: +1 (435) 304-9274
Fax: +1 (810)454-4740
=========================================
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
INSIDE BURMA
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
CRPP: ON RATCHABURI INCIDENT--"TERRORISM ONLY BREEDS TERRORISM"
Representatives of the People elected to the Parliament in the 1990
multiparty democratic elections
(Committee Representing People' Parliament)
Notification 3(1/00)
1.It has been reported that the armed group known as God's Army seized a
hospital in the province of Ratchaburi in Thailand.
2. It has also been reported that after such seizure the gunmen made
certain demands.
3. This seizure of a hospital where unarmed helpless and disabled
people are suffering from illnesses and diseases and where doctors,
nurses and staff are attending to them is totally unacceptable. The
holding of these people as hostages to obtain one's own demands and
desires is also totally unacceptable. This kind of terrorism is
unconditionally and vehemently denounced by the CRPP.
4. We appreciate the deep and difficult problems that such activities
have created for the countries in the region. We are saddened and regret
that it has ended in confusion and bloodshed but take comfort in the
fact that no patients or medical staff was hurt in the process.
5. This is a predicament that can have repercussions on regional peace
and security. Acting in this way because of the situation in one's
country can effect the dignity and prestige of the country.
6. Therefore it is essential that the present rulers of the country,
the SPDC seriously examine the underlying causes that have produced such
undesirable activities.
7. This is the second terrorist activity. The first was the seizure of
the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok. Special attention should be taken to
prevent the occurrence of such ugly incidents.
8. Here we quote a passage from the preamble of the UN Declaration of
Human Rights, which should be strictly adhered to. "disregard and
contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts .........it is
essential if human beings are not to be compelled to have recourse, as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression,
that human rights be protected by law. It is essential to promote the
development of friendly relations between nations".
9. The implementation of the sentiments mentioned above relating to
human rights, and the solution of problems relating to politics,
economy, society, education, health etc are the entire responsibility of
those who have seized state power.
10. The entire country and the nationalities are fully aware that the
responsibility lies entirely with the SPDC which is the ruling authority
having seized state power unto themselves.
11. The absence of peace and stability in the country can cause
instability in the entire region. This is a fact that must be
constantly remembered.
12. There is only one way to solve all the internal problems between
the ethnic races and the current political, social, economic and other
problems and that is by political process. This is true all over the
world. Remember always that TERRORISM ONLY BREEDS TERRORISM.
Committee Representing Parliament
26 January, 2000
(Distributed by National League for Democracy)
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
CRPP: ON RATCHABURI HOSPITAL GUNMEN--"KILLING THEM COLD-BLOODEDLY
REFLECTS BRUTALITY AND EXTREME LACK OF COMPASSION"
Representatives of the People elected to the Parliament in the 1990
multiparty democratic elections
(Committee Representing People's Parliament)
Notification 4(1/00)
(Addendum to CRPP 3(1/00) dated 26 January,2000)
1. The terrorist activity of the armed group known as God's Army is
totally unacceptable.
2. If the reports emanating about the action of the Thai commandos in
the handling of the situation are correct, we find it ugly.
3. Reports are that after the gunmen had surrendered, the commandos
arrested, sat them down, and executed them one by one.
4. It is reported that an eyewitness who was held hostage in the
hospital gave this account.
5. Reporters and others who were in the neighborhood of the incident
have related that there was no exchange of gun fire. The shots that were
fired were close-range and sounded like executions. Other news is that
the faces
of the corpses were not seen and that the bleeding was from the heads.
The fact that no hostages or patients in the hospital were injured
appears to give credence to this news.
6. If this information is true, it appears that the Thai commandos
exercised excessive force and handled the situation inappropriately.
Where no resistance is offered and the enemy surrenders, killing them
cold-bloodedly reflects brutality and extreme lack of compassion.
7. The Geneva Convention prohibits the execution of an enemy who
surrenders. The provisions of law should be adhered to. No matter how
heavy the penalty may be, penalty imposed by law only must be meted out.
8. That this action was taken to prevent future similar activity is no
justification for executions.
9. To meet force with force (evil for evil) is not the right way to
solve problems. There are many precedents. In the Central West, the
Kosovo problem is still unsolved. This should be a lesson for us.
10. We commended the solving of the Bangkok embassy siege by peaceful
negotiation and without bloodshed.
11. If the reports regarding the commandos handling of the hospital
siege are true, the CRPP condemns them.
12. We urge the authorities to look for the root causes of the seizure
of the hospital.
Committee Representing Parliament
27 January, 2000
(Distributed by National League for Democracy)
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
SHAN: SA SOUTH CONFIRMS OF WANTING TO NEGOTIATE
Shan Herald Agency for News
Shan - EU News
February 4, 2000
SSA South confirms of wanting to negotiate
Ceasefire deal will be different from other CFGs
Based on the report from Kham Serng (SSA News - 3 February 2000) amd
SHAN report of 29 January 2000
As a follow-up of the SSA's 25 January Statement, Colonel Yawd Serk,
commander of the SSA South said:
"First we need cease-fire to do the negotiation and the conditions will
not be the same as in the SSA-North and SSNA. If the SPDC uses force to
threaten us, we will fight to the end or complete victory."
Yawd Serk accused the ceasefire groups of only trying to safe their own
skins and that nothing have been done to uplift the well-fare of the
troops and civilian population. They instead even exploited them of
their human resources, milking the Shan people completely dried.
He compared the ceasefire groups to the fishes in a pond where SPDC
could slaughter them at will.
Yawd Serk's overture of wanting to end the resistance war came, after
the defection of his 72 soldiers to the SPDC on 20 January. Heavy
clashes involving the Shan ceasefire and anti-insurgency groups,
together with the SPDC troops in the north had made Yawd serk wary of
the struggle. He reasoned that it would only be counter-productive for
the Shans to slaughter each others for the benefit of the oppressed SPDC
regime. On top of that, the Thai army's burning of the Shan refugee camp
on 23 January in Pang Mapha District of Maehongson, which was under the
protection of SSA, seems to be the final blow, leading to the
controversial statement.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
ASIAWEEK: MYANMAR: WHAT A BASH!
February 4, 2000
FRONTLINES; Intelligence; Pg. 11
They're still talking about New Year's Eve in Yangon. The city's
biggest end-of-the-millennium party was scheduled for the swank Sedona
hotel, where Yangon's expat community had gathered. Unfortunately a sous
chef, apparently peeved at not being allowed to join the festivities,
launched a skirmish in which a hotel manager was reportedly stabbed. The
fracas spread to pool-side, where police were summoned.
They, according to a guest, stood back until a party-goer finally
subdued the irate kitchen hand. Big deal. Here's what was happening
downstairs at Sedona's basement disco, Paddy O'Malley's: Some foreign
revelers, mistaking a minister's daughter for one of the bar's more
regular female habitues, precipitated a melee by making an immoral
proposition to her. By Jan. 12 Paddy's was closed, ostensibly for
renovations. Talk is that a more sedate version will open in four
months. Sedona's management has declined to comment on the incidents.
Meanwhile, if you're in Yangon, the action continues at the Equatorial
Hotel's London Pub and the Asia Plaza Hotel's Asia Entertainment City,
as well as at long-standing spots in Chinatown.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
INTERNATIONAL
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
BBC: EAST TIMOR INVITES BURMESE DISSIDENTS
Thursday, 3 February, 2000, 12:26 GMT
The East Timorese independence leader, Xanana Gusmao, has invited the
Burmese government-in-exile to open an office in the East Timor capital,
Dili, after the territory becomes
fully independent.
Speaking to the BBC from Thailand, Mr Gusmao said that East Timor and
Burma shared an interest in achieving democracy.
He's travelling in the region seeking help for rehabilitating the
United Nations-controlled territory which
voted last year for independence from Indonesia.
The Washington-based Prime Minister-in-exile, Sein Win, says he and his
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma will accept the
offer of a Dili office.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
XINHUA: POLITICAL FEATURE: THAI POLICY TOWARD MYANMAR REFUGEES
BACKFIRES
February 3, 2000, Thursday
Xu Haijing
BANGKOK, February 3 (Xinhua) -- Thailand's first Armed Forces Day in
the new millennium on January 25 was greeted by a hostage crisis in the
western province of Ratchaburi where 10 Myanmar ethnic Karen gunmen
stormed a hospital and took some 500 people hostage a day earlier. After
a 22-hour standoff, the drama was brought to an abrupt end as elite Thai
commandos stormed into the hospital, killing the 10 gunmen and rescuing
all the hostages, before dawn broke for the special day for Thai
servicemen. Applause and cheers were presented to the commandos and the
Thai government. An opinion poll showed that more than 70 percent of
Thai people backed the government's decisive action to bring an end to
the crisis. The latest hostage drama ended, but the discussions about
the siege are far from over. In the past week, newspapers and television
programs put weight on the coverage of the aftermath of the hostage
crisis. A little retrospect brought back Thai people's recent memory of
a similar incident last October when five heavily armed Myanmar students
seized their country's embassy in Bangkok, taking 38 people hostage and
trapping dozens of others inside the embassy compound. Then, the
hostages were freed unharmed, but only after the students were given
safe passage to the Thai-Myanmar border by the Thai government. The
"success" of the five students apparently inspired the Karen gunmen to
storm the hospital in the first place.
In fact, two of the 10 gunmen killed by Thai commandos during the action
were students who launched the embassy siege. The students, calling
themselves "Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors," were given shelter after
fleeing to the Myanmar side of the border by God's Army, a 100-strong
Karen fringe group, to which the hospital hostage takers belonged. The
two hostage crises in Thailand in less than four months appeared to show
that Thailand's lenient policy toward Myanmar students and ethnic
minorities has backfired, which is threatening the country's national
security, analysts said. Myanmar students and ethnic minorities living
along the Thai- Myanmar border have been two major obstacles to the
further development of bilateral relations between the two neighbors.
Thailand has long been providing shelter for Myanmar students,
numbering at about 3,000. The Thai government and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees established refugee camps for the
students, among them the largest is called Maneeloy Holding Center in
Ratchaburi province, bordering Myanmar. However, the camps and holding
centers are not very well managed and the control of the students is so
lax that they could leave freely and travel to Bangkok and other
provinces to launch demonstrations against the Myanmar government.
The five "Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors" were from the Maneeloy
Holding Center, which shelters about 1,500 Myanmar students. Myanmar's
ethnic minorities, especially the Karens, are another headache for the
Thai government. The Karens have been fighting the Myanmar government
for more than 50 years.
Whenever there is a fighting between the government troops and the Karen
fighters, there will be a large number of Karen refugees fleeing to the
Thai side of the border, causing a series of problems to Thailand and
resulting in souring Thai- Myanmar relations, observers said. In recent
weeks, Myanmar government troops began a dry-season campaign against the
Karen armed guerrillas, causing heavy casualties to the Karens,
including the God's Army. The Thai army also shelled the military base
of God's Army and tightened border control to prevent the fighting from
spilling over to Thai soil. The cornered God's Army fighters therefore
chose the radical way to raise the world's attention to their
conditions. According to a famous Thai columnist, the hospital crisis in
Ratchaburi is a "disaster that was waiting to happen." Suthichai Yoon
said in The Nation newspaper that the real cause of the crisis is "the
culmination of the long history of the Thai government's murky policy
toward the armed minorities along the border."
During the Cold War era, the Thai government had been supporting the
armed minorities so that a cushion area could be formed between Thailand
and its neighbor. Even now, the Thai government's policy over the armed
minorities remains ambivalent despite the end of the Cold War and
Myanmar's entry into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (
ASEAN), he said. The Thai-Myanmar relations have experienced ups and
downs in the past months. After the embassy siege, bilateral relations
plummeted to rock bottom as the Myanmar government, angered by the
Thailand's release of the students, closed its border with Thailand for
two months and shut out Thai fishing boats from its waters. The fence
was gradually mended especially after Thai Foreign Minister Surin
Pitsuwan's visit to Yangon last year. The lethal action against the
gunmen in the Ratchaburi hospital is another catalyst for the warming
Thai-Myanmar relations. Soon after the crisis ended, the Myanmar
government issued a press release, saying it "commends the Thai
government for its decisive way in handling and protecting its citizens
from the perils of terrorism and making it a glaring example that under
no pretext of guise can terrorism be accepted."
The latest hostage crisis also raised another concern over Thailand's
national security. Thai people are worried that the God's Army would
take revenge on the killing of their gunmen by launching more terrorist
attacks in Thailand. After the hospital crisis, Ratchaburi province has
received several anonymous phone calls threatening bomb attacks. A group
of Thai soldiers patrolling the border in the same province were
attacked by unknown gunmen and several were seriously injured after
stepping on landmines. As for the government, analysts said, the most
urgent task is to tighten the control of the 2,400-kilometer-long border
with Myanmar and to make sure the United Nations officials and heads of
state and government attending the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), to be held in Bangkok on February 12 to 19, are
safe and sound. After the two hostage crises, the Thai government can
not afford another embarrassment especially during the UNCTAD meeting,
which Thailand has vowed to make a showcase of its achievements,
analysts said.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
BURMA DEMOCRATIC ACTION GROUP (Australia): FIFTH AUSTRALIAN CITY ADOPTS
SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAW
MEDIA RELEASE
4th February, 2000
On the 10th January 2000 the City of Grater Dandenong adopted a policy
to support the democratic movement in Burma, currently a military
dictatorship.
The Selective Purchasing Policy (SPP) stated that council would "avoid
contractual arrangements?with any company or person that is providing or
willing to provide goods or personal services to:
(i) the military regime in Burma
(ii) any business or corporation organized under the
authority of the military regime in Burma."
The spokesperson for the Burma Democratic Action Group (BDAG) said, "we
have been lobbying council for the past year and half to adopt the
Selective Purchasing Policy. We are overjoyed that they have made the
commitment to support the fight for democracy within Burma."
The BDAG is a coalition of local community groups comprising the
National League for Democracy (Liberated Area) Australia, Urban
Neighbours of Hope (UNOH) and the Indo-China Refugee Assoc. (Vic.), with
the cooperation of the Burmese Community.
Commenting on the tragic situation in Burma, Mr. Soe Moe said, "Burma
systematically uses forced labour to build its entire infrastructure for
commerce. Doing business with Burma means trading with state-owned
and/or controlled companies ? and controlled by a government that
ignores and abuses all human rights of its citizens.
Burma is the world's largest exporter of heroin. The heroin trade
provides the military government with a large percentage of its income.
Australia receives a massive 70 per cent of its illegal heroin from
Burma creating significant social and health problems.
In 1998 the military government spent 55 percent of its annual budget on
military spending, 2.2 per cent on education and only 0.8% on health
(Human Rights Yearbook 1997-98: Burma).
"For this reason all trade must cease with the Burmese military
self-appointed government for democracy to be installed" Mr Soe Moe
said.
Mr Soe Moe said, "To date five Australian cities have adopted the
selective purchasing policy against Burma. The City of Greater Dandenong
becomes the 2nd City in Victoria following Moreland City Council in
1998. The City of Greater Dandenong joins a growing international
movement in support of the struggle for democracy in Burma."
Mr Soe Moe said, "The Burma Democratic Action Group will be approaching
other Victorian City Councils and the Sate and Federal Governments to
adopt similar policies."
For further information please contact Mr Kyaw (Joe) Soe Moe on 9546
1115 or Urban Neighbours of Hope on 9547 1129 or Indo-China Refugee
Assoc. (Vic) 9543-8352.
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE: 6 MYANMAR SOLDIERS DETAINED IN THAILAND
February 3, 2000, Thursday
BANGKOK, Feb. 3 Kyodo
The Thai military on Thursday apprehended six Myanmar soldiers who had
crossed the border into Thailand, a local military officer at the border
province of Mae Hong Son said.
The soldiers, carrying two rifles and 80 rounds of ammunition, were
quoted as saying they were looking for food when they entered Thai
territory by accident.
They were apprehended about 1 kilometer from the border, said Lt. Col.
Chalaem Chaiyasit, chief of Thai-Myanmar coordination office in the
province, about 900 kilometers north of Bangkok.
The soldiers reportedly belong to the 530th Battalion of the Myanmar
army, based near the Thai Ban Nampeangdin pass.
They were detained in a Thai military camp for questioning.
'It is not clear why they are in Thailand. The coordination office
earlier agreed with Myanmar authorities in border areas that Myanmar
personnel could enter Thailand with advance notice,' he said.
During questioning, the group told Thai officials that their mission was
to seek food near the border and that they accidentally crossed into
Thailand, according to Lt. Col. Chalaem.
Thailand has tightened its border controls since a group of 10 ethnic
Myanmar rebels stormed a hospital in the western province of Ratchaburi.
The Thai authorities killed all 10 guerrillas believed to be members of
God's Army, a Karen minority guerrilla group fighting the Yangon junta,
freeing nearly 1,000 hostages.
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GREENWIRE: THAILAND: FOREST CHIEF UNDETERRED BY DEATH THREATS
February 03, 2000
Forestry Department chief Plodprasop Suraswadi says he will not let
threats against his life prevent him from carrying out his duties.
Timber traders have reportedly hired gunmen to kill Plodprasop because
of his tight restrictions on log imports from Burma. An assassination
attempt was reportedly planned should Plodprasop visit Burma to inspect
logs. But Plodprasop said the reported threats would not cause him to
relax the import conditions or stop protecting the forests. Plodprasop:
"I've lived 55 years, and if I cease to exist at this point, it is all
right." Security around Plodprasop has been tightened, with 12 officers
from the Armed Forces Security Center assigned to protect him. Special
training will also be given to forestry officials (Tunyasiri/Noikorn,
Bangkok Post, Feb. 3). -- MB
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DAILY STAR (Bangladesh):11 MYANMAR CITIZENS HELD IN CTG [Chittagong] FOR
SMUGGLING CATTLE
COX'S BAZAR, Feb 2: BDR jawans Tuesday seized 73 cattleheads being
smuggled into the country through the Naaf river in Teknaf thana and
arrested 11 Myanmar nationals in this connection, reports UNB.
Sources said that a BDR squad halted two trawlers in the river and
arrested 11 Myanmar nationals along with the cattleheads worth about Tk
5 lakh.
The arrested were identified as Hethami, 31, Muchiaoung, 32, Kawho, 25,
Toaithoa, 26, Thela, 28, Aoungoe, 29, Momiza, 35, Aoungo, 35, Moasi, 29,
Chotenoe, 28 and Koepejoe, 40.
A case was filed in this regard.
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ASAHI SHIMBUN: SOME OVERSTAYERS GET CASE-BY-CASE VISA APPROVAL
Among 21 visa violators seeking to
stay in Japan, an Iranian family is accepted and a
Myanmar family is not.
February 3, 2000
Justice Minister Hideo Shirai approved a residency
extension on Wednesday for a family of three from Iran
who overstayed their visas. But a family from Myanmar
seeking similar status was rejected.
The Iranian petition was approved apparently to allow the
family's teenaged son to continue attending school here.
They were among 21 foreigners who have appealed to the
Tokyo Immigration Bureau to stay in Japan, although they
have overstayed their original visas. The others are
expected to receive notice soon, and at least nine are
expected to be allowed to stay in Japan.
The Iranian family lives in Matsudo, Chiba Prefecture. The
39-year-old father works at a bookbinding company. He
has a 37-year-old wife and a 15-year-old son who is a
first-year student at a prefectural high school.
The Myanmarese family whose petition was rejected lives
in Tokyo's Koto Ward. The father, 43, also works at a
bookbinding plant. He and his 34-year-old wife have a
two-year-old daughter in nursery school.
The father was detained Wednesday just after the ruling.
The mother and daughter were allowed to return home to
pack for their deportation to Myanmar. They intend to
appeal the ministry ruling.
In both cases, the families have been in Japan for nearly
10 years and have filed proper tax returns. While the
Justice Ministry has not detailed its rulings, it is believed that the
children were the decisive factor. The daughter of the family from
Myanmar is regarded as young enough to adjust to living there, while
the boy from Iran is not.
Katsuji Yamada, head of the Immigration Bureau's
Adjudication Division, which considers visa status
appeals, said several factors are weighed, including the
reason for the application, family circumstances and the
effect that their stay may have on illegal immigrants.
``There are also issues of privacy,'' Yamada said. ``We
cannot comment on how we reach a decision,'' Yamada
said.
As of July, 268,000 were living in Japan illegally, of whom 11,000 were
minors.
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XINHUA NEWS AGENCY: CHINA'S EXPORTS TO MYANMAR, JAN.-NOV. 1999
February 3, 2000, Thursday
BEIJING
Following is a table showing the composition of China's exports to
Myanmar in November and January-November of 1999, classified according
to the Commodity Catalog of Customs Statistics of the Peoples Republic
of China on the basis of HS (Source: General Administration of Customs)
(unit: 1,000 U.S. dollars) Category Nov. Jan.-Nov. 99 Total value
31,743356,108 Live animals and animal 1492,995 products Plant
products 1,9779,396 Animal and vegetable oil -8 and fats Food,
beverages, wine, 9729,271 vinegar, tobacco and products Minerals
1,35916,778 Chemicals and related 4,37637,666 products Plastics,
rubber and 7807,995 their products Leather, fur and their -1,059
products; bags and cases Wood and wood products 1098 Fiber pulp; paper
and 3904,798 paper products Textiles and their raw 8,56587,520
materials Shoes, caps, umbrellas; 2224,800 down products; artificial
flowers; hair products Stone products; ceramics; 7405,690 glass and
products -- Jewelry, ornaments, coins Cheap metals and products
2,32930,861 Machinery, equipment, 7,53782,761 audio and video
products, and parts Vehicles, aviation 1,07339,339 products, and ships
Optical and medical 5915,986 apparatus; timepieces; music organs
Weapon, ammunition and -1,400 parts Miscellaneous goods 6747,684
Arts, crafts and antiques -4 Special and unclassified -- products
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY: CHINA'S IMPORTS FROM MYANMAR, JAN.-NOV. 1999
February 3, 2000, Thursday
BEIJING
Following is a table showing the composition of China's import from
Myanmar in November and January-November of 1999, classified according
to the Commodity Catalog of Customs Statistics of the Peoples Republic
of China on the basis of HS (Source: General Administration of Customs)
(unit: 1,000 U.S. dollars)
Category Nov. Jan.-Nov. 99 Total value 8,538 86,811 Live animals
and animal 27 642
products
Plant products 219 5,197
Animal and vegetable oil - - and fats Food, beverages, wine,
23 495
vinegar, tobacco and products Minerals 683 12,874
Chemicals and related - 141
products Plastics, rubber and their - 143 products Leather, fur
and their - 1
products; bags and cases Wood and wood products 4,797 41,663 Fiber
pulp; paper and - 0 paper products Textiles and their raw
- 10 materials Shoes, caps, umbrellas; - 172 down products;
artificial flowers; hair products Stone products; ceramics; -
7 glass and products Jewelry, ornaments, coins 2,537 22,815 Cheap
metals and products 0 36 Machinery, equipment, 251 2,614
audio and video products, and parts Vehicles, aviation - -
products, and ships Optical and medical - - apparatus;
timepieces; music organs Weapon, ammunition and - 1 parts
Miscellaneous goods - 1
Arts, crafts and antiques - -
Special and unclassified - - products
*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*
THE DAILY STAR (Bangladesh) AMBASSADOR TELLS CTG CHAMBER
PROPER PLANNING NEEDED FOR BOOSTING BORDER TRADE WITH MYANMAR
CHITTAGONG, Jan 24: Newly-appointed Bangladesh Ambassador to Myanmar
Ahmad Rahim said here yesterday that there was a very good prospect for
expanding Bangladesh-Myanmar border trade, reports BSS.
"Myanmar may import increasing quantities of jute goods, rods, malamine
products, pharmaceuticals etc from Bangladesh while Bangladesh can
explore all possibilities in this connection," he said.
Ambassador Rahim said this during the meeting with leaders of Chittagong
chamber here. He said Myanmar has a vast natural resource base and there
is an ample scope for expanding trade between the two neighbours for
which proper approach and planning are needed.
Senior Vice President of the Chamber Saifuzzaman Chowdhury and member
Syed Mahmudul Haq called upon Ambassador Ahmed Rahim to utilise his
diplomatic opportunities for Bangladesh-Myanmar cooperation in promoting
trade and setting up joint venture industries.
In this connection they called for expediting implementation of the
agreement for setting up of 5000-ton clinker factory in Myanmar. They
also suggested development of the road from Mangdo (Myanmar) to Link
Road (Cox's Bazar) for the convenience of border trades between the two
countries.
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ADDENDUM
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CIA: PREPARED TESTIMONY OF GEORGE J. TENET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT - THE WORLDWIDE THREAT IN 2000: GLOBAL REALITIES OF OUR NATIONAL
SECURITY
February 3, 2000, Thursday
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, as we face a new century, we face a new world. A world
where technology, especially information technology, develops and
spreads at lightning speed--and becomes obsolete just as fast. A world
of increasing economic integration, where a US company designs a product
in Des Moines, makes it in Mumhai, and sells it in Sydney. A world where
nationstates remain the most important and powerful players, but where
multinational corporations, nongovernment organizations, and even
individuals can have a dramatic impact.
This new world harbors the residual effects of the Cold War--which had
frozen many traditional ethnic hatreds and conflicts within the global
competition between two superpowers. Over the past 10 years they began
to thaw in Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, and we continue to see
the results today.
It is against this backdrop that I want to describe the realities of our
national security environment in the first year of the 21st century:
where technology has enabled, driven, or magnified the threat to us;
where age-old resentments threaten to spill-over into open violence; and
where a growing perception of our so-called "hegemony" has become a
lightning rod for the disaffected. Moreover, this environment of rapid
change makes us even more vulnerable to sudden surprise.
TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
Mr. Chairman, bearing these themes in mind, I would like to start with a
survey of those issues that cross national borders. Let me begin with
the proliferation weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Chairman, on proliferation, the picture that I drew last year has
become even more stark and worrisome. Transfers of enabling technologies
to countries of proliferation concern have not abated. Many states in
the next ten years will find it easier to obtain weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them. Let me underline three
aspects of this important problem:
- First, the missile threat to the United States from states other than
Russia or China is steadily emerging. The threat to US interests and
forces overseas is here and now.
- Second, the development of missiles and weapons of mass destruction in
South Asia has led to more-advanced systems, and both sides have begun
to establish the doctrine and tactics to use these weapons.
- Third, some countries that we have earlier considered exclusively as
weapons technology importers may step up their roles as "secondary
suppliers," compounding the proliferation problem even further.
Let's look at the first issue, the growing threat to the United States.
We're all familiar with Russian and Chinese capabilities to strike at
military and civilian targets throughout the United States. To a large
degree, we expect our mutual deterrent and diplomacy to help protect us
from this, as they have for much of the last century.
Over the next 15 years, however, our dries will face ballistic missile
threats from a wider variety of actors--North Korea, probably Iran, and
possibly Iraq. In some cases, this is because of indigenous
technological development, and in other cases, because of direct foreign
assistance. And while the missile arsenals of these countries will be
fewer in number, constrained to smaller payloads, and less reliable than
those of the Russians and Chinese, they will still pose a lethal and
less predictable threat.
- North Korea already has tested a space launch vehicle, the Taepo
Dong-1, which it could theoretically convert into art ICBM capable of
delivering a. small biological or chemical weapon to the United States
although with significant inaccuracies. Moreover, North Korea has the
ability to test its Taepo Dong-2 this year; this missile may be capable
of delivering a nuclear payload to the United States.
- Most analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean pattern,
could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to the United
States in the next few years.
- Given that Iraqi missile development efforts are continuing, we think
that it too could develop an ICBM---especially with foreign assistance
sometime in the next decade.
These countries calculate that possession of ICBMs would enable them to
complicate and increase the cost of US planning and intervention,
enhance deterrence, build prestige, and improve their abilities to
engage in coercive diplomacy.
- As alarming as the long-range missile threat is, it should not
overshadow the immediacy and seriousness of the threat that US forces,
interests, and allies already face overseas from short- and medium-
range missiles. The proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs)---driven primarily by North Korean No DonS sales--is
significantly altering strategic balances in the Middle East and Asia.
Mr. Chairman, nowhere has the regional threat been more dramatically
played out than in South Asia. Both Pakistan and India have intensified
their missile and nuclear rivalry. Further nuclear testing is possible
and both states have begun to develop nuclear-use doctrines and
contingency planning. This is a clear sign of maturing WMD programs. I
will discuss South Asia's broader problems later in my briefing.
Mr. Chairman, another sign that WMD programs are maturing is the
emergence of secondary suppliers of weapons technology.
- While Russia, China, and North Korea continue to be the main suppliers
of ballistic missiles and related technology, long-standing
recipients--such as Iran--might become suppliers in their own right as
they develop domestic production capabilities. Other countries that
today import missile-related technology, suck as Syria and Iraq, also
may emerge in the next few years as suppliers.Over the near term, we
expect that most of their exports will be of shorter range ballistic
missile-related equipment, components, and materials. But, as their
domestic infrastructures and expertise develop, they will be able to
offer a broader range of technologies that could include longer-range
missiles and related technology.
- Iran in the next few years may be able to supply not only complete
Scuds, but also Shahab-3s and related technology, and perhaps even more
advanced technologies if Tehran continues to receive assistance from
Russia, China, and North Korea.
Mr.
Mr.
Chairman, the problem may not be limited to missile sales; we also
remain very concerned that new or nontraditional nuclear suppliers could
emerge from this same pool.
This brings me to a new area of discussion: that more than ever we risk
substantial surprise. This is not for a lack of effort on the part of
the Intelligence Community; it results from significant effort on the
part of proliferators.
There are four main reasons. First and most important, proliferators are
showing greater proficiency in the use of denial and deception.
Second, the growing availability of dual-use technologies--including
guidance and control equipment, electronic test equipment, and specialty
materials--is making it easier for proliferators to obtain the materials
they need.
The dual-use dilemma is a particularly vexing problem as we seek to
detect and combat biological warfare programs, in part because of the
substantial overlap between BW agents and legitimate vaccines. About a
dozen countries either have offensive BW programs or are pursuing them.
Some want to use them against regional adversaries, but others see them
as a way to counter overwhelming US and Western conventional
superiority.
Third, the potential for surprise is exacerbated by the growing capacity
of countries seeking WMD to import talent that can help them make
dramatic leaps on things like new chemical and biological agents and
delivery systems. In short, they can buy the expertise that confers the
advantage of technological surprise.
Finally, the accelerating pace of technological progress makes
information and technology easier to obtain and in more advanced forms
than when the weapons were initially developed.We are making progress
against these problems, Mr. Chairman, but I must tell you that the hill
is getting steeper every year.
TERRORISM
Let me now turn to another threat with worldwide reach--terrorism.
Since July 1998, working with foreign governments worldwide, we have
helped to render more than two dozen terrorists to justice. More than
half were associates of Usama Bin Ladin's Al-Qa'ida organization. These
renditions have shattered terrorist cells and networks, thwarted
terrorist plans, and in some cases even prevented attacks from
occurring.
Although 1999 did not witness the dramatic terrorist attacks that
punctuated 1998, our profile in the world and thus our attraction as a
terrorist target will not diminish any time soon.
We are learning more about the perpetrators every day, Mr. Chairman, and
I can tell you that they are a diverse lot motivated by many causes.
Usama Bin Ladin is still foremost among these terrorists, because of the
immediacy and seriousness of the threat he poses. Everything we have
learned recently confirms our conviction that he wants to strike further
blows against America. Despite some well-publicized disruptions, we
believe he could still strike without additional warning. Indeed, Usama
Bin Ladin's organization and other terrorist groups are placing
increased emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in an
effort to avoid detection. For example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)
is linked closely to Bin Ladin's organization and has operatives located
around the world including in Europe, Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, and
Afghanistan. And, there is now an intricate web of alliances among Sunni
extremists worldwide, including North Africans, radical Palestinians,
Pakistanis, and Central Asians.
Some of these terrorists are actively sponsored by national governments
that harbor great antipathy toward the United States. Iran, for one,
remains the most active state sponsor. Although we have seen some
moderating trends in Iranian domestic policy and even some public
criticism of the security apparatus, the fact remains that the use of
terrorism as a political tool by official Iranian organs has not changed
since President Khatami took office in August 1997.
Mr. Chairman, we remain concerned that terrorist groups worldwide
continue to explore how rapidly evolving and spreading technologies
might enhance the lethality of their operations. Although terrorists
we've preempted still appear to be relying on conventional weapons, we
know that a number of these groups are seeking chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents. We are aware of several
instances in which terrorists have contemplated using these materials.
- Among them is Bin Ladin, who has shown a strong interest in chemical
weapons. His operatives have trained to conduct attacks with toxic
chemicals or biological toxins.
- HAMAS is also pursuing a capability to conduct attacks with toxic
chemicals.
Terrorists also are embracing the opportunities offered by recent leaps
in information technology. To a greater and greater degree, terrorist
groups, induding Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization, and Bin
Ladin's al Qa'ida organization are using computerized files, e-mail, and
encryption to support their operations.
Mr. Chairman, to sum up this part of my briefing, we have had our share
of successes, but I must be frank in saying that this has only succeeded
in buying time against an increasingly dangerous threat. The difficulty
in destroying this threat lies in the fact that our efforts will not be
enough to overcome the fundamental causes of the phenomenon---poverty,
alienation, disaffection, and ethnic hatreds deeply rooted in history.
In the meantime, constant vigilance and timely intelligence are our best
weapons.
NARCOTICS
Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to another threat that reaches across
borders for its victims: narcotics, The problem we face has become
considerably more global in scope and can be summed up like this:
narcotics production is likely to rise dramatically in the next few
years and worldwide trafficking involves more diverse and sophisticated
groups.
On the first point, coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia has continued
to decline--due largely to successful eradication efforts--but that will
probably be offset to some extent by increases in Colombian cultivation.
More productive coca varieties and more efficient processing results in
production of cocaine more than two and a half times that previously
estimated.
- There is some good news in Colombia. Under President Pastrana's
leadership, Bogota is beginning to improve on its 1999 counterdrug
efforts. In November, Pastrana approved the first extradition of a
Colombian drug trafficker to the United States since passage of a 1997
law.
On the other side of the world, a dramatic increase of opium and heroin
production in Afghanistan is again a cause for concern. This year,
Afghanistan's farmers harvested a crop with the potential to produce 167
tons of heroin, making Afghanistan the world's largest producer of
opium. Burma, which has a serious drought, dropped to second place, but
will likely rebound quickly when the weather improves.
- Explosive growth in Afghan opium production is being driven by the
shared interests of traditional traffickers and the Taliban. And as with
so many of these cross-national issues, Mr. Chairman, what concerns me
most is the way the threats become intertwined. In this case, there is
ample evidence that Islamic extremists such as Usama Bin Ladin uses
profits from the drug trade to support their terror campaign.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
Mr. Chairman, let me turn now to the related issue of organized crime.
Organized crime has become a serious international security issue. It
not only can victimize individuals, but it also has the potential to
retard or undermine the political and economic development of entire
countries, especially newly independent ones or those moving from
command systems to open societies.
The threat is quite apparent in Russia, where it has become a powerful
and pervasive force. Crime groups there have been aggressive in gaining
access to critical sectors of Russia's economy--inducting strategic
resources like the oil, coal, and aluminum industries.
Meanwhile, money is moving out of Russia on a large scale. Russian
officials estimate that some $1.5 to $2 billion leaves the country
monthly. Most is not derived from criminal activities but rather is sent
abroad to avoid taxation and the country's economic instability. Still,
Russian officials say that criminal activity may account for about
one-third of the capital flight.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Finally Mr. Chairman, before I end this chapter on transnational issues,
let me note the especially threatening nature of a relatively new
phenomenon-information warfare. I say especially threatening because as
this century progresses our country's security will depend more and more
on the unimpeded and secure flow of information. Any foreign adversary
that develops the ability to interrupt that flow or shut it down will
have the potential to weaken us dramatically or even render us helpless.
A surprising number of information warfare-related tools and "weapons"
are available on the open market at relatively little cost. Indeed, the
proliferation of personal computers, and the skills associated with
them, has created millions of potential "information warriors".
Already, we see a number of countries expressing interest in information
operations and information warfare as a means to counter US military
superiority. Several key states are aggressively working to develop
their IW capabilities and to incorporate these new tools into their
warfighting doctrine.
This is one of the most complex issues I've put on the table, Mr.
Chairman, but, simply put, information warfare has the potential to be a
major force multiplier. And why is this?
- It enables a single entity to have a significant and serious impact.
- It is a weapon that "comes ashore" and can effect the daily lives of
Americans across the country.
- It gives a force projection capability to those who have never had it
before, and it can be used an as asymmetric response.
- It will be a basic capability of modern militaries and intelligence
services around the world in the near future and of secondary players
not long thereafter.
All of this amounts to one of the "cutting edge" challenges for
intelligence in the 21" century. We are working on means of prevention,
warning, and detection, but as in so many areas m this technological
age, Mr. Chairman, we are truly in a race with technology
itself.REGIONAL ISSUES
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to leave the transnational issues
and turn briefly to some of the regions and critical states in the
world.
RUSSIA
We begin with Russia. As you know, we are now in the post-Yeltsin era,
and difficult choices loom for the new president Russians will choose in
exactly two months:
He will face three fundamental questions:
- First, will he keep Russia moving toward further consolidation of its
new democracy or will growing public sentiment in favor of a strong hand
and a yearning for order tempt him to slow down or even reverse course?
- Second, will he try to build a consensus on quickening the pace of
economic reform and expanding efforts to integrate into global
markets---some Russian officials favor this---or will he rely on heavy
state intervention to advance economic goals?
- Finally, will Moscow give priority to a cooperative relationship with
the West or will anti-US sentiments continue to grow, leading to a
Russia that is isolated, frustrated, and hostile? This would increase
the risk of an unintended confrontation, which would be particularly
dangerous as Russia increasingly relies on nuclear weapons for its
defense an emphasis reflected most recently in its new national security
concept.
As these questions indicate, a new Russian President will inherit a
country in which much has been accomplished -- but in which much still
needs to be done to fully transform its economy, ensure that democracy
is deeply rooted, and establish a clear future direction for it in the'
world outside Russia.
Russian polls indicate that Acting President Putin is the odds on
favorite to win the election--though I must tell you, Mr. Chairman, that
two months can be an eternity in Russia's turbulent political scene.
Putin appears tough and pragmatic, but it is far from clear what he
would do as president. If he can continue to consolidate elite and
popular support, as president he may gain political capital that he
could choose to spend on moving Russia further along the path toward
economic recovery and democratic stability.
- Former Premier Primakov is in the best position to challenge Putin,
though he faces a big uphill battle. He would need the backing of other
groups-- most importantly the Communists. The Communists, however, have
shown their willingness to deal with Putin's party in a recent agreement
that divided Duma leadership positions between them. Such tactical
alliances are likely to become more prevalent as parties seek to work
out new power relationships m the post-Yeltsin era.
At least two factors will be pivotal in determining Russia's near-term
trajectory
- The conflict in Chechnya: Setbacks in the war could hurt Putin's
presidential prospects unless he can deftly shift blame, while perceived
successes there will help him remain the front runner.
- The economy: The devalued ruble, increased world oil prices, and a
favorable trade balance fueled by steeply reduced import levels have
allowed Moscow to actually show some economic growth in the wake of the
August 1998 financial crash. Nonetheless, Russia faces $8 billion in
foreign debt coming due this year. Absent a new I-M-F deal to
reschedule, Moscow would have to redirect recent gains from economic
growth to pay it down, or run the risk of default.
Over the longer term, the new Russian president must be able to
stabilize the political situation sufficiently to address structural
problems in the Russian economy. He must also be willing to take on the
crime and corruption problem--both of which impede foreign investment.In
the foreign policy arena, US-Russian relations will be tested on a
number of fronts. Most immediately, Western criticism of the Chechen war
has heightened Russian suspicions about US and Western activity in
neighboring areas, be it energy pipeline decisions involving the
Caucasus and Central Asia, NATO's continuing role in the Balkans, or
NATO's relations with the Baltic states. Moscow's ties to Iran also will
continue to complicate USRussian relations, as will Russian objections
to US plans for a National Missile Defense. There are, nonetheless, some
issues that could move things in a more positive direction.
- For example, Putin and others have voiced support for finalizing the
START II agreement and moving toward further arms cuts in START III.
- Similarly, many Russian officials express a desire to more deeply
integrate Russia into the world economy, be it through continued
cooperation with the G-8 or prospective membership in the WTO.
One of my biggest concerns--regardless of the path that Russia
chooses-remains the security of its nuclear weapons and materials.
Russia's economic difficulties continue to weaken the reliability of
nuclear personnel and Russia's system for securing fissile material. We
have no evidence that weapons are missing in Russia, but we remain
concerned by reports of lax discipline, labor strikes, poor morale, and
criminal activities at nuclear storage facilities.
THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
Mr. Chairman, earlier I mentioned the war in Chechnya in the context of
Russia's domestic situation. Chechnya also has significance for the
Caucasus and Central Asia, a part of the world that has the potential to
become more volatile as it becomes more important to the United States.
As you know, the United States has expended great effort to support
pipelines that will bring the Caspian's energy resources to Western
markets.
One oil pipeline is expected to pass through both Georgia and
Azerbaijan. Western companies are trying to construct a gas pipeline
under the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan through Azerbaijan and Georgia
en route to Turkey.
Although many of the leaders in the region through which the pipelines
will flow view the United States as a friend, regime stability there is
fragile.
Most economies are stagnating or growing very slowly, unemployment is
rising, and poverty remains high. This creates opportunities for
criminals, drug runners, and arms proliferators. It also means the
region could become a breeding ground for a new generation of Islamic
extremists, taking advantage of increasing dissatisfaction.There is not
much popular support for Islamic militancy anywhere in Central Asia or
the Caucasus, but as militants are pushed out of Chechnya, they may seek
refuge--and stoke militancy--in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
THE MIDDLE EAST
Mr. Chairman, let me turn now to another region of the world where vital
US interests are at stake: the strategically important Middle East. Many
positive developments are apparent, most notably the new potential for
progress on peace. But if we step back for a moment, it is clear that
the Middle East is entering a major transition in many aspects of its
political, economic, and security environment.
In addition to the leadership successions that have begun with the
passing of King Hussein of Jordan, the Amir of Bahrain, and King Hassan
of Morocco, there is the challenge of demographics. Many of the
countries of the Middle East still have population growth rates among
the highest in the world, significantly exceeding 3 percent, meaning
that job markets will be severely challenged to create openings for the
large mass of young people entering the labor force each year.Another
challenge is economic restructuring. There is a legacy of statist
economic policies and an inadequate investment climate in most countries
in the Middle East.
- As the region falls behind in competitive terms--despite a few
positive steps by some countries---governments will find it hard over
the next 5 to 10 years to maintain levels of state sector employment and
government services that have been key elements of their strategy for
domestic stability.
Finally, there is the information revolution. The rise of regional
newspapers, satellite television, and the Internet are all reducing
governments' control over information flows in the Middle East. Islamist
groups, among others, already are taking advantage of these technologies
to further their agendas.
What all of this means, Mr. Chairman, is that the Middle East--a region
on which we will depend even more for oil a decade from now (40 percent
compared to 26 percent today)--is heading into a much less predictable
period that will require even greater agility from the United States as
it seeks to protect its vital interests there.
Iran
Turning now to Iran: Change in Iran is inevitable, Mr. Chairman. The
election of President Khatami reflected the Iranian popular desire for
change.
He has used this mandate to put Iran on a path to a more open society.
This path will be volatile at times as the factions struggle to control
the pace and direction of political change.
A key indicator that the battle over change is heating up came last July
when student protests erupted in 18 Iranian for several days. The coming
year promises to be just as contentious as Iran elects a new Majles
(Parliament) in February.
- Many Iranians, particularly the large cohort of restive youth and
students will judge the elections as a test of the regime's willingness
to accommodate the popular demand for reform.
- If they witness a rigged election, it could begin to radicalize what
has so far been a peaceful demand for change.
- Fair elections would probably yield a pro-reform majority, but
opponents of change still exert heavy control over the candidate
selection process.
- Former President Rafsanjani's decision to run for the Majles--
apparently at the urging of the conservatives--highlights the
leadership's desire to bring the two factions back to the center. The
conservatives are supportive of his candidacy, because they believe a
centrist Rafsanjani is a more trustworthy alternative to the reformers.
Even if the elections produce a Majles dominated by Khatami's
supporters, further progress on reform will remain erratic. Supreme
Leader Khamenei and key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guard
Corps and the large parastatal foundations will remain outside the
authority of the Majles and in a position to fight a stubborn rearguard
against political change.
- Moreover, even as the Iranians digest the results of the Majles
elections, the factions will begin preliminary maneuvering for the
presidential election scheduled for mid-2001, which is almost certain to
keep the domestic political scene unsettled.
The factional maneuvering probably means that foreign policy options
will still be calculated first to prevent damage to the various leaders'
domestic positions. This will inhibit politically risky departures from
established policy. This means that Iran's foreign policy next year will
still exhibit considerable hostility to US interests. This is most
clearly demonstrated by' Tehran's continued rejection of he Middle East
peace process and its efforts to energize rejectionist Palestinian and
Hizballah operations aimed at thwarting a negotiated Arab-Israeli peace.
Iranian perceptions of increasing US influence in the
Caucasus--demonstrated most recently by the signing of the Baku- Ceyhan
pipeline agreement--could similarly motivate Iran to more aggressively
seek to thwart what it regards as a US effort to encircle it to the
north.
Iraq
With regard to Iraq, Saddam faced a difficult start in 1999--including
the most serious Shia unrest since 1991 and significant economic
difficulties.
- The Shia unrest was not confined to the south but also affected some
areas of Baghdad itself, presenting Saddam's regime with a major
security problem. On the economic side, to rein in inflation, stabilize
the dinar, and reduce the budget deficit, Saddam was forced to raise
taxes, ease foreign exchange controls, and cut nonwage public spending.
Saddam has, however, shown himself to be politically agile enough to
weather these challenges. He brutally suppressed the Shia uprisings of
last spring and early summer. The regime is still gaming some revenue
from illegal off sales. Increased access to food and medical supplies
through the oil for food program has improved living conditions in
Baghdad.
A major worry is that Iraqi reconstruction of WMD-capable facilities
damaged during Operation Desert Fox and continued work on delivery
systems shows the priority Saddam continues to attach to preserving a
WMD infrastructure. And Iraq's conventional military remains one of the
largest in the Middle East, even though it is now less than half the
size during the Gulf War.
- He can still hurt coalition forces, but his military options are
sharply limited. His continuing challenge to the no-fly-zone enforcement
remains his only sustainable means of engaging US and UK forces.
In sum, to the extent that Saddam has had any successes in the last
year, they have been largely tactical. In a strategic sense, he is still
on a downward path.His economic infrastructure continues to deteriorate,
the Kurdish-inhabited northern tier remains outside the grip of his
army, and although many governments are sympathetic to the plight of the
Iraqi people, few if any are willing to call Saddam an ally.
THE BALKANS
Mr. Chairman, looking briefly at the Balkans--
Signs of positive long-term change are beginning to emerge there as the
influence of the Milosevic regime in the region wanes in the wake of the
Kosovo conflict and a new, more liberal government takes the reigns of
power in Croatia. Political alternatives to the dominant ethnic parties
in Bosnia also are beginning to develop; capitalizing on the
vulnerability of old-line leaders to charges of corruption and economic
mismanagement.
Despite this progress, there is still a long way to go before the
Balkans move beyond the ethnic hatreds and depressed economies that have
produced so much turmoil and tragedy. Of the many threats to peace and
stability in the year ahead, the greatest remains Slobodan
Milosevic--the world's only sitting president indicted for crimes
against humanity.
Milosevic's hold on power has not been seriously shaken in the past few
months. He retains control of the security forces, military commands,
and an effective media machine. His inner circle remains loyal or at
least cowed.
The political opposition has not yet developed a strategy to capitalize
on public anger with Milosevic.
Milosevic has two problems that could still force him from power--the
economy and the Montenegrin challenge. The Serbian economy is in a
virtual state of collapse, and Serbia is now the poorest country in
Europe. Inflation and unemployment are rising, and the country is
struggling to repair the damage to its infrastructure from NATO air
strikes. The average wage is only $48 a month and even these salaries
typically are several months in arrears. Basic subsistence is guaranteed
only by unofficial economic activity and the traditional lifeline
between urban dwellers and their relatives on the farms.
- Milosevic's captive media are trying--with some success--to blame
these troubles on the air strikes and on international sanctions.
Nonetheless, as time passes, we believe the people will increasingly
hold Milosevic responsible. Moreover, a sudden, unforeseen economic
catastrophe, such as hyperinflation or a breakdown this winter of the
patched-up electric grid, could lead to mass demonstrations that would
pose a real threat.
For its part, Montenegro may be heading toward independence, and
tensions are certainly escalating as Montenegrin President Djukanovic
continues to take steps that break ties to the federal government.
Milosevic wants to crush Djukanovic, because he serves as an important
symbol to the democratic opposition in Serbia and to the Serbian people
that the regime can be successfully challenged. Djukanovic controls the
largest independent media operation in Yugoslavia, which has strongly
criticized the Milosevic regime over the past several years for the
Kosovo conflict, political repression and official corruption. Both
Milosevic and Djukanovic will try to avoid serious confrontation for
now, but a final showdown will be difficult to avoid.
Kosovo
Regarding Kosovo, Mr. Chairman, the international presence has managed
to restore a semblance of peace, but it is brittle. Large-scale
interethnic violence has vanished, but the UN Mission in Kosovo and K-
FOR have been unable to stop daily small-scale attacks, mostly by
Kosovar Albanians against ethnic Serbs. This chronic violence has caused
most of the remaining 80,000-100,000 Serbs to congregate in enclaves in
northern and eastern Kosovo, and they are organizing self- defense
forces.
The campaign to disarm the former Kosovo Liberation army has had
success, but both sides continue to cache small arms and other ordnance.
There is even a chance that fighting between Belgrade's security forces
and ethnic Albanians will reignite should Belgrade continue to harass
and intimidate the Albanian minority in southern Serbia, and should
Kosovo Albanian extremists attempt to launch an insurgency aimed at
annexing Southern Serbia into a greater Kosovo.
CHINA
Mr. Chairman, let us now turn to East Asia, where China has entered the
new century as the world's fastest rising power.
The leadership there is continuing its bold, 20-year-old effort to
propel the nation's economy into the modern world, shedding the
constraints of the old Communist central command system. The economy is
the engine by which China seeks world prestige, global economic clout,
and the funding for new military strength, thereby redressing what it
often proclaims as a hundred years of humiliation at the hands of
Western powers. Domestically, it also was the engine that Deng Xiaoping
and his successors calculated would enable the Party to deliver on its
unspoken social contract with the Chinese people: monopoly of political
power in exchange for a strong China with a higher standard of living
for its citizens.
But events conspired last year to tarnish Beijing's achievements, to
remind people that China had not yet arrived as a modern world power,
and to make the leadership generally ill-at-ease:
- China put on an impressive display of military might at its 50th
anniversary parade in Beijing, but the leadership today sees a growing
technological gap with the West.
- Inside China, the image of domestic tranquility was tarnished by last
April's appearance of the Falungong religious sect, whose audacious,
surprise demonstration outside the leadership compound called into
question the Communist Party's ability to offer an ethos that still
attracts the Chinese people.
- Even the return of Macau in late December--the fall of another symbol
of a divided China--was overshadowed by the actions of Taiwan President
Lee Teng-hui. Lee declared last July that his island's relations with
the mainland should be conducted under the rubric of "state to state"
rather than "one China".
Lee's statement has China deeply worried that Taiwan's return to Beijing
rule is less likely than before. Chinese leaders act as if they believe
that, at a minimum, a show of force is required if they are to preserve
any hope of reunification.
Because of this, we see high potential for another military flare-up
across the Taiwan Strait this year. The catalyst for these tensions is
the Taiwan election on 18 March, which Beijing will be monitoring for
signs that a new president will retreat from Lee Teng-hui's statements--
r further extend the political distance from reunification.
Although Beijing today still lacks the air and sealift capability to
successfully invade Taiwan:
- China has been increasing the size and sophistication of its forces
arrayed along the Strait, most notably by deploying short-range
ballistic missiles.
- China should receive the first of two modem, Russian-built Sovremennyy
destroyers later this month; we expect the ship to join the East Sea
Fleet, which regularly conducts operations near Taiwan.
In the coming year, we expect to see an uncertain Chinese leadership
launching the nation deeper into the uncharted waters of economic reform
while trying to retain tight grip political control. Thus far, Beijing's
approach has largely succeeded. But the question remains open whether,
in the long run, a market economy and an authoritarian regime can
co-exist successfully.
NORTH KOREA
Looking further east, North Korea's propaganda declares 1999 the "year
of the great turnaround." This is a view not supported by my analysts,
however. Indeed, we see a North Korea continuing to suffer from serious
economic problems, and we see a population, perhaps now including the
elite, that is losing confidence in the regime. Mr. Chairman, sudden,
radical, and possibly dangerous change remains a real possibility in
North Korea, and that change could come at any time.
The North Korean economy is in dire straits. Industrial operations
remain low. The future outlook is clouded by industrial facilities that
are nearly beyond repair after years of underinvestment, spare parts
shortages, and poor maintenance.
- This year's harvest is more than 1 million tons short of minimum grain
needs. International food aid has again been critical in meeting the
population's minimum food needs.
- Trade is also down. Exports to Japan--the North's most important
market--fell by 17 percent from $111 million to $92 million. Trade with
China--the North's largest source of imports---declined from nearly $200
million to about $160 million, primarily because China delivered less
grain.
Kim Chong-il does not appear to have an effective longterm strategy for
reversing his country's economic fortunes.
Kim's inability to meet the basic needs of his people and his reliance
on coercion makes his regime more brittle because even minor instances
of defiance have greater potential to snowball into wider anti-regime
actions.
- Instead of real reform, North Korea's strategy is to garner as much
aid as possible from overseas, and the North has reenergized its global
diplomacy to this end. It is negotiating for a high-level visit to
reciprocate Dr. Perry's trip to P'yongyang. It has agreed to diplomatic
talks with Japan for the first time in several years. It has
unprecedented commercial contacts with South Korea, including a tourism
deal With a South Korean firm that will provide almost $1 billion over
six years.
- But P'yongyang's maneuvering room will be constrained by Kim's
perception that openness threatens his control and by the contradictions
inherent in his overall strategy - a strategy based on hinting at
concessions on the very weapons programs that he has increasingly come
to depend on for leverage in the international arena. Squaring these
circles will require more diplomatic agility than Kim has yet to
demonstrate in either the domestic or international arenas.
EAST ASIA
Mr. Chairman, China and North Korea do not exist in a vacuum. They
influence the policies of other states--including how those states
relate to us. Nowhere is this more true than in East Asia, Let me talk
about two trends there that I believe will affect US interests over the
next several years.
The first is the growing concern in the region about China and North
Korea. Leaders in Southeast Asia have long worried about Chinese
interference in their internal affairs, but the concerns of these
governments and publics also now focus on China's growing economic and
military power and the potential influence it will provide Beijing.
Concerns about North Korea are more varied and localized. Japan fears
North Korea's expanding missile capabilities, while South Korea--along
with the historical threat of a North Korean invasion--worries that the
collapse of the regime in the North will create humanitarian, economic,
and military challenges for the South.
These concerns create several dynamics. For one thing, they fuel
incentives to expand and modernize defense forces. Japan's interest in
building its own satellite imaging system, for example, is a direct
result of its concern about North Korea. Vietnam's recent acquisition of
Su-27 aircraft from Russia reflect concerns about China's future
military might. And Seoul's attempts to modernize its air force and navy
reflect the fact that it is looking beyond North Korea toward potential
future threats.
In addition, these concerns reinforce the long-standing desire among
almost all the states of the region for the US to remain engaged
militarily. In short, regional leaders--and most publics--continue to
see the US presence as key to East Asian stability, although I must tell
you, Mr. Chairman, that some leaders in the region have doubts about our
staying power there.
The second trend worth noting for you is the continuing pressure in East
Asia for more open and accountable political systems. Over the last 15
years, that pressure brought political change to the Philippines,
Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and most recently Indonesia.
Others, including Malaysia and China, are certain to face similar
pressure for change in the years ahead as the spread of information
technology limits the ability of authoritarian leaders to control the
public's exposure to democracy and to constrain opponents from
organizing. These pressures, of course, create the potential for
political instability, particularly if they are resisted by incumbent
leaders.
INDONESIA
Mr. Chairman, I've mentioned Indonesia a couple of times earlier, so let
me take a moment to say a few words about it. Indonesia is in the midst
of a difficult transition to democracy that will have a powerful bearing
on the country's future direction and perhaps even on its cohesion as a
nation. President Wahid is grappling with a variety of long-standing,
intractable issues including communal violence, separatist sentiments,
and an economy in distress. At the same time, he is trying to forge a
new role for the Indonesian military - which includes tighter civilian
control and the gradual withdrawal of the armed forces from the domestic
political arena - and create an open, consensual decisionmaking process
in a country accustomed to 30 years of one-man rule.
Since his selection to the presidency last October, Wahid has
implemented a variety of initiatives designed to set the country on the
path to democracy. A popularly elected president who preaches religious
and political tolerance, Wahid has succeeded in forming a viable
coalition government drawn from disparate elements. He is actively
supporting a national investigation into alleged human rights abuses by
the Indonesian military in East Timor, and a once muzzled national press
is flourishing. He also is taking steps to improve Jakarta's bilateral
relations with a number of countries and restore Indonesia's regional
prominence, which suffered in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in
1997 and the domestic political uncertainty that surrounded the fall of
President Soeharto in 1998.
Addressing demands from restive provinces to redefine their relationship
with Jakarta is Wahid's most immediate challenge, several leaders in the
region remain concerned that Jakarta's loss of East Timor-coupled with
growing separatist tensions and communal violence across the
archipelago---could result in the Balkanization of the country over the
next several years. The challenges are myriad: in the west, pressure is
mounting from Acehnese separatists who have resisted Jakarta's control
since the 1950s and began an insurgency in 1976. To the east in Irian
Jaya--recently renamed Papua--there is local resentment of Jakarta's
exploitation of the province's natural resources, but the insurgent
movement is weak. The nearby Malukus have been wracked by communal
violence for the past year; this is Christian-Muslim violence with an
ethnic overlay that may not only be difficult to pacify, but could
ignite sectarian violence elsewhere in the archipelago, testing the
country's long commitment to religious tolerance. Indonesia's ASEAN
partners particularly fear the refugee and humanitarian crisis that
would accompany such worst-case scenarios.
INDIA-PAKISTAN
Whatever suspicions and fissures exist among states in Bast Asia, they
pale in comparison to the deep-seated rivalry between India and
Pakistan. Mr. Chairman, last spring, the two countries narrowly averted
a full-scale war in Kashmir, which could have escalated to the nuclear
level.
The military balance can be summarized easily: India enjoys advantages
over Pakistan in most areas of conventional defense preparedness,
including a decisive advantage in fighter aircraft, almost twice as many
men under arms, and a much larger economy.
- Recent changes in government in both countries add tensions the
picture. The October coup in Pakistan that brought to power Gen.
Musharraf-who served as Army chief during the Kargil conflict with India
last summer --has reinforced New Delhi's inclination not to reopen the
bilateral dialogue anytime soon.
- Pakistanis are equally suspicious of India's newly elected coalition
government in which Hindu nationalists hold significant sway.Clearly,
the dispute over Kashmir remains as intractable as ever.
- We are particularly concerned that heavy fighting is continuing
through the winter, unlike in the past, and probably will increase
significantly in the spring.
- New Delhi may opt to crack down hard on Kashmiri militants operating
on the Indian side o[ the Line of Control or even order military strikes
against militant training camps inside Pakistani-held Kashmir.
Thus, we must head into the new year, Mr. Chairman, with continuing deep
concerns about the antagonisms that persist in South Asia and their
potential to fuel a wider and more dangerous conflict on the
subcontinent.
AFRICA
Mr. Chairman, South Asia presents a discouraging picture but it hardly
compares to sub-Saharan Africa, which has been largely bypassed by
globalization and the accelerating spread of technology. The region has
little connectivity to the rest of the world--with just 16 telephone
lines per 1,000 people--and its battered infrastructure, the
population's limited access to education, and widespread health problems
such as AIDS and malaria have deterred many foreign investors.
- One indicator of Sub-Saharan Africa's marginalization is its
infinitesimal share of world trade in goods and services, which slipped
from 2.8 percent in the early 1980s to just 1.5 percent in recent years.
- As Africa's already small role in the international economy has faded,
instability has intensified. Humamtarian crisis is constant. Since 1995,
violent internal unrest has wracked 15 of the region's 48 countries, and
19 SubSaharan governments have deployed military forces---as
peacekeepers, protectors of beleaguered regimes, or outright
invaders--to other African states.
Instability fosters conditions potentially leading to genocide and other
massive human rights abuses. In the Great Lakes region, Congo (K)'s
beleaguered government periodically targets Tutsis as suspected
saboteurs, while the civil war in Burundi could with little warning
degenerate into another round of wholesale ethnic killings. In Sierra
Leone, the rebels who used widespread mutilations of civilians as a
conscious tactic of intimidation are poised to break a tenuous cease-
fire and resume a campaign of terror.
Finally, endemic violence and instability increase the danger that
criminal and insurgent groups will zero in on individual US citizens as
soft targets.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, this has been a long briefing, and I'd like to get to your
specific questions on these and other subjects. Before doing so, I would
just sum it up this way: the fact that we are arguably the world's most
powerful nation does not bestow invulnerability; in fact, it may make us
a larger target for those who don't share our interests, values, or
beliefs. We must take care to be on guard, watching our every step, and
looking far ahead. Let me assure you that our Intelligence Community is
well prepared to do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, I'd welcome any questions from you and
your colleagues.
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