Wa (cultural, political, economic)

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Description: "Police have been unable to perform their primary duty of law enforcement since the coup as they have been busy helping the Myanmar military impose a crackdown on dissidents. The resulting lawlessness has allowed criminal gangs and allied human traffickers to thrive in areas controlled by ethnic armed organizations on the Myanmar-China border. Human traffickers have expanded their network to major cities like Yangon and Mandalay, key border towns including Lashio and Tachilek, and even Sagaing and Magwe regions in central Myanmar, which is experiencing fierce fighting between junta and resistance forces. Here, they lure young people with the promise of high-paying jobs, before trafficking them to Wa State, an autonomous enclave in northeastern Myanmar controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). RelatedPosts Myanmar Junta Detains Battalion Commander, Deputy for Refusing to Fight About 50 Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Four Days of Resistance Attacks Cambodia’s Ruling Party Says on Course for ‘Landslide’ in One-Sided Poll At least 350 people were trafficked in Wa State from February 2021 to May 2023, according to data compiled by the UWSA, Thai authorities, news agencies in northern Shan State, and The Irrawaddy. Among those trafficked were young people from Yangon, Mandalay, Lashio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Sagaing and Magwe as well citizens from fellow ASEAN countries including the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and Indonesia, and from Russia. This figure only represents those who have been rescued or sought help. The actual number of trafficked Wa State, officially the Wa Self-Administered Division, is located in northern Shan State on the border with China. The UWSA is headquartered in Panghsan, and the self-administered division is made up of Mongmao, Monglin and Mongpauk districts and Panghsan and Namtit special townships – areas which the UWSA refers to as northern Wa State, covering around 1,500 square kilometers. Northern Wa State to the east of the Salween River is under the de facto control of the UWSA. Central government administration is limited to areas west of the Salween River. Northern Wa State comprises 24 townships. Panghsan, Monglin and Mongpauk are the busiest, hosting casinos, brothels, and hotels that sell narcotics including methamphetamine, ecstasy, ketamine and Happy Water. The USWA, which has a long history of trading narcotics and arms, claimed in 2005 that it had abandoned opium-poppy cultivation to focus on rubber, tea and orange trees, as well as mining rare earth elements and other minerals. However, the armed ethnic organization remains on the drugs and arms trafficking watchlists of neighboring Thailand and the US. But one key USWA-controlled business that the Wa army has avoided talking about is the hotel industry linked with casinos, gambling dens, brothels, and phone and internet scams. This sector is referred to as the “entertainment business” in Wa State. Investors in the UWSA’s entertainment business are mostly Chinese nationals. Brothels with Chinese names are controlled by criminal gangs and are hubs for human trafficking, slavery and forced prostitution. Brothels and online-scam businesses owned by Chinese nationals are guarded by armed men, according to a restaurant manager, an entertainment-business investor and other Wa State locals. Most operate undercover as massage parlors. The armed guards make sure trafficked victims don’t flee and do what they are told. These so-called businesses more accurately resemble organized crime groups. Female sex workers at brothels in Panghsan or Mongpauk earn 200 yuan (around 84,000 kyats at the current exchange rate) for 45 minutes, and between 1,000 and 2,500 yuan for the night, according to local agencies that help find recruits for brothels and online scammers. In some brothels, sex workers are reportedly forced to pay 50 percent of their earnings to their boss. But some are even less fortunate, sold by traffickers to Chinese businessmen for 15,000 to 20,000 yuan to become sex slaves. A virgin can earn a trafficker between 5,000 and 8,000 yuan per day. Hence, human traffickers target young girls as young as 14. “They [sex workers] should not be older than 25. Fifteen-year-olds are also okay. They are better since we can contract them for a long time. Virgins get better prices,” a brothel manager in Wa State told The Irrawaddy. Two of the registered 350 human trafficking victims were girls aged between 14 and 16. Women younger than 25 are preferred for prostitution, according to job adverts posted by brothels in Panghsan and Mongpauk. Applicants have to send three photos and a video of themselves to the brothels. Chinese bosses use middlemen in Shan State border towns, who provide transportation costs for successful applicants or send vehicles to pick them up, according to individuals engaged in the business. The prostitution industry in Wa State is not limited to sex with customers. Sex workers are also used as escorts for Chinese gamblers and nationals working in casinos, in internet scams and brothels, to perform in porn videos and via livestreams. Sex workers are also forced to use narcotics and stimulants so they can work for hours without sleep, according to accounts by victims, some of whom have filed complaints at Mongpauk police station. Meanwhile, men and women trafficked for phone and internet scams are confined in apartments and forced to work up to 19 hours per day, according to victims. Some were first sold into the scams but later forced into prostitution. Varying degrees of punishment are imposed on those who refuse to take orders. First-degree punishments include being confined to a room, gang-beaten, tased, and denied food and water, according to an ethnic Palaung woman who suffered torture before being released in 2022 after her family paid ransom money. Second and third-degree punishments include hanging from a tree or beam, searing the skin with hot objects, confinement in a doghouse, being stripped naked and beaten, imprisonment in a pitch-black room for several days, and chest-deep immersion in a water tank. An ethnic armed organization official posted to Panghsan for six years said: “This system is practiced on all [victims] regardless of their race or nationality. Whether they are Bamar or Chinese or Wa or Kachin or Palaung, they will be punished if they fail to pay back debts or lose at gambling and can’t repay the money. Men and women come to work here and if they want to go back before their contracts expire, or if they refuse to do the work as ordered, they are also beaten. Or they can be ransomed.” UWSA involvement in criminal activities The UWSA is known as the most powerful ethnic armed organization in Myanmar and envied by fellow EAOs for its de facto control over Wa State. But its other face is a vast business enterprise with ties to criminal gangs. Despite a constant flow of men and young women being trafficked into slavery, the entertainment industry in Wa State continues as usual. Its businesses are officially licensed and taxed by the UWSA-run government, which profits handsomely from the revenues. Meanwhile, UWSA chiefs benefit directly and indirectly from lucrative joint ventures with Chinese investors in the entertainment industry, according to sources in the industry. As in Wa State, human trafficking is rampant in neighboring China-Myanmar border towns controlled by the Kokang Border Guard Force and National Democratic Alliance Army. These casino towns are also notorious for prostitution and criminal gangs engaged in drug and arms trafficking. These businesses provide a large source of income for various EAOs and are thus unlikely to collapse anytime soon. International pressure rising The US State Department’s 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report for Myanmar states that “efforts to combat trafficking declined dramatically after the coup as the military regime shifted its focus away from other justice sector priorities and toward persecution of the pro-democracy opposition.” Myanmar was ranked on the bottom rung or Tier 3, for countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so. Minimum standards include laying out legislation that prohibits and punishes human trafficking as a crime; punishing these crimes in a way that is consistent and appropriate for the gravity of the evil involved in trafficking a person; punishment that appropriately deters future acts; and making “serious and sustained efforts” to eliminate all forms of trafficking by enforcement and prosecution, victim protection, trafficking prevention and more. Authorities and civil society organizations in Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines also report having to conduct tough negotiations with Myanmar authorities to rescue their trafficked citizens from Myanmar. Thai authorities said last month that around 140 Thai citizens had been trafficked into Shan State, and only 63 had been rescued. They waited two to three months after asking Myanmar authorities before the Thai victims were eventually rescued. Chinese ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai held talks with deputy junta chief Soe Win in March and May in Naypyitaw, seeking cooperation to combat cross-border crimes and phone and internet scams. China’s top diplomat, Qin Gang, raised the same issue when he visited the China-Myanmar border and Naypyitaw to meet junta chief Min Aung Hlaing in the first week of May. Videos warning about Myanmar traffickers luring victims with promises of high-paying jobs have flooded Chinese social media. The videos highlight the plight of victims who are confined and tortured, and how they can also end up as victims of the organ trade. Following international pressure, the UWSA has taken steps to enforce the law against traffickers. In February, it issued an order barring judicial and law enforcement personnel from visiting casinos and entertainment venues except as part of their duties, and also barred them from drinking alcohol except on weekends. It also said it had handed over 100 victims of human trafficking to junta police on March 23 as part of regime efforts to rescue victims. The UWSA issued another order on June 6 warning of harsh action against entertainment venues caught selling narcotics including so-called party drugs such as ketamine, ecstasy and Happy Water. But the measures have seemingly failed to dent the operations of organized crime groups in Wa State. They continue to operate freely while human traffickers are still luring job seekers via social media. UWSA second generation The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) measures human security according to seven criteria: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. A situation in which individuals cannot live with dignity or make a living also constitutes a lack of human security. According to the UNDP’s indicators, the operations of crime groups and traffickers in Wa State are a threat to both personal and community security. That threat on the Myanmar-China border is being monitored not just by Myanmar’s neighbors, but also the US and international human rights agencies. The Irrawaddy was unable to obtain comment from UWSA spokesman Nyi Rang about reported sex and cyber slavery and crime groups in Wa State. First-generation UWSA leaders such as Bao Youxiang and Wei Hsueh-kang have a murky past as drug traffickers. They earned their names as drug lords rather than as leaders of an ethnic armed organization fighting for freedom. The US even offered a reward of $ 200,000 for the arrest of UWSA vice chair Wei Hsueh-kang. But with the changing times, the UWSA has become increasingly involved in the politics of ethnic minorities in Myanmar. It now seeks official status of statehood for Wa State. The UWSA has also allied with other ethnic armies and supplied them with arms and financial assistance in a bid to enhance its image and expand its political influence. Through its allies, it has also provided help to resistance groups that emerged in the Spring Revolution against junta rule. The UWSA reshuffled its leadership in August last year, which saw Bao Ai Kham, son of long-time UWSA commander-in-chief Bao Youxiang, promoted to deputy general secretary of the United Wa State Party, the political wing of the UWSA. He is tipped to succeed his father as the next leader of Wa State. Zhao Ai Nap Lai, a son of Zhao Nyi-Lai, one of the founders of the UWSA, became the head of the politburo. Bao Youxiang’s nephew Bao Ai Chan was also promoted to deputy commander-in-chief of the UWSA. However, the second generation of UWSA leaders is likely to fall under the same shadow as the first generation if they fail to control criminal activity that threatens the social fabric of Wa State. Margaret Aung (a pseudonym) is a researcher at the Yangon-based Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2023-07-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-22
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Description: "၁။ ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၂ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ(၁၇)ရက်နေ့တွင်ကျရောက်သော “ဝ”ပြည်နယ် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးတည်ဆောက်မှု (၃၃)နှစ်ပြည့်သို့ ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကို ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ “ဝ”ပြည်သူများ၏အစဥ်အလာကြီးမားသော ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်များကို အာမခံချက် အပြည့်အဝရရှိစေရန်လည်းကောင်း၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်စာပေ၊ ယဥ်ကျေးမှုနှင့်အထွေထွေလူမှုစီးပွားအခွင့်အလမ်း များ တိုးတက်မြင့်မားစေရန် အတွက်လည်းကောင်း “ဝ” အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် “ဝ” ပြည်သူများ သည် ၁၉၈၉ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ (၁၇) ရက်နေ့တွင် “ဝ” ပြည်သွေးစည်းညီညွတ်ရေးပါတီ၊ “ဝ” ပြည်သွေးစည်း ညီညွတ်ရေးတပ်မတော်တို့ကို ထူထောင်ကာ အခက်အခဲများကြားတွင် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်စွာဖြင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးကို ကြိုးပမ်းတည်ဆောက်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၃။ “ဝ” ပြည်နယ်၏ရရှိပြီးသော ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာအတူယှဥ်တွဲနေထိုင်မှုနှင့်လူမှုစီးပွားကဏ္ဍပေါင်းစုံ တိုးတက် ဖွံ့ဖြိုုးမှုများ အဓွန့်ရှည်တည်တံ့ခိုင်မာစေရန် “ဝ” အမျိုးသားခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့်“ဝ” ပြည်သူများ ဆထက် ထမ်းပိုးကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်းနှင့်အနာဂတ်ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်ကို အုတ်မြစ်ချထူထောင်ရာတွင် အမြော်အမြင်ကြီးမားစွာဖြင့် ဦးဆောင်ပါဝင်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
2022-04-17
Date of entry/update: 2022-04-17
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Description: "Stories from an Ancient Land: Perspectives on Wa History and Culture By Magnus Fiskesjö Berghahn, New York and Oxford, 2021, 314 pages. US$145 (hardcover), US$33.03 (Kindle) The Wa, who live on both sides of the Myanmar-China border, are probably Southeast Asia’s most misunderstood—and often maligned—ethnic minority. Over the years, they have been described as wild headhunters, communist rebels, drug traffickers and puppets of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In Myanmar, many people seem to believe that they are a kind of Chinese when they are, in fact, a Mon-Khmer tribe related to the Palaung of northern and eastern Shan State. This book by US-based Swedish anthropologist Magnus Fiskesjö, therefore, is a very welcome contribution to a better understanding of the Wa. Although his field work was done almost exclusively on the Chinese side of the border, his accounts of Wa culture and history, and the group’s troubled relationship with the Chinese state, should be essential reading for anyone interested in peace along the common border. And that is especially important now, given the United Wa State Army (UWSA)’s position as the strongest and best-equipped ethnic armed group in the country at a time when Myanmar is descending into chaos. They have not, so far, played any direct role in domestic politics and they are not fighting the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. But several groups that are, among them the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, the Arakan Army, and to a lesser extent the Kachin Independence Army, have benefited from arms, ammunition and other equipment supplied by the UWSA. The Wa in Myanmar have never been controlled by any central authority. During the British time, colonial presence consisted of little more than a few field officers on the outskirts of the hills, and occasional flag-marches up to the border to show the Chinese where their designated territory supposedly ended. After independence, the Wa Hills were ruled by local chieftains and warlords, and, in some parts, remnants of Nationalist Chinese, Kuomintang, forces that had retreated across the border after being defeated by Mao Zedong’s communists during the Chinese Civil War, which ended in 1949. Then, in the early 1970s, the Wa Hills were taken over by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which established a base area covering most of the border mountains. In 1989, the rank-and-file of the CPB’s army, which included thousands of Wa fighters, mutinied against the ageing, staunchly Maoist leadership of the party, drove them into exile in China, and established their own army, the UWSA. Today, the 20,000-30,000-strong UWSA and its political wing, the United Wa State Party, rules the Wa Hills without any central government interference. Their area is, in effect, a wholly autonomous buffer state between Myanmar and China with its own administration, schools, hospitals, courts and trading companies. On the Chinese side, the situation has historically been equally complex. The emperors in Beijing had no jurisdiction over the Chinese Wa Hills, and contacts with the Wa were limited to some merchants who had dealings with them in opium, silver and salt. That changed after 1949, when the PLA moved into the Wa Hills to counter the Kuomintang’s attempts to reenter southern China from their clandestine bases in northeastern Shan State. As Fiskesjö explains, many Wa, who feared the Chinese, then fled into the Myanmar Wa Hills. But, by and large, the PLA treated the local population relatively well because they needed the Wa’s knowledge of terrain in order to secure the border areas, and depended on them for intelligence, even across the border into the Wa Hills of Myanmar, where the Kuomintang had bases. After a few years of comparative leniency, and as soon as the Kuomintang threat had been eliminated, the Chinese introduced a new, and unwelcome, social and political order. Weapons in the possession of Wa villagers, who were used to being armed because they depended on hunting, were confiscated and according to Fiskesjö all paraphernalia associated with head-hunting were destroyed. Drum houses, the main social institution in any Wa village, were torn down, their log drums were thrown out or burned and “the major rituals of the past were abandoned. Chief ritualists and other leaders were demoted, marginalized, or even prosecuted.” Wa elders Fiskesjö spoke to regarded 1958 as the key watershed, “since in that year the Chinese policy shifted from reconciliation to enforcement.” Even the Wa had to become Chinese communists and were herded into people’s communes. But what about head-hunting and opium? According to Fiskesjö, head-hunting as well as poppy appeared “in the Wa lands relatively recently.” Opium, Fiskesjö writes, “was seized upon as a new source of wealth…as a profitable but illicit crop, it could be grown with impunity only in these mountains, well away from the interference of states.” And that happened in the late 19th and early 20th century, presumably because there was then a huge demand for the drug in China. As for head-hunting, in the past bodies of dead tigers were placed outside villages to scare away potential enemies; but “after the wars of the mid-19th century, and with the spread of modern firearms [tigers] have now become scarce…[and] in a way humans replaced tigers as the most dangerous adversary of the land.” Long lines of posts, or a nog in Wa, with dry, whitened skulls on display lined the paths leading into villages and “served as a key Wa weapon of deterrence, legible as such by alien soldier-observers like the British and the Chinese.” The only place where Fiskesjö’s analysis goes astray is when he describes the arrival of the CPB in the Myanmar Wa Hills. He writes that “the Chinese-supported [CPB], equipped with modern weaponry, moved from central Burma into Wa country in the late 1960s.” In fact, the CPB takeover of the border areas came after more than a hundred Myanmar communists, who had been living in exile in China since the early 1950s, came across the border on January 1, 1968 accompanied by a few hundred Kachin, followers of the early rebel leader Naw Seng, who had retreated independently into China at about the same time—and thousands of heavily armed Red Guard volunteers from China who were sent to fight alongside their Myanmar comrades. The first incursion took place at Möng Ko in the north, far from the Wa Hills, and it was not until the early 1970s that the CPB, with Chinese assistance, took over the Wa Hills. The plan was to establish a “liberated area” along the border and from there push down to the Myanmar heartland, where poorly equipped CPB units were still holding out in places like the Pegu Yoma north of Yangon, and pockets in Sagaing Division, the Arakan Hills and Tenasserim (now Tanintharyi). That plan failed as the Tatmadaw realized that it could only contain, not defeat, the “new” CPB forces on the Chinese border—of whom the vast majority soon consisted of Wa conscripts—and, therefore, concentrated its efforts on wiping out the old strongholds in central Myanmar. That strategy proved to be successful and the last of the old major bases, those in the Pegu Yoma, were overrun in 1975. The number of Pegu Yoma survivors who made it to the new, northeastern base area was minimal. When I was at the then CPB headquarters at Panghsang in the Wa Hills in 1986-1987, I was able to meet only two such veterans. But Fiskesjö is correct in saying that the imposition of CPB rule over the Wa Hills led to the annihilation of “the long-standing Wa autonomy, or, more precisely, what remained of Wa autonomy after World War II, when parts of the Wa lands became the battleground of Chinese Kuomintang forces on the run from the lost cause of their civil war in China.” Fiskesjö goes on to explain how “the broad assault on Wa cultural and political traditions under the [CPB] in some ways was even more drastic than what occurred in Chinese-annexed Wa territory.” Indeed, the “new” CPB treated the Wa as little more than cannon fodder in their struggle to reach central Myanmar, where the party’s future, if any, would have lied. It is significant that the CPB chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin left his headquarters at Panghsang only to go to China, and, on a few occasions, to Möng Ko. He never even once visited a Wa village inside the CPB-controlled base area to talk to the people there. The outcome of the CPB’s failure to reach the Myanmar heartland was that it became isolated in a remote mountain area where they did not belong and had never intended to stay. That, in turn, led to the 1989 mutiny, in which the CPB’s Wa troops stormed Panghsang and the Myanmar communists, once again, had to seek refuge in China. But this time, China had changed its policy. Unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, the Myanmar communists were not allowed to engage in any kind of politics, and had to survive on pensions provided to them by Chinese authorities. In one of the most powerful chapters in the book, Fiskesjö describes how commercial entrepreneurs in modern times have built theme parks where supposed head-hunting paraphernalia are on display, and visitors can stay in newly-built huts and watch “wild Wa tribesmen” perform “exotic” dances which have no resemblance to Wa traditions. The much-promoted Wa “hair dance”, where young Wa women toss their long hair back and forth, is one such invention. One of those “China Folk Cultural Villages” in Shenzhen opposite Hong Kong is called “Windows of the World, where young Wa dancers also work — but they perform there as Africans, New Zealand Maoris, and American Indians.” It is no wonder many Wa feel exploited and resent being looked down upon by the Chinese—and that strained relationship, as well as the past Wa history of being oppressed by the Chinese Communist Party, is something most foreign observers have overlooked. The UWSA today may be heavily dependent on the Chinese for trade, and its vast and sophisticated arsenal made up almost entirely of weapons procured in China. But that does not mean that relations between China and the Wa in Myanmar are as smooth as people think. And drugs? Fiskesjö outlines the history of poppy cultivation in the Wa Hills but, as an anthropologist, does not dwell on today’s trade in narcotics. There is no doubt that the UWSA built up its now well-developed, autonomous area in Myanmar with profits from the trade in opium and heroin, and, more recently, methamphetamines. But it would also be fair to say that the organization’s relative wealth today is based on a number of other sources of income as well. Tin mining and the extraction of rare earth metals are believed to be more lucrative than the trade in narcotics. The price of the book, US$145, may make most people interested in the topic reluctant to buy it, but there is also a more affordable Kindle version of this groundbreaking study. Read it—it is well worth it. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-12-07
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-08
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Description: "While the whole country has risen in revolt against the Feb. 1 coup—at first peacefully and then more violently when the military began to open fire on the protesters—there is one part of Myanmar that appears to be unaffected by the nationwide turmoil: the Wa Hills of northeastern Shan State. Ethnic groups like the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) have provided shelter to activists who have fled urban areas and even trained some of them in guerrilla warfare. Other ethnic rebels have at least issued statements condemning Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s power grab, often working together with civil society organizations. Myanmar’s most powerful ethnic army, the 20,000-30,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA), on the other hand, has remained conspicuously silent since the coup. But that doesn’t mean that all Wa agree with the stance that the UWSA and its political wing, the United Wa State Party (UWSP), have taken. On March 25, 10 Wa civil society organizations, among them the Tang-yan Wa Youth Network, university students from the Wa Christian Fellowship and the Wa Women’s Network, sent an open letter to the UWSP/UWSA leadership urging them to say something about the killings and to publicize their stand on the movement for federal democracy. That hasn’t happened, though, and the issue at stake is the UWSA’s close relationship with the security services across the border in China. Those agencies do not want to get involved with any movement that wants to overthrow the coup-installed government in Naypyitaw—and the UWSA is an ally in China’s geostrategic quest for dominance in Myanmar and beyond. Put in plain words, China’s support for the UWSA gives Beijing leverage inside Myanmar, the only neighboring country that provides China with easy and convenient access to the Indian Ocean. When Aung Min, then president’s office minister in the Thein Sein administration, visited Monywa, a town northwest of Mandalay, in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project in the area, he openly admitted: “We are afraid of China…we don’t dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume support to the communists, the economy in the border areas would backslide. So you’d better think seriously.” By “the communists” he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, offshoots of the once China-supported Communist Party of Burma’s (CPB) powerful army, which collapsed after a mutiny among its hilltribe—mainly Wa—rank-and-file in 1989. And he was right. In fact, the UWSA, which like the old CPB is supported by China, has become even stronger and better equipped than the old party ever was. The UWSA’s strength—and the scope of its arsenal—was demonstrated on April 17, 2019, when it celebrated the 30th anniversary of the mutiny against the elderly, orthodox Marxist-Leninist and mainly Burman leadership of the CPB. The CPB with its increasingly anachronistic policies had lost its importance to the Chinese, who are now more interested in exporting consumer goods than Maoist-style revolutions. The old CPB leaders were allowed to retire in China, and the UWSA and three other components of the erstwhile CPB were born. Those four former CPB forces also entered into ceasefire agreements with the then junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which suited China’s interests as well. On that day, a bit over two years ago, thousands of Wa soldiers in impeccable uniforms goose-stepped in perfect formation past the grandstand where their leaders stood at attention. Then came an impressive display of surface-to-air missiles, heavy artillery, mortars, rocket launchers, machine guns, assault rifles, armored personnel carriers and even a weaponized drone. Columns of civilians, mostly Wa tribesmen but also people from other ethnic groups from the over 30,000-square-km area that the UWSA controls along the Chinese border and in the south near Thailand, made their way to the parade grounds. Spectacular fireworks lit up the sky after dark and people cheered and danced through the night. Needless to say, China’s security services do not want to see a war like the one the CPB once fought from the same areas. Such hostilities would mean instability in the border areas, a flood of refugees into China and a disruption of trade between the two countries. But China, almost the sole supplier of weaponry to the UWSA, wants it to be strong enough to deter the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, from even trying to bring its base area under central control. As Aung Min inadvertently admitted, the UWSA has become exactly what the Chinese want: a useful bargaining chip when they want to put pressure on the Myanmar government to get economic concessions. Moreover, before the coup, China was also eager to prevent Myanmar from straying too close to the West. But that is hardly an issue today as the West has condemned the coup and imposed sanctions on the Tatmadaw and affiliated entities. Today, after the coup, China wants to be seen as a moderating voice that, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the opening of the 9th World Peace Forum in Beijing on July 3, is opposed to sanctions and other punitive measures and wants to see a solution to Myanmar’s current crisis “through internal dialogue and reconciliation.” Russia, the other main power that has come out against Western condemnation and sanctions in the wake of the coup, has adopted a similar view. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated during a visit to Jakarta on July 6 that his country supported ASEAN’s five-point proposal for restoring “normalcy” to Myanmar, which includes “a constructive dialogue to find a peaceful solution” to the upheaval. But Wang is not so naïve as to believe that such a dialogue leading to reconciliation is possible, and Lavrov, an experienced diplomat, must realize that ASEAN’s five-point proposal is a nonstarter. Support for ASEAN’s “peace plan”, however, serves as a convenient cover for protecting other interests and opposition to the West’s sanctions policy. For the Russians, it is a question of protecting lucrative arms sales to Myanmar and other economic interests, as well as gaining a new ally in a region where Moscow’s influence has waned since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. China’s long-term objectives go way beyond Russia’s, and access to the Indian Ocean is only one aspect of Beijing’s massive, all-encompassing and ultimately global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure project, which President Xi Jinping launched in 2013. Myanmar’s strategically important location between South and Southeast Asia is of utmost importance to China. There is no doubt that the Wa’s dependence on China is real and overwhelming, militarily as well as economically. Apart from being equipped with Chinese-made weaponry, the Chinese yuan, not the Myanmar kyat, is the preferred currency in the area under UWSA control. People are connected to Chinese mobile phone and internet providers, and petrol and diesel come from China, as do medical supplies and most of the food. Furthermore—and this has escaped the attention of the outside world—the UWSA-controlled area is the only part of Myanmar where nearly everyone has been vaccinated against COVID-19. Supplies and even many of the medics administering the vaccine came from Yunnan, across the border. Nonetheless, it would be a serious mistake to believe that the Wa are hapless Chinese minions and compliant pawns in Beijing’s quest for regional and ultimately global dominance. Many Wa I have met are aware that the Chinese feel superior to them and, in many instances, refer to them as erstwhile headhunters and therefore uncivilized savages. There could be as many as 600,000 Wa in Myanmar—no one knows for sure—and another 400,000 in China, where they are also recognized as an ethnic minority. But what little most Chinese outside Yunnan know about the Wa comes from a series of music videos in which young girls, accompanied by young men beating drums, shake their long hair back and forth. The girls are dressed in red woven skirts with some kind of pattern that looks like it could be of hilltribe origin, and the young men are bare-chested. The problem is that those skirts are much shorter than the sarongs Wa girls would normally wear, and no female living in the hills, where water is scarce, would have hair that long because it would be impossible to keep it clean. Besides, young Wa men these days would not go around dressed in little more than a loincloth, even when taking part in cultural events in their home villages. Tellingly, these dances are not performed in a rural Wa setting but in purpose-built theaters in front of big audiences. The famous “Wa hair dancers” are, in fact, the daughters of city cadres who are of Wa, Chinese, or mixed Wa-Chinese ancestry. According to Swedish anthropologist and Wa expert Magnus Fiskesjö, the Chinese have created “an official socialist-era image of the Wa as a member of the happy family of nationalities within the Chinese nation: as exotic dancers full of primitive energy, now sanitized and harnessed under Communist Party guidance—the socialist-era version of Wa primitivity.” In line with this thinking, ethnic theme parks have been established in several Chinese cities where one of the main attractions is “real Wa headhunters” performing exotic dances. Young Wa, because of their dark complexion, are hired to perform not only as wild Wa but, according to Fiskesjö, as Africans, New Zealand Maori and American Indians. These performers are Wa from Yunnan or Myanmar who have migrated to Chinese cities to find work in factories, and take part in such spectacles to earn some extra money. But it is easy to imagine what the Wa dancers themselves think about their ethnicity and culture being exploited and, in effect, humiliated in this way. No central or local Chinese authority ever controlled, or even showed interest in, the Wa-inhabited areas of southern Yunnan—not until the communist takeover in 1949. Remnants of the defeated Kuomintang (KMT), who had not been able to flee to Taiwan along with their supreme leader Chiang Kai-shek, retreated into those areas and, more importantly, the Wa Hills of Myanmar. Those hills were only nominally part of Myanmar; at that time, headhunting was part of the way of life there, along with local wars and feuds between different tribes and clans. In the early 1950s, the communist Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entered southern Yunnan to prevent the KMT from trying to achieve their stated objective, to “reconquer the Chinese mainland”. Hardly any Chinese had been there before, and the PLA as well as the KMT were seen as foreign forces, so people did not know what to expect and were afraid of them. But the PLA, which needed local support and knowledge of the terrain to be able to push the KMT back into Myanmar, treated the Wa rather leniently. The KMT, on the other hand, could be very rough in its behavior towards the Wa and other tribes in the frontier areas. After a few years of tolerance—and as soon as the KMT threat had been eliminated—the Chinese authorities brought in an entirely new oppressive system aimed at “uprooting feudal superstition”, as the Chinese communist jargon went. Weapons in the possession of Wa tribesmen, who were used to being armed because they depended on hunting, were confiscated and, according to Fiskesjö, all headhunting paraphernalia was destroyed. Social institutions that were important in Wa society were disbanded. Drum-houses, the main meeting place in every Wa village, were torn down and the Wa’s log drums were thrown out or burned. Only a few survive in a few faraway museums, such as those on display at the Yunnan Nationalities University in Kunming, Yunnan’s provincial capital. According to Fiskesjö: “Roadside a nog [head-container posts planted along the approach to a village] were destroyed or abandoned; the fortifications protecting villages were broken up and demolished. The major rituals of the past were abandoned. Chief ritualists and other community leaders were demoted, marginalized, or even persecuted.” Wa elders Fiskesjö spoke to during his research in the area in the 1990s regarded 1958 as the key watershed: “Since in that year the Chinese shifted policy from reconciliation to enforcement.” Even the Wa had to become Chinese communists and were herded into people’s communes. Although this happened in the Wa-inhabited areas of Yunnan, the bitterness based on memories of that repression is deep on both sides of the border. That resentment, and unhappiness with the disgraceful way in which the Wa are being treated in China today, are consequences of a long-standing, strained relationship between these proud tribesmen—regardless of where they live—and the Han Chinese. Since the 1989 mutiny, the UWSA has built up what amounts to a well-organized, de facto self-governing state between Myanmar and China with its own administrative offices, courts, hospitals and schools. It may be argued that a lot of the wealth that has made this possible comes from the trade in narcotics—first opium and heroin and then methamphetamine—and that is something the Wa leadership cannot hide or escape from. Today, other sources of income exist, such as tin and rare earth metals. But the way forward, for the Wa and the rest of Myanmar, would have to take into account the unique history of the Wa, and the fact that they have never been ruled by any central authority. Before independence, colonial presence in the area was limited to occasional flag marches up to what the British perceived as the border with China. Then, in the 1950s and well into the 1960s, KMT warlords and local chieftains ruled the Wa Hills. That was the case until the early 1970s, when the CPB took over the entire border area, including the Wa Hills. And after the 1989 mutiny, of course, the UWSP/UWSA became the new governing body. An enlightened and democratic Myanmar government could through wiser policies than those of the past integrate the Wa Hills with the rest of the country. But the possibility of that happening seems remote: the military, with its chauvinistic approach to ethnic minorities, remains in power in Naypyitaw, and the Chinese are not likely to abandon their strategically important grip over the UWSP/UWSA any time soon. Sadly, the Wa issue is more likely to continue to exist as one of many sources of despair in the seemingly never-ending Myanmar tragedy. But, at least, it deserves a better understanding than what has so far been the case both in Myanmar and internationally. The Wa may be Chinese puppets, but they are no Chinese stooges..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-07-12
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: plantation, dispossession, life, economy, Wa
Topic: plantation, dispossession, life, economy, Wa
Description: "A classic origin story told and retold among the Wa of China and Myanmar is about their flight from Keng Tung: in the long‐ago past, the Wa ruled over the Shan in the great city of Keng Tung.1 But they were tricked by the Shan, who came with an army of elephants and expelled them from the city. Those who went ahead broke plantain leaves along their path so that those coming behind would find the way. But plantains grow back very fast, and the latecomers got lost and had to stay in the plains: the Wa pioneers entered the mountains where they are until today, and the others are the ‘left‐behind Wa’, the Wa Git, or the ‘Hill Thai’, Tai Loi. From then on, every time a new Sawbwa was installed in Keng Tung, some left‐behind Wa were feasted at the palace and then ritually expelled (Enriquez 1918: 33; Mangrai 1981: 230). Today, the Shan of Kengtung recognise their Burmese overlords and have no Sawbwa anymore, but the Tai Loi, the descendants of the Wa, still play an important part in the rituals of Songkran, the Thai New Year Festival, specifically by carrying and playing drums. Even though the rituals imply mutual interdependence, it is clear that the Tai Loi subordinate themselves to the Tai Khuen, the Shan majority group in today’s Keng Tung, thus annually repeating the humiliation of their expulsion centuries ago (Karlsson 2013). Yet, about 100 km to the North of Keng Tung, in Pang Hsang, the capital of the Wa State, we can observe an inversion of the ritual of expulsion. Each year at the Songkran of Pang Hsang, Wa rulers receive gifts from local Shan villagers. Similar to the Shan princes of the past, representatives of the Wa central authorities sit in elevated thrones, while the Shan villagers squat in front of them. During the rituals, the Shan villagers pay their honours to the Wa, deliver presents to them, including fruits, sweets and sticky rice, and in turn receive red envelopes with money from the Wa officials. Most of the leaders of the Wa State are from villages in the hills to the North of Pang Hsang and can easily be distinguished from their Shan subordinates: dark‐skinned and in army fatigues, followed by an entourage of soldiers, no one would mistake them for a Shan villager. The core leaders of the Wa State are relatives and associates of Tax Pang, also known by his Chinese name Bao Youxiang. Tax Pang, and his brothers Tax Rang and Tax Jiet, were born in the village of Taoh Mie in the 1940s and 50s. When they were children, neighbouring armies had just started to move into the Wa hills, and as teenagers they still took part in raids and headhunting rituals. They rose through the ranks of the guerrilla armies of the Communist Party of Burma during the 1970s and 80s, founded the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in 1989, and have been presiding over its de‐facto state since. Like Tax Pang and his brothers, most members of the central committee and politburo of the Wa State are veterans of the Communist Party of Burma. All of them have accumulated substantial personal wealth – bureaucracy and administration is relatively weak, and most infrastructure construction in the Wa State is paid for directly by the elites. The trade in drugs played an important role in the emergence of this elite, but already in the 1990s, they started to diversify into other industries, including mining and food, as well as large‐scale investments in China, Thailand and Myanmar (where they own, for instance, one minor airline). Ordinary villagers and Chinese traders often tell stories about the unimaginable wealth of the Wa commanders: for instance, one commander had so much cash stored in his warehouses that it got mouldy and had to be taken out. His servants dried truckloads of 100‐Yuan batches in the huge courtyard for several days, just like other people would dry corn cobs or tea leaves. Wa villagers who have served in the army or at the house of a commander commonly know that a normal 50 kg rice‐bag can carry three million Chinese yuan (the equivalent of € 380,000). In the warehouse of one Wa commander I have seen two Bentleys, and in one of Pang Hsang’s large garages, a monster truck imported from Thailand that is said to be worth exactly one rice bag full of Chinese money. The elites of the Wa State have effectively turned around the old story of the Wa’s expulsion from the highlands and have re‐conquered the lowlands. During the 1970s and 80s, when they fought with the Communist Party of Burma, Wa soldiers entered the plains of Pang Hsang, Meng Pok and Meng Yawn – traditionally settlements of their Shan neighbours. Since then, the Wa have established a de facto state the size of Belgium, and the core leaders of this state are tightly connected through kinship and business ties. Most of them have grown up in villages at the Chinese border. In their lifetime, they saw huge changes: they have conquered the surrounding valleys and since then have also overseen huge changes to the villages in the hills, where they had grown up. They started off, quite literally, as pioneers, that is, foot soldiers,2 in the Communist Party of Burma. Even though the first generation of Wa leaders rose through the ranks of the army and have become agrarian capitalists, they still define themselves by a pioneering ethos that will become apparent. They have been pioneers in many ways, but here I want to focus on the plantation economies that they have established in the Wa State. Using their income from elsewhere, the elites of the Wa State have invested in new forms of commercial and large‐ scale agriculture. The rubber and tea plantations they have opened rely on the new technologies of transport, communication and production that in the Wa hills were introduced for military purposes. The plantations also required large‐scale forced resettlements, which took place especially during the 1990s but continue until the present day. The plantation economy requires a lot of investment, it often incurs losses (especially rubber, in recent years) and is generally not very profitable. But even so, it is an essential part of the de facto sovereignty of the Wa State, not least because it is a core institution of the military state and its ‘garrison‐entrepôts’ (Roitman 2005): plantations provide radical means to control populations, and thus offer a core nexus between the elites of the Wa State and ordinary villagers – as well as with animals and plants..."
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Source/publisher: Wiley Periodicals LLC
2021-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Challenging Christianity in Wa Special Region
Description: "On 13 September 2018, Myanmar’s largest non-state armed actor, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), issued a statement saying it was curtailing the practising of Christianity. The statement said that all churches built after 1992 would be destroyed as they had been built illegally and that only churches built between 1989 and 1992 were legal. It also noted that authorities would also check on the number of Christian schoolteachers and students in the region.1 In addition, it also said authorities would monitor the activities of organizations that support churches in the region and Evangelical Christians would not be allowed to proselytize at schools.2 Only ethnic Wa would be allowed to train as religious leaders, and they would be under the authority of the UWSA central government. Myanmar media quoted Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) chairman Rev. Samson as saying that that action had been prompted by the work of ‘extremist missionaries’ and, You can’t call them typical Christians. They are just people who want to attack established churches. They are against what we Christians believe.3 According to another media report, the UWSA detained 92 Lahu Christian leaders and 42 Wa students in Shan State, and the students were forced to serve as soldiers.4 There is an estimated 221,000 Lahu living in Myanmar - 80% of whom are Christians with 43% believed to be Evangelical.5 In a statement dated Sept. 25, Lahu Baptist Convention (LBC) said that 52 churches had been closed and stripped of all Christian symbols. Three other churches were demolished, and religious schools shut down, the LBC is based in Kengtung, eastern Shan. In addition, to closing down LBC churches the UWSA have also closed those operated by the Kachin Baptist Convention and the Wa Baptist Convention. On 5 October, 100 ethnic Wa Christians the UWSA had detained were freed, but the group continued to hold more than 100 ethnic Lahu Christians..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The UWSA and Statehood
Description: "Once again, the leader of the United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA) Bao Youxiang has reiterated his call for state recognition of the Wa self-administered zone this time at the organisation’s 30th anniversary. During his speech in the Wa capital of Panghsang, on northern Shan State’s border with China, the chairman apparently told the assembled that Wa state is an inalienable part of the Union of Myanmar, and solemnly promised not to split from it or seek independence.1 In his speech, he was reported as saying, What we need is ethnic equality, ethnic dignity, ethnic autonomy, and we ask the government to give the Wa an autonomous ethnic state; then we will fight for our lives . . . Until our political demands are realized, we will hold high the banner of peace and democracy on one hand, and armed self-defence on the other, and maintain the status quo. 2 The success of the UWSA and its ability to maintain an all but in name autonomous state in Myanmar is largely due to its support from China. The UWSA is especially supported by members of the PLA and Yunnan Province administration. 3 Many Chinese advisers, including Chinese intelligence officers and former PLA personnel, are close to the Wa leadership, and the UWSA often echoes official Chinese talking points. China’s links with the Wa are also strengthened by language, investment, communications, and transport, all of which are linked to Yunnan. 4 While other armed ethnic groups up until the 1990s had also been able to maintain semiautonomous enclaves, the Karen especially, bordering Thailand, this ended when the Thai Government warmed to successive Myanmar military governments. As a result, pressure was put on such groups to acquiesce to the then government, the NMSP ceasefire being an obvious case. The UWSA had not previously maintained ethnic aspirations but was borne out of the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma and is largely a political construct underscored by ethnicity. Khin Nyunt after signing a ceasefire with the group used it to fight against the Mong Tai Army (MTA) and in doing so it was able to take over large swathes of Shan territory north and south of Kengtung which they still control today and see as part of a future Wa State. After signing the 1989 ceasefire agreement, the UWSA used money from the narcotics trade and invested in a number of casinos, hotels, and other entertainment enterprises. One of the five largest banks in Myanmar, Mayflower Bank, prior to its suspension by the Myanmar Government, had been linked to the UWSA and was subsequently accused of money laundering by the U.S. which has designated the UWSA as significant narcotics traffickers under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. In addition, the UWSA also set up a number of other businesses including the Hongpang Group, founded in 1998, and involved in import/export, general trading, production of textiles, wires and cables, electric appliances and agricultural goods. It is also engaged in livestock breeding, gem mining and highway construction. In addition to its more legitimate concerns, the UWSA has also been implicated in the arms trade supplying not only other Myanmar based ethnic armed groups but also Naga and in the past Maoist rebels. Currently, the group has used proxies such as Ho Chin Ting to invest in enterprises such as Yangon Airways and a chain of hotels in Myanmar, among them the luxurious Thanlwin Hotel in Yangon.5 In reality, the Wa region is a prefecture of China in all but name, despite this, the government has asked the UWSA to sign the NCA, but as head of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) alliance which also includes the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), Kachin Independence Organization/ Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA), Palaung State Liberation Front /Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), Peace and Solidarity Committee/Shan State East National Democratic Alliance Association (PSC/NDAA), many of whom continue to fight with government forces, it has rejected calls to do so unless major changes are made to the agreement.6 While many commentators have generally recognised former CPB organisations on a par with those ethnic armed groups that emerged since 1948, the objectives and most importantly the constructs that define them are not similar. While many in the FPNCC believe that the UWSA shares the same over-arching objective in ethnic unity for all – it remains unclear as to whether the UWSA see this as a genuine objective or merely a convenient identifier to achieve its own aims. For the UWSA, the overall veneer of ethnic equality is a useful tool towards establishing its own statehood and assuaging doubts about its somewhat controversial past deeds not to mention those alleged in the present. While Bao Youxiang may call for ‘ethnic equality, ethnic dignity, ethnic autonomy’ which is a particularly noble aspiration, it could be argued when conflict occurred in 2009 against the MNDAA it did little to support their brothers in arms with whom they had an alliance.7 Rather, the UWSA moved to secure its own flank and did little else to change the course of the conflict.8..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The United Wa State Party (UWSP) will cooperate with the Union Election Commission (UEC) to ensure the success of the November elections in the four townships in the Wa self-administered division, a party spokesperson said.
Description: "A UEC delegation led by its chair, U Hla Thein, came to Panghsang, the capital of the Wa region in Shan State, to meet with Wa leaders on the elections last week, said U Nyi Rang, UWSP spokesperson. “In the poll, we will help the UEC, though we cannot say yet whether voting would be held in the four townships. We need to hold more talks,” he added. Of the six townships in the Wa region, four are controlled by the UWSP and two by the government. In the 2010 and 2015 general elections, the UEC did not hold voting in the Wa-controlled townships of Pangwaing, Mine Maw, Panghsang and Narhpan. U Hla Thein urged the leaders of the Wa state government to work together with the poll body in the 2020 elections. He talked about the right to vote and to elect poll representatives. The UWSP submitted eight demands to the UEC, but U Nyi Rang refused to provide details. Xiao Mingliang, vice chair of the UWSP, said the Wa government hopes Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would visit the Wa region, which has often invited the State Counsellor to visit..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
2020-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The United Wa State Army (UWSA), Myanmar’s largest ethnic armed organization, on Wednesday confirmed it had acquired a helicopter, making the northeast-based rebel group the nation’s first to possess such an aircraft. A UWSA spokesman denied speculation that the group’s latest acquisition—which was reportedly ordered and delivered from China—would be used for military purposes, insisting it is only for “personal and leisure use.” U Nyi Rang, the UWSA’s liaison officer, confirmed that the UWSA had acquired a four-seater helicopter, adding that it was purchased late last year and is already in use. It is the first time the UWSA has bought a private helicopter, he added. “It is just for personal use and for leisure, and is not for any other purpose,” he told The Irrawaddy on Wednesday, saying rumors about the UWSA owning military helicopters were false. The UWSA, which has an estimated 30,000 soldiers and 20,000 auxiliary troops, showcased its sophisticated arsenal of military hardware during a parade in April last year. U Nyi Rang declined to divulge the price of the helicopter, where it was bought, or whether the group paid tax on the purchase to the government. However, local news sources have reported the aircraft is Chinese made and was purchased in September 2019. Depending on the model, the price tag for a four-seater private helicopter is in the range of US$250,000–$1,700,000 (about 360 million-2.5 billion kyats), according to two finance and aviation websites..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The United Wa State Party (UWSP) says that they expect the solution for resolving fighting between government troops and northern Myanmar based ethnic armed forces will be found during Chinese President Xi’s visit to Myanmar. The statement issued by UWSP/UWSA (United Wa State Army) welcomes President Xi’s visit to Myanmar and added that peace in northern Myanmar was concerned with Sino-Myanmar relations and development among people (with China). The statement suggests that China plays a crucial role in restoring peace in Myanmar especially a ceasefire with ethnic armed groups in the Northern Alliance..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-01-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Two ethnic armed groups with strong militaries—the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—have both said they welcome the Myanmar government’s move to defend itself against charges of alleged genocide against the Rohingya in 2017 at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. “We welcome [the government’s] courage, embracing responsibility and accountability by going to defend itself instead of issuing denials,” said UWSA liaison officer U Nyi Rang. “The truth cannot be hidden. The court will decide whether there are genocidal crimes or not. We do not support any circumstances which could cause more confusion.” State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is preparing to travel to the UN’s court in The Hague to lead Myanmar’s legal defense team against a lawsuit filed by The Gambia accusing Myanmar of genocide. The Gambia filed the suit on behalf of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on Nov. 11 and the ICJ will hold the first public hearings in the case on Dec. 10-12. The Office of the State Counselor formed the Special Unit on International Criminal Justice on Nov. 26. The unit includes two military officers, one of whom is reportedly an expert on international law..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2019-12-02
Date of entry/update: 2019-12-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "n the northern part of Myanmar next to the Chinese border, there lies a Wa state where the way of life resembles that across the border in China. The yuan has become the main currency, Chinese language is widely spoken, and mobile telephones are connected to Chinese networks. It is also where the United Wa State Party (UWSA), the largest non-state armed group in the country, is located. This April marked the 30th anniversary of an internal coup within the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) by the Wa, with a three-day military parade. During the parade, Bao Youxiang, the President of Wa, even vowed, “We will not hesitate to sacrifice our lives and achieve the goal of being an autonomous state.” This article will discuss the reasons behind such a phenomenon in Wa state, the way and the extent of China’s intervention, and also the challenges faced by the Myanmar government..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
2019-11-23
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Nestled in the hills of eastern Shan State near the China-Myanmar border, Panghsang is the capital of the Wa Region, a self-administered area approved by Myanmar’s Constitution. It is home to Myanmar’s largest and best-equipped ethnic armed group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), with an estimated 30,000 troops and 10,000 auxiliary members, according to Myanmar Peace Monitor. In April, the army celebrated the 30th anniversary of its foundation in Panghsang in grand scale, with columns of troops paraded in the city square. Founded in 1989, the UWSA signed a ceasefire with Myanmar’s then-military government—the State Law and Order Restoration Council—in the same year after splitting from the Communist Party of Burma. It also founded the United Wa State Party and the Wa State People’s Government while pressing the Union government to recognize their region as a state of Myanmar. Despite its location on the Myanmar side of the border, on a stroll around the town you could believe you’re in China. On the streets of Panghsang, most people communicate in Mandarin. Chinese characters, along with Myanmar and Wa translations are emblazoned on shopfronts. Yuan is the currency of choice here. For a good cell phone signal, you’d better connect with a Chinese network. Street signs are written in Myanmar and Chinese. Stores are stocked with goods imported from China..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2019-05-20
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Drug trafficking, United Wa State Army
Topic: Drug trafficking, United Wa State Army
Description: "Two armed men from an illegal drug trafficking gang were killed and eight others were arrested by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) on Tuesday after fighting briefly broke out between the two groups in eastern Shan State near the Thai-Myanmar border, according to the UWSA. UWSA spokesperson Nyi Rang told The Irrawaddy that one of the eight detainees was wounded and that some people escaped during the clash and crossed the border into Thailand. The clash broke out at a village in Hwe Aw Township after the UWSA seized 1.8 million methamphetamine tablets and one gun. The UWSA received a tip last month that a group of illegal drug traffickers was using its territory to transport methamphetamine tablets into Thailand. The UWSA tightened security along the border with Thailand starting on Sept. 10. On Tuesday, the UWSA learned that a group had entered into its territory. When UWSA forces attempted to stop and search the group, the traffickers allegedly attacked the UWSA members..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2019-10-02
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The far east of Myanmar is run by the country's largest rebel army which unilaterally declared it Wa State.
Description: "In Myanmar, it has been almost four years since a so-called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement was signed between ethnic rebel armies and the government. But there is still no sign of lasting peace. Some groups are refusing to sign the document, including what is regarded as East Asia’s largest non-state army, which runs an isolated state on the borders with China and Thailand. Al Jazeera's Wayne Hay takes a rare look at the secretive Wa State..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Al Jazeera" (Qatar)
2019-09-29
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: CHINA, MYANMAR, UNITED WA STATE ARMY, NATIONAL CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, FPNCC
Sub-title: China-backed ethnic army is under pressure to disarm but tells Asia Times ‘if we don’t have weapons, we have nothing’
Topic: CHINA, MYANMAR, UNITED WA STATE ARMY, NATIONAL CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, FPNCC
Description: "Shops, hotels and restaurants in Panghsang, the unofficial capital of Myanmar’s northeastern area controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), display signs in three languages: Wa, Chinese and Bamar. But while Wa, Chinese and other ethnic dialects are widely spoken in the city, very few residents can speak or read, Bamar. Other social and political influences from the country’s largest ethnic group are also largely non-existent. The UWSA and its political wing, the United Wa State Party (UWSP), have what the country’s many ethnic armed organizations crave: an autonomous region with no interference from central authorities, armed forces equipped with sophisticated weapons and, most significantly, bilateral ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar military, one of which has held firm for three decades. Now, however, the UWSA is under pressure to also sign the government’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), an initiative launched by the previous military regime that the current elected administration has made a pre-condition for political talks on the fractious nation’s future as a unitary state or federal union. “The government wants us to give up our weapons, but we can do that only when a political agreement has been reached, and when there is peace in the whole country. Only then, not now,” said Zhao Guoan, a member of the UWSP’s politburo’s standing committee tasked with handling foreign affairs, in an Asia Times interview..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2019-09-18
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "It has a standing army of 25,000, manufactures its own guns and conscripts at least one member of each household -- meet the United Wa State Army: Communist, reclusive, China-backed rebels determined to protect their supremacy over Myanmar's badland border zone. Thousands of soldiers, including a company of women and a sniper platoon in combat webbing, marched early Wednesday alongside armoured vehicles in Panghsang, the capital of the ethnic Wa, which borders China's Yunnan province.It was a show of force marking 30 years since Communist Wa rebels prodded Myanmar into a ceasefire leading to the establishment of special, semi-autonomous zone, marshalled by Bao Youxiang, chief of one of the world's largest non-state armies. This week the normally inscrutable Wa extended a rare invite to foreign media to their isolated territory to show off their military muscle and deliver a defiant message of self-sufficiency within Myanmar's borders..."
Source/publisher: "Bangkok Post" via AFP
2019-04-17
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: MYANMAR, UNITED WA STATE ARMY, NATIONAL CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, BAO YOUXIANG
Sub-title: UWSA leader Bao Youxiang tells Asia Times in an exclusive interview why the world’s arguably largest and best-equipped non-state army is reluctant to lay down its guns
Topic: MYANMAR, UNITED WA STATE ARMY, NATIONAL CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, BAO YOUXIANG
Description: "Columns of soldiers goose-stepped in perfect formation on a parade ground. Trucks towed heavy weaponry while armored fighting vehicles drove past a grandstand of observers. The ceremonial show of force along the Myanmar-Chinese border in mid-April was similar to military muscle-flexing in many places in the world. But this was no normal fighting force; it was the United Wa State Army (UWSA), arguably the largest and best-equipped non-state army worldwide. The ethnic Wa were celebrating the 30th anniversary of the founding of their own military force in what effectively amounts to a self-governing buffer state between Myanmar and China. Myanmar security authorities prevented foreign journalists from attending the celebrations at the UWSA’s Pangkham headquarters, which was attended by thousands of tribesman from both sides of the China-Myanmar border.
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times"
2019-04-17
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Myanmar’s United Wa State Army, a militia long known for drug trafficking, has emerged as the core of resistance to the government’s peace plan
Description: "After nearly six years of fruitless peace talks in Myanmar, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the country’s largest and most heavily armed ethnic force, has asserted its until now dormant power over the process. Behind the UWSA looms China’s security services, a key but often unspoken actor in Myanmar’s northern ethnic wars. Together they have outmaneuvered and marginalized the Western governments, peace promotion outfits and think tanks that have been intimately involved in Myanmar’s peace process since it was first launched by then President Thein Sein in 2011 and since sustained by Aung San Suu Kyi’s nearly one-year-old elected National League for Democracy party-led government. Western government-sponsored seminars, workshops​ and “capacity-building” peace projects have been overshadowed in the past year by the UWSA’s more concrete and impactful initiatives. Those have included meetings held at its Panghsang headquarters​ in the autonomous area it controls near the Chinese border, where ethnic armed groups have agreed on common strategies to deal with Myanmar’s central, civil and military authorities. The UWSA has also impacted the battlefield by providing its ethnic allies with munitions to fight against the Myanmar army..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times"
2017-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Two Wa political parties have asked the government to allow their people to move freely in northern Shan State after authorities blocked members of the ethnic group from traveling to Kyaingtong and Tachilek. Ethnic Wa in the two major towns have also been stopped from returning to their homes near Pangsang Township. Meanwhile, ethnic Wa students who have just finished exams at government schools have also been prevented from going back to their homelands, according to a joint statement released by the Wa Democracy Party and the Wa National Unity Party. ?Blocking them from traveling benefits no one. We are asking the government to let our civilians travel,” said Nyi Palote, chairman of the Wa National Unity Party..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Reuters via "The Irrawaddy"
2018-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2018-02-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: In den Grenzregionen des Shan State im Nordosten Burmas, die seit 1989 unter der Kontrolle der United Wa State Army (UWSA) ist, werden 65 Prozent des gesamten Opiums des Landes angebaut. Trotz der Bereitschaft der Landwirte konnten wegen minderwertiger Bodenbeschaffenheit und klimatischer Bedingungen bisher noch keine Erfolg versprechenden Alternativen zum Opiumanbau realisiert werden. Seit dem kompletten Bann im Jahre 2005 werden tiefgreifende humanitäre Konsequenzen für die Region in Form von Menschenhandel, Armut und mangelnder Sicherheit befürchtet. keywords: ethnic minorities, Wa, Shan State, opium production, opium trafficking, resettlement
Creator/author: Michael Tröster
Source/publisher: Asienhaus Focus Asien Nr. 26; S. 45-55
2005-12-29
Date of entry/update: 2006-03-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: Deutsch, German
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Description: THE PROPOSAL: "We, the leadership of the United WA State Party (UWSP) and the United WA State Army (UWSA) propose to anyone who might be interested, that we eradicate opium growing and stop the production of heroin in all the territory controlled by the WA. This we are willing to do. It can be done very quickly. I have full authority to speak for the United WA State Party and the United WA State Army which has ample power to carry out this proposal... THE PLEA" The plea is a necessary part of the proposal. We need food for our people while we develop substitute crops. Our people are already so poor that to take away opium production without giving them food would mean starvation. Beyond that, we need help of every appropriate kind to make the transition from an opium-based economy to a new agricultural economy..."
Creator/author: Ta Saw Lu
Source/publisher: United Wa State Party (UWSP) Foreign Affairs Department
1993-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2003-07-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : htm
Size: 41.91 KB
Local URL:
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Description: "Beginning 1999 up to March this year (2002), hundreds of thousands of Wa people, who had impressed British travelers as ?exceedingly well-behaved, industrious, and estimable race?, were forcibly moved to border areas adjacent Thailand. The report is about them, why and how they were uprooted, what happened to the native people where the Wa were forced to resettle and what the reader can do to help both categories of victims..." Important, timely and well-produced document, complete with maps and photos.
Source/publisher: Lahu National Development Organization
2002-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : pdf
Size: 2.55 MB
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