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Description: "What drives demand for migrant and refugee smuggling in Southeast Asia? New research from UNODC Bangkok, 26 March 2024 Tens of thousands of people are smuggled every year in Southeast Asia because of conflict, corruption and a lack of options for regular travel, according to new research launched today by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). “Migrant smuggling is often not a free or voluntary choice, but an act of desperation, to seek security, safety or opportunity, or freedom from threat of harm, oppression or corruption,” says Masood Karimipour, Regional Representative of UNODC in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. “The data shows that smugglers may be individual actors, loosely connected criminals, or organized groups. Bringing them to justice is an important part of protecting the people seeking safety and a better life.” Refugees from countries like Myanmar (particularly Rohingya people), Afghanistan and Somalia frequently lack travel or ID documents. They face a lack of prospects for stability, safety and economic and educational opportunities in their countries of origin or in the countries they arrived to first (e.g., Bangladesh, Islamic Republic of Iran, or Ethiopia). Smugglers, the research notes, can be their only or ‘least bad’ option for individuals seeking international protection or a sustainable solution. One in four of the 4,785 smuggled refugees and migrants surveyed said that climate-related issues – including flooding, storms, drought, extreme temperatures or livestock or crop disease – influenced their decision to migrate and use smugglers. Corruption both enables and drives migrant smuggling in the region, the research found. 25 per cent of smuggled people surveyed reported giving officials a gift, money or a favour in return for a service. Corruption also drives demand for migrant smuggling, because people think that they need smugglers to help them deal with corrupt authorities. The research goes on to explore the different smuggling routes taken within the region by land, sea and air. The modi operandi of smugglers are examined, with the research showing that refugees and migrants or their family and friends initiate contact with the smugglers in 69 per cent of cases, rather than being actively approached by smugglers. People paid, on average, US $2,380 per person in smuggling fees in the region, though the sums varied widely. Finally, the research study analyses the different types of abuses experienced by smuggled migrants and refugees. It finds that three out of four smuggled people surveyed experienced some form of abuse during their journeys, perpetrated by military, police, smugglers, border guards or criminal gangs..."
Source/publisher: UN Office on Drugs and Crime
2024-03-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-26
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Description: "Myanmar Red Cross Society has been providing humanitarian assistance to most needed communities in line with the Fundamental Principles. On March 20, 2024, volunteers and staffs of the Myanmar Red Cross Society delivered essential relief items to 168 families affected by current situation who displaced in Taung Pulu Monastery, Baptist Church and two villages in Mindat Township, Chin State. During this distribution effort, we provided 139 Pcs of Dignity Kits, 138 Pcs of Hygiene Kids, 5 Pcs of Clean Delivery Kits, 64 Pcs of Psychosocial Support Kits for Children, 52 Pcs of Infant Kits, 66 Packs of Clothing for Children, 168 Mosquito nets, 168 Blankets, 107 Tarpaulins, 336 Bottles of cooking oil (1 liter), 168 Packs of Salt, 168 Packs of Dry Fish, and 168 Packs of Beans. Our effort provided significant assistance to them, despite not being entirely tailored to their requirements. It effectively addresses the specific needs of communities. The Myanmar Red Cross Society remains dedicated to delivering such humanitarian aid to communities in need..."
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Red Cross Society"
2024-03-24
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "SG/SM/22167 The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres: The Secretary-General remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation and escalation of conflict in Myanmar. He condemns all forms of violence and reiterates his call for the protection of civilians including aid workers in accordance with international humanitarian law, for the cessation of hostilities, and humanitarian access. The expansion of conflict in Rakhine State is driving displacement and exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities and discrimination. The Secretary-General calls on all parties to prevent further incitement of communal tensions. He is alarmed by reports of ongoing airstrikes by the military, including today in Minbya township that reportedly killed and injured many civilians. He is concerned by reports of forcible detention and recruitment of youths, including Rohingya, and the potential impact of forced conscription on human rights and on the social fabric of communities in Myanmar. The Secretary-General calls for sustained international and regional attention to the crisis in Myanmar, including through strengthening regional refugee protection efforts and responsibility sharing with countries hosting those fleeing persecution and violence. Addressing the root causes of systemic discrimination in Myanmar and seeking accountability for serious violations of international law will be central to any lasting solution to the crisis. The United Nations is committed to staying and delivering in Myanmar and to working with all stakeholders, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional actors, to attain sustainable peace. For information media. Not an official record..."
Source/publisher: UN Secretary-General
2024-03-18
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-18
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Description: "This Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) is a suppliment to the MAU Market Price Report in South Sagaing Region. It provides township-level data on market functionality, activity, supply, and logistics. Data were collected through observation and KIIs with retailers during Feb. 21-27, 2024. Reports available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS • Markets remained open and operational, but security was poor in Myaung, Shwebo and Yinmarbin; • Many foods and NFIs were available, although NFIs were generally less available than food items; • Fuel and medicines were scarce regionwide, and and rice and cooking oil were limited in Monywa; • Regional trade remained possible, but supply lead times ranged from two days to two weeks; • Monywa, Mandalay and Yangon supplied goods to markets in the region, and costs were fairly stable; • Security and transportation were key challenges for retailers, while other challenges were moderate. Regional Overview Market Functionality - Markets continued to operate regularly, but security was poor in some markets. Markets were generally open and there were no reports of recent damage or closures, but markets in Myaung, Shwebo Town, and Yinmarbin were described as relatively unsafe. Market Activity - Activity in town and village markets was stable or falling in recent months. Markets in Shwebo and Yinmarbin had contracted sharply in past months, and customer activity was down in Monywa Town market. Other markets saw little change in activity, while the Ye-U village had seen customers increase as peopled visited from other townships. Availability of Goods - Goods were generally available in markets, but fuel and medicines were scarce. The availability of food items was sometimes better than for NFIs, but overall many goods were available. The Yinmarbin village market was an exception as it lacked some foods and many NFIs. Poor availability of fuel and medical-related items was common across markets in the region. Transport & Logistics - Retailers supplied from Yangon, Mandalay and Monywa, but lead-times varied. Supply lead-times varied greatly by market and ranged from as little as two days to as much as two weeks. Retailer Challenges - Retailers struggled most with security and transportation. Poor security was a common concern for retailers across markets, as was poor transportation and supply. Retailers in Shwebo Town reported the most challenges, and Shwebo and Yinmarbin retailers both reported weak demand. Possible Interventions - Retailers said interventions could help them increase inventory but only slightly. Most retailers were willing and able to increase inventory provided support, but they were likely to increase it only slightly. This may be due to the fact that goods appeared to be already fairly available in most of the markets monitored. What to Watch • Availability of fuel and medicines was consistently poor across the region; • Security concerns in Monywa in early-March may further reduce customer activity in this key market; • Remote village markets like that in Yinmarbin likely face poorer food and NFI availability..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-03-15
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Council Fifty-fifth session 26 February–5 April 2024 Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Situation of human rights in Myanmar Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews* Summary The human rights and humanitarian crisis precipitated by the 2021 military coup has continued to worsen in Myanmar. The military junta has responded to mounting losses of troops and territory by escalating its aerial attacks on villages, blocking humanitarian aid, and announcing plans to draft thousands of young people into the military. Many have gone into hiding, fled the country, or joined resistance forces. The people of Myanmar have responded with courage, resolve, and defiance. Armed resistance forces are steadily gaining ground, securing territory as they hand junta forces stunning losses. Civil Disobedience Movement health care workers are working tirelessly to serve those in need even as clinics and hospitals are attacked. “Citizen sanctions” persist as people refuse to purchase goods or services that are linked to the junta. Silent strikes and “pop-up” protests demonstrate defiance and encourage a weary population. Many in Myanmar express deep disappointment in the international community’s response to the crisis. They are frustrated by the failure of the UN Security Council to act and see clear signals that Myanmar lacks significance to UN and world leaders, their rhetoric notwithstanding. In this report, the Special Rapporteur identifies opportunities for the international community to support the people of Myanmar. Member States should strengthen coordinated action to deprive a weakened junta of weapons, money, and legitimacy, take steps to ensure accountability for the perpetrators of atrocity crimes, and support the efforts of leaders forging a political framework for a just, peaceful, and democratic Myanmar. Donors and humanitarian organizations must ensure that desperately needed humanitarian aid reaches those with the greatest needs, including displaced populations in conflict areas. The Special Rapporteur urges the international community to seize these opportunities. *The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-03-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-15
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Description: "NATIONAL SOCIETY PROFILE: The Myanmar Red Cross Society is the oldest humanitarian organisation in Myanmar. It began its operations in 1920 as a branch of the Indian Red Cross. After Burma formally separated from India in 1937, the Society obtained official national status and was admitted to the International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in 1946. The role of the National Society, as enshrined in the Myanmar Red Cross Society Law 2015, mentions it serves independently and voluntarily as the auxiliary strength of the State in the humanitarian field, in accordance with the Red Cross Red Crescent Fundamental Principles. The Myanmar Red Cross Society has an extensive reach and operates through 65 district branches, and branches in each of the country’s 330 townships. The National Society also counts with 17 supervisory committees (states, regions and Naypyitaw Union Territory), and has branches in universities, colleges, and sub-branches at town, ward, village tract and schools across the country. The Myanmar Red Cross Society Strategic Plan (2021-2025) sets the following three goals: Build healthier and safer communities, reduce their vulnerabilities and strengthen their resilience Promote understanding and respect for the Red Cross Principles, Humanitarian Values, and International Humanitarian Law as a means to promoting social cohesion and non-violence Strengthen understanding of the Myanmar Red Cross’s auxiliary role among the humanitarian sector by developing a strong, well-functioning and resourceful National Society. According to its Strategic Plan, 2021–2025, with partner support, the Myanmar Red Cross aims to equip Red Cross volunteers, state, region and township branches and the national headquarters with the technical, financial and material resources “to be a well-functioning National Society with the capacity of providing humanitarian services to the most vulnerable people in Myanmar and beyond”. The National Society plans to extend its traditional emergency response activities – including the delivery of ambulance and first aid services, primary health care, water, sanitation and hygiene services, psychosocial support and protection – while also developing its preparedness through disaster risk reduction, anticipatory action and resilience building. To support these ambitions, the National Society plans to enhance its institutional capacity through branch development and decentralization, volunteer and youth management and capacity building, resource mobilization and human resource management, and partnership frameworks..."
Source/publisher: International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-03-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-14
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Description: "Highlights: At the end of February 2024, more than 2.7 million people have been internally displaced in Myanmar and are living in precarious conditions. More than 18.6 million people (including six million children) are in need of humanitarian aid in 2024 more than 18 times the number before the military takeover in February 2021. UNICEF Myanmar launched its 2024 Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal for US$ 208.3 million to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to 3.1 million people, including 2.1 million children. This funding is crucial for UNICEF to ensure children get the basic social services they need, plus meeting multisectoral humanitarian needs across the country. UNICEF aims to reach 850,000 people with critical WASH supplies; 350,000 children and women with primary health care services; and to support more than 890,000 children with access to education services..." Situation in Numbers 6,000,000 children in need of humanitarian assistance 18,600,000 people in need (HAC 2024) 2,448,200 Internally displaced people after 1 February 2021 (UNHCR) 59,300 People displaced to neighbouring countries since 1 February 2021 306,200 people living in protracted displacement before February 2021
Source/publisher: UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-03-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "On March 4, 2024, the French lawyers William Bourdon and Lily Ravon reported Htoo Htwe Tay Za, also known as Rachel Tayza, to Italian authorities on behalf of Justice For Myanmar, requesting that they investigate her involvement as a shareholder and director of companies that are part of the EU-sanctioned Htoo Group of Companies, and where appropriate, to freeze her assets and to remove her from Italy. Rachel Tayza has continued to reside in Italy and conduct business for the EU-sanctioned Htoo Group of Companies, a crony conglomerate that is owned by her family. Htoo Group is a key node in the Myanmar military’s international network of businesses that provides it with funds, arms and equipment, which aids and abets genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It does this though its network of more than 60 businesses in Myanmar and Singapore in sectors throughout the economy, including extractive industries. Htoo Group is also sanctioned by the US, UK and Canada. In its reasons for sanctions, the EU noted, “Htoo Group of Companies has acted as an intermediary for the provision of military equipment which was used against civilian populations protesting against the 1 February coup, all across the country and in particular in areas with ethnic minorities.” William Bourdon and Lily Ravon also submitted a dossier to Rachel Tayza’s bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which is owned by BNP Paribas, urging that they take action under EU sanctions. Rachel Tayza has been residing in Milan, where she recently completed her studies at a fashion school, supported by proceeds from Htoo Group of Companies, according to a Justice For Myanmar investigation. While in Italy, Rachel has continued to hold shares and act as director of at least seven Htoo Group companies, including ones newly formed after the military’s coup attempt, and those in direct business with the Myanmar army. This includes Ayeyarwaddy Resorts and Lodges Company Limited, which has build-operate-transfer contracts with the Myanmar army’s EU-sanctioned Office of the Quarter Master General. One of their projects is for a commercial project on 22 acres of land in Yangon, which provides the military with approximately USD$1.65 million annually under a 50-year contract, according to Myanmar Investment Commission data released by Distributed Denial of Secrets. Other companies Rachel holds shares in and serves as a director from Italy are Pegu Wood Company Limited, a subsidiary of Htoo Capital Company Limited, and One Fibre Company Limited, a subsidiary of Htoo Tech Company Limited, both established after the military’s illegal coup attempt. Rachel was previously a director and shareholder in the now dissolved Myanmar Avia Export Company Limited, a Myanmar military arms broker that supplied Russian military aircraft and spare parts. Rachel was sanctioned by the USA on January 31, 2023 for her active role in Htoo Group of Companies and for being the adult daughter of the Htoo Group Chairperson, Tay Za. Tay Za is sanctioned by the EU, USA, UK and Canada. Rachel’s brothers, Pye Phyo Tay Za and Htoo Htet Tay Za, are sanctioned by the USA, UK and Canada. In addition to providing arms, Htoo Group donated funds to the Myanmar military in 2017 in support of their campaign of genocide against the Rohingya, a fact noted in the EU’s sanctions designation against the conglomerate. Justice For Myanmar urges the EU to impose sanctions on the whole Htoo Group network of companies and individuals, including Rachel Tayza, as well as all other Myanmar junta cronies and arms brokers. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “Weak sanctions enforcement by Italian authorities has allowed Rachel Tayza to do business in Italy that funds an illegal and illegitimate military junta. “Rachel Tayza and her family have long aided and abetted the Myanmar military’s endless war crimes and crimes against humanity through Htoo Group of Companies and profited from the bloodshed of Myanmar people. “Rachel Tayza should be held accountable under EU sanctions and Italy needs to ensure that she and no other Myanmar cronies can do their bloodstained business on Italian soil. “The EU and other governments need to do far more to block the junta’s access to funds and arms through more concerted, strategic and coordinated sanctions that cover whole networks of companies, and through far stronger enforcement. “For three years, the people of Myanmar have courageously resisted the military’s failing attempted coup. “Italy and the EU must stand with the people of Myanmar in the struggle to build a new and inclusive Myanmar that respects human rights and guarantees justice and accountability.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
2024-03-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-08
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Description: "A month after the prime minister of Bangladesh raised concerns about the possibility of Rohingya repatriation, UNHCR representatives in Myanmar met with the junta’s education minister on February 7 to discuss repatriation. Meanwhile, Bangladeshi officials are reluctant to act in any way that might be perceived as taking sides between the junta and the ethnic Arakan Army; Bangladesh has perhaps started to understand there is a new sheriff in Rakhine, just across the Naf River. But what do AA victories mean for the Rohingya repatriation promoted by the UNHCR and the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh? Our answer is that after 45 years of persecution of the Rohingya: Not much. The Rohingya also know that safety conditions have actually become worse in Rakhine since they fled. The million stateless Rohingya refugees living in Cox’s Bazar is still one of the world’s most intractable refugee situations. Their Myanmar homeland insists they are foreigners from Bangladesh; their Bangladeshi hosts insist that they belong in the land of their birth, Myanmar. The rebellious AA insist that they can be part of a new Rakhine, but only if they meet AA conditions, and not as equals. And to top it off, the junta’s military has started to conscript the few Rohingya still in Myanmar to fight against the AA. Humanitarians from the UN, meanwhile, have tired of an impoverished population that has poor English, few urban skills, and is easily dismissed as different and even primitive. Thus, even as hundreds of Rohingya are drowning at sea, the border post to Bangladesh has been captured by AA forces, and Sittwe itself may come under siege, Myanmar, Bangladesh and the UNHCR avoid the subject of resettlement in third countries, claiming simply that “Rohingya refugees require sustained, predictable and adequate financial support to live safely and decently, and to prepare for a sustainable return.” This would perhaps be promising, except that of course the voluntary repatriation policy was tried before, beginning in 1978, the first time UNHCR became involved in a Rohingya refugee movement. The Tatmadaw has repeatedly expelled the Rohingya as a way to reinforce Burmanization policies adopted after the military coup in 1962. Persecuted by Tatmadaw; viewed as primitive by global community? For centuries, Rohingyas lived in Rakhine, predating the British East India Company in 1824, and more were brought in by British colonizers to farm between 1824 and 1938. Many were Muslim but engaged in a range of religious practices also seen in neighboring British Bengal. In 1962, the hyper-nationalist Burmese Buddhist forces of the Ne Win regime seized control, and defined the Rohingya as ineligible for citizenship unless they could prove their ancestors were in Rakhine before the 1824 British conquest. General Ne Win’s military insisted that the Rohingya were foreign citizens and initiated mass deportation of 200,000 in 1978. A quick repatriation occurred with the help of UNHCR. Most were pushed back to Myanmar after an experienced UN observer remarked that the lack of food and basic sanitation in the camps led to them becoming “death traps.” A similar episode happened in 1990 when the military deported 250,000 Rohingya, using Islamophobia to divert attention of the ethnic Bamar from the developments of 1988 pro-democracy movements. And just as in 1978, a quick repatriation was arranged with UNHCR help. History repeated in 2012 when Rakhine was again cleared of Rohingya. The repatriation back to Myanmar was not as aggressive but the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar just grew larger. Then finally in 2017, the greatest expulsion of all was undertaken by the Burmese military, and perhaps another 800,000 Rohingya fled after the Tatmadaw burned villages, committed massacres, and ethnically cleansed Rakhine of its Rohingya population. And still, now seven years later, the international response is ambivalent, even as some 30,000 Rohingya babies are born each year, and hundreds of thousands of young children grow up in refugee camps where radicalization is a predictable by-product. Trapped by righteousness of historical narratives The Rohingya ultimately are trapped between competing and complex historical narratives. Myanmar’s nationalist Burmanization narrative continues to insist that the Myanmar people are defined by government-determined nationalities called Taingyingtha, which are considered sub-groups of the dominant Burmese Buddhist majority. By such definitions, Rohingya were foreigners and intruders from British Bengal; righteousness by this logic demands that they return to its successor state, Bangladesh. And of course, Bangladesh’s own citizenship definition excludes Rohingya because the British in 1824 classified Rohingya as Burmese. To complicate matters further, the Buddhists of Rakhine themselves are in revolt against the Burmese military and have occupied border posts between Myanmar and Bangladesh. The AA’s General Twan Mrat Naing recently told the BBC that, if “Rohingyas or Bengalis or Chittagonian Muslims” would like to enjoy the benefits of equal treatment under [Arakan] law, they must get along with other ethnic groups and abandon contesting “doctored” historical narratives and claims of Rohingyas. In other words, ethnic Rakhine communities, which root their own identity in historical claims of Buddhist Arakan dominance, have attitudes toward the Rohingya that are similar to the heirs of the Konbaung Kingdom ruling from modern Naypyitaw. For all that, nobody has seriously asked the Rohingya where they fit in a future Myanmar or Rakhine. As a result, the million Rohingya are trapped in Cox’s Bazar as wards of the international humanitarian regime represented by the UNHCR. There they are accused of being freeloaders in the international humanitarian system which created the camps in the first place. There they have been repeatedly excluded from their rights as refugees. Jeff Crisp, formerly of the UNHCR, described the Rohingya as being among the most disadvantaged refugees not only because they are caught between Burma and Bangladesh, but because the Rohingya were assumed by the UNHCR to be primitive, and repatriation to Myanmar considered the only solution. They were excluded from the mass resettlement assistance successfully extended to Indochinese, Yugoslavians, Ukrainians, Europeans and millions of others who moved beyond refugee camps while retaining their right to eventually return. And then there is the demography problem… In short, the Rohingya refugee problem cannot be resolved through wishful thinking of the UNHCR, Myanmar or Bangladesh governments about mass repatriation. About 30,000 Rohingya have been born every year in the camps since 2017, a rate that will accelerate soon. Indeed, a 2022 survey showed that 22% of the refugees were under 5 years old, which means they were mostly born in the camps after 2018. Doing nothing is to court a long-term disaster, from the radicalization of the young population, or perhaps a Bay of Bengal typhoon. What this means is that there are now over 1 million Rohingya trapped in the camps. Without resettlement policies, the number will begin doubling every 20 years or so, meaning 1 million will become 2 million. The basic demographic reality is that the population will be young, energetic, and excluded. The question is only what their energies will be turned toward: engagement with the modern world, or rebellion and dreams of violent return. Looking forward: Resolution of refugee problems But the Rohingya situation is not the first seemingly intractable refugee crisis. Indeed, probably the most intractable is the Palestinian refugee crisis which has festered in the Middle East since 1948, and which despite the successful resettlement of millions of Palestinians across the Middle East (2 million in Jordan alone), continues to produce explosions, even in 2024. It is well beyond this article to suggest solutions for the Palestinian refugee situation, except to note that the Palestinian situation is a warning of how badly things can go wrong when there is too much wishful thinking about quick repatriation. But not all refugee situations turn into the Palestinian situation in Gaza. Also relevant for Rohingya refugees is how the Indochinese refugee situation was resolved after perhaps 3 million fled between 1975 and 1990. Perhaps 250,000 died at sea, but the remainder made it to neighboring countries, especially Thailand, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines. There they were housed in camps like those in Cox’s Bazar today. There was also of course great hope that “all” would return to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. But most did not. The largest numbers are in the United States, China, and in the case of Cambodians, in Vietnam. More such refugees and their descendants are still in Thailand. Similarly, the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s saw millions resettled in Europe. Decades earlier, 10 million European refugees from World War II were dispersed across Europe, North America and, in the case of the survivors of the Holocaust, to Israel. Following the Bangladesh Revolution in 1972, India and Bangladesh cooperated to resettle 10 million refugees back in Bangladesh – an exception to the general rule that a good proportion of refugees end up resettled outside the home country. Indeed, the current president of Bangladesh, Sheikha Hasina, was herself a refugee in the 1980s. Unresolved refugee crises today also include the millions of Syrians who are hosted mostly in the Middle East or Germany, Ukrainians who have taken sanctuary in European countries, and Venezuelans who are being hosted in Colombia, Ecuador, and other neighboring countries. Refugee problems require regional solutions All this is a way of saying that the Rohingya situation does not need to end up like Gaza, and will not if there is a concerted international effort to address the needs of the Rohingya from a regional perspective, just like was done with the former Yugoslavians, Europeans, and Ukrainians. Myanmar’s war-torn zones are likely to remain unsettled, and in the short term will offer little potential for refugee return – in fact, a premature return to AA territory is likely to victimize the Rohingya further. The mid-term solution is of course to integrate Rohingya into the burgeoning cities of South and Southeast Asia, where there are labor shortages. Indeed, this is happening with Venezuelans in Colombia and Ecuador; Ukrainians in Europe; and Syrians in Turkey and the Middle East. This does not mean that the refugees give up their right to return to a homeland. But spreading responsibility means that the generosity of single hosts is not stretched, and radicalized refugee groups seeking violent return are less likely to develop. Prospects for the Rohingya to return to Myanmar in future can be retained, despite the current uncertainty over when a peaceful return may be possible. And indeed the Rohingya will be the best to judge this. The frustrating aspect, from the perspective of the existing nation-state system, is that such a regional solution implies letting the Tatmadaw get away with atrocities, at least in the short term. It also runs the risk of incentivizing further bad behavior by the Tatmadaw or perhaps even the AA. This is a puzzle for the regional and international actors to ponder. But, to reduce the risk of catastrophe, the UNHCR, ASEAN, and nearby countries need to be more willing to share the burden of hosting Rohingya refugees, which currently falls primarily on Bangladesh, albeit reluctantly. Tony Waters is a Visiting Professor at Leuphana University, Germany, and formerly at Payap University Chiang Mai. R.J. Aung (a pseudonym) is a former peace and development worker in Yangon and Thailand, and a native of Yangon..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-03-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "This Short Update describes events that occurred in Htaw Ta Htoo (Htantabin) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District during the period between September and November 2023, including house burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes. In September 2023, tensions were heightened between the State Administration Council (SAC) and local armed resistance groups in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo Township, after People’s Defence Force (PDF) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) extrajudicially killed an SAC soldier who had been sent to the area as a spy. After this killing, the SAC burned down at least 27 villagers’ houses in five different villages, shelled mortars into villages, and conducted air strikes in the area, causing three casualties. The shelling injured one villager, damaged five villagers’ houses and one shop, as well as plantations, and killed one cow. The air strikes injured two villagers and damaged a villager’s house.[1] House burning in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract From the second week of August 2023, combined forces of the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[2] and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[3] increased their military activities in every village in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo (Htantabin) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. As reported by local villagers, Maung[4] Kyaw Htun, a soldier from State Administration Council (SAC)[5] Infantry Battalion (IB)[6] #39, was ordered by his leader to return to his parents’ village, A--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, to investigate the military activities of the KNLA and PDF there while posing as a civilian. Soldiers from the KNLA and PDF knew about this situation. On September 12th 2023, the KNLA and PDF arrested Maung Kyaw Htun whilst he was at his father’s house, took him to a place outside the village, and killed him. Maung Kyaw Htun’s family members went to SAC IB #39 army camp immediately after finding out he was killed and informed the SAC about what had happened. On September 13th 2023, at 6 am, SAC combined forces, including IB #39 which is based in Lay Maing village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, went with five military trucks and two artillery trucks to A--- village, B--- village, and C--- village, in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. At around 10 am on September 14th 2023, these SAC combined forces burned down four houses in B--- village. The owners of those houses are Saw[7] D---, Saw E---, Saw F--- and Saw G---. Also on this day, these SAC combined forces burned down seven houses in C--- village. The owners of those houses are Ko[8] H---, Ko I---, Ko J---, Ko K---, a daughter of Ko K---, Daw[9] L---, and Daw M---. After the SAC troops burned down villagers’ houses in these two villages, they stayed in B--- village for three days. On the third day, September 16th, at 6 am, the SAC troops retreated from the village and returned to their army camp. On the afternoon of September 16th 2023, KNLA and PDF soldiers burned down Maung Kyaw Htun’s father’s house. This contributed to increasingly heightened tensions between local armed resistance groups and SAC troops in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. On October 20th 2023, SAC combined forces, including IB #39, went to N--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, where they burned down three villagers’ houses. The owners of those houses are Saw O---, Saw P--- and Saw Q---. On November 12th 2023 at 1:30 pm, the combined forces of the KNLA and PDF attacked these SAC troops using tripwire bombs in a place between A--- village and N--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, after which fighting broke out. On the evening of November 12th 2023, the SAC troops burned down nine houses in B--- village, as well as four houses in A--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. Villagers whose houses were burned down in B--- village are Saw R---, Saw S---, Saw T---, Saw U---, Maung V---, Naw[10] W---, Naw X---, Saw Y--- and Saw Z---. Villagers whose houses were burned down in A--- village are Aa---, Ko Ab---, Ko Ac--- and Ko Ad---. The SAC combined forces that are based in Lay Maing village, including IB #39, often fired mortar shells into villages and surrounding areas where they thought the KNLA and PDF soldiers might stay, regardless of whether fighting had occurred or not. During the reporting period, the SAC also conducted air strikes in this area. Indiscriminate shelling into Day Loh Mu Nu village tract On October 19th 2023, at around 1 pm, the SAC combined forces, including IB #39 that is based in Lay Maing village, indiscriminately fired rounds of mortars into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo Township, Taw Oo District. These villages include A---, B---, C---, N---, Ae---, Af---, Ag---, and Ah--- villages. One of the mortar shells landed in a shop owned by U[11] Ai--- in C--- village. The mortar shell exploded, damaging the shop. On November 17th 2023, the SAC troops indiscriminately fired mortar shells into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. One of the mortar shells landed in a farm near Ae--- village. It exploded and its shrapnel killed a cow owned by Saw Aj---. On November 19th 2023, the SAC troops again indiscriminately fired rounds of mortar into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu area. One of the mortar shells landed in a villager’s house in N--- village. It exploded and damaged the roof of the house owned by Ak---. Shrapnel from the mortar shells also hit other three houses nearby, damaging them. On November 27th 2023, the SAC troops indiscriminately fired rounds of mortar into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. One of the mortar shells landed in a rubber plantation owned by a villager near Af--- village. It exploded and damaged the rubber plantation. There were no casualties [caused by the shelling] in this village. Also on November 27th 2023, at 9:04 pm, the SAC combined forces based in Lay Maing army camp and Kon Nit Maing (Seven Miles) army camp, indiscriminately fired rounds of mortars into Ag--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. The mortar shells exploded in a rubber plantation owned by a villager, damaging it. Shrapnel from the mortar explosion hit a house owned by a 34-year-old female villager, Naw Al---. She was also hit by the mortar shrapnel, sustaining injuries to her elbow. Air strikes in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract On November 27th 2023, at 3:17 pm, the SAC conducted an air strike in Ah--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. The air strike injured two villagers, one of whom was seriously injured. A villager’s house was also damaged by the air strike. Further background reading on the situation on house burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes in Taw Oo District, Southeast Burma, be found in the following KHRG reports: “Taw Oo District Situation Update: Fighting, shelling, and house burning in Thandaung Town, and air strikes in Htaw Ta Htoo Township (January to July 2023)”, January 2024 Striking Fear: Impacts of State Administration Council (SAC) shelling on villagers’ lives in Southeast Burma (January to October 2023), December 2023. “Taw Oo District Incident Report: Killings, property destruction, and indiscriminate shelling by the SAC in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township (July 2023)”, November 2023. “Taw Oo District Short Update: Air strikes, displacement and property damage in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township, July 2023”, August 2023. Burning Karen State: Retaliatory burning of houses and property against rural civilian communities of Southeast Burma (2021 and 2022), March 2023. Footnotes: [1] The present document is based on information received in November and December 2023. It was provided by a community member in Taw Oo District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG. [2] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma (Myanmar), which then formalised the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army. [3] The Karen National Liberation Army is the armed (KNLA) wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). [4] ‘Maung’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name. [5] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma/Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup. [6] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations. [7] ‘Saw’ is a S’gaw Karen male honorific title used before a person’s name. [8] ‘Ko’ is a Burmese title meaning older brother. It can be used for relatives as well as non-relatives. [9] ‘Daw’ is a Burmese female honorific title used before a person’s name. [10] ‘Naw’ is a S’gaw Karen female honorific title used before a person’s name. [11] ‘U’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
2024-03-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-05
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Description: "This week, in Melbourne, the Australian government for the second time is hosting leaders for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Australia Special Summit. It's been six years since the last summit on Australian soil. While many countries in the region have seen economic growth during that time, repression and democratic backsliding has also been growing. The rights of people across the region are being trampled or ignored. The summit is an opportunity to put those issues, and the rights of south-east Asian people, front and center. In 2018, Aung San Suu Kyi represented the government of Myanmar at the summit. Since then, the military has ousted the civilian-led government and has drawn the country into a spiraling human rights and humanitarian crisis. The military has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity - Aung San Suu Kyi is among the tens of thousands arbitrarily detained. She is serving 27 years in prison under a slew of fabricated charges. Six years ago, Hun Sen was Cambodia's leader posing for selfies at Sydney Harbor and brazenly threatening Cambodians who dared to protest that he would "beat them." Now his son Hun Manet is leader. As Human Rights Watch has documented, physical assaults of opposition members have continued. The opposition leader Kem Sokha is serving a 27-year sentence confined to his home, and the main opposition party was banned from contesting the sham 2023 elections. Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited last time and will attend the summit again, but his term is ending. Indonesia's democratic institutions meant to provide a check on power such as the Constitutional Court and Anti-Corruption Commission have been eroded, with a return to dynastic patronage politics. His likely successor is currently the defence minister, Prabowo Subianto - implicated in massacres in East Timor in 1983, and the 1997-1998 kidnappings of activists in Java that led to his dismissal from the army. The lesson is that when there is no proper accountability following a truth commission as in Timor-Leste, even notorious human rights abusers can go on to hold political power. Prabowo has the support of Widodo, who paired his son Gibran Raka to be Prabowo's vice-president. Then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte skipped the last summit. Now it's Ferdinand Marcos jnr son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos. His son is desperate to rehabilitate the family name and is being feted by Western leaders from Washington to Canberra. While the Australian government may be relieved to have a non-volatile pro-West partner in Malacaang Palace, the summary killings of drug suspects still occur regularly because of the lack of accountability for police violence. The government refuses to co-operate with the International Criminal Court's investigation into the "drug war" killings, and killings of leftist activists and trade unionists continue, fueled by the authorities' practice of "red-tagging" them as "communists." Thailand's then-Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha, who seized power in a 2014 military coup, attended the last summit. As in Myanmar, Thai generals had the foresight to shore up their continued domination of the political process through a constitutional and legal framework that enabled the military to determine who became prime minister. So when the reformist Move Forward Party resoundingly won the most votes in the May 2023 election, entrenched interests had ways to prevent them from assuming power. Now Thailand is ruled by Srettha Thaivisin, a former businessman from the Pheu Thai party, while the former exiled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra is back home, on parole and holding court for ruling party politicians. Malaysia's leader in attendance is Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who doggedly won the last election after years of trumped-up charges against him. As Anwar struggles to hold together a fragile coalition of parties, many of his promises for reform have gone unmet. Vietnam and Laos both remain Communist Party states that don't even pretend to hold independent elections. Laos is chairing ASEAN this year. Vietnam is enjoying attention from Western capitals and companies looking to "de-risk" from China. Meanwhile, its crackdowns have intensified against activists, including environmental defenders. This regional backsliding on democracy and human rights should be of immense concern to the Australian government and Australians. The government is rightly worried about the Chinese government's growing influence in the region. Across south-east Asia, Chinese companies as part of China's mass surveillance infrastructure are building "smart" city systems that collect massive amount of personal and other data without oversight. Beijing is actively seeking to shore up support for votes from governments in the region to evade accountability at the United Nations and in the global arena. And it is pressing south-east Asian governments to return dissidents and ethnic Uyghurs, sending a stark reminder to Chinese nationals that even if they have left the mainland, they are not truly safe. Instead of taking bold steps to defend democracy and human rights, Australia and other democratic governments have shown less willingness to hold human rights abusers responsible if those abusers are strategic allies, trade partners in "de-risking," or otherwise considered helpful in containing China. The approach is deemed "pragmatic" but involves passively monitoring the decline of human rights and democracy across the region or raising matters privately, where there is little chance of impact. Meanwhile, civil society activists, government critics and journalists are facing intimidation, threats, harassment, and in some cases physical attacks. ASEAN has proven woefully inadequate in addressing regional human rights crises - most starkly evident with its impotent and ineffectual response to atrocities in Myanmar. This is hardly likely to improve now that Laos is the chair. Australia should use this summit to press for meaningful co-ordinated action on Myanmar. Australia is right to forge greater trade and security ties and strengthen its relationships in the region. But those ties alone will not be enough to stop the authoritarian slide. In its capacity as summit host, the Australian government can direct conversations with a human rights focus. It can encourage openness by acknowledging the deficiencies in its domestic rights record. This forthright approach will send the message that strong diplomatic relations still thrive without condoning or covering up each other's human rights concerns..."
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Source/publisher: The Canberra Times via Human Rights Watch (USA)
2024-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-04
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Description: "On 1 March 2024, H.E. Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, participated in the Interactive Dialogue on High Commissioner’s Oral Update on Myanmar during the 55th Session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva, Switzerland. On this occasion, Ms. Usana Berananda, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations Office at Geneva, delivered a statement by Thailand, stating that as an immediate neighbour, Thailand is deeply concerned about the current situation in Myanmar, especially the plight of people in the country. For this reason, Thailand has undertaken the initiative to upscale humanitarian assistance along the Thai - Myanmar border to support the implementation of the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. In addition, Thailand hoped that ASEAN, neighbouring countries, and external partners would seek to build on this initiative by encouraging all parties to work towards dialogue, reconciliation, and a return to democracy, with a goal to achieve a peaceful, stable, and unified Myanmar where human rights of the Myanmar people are fully respected. On the same day, VFM also met with H.E. Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations in Geneva to share Thailand’s visions in enhancing the effectiveness of HRC, especially in emergency situations. VFM reaffirmed Thailand’s readiness to work with all countries and stakeholders to advance the work of the HRC..."
Source/publisher: Government of Thailand
2024-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-04
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Description: "This regular update, covering humanitarian developments up to 3 March, is produced by OCHA Myanmar in collaboration with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and UN agencies. Response figures are based on self-reporting by organizations to clusters. The next humanitarian update will be issued end of March 2024. HIGHLIGHTS & KEY MESSAGES • Across Myanmar 18.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in 2024, with people struggling to survive amid conflict and insecurity, civilian safety and protection threats, as well as soaring inflation that is affecting people’s ability to meet basic needs. • Conflict spans various parts of the country with a deteriorating situation in Rakhine, as well as the Northwest and Southeast, driving new displacement. Nationwide, more than 2.7 million people are now displaced. • In Rakhine, people were killed and injured in Sittwe when a stray shell, landed in the downtown market on 29 February. • The closure of roads and waterways in Rakhine since the renewed conflict in November 2023 has led to food scarcity and other supply shortages, as well as increased prices of essential goods. • The situation in northern Shan has been relatively stable following the ceasefire agreed in January. However, landmine contamination, recruitment by armed groups, isolated tensions and movement restrictions remain a threat to local communities. UN staff temporarily relocated from Lashio will soon be returning due to the improved security situation. • Active fighting, administrative restrictions being imposed by all sides, and violence and harassment of humanitarian personnel remain key barriers to accessing affected people and providing lifesaving assistance. • At least 3.2 million people were reached with assistance in 2023 however this support is not as deep or sustained as planned due to underfunding and access constraints. • Through the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan aid workers aim to reach 5.3 million people with urgent assistance for which $994 million is required. A repeat of 2023 funding levels (HRP 37 per cent funded) in 2024 would be catastrophic for affected people..."
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-03-03
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-03
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Sub-title: Albanese, Southeast Asian Leaders Should Address Myanmar, Other Regional Crises
Description: "Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should focus on human rights concerns and democratic backsliding at the upcoming summit with Southeast Asian leaders. Human rights conditions have worsened in ASEAN countries in recent years, and ASEAN as an organization has done little to address key crises among its members. Key concerns include the need for stronger sanctions against Myanmar and ending attacks on dissidents in Cambodia and Vietnam, and security forces’ targeting of activists in the Philippines. (Sydney) – Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should focus on human rights concerns and democratic backsliding at the upcoming summit with Southeast Asian leaders, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Albanese will host leaders from nine of the countries making up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit on March 4 to 6, 2024, in Melbourne. The 60-page report, “Human Rights in Southeast Asia,” summarizes critical human rights issues that Albanese should raise at the summit. Human Rights Watch urged the Australian government to put its values as a rights-respecting democracy at the core of its relations with ASEAN countries. As the Australian government approaches the summit with the goal of removing blockages to regional economic cooperation, it should not bypass human rights concerns in the hopes that they will resolve themselves, because they will not. “This high-level meeting would be a lost opportunity for Australia and the people of ASEAN countries if the Australian government were to gloss over human rights issues,” said Daniela Gavshon, Australia director at Human Rights Watch. “The Australian government should send the message that human rights violations are a key foreign policy concern.” It will be especially important for Australia to guide discussion toward human rights since the subject has been left off the summit agenda. The summit marks 50 years of ASEAN-Australia dialogue relations. Over the past five decades, successive Australian governments have pursued closer economic, security, and political partnerships with ASEAN countries. Australia continues to strengthen its ties with Southeast Asian countries to offset the shift in global power dynamics. United States influence in the region is being challenged by the growing political, economic, and military clout of a more assertive China. To counter China’s threat to human rights and the rules-based international order, Australia should center its dialogue with ASEAN leaders on the rights of Southeast Asian people rather than just on strengthening friendly relations. The anniversary presents a unique opportunity to reflect on human rights in the region and to reframe the next 50 years of Australia-ASEAN cooperation. Albanese has already projected the next half-century to be “even more successful than the last” for ASEAN-Australia relations, and pledged A$95.4 million (US$63.9 million) to kick-start Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040. In a February letter, Human Rights Watch urged Prime Minister Albanese to press for commitments from individual countries at the summit, and raise specific human rights issues with individual governments. “Human rights conditions have worsened in ASEAN countries in recent years and ASEAN as an organization has done little to address key crises among its members,” Gavshon said. “Australia’s failure to directly address human rights concerns at the summit would be a propaganda coup for abusive leaders, and it will embolden new ASEAN leaders to continue the human rights abusing legacies of their predecessors.” In its most serious human rights lapse, ASEAN has not dealt with the spiralling humanitarian and human rights crisis in Myanmar. The consequences have spilled over the borders of Thailand, India, and China, and contributed to the continued suffering of ethnic Rohingya who have fled to Bangladesh. Tens of thousands have sought safety in neighboring countries since the 2021 coup by the Myanmar military. In addition, Rohingya who fled crimes against humanity and acts of genocide in 2017 cannot return. Given increasing insecurity and deteriorating conditions in the camps housing one million Rohingya in Bangladesh, 4,500 made the high-risk sea voyage to Indonesia or Malaysia in 2023, according to the United Nations refugee agency. ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus – which Myanmar’s junta repudiated days after agreeing to it in April 2021 – is not a viable framework for dealing with a military that continues to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes. Australian and ASEAN governments should agree to enforce sanctions against Myanmar, including those newly imposed by Australia on banks and jet fuel suppliers, in their own jurisdictions. Together, Albanese and Southeast Asian leaders should commit to strengthening multilateral action at the UN Security Council. Among other key rights issues to be addressed is the Thai and Cambodian governments’ cooperation to uncover, intimidate, and arrest Cambodian civil society activists in Thailand. In Vietnam, the government systematically suppresses freedom of expression and other basic liberties. In the Philippines, the security forces target activists, rights defenders, and journalists, often with deadly results. State-sponsored discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia remains pervasive. On an institutional level, ASEAN purports to respect the human rights of its 685 million citizens. However, its Human Rights Declaration and ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) have no real impact. In its capacity as summit host, the Australian government can direct conversations with a human rights focus. It can encourage openness by acknowledging the deficiencies in its own domestic rights record. This forthright approach will send the message that strong diplomatic relations still thrive without condoning or covering up allies’ human rights concerns, Human Rights Watch said. “The 50th anniversary of ASEAN-Australia dialogue relations marked at this summit could be a turning point,” Gavshon said. “Looking forward to 2040, the region will face environmental challenges, economic uncertainty, and strategic competition, but these challenges can be lessened if governments show respect for human rights and democracy.”..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2024-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-28
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Description: "A deadly stampede outside a passport office that took two lives and unending lines outside embassies - these are just some examples of what has been happening in Myanmar since the announcement of mandatory conscription into the military. Myanmar's military government is facing increasingly effective opposition to its rule and has lost large areas of the country to armed resistance groups. On 1 February 2021, the military seized power in a coup, jailing elected leaders and plunging much of the country into a bloody civil war that continues today. Thousands have been killed and the UN estimates that around 2.6 million people been displaced. Young Burmese, many of whom have played a leading role protesting and resisting the junta, are now told they will have to fight for the regime. Many believe that this is a result of the setbacks suffered by the military in recent months, with anti-government groups uniting to defeat them in some key areas. "It is nonsense to have to serve in the military at this time, because we are not fighting foreign invaders. We are fighting each other. If we serve in the military, we will be contributing to their atrocities," Robert, a 24-year-old activist, told the BBC. Many of them are seeking to leave the country instead. "I arrived at 03:30 [20:30 GMT] and there were already about 40 people queuing for the tokens to apply for their visa," recalled a teenage girl who was part of a massive crowd outside the Thai embassy in Yangon earlier in February. Within an hour, the crowd in front of the embassy expanded to more than 300 people, she claims. "I was scared that if I waited any longer, the embassy would suspend the processing of visas amid the chaos," she told the BBC, adding that some people had to wait for three days before even getting a queue number. In Mandalay, where the two deaths occurred outside the passport office, the BBC was told that there were also serious injuries - one person broke their leg after falling into a drain while another broke their teeth. Six others reported breathing difficulties. Justine Chambers, a Myanmar researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies, says mandatory conscription is a way of removing young civilians leading the revolution. "We can analyse how the conscription law is a sign of the Myanmar military's weakness, but it is ultimately aimed at destroying lives... Some will manage to escape, but many will become human shields against their compatriots," she said. Myanmar's conscription law was first introduced in 2010 but had not been enforced until on 10 February the junta said it would mandate at least two years of military service for all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27. Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun, the spokesperson for the military government, said in a statement that about a quarter of the country's 56 million population were eligible for military service under the law. The regime later said it did not plan to include women in the conscript pool "at present" but did not specify what that meant. The government spokesperson told BBC Burmese that call-ups would start after the Thingyan festival marking the Burmese New Year in mid-April, with an initial batch of 5,000 recruits. The regime's announcement has dealt yet another blow to Myanmar's young people. Many had their education disrupted by the coup, which came on top of school closures at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2021, the junta suspended 145,000 teachers and university staff over their support for the opposition, according to the Myanmar Teachers' Federation, and some schools in opposition-held areas have been destroyed by the fighting or by air strikes. Then there are those who have fled across borders seeking refuge, among them young people looking for jobs to support their families. Young Burmese confront dashed dreams in exile Why India wants to fence its troubled Myanmar border In response to the conscription law, some have said on social media that they would enter the monkhood or get married early to dodge military service. The junta says permanent exemptions will be given to members of religious orders, married women, people with disabilities, those assessed to be unfit for military service and "those who are exempted by the conscription board". For everyone else, evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine. But Robert doubts the regime will honour these exemptions. "The junta can arrest and abduct anyone they want. There is no rule of law and they do not have to be accountable to anyone," he said. Wealthier families are considering moving their families abroad - Thailand and Singapore being popular options, but some are even looking as far afield as Iceland - with the hope that their children would get permanent residency or citizenship there by the time they are of conscription age. Others have instead joined the resistance forces, said Aung Sett, from the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, which has a long history of fighting military rule. "When I heard the news that I would have to serve in the military, I felt really disappointed and at the same time devastated for the people, especially for those who are young like me. Many young people have now registered themselves to fight against the junta," the 23-year-old told the BBC from exile. Some observers say the enforcement of the law now reveals the junta's diminishing grip on the country. Last October, the regime suffered its most serious setback since the coup. An alliance of ethnic insurgents overran dozens of military outposts along the border with India and China. It has also lost large areas of territory to insurgents along the Bangladesh and Indian borders. According to the National Unity Government, which calls itself Myanmar's government in exile, more than 60% of Myanmar's territory is now under the control of resistance forces. "By initiating forced conscription following a series of devastating and humiliating defeats to ethnic armed organisations, the military is publicly demonstrating just how desperate it has become," said Jason Tower, country director for the Burma programme at the United States' Institute of Peace. A turning point in Myanmar as army suffers big losses Who are the rulers who executed Myanmar activists? Mr Tower expects the move to fail because of growing resentment against the junta. "Many youth dodging conscription will have no choice but to escape into neighbouring countries, intensifying regional humanitarian and refugee crises. This could result in frustration growing in Thailand, India, China and Bangladesh, all of which could tilt away from what remains of their support for the junta," he said. Even if the military does manage to increase troop numbers by force, this will do little to address collapsing morale in the ranks. It will also take months to train up the new troops, he said. The junta had a long history of "forced recruitment" even before the law was enacted, said Ye Myo Hein, a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. "So the law may merely serve as a facade for forcibly conscripting new recruits into the military. With a severe shortage of manpower, there is no time to wait for the lengthy and gradual process of recruiting new soldiers, prompting [officials] to exploit the law to swiftly coerce people into service," he said. Even for those who will manage to escape, many will carry injuries and emotional pain for the rest of their lives. "It has been really difficult for young people in Myanmar, both physically and mentally. We've lost our dreams, our hopes and our youth. It just can't be the same like before," said Aung Sett, the student leader. "These three years have gone away like nothing. We've lost our friends and colleagues during the fight against the junta and many families have lost their loved ones. It has been a nightmare for this country. We are witnessing the atrocities committed by the junta on a daily basis. I just can't express it in words."..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
2024-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Ma Shwe said she “was just a young girl” when an act of sexual violence perpetrated by a man from her village crushed her self-confidence and left her feeling terrified. Ma Shwe, who is identified by a pseudonym to protect her identity, was raised in a small farming village in Myanmar with about 200 households. After the attack, she felt judged by her community, shamed, and outcast. “I was afraid to live in my environment, and so I left my home and village,” she said. She only felt safe enough to return when she found that the perpetrator had also left the village, and enough time had passed that it seemed clear he would not return. By then, Ma Shwe had a child, and she wanted to live with her family and raise her child in her home village. However, upon her return, she continued to feel judged by those around her, and as she dealt with the ongoing physical and mental health impacts of the violence, it was a daily struggle to feel safe and comfortable. “I used to feel shy and afraid of people,” she said, “but there was a training in my village on gender-based violence and I attended. After the training I felt that I can accept being alive.” Ma Shwe accessed that training and a range of services, including counselling sessions, with the support of a local women-led organization, one of several groups that UN Women works with across Myanmar to reach women and girls who have experienced or are at risk of experiencing gender-based violence. A representative from that organization said that, when Ma Shwe first approached the group, “she cried openly because of the comments from some people around her and every day was a time of worry and sadness for her.” “However, she attended the awareness sessions and accepted that it was not her fault. In addition, she was able to regain her self-confidence and acceptance of her own existence as she received timely counselling sessions,” the representative said, asking that their name and organization not be made public for security concerns. Ma Shwe also attended training courses and awareness raising sessions that were delivered through a digital learning platform. A wide range of people in the community, including men and boys, used that platform and attended the in-person sessions, which aimed to break down harmful social norms and attitudes that perpetuate violence and discrimination against women and girls. “After the training, I saw that the views of the people around me had changed a lot”, Ma Shwe said. “This change is important. It makes people feel equal and understand everyone has rights, so they learn to value each other.” UN Women works with other UN agencies, including the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and local partner organizations to prevent gender-based violence and offer response services across Myanmar. From 2021 to 2023, UN Women and UNFPA reached more than 16,000 women through a joint programme on preventing and responding to gender-based violence. Of those women, 1,290 received legal advice and assistance, psychosocial support, and referrals to other services. More than 800 women-headed households received cash assistance and food, and also accessed services including mental health and psychosocial support. As fighting in Myanmar continues to escalate and the economic, political, and humanitarian crisis worsens, civilians’ coping capacities are stretched to the limit. A new joint programme supported by the Government of France will provide additional support for UN Women and UNFPA to deliver services aimed at preventing gender-based violence in communities affected by the conflict, including livelihood support and access to emergency services. The country’s broader crisis is perpetuating gender disparities in employment and increasing vulnerability to trafficking and gender-based violence including sexual exploitation, harassment, and intimate partner violence, which Myanmar women have said is the most common form of gender-based violence in their communities.[1] Women’s organizations in Myanmar play a vital role in preventing and responding to gender-based violence by providing services at the community level, bolstering women’s empowerment, and reaching those at risk of being left behind. While Ma Shwe continues to struggle with the impact of the violence that was perpetrated against her, she now feels more comfortable in her community. She said she has hope for the future and even dreams of one day opening her own business. She said, “I feel like I've got my own life back, and I'm not afraid of people anymore.” [1] Findings from focus group discussions conducted for 2023 Multi Sectoral Needs Analysis..."
Source/publisher: UN Women (New York)
2024-02-27
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-27
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Sub-title: In Part 2 of a 2-part series, Bobby Anderson considers the strengths and weaknesses of Myanmar’s military and its chances of collapse.
Description: "The Resistance Let’s start with the difference between an Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) and a People’s Defense Force (PDF). Put simply and broadly, a PDF does not seek autonomy within the State, while autonomy within a federal state (but no longer succession) is a key demand of most EAOs.[1] PDFs were created in response to the 2021 coup, while EAOs uniformly pre-dated it. Some but not all PDFs are connected to the NUG, although the term PDF also includes Local Defense Forces (LDFs), which are autonomous. Taking PDFs and EAOs as a whole, Andrew Selth estimates ‘up to 250 loosely organised local defence groups, urban resistance cells and EAOs… there could be about 25,000 active members of the various militias and resistance groups, and a further 30,000-35,000 in the relevant EAOs.’ This and other claims arrive with the caveat that no one has an accurate macro-level tally: local organizations are the only ones likely to have accurate estimates, but those too would be limited and area-specific data, which is constantly shifting. Therefore, any tally is out-of-date soon after it occurs. Ethnic Armed Organizations Regarding EAOs, in 2018, I wrote about the failure of the deposed civilian government’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, and that relates to Selth’s key use of the word relevant. His count of 30,000-35,000 EAO troops discounts EAOs not currently at war with the junta, most through ceasefires – a situation that predates the current junta’s seizure of power. Let’s briefly consider EAO numbers as a whole, because those with ceasefires still represent potential combatants. The sit-tat’s aforementioned manner of signing and breaking ceasefires is a deadly game, and EAO’s with current ceasefires know that they are not durable. Estimates of pre- and post-coup EAO numbers (i.e. not PDFs) are represented in the table below: * includes reserves. ** indicates no known or significant change from pre-coup numbers Since the coup, we can only note that EAO numbers have increased. If Ye Myo Hein’s estimates are correct, there is at least a parity between EAO numbers overall and the sit-tat’s human resource capacity. Prior to the October 27 offensive, the disorganization of the resistance was what in part held back faster territorial acquisition and greater sit-tat attrition. The sit-tat, in many ways inept, at least acknowledges the stark fact that it can’t fight the strongest EAOs, and so it continued to play the aforementioned game of musical chair ceasefires. The momentum building against the sit-tat makes this option less attractive for EAOs. Back to Selth’s ‘relevant,’ select EAOs falling under the China-backed Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC), deserve particular mention. The FPNCC is a negotiating block created and led by the United Wa State Party (UWSP), which formed out of the remnants of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989. The UWSP for its part has been built by China into the largest, best armed, and most cohesive EAO in the country, and perhaps after the now-defunct Wagner Group and the thoroughly desiccated Islamic State, is now the largest non-state armed group on the Asian continent. The Three Brotherhood’s AA, MNDAA, and TNLA are under the FPNCC umbrella, as are the National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla), and the Shan State Army North (linked to the Shan State Progress Party). Unlike many an EAO alliance, the FPNCC proved more durable, and at present it contains the absolute majority of EAO fighters countrywide. The Chin National Front’s (CNF) armed forces are allied with several newly formed Chinland Defense Forces – which are PDF groups based in Chin State. Their exponential post-coup growth is noteworthy and harken back to the CNF’s bloody and unexpected arrival on the resistance scene in the mid-1990s after they were trained and armed by the KIA. An outlier in the EAO continuum is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Other Rohingya groups, such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, and other EAOs, regard it as a terrorist organization, with links to other Jihadist groups worldwide, although ARSA denies this. ARSA have also been implicated in massacres in Rakhine. They are mostly involved in intra-Rohingya political struggles in the refugee camps in Bangladesh and are more actively engaged in killing Rohingya alternates to their authority there, and occasional Bangladeshi security officials, than killing sit-tat in Rakhine. Rohingya people, as far as the author is aware, have no representation in PDFs, nor are they part of any resistance not wholly concerned with their own specific ethno-religious-territorial concerns. This is despite some outreach on the part of NUG to build bridges with Rohingya, firstly by actually using the word ‘Rohingya’, in contrast to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, who only referred to them as Bengalis in order to cement the claim that they were recent migrants from Bangladesh. NUG has since acknowledged the violence they were subjected to by the sit-tat, but has hardly acknowledged the structural violence adhered to by the NLD against them. And so NUG’s claims – that it would provide justice, repatriation, and reparation for Rohingya – are yet to be tested. People’s Defense Forces The most recent PDFs in Myanmar began forming and arming immediately after the 2021 Military coup. However, they have a long and potted history in Myanmar, explained by Jasnea Sarma at the University of Zurich as follows: In the past too there used to be such groups. They went by different names like Swan Ar Shin စွမ်းအားရှင်, ပြည်သူ့တဝန် or civilian task force, ရွာတာဝန်ပြည်သူ့စွမ်းအားရှင် or village task force etc) . These groups were driven by self-defence and formed often as a response to circumstance, namely local protection from threats. The post-coup PDFs, often referred to as ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် or ပြည်သူ့တပ်မတော်, are a direct response to the coup, all fighting the sit tat, but they do mimic the workings of these older groups. This explains in-part why it’s difficult to clearly understand which PDF is aligned with which group. They are not necessarily always linked to previously elected representatives, although many are. Not all PDFs are tied to NUG. Many are now allied with EAOs, some are standalone, with occasional alliances of convenience. There are many composed mainly of armed university students assisted by EAOs. Some also have church affiliations. What’s important is that they have arms and can maintain a defensive posture and have been extremely important and effective after the 2021 coup. History tells us that if anything, they will keep forming in (and around) Burma, adapting to the needs. Jasnea Sarma PDFs have been able to mount effective resistance across Bamar areas and have been able to recruit a significant number of fighters, including former soldiers and police officers; as mentioned, many Bamar youth in Sagaing and Magwe who might have joined the sit-tat are in PDFs instead. They have also received weapons from abroad, although most of their firearms originate from actions against the sit-tat or from select EAOs. Local manufacture of firearms also occurs, but the artisanal nature of these operations not only limits their impact, but poses danger to both manufacturer and shooter. Civilian drone conversion is another factor. Regarding numbers, NUG claims 50-100,000 fighters in 259 trained PDF battalions and 401 LDFs. The formal size of a PDF battalion is 200 personnel, but some are up to 500. Hein estimates that PDF personnel numbered 40,000 as of February 2022, with no less than 30,000 LDF personnel. These PDFs are concentrated in the Anyar theatre of Sagaing, Magwe, and Mandalay, where there are at least 15,000 PDF and 20,000 LDF combatants. As of November 2022, independent observers speaking with Ye Myo Hein estimated that 30 percent of PDFs/LDFs fell under the command of NUG, 40 percent had some links to NUG, while 30 percent were wholly independent. At the local level, it’s likely that all PDFs have more authority than local NUG representation. They’re armed, after all. However, some PDFs are under the control of NUG (which raised $44 million for its defense ministry alone in its first 14 months), with a clearer integration between the two, rather than the diffuse and grassroots nature of many other PDFs which resemble the franchise nature of many an insurgency. However, the PDFs face deep challenges, including a lack of coordinated leadership, limited support from the international community, and even the populations of some areas they control, due to the predatory behavior of select groups. Limited resources are worth highlighting: Min Zaw Oo from the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security estimated to Deutsche Welle that at the beginning of 2022, only 10 percent of PDFs had automatic weapons, although they are now generally better armed. Despite this, we have evidence of local support, of retention in numbers, of the capacity of fighters, all found in the sit-tat body count the PDFs are responsible for. Overall, the balance of personnel favors the armed resistance. Credibility Issues The support EAOs might give to PDFs in particular and the NUG in general is constrained by the lack of credibility the deposed civilian government had with some EAOs. AA chief General Twan Mrat Naing summarized it well: “the NLD government after 1988 promised federalism and they pledged this to the ethnic people, but after they came to power, they didn’t keep the promise. So we have learned the lesson and we are not naive anymore.” The past relationships of many EAOs with the deposed civilian government surely shapes EAO relations with the NUG and PDFs and this issue will come to the forefront in any NUG-EAO victory. Promises of federalism will not be taken at face value. International Support for the Sit-tat Since the coup, elements of the “international community” have imposed sanctions on the sit-tat and affiliated individuals. The countries and institutions most in support of NUG are peripheral in comparison to the countries which maintain pragmatic relations with the sit-tat. Who cares about Switzerland when you’ve got China? While, as mentioned, sanctions may bite because of the predominance of the US dollar, this is not an insurmountable issue for either the junta or allies who seek alternates to said dollar. China and Russia protect the sit-tat from United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) resolutions, and both can offer the veil of legitimacy to any staged elections. India and other Myanmar neighbors must keep their options open with a state they must trade with and absorb refugees from. China In 2004 the sit-tat began reaching out to “the west”, which was seen as a hedge against China’s hegemony in the region. The situation is now an inverse of the one which led to the removal of Khin Nyunt and his China clique two decades ago. China’s support is crucial to the sit-tat’s survival. However, China’s nuanced approach to the Three Brotherhood Alliance reflects both a loss of patience and a hedging of bets. Since the February 2021 coup, China has justified engagement with the sit-tat to both support stability and ensure bilateral relations, although a recent USIP report showed how, with regard to stability, the opposite is occurring, with negative implications for China. China also cites principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Implicitly, Myanmar is firmly within China’s sphere of influence. The notion of a ‘sphere of influence’ was once imagined to be terminally ill by liberal internationalists, but it is both healthy and real, and extends to China’s drug control policy as well as its vaunted Belt and Road Initiative, which binds Myanmar and her eastern neighbors to China, economically and infrastructurally. The bond already exists culturally, in Yunnan in particular. China is Myanmar’s predominant economic partner, much to India’s consternation (see below), and has invested heavily in Myanmar’s energy sector, infrastructure development, and natural resource extraction, providing a much-needed source of economic support for the country, both under the civilian government and the latest junta. Myanmar, however, has a considerable amount of authority in the relationship. Key Chinese investments include the Kyaukphyu deep sea port, power plant, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which will connect Kyaukphyu and Yunnan via pipeline and reduce China’s reliance on fuel shipments through the Straits of Malacca; the Mee Lin Gyaing natural gas power plant in Ayeyarwady; and numerous others. This is imperial thinking of a scale not comprehensible to many a government, especially ones who only see foreign relations through the prism of their own domestic elections, and still others who automatically discount the effectiveness of state-controlled enterprises in favor of the sacraments of a ‘free market’. This relationship has not always been so smooth. Myanmar and China cooperated in the subjugation of Chinese Nationalist Guomindang (GMD) forces which had fled Yunnan and established themselves in Shan in the late 1940s, with a delusion that they would one day re-invade with the support of the CIA. Those wash-outs were a theoretical threat to the China’s ruling communists, entirely overblown. The dregs of the GMD in Shan, unlike the sit-tat, was an institution entirely hollowed out by corruption, and was generally only interested in making money. China-Myanmar cooperation was, at the time, an aberration. During the Cold War, Myanmar considered China both rival and threat. After the dictator Ne Win’s expulsion of large numbers of ethnic Chinese in the late 1960s, China increased support to Communist Party of Buma (CPB) forces in Bago Yoma, just north of Yangon, while Red Guard ‘volunteers’ supporting the CPB invaded Northern Shan in 1968. Reconciliation began after the death of Mao and Deng Xiaoping’s emergence as China’s paramount leader in the late 1970s. The CPB’s vocal support for the ’Gang of Four’, a faction of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials whom Deng had purged, led Deng’s support to the CPB to decline. The removal of the sit-tat’s ‘China clique’ in 2004 did not end Chinese overtures and investments, although the derailing of the Myitsone dam project in 2011 was a further hiccup in the relationship. Since the coup, China has not only blocked efforts to impose sanctions on Myanmar but has increased its own investments. Even before the recent offensive, China hedged its bets vis a vis the sit-tat, and the civilian government they deposed, with EAOs, though the FPNCC; a coalition of EAOs that were by and large excluded from peace process before the coup. China’s facilitation with these EAOs led to ceasefires which allowed the overextended sit-tat to reallocate overextended forces elsewhere. China also froze out the western powers that sought to engage FPNCC, leaving those westerners – “conflict” and “peacebuilding” experts and the like – to content themselves with NCA signatories, the KNU and NMSP especially. China’s relations with FPNCC members continued after the latest offensive; indeed, it is likely that the Three Brotherhood Alliance alerted China of its intentions in advance. China’s continued subtle approach toward both the sit-tat and the alliance reflects their stated policy of non-interference, but it also likely reflects a loss of patience in the sit-tat’s sheltering of the operations of ethnic Chinese criminal gangs in Shan and elsewhere. The October 27 Offensive has resulted in the capture and extradition of numerous of these criminals to China, and China has also mediated temporary ceasefires between the warring parties which will likely peter out soon due to the sit-tat’s incorrigible belief in its own battlefield genius, despite all evidence to the contrary. China also extends the occasional fig leaf to NUG, while explicitly stating their displeasure at the NUG’s continued relations with Western powers. This seems mostly for show. NUG, for its part, has issued a policy paper on China which includes support for the ‘One China’ policy. If NUG were to emerge victorious in the struggle against the sit-tat, China would find itself temporarily sidelined, because despite its insistence on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, its dealings with the current sit-tat is implicitly a bet on its success. However, this sidelining would be temporary. China simply has too much authority—economic, political, and otherwise. Russia The sit-tat hedges its China bets with Russia. During the Cold War, Myanmar was closely aligned with the Soviet Union—the USSR even built the Inya Lake Hotel following Nikita Khrushchev’s 1958 visit—and Russia retains much of that goodwill. This remains, however, a relationship of convenience: the sit-tat needs arms, and Russia needs cash. Russia is currently the sit-tat’s largest arms supplier, and this includes artillery and fighter jets. This cooperation extends to tourism, trade, and nuclear energy. Russia also blocks UNSC attempts to sanction the sit-tat. Russia’s support to development of nuclear energy in Myanmar is of particular note: the sit-tat claims that such development is peaceful. However, surely Min Aung Hlaing is following the example of Kim Jong Un and the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK), just as Kim learned from what happened to Moammar Qaddafi in Libya. Weapons of mass destruction are protective amulets westerners also believe in. India India’s position toward the sit-tat and the February 2021 coup has been aptly described as ‘fractured between words and deeds’ – sweet diplomatic words about upkeeping democracy, and deeds reflecting an extremely short-sighted military, political, and economic support for the junta, as well as a reluctance to understand the important role of other resistance actors. India tries to maintain a positive relationship with whoever happens to be running Myanmar, and the reason is a) China, and b) security in Northeastern India, including counterinsurgency along the long and porous border with Myanmar. This border security also involves China, which regards Northeastern India’s Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet. India’s current policy dates back to at least 1988. Like China, India justifies this engagement with the principle of non-interference and the need for stability. During the brief democratic transition, it maintained a balance in its relations with the sit-tat and the civilian government, with the aim of promoting its strategic interests in the region, including security, energy, and connectivity. India has reverted to its pre-democratic stance, maintaining positive relations with the current junta to the extent that the Modi government has downplayed junta bombs erroneously falling into Indian territory and return soldiers safely back to Myanmar who escape to safe Indian army/paramilitary controlled areas. Myanmar is an important partner for India’s ‘Act East’ policy, which aims to deepen India’s ties with Southeast Asia and strengthen its position as a regional power. It is seen as key to India’s energy security, with several major projects underway, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project which connects Sittwe and NE India, and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway; India’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The sit-tat’s attitude toward India is more transactional. They look the other way while Indian Naga, Meitei, Mizo and other insurgents to use Myanmar as a base. The sit-tat likely see the presence of these foreign insurgents as useful bargaining chips in any negotations with Indian authorities. The insurgents pay for the privilege in the form of protection fees, and they purchase weapons and supplies from local sit-tat as well.[15] Other neighbors are less, but still, important: Thailand has maintained a pragmatic relationship with the powers that be in Myanmar since the departure of the Raj. Bangladesh, despite the burden of the expelled Rohingya, and delays to their repatriation, does likewise. Near neighbors have had to be more serious than the utopian foreign policies of distant states. Short-term predictions Who’d have known? That three years on this fight would continue. That the Bamars would lead it. That some EAOs would finally, meaningfully, join forces, not only with one another, but with PDFs. That the sit-tat would shrink in the face of it. What we’ve learned firstly is that the sit-tat is an ineffective and inefficient war-making enterprise. They draw from the same limited toolbox across juntas and acronyms; they don’t seem to have any new ideas, other than conscription. And so, while they won’t likely collapse anytime soon, they will continue to weaken and bleed. We will see more defections, more forced conscription, and ever less enthusiasm for the fight. We may even see foreign support for the sit-tat in the form of foreign fighters, namely Russian military, although the parameters of this limit the extent of it: firstly, sit-tat ego needs to be overcome; second, China needs to approve. Such foreigners would be labelled ‘advisors’, and the resistance would have no small fun in killing them. The sit-tat’s brutality will increase within an ever-shrinking space. We can anticipate a further revamping of the sit-tat’s ‘Four Cuts’ (လေးဖြတ် ဗျူဟာမှာ/ ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ်) counterinsurgency strategy, first used in the 1960s in the Bago Yoma – an area that remains depopulated to the present day. Four Cuts aims to deny food, funds, intelligence and recruits to enemies of the state, and involves large-scale detentions, population transfers, and the inevitable killings. This is already happening, especially in order to secure transport routes, and we can anticipate more systematic actions in the Bamar heartlands of Sagaing and Magwe in particular, where the sit-tat will attempt to depopulate inconvenient areas whose populations they cannot adequately control. Given attrition rates and growing emphasis on less reliable militias, in addition to growing financial shortfalls, we can anticipate the sit-tat’s further loss of territory, with the junta essentially surrendering remaining tracts of Chin, Kayah, Northern Shan, and Rakhine in particular. The same will happen in Bamar areas in which Four Cuts cannot be effectively implemented; they will fall back to flatlands distinguished by all-weather roads, and EAO and to a lesser extent PDF territories will expand in response. Personnel attrition will lead to a further reliance on air power, which in turn leads to more reliance on Russia for planes, parts, and training. Areas of the country controlled by the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other members of the FPNCC which have ceasefires with the junta will continue to expand and assert sovereignty. So will independent-minded BGFs and criminal gangs. The oft-claimed fiction that Myanmar is a state will become ever more untenable. Ultimately, we will witness a desiccated sit-tat ruling a desiccated Bamar space, surrounded by enemies. This will also prove untenable: the international community has no stomach for any new states, and this includes China and Russia. The future Myanmar will be federal by fiat. It’s worth returning to the dream of impending collapse: a remote possibility that still cannot be discounted. The degrading of such an institution as the sit-tat occurs at what looks to be a slow pace which suddenly accelerates. If enough officers believe it is going to happen, their own individual decisions will combine to make it happen. What happened to Romania in December of 1989 illustrates such a process. Political wits once said of Romanians that they were like corn mush in that they could be boil forever yet never explode, but they had the strength to boo the dictator in Timisoara, on live television. The regime, at that moment, ended, because it ended in the minds of its enforcers, who shot Ceausescu and his wife and then turned on one another in a brief killing frenzy while re-labelling themselves a democratic opposition. The sit-tat’s implosion would be far bloodier, and that sour-faced major general I ran into in Paletwa in 2019 will be either in front of the firing squad or behind the rifle stock. The one thing we can bank on is that the people of Myanmar will continue to suffer..."
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Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
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Description: "This Short Update describes events that occurred in Kaw T’Ree (Kawkareik) Township, Dooplaya District, in November 2023. On November 2nd 2023, combined troops of Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA) attacked State Administration Council (SAC) Infantry Battalion (IB) #32 army camp near A--- village, Maw Hkee village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, by drone, and fighting broke out. Following this, SAC troops heavily shelled into A--- village and surrounding villagers’ plantations during the whole day. In fear, villagers from A--- village fled to B--- area, an internally displaced people (IDP) site. Moreover, the SAC shelling into A--- village created fear for villagers in neighbouring villages to live and work in their village.[1] SAC shelling after fighting in Kaw T’Ree Township On November 2nd 2023, in the morning, at 7:20 am, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[2] Battalion #201, combined with Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA)[3] troops, dropped three shells by drone into State Administration Council (SAC)[4] Infantry Battalion (IB)[5] #32 army camp near A--- village, Maw Hkee village tract[6], Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District. SAC IB#32 Battalion Commender's name is Kyaw Zin Oo. Following the shelling, fighting broke out, and stopped at 10:40 am. Though the fighting stopped, the SAC soldiers shelled [rounds of] 120mm, 81mm, and 60mm mortar shells and [fired rounds from an] RPG7 [rocket-propelled grenade launcher] into A--- village and nearby plantations for the whole remaining day. As a result, some shells landed on corn fields and pea plantations, creating fear for villagers to go and harvest rice and peas from the plantations, though it was time to harvest crops. [Due to the shelling, several buildings such as a church, a school and a house were damaged, but no villagers were injured.] As reported by a local villager to KHRG, villagers from A--- village did not dare to live in their village, so they sought shelter in B--- area [an IDP site located at the Thai-Burma border]. Villagers from [nearby villages such as] C--- village and D--- village, in Maw Hkee village tract, were also living in fear. As a result of this incident, villagers feel that they must be wary when moving around their villages, working in plantations, or going to school, for example. They also feel trapped because of this fear of moving around. Further background reading on the situation of indiscriminate shelling and displacement in Southeast Burma can be found in the following KHRG reports: “Dooplaya District Situation Update: Indiscriminate shelling of villages causing displacement and livelihood difficulties (March to May 2023)”, January 2024. “Dooplaya District Short Update: Killing, house burning, shelling, and displacement, from January to February 2023”, December 2023. “Dooplaya District Incident Report: A villager was killed by SAC shelling in Noh T’Kaw (Kyainseikgyi) Township, June 2023”, December 2023. “Dooplaya District Incident Report: Threat, forced labour, indiscriminate shelling and looting in Kaw T’Ree Township, March 15th 2023”, June 2023. “Dooplaya District Short Update: Indiscriminate shelling and a landmine explosion in Noh T’Kaw Township, June to September 2022”, April 2023. Footnotes: [1] The present document is based on information received in November 2023. It was provided by a community member in Dooplaya District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG. [2] The Karen National Liberation Army is the armed (KNLA) wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). [3] The Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA) was founded on July 17th 2022 by Brigadier-General Nerdah Bo Mya. Nerdah Bo Mya, former Commander-In-Chief of the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), was dismissed by the KNU in 2022. KTLA operates in two districts in Southeast Burma, in KNU-controlled areas, namely Mergui-Tavoy and Dooplaya districts. In Dooplaya District, they operate in alliance with resistance armed groups. KTLA battalions in Mergui-Tavoy District are in conflict with both SAC and KNLA troops. [4] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup. [5] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are understrength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations. [6] A village tract is an administrative unit of between five and 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Louise Taylor 1 February 2024 marked the third anniversary of the coup in Myanmar. Although there is much geopolitical tension and conflict at the moment occupying people’s minds, with developments in the Middle East and Ukraine particularly dominating the news, the situation in Myanmar been delicately avoided by donors and international partners for some time. However, as the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index shows, organized crime in Myanmar has significantly worsened, to the point that the country currently has the highest levels of organized criminality in the world. Furthermore, Myanmar’s resilience to organized crime has weakened significantly since its low ranking in 2021. The gap between its criminality and resilience scores is so large that it has no meaningful global comparator. This calls for urgent intervention in Myanmar and could be a cautionary tale for countries such as Ecuador and Haiti, whose emerging crime–resilience gap scores may not be at this critical juncture yet but are steadily approaching Myanmar’s dire, unenviable situation. In 2021, Myanmar’s criminality score of 7.59 (out of 10, where 10 is the worst ranking), placed it third among all countries in the world. By 2023, a score of 8.15 propelled Myanmar to the top of the global ranking, i.e. it has the highest levels of criminality globally. The most significant increases in its criminal market scores (one component of the criminality ranking) were in non-renewable resource crimes (following a surge in illegal rare earth mining after the 2021 coup) and human trafficking, where cases of forced labour and of trafficking for forced criminality and marriage, as well as the plight of the Rohingya people, were exacerbated by the conflict and subsequent sanctions imposed by the international community. Myanmar’s score for criminal actors (the other component of the criminality ranking) also jumped between 2021 and 2023 – with a particular upward trend for foreign (namely Chinese) actors operating in the country – to a record 9 out of 10. This now matches the score also reached by state-embedded actors, who are active in most, if not all, criminal markets. In particular, state-embedded actors are facilitators in Myanmar’s drug markets (where the country scores 10 for synthetic drugs). Overall, Myanmar has the highest combined score for criminal actors in the world. But the biggest shifts are seen in Myanmar’s ability to resist and withstand organized crime. The Index shows that the more a country is affected by conflict or instability, the more likely it is to have reduced resilience to organized crime. Myanmar is no exception. The country’s resilience score, already low at 3.42 (out of 10) in the 2021 edition of the Index, slid to a paltry 1.63 in 2023. This is not the lowest score in the world – Libya and Afghanistan rank lower – but two key findings are nonetheless striking. First, the country has seen a drop of between 1 and 3 points in every single resilience indicator. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the gap between criminality and resilience is so large that it puts Myanmar eons away from any other country. In 2021, the gap between criminality and resilience was 4.17 points, but by 2023 it had widened to an alarming 6.52 points (the gap ‘growth’ between 2021 and 2023 is shown in the figure below, alongside other countries that also experienced growth gaps). The biggest resilience score drop was seen in the international cooperation indicator, which fell from 5.0 to 2.0. Much of this can be explained by the decisions of many international partners not to engage directly with the military government, and Myanmar’s exclusion from international forums, and information and exchange mechanisms until the coup is resolved. Donors suspended their government-to-government aid agreements, partnerships and projects after the coup, and promised to support more civil society and humanitarian projects. However, these promises may not have been realized. Aid delivery and programming in Myanmar is challenging. Civil society and communities are literally under fire; there are difficulties in getting funding into Myanmar (possibly complicated by the unintended consequences of the Financial Action Task Force blacklisting); and there are concerns about the safety of project staff. Data from the OECD shows a considerable 85% drop in overall aid contributions since 2021 – arguably at a time when intervention and support are most urgently and desperately needed. There were other demands on donors during this period, such as Ukraine, which saw a surge in aid in 2022. However, in December 2023, the UN reported ‘gross underfunding’ for the estimated 1.9 million people who had been prioritized for aid. The drop in donor activity and aid, and the knock-on effect of limited programming and interventions, has also affected the ability to monitor the situation in Myanmar. This has been exacerbated by a significant decline in the resilience capacity of non-state actors. This is not surprising, given the well-documented targeting of civilians and the repressive tactics of the military government. The conflict in Myanmar has not only increased vulnerability, but the resulting lawlessness has fuelled crime and enabled new illicit markets to consolidate. Myanmar scores 7.5 for the cyber-dependent crimes market. Cyberscam centres have sprung up across the country, particularly in border towns and special economic zones, facilitated by state-embedded and Chinese actors. The cyberscam phenomenon is also an example of how domestic criminality, if left unchecked and unregulated, can affect the stability and security of neighbouring countries – such as Thailand –, the wider region and the world. The scale of cyberscam activity has become so significant that it appears to have even affected China’s delicate geopolitical balance in the region, eventually forcing Beijing to issue arrest warrants for key figures linked to cyber fraud in Myanmar’s Shan State. The absence of scrutiny in Myanmar has therefore not only contributed to the widening and deepening of the country’s crime–resilience gap, but has also been instrumental in allowing rising criminality to have reach and impact far beyond its borders. While cyber fraud in Myanmar has attracted much international scrutiny and attention, it is primarily a manifestation of an internal, complex picture of intertwined criminality, vulnerability and risk. The ‘gap’ that exists for Myanmar is a canary in the coal mine for us all – it needs to be top of the agenda in 2024 for governments and civil society practitioners alike. Prescribing a tonic of acute diplomatic attention, rapid redirection of aid and programming efforts that navigate complexity to create innovative solutions to address state-embedded criminality while supporting and building community resilience is an urgent imperative for the country. This analysis is part of the GI-TOC’s series of articles delving into the results of the Global Organized Crime Index. The series explores the Index’s findings and their effects on policymaking, anti-organized crime measures and analyses from a thematic or regional perspective..."
Source/publisher: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (Geneva)
2024-02-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-26
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Description: "The MAU tracks market prices in southern Sagaing Region. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market at the end of each month. The data include prices from Monywa (main market), Myaung (Na Bet), Shwebo (main market), Ye-U (Tin Tein Yan), and Yinmarbin (Yin Paung Taing). Data and product specs are available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS Prices for rice and pulses rose at least 8% in January, although cooking oil prices fell 6% or more; Vegetable prices fell 9% or more across markets with lower prices for onion, eggplant, and long bean; Meat and fsh price trends varied by market with Myaung and Ye-U experiencing lower prices; Prices for hygiene products were largely stable except in Monywa where prices were generally higher; Most NFI prices increased 3-12% in Monywa, and prices for tarps and other NFIs rose 2-7% across markets; Monywa saw a second month of broad price hikes, although increases this month were more limited to NFIs; Yinmarbin saw notable price stability in January after notable price increases for NFIs in December. Product-Level Price Changes Essential Foods – Prices for rice and pulses rose at least 8% in January, although cooking oil prices fell 6% or more. Prices for rice and pulses increased in three of fve markets monitored, rising at least 8% and 6%, respectively. By contrast, cooking oil prices declined for a second straight month, falling 6% or more across markets. Vegetables – Many vegetable prices fell at least 9%, with lower prices in most markets monitored. Long bean, eggplant, and onion fell in three of fve markets, declining at least 3%, 17%, and 23%, respectively. Prices for green chili fuctuated, while garlic prices rose 4-14%. Prices for watercress were stable. Meat and Fish – Meat and fsh price trends varied by market again in January, with lower prices in Myaung and Ye-U. Meat and fsh prices fell at least 6% in Myaung and at least 13% in YeU. Meat and fsh prices were stable in Shwebo and Yinmarbin, and they fuctuated 12-15% in Monywa. Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products were fairly stable in January, except in Monywa where prices rose. Prices for hygiene products rose 3-6% in Monywa, but elsewhere there were few clear trends. Prices for hygiene products fuctuated up to 33% in a few isolated cases but were otherwise mostly unchanged. Prices for hygiene products were stable in Shwebo. Other NFIs – NFI prices rose again in Monywa, and they increased moderately in other markets. Prices for plastic tarps, mosquito nets, longyis, and towels, were up 2-7% in most markets in January. Prices increased 3-12% for all NFIs monitored in Monywa, marking a second straight month of signifcant price hikes there. NFI prices were stable in Yinmarbin, where they rose sharply last month..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Feb 15 to 21, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Rakhine State, Kachin State, Shan State, Kayah State, Kayin State, and Mon State from February 15th to 21st. Over 100 civilians died by the arrest and killing of Military Troops and 4 women including an aged girl were raped and killed. Military Junta arrested and blackmailed the civilians by using the Conscription Law in many places around the country. About 20 civilians died and over 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 6 underaged children died when the Military Junta committed abuses. A civilian also died by the landmine of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myat Thu Tun is the fifth Myanmar journalist to be killed by the junta since the coup d'état in February 2021. His body was recently found buried, riddled with bullets and marked by signs of torture. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) calls on the international community to take action to force the junta to stop this massacre. The buried body of Myanmar journalist Myat Thu Tun was recently found in the town of Mrauk-U, in the western Rakhine region, along several bodies of prisoners buried in an air shelter, and was reportedly marked with gunshot wounds and signs of torture, according to a statement by the rebel troops of Arakan Army on 11 February 2024. "This shocking murder bears the hallmark of the Myanmar military junta, which for three years now has imposed a climate of terror on all media professionals and is once again demonstrating its ruthless violence. We call on the international community to step up pressure on the Myanmar regime to cease its campaign of terror against reporters and release the 62 journalists and press freedom defenders detained in the country. Cédric Alviani RSF Asia-Pacific Bureau Director The victim, Myat Thu Tun, also known as Phoe Thiha, had been held in prison since his arrest at his home in September 2022, and was awaiting trial on charges of "disseminating false information" and "inciting hatred", under Article 505(a) of the Penal Code, which carries a penalty of up to three years imprisonment. Before the coup in February 2021, he had worked for various Myanmar media outlets, including the Democratic Voice of Burma, 7 Days Journal and The Voice Journal. At the time of his arrest in September 2022, he was still working for local media Western News in the western state of Rakhine. Myat Thu Tun is the fifth journalist to be killed by the military junta since the coup d'état in February 2021. Freelance photojournalists Aye Kaw and Soe Naing were also murdered in detention, while the founder of the Khonumthung News Agency Pu Tuidim and the editor of the Federal News Journal Sai Win Aung were both shot by the army while reporting on the ground. Myanmar, ranked 173th out of 180 countries in RSF's 2023 World Press Freedom Index, is one of the world’s biggest jailers of journalists with 64 detained, second only to China..."
Source/publisher: Reporters Without Borders (Paris)
2024-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: In Part 1 of a 2-part series, Bobby Anderson considers the strengths and weaknesses of Myanmar’s military and its chances of collapse.
Description: "Starting in 2017, the insurgent Arakan Army (AA) waged war against the Union of Myanmar across the complex topography of Paletwa township in southern Chin State. In January 2024, Paletwa fell to them. I had worked in Paletwa with the deposed civilian government’s Department of Rural Development (DRD) before the February 2021 coup. From 2017 onward, in response to the AA’s guerilla actions, the civilian government had constricted my movement across the township; by 2019 I was limited to Paletwa town and the expanse of the Kaladan River stretching south. I still heard small arms fire at night. Back then the river was my only way in or out of town, and it wasn’t safe either: boats transporting soldiers were strafed. In what is now a memory steeped in irony, back in 2019 the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw, of late referred to as စစ်တပ် / sit-tat, hosted a ceremony in Paletwa town to commemorate their “re-taking” of the township from AA. They hadn’t re-taken any territory at all, but no matter: the sit-tat has never let reality get in the way of self-adulation. That afternoon I sat obliviously on the side of the road which ran down to the jetty, eating ဝက်သားဟင်း tamin hin (pork curry). I paid and I happened to step outside just as a major general and his entourage passed on foot. He stopped and looked at me, open mouthed, and I did the same to him. My first thought was that he looked like a cut rate scoutmaster: U Baden-Powell. Then I wished I’d paid more attention before I stepped out. None of the soldiers lining the street were there when I’d entered the mess an hour before. I smiled dumbly, hoping for reciprocity. Instead, I got a look of hatred that felt white-hot; an expression that spread across the soldiery. Civilian officials later told me that the major general was vexed that I was in Paletwa. And he was especially vexed because I had permission to be there from the civilian government. I’d passed security checkpoints on the Kaladan with the requisite paperwork and had checked in with the town’s police and immigration officials—in the Union, immigration officials control the internal movement of both foreigners and Myanmar citizens. That sour look stayed with me. For a commander, who would have had total control over the township prior to the quasi-democratization that began a decade earlier, back in Paletwa for a victory lap, it must have been a rude shock to be blindsided by a useless, grinning, pale guy. I flatter myself in hindsight by imagining that in some miniscule way I was, to that commander, representative of everything abhorrent about civilian rule. This essay considers the possibility for a return to civilian rule in the face of both sit-tat intransigence and stunning recent losses at the hands of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance – comprised of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – launched a coordinated offensive against the sit-tat on October 27, 2023, and have since seized much of northern Shan state, while People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and other Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) launch new operations countrywide. This has all served to put down the myth of the sit-tat’s dominance. I consider alternating claims of sit-tat resiliency and fragility, with particular attention to the demographics of both the sit-tat and the resistance; as well as sit-tat coherence, mindset, funding, territorial control, and international relations. I conclude with a few predictions. Myanmar’s military Myanmar’s military has dominated the country’s political and social landscape since independence. It ruled Myanmar as a dictatorship from 1958 to 1960, then from 1962 until 2011, when a series of political and economic reforms initiated by the sit-tat through their affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) under Thein Sein led to a transition to a semi-democratic system which ultimately saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) win elections in 2015. However, prior to this ‘loss’, the sit-tat, learning from the Indonesian military’s post-1998 mis-steps in that country’s abrupt and disorganized transition to civilian rule, had enshrined their dominance through a constitution they drafted. The 2008 Constitution gave the sit-tat undisputed control of key ministries including Home Affairs and Defense, and allocated them 25 percent of seats in the parliament or Hluttaw, making reforms of the aforementioned constitution impossible. The sit-tat’s constitution also provided a legal basis for any future coup d’état. The NLD’s expert on constitutional law, U Ko Ni, believed in a democratic future and noted that what could not be amended could be replaced. In 2017, he received a bullet to the head by way of reply. The sit-tat would remain in control, and any future civilian government would be, for all intents and purposes, window dressing. On February 1, 2021, the sit-tat deposed the civilians anyway. Sit-tat head, Min Aung Hlaing, justified his coup by alleging widespread ballot fraud in the November 2020 elections which had seen the NLD accrue a majority of votes. The coup was widely condemned by the international community, bar the sit-tat’s most powerful friends: the People’s Republic of China, which referred to the coup as a ‘cabinet reshuffle,’[1] and Russia. The civilian government reconstituted itself as best it could in non-sit-tat-controlled territories and abroad, forming the National Unity Government (NUG) together with its allies from EAOs, activist groups, and political parties in April 2021. While the coup was historically predictable, as was resistance in non-Bamar, ethnic minority areas, the violent ferocity of the resistance in Bamar areas that came perhaps as a shock to the military. Some civilians began to band together in People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). Some PDFs sheltered in territories controlled by the country’s myriad EAOs, receiving training from them. Some PDFs also aligned themselves with the NUG. And soon, PDFs began killing soldiers in droves. The sit-tat, for their part, responded to resistance predictably, and with increasing sadism, moving from the first days of jailing NLD figures and dispersing protesters to levelling entire communities from the air, recently with the deadliest airstrike thus far in the conflict. The 168 civilians dead in Pa Zi Gyi in April 2023 join untold thousands in graves, while many survivors join two million displaced. Many Myanmar-focused academics and journalists have staked positions on the sit-tat’s resiliency or fragility. In 2021, the Center for Strategic and International Studies claimed hopefully that the sit-tat was on their last legs, while in 2023, The Irrawaddy more subtly and intelligently noted that the sit-tat’s implosion is not impossible. Numbers Before the coup, general estimates of sit-tat personnel ranged from 300,000 to 400,000. These were overblown. In the past three years, more sober estimates have emerged. On the low end, in May 2023 Ye Myo Hein estimated 150,000 personnel, of which 70,000 are in combat roles. However, the line between combatant and non-combatant in that structure has essentially been erased due to understaffing and losses, and this attrition in numbers was obvious even before the October offensives. As for police, who serve as auxiliaries to the sit-tat, Andrew Selth suggests 80,000, while Ye Myo Hein estimates 70,000. Police would be less reliable regime enforcers: they are not indoctrinated in the manner of soldiers (see below) and they reside in civilian communities. Border Guard Forces (BGF) and Pyu Saw Htee – newly-created and armed militias[2] – may also be counted, but they are peripheral. BGF loyalties are local and diffuse; as a rule they once fought the state but then switched sides, generally betraying previous ideologies, and so their loyalties can be fluid. They are essentially rural gangs running small fiefdoms with state protection. As for militias in general, their numbers are growing due to an inability for the sit-tat to recruit fast enough to replace their own losses. Such militias- staffed with retirees, criminals and EAO turncoats- are a cheap and collateral interim. Losses Even before the October 2023 offensive in northern Shan State, Ye Myo Hein estimated 13,000 sit-tat casualties since the start of the coup, along with 8,000 defections and desertions. He estimated 7,000 police losses, although this police figure is not disaggregated by casualty, or desertion/defection. Nikkei noted that unnamed Yangon diplomats believed that the sit-tat was losing an average of 15 soldiers per day, or roughly 5,500 per year. The NUG claimed nearly 5,000 dead soldiers in the first 10 months following the coup, and prior to the October 27, the 2023 Offensive claimed that the sit-tat had lost half of its combat forces in the last two years, or 30,000 troops. These claims, however, cannot be confirmed, nor can the vast number of changing estimates following the recent offensives, and so sticking with conservative estimates is prudent. If we accept Ye Myo Hein’s estimates as accurate – and this author does – then losses estimated by Nikkei of 5,500 per year constituted 3.7 percent of the overall. That is a considerable bleed. To this we need to add desertions and defections: Hein estimated an additional 8,000, while the NUG claimed that roughly 14,000 sit-tat and police left the ranks as part of the civil disobedience movement (CDM) as of March 2023. The NUG claims to offer financial incentives for deserters, but this is unlikely to be a deciding factor in a soldier’s choice. There simply aren’t funds available to create a durable financial incentive to leave; a decision which is complicated by many other factors. These numbers have increased since the October 27 offensive, and although the totals are unknown, they are stark. In early January 2024, at the capture of Laukkai alone, 2,389 military personnel, including six brigadier generals, surrendered: “the largest surrender in the history of Myanmar’s military”, according to Ye Myo Hein. Which begs the question: even before the October offensive, were sit-tat recruitments keeping pace with losses? Not by a long shot. The recent activation of the Conscription law starkly bears this out, but even before the recent offensive, the sit-tat faced ever-growing issues in both recruitment and retention. Their traditional recruiting grounds, such as Sagaing and Chin, are now charnel houses, and many of the young who may have sought sit-tat careers are now rebels instead. The Irrawaddy indicates that applications to the sit-tat’s officer academies are significantly down. While this might constrain talent, talent itself is relative. This sit-tat is hardly a group of innovative tacticians. They throw bodies at problems, including medically unfit ones. Ye Myo Hein reasonably asserts that the sit-tat is “barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force, much less a government”: they were understaffed even before the coup. However, the sit-tat is used to bleeding, and managing multiple rebellions across both broad topographies and decades. The potential for a sudden collapse has been bandied about, but there is no historical precedent the author is aware of that looks anything like the current situation in Myanmar. However, conscription can be seen to reflect desperation. Other comparable militaries have ‘collapsed’ because they were either miniscule or corrupt or faced overwhelming force, or a combination of the three. The sit-tat maintains a disciplined, hierarchical corruption variant which functions because civilians are the prey, and so this corruption has not yet served to hollow out the institution. The culture of the sit-tat supports its longevity. A 2021 Deutsch Welle article claimed that soldiers were being “brainwashed” into buying the army’s worldview”. But they already knew that worldview. The sit-tat always has been a Bamar-supremacist, totalitarian organization.[3] While Theravada Buddhism is a part of this identity, it exists more as a marker to distinguish the sit-tat from non-Buddhists, Muslims especially. The sit-tat’s willingness to kill Buddhist monks when the sangha diverges from the sit-tat shows how disposable this marker can be: indeed, to its officer class, the sit-tat may be a religion that supersedes Buddhism, or at least embodies a ‘purer’ form of Buddhism than the monks who have dedicated their lives to its practice.[4] And while the sit-tat’s lower ranks may contain Rawang, Chin, and other non-Bamar and Christian foot-soldiers, the officer class is entirely Bamar. This doesn’t mean that the lower ranks joined because they prescribe to the worldview: escaping poverty is a more plausible rationale. This culture is supported by insularity.[5] Recruitment is multi-generational. Soldiers and their families live apart from civilians and tend to intermarry. They have their own schools and universities, their own health care, their own insurance and pensions, and their own courts. Civilians, to this group, are entirely untrustworthy, occasionally traitorous. The sit-tat has always ‘safeguarded’ the nation and so they believe they own it. The sit-tat’s sadism is also part and parcel of its culture: gore is bonding materiel. The massacres carried out by soldiers and militias forge a palpable hatred of the sit-tat among civilians, and surely give soldiers the feeling that reprisals await, and there is nowhere else to shelter but in the bloody organization that stains them. In the face of this, the security the Tatmadaw offers, financial and otherwise, is a powerful motivation to stay.[6] This motivation may be seen in the sit-tat personnel who recently fled into Mizoram, India; all opted to return. With the mitigating circumstance of desperate poverty for many of the rank-and-file, to join this group is to knowingly join a criminal, sadistic, totalitarian endeavor. Funds Bodies are one count; cash is another. The sit-tat’s FY 2023-4 budget is US$2.7 billion equivalent – 25 percent of the national budget. The source of their on-budget funding is largely from Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise and revenues linked to extractive industries. The sit-tat has a much larger business structure than the state budget; they directly run two business conglomerates, Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). MEC and MEHL holdings are vast, expanding across mining, industry, banking, food, and tobacco. Contributions to MEC, MEHL, and associated insurance and pension schemes operated by conglomerate subsidiaries are automatically deducted from soldier’s pay, with select contributions converted to MEC or MEHL shares, further bonding soldiers to the sit-tat. Loot for the rank-and-file is also an aspect of economic embeddedness. By way of illustration, much livestock was stolen by soldiers and proxies from fleeing Rohingya during the 2017 expulsions that the price of meat temporarily collapsed in Sittwe.[7] Other illicit local economic opportunities for officers in particular abound, which the aforementioned BGFs and allied militias play an important role in, especially regarding the sit-tat’s need for plausible deniability in such illicit businesses. Indeed, the system of promotion in the sit-tat is based in part on the funds which junior officers can amass and funnel upwards. These opportunities remain a fundraising and control mechanism for regional sit-tat commands and BGFs in particular. Narcotics have been a form of conflict resolution utilized by the sit-tat at least since the 1960s, and this became especially evident after collapse of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1989, when the sit-tat made immediate ceasefires with the CPB’s successor organizations and turned a blind eye to their manufacture and trafficking of heroin, and later, methamphetamine. Bertil Linter, Ko Lin Chin, Tom Kramer and others have described these dynamics extensively. Myanmar recently became, again, the world’s biggest opium producer. In exchange for policing territories as state proxies, the sit-tat has turned a blind eye to such illicit economies at least, and more likely, is engaged in the trade. The application of outside theories upon the sit-tat leadership is a type of anthropomorphism. This includes economics. Myanmar’s GDP growth fell to a negative 18% in the year following the coup, although it did eventually recover to 1%. Before the coup, it averaged a positive 6% per annum. In discarding or being ignorant of economic theories, the sit-tat has demonstrated that it is not as subject to them as N. Gregory Mankiw and other Economics 101 textbook authors would imagine. This also applies benefit to us outsiders in that it demonstrates that economics, for all the ambition of its proselytizers, is a social science, not a hard one. How many times, according to economic predictions, should the country have collapsed under Ne Win or Than Shwe? Although Myanmar is not experiencing hyperinflation, it is worth comparing it to an extreme example: the hyperinflation in rump Yugoslavia in 1993. In August 1993, inflation climbed to 1,880 percent; at an annualised rate, this totaled 363 quadrillion percent. By December of 1993, 500 billion Dinar notes were printed. At the time, I was a teen blissfully unaware of economics. But I did note while I was there that, in bars, the prices of drinks would change between rounds. And yet Yugoslavia kept going – with no friends save a weak Russia, no natural resources worth mention, no China. The country’s institutions continued under a much more effective sanctions regime than is currently imposed on Myanmar, under what were effectively new “rules of the game” only seen clearly in the rear-view mirror. And so the sit-tat also stumbles onward, economics be damned. The sit-tat often displays a rawer understanding of how money works than many an economist who would have bet on collapse. The trend of cronyism displays this understanding all too well: the mutuality of oligarchy and junta is a support mechanism that proves durable for all parties, and I hope someday Joe Studwell, former editor of the Far East Economic Review and author of Asian Godfathers and How Asia Works, chooses to write about this interrelation in Myanmar. That said, Min Aung Hlaing’s recent complaints about finances indicate that even he senses something is economically amiss. But the leadership’s short-sightedness limits their response to inflation to targeting cooking oil producers, threatening local banks that Min Aung Hlaing labels traitorous, and most revolting of all, attempting to rob Myanmar’s migrant workers by demanding they remit 25 percent of their wages home at the regime’s ‘official’ (i.e. fake) exchange rate, in addition to imposing a ten percent tax rate on earnings abroad. Meanwhile the price of rice has doubled, and the military’s answer in the form of price caps will hurt farmers immensely. Sean Turnell uses the word ‘catastrophe’ in his review of Myanmar’s current economy, but it is only that if one cares about people. It is not a catastrophe if it is seen through the prism of organized crime. Surely demonetization, a tool used by the much-hated Ne Win, and which wiped out the kyat savings of civilians countrywide in 1964, 1985 and 1987, is around the corner, even though it is expressly forbidden in the 2008 constitution. Factionalism Sit-tat culture and economic interconnectedness restrict the possibilities of factionalism. The coup and the subsequent crackdown, it is alleged, have led to tensions and divisions within the sit-tat. Terence Lee and Gerard McCarthy evaluate this in the forthcoming “Fracturing the Monolith: Could Military Defections End the Dictatorship in Myanmar?”, while Anders Kirstein Moeller did so in “Peering under the hood: Coup narratives and Tatmadaw Factionalism”. Both attempt to discern the contours of factionalism within the sit-tat. However, it bears reminding that, for all our knowledge of the sit-tat, we do not know what’s happening inside the ranks. Reports of low morale among troops deployed to areas of armed resistance means that the sit-tat deals with the same issues as every other occupying force in history. Low morale in the face of the latest offensive is resulting in surrender, but it has yet to lead to revolt. It’s fair to assert that any factionalism happening within that olive drab opacity is limited to the point where said factionalism does not threaten to change the organizational philosophy of the group, nor the core beliefs it holds. An intra-sit-tat revolt against Min Aung Hlaing will not occur because he is a Bamar supremacist fascist. Rather, it will happen because he is a Bamar supremacist fascist who is losing. Nor will the sit-tat compete against civilians in a game that they haven’t already fixed in their favor. The system remains totalitarian, supremacist, and monolithic. For those arguing that factionalism is possible, I hope for the same, but we simply don’t know. Nevertheless, these hopes of factionalism within limits have precedent. The previous junta’s ‘opening’ in 2010 dated as far back as 2004 with the arrest of Military Intelligence Commander Khin Nyunt and the deposing of his ‘pro-China’ clique. Despite the sit-tat’s overarching ideology, there may be a minute amount of pro-NUG elements within it. Select PDF attacks, according to Ye Myo Hein, “were likely only possible with the collaboration of military insiders, and they have aroused anxiety within the military’s leadership.” Territorial control The sit-tat has been able to maintain control in all major cities and many of the roads connecting them, but even prior to the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s October 27 offensive, the sit-tat controlled less territory and faced more complex and violent resistance than at any time in their history. Shona Loong starkly illustrates this in Post-coup Myanmar in Six Warscapes. Back in February 2023, Min Aung Hlaing stated that only 198 out of over 330 townships in Myanmar were ‘100 percent stable’. If we take ‘stable’ as code for ‘under control,’ Min Aung Hlaing was implying that 40 percent of the country’s townships were ‘out of control’. By July 2023, the sit-tat had imposed martial law in 37 townships, including resistance strongholds in Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Kayah. Prior to the October 27, 2023 offensive, most of Chin state was already under resistance control, as was much of Kayah. The same for Rakhine, which was largely run by the Arakan Army (see below). In Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Kayah, the sit-tat was forced to rely on air power and artillery. It also faced difficulties in maintaining supply lines and, apparently, ensuring the loyalty of troops deployed in these areas. To shore up its own defense, the sit-tat made changes to the Arms Act to arm pro-junta militias and security organizations. As of August 2023, they began conscripting civil servants into militias in southern Shan and Kayah state, including health and education staff – a telling indicator of the effect of the bleed the PDFs were subjecting the sit-tat to. Other proxies were being mobilized to guard foreign investments the sit-tat could not commit numbers to. In a repeat of the practice of previous juntas, the sit-tat also conscripted criminals. Implicitly, then, recruitment was not keeping up with losses. And territories continued to be lost. And then came the October 27, 2023 offensive, in which the Three Brotherhood Alliance overran dozens of towns across Northern Shan State, and the garrisons which supposedly were there to defend them. Most of Northern Shan, and within it, the entirety of Kokang, was lost. Offensives began simultaneously in Rakhine, Chin, and Kayah, effecting the loss of nearly all the remaining territory in the latter two, while much of Western Rakhine is also lost to the sit-tat, and where even distant Ramree island is hosting fighting between the AA and the sit-tat. The coordination was not limited to EAOs: PDFs ramped up operations in Sagaing and elsewhere, and the Pa’O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) is now fighting the sit-tat as well. Even the criminal Karen BGF, guardians of Shwe Kokko, has apparently gone over to the resistance. This was a signature moment, and one that the sit-tat, with its decades of successful ‘musical chairs ceasefires’ in which an offensive against one EAO gives another breathing space, could not have imagined. Nor could they have imagined that, in another signature event, the United Wa State Army would assume administrative control of areas the alliance had seized from sit-tat control. Despite this stunning set of losses, sit-tat tactics are not deviating from past practice. This includes asking China to broker ceasefires which they then speedily violate. This criminal, totalitarian endeavor holds such a supremacist belief in itself that it cannot comprehend battlefield realities..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Many in Myanmar have condemned what they perceive as seriously flawed Western criticism of the Burmese ex-leader.
Description: "On 18 October 2023, the Brighton and Hove City Council in the United Kingdom revoked the Freedom of the City awarded to Burmese politician Aung San Suu Kyi in 2011. Their special meeting lasted only 18 minutes, with Councillor Bella Sankey, the Labour leader of the Council, stating that it was not right to honour a person who “presided over the ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Muslim Rohingya community” and was “an enabler to racial and religious discrimination and ethnic cleansing”. Sankey was supported by all 50 or so of the Council members present. This revocation was the latest act by Western institutions and human rights groups, at times inclined to zealotry and intolerance, to humiliate and punish Suu Kyi for her perceived failure to “speak out” against the persecution of the Rohingya Muslim ethnic minority in Myanmar. Yet not one of her critics has ever attempted to say why she supposedly did not speak out, nor offered any word of explanation other than, like Bob Geldof, to denigrate her as a “handmaiden to genocide”. Their main concern has been to topple her from the pedestal on which they put her, and not to seek to understand her fraught and fragile relationship with the military, which has led to her detention and imprisonment for more than three years. This year, an invaluable compendium of documents was published by the American Buddhist scholar Alan Clements and his British colleague Fergus Harlow entitled “Burma’s Voices of Freedom”, which includes interviews, articles and speeches by Suu Kyi and several of her Burmese associates. The four-volume set offers a clear and persuasive narrative of her policies from a Burmese perspective, which would come as a complete surprise to many of her Western critics. Suu Kyi indeed acknowledged that she had not “spoken out” on the Rohingya crisis because to do so would only make matters worse. Suu Kyi’s consistent approach over the years to the Rohingya – as on all issues – is inspired by the Buddhist virtues of loving kindness (mettā), compassion (karunā), empathetic joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekkhā). In practical terms it is based on: Reconciliation, not condemnation. A refusal to take sides in the communal disturbances between Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine State. Cooperation with the military at all costs. A refusal to condemn publicly, but to search for a modus vivendi with the aim of securing their understanding and support for the country’s political transition. Determination not to endanger the prospects for democratic change after so many years of military rule, even at the risk of being seriously misunderstood in the West. Suu Kyi had discussions with a considerable number of Western politicians and personalities once she began to travel overseas in 2012. To some, she would undoubtedly have explained in confidence how fragile was her position, but publicly she did not dare make reference to this. Her spokesman, U Win Htein, confided to Clements on 10 April 2015 that Suu Kyi “did clearly express her position about the Rohingya, but what she expressed was that, if she spoke up for the Rohingya or advocated too heavily on their behalf, it would have unfavourable repercussions among the Burmese … It might help the international community understand the situation, but it won’t help Burma.” Suu Kyi indeed acknowledged that she had not “spoken out” on the Rohingya crisis because to do so would only make matters worse, sully her relations with the military, and endanger her very political existence. Yet this is what human rights organisations pressed her to do. Instead, Suu Kyi put the interests of her country before her personal reputation. In an interview with NHK World (Japan) on 6 October 2018, she stated, “I don’t care about prizes and honours as such. I am sorry that friends are not as steadfast as they might be. Because I think friendship means understanding, basically, trying to understand rather than to just make your own judgement. But prizes come and prizes go.” On her decision to represent Myanmar at the International Court of Justice on 11 December 2019, Suu Kyi’s Burmese associates are unanimous that she did not go to The Hague to defend the military, but to appear as a representative of her country in their dispute with The Gambia, and to defend Myanmar’s honour and dignity. The human rights activist and Harvard graduate Ma Thida Sanchuang said in January 2020: “But for the eyes of the general public, Aung San Suu Kyi took the lead to defend our country’s image … The general public’s stand with her on the ICJ case was the signal … to show how much they are still against the military and its party.” This is entirely opposite to most Western interpretations. Not surprisingly, many of Suu Kyi’s closest collaborators have condemned what they see as seriously flawed Western criticism of her policies, especially on the Rohingya. U Win Htein commented: “They are false judgements. They are misperceptions. They are from the uninformed and misguided … Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is one of the most compassionate people I have ever met.” A senior Buddhist monk, the late Myawaddy Sayadaw Abbot of Mingyi Monastery, was even blunter in December 2017: “Wait and see. Only those who revoked the awards will lose their dignity in the end.” And as Myanmar’s version of Lady Gaga, Phyu Phyu Kyaw Thein, a Christian, noted in January 2020: “But one thing for sure is Daw Suu, as a devout Buddhist, forgives them for she knows that ‘they know not what they say’.” One day soon, Suu Kyi may be free to put the record straight. Her detractors can then eat humble pie, if they have the moral courage..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Lowy Institute via The Interpreter
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Three years after the failed military coup in Myanmar, there is genuine hope within the country for democratic resistance. By the end of 2023 and into the beginning of 2024, Myanmar reached a turning point, with significant successes achieved by the revolutionary movement, particularly on the battlefield. For the first time since the coup, there is a growing possibility that the resistance movement may prevail against the military dictatorship. Three years after the military coup, approximately 17.6 million people in Myanmar are facing a humanitarian emergency, and 2.6 million people are homeless. The military has been responsible for the deaths of over 4,500 people, including about 500 children. In addition, more than 26,000 individuals have been detained, with 20,000 still languishing in prison. While the struggle in Myanmar is tragic, marked by a great deal of brutality and significant loss of life, it is also deeply inspiring. The previously deeply divided nation with various ethnic groups has united against the military, which illegally seized power on February 1, 2021. Likely driven by a combination of the military’s significant electoral defeat (in the form of a pro-military party, composed of formed generals) and the personal aspirations of coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the military arrested most of the country’s civilian leadership, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and halted all democratic processes, in order to install a new government, a military junta under the name State Administration Council (SAC). At first, the people of Myanmar faced daunting odds. However, they persevered, and now, three years later, we see the balance of power beginning to shift in their favor. The prospect of overcoming the junta seemed bleak in the aftermath of the coup, as the military seemed poised to violently suppress the initially non-violent protests that eventually escalated into armed defense. For the first two years, the resistance movement struggled to survive, clinging on despite the military’s vast advantage, eventually reaching a tipping point where the coup leaders could not quash the resistance, yet the resistance could not overcome the junta. The year 2023 brought a change to this situation: the first half of the year saw an improvement on the side of the revolutionary forces compared to previous years but without major victories. It was only in the second half of the year that the situation changed significantly. With Operation 1027, named after the date of its start – October 27, 2023 –it seems for the first time that the revolutionary forces may eventually emerge victorious. The duration of this process, however, remains uncertain and will depend on a number of factors, including internal, regional, and international dynamics. Key external players that can influence events in Myanmar include China, Thailand, and India, three neighboring countries. China deserves special attention because it has been extensively involved in Myanmar’s affairs for decades and is known for its ability to turn violence in Myanmar’s border regions on and off like a switch, depending on China’s needs. Moreover, the 2017 Operation has had a strong impact on Myanmar’s relations with China. For months, China’s central government pleaded with the SAC to crack down on cross-border cyber scam syndicates run primarily by Chinese criminals from guarded compounds on the Myanmar side of the border, controlled by local warlords, but to no avail. Then came the solution for China in the form of Operation 1027, essentially greenlighted by Beijing. In the short term, cracking down on scam centers took precedence over peace on the border. Publicly, China called for a de-escalation of the conflict. In October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, composed of three ethnic armed organizations joined by the people’s defense forces, known as PDFs (armed units formed post-coup to resist the military regime and recognized by the National Unity Government, the parallel legitimate government formed by representatives elected in the 2020 elections), launched an operation with a dual objective: to eliminate the scam syndicates operating in the region and to confront and defeat the military dictatorship. The first objective led to the liberation of numerous compounds, with the return of the enslaved, mostly Chinese, to their homes. The second objective resulted in unprecedented battlefield losses for the Myanmar military. The second outcome was unexpected by China, as the Myanmar military suffered unprecedented battlefield losses, highlighting the effectiveness and impact of the operation. Operation 1027, which is still ongoing, has emerged as the most significant threat to the military regime since the coup. The alliance has successfully blocked the junta’s access to the northern part of Shan State, seized key cities and town in the region, and gained control of the Myanmar-China border, thereby disrupting the lucrative border trade (which had previously funneled cash into the hands of the junta). Throughout these developments, China mediated talks between the military and the alliance (with the primary goal of averting a prolonged disruption of border trade). However, the negotiated ceasefires have been tenuous, with numerous instances of breakdown. There is an interesting dual dependency and influence at play. Operation 1027 was made possible by the broader resistance movement in Myanmar, as the junta has been under attack by a national uprising in various towns across the country over the last three years. This further stretched the junta’s already thinning forces. In turn, Operation 1027 not only capitalized on this weakening of the junta, but also served to significantly strengthen the revolutionary forces in other parts of Myanmar, such as Chin, Kachin, Karen, Sagaing, and Magway. The revolutionary forces in these areas accelerated and began to occupy military bases. As a result, the army suffered losses as several bases fell and many soldiers were detained. While serious battles between the military and the resistance movement continue, one thing is certain: there is no turning back at this point. At present, everything in Myanmar revolves around the removal of the junta’s cruel rule and, more broadly, the removal of the military’s influence from the country’s political landscape. The entire population shares the belief that the continued existence of a military junta in society is untenable. A return to a compromise situation in the form of a hybrid regime, similar to that of the 2010s, in which the military wields significant political power alongside the civilian government, is not a realistic solution for Myanmar’s future. While the people of Myanmar believe that victory is within reach, it remains to be seen how long this process actually takes – it could be years before we see a real change. But for now, we can look at it through a lens of hope..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Reset Dialogues on Civilizations
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
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Sub-title: The arrests were for writing or sharing anti-junta posts on Facebook and other social networks.
Description: "Myanmar junta authorities have arrested and jailed nearly 1,500 people they say posted anti-junta messages on Facebook, TikTok and Telegram over the last two years, research group Data for Myanmar has found. The arrests included a woman who had been working in Thailand and was sentenced to life in prison in December after she returned to Myanmar to have her passport and work visa renewed, a family friend told Radio Free Asia. Officers checked her phone during the renewal in Yangon and found anti-junta messages that she had sent privately, the family friend said. “After that, she was arrested and taken to the North Dagon jail,” the friend said. “Then she was sent to Insein Prison.” The junta has struggled to gain popular support since taking power from a civilian government in a Feb. 1, 2021, coup d’etat. Responding to critical messages with criminal prosecution has had a chilling effect on how people express themselves online. It has also earned Myanmar a ranking as the second worst country in the world for internet freedom, according to Washington-based Freedom House. The Data for Myanmar report said that most of the 1,480 people detained between Feb. 29, 2022, and Jan. 30, 2024, were Facebook users. The independent NGO also found that an average of 62 people were detained every month. Almost half of the detainees – nearly 700 people – were from the Yangon and Mandalay regions. Data for Myanmar compiled data for the Jan. 31 report by monitoring junta-affiliated daily newspapers and news media. Jailed for sharing news Another social media-related arrest was that of Mandalay resident Khin Maung Chin, who was detained in December 2022 for sharing news articles and critiques of the military written by other Facebook users, a friend of his told RFA. Khin Maung Chin was also found to have written messages about Aung San Suu Kyi, the head of the deposed National League for Democracy and the country’s former de facto leader. And last November, junta troops raided the home of Yangon resident Min Nyo, who had worked to provide clothing and medicine to war victims. A family member told RFA.that pro-military supporters had informed authorities about his online criticism of the junta. Min Nyo is also serving a sentence at Insein Prison, where many pro-democracy activists are held. Freedom House noted in a report released in October that the junta has reduced broadband speeds, cut internet connections and blocked some text and calling services in areas where anti-regime resistance has been strong. ‘Procedure used by dictators’ Junta authorities have also restricted Burmese citizens from accessing social media platforms while junta-controlled publications frequently warn that people can be charged under the Penal Code and Telecommunications Law, the report said. In December, the junta announced the formation of a committee to further monitor and take action against what people write and share online. RFA’s attempts to reach junta spokesman Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun to ask about the Data for Myanmar report were unsuccessful. However, junta officials have previously stated that the regime will take action if posted messages are aimed at inciting people to destroy the country’s peace and stability or to abolish the junta’s governing mechanism. A former military officer told RFA that arresting people for critical comments is an understandable part of governing. “As a ruler, he would arrest those who spoke ill of him,” he said. “This has become an obligation. It must be done. It is his job to arrest those who raised the rebellion.” Aung Myo Min, the human rights minister for the shadow National Unity Government, criticized the arrests as merely a “procedure used by dictators to prevent people from speaking up” – not as a way to maintain stability..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "BANGKOK – ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) strongly condemns the decision by the Myanmar military to enforce a national conscription law that would mandate all men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 to serve for at least two years in the armed forces. “We are deeply concerned about the impact the Conscription Law will have on the young people of Myanmar. This is yet another disgraceful attempt by the military junta to rule through fear and sabotage,” APHR Board Member and former Thai foreign minister Kasit Piromya said today. The People’s Military Service Law was enacted in 2010 but never enforced or repealed under the National League for Democracy, despite calls to do so from civil society organizations. Nearly two decades later, the law is being implemented as the Myanmar junta’s bases and territory are rapidly being lost to the armed resistance forces. It is apparent that the junta is seeking to make up for the casualties it has lost at the cost of the future of Myanmar’s youth. “This law seeks to undermine the youth-led struggle against the dictatorship and knowingly pits them against the opposition forces so many of them have supported. Its enactment also shows the utter cowardice of the Myanmar junta; they – quite literally – cannot fight their own battles,” Kasit said. The announcement has caused widespread uncertainty for young people and their families who have no desire to serve under the military’s corrupt and violent dictatorship, which is deeply unpopular throughout the majority of the country. Myanmar’s young people have shown exceptional bravery in the wake of the military’s increasing violence and have done so to ensure their generation does not inherit another era of authoritarian rule. In a brutal and coordinated attempt to silence those efforts, the junta is forcing them to the frontlines. “We urge ASEAN member states and the wider international community to help provide access, including visas and educational opportunities, to Myanmar youth who seek to flee to other countries ahead of the draft. We also call on the international community to recognize that this is a desperate attempt from a failing regime to cling to power and act decisively to support Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces and bring an end to the junta’s rule,” said Kasit..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
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Description: "OVERVIEW: At the close of 2023, Myanmar was entrenched in a deepening humanitarian crisis with the civilian population facing new dimensions of conflict across multiple fronts that are driving surging displacement and escalating humanitarian needsincreasing fear for their lives and is now grappling with exhausted coping capacities. The humanitarian situation remained dire at year’s end, primarily fueled by profound protection risks from conflict and discrimination, compounded by a range of challenges such as food insecurity, a beleaguered health system, disrupted education, and the aftermath of Cyclone Mocha which struck Myanmar in May and affected more than three million people. Inflation and conflict have led to a sharp increase in the price of essential items, leaving vulnerable households hungry and economically distressed, pushing many to resort to negative coping measures for survival. The final days of 2023 witnessed intense fighting across the majority of states and regions, compelling civilians to flee their homes, often multiple times, largely due to fears of indiscriminate attacks and the use of aerial bombardment. As of 31 December, more than 2.6 million people were estimated to be displaced nationwide, facing dire conditions and inadequate shelter, often in informal sites, with a desperate need for basic services like clean water. Those on the move are confronting escalating risks from explosive ordnance, and individuals in protracted displacement situations are seeing their vulnerabilities compounded over time. The cumulative impact of conflict, displacement, poverty, and natural disasters underscores the gravity of the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, necessitating urgent and comprehensive interventions to alleviate the suffering of the affected population. Humanitarian efforts in 2023 faced severe hindrances due to access constraints and bureaucratic impediments, with at least 142 arrests and detentions of aid workers reported. However, advocacy persists for expanded access to conflict areas, particularly in regions where bureaucratic hindrances have intensified since the escalation of conflict in late October. Despite these challenges, resilient humanitarian actors used a range of approaches to reach at least 3.2 million people with assistance at least once. It is also likely that actual reach is higher due to underreporting of assistance in conflict areas but this remains difficult to quantify. While the number of people reached is substantial in the circumstances, this reach falls short of the envisioned depth and sustainability due to substantial underfunding, resulting in an unprecedented level of unmet needs (1.8 million people missed), which is expected to persist into 2024. As of 31January 2024, funding against the 2023 Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan had reached $324 million which is only 37 per cent of the requested funding, leaving a significant $563 million funding gap. Urgent attention and a substantial increase in financial support for both humanitarian and development actors are imperative to bridge this gap in 2024. Analysis of reach Humanitarians reached 65 per cent (3.2 million people) of the annual HRP target set at 5 million individuals, with more than half a million people impacted by cyclone Mocha assisted via a range of modalities. Notably, close to 1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) received assistance during the course of the year, reflecting a concerted effort in 2023 to better address the needs of one of these critically vulnerable groups. This is a 33 per cent increase on the number of IDPs reached in 2022 but still means that there were significant gaps in assisting newly displaced people in hard-to-reach areas. Additionally, more than 1.8 million of people reached fall within the category of other crisis-affected people with humanitarian needs, highlighting the diverse challenges faced by the population and humanitarian efforts to support non-displaced populations due to the collapse of basic services and in the absence of large-scale development interventions. This is unsustainable in the longer-term and underscores the need for complimentary development funding to build community resilience. The data also underscores a specific emphasis on children in the response, with the number of boys and girls reached steadily increasing each quarter, indicating an awareness of the vulnerabilities children face in crisis situations. Furthermore, there is a consistent and commendable effort to reach persons with disabilities, as reflected in the steadily increasing numbers throughout the year. This commitment has led to a more inclusive approach to humanitarian assistance, recognizing and actively addressing the specific challenges confronted by this group, though overall numbers of persons with disabilities reached still remain far behind those targeted for humanitarian assistance. The data also reveals a consistent trend wherein the number of women reached exceeds that of men, showcasing a heightened awareness of gender-specific vulnerabilities. Thanks to the concentrated efforts of the clusters in enhancing outreach and bolstering partner capacity, the count of partners reporting their progress grew significantly from 222 in 2022 to 269 in 2023. Likewise, the overall number of participating cluster partners (those participating in cluster meetings and activities) increased from 238 in 2022 to 272 in 2023. The majority of partners are thus now regularly sharing their progress on their humanitarian response activities. Despite formidable access constraints, humanitarian operations demonstrated resilience by expanding into hard-to-reach areas, achieving 64 per cent of those targeted in the Southeast. A notable increase was also seen in people reach figure from 269,600 at the end of 2022 to 536,000 in the close of 2023, reflecting a significant expansion in coverage of assistance. The Northeast and Rakhine experienced a notable scale-up in assistance, with rates of 112 per cent and 88 per cent respectively with the quarter 4 escalation in fighting and Cyclone Mocha likely to be key factors in the increased response effort in these areas. Encouragingly, the clusters covering education, food security, protection, and shelter/NFI/CCCM noted improved results against escalating needs reaching anywhere between 65 per cent up to 90 per cent of their targets by the conclusion of 2023. The Health Cluster reported only 31 per cent reach, although to some extent this is the result of underreporting of this type of activity..."
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-02-21
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-21
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Description: "NEW YORK (21 February 2024) – Myanmar’s military junta is becoming an even greater threat to civilians, even as it shows further signs of weakness and desperation through the imposition of mandatory military service, warned a UN expert. Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, today called for stronger international action to protect increasingly vulnerable populations. “While wounded and increasingly desperate, the Myanmar military junta remains extremely dangerous,” he said. “Troop losses and recruitment challenges have become existential threats for the junta, which faces vigorous attacks on frontlines all across the country. As the junta forces young men and women into the military ranks, it has doubled down on its attacks on civilians using stockpiles of powerful weapons.” On 10 February, the junta issued an order that purportedly brought the 2010 People’s Military Service Law into force. Citizen men aged 18 to 35 and citizen women aged 18 to 27 are eligible for conscription, though “professional” men and women can be conscripted up to the ages of 45 and 35 respectively. Those who evade military service or help others evade military service are subject to up to five years imprisonment. A junta spokesperson has indicated that the junta intends to conscript 5,000 individuals per month beginning in April. In the face of inaction by the Security Council, the Special Rapporteur urged States to strengthen and coordinate measures to reduce the junta’s access to the weapons and financing it needs to sustain its attacks on the people of Myanmar. “Make no mistake, signs of desperation, such as the imposition of a draft, are not indications that the junta and its forces are less of a threat to the people of Myanmar. In fact, many are facing even greater dangers.” “By seeking to activate the conscription law, the junta is trying to justify and expand its pattern of forced recruitment, which is already impacting civilian populations around the country. In recent months, young men have reportedly been kidnapped from the streets of Myanmar’s cities or otherwise compelled into joining the military’s ranks. Villagers have reportedly been used as porters and human shields,” said Andrews. “Young people are horrified by the possibility of being forced to participate in the junta’s reign of terror. The numbers fleeing across borders to escape conscription will surely skyrocket.” The Special Rapporteur also called for an infusion of humanitarian aid for impacted communities, including through the provision of cross-border aid. “I implore the international community to provide increased levels of humanitarian aid to those impacted by the conflict while supporting leaders committed to a democratic transition process that affirms human rights, transparency, and accountability,” he said. “Now, more than ever, the international community must act urgently to isolate the junta and protect the people of Myanmar.” ENDS Mr. Thomas Andrews (United States of America) is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale Law School and an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen. He has been a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network and has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide. The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Comprising the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, Special Procedures is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-02-21
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Fighting continues in northern Rakhine State since the Arakan Army (AA) launched an offensive against Myanmar’s junta in mid-November last year. The AA has seized Mrauk-U, Minbya, Kyauktaw and Pauktaw towns and Paletwa in southern Chin State along with numerous junta bases and border outposts. The AA is attacking Rathedaung town and has told the Regional Operations Command in the state capital, Sittwe, to surrender. Sittwe is the junta’s administrative seat in Rakhine. The regime blew up a bridge on the Yangon-Sittwe road to disrupt AA troops advances on the city and senior administrative officials have allegedly left Sittwe. Many of Sittwe’s residents have left but The Irrawaddy recently talked to someone who remains in the city. What is the situation in Sittwe? The AA has taken most of northern Rakhine State but Buthidaung has not fallen. The AA controls Paletwa, Kyauktaw, Minbya and Mrauk-U along the Kaladan River. Only Sittwe is left. Many residents have fled and people fear the city could be flattened, like Pauktaw and Minbya. Those who can afford it have gone to Yangon, Mandalay or Pyay. Half of the city has already fled and many are waiting to buy air tickets. Flights are apparently booked until late April. Canceled tickets cost around 700,000 kyats (US$200), about eight times the normal price. The regime has blockaded Sittwe, which is surrounded by the Bay of Bengal and some try to escape by sea. Residents fear fighting could break out at anytime and junta shelling and airstrikes will follow if fighting starts. They know about the regime’s indiscriminate attacks elsewhere. Many residents cannot afford to leave and there is no way out from Sittwe if fighting breaks out. We heard junta administrators are leaving Sittwe. The government neighborhood is heavily guarded and cordoned off. We heard reports that they are moving to Thandwe [200km to the south]. Is there enough food despite the regime’s blockade? Commodities are running low since the roads were blocked. Shops are selling off their stocks as they want to leave. They are not restocking. Garlic is unavailable and an onion costs 1,000 kyats. We still can buy peppers from the Muslim villages but the fuel prices make it difficult to get there. Some cycle. A used bike sells for around 500,000 kyats. Fuel has dropped from 30,000 kyats to around 18,000 kyats per liter. [The Yangon price is around 2,600 kyats]. There are no children’s snacks and rice and cooking oil prices have soared. Many people left with nothing and they need blankets at night. They also need food. Fighting started more than three months ago and people are facing serious food shortages. How are transport, communications and health care? They have cut off internet access. And we can only use [military-owned] Mytel sims to make phone calls but the signal is unstable. We switched to Mytel but we can’t transfer cash online. Many people working in Thailand and Malaysia cannot transfer remittances. I heard Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya and Ponnagyun are deserted. Hospitals and clinics still operate. The regime has imposed a curfew in Sittwe. A motorbike taxi driver was shot dead last week. No one knows who did it. Some blamed junta soldiers but others said it was the Arakan Liberation Party. The city is in panic. How are residents earning a living in Sittwe? Businesses have not been able to operate for months. People do odd-jobs and business owners eat what they have. Many motorbike taxi drivers now use cycle-rickshaws due to high fuel prices. Theft has increased. The police are not interested in crime as they are busy ensuring their safety. Fishing and trade are the main sources of income in Sittwe but businesses have closed and the streets are largely deserted..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-02-21
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-21
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Description: "(CNN) — Anna wakes up about four times a night from dreams in which she is being sent to the front lines of a bloody war and forced to fight. It’s a terrifying prospect that could become a reality for Anna and millions of her peers across Myanmar after the military junta activated a mandatory conscription law for all young men and women. “We are in panic mode and are considering a way to escape,” said Anna, an educator in her 20s from the country’s south who requested to use a pseudonym to protect her safety. “I don’t think I can keep living in Myanmar.” Three years on from its bloody coup, Myanmar’s military junta is facing the biggest challenge to its fragile hold on power as it struggles to fight a nationwide armed resistance on multiple fronts across the Southeast Asian nation. The junta’s surprise announcement that it’s seeking to boost its armed forces with compulsory service prompted a rush by young people to get visas out of the country. Videos shared on social media show long queues of people clutching documents at the Thai Embassy in Myanmar’s biggest city Yangon. Young people told CNN they’re scrambling to figure out how to avoid being sent to the barracks, with some planning hasty exit strategies – illegal if necessary – from Myanmar or weighing up leaving their homes and families to join resistance forces that have taken up arms against the military. Under the law, all men ages 18 to 35 and women ages 18 to 27 are required to serve for up to two years under military command. Specialists such as doctors up to age 45 must serve for three years. Evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine. Analysts say the law, which has been on the books since the previous military regime in 2010 but not enacted until now, will force a young generation to fight their own people and could be used to justify human rights abuses. It could also result in further regional instability by sparking a mass exodus of people fleeing conscription into neighboring countries, they said. Some say conscription is a desperate effort by the military to boost ranks depleted by death, desertions and defections. “While wounded and increasingly desperate, the Myanmar military junta remains extremely dangerous,” Tom Andrews, United Nations Special Rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, said in a statement. “Troop losses and recruitment challenges have become existential threats for the junta, which faces vigorous attacks on frontlines all across the country. As the junta forces young men and women into the military ranks, it has doubled down on its attacks on civilians using stockpiles of powerful weapons.” ‘We don’t have another choice’ Myanmar’s military has been weakened by unprecedented coordination between ethnic armed organizations and resistance groups known as People’s Defense Forces, analysts say. These groups, which support the National Unity Government in exile, and ethnic rebel armies have taken control of hundreds of strategic border towns, key military positions and vital trade routes since launching an offensive last October. Analysis from the United States Insitute of Peace suggests the military only has about 150,000 personnel, including 70,000 combat soldiers — “barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force” — and has lost at least 30,000 soldiers since the coup. Defense Minister Adm. Tin Aung San said the military has capacity to recruit up to 50,000 people a year and conscripts “will receive salary, rations, and entitlements according to their grades and qualifications,” according to the state mouthpiece Global New Light of Myanmar. People who have been temporarily exempted from serving in the military — those with a medical reason, civil servants, students and carers — must return to serve even if over the age of military service, Ting Aung San said, according to the paper. Veterans could also be called up, the Global New Light reported. Junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun said about 13 million young people would be eligible for conscription, with 60,000 men the first to be recruited reportedly beginning in April. There’s little detail about how they’d be called up – and what training they’d receive to fight. Young people CNN spoke to are scared that conscripts will be sent to the front lines – in mountainous, jungle terrain – without proper training. “People know for sure that no matter what is written in the conscription law, they will have to go to the front lines. That is one thing that every person in the country is sure of,” said Kyaw Naing, 28, a teacher from Yangon region who requested to use a pseudonym for his security. Myanmar's junta chief Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who ousted the elected government in 2021, presides at an army parade on Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw on March 27, 2021. Reuters Aung Myo Min, human rights minister for the shadow government in exile said it has received reports of mass defections to People’s Defense Forces, with some soldiers abandoning the military because “they don’t have enough food and they are forced to take up a position to fight against civilians.” Some of those former soldiers told the National Unity Government the military’s power has weakened, and it desperately needs recruits, according to Aung Myo Min. But both Anna and Kyaw Naing say they’ll refuse to join their ranks. Anna said she doesn’t have the money or connections to buy a visa out of the country, and worries the junta will be monitoring the airports, stopping those of age and arresting them. Her parents have urged her to escape as soon as possible, but that means finding a way to cross the border illegally to Thailand. “All the information on Facebook right now is about how to escape this country,” Anna said. “From my side, I will try and do as much as possible to escape but if not, I will join (the People’s Defense Forces),” Anna said. “It seems like we don’t have another choice.” Neighboring Thailand would likely be the country of choice for many of those deciding to flee. Thailand’s Foreign Ministry told CNN Monday its embassy in Yangon has experienced an “increase in the number of Myanmar citizens applying for Thai visas in recent days” and was implementing a token system to process 400 walk-in applicants per day. While Thailand has hosted Myanmar nationals fleeing conflict for decades in displacement camps along the border, it has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and considers those fleeing persecution to be illegal immigrants, who face jail and potential deportation. Reports of kidnappings and arrests For Kyaw Naing, fleeing to Thailand is not an option as he is the sole breadwinner of his family and cares for his elderly parents. “If I leave, no one is there to look after them. I just have to survive,” he said. Kyaw Naing says he’s stopped going out at night for fear he’ll be arrested and sent to the barracks. “My parents are afraid I might be kidnapped by police and soldiers when I’m on my way back home from work, or when I go outside to hang out with my friends, or even when I go out to throw litter into the dustbin in the street,” Kyaw Naing said. Even before the announcement of the mandatory conscription law, local media has reported an increase in the arrests of young people in several towns and cities and military vehicles picking people up in the street. There are also reports of dozens of young people detained at airports in western Rakhine state in recent days, with no official explanation. CNN cannot independently verify the reports and has reached out to the military for comment. Khin Ohmar, founder and chairperson of Progressive Voices, a Myanmar human rights research and advocacy organization, said the conscription law will “provide the junta legal cover for abusive forced recruitment practices — grabbing young men and women, especially the disenfranchised and impoverished including minors, from bus stops and factories in the cities.” Maung Nyein, 32, lives and works in Yangon, and worries how his wife and 8-year-old daughter will cope if he’s forced to serve. “In Myanmar, young people are not safe anymore,” said Maung Nyein, who also requested to use a pseudonym for safety reasons. “If you are forced to enter the military, there are so many things to worry about.” The prospect of being forced to fight and kill his compatriots terrifies him. “In other countries, this law is to train you in case of another country’s invasion, but here there is civil war going on. This is to force you to kill each other.” CNN has reached out to Myanmar’s military spokesperson for comment but has not received a response. The junta’s ministry of Immigration and Population said in a statement that there is “no restriction on overseas leave” and international airports and the entry and exit points with neighboring countries “are operating as usual,” according to Global New Light. The junta also denied that its “security forces and administrative organizations are conscripting youths for military training and arresting passers-by,” calling it “misinformation” spread by “malicious media networks.” Forced labor already happening Myanmar’s military has a long and documented history of using civilians as human shields or forcibly recruiting them to work in the army, either as porters – carrying military equipment to and from the front lines — or performing the risky task of clearing land mines from fields. A major concern is that the law will be used by the military to legalize this practice. A report from the International Labour Organization’s commission of inquiry from October 2023 found that since the coup, the Myanmar military junta “continues to exact different types of forced labor in the context of armed conflict … as well as forced recruitment into the army.” Wing Ko, a farmer from Shwebo in central Sagaing region, said he was forcibly recruited to work for the military for three months in 2023. “One day when I was in my tent, a military troop caught me and took me to carry their clothes and weapons,” Wing Ko told CNN, using a pseudonym for safety. “After that, I was forced to walk all day with their stuff,” he said. “There were days I didn’t get to eat and drink.” He says he was one of 42 men, most over the age of 50 with the youngest just 16, who were forcibly taken by junta troops from their villages. “If we knew the areas, we were forced to walk in front of them so that they don’t risk themselves (standing on) land mines.” Wing Ko said those who tried to escape were shot and killed. CNN cannot independently verify his account. “I never thought I would see my family again. When I got home, I felt like I came back from being dead,” he said. Maung Aye, also from Sagaing region, said six people from his village were taken by the military in June last year and forced to carry clothes and weapons. He said there’s no way his neighbors would willingly join them. “Our villagers won’t join the military forces or leave the country, instead we will join our resistance forces. I won’t let my children be taken by the military, instead I’d rather risk them joining the (People’s Defense Forces) for the revolution’s sake,” said Maung Aye, who also used a pseudonym for safety. Impact on millions of young people Conscription is not just about boosting troop numbers, analysts and human rights workers say, but a means to break up the powerful democratic resistance movement that has only gained in strength since the coup. “The junta’s decision to enforce the conscription law now is also a way to remove the young people who were spearheading the Spring Revolution from the civilian population and put them in positions where they are likely to be killed or to kill their fellow people,” said Khin Ohmar. The law would allow corruption, extortion and crime to flourish and could exacerbate a brain drain that’s already seen many young people leave Myanmar, impacting education and the labor market, which would “cause utter devastation to the country,” she said. Those too young to be conscripted are already feeling the weight of the law. “Today one of my teens asked me if all the lessons she is learning right now in class are still useful for her life in the future if she has to go to the front line,” Kyaw Naing said of his student. “I was deeply saddened by that.” Kyaw Naing says he’d join the resistance if faced with conscription. But he would offer to teach over holding a gun. “I don’t want to kill people,” he said. “But if the situation pushes me to do it, I will have to. I won’t have a choice.”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "CNN" (USA)
2024-02-21
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "20 February 2024: Comments from SAC-M’s founding members in response to the Myanmar military’s decision to enforce the 2010 conscription law: Marzuki Darusman: “Myanmar’s youth have been abandoned to wage a three-year long struggle alone against military tyranny in pursuit of a Myanmar built on peace, justice and human rights. If the UN and ASEAN allow Min Aung Hlaing to forcibly conscript millions of young people into his junta death cult, then they will be further complicit in denying Myanmar this future.” Chris Sidoti: “The Myanmar military’s conscription implementation reflects its desperation. They are losing the war and have run out of ideas. This is an indication that the junta’s total collapse is only a matter of time.” Yanghee Lee: “Min Aung Hlaing’s forced conscription directive won’t save him or his junta. Instead, his depraved attack on the country’s future illustrates he is willing to destroy an entire generation rather than accept the failure of his disastrous coup. He must accept that the old military playbook will not work this time.”..."
Source/publisher: Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "While the world’s attention has been focused on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the civil war in Myanmar has taken an unexpected turn back toward democracy. In the battle between the military junta — which staged a coup in 2021 to pre-empt the seating of Aung San Suu Kyi’s newly re-elected government — and the representatives of that government, the resistance now seems to be winning. That shift in what has been at times a horrifyingly brutal war by the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, against its own citizens, has implications for democracy in the region, for China’s regional role and foreign policy, and for the future of an imprisoned leader whose status as an icon of freedom has been tarnished internationally but who remains a national cult figure at home. This is but the latest chapter in Myanmar’s struggle for democracy, which — from its independence in 1948 through its shedding of the colonial name of Burma in 1989, through the democratic rise of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) — has swung like a pendulum between military dictatorship and elected government. After the country’s democratic transition began in 2011, Aung San Suu Kyi finally became state counsellor. Her National League for Democracy won another landslide victory in 2020, but the military once more seized power on February 1, 2021 before the government could be sworn in. The coup triggered massive protests. Far more threatening to the military junta, or Tatmadaw, were the speed and skill of the defeated government in galvanizing the entire opposition. Within weeks, they had established an alternative power centre, the National Unity Government (NUG) — for which I, full disclosure, serve as an unofficial advisor — with multi-ethnic representation in its leadership, including the Rohingya, for the first time in the nation’s history. Thousands of young people fled to the cities to join the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) — the NUG’s army — transformed from shop clerks and students into guerrilla fighters in training camps in the highland jungles. Today, the PDF and the ethnic armed organizations fight under joint commands, their unity a weapon against decades of tactical ethnic division sown by the military. They have now seized nearly half of the national territory. Three things make this challenge different from any previous battle with the Tatmadaw. First, today’s resistance struggle comes after nearly a decade of partial democratization under the NLD. Many of the young soldiers fighting the army today were part of the first generation to grow up under increasing — if still fragile and partial — democracy. They want it back. Secondly, the army badly miscalculated the skillful political leaders of the government they had deposed. The NUG quickly reached out internally to build political and military alliances with the now-powerful ethnic community governments and armies; and externally to a broad network of international allies. Within a year, the PDF and the so-called “ethnic armed organisations” were creating new legal, medical and educational institutions on the ground in liberated territories. A year later, a series of attacks by the NUG’s military joint commands were inflicting heavy losses on the Tatmadaw. Many of the young soldiers fighting the army today were part of the first generation to grow up under increasing — if still fragile and partial — democracy. They want it back. Finally, the wanton cruelty and lawlessness with which the junta waged war; bombing schools, hospitals, and entire villages began to turn sentiment even in its former strongholds. The opposition took in thousands of defectors and many thousands of Myanmar people fled into neighbouring countries. This year, the army has begun forcible kidnapping of citizens to serve as its porters and human shields. It recently announced a massive conscription drive, which the NUG has vowed to resist. The most serious turning point came last fall, when the world was watching the Middle East. On October 27, the joint rebel forces of the Three Brotherhood Alliance staged “Operation 1027”, capturing key cities, towns, and military basesalong the northern border with China. It was a shock to the junta and a deep concern to Beijing. China’s always-opportunistic foreign policy was strained by this new turn in the conflict. They had carefully balanced support for the junta, feeding it billions of dollars in resource revenues and military assistance, and the ethnic organizations, several of whom were of majority Chinese ethnicity. It seems likely that as the opposition continues to seize more territory, and morale among the junta forces sags more and more deeply, that China will in the end support the opposition. China rarely backs a loser, and the junta’s days seem numbered. The big question facing the NUG now is what happens the day after victory. The country has no history of shared governance. In some areas, they have only decades of warfare. The institutions on the ground, for a country of 55 million people, in medicine, law and local governance are shallow or non-existent. The challenges of finding common ground among peoples who are separated by language, history, and in the case of the Rohingya and other Muslims, by religion, could not be more daunting. Some regional pundits predict that a new opposition government will inevitably fail over internal tensions within a year or two and the army will come marching back in. That is not merely spin on behalf of the war criminals who lead the Tatmadaw. They have billions of dollars squirrelled away from decades of corruption. They have a massive military infrastructure. They have a record of success in stirring up conflict between and among the various ethnic communities who surround them. Still, it would not be prudent to see this latest battle against the military as facing the same end as previous collisions. For the reasons cited above — new alliances, a new generation of citizen soldiers committed to democracy, and a skillful and demonstrably capable cadre of leaders already successful in creating a new government with a broad commitment to a loosely federal democracy; this time, the odds are better. The early months, post-victory, will turn on how quickly and how firmly a new government can bring all of its internal partners to agree on some governance minimums. They have wisely set the consensus bar low, and the transition process long. They recognize that communities that have operated as nation states, with their own legal systems, taxation frameworks, and local bureaucracies are not quickly going to cede all of that to a new central government in Yangon. Nor are they going to be willing to make detailed long-term commitments without some evidence that there is a feasible path forward that includes everyone. The tension has already emerged behind the scenes between the seize-the-moment, ‘go faster’ caucus and the careful, ‘slow and patient’ caucus. As Canada’s constitutional wars revealed, the only successful path forward — with far fewer issues and groups — is one of slow trust-building, endless meetings that build that trust, friendships across borders, and the recognition that one may need many small steps over many years before even seeing the finish line. Our process took nearly 40 years, from Victoria to Charlottetown, and is only partially successful to this day. Canada and other nations have contributed some of our best brains in constitution-making to the most difficult and risky task there is in governing. Another key early task will be swift investigation and then prosecution of war crimes. Not only because it is the essential moral responsibility after a conflict so targeted at killing women and children, but also because it will give early proof and confidence to a skeptical nation that this time it really will be different. Russia and China have been aiding the junta in training and equipment on the battlefield. They have to understand that they could become the targets of greater sanctions than those already imposed —and that they are wasting their time and money on a losing battle. The ASEAN nations have been powerless in attempting to find a way to return to democracy — not entirely surprising, since fewer than half of the members can claim any democratic credentials themselves. Canada has an international expert on Myanmar in our service in UN Ambassador (and Policy contributor) Bob Rae, who did the definitive study of the Rohingya genocide and its consequences. He remains deeply involved in bridge-building among allies of the fight for democracy. The EU and the US have both strongly condemned the junta, and granted money and political support to the NUG. This year could be the year that these elements come together. With greater public support, and private assistance from its international allies, 2024 could be the year that Myanmar returns to the club of nations attempting to build stable and free democracies. Veteran political strategist and Policy Contributing Writer Robin V. Sears lived and worked in Tokyo as Ontario’s senior diplomat and later as a management consultant in Hong Kong. Today he serves as a volunteer senior advisor to the leadership of the NUG..."
Source/publisher: Policy Magazine
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-20
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Description: "As the resistance forces gain momentum in the Spring Revolution, the Myanmar military, disparagingly known as the Sit-Tat, finds itself increasingly on the defensive. Amidst this backdrop, the State Administration Council (SAC) announced on February 10, 2024, the enforcement of the 2010 Conscription Law, a move widely perceived as another ill-judged attempt by General Min Aung Hlaing to drag the entire nation down with him. The People’s Military Service Law, enacted by the State Peace and Development Council—the precursor to the SAC—and signed into law by General Than Shwe on November 4, 2010, mandates service in the armed forces for all men aged 18 to 35 (extending to 45 for those with professional expertise) and women aged 18 to 27 (extending to 35 for those with professional expertise) for a period of two years, which can be extended to five years during national emergencies. Failure to comply with conscription can result in imprisonment for up to five years, a fine, or both.1,2 The question arises: why resurrect this 14-year-old law now? The apprehensive coup leader highlighted the law at the Veterans Convention on November 22, 2021, and again at the SAC’s annual meeting on February 2, 2022.3,4 According to Ye Myo Hein, a visiting Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, the Sit-Tat had approximately 150,000 members, including around 70,000 combatants, as of May 2023.5 However, there has been a significant decrease in morale and numbers among the military due to a series of defeats inflicted by the coordinated democratic forces across Myanmar as well as an increase in casualties, desertions, defections, and detentions as prisoners of war since Operation 1027 in October 2023.6,7In addition to colossal losses on the battlefields, the junta has also experienced severe setbacks on the economic front due to Western sanctions. In a desperate bid to replenish his depleted forces, General Min Aung Hlaing attempted two unsuccessful measures. On November 14, 2023, the members of the University Training Corps were ordered to report their biodata to the Directorate of People Militia and Border Guard Forces. On December 21, 2023, 645 deserters were released from prisons under a decree with the stipulation that they re-enlist.9 After these two attempts failed, the “Commander-in-Mischief” opted for what many see as a last-ditch effort: the enforcement of Conscription Law on February 10, 2024, followed by the activation of Reserved Military Force Law on February 13, 2024.10 The latter mandates veterans to serve in the reserved force for five years post-retirement. The repercussions of the Conscription Law have far-reaching consequences, affecting not only the people and the junta but also the revolution and neighboring countries. The plan to draft 60,000 young men and women starting in mid-April has already triggered widespread panic, prompting a mass exodus of the youth. Families of the 13 million youth in Myanmar are feeling the acute impact, compounded by economic hardships, shortages of essential goods, soaring prices, and inflation. The private sector is further burdened, being compelled to continue paying salaries for drafted employees. This law will essentially sanction a longstanding abusive practice of coerced military service, which has been both ad hoc and illegal. The generals may hope to replace experienced troops with these inexperienced recruits, using them primarily as cannon fodder. However, forced enslavement runs the risk of these reluctant conscripts turning their weapons against their own ranks or becoming informants. Morale is expected to plummet further as troops witness their relatives being forcibly conscripted, potentially driving more individuals to join the armed resistance. In response, the National Unity Government (NUG) issued a statement on February 13, 2024, stating that “the NUG of Myanmar, in collaboration with allied organizations will take all necessary measures to prevent the junta’s attempted roll out of forced conscription and will address dangers faced by the public.”8 This reflects a strategic and thoughtful approach by the NUG and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) to avoid the pitfalls of the junta’s scheme, which would result in the displacement of young individuals—a scenario that would pose immense challenges in terms of accommodation, basic needs, and security. In the words of Sun Tzu, “Know thyself and know thy enemy,” and “Who wishes to fight must first count the cost. Don’t let sacrifices sneak up on you. Whatever path you take, know the consequences.” The revolutionary leaders are thus urged to remain vigilant, not allowing the junta’s actions to distract from the broader goals of the revolution. The international community, and particularly neighboring countries, must brace for a massive humanitarian crisis due to significant influx of migrants, including a surge in unregulated and hazardous labor migration, on top of the existing refugee crisis and cross-border instability. This situation underscores the role of the Myanmar military as the primary source of chaos within country and a key contributor to regional instability. Despite the turmoil, there lies an opportunity to dismantle the military dictatorship. The people of Myanmar are called upon to deepen their engagement in the Spring Revolution and to support the revolutionary forces with prudence, patience, and perseverance. The revolution must ensure that conscription becomes a constriction not for the people’s movement but for the military dictators themselves. References: http://www.asianlii.org/mm/legis/laws/pmslpadcln272010638.pdf https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/six-key-points-about-myanmars-newly-enforced-conscription-law.html https://vk.com/@sac.council-mnof https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/junta-leader-wants-conscription-law-2020-02042022065126.html https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/myanmars-military-smaller-commonly-thought-and-shrinking-fast https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/charting-the-shifting-power-balance-on-myanmars-battlefields.html https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/the-existential-threat-facing-myanmars-junta.html https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/02/15/7181 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gH1Fu9B_TT0 https://www.myanmaritv.com/news/myanmar-reserve-forces-law-sac-enforced-reserve-military-force-law ..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: East Asia Forum
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The People’s Representatives Committee for Federalism (PRCF) published its constitution for a federal democracy on Feb. 12. The committee comprises 12 political parties: the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Arakan League for Democracy, Karen National Party, Zomi Congress for Democracy, Democratic Party for a New Society, United Nationalities Democracy Party, Danu Nationalities Democracy Party, Daingnet National Development Party, Mro National Democracy Party, Karen National Party, Shan State Kokang Democratic Party and Mon Affairs Association. Previously known as the PRF, the committee changed its name to PRCF in March 2021. Sai Kyaw Nyunt, a joint secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, recently spoke with The Irrawaddy about the objectives of the constitution and its most important features. What is the intention of publishing a constitution? It has been nearly two years since we drafted the constitution in 2022. So, we decided that it was time to publish it. What is the PRCF? The PRCF was formed after the 2021 coup. It comprises primarily members of the United Nationalities Alliance and their partners. The PRCF mentioned three main tasks in its statement about publishing its constitution. Can you elaborate on them? We can’t accept any form of dictatorship, either military dictatorship or civilian dictatorship. The conflict in our country since independence is deeply connected to the constitution. The 1974 constitution did not meet the wishes of the people and the same is true of the 2008 constitution. In our view, federalism is the best [form of government] for this highly diverse and multi-ethnic country. But federalism alone is not enough. There must also be democracy. So, there is a need for a federal, democratic constitution. But again, a constitution alone is not enough. Peaceful co-existence is also critically important for us to come together to form and maintain a union. How do you see the current political landscape in Myanmar? Myanmar is at war now. We are politicians so we don’t know much about military affairs. Military solutions alone can’t solve problems in a country. Space for politics is necessary. It is more powerful than military action in terms of fulfilling the wishes of the people. We want things handled peacefully. So, your political parties prefer non-violence? We don’t want to say which is right and which is wrong. I am only talking about our tendency. By political means, I mean…… you don’t necessarily have to establish a party and contest the election. You may oppose the voting, and release statements about your views. These are all political means. Dialogue is also a political means. This is what we believe. What drove the PRCF to design a constitution? Eleven of the 12 organizations in the PRCF are political parties. We believe certain conditions must be met for our country to have greater peace and stability. So, we have designed the constitution, outlining the conditions that we think are necessary to have peace and stability. Those parties have won votes and support from people in their respective constituencies. So, we designed the constitution to convey our idea about an ideal union. What are the salient points about your constitution? We refer to four documents: the fundamental principles of the PRCF, the fundamental principles in a federal democracy charter, the constitution from the Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordinating Committee, and the constitution from the UNA and allies. Our constitution touches upon new topics, such as financial matters, relations between government agencies, and administration and public services. So, is it fair to say the constitution drafted by the PRFC is one that reflects the federal democracy charter declared by anti-regime political forces? We can’t say so. Many organizations, including ethnic armed organizations, were involved in designing the federal democracy charter. Our constitution was drafted solely by PRCF members, but it can be used as a draft for all the stakeholders to discuss in the future. Will you accept recommendations, if there are any, to your constitution? We are willing to accept any recommendation that does not go against our principles. The military regime upholds the 2008 Constitution. What will you say if they say they don’t accept your constitution? We represent people to a certain extent, and we live among the people. So, the constitution represents our view of what this country should be like. Everyone is aware that one group or organization representing all the others was not successful. We need to try to write a constitution that is acceptable to all by negotiating between all stakeholders. How did stakeholders in the country respond to your constitution? No one has yet strongly responded to our constitution. It was only published recently, and perhaps stakeholders are still studying it. Our constitution is largely based on documents of ethnic armed organizations, ethnic political organizations and ethnic Bamar organizations. So, there won’t be much difference between ours and theirs. There might be differences in the way we operate, but I don’t think there will be much disagreement regarding policies. The policies of the regime and the military, however, can be markedly different from ours. In the future, we will have to accept what is best for the people. What is the PRCF’s next step? We established political parties to do our share for the country. So, we will continue to work in our way to restore peace and build a country that all citizens want to see..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2024-02-20
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "For all the rhetoric surrounding Myanmar’s instability since its coup d’état in 2021, those paying close attention to Myanmar recognize an even more important fact: it may only become more unstable. The essential combination of historical precedent and political theory suggests that not only is Myanmar better off with a centralized government, but that if it maintains its crash course towards decentralization, it will result in devastating consequences for all different populations in Myanmar. If international actors advocating for the restoration of a democratic Myanmar fail to intervene or otherwise assist democratic advocates in Myanmar, the ensuing conflicts will ravage the state and destabilize an increasingly strategically important region. The inherent nature of Myanmar as a multi-ethnic state has been a source of division since its independence in 1948. Its consistent oppression of the Rohingya people resulted in massive sources of conflict in 2012 and 2017, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Yet the recent coup has in many ways united many minority groups, creating a common enemy out of the oppressive majority government, which has forced armed rebel groups to work synchronously to effectively combat the military government. Al Jazeera reports that the unity of these armed groups has resulted in the creation of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, composed of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, which have waged combat against the military junta quite effectively, and garnered significant momentum since late 2023. When considering the overall instability of the region, the military junta’s proven inability to establish sovereignty at home and legitimacy abroad has become flashpoints of concern. The Associated Press reports that inflation and displacement are increasing in Myanmar, whilst economic growth remains stagnant at best. Furthermore, as armed groups establish their own regions of governance, the decentralization of power will likely result in further economic decline and civilian safety. According to the United States Institute of Peace, the junta’s inability to maintain control over specific regions controlled by ethnic minority groups has also destabilized trade in the region, led to increased crime, starvation, and homelessness. It must be acknowledged that the current form of governance in Myanmar is unacceptable from a moral and political standpoint. The Guardian reports that since the military took over in 2021, 4,000 civilians have died at the hands of the military, and the possibility that crimes against humanity have been committed has been raised by multiple rights groups. Yet the success of armed groups in rebelling against the military has and will continue to only increase these issues. Decentralization has rarely worked in global politics, and although the prospect of multiple ethnicities experiencing self-determination appears a flowery and conclusive concept, the inevitable consequences are frightening. Even in scenarios where ethnic, religious, or racial groups have managed to split into their self-governing states, it is not a process that has occurred peacefully or accompanied by economic growth. Whether it is an artificial split, a practical split, or a blend of both, the potential for genocide, protracted conflict, and continued oppression persists. Examples of these are plentiful, whether it be Yugoslavia in the early 1990s or Palestine in the 1940s, these regions still maintain incredibly volatile conflicts. Myanmar appears to be set on the same path if multiple ethnic groups continue to establish power within their own regions and decentralize Myanmar as a whole. It becomes increasingly imperative that the U.S. and other powerful actors stand by supposed liberal values and intervene. The prospect of increased instability in Myanmar is disconcerting to all actors in the region and on the international stage. Additionally, the idea that a democratic state could turn into a decentralized failed state within a decade raises serious concerns about the international community’s commitment to these ideals and capability in addressing them. Amid this crisis, China has become an increasingly relevant actor, stepping in to act as a mediator between rebel groups and the military junta, reports Reuters. Motivated by threats to trade and the potential for a refugee crisis, China has acted in its own self-interest in attempting to stabilize the conflict as much as possible. This contrasts sharply with the actions of important Western actors, who provide only lip service to the values of democratic freedom and anti-authoritarianism that they purportedly espouse. Sanctions and condemnations are insufficient in providing necessary change, and China’s proposed rules of order in international politics will only gain more traction the longer the West allows states to drift further towards authoritarian structures. Advocacy for the restoration of Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic government should become a focal point of the Biden administration’s Southeast Asian foreign policy agenda. If it does not, the U.S. becomes complicit in the demise of yet another potential democracy..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: The Diplomatic Envoy - Seton Hall University
2024-02-19
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The United States strongly condemns the January 7 airstrike on Kanan Village in the Sagaing Region town of Khampat, Burma. Reporting indicates this latest attack killed at least 17 civilians, including nine children. This is yet another example of the horrors experienced by people in Burma since the military coup and the violence it has fueled across the country. We reiterate our call on the Burma military regime to cease all forms of violence, free all those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including with regard to the protection of civilians. We reaffirm our continued support of the Five Point Consensus, and stress that the United Nations Security Council must fully implement Resolution 2669 and also consider further actions to stem the regime’s violence. The United States underlines its commitment to using all tools at the Security Council’s disposal to support ASEAN’s efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis, a commitment affirmed by the vast majority of the Security Council. The United States will continue to support peace, human rights, and an inclusive dialogue to promote genuine and inclusive democracy in Burma through our work with members of the Security Council, other UN Member States, and regional partners, including ASEAN. The people of Burma, after nearly three years since the military wrested power away from the democratically elected government, are looking to us all for support. The international community must step up and speak out..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: United States Mission to the United Nations Office of Press and Public Diplomacy
2024-01-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Council Fifty-fifth session 26 February–5 April 2024 Agenda item 2 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Summary The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 50/3, in which the Council decided to hold, during its fifty-third session, a panel discussion on the measures necessary to find durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis and to end all forms of human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar. Also in that resolution, the Council requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to submit a report on the panel discussion to the Council at its fifty-fifth session. The present report contains a summary of the panel discussion, which was held on 21 June 2023. I. Introduction Pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 50/3, the Council, during its fifty-third session, convened a panel discussion on the measures necessary to find durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis and to end all forms of human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar. The panel discussion, held on 21 June 2023, provided an opportunity for members and observers of the Human Rights Council, experts and other stakeholders, including representatives of the Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar, to discuss the situation of human rights of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar, and to identify potential measures and durable solutions to the Rohingya crisis, with a particular emphasis on ways to work towards the sustainable return of refugees in safety and dignity. The discussion was opened by the United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights. The panellists were Yasmin Ullah, Chair of the Board of the Alternative Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Network on Burma; Chris Lewa, Founder of the Arakan Project; Kyaw Win, Executive Director of Burma Human Rights Network; and Mohshin Habib, Adjunct Professor at Laurentian University (Ontario, Canada). II. Background Violations against ethnic and religious minorities in Myanmar affect the entire spectrum of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. The Rohingya minority of Myanmar has, over generations, been subjected to institutionalized persecution, denial of identity and extreme discrimination that together have created a cycle of marginalization and led to serious violations of their human rights, which may amount to international crimes, including mass forced displacement. It continues to be deprived of citizenship and civil documentation, faces extreme restrictions on freedom of movement, has very limited access to health and education services, and to livelihood opportunities. Long-standing armed conflicts have also led to gross violations of the human rights of ethnic minorities in other States, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, forced labour, sexual and gender-based violence, and extensive forced displacement. Since the military coup of 1 February 2021, Myanmar has been caught in a downward spiral of violence, characterized by the widespread violations committed by the Myanmar military of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including the widespread use of indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery attacks in populated areas, the raiding and burning of villages, arbitrary arrests, the use of torture, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence. This catastrophic situation of human rights has also further affected the Rohingya and other minorities, causing further refugee movements to neighbouring countries and unprecedented internal displacement within Myanmar. The situation of human rights of the Rohingya and of other minorities in Myanmar has been extensively documented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in several recent reports submitted to the Human Rights Council2 as well as in the reports of successive holders of the mandate of Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar3 and of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar.4 More recently, in June 2022, pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 47/1, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) organized a panel discussion at the fiftieth session of the Council on the root causes of human rights violations and abuses against Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar. Participants in the panel discussion identified the lack of accountability for the human rights violations of the Rohingya and other minorities and the continuing impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military as the root causes of the current crisis.5 Addressing root causes of discrimination and human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities in Myanmar and ensuring accountability for serious crimes committed were essential to achieve durable peace and to build a society on the basis of the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Supporting long-term grass-roots initiatives aimed at strengthening intercommunity and interreligious dialogues, addressing hate speech and providing human rights education to young people were also essential. At the international level, efforts to ensure legal accountability are ongoing at the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. Meanwhile, steps to that end have also been taken at the national level in third States with relevant jurisdiction. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar has been providing key support to such efforts. From August to November 2022, fighting between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in Rakhine State further exposed the Rohingya community to grave risks and violations. Battles were fought in and around Rohingya villages, resulting in casualties and displacement. OHCHR had also received credible reports of the use of sexual violence against Rohingya women and girls by both parties. The Myanmar military had also imposed further restrictions on humanitarian access and on movement. Rohingyas were required to obtain temporary travel authorization for movement between townships in Rakhine State. Anyone – including children – caught undertaking unauthorized travel faced arrest and imprisonment. These had significantly affected the Rohingya community and exacerbated their protection risks and vulnerabilities. Since 2017, more than one million Rohingya in refugee camps in Bangladesh had been living in difficult conditions, facing serious security, economic and human rights challenges. Lack of adequate security in the camps had led to threats, beatings, kidnappings and numerous killings of Rohingya refugees. Owing to dwindling funding, food assistance had been reduced by 30 per cent, making life in the camps even more difficult. Gender-based violence remains high, with high rates of domestic violence and risks of trafficking in women and girls. As a result of the systemic discrimination, crippling restrictions and rising hardships, an increasing number of Rohingya had been taking immense risks to flee Myanmar and Bangladesh. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2022 alone, 3,545 Rohingya — a 360 per cent increase over the number in 2021 — attempted dangerous sea journeys to other countries in order to seek protection, security, family reunification and livelihoods, with 348 people believed to have died or gone missing at sea.6 Those intercepted at sea and returned to Myanmar faced imprisonment. The number of Rohingya arrested for unauthorized travel within Myanmar, namely seeking to travel outside Rakhine State, doubled in 2022 to around 2,000 cases. The gravity of the situation had also drawn the attention of the Security Council. At the end of 2022, while expressing concern at the recent developments in Myanmar and underlining the risks that the Rohingya situation poses for the wider region, the Council adopted resolution 2269 (2022), its first resolution on the situation in Myanmar, in which it underscored, among other things, the need to address the root causes of the crisis in Rakhine State and to create the conditions necessary for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons. On 14 May 2023, Cyclone Mocha devastated Rakhine State, disproportionately affecting Rohingya communities, especially those who had been displaced. There were reports of disproportionate numbers of deaths of Rohingya and extensive damage to their dwellings. The dire consequences of the cyclone had been exacerbated by the actions of the Myanmar military directed at preventing humanitarian access to the affected areas and its failure, over the years, to create conditions conducive for sustainable returns. The military had suspended travel authorizations for all relief operations for several weeks and ordered that all disaster relief responses and supplies be directly managed by its own personnel. The military had not allowed the Rohingya to freely move to seek assistance, and also obstructed the relief efforts of local civil society groups through threats and arrests of those delivering aid or raising funds for relief efforts..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-01-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The MAU tracks market prices in Central and Northern Rakhine State and Chin State. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market in the last week of each month. Data and product specifications are available online through the MPR dashboard at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit. KEY FINDINGS Essential food prices dipped in January as rice prices fell 4% and cooking oil prices declined 10-32%; Vegetable prices fell 25-75% across markets, likely due in large part to new supply of local winter crops; Vegetables remained 200-500% above last year, even after falling prices unwound the latest price hikes; Meat and fish prices rose another 10% in January, and they lingered 60-120% above 2023 levels; Prices for hygiene products climbed at least 17% amid retailer reports of dwindling supply; Access to NFIs from outside the region may worsen as roads and town markets remain closed; Lower rice and vegetable prices were a promising sign and suggested that winter crop harvest may be reaching local markets despite mounting challenges. Product-Level Price Changes Essential Foods – Essential food prices dipped modestly in January. Rice prices retreated by 4% or more in most markets monitored, while cooking oil prices fell 10-32% (one-time oil shipments to Sittwe in mid-January likely explain this in part). Prices for pulses rose another 10% or more in several markets. Vegetables – Vegetable prices fell 25-75% across markets, likely due to increased winter supply. Prices for onion, eggplant, garlic, and green chili retreated 25-75% in January, likely due to improved supply from winter harvest. Lower prices may also owe in part to a shift to measuring village prices (vegetables are often cheaper in villages where they are grown than in towns where they are sold with a mark-up for transportation costs).1 Meat and Fish – Meat and fish prices increased 10% or more in most markets in January. Chicken prices rose more sharply than other foods in January and prices doubled in Ponnagyun. Meat/fish prices fell in some cases but rose in general. Sitwe saw notable increases of 10-30% for multiple meat/fish items. Hygiene Products – Prices for hygiene products climbed at least 17% in January amid reports of dwindling inventory. Prices for soap, detergent, and sanitary pads doubled in some cases, and retailers reported low inventories. Prices for hygiene products were fairly stable in Sittwe and Maungdaw towns, but prices were higher in villages where town markets have closed. Other NFIs – NFI prices climbed in January, particularly winter-related items like charcoal and blankets. Prices for charcoal and blankets increased 25-50% in January, while prices also rose in some markets for cooking pots, tarps and towels. Retailers worried about stockouts of NFIs supplied from afar..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-02-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 1.09 MB
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Description: "WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS In the South-East, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) sharply increased from 716,700 last week to 754,000 this week. In Bago Region (East), due to increased fighting, 561 IDPs from Thangdaunggyi Township and 21,227 IDPs from Htantabin Township were displaced to Oktwin, Htantabin, and Taungoo townships. 6,161 out of 21,227 IDPs from Htantabin Township were displaced as a secondary displacement within the Township. In Addition, 450 IDPs from Yedashe Township were displaced within the Township. In Kayin State, 1,980 IDPs from Thandaunggyi Township were displaced within the Township, and 18 IDPs from Hpapun Township were displaced to Hpa-An Township. Among the 1,980 IDPs from Thandaunggyi Township, 216 were displaced as a secondary displacement within the same Township. In Tanintharyi Region, due to intensified fighting, 1,350 IDPs from Kyunsu Township were displaced to Myeik Township. In Mon State, 516 IDPs from Billin Township were displaced within the same Township due to indiscriminate shelling. In Shan State (South), 183 IDPs from Hsihseng Township were displaced to Nyaungshwe Township, while 3,000 IDPs from Hsihseng Township were displaced to Taunggyi Township due to intensified fighting including airstrikes and shelling. Additionally, 183 IDPs from Hsihseng Township were displaced as a secondary displacement within Nyaungshwe Township. In Kayah State, 1,560 IDPs from Bawlake Township and 2,090 IDPs from Hpasawng Township were displaced to Mese Township while 5,390 IDPs from Mese Township were displaced within the Township. Additionally, 600 IDPs from Loikaw Township were displaced to Shadaw Township, and 3,850 IDPs from Shadaw Township were displaced within the Township. Furthermore, 1,009 IDPs from Bawlake Township were displaced within the same Township due to fighting, airstrikes, and shelling..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-02-12
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 2.25 MB
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Description: "Since the Armed Forces of Myanmar (Tatmadaw) seized control of the country on 1 February 2021 following a general election that the National League for Democracy party won by a landslide, Insecurity Insight has documented how violence has devastated the health-care system. Starting in late 2022, armed violence has escalated, with the Myanmar military increasingly using aircraft-delivered explosive weapons against communities that strongly resisted the military’s rule. Kayah state has been particularly affected. Forty incidents were recorded in which Myanmar military aircraft dropped explosive weapons that damaged or destroyed clinics, hospitals, pharmacies and rural health centres. Incidents occurred during wider attacks on civilians and opposition groups and often involved other civilian infrastructure being damaged, including homes, monasteries and schools. In addition, at least one health worker was killed and two others injured when the facility that they were working inside was hit by military air strikes. In total, nine health workers were killed and four injured by explosive weapons dropped by Myanmar military aircraft. Staff were harmed while providing medical care to people injured during armed clashes at an IDP camp and in health facilities inside the camp. In one incident in April 2023 a fully functioning hospital was damaged when it was struck by Myanmar military air strikes, injuring a nurse, a patient and three civilians. Two ambulances were damaged and IDPs sheltering near the hospital were further displaced..."
Source/publisher: Insecurity Insight (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-02-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Description: "HIGHLIGHTS: The situation in Myanmar deteriorated significantly in the last quarter of 2023 with the escalation of armed clashes and increasing of grave violations against children. More than 2.6 million people are internally displaced by the end of 2023, an increase of 1.1 million since the same time in last year. In 2023, UNICEF received 16.7 per cent of its Myanmar Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal of US$ 217.9 million. Despite the huge funding gap and multiple constraints, UNICEF and its partner reached almost 1.8 million children and their families. Despite the funding limitation, measles vaccination reached 93 per cent against the target. UNICEF and its partners able to support children’s education access up to 75 per cent of the target while 63 per cent of WASH supplies and 53 per cent achieved for severe acute malnutrition (SAM) admissions due to the complementary funding and programmatic modalities. SITUATION IN NUMBERS 5,800,000 Children in need of humanitarian assistance 18,100,000 People in need of humanitarian assistance 2,310,900 Internally displaced people after 1 February 2021 306,200 People in protracted displacement before Feb 2021 FUNDING OVERVIEW AND PARTNERSHIPS UNICEF Myanmar appealed for US$217.9 million in 2023 to address the needs of 3.7 million people, including 2.3 million children. At the end of 2023, the Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) remains severely underfunded with a funding gap of 83.3 per cent. UNICEF secured US$36.50 million (US$27.28 million in 2023 and $9.22 million carried over from 2022), representing 16.7 per cent of its 2023 HAC appeal. The humanitarian needs remain high going into 2024 as reflected in UNICEF’s 2024 HAC appeal. In 2023, UNICEF received generous support from Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), the United States Fund for UNICEF, the European Commission’s Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations Department (DG ECHO), the Government of Canada, the Government of Japan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Government of Norway, the Royal Thai Government, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) along with the Central Emergency Response Fund, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Czech Committee for UNICEF, the French Committee for UNICEF, the German Committee for UNICEF and Gavi the Vaccine Alliance. UNICEF Myanmar also received internal allocations from global humanitarian thematic funding and the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) loan to support the provision of the humanitarian response. Additionally, UNICEF provided humanitarian leadership and cluster coordination and strengthened protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA). With this support, UNICEF delivered life-saving humanitarian assistance and ensured critical services reached almost 1.8 million children and their families in need. For the year 2024, UNICEF will scale up programmes and approaches to reach more vulnerable children and communities. UNICEF expresses its sincere appreciation to all private and public sector donors for their contributions in supporting the children of Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-02-14
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 11.34 MB
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Feb 1 to 7, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Tanintharyi Region, and Kayin State from February 1st to 7th. 4 children died and 10 children were injured by the bomb dropping airstrike of Military Junta in Demoso Township, Kayah State on January 5th. Military Troop arrested over 300 civilians and used them as human shields from Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Mandalay Region, and Kayin State. A female political prisoner from Mandalay O Bo Prison died from a lack of medical treatment and care. Over 8 civilians died and over 30 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 12 underaged children were injured and 9 died when the Military Junta committed abuses.7 civilians were injured and 1 died by the landmine of Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2024-02-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 350.67 KB 346.43 KB 469.63 KB
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Description: "Air strikes by the Myanmar military killed 17 civilians – including nine children – as they gathered to attend church last month, Amnesty International said in a new investigation. The strikes, at approximately 10.30am on Sunday 07 January, struck close to Saint Peter Baptist Church in Kanan village in Sagaing region, near the country’s western border with India. More than 20 people were injured. Witnesses told Amnesty International that two children were killed by the first set of explosions while playing football in front of a nearby school. Many of the other victims were trying to run to safety when the second air strike hit. The attack damaged the church and school, as well as six civilian houses. “The Myanmar military’s deadly attacks on civilians show no signs of stopping,” said Matt Wells, Director of Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Programme. “The world cannot continue to look the other way while the Myanmar military relentlessly attacks civilians and civilian targets, including churches, schools and hospitals. Countries and companies around the world must stop the flow of jet fuel to the military, to protect civilians from further catastrophe. “These attacks must be investigated as war crimes, and the UN Security Council should refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. The perpetrators of these crimes under international law must be brought to justice.” Amnesty International interviewed four witnesses to the attacks, one person who visited Kanan after the attack and saw the bodies of those killed, and another person with knowledge of military operations in the area. The organization also analysed 99 photos and videos of the strikes and their aftermath, including images of those killed and injured. All of the structural damage caused to the school, church and nearby homes is consistent with air strikes. The combined photo and video evidence indicates at least three impact locations, with craters consistent with aircraft bombs of approximately 250kg each. Satellite imagery taken after the strike also confirms significant damage to the school, adjacent structures and nearby homes, all consistent with an air strike. The Myanmar military has denied responsibility for the attack, claiming no planes were flying in the area that morning. However, Amnesty International reviewed a video taken during the strike which shows the distinctive swept-wing silhouette of an A-5 fighter jet flying over the village. In Myanmar, only the military flies A-5 jets, which were imported from China. Amnesty International previously documented how the Tada-U military air base, near Mandalay, is often used to launch aircraft in strikes aimed at Sagaing. Satellite imagery of Tada-U, taken shortly before and after the strike, shows active A-5 operations on the airfield. In three separate postings on a group messaging channel reviewed by Amnesty International, flight spotters on the ground indicated they witnessed a fighter jet taking off from Tada-U air base at 10am; an A-5 flying northwest over Kalewa, in the direction of Kanan, at 10.26am; and then an A-5 landing from the northwest at Tada-U at 10.56am. The locations, directions and timings of these observations are all consistent with an attack on Kanan at approximately 10.30am. Sources interviewed by Amnesty International said they had been told that members of a local People’s Defense Force (PDF) – one of many local armed groups formed since the coup to oppose the military’s rule – had planned a ceremony at the village school later that day. However, based on consistent witness accounts, fighters do not appear to have been present at the time of the strikes, which killed and injured civilians only. Even if the military believed there may have been lawful targets present, it dropped several large bombs on a residential area at a time on Sunday when civilians were gathering for church, and struck again as civilians fled in panic. As such, these attacks were indiscriminate at a minimum, and should be investigated as war crimes. Last week, Amnesty International called again for the sale or transfer of jet fuel to Myanmar to be suspended after its investigation suggested the military were still importing fuel despite sanctions being placed on individuals and companies linked to the supply chain. ‘We can’t sleep when we think about what happened’ The Myanmar military has repeatedly attacked civilians and civilian objects – often destroying or damaging schools, religious buildings and other key infrastructure – in the three years since carrying out a coup. Kanan – a village of an estimated 7,000 people – is located just north of the town of Khampat in Tamu township. Most of its residents are ethnic Chin, and practice Christianity. Residents of Kanan said that, prior to these strikes, they had not directly experienced armed conflict since the February 2021 coup. However, on 07 November 2023, a coalition of resistance forces seized Khampat from the military following four days of clashes. The military attempted to retake the town with a series of ground offensives in December, but was unsuccessful and retreated after a week, according to local media reports. Witnesses told Amnesty International of the devastation caused by the air strikes on 07 January 2024. A 56-year-old community worker said he saw a jet flying overhead as he prepared to leave his home for the nearby church. Moments later, the first strike hit approximately 200 meters from where he was standing. He hid in his family’s rice storage shed with his wife and two children, just before another strike hit. Around 15 minutes later, he went to assist the injured and collect the bodies of the dead, which he described as “distressing”. Amnesty International reviewed photographs of the aftermath of the strike, which showed that one of the victim’s bodies had been dismembered, and that others had suffered catastrophic head injuries, also as described by witnesses. A 68-year-old man, who was inside the church when the first bomb struck, said: “We only knew about it when the bomb fell. We didn’t hear the plane. We were singing inside the church when it happened. The church’s ceiling collapsed and windows were broken, so people inside the church fled outside.” A 43-year-old market vendor, who was struck on the head by falling debris as he attempted to leave the church, told Amnesty International the second strike hit people who were running for their lives. He said: “Everyone was scared and fleeing and trying to get home, and the second air strike hit at that moment. There is a road behind the church, and it hit the people who were running home.” A 40-year-old man said the traumatized community remained on constant alert fearing further attacks. He said: “Even when we hear the sound of a motorbike, we are frightened thinking of a plane coming. We can’t sleep when we think about what happened… [The attack] has left emotional scars. We can’t go to church.” The damage caused, as well as fear of further attacks, forced the majority of villagers to flee, seeking refuge in nearby villages, farms and forests, or across the border with India. Many of those displaced are relying on support from relatives, local religious and charity groups, and host communities to survive. Background Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar has experienced a severe escalation of human rights violations. Amnesty International’s May 2022 report, ‘Bullets rained from the sky’: War crimes and displacement in eastern Myanmar, found Myanmar’s military had subjected civilians to collective punishment via widespread aerial and ground attacks, arbitrary detentions, torture, extrajudicial executions and the systematic looting and burning of villages. An August 2022 report, 15 days felt like 15 years: Torture in detention since the Myanmar coup, documented torture and other ill-treatment when Myanmar’s military interrogated and detained individuals suspected of being involved in protests. A November 2022 report, Deadly Cargo: Exposing the Supply Chain that Fuels War Crimes in Myanmar, called for a suspension of the supply of aviation fuel to prevent the military from carrying out further unlawful air strikes. Amnesty International also documented an air strike on an internally displaced persons camp in Kachin State 09 October 2023, which killed at least 28 civilians, including children..."
Source/publisher: Amnesty International (UK)
2024-02-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-08
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Description: “UNICEF is appalled by the deaths of four school children and two teachers as the result of an air strike on two schools in Kayah state, eastern My “The children who died were aged between 12 and 14. Many more were injured. More than 100 children were in school at the time of the strikes. “UNICEF strongly condemns any strikes against schools and places of learning, which must always be safe spaces for children. “Attacks against schools are a grave violation of children’s rights and international humanitarian law.” Media contacts Simon Ingram UNICEF Brussels Tel: +32 491 90 5118 Email: [email protected] Sara Alhattab UNICEF New York Tel: +1 917 957 6536 Email: [email protected]..."
Source/publisher: UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-02-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-07
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Description: "QUESTION Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs in view of the ongoing situation and the progress of implementing the “Five-Point Consensus” in Myanmar, what is the Ministry’s assessment of the impact on ASEAN’s unity and image. REPLY Ms Sim Ann: Sir, ASEAN has taken a firm and consistent approach to the situation in Myanmar following the 1 February 2021 coup, which is reflected in the Five-Point Consensus. The ASEAN Leaders reviewed the situation at their Summits in 2022 and 2023 and agreed on a series of steps to send a clear signal to the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat last week, ASEAN reaffirmed its commitment to the Five-Point Consensus as well as the Leaders’ decisions. There has been little progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus and in fact the situation in Myanmar has become more dire of late. However, the rate limiting factor for progress is not ASEAN, but the Tatmadaw. Singapore will continue to work with ASEAN Chair Laos, fellow ASEAN Member States, and our external partners to press the Tatmadaw to cease violence and implement the Five-Point Consensus swiftly and fully. SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS Question 1 Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant: I thank the SMS for her answer. May I ask the SMS what alternate steps does ASEAN have if Myanmar refuses to implement the consensus plan? REPLY: Ms Sim Ann: Sir, ASEAN Leaders have reviewed the issue twice and remain committed to upholding the Five-Point Consensus. Question 2 Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: Thank you, Speaker. I would like to ask the SMS, with the change of ASEAN Chair this year to Laos, does Singapore expect any change in the momentum of ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar? How does Singapore continue to expect itself to support the new ASEAN Chair in ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar regarding the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus? Thank you. REPLY: Dr Vivian Balakrishnan: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Let me address that supplementary question because I just returned last week from the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat. I would emphasise that the key word is “consistency”. ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Laos has expressed our clear intention to maintain that consistent position, and the paramount expression of that is the Five-Point Consensus. I would say as far as ASEAN is concerned, there is no change. 2 The unfortunate change which is happening is on the ground in Myanmar. If you would check with your contacts there, the security situation remains dire. It is almost tantamount to a civil war. Whilst the military has no intention of ceding power, their ability to maintain authority on the ground is being severely challenged by a variety of groups, both the ethnic armed organisations as well as the resistance from the Burmese majority within Myanmar itself. 3 The other point which we have all emphasised is that there is a need to continue humanitarian support. ASEAN is engaged on this, and we are also expecting that Thailand will do a bit more to enable or to facilitate the cross-border delivery of humanitarian assistance. I think our priority remains the welfare of the citizens, the people of Myanmar. 4 We should be under no illusions that ASEAN can magically resolve the problems. Ultimately, this is a political problem. This is a problem of leadership and the political leaders across the spectrum in Myanmar need to get together and reconcile their diverse positions. We still believe that there needs to be direct, face-to-face negotiations conducted in good faith amongst all the political leaders there. It is a complex situation, but we will continue to maintain our consistent position..." . . . . .
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
2024-02-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-07
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Description: "7 February 2024: Comments from SAC-M’s founding members in response to the joint statement issued by nine members of the United Nations Security Council ahead of a closed-door Council meeting on the situation in Myanmar on Monday, 5 February 2024: Yanghee Lee: “The UN Security Council has abjectly failed to enforce its Resolution 2669 (December 2022) on Myanmar, which demanded an immediate end to all forms of violence. Instead, the Council holds closed-door meetings and issues mere statements, while the military junta drops bombs on refugee schools and its supporters burn people alive for supporting the resistance.” Marzuki Darusman: “The crisis in Myanmar is escalating rapidly and the Myanmar people urgently need support and protection from the UN Security Council. It is simply not good enough for the Security Council to issue toothless statements and defer to an even more toothless ASEAN. The junta must face justice for its deplorable acts.” Chris Sidoti: “The UN Security Council should have referred the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC) long ago. If it can’t, or won’t, then others must act to finally bring the perpetrators of grave international crimes in Myanmar to justice through the ICC or a special tribunal.”..."
Source/publisher: Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
2024-02-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-07
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Description: "An airstrike by the Myanmar military on a school in Daw Si Ei village in Kayah State on 5 February left 4 children dead and 10 injured. The school teaches children aged 5-14 years of age. The air strike destroyed 90% of the school building. On the International Day to Protect Education from Attack in 2023, the UN listed Myanmar among Ukraine and Burkina Faso as the three countries with the largest number of attacks against education..."
Source/publisher: European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
2024-02-06
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-06
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Description: "DESPERATE JOURNEYS: ROHINGYA REFUGEES IN SEARCH OF PROTECTION Over 1 million Rohingya, a stateless Muslim minority from Myanmar, have fled conflict and persecution in Myanmar in successive waves of displacement. The largest exodus took place in August 2017, when more than 742,000 individuals fled from Myanmar to Bangladesh. The region now hosts 1.1 million Rohingya refugees with limited opportunities to develop self-reliance. With dwindling humanitarian assistance, many risk their lives, undertaking desperate journeys1 in search of safety and solutions. For additional information and statistics, please visit the Myanmar Situation Data Portal. DEVELOPMENTS IN 2023 A total of 6,500 persons attempted land and sea movements in 2023. With nearly 4,500 Rohingya refugees embarking on perilous sea journeys and 569 people reported deceased or missing, 2023 was the deadliest year on record for maritime movements in the region since the 2015 Andaman Sea crisis. Out of the 6,500 individuals travelling by land and sea, nearly all the 569 persons reported as dead or missing were from maritime movements. In addition to sea movements, around 2,000 Rohingya refugees are known to have undertaken land movements in 2023, with the vast majority reporting detention by authorities or other protection risks along the land routes.2 Given the lack of access and information on the often-clandestine land movements, the actual figures are likely to be higher. On the land route, four persons died and 10 were injured in a car accident in Thailand. Compared to 2022, the number of persons embarking on sea journeys increased by 21 per cent while the number of dead or missing rose by 63 per cent. In contrast, a 170 per cent drop was observed for land movements. As observed in the last Quarterly Update, the trend projection of increased perilous maritime movements was confirmed by the end of 2023. Reportedly, additional boats are currently (as of 31 Jan 2024) at sea and with the so called ‘sailing season’ expected to last until March/April 2024, more boats are foreseen to depart the coming months in the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. At least seven known tragic accidents at sea occurred, resulting in 250 confirmed deaths and 319 persons missing between January and December 2023. In addition, widespread physical abuse, including Gender-Based Violence, was reported by the survivors. Over 2,400 Rohingya refugees are currently detained in countries along the route outside of Myanmar on immigration charges, often indefinitely and without due process of the law. Out of these, 72 have serious medical conditions 195 are minors, of whom 126 are unaccompanied or separated children. A significant number of these Rohingya refugee detainees have been incarcerated for prolonged periods that span several years. Within Myanmar, over 1,500 Rohingya were detained from January to December 2023, resulting in an estimated total of 3,900 Rohingya in detention. With restricted access by UNHCR and partners to detention centres, the actual figure may be significantly higher..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-02-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "As the conflict in Myanmar enters its third year, we see an under-reported war marked by a sharp rise in the use of explosive weapons. Reports by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) indicate a 114% increase in such attacks by the military government in 2023, highlighting escalating tensions between the military, the People’s Defense Forces, and Ethnic Armed Organisations seeking autonomy. Consequently, the conflict resulted in 2,164 reported civilian casualties from explosive weapons in 2023, including 745 fatalities, reflecting a 121% and 155% increase in casualties and deaths, respectively, over 2022. The military is linked to 85% of these civilian casualties and 88% of the fatalities. Since 2010, AOAV has recorded 1,825 explosive weapon incidents in Myanmar, leading to 4,343 civilian casualties, including 1,450 deaths. Notably, 50% of these casualties, and 51% of those fatalities, occurred in the last year alone, emphasising the conflict’s intensity. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) identifies Myanmar as the most violent among the 50 wars it tracks globally, with an estimated death toll of at least 50,000 since the 2021 military coup, including at least 8,000 civilians. The conflict has displaced approximately 2.3 million people, according to the United Nations, yet it has received relatively muted international attention compared to crises in Ukraine and Gaza. This discrepancy is attributed to Myanmar’s lower strategic significance to Western powers and the complexities within its borders. Human Rights Watch has praised the resilience and grassroots resistance of Myanmar’s people against military oppression and human rights abuses. However, the international community’s focus has shifted, with criticisms of the lack of attention to Myanmar’s plight compared to other global conflicts. The widespread use of air strikes and shelling by the military and the junta’s political isolation, dismissing diplomatic efforts by regional entities like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, have drawn criticism. The complexity of the situation and the junta’s refusal to engage in dialogue present significant challenges to resolving the conflict. The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has expressed deep concern over the escalating violence, appealing for the protection of non-combatants and the facilitation of humanitarian aid. The displacement crisis has grown, with two million people affected. Recent successes of an alliance of ethnic armed groups in Shan State, along with increased operations by ethnic Karenni insurgents in Kayah State and Volunteer People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) capitalising on military setbacks, indicate a shift in the conflict’s dynamics. Despite being less experienced, PDFs have shown improved capabilities and often collaborate with seasoned ethnic soldiers. The military’s loss of control over significant border areas and reports of low morale and recruitment challenges within its ranks suggest a strained capacity to respond effectively to the expanding resistance. The failure to counter-attack in Shan State highlights either a lack of resources or a misunderstanding of the opposition’s strength. Overall, the conflict in Myanmar has been characterised by the military government’s tried and tested ‘Four Cuts’ strategy, targeting the civilian networks that sustain the opposition. This means, over the past three years, towns and villages, schools and hospitals, have borne the brunt of military violence. As non-state actors continue to escalate their resistance, and the military junta escalates its own established strategies in response, civilians will inevitably continue to suffer acutely and disproportionately as a result of this devastating conflict. Dr Iain Overton, CEO of Action on Armed Violence, warns “The conflict in Myanmar, as it enters its third year, is a tragic testament to the escalating use of explosive weaponry in warfare, marking a period of intense and under-reported violence. Our data reveals a staggering 114% increase in explosive weapon attacks by the military government in 2023 alone. This sharp escalation underscores the growing tensions between the military, the People’s Defense Forces, and Ethnic Armed Organizations. Such figures are a clear indicator of the intense suffering and instability faced by the people of Myanmar, further exacerbated by the international community’s shifting focus away from their plight. As this conflict continues to evolve, with the military facing challenges on multiple fronts, the need for a concerted and meaningful international response has never been more urgent.”..."
Source/publisher: Action on Armed Violence (London) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-02-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-03
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Description: "Myanmar: An estimated 18.6 million people in Myanmar need humanitarian assistance in 2024. Intense armed conflict, widespread and systematic violence, political and economic instability, displacement prompted by conflict and natural hazards, and widespread protection risks mainly drive the humanitarian crisis in the country. Myanmar has been facing this deepening crisis since the military coup in February 2021, which resulted in conflict between the military junta forces, along with pro-military armed groups, and anti-military armed groups comprising ethnic armed organisations and anti-coup resistance groups. The armed conflict has significantly escalated since late October 2023. Since the coup, nearly 2.3 million people have been displaced within the country, taking the number of IDPs to nearly 2.6 million as at 22 January 2024. Almost 13 million people need food security assistance, and around 12 million need assistance in accessing health assistance and protection..."
Source/publisher: ACAPS via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-02-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-02
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Jan 22 to 31, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Tanintharyi Region, Chin State, Rakhine State, and Shan State from January 22nd to 31st. Military Junta arrested a civilian from the Mandalay Region and 5 from the Sagaing Region and used them as human shields. 8 civilians died by the arresting and killing of Military Junta troops within a week. A female political prisoner from Magway Prison died from the lack of medical treatment and care. Over 50 civilians died and about 50 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 underaged children were injured and 1 died when the Military Junta committed abuses. Civilians left their places 6 times because of the Military Junta Troop’s marching and raiding within a week. 4 civilians were injured by the landmines of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2024-02-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 1.43 MB 1.59 MB 473.24 KB
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Description: "WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS: In the South-East, the number of IDPs slightly increased from 695,400 last week to 701,000 this week. In Kayah State, due to intensified fighting, including airstrikes and shelling, some 560 IDPs from Loikaw Town have been displaced to Hpruso and Loikaw Townships, while 170 IDPs returned to their place of origin in Demoso Township. In Shan State (South), 75 IDPs from Loikaw Township (in Kayah State) were forced to flee to Pekon Township, due to escalation of violence in Loikaw Town. In the Tanintharyi Region, due to increased fighting, some 5,070 IDPs from Thayetchaung Township have been displaced within the same Township..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva)
2024-02-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-01
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Description: "1 February 2024: The international community must formally recognise Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) and establish a special tribunal to prosecute the military for the commission of international crimes, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). SAC-M hosted an online panel discussion “Emerging Realities in Myanmar: What Can the International Community Do?” to mark the third anniversary of the start of the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, which sparked the Spring Revolution. His Excellency Duwa Lashi La, Acting President of the NUG, opened the event by addressing the historic successes of recent revolutionary offensives against the military junta. “The Spring Revolution’s military triumphs have shattered a decades-old myth: that the Myanmar people can never topple the military,” said H.E. Duwa Lashi La. “This has now been replaced by the evident truth that the criminal military will never crush the will of our people.” The junta has responded to its mounting territorial losses with intensified aerial bombardment and indiscriminate shelling of towns and villages under resistance control and in contested areas. “The junta’s collapse is inevitable. The real question is when, not if, and how much devastation will occur before the end,” said Marzuki Darusman, SAC-M founding member. The humanitarian impact of the junta’s persistent attacks is enormous and growing at an increasing rate, yet international assistance is limited. “Every aspect of people’s basic needs – food, shelter, health care – is an emergency need right now,” said Esther Ze Naw Bamvo, a leading Kachin social justice advocate. “Almost all of the citizens from cities in conflict areas have moved to [Ethnic Revolutionary Organisation]-controlled areas. If the international community wants to provide direct support to the Myanmar people, they should find ways to contact and work with local [civil society organisations] and those organizations who are working in these areas.” Action must be taken to apply pressure on the junta to cut its capacity to commit atrocities and other human rights violations, said SAC-M. Ending the military’s impunity was highlighted in particular. “I believe that establishing a special criminal tribunal for Myanmar is the path forward that we all need to pursue,” said appeals prosecutor Martin Witteveen. “Accountability and criminal law will not solve every problem, but without a credible accountability, the problem will certainly not be solved.” At the same time, action must be taken to support the democratic movement and facilitate the realisation of the Myanmar peoples’ clearly expressed democratic will and aspirations. SAC-M founding member Yanghee Lee called on the international community to recognise the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar: “The NUG are not a shadow government and they are not a government in exile. The NUG is the de facto government and the legitimate government.” Marzuki Darusman echoed this call: “It is clear that it is time for the international community to get off the fence and fully back the people and their representatives in the form of the NUG and the [National Unity Consultative Council]. This is the way forward to peace, stability, and democracy—no less than what Myanmar deserves.” H.E. Duwa Lahsi La, in his closing remarks, urged the international community to join the Myanmar people as they stand firm in their resolve to deliver a truly federal Myanmar that is united, free and fair. “There is still time for the international community – ASEAN, the UN, our neighbours and other nations – to stand with us on the right side of history.”
Source/publisher: Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
2024-02-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-01
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Description: "In the early morning of February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military sent armored vehicles through the capital, Naypyidaw, arresting the country’s elected civilian leaders. Three years on, the junta’s relentless efforts to consolidate power have caused a spiraling human rights and humanitarian catastrophe. Junta security forces have killed over 4,000 people, arrested over 25,000, and deliberately blocked humanitarian aid from reaching millions of people amid countrywide economic and infrastructure collapse. The number of people needing assistance has grown from 1 million before the coup to 18.6 million in 2024, including 6 million children. The military’s widespread and systematic abuses amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, fueled by decades of impunity and meager international efforts to stop the violations. While atrocities spiral and slivers of refuge disappear, the United Nations Security Council remains at a standstill. In December 2022, the Security Council passed its first resolution on Myanmar since the country’s independence in 1948, denouncing the military’s post-coup abuses. But the final text was troublingly watered down, with the calls for sanctions and arms embargoes in an initial United Kingdom-led draft removed to stave off threatened vetoes from China and Russia. The UK, the Security Council’s designated penholder for resolutions on Myanmar, has for years taken a hyper-cautious approach to the country, a strategy that failed to promote any chance of accountability in the wake of the military’s 2017 crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against the ethnic Rohingya. When the resolution passed—with 12 members in favor and abstentions from China, Russia, and India—the UK and others presented the compromised text as a first step, opening the door to heightened scrutiny of the atrocities taking place on the ground. “We stand ready to take further action,” the UK ambassador said. “We expect this resolution to be implemented in full.” One year on, that further action has not materialized. Without any leverage or enforcement mechanism in the resolution, the junta has disregarded the document’s calls, such as for the release of prisoners and full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access. Instead, since the resolution was passed, security forces have arrested more than 2,200 people, killed over 1,700, and bombed schools, hospitals, and displacement camps. The junta has ramped up its deadly blockages of humanitarian aid as a method of collective punishment against the civilian population. After Cyclone Mocha made landfall in May, junta authorities refused to authorize travel and visas for aid workers, release urgent supplies from customs and warehouses, or relax onerous and unnecessary restrictions on lifesaving assistance for millions of people in need. The UN estimates that 10,000 children under 5 died in 2023 due to the lack of treatment for malnutrition. Since late October, fighting between junta forces and alliances of ethnic and anti-junta armed groups has erupted across much of the country. Over 660,000 people have been forced to flee their homes in the months since, pushing the total number of internally displaced to 2.6 million. “We’re living in constant fear of attacks, arrests, and harassment by the military,” said a villager in Rakhine State, where fighting broke out in mid-November, ending a year-long unofficial ceasefire. “Most of the men from Rakhine villages have gone into hiding to avoid arrest. The fighting left so many of our houses destroyed to the ground. All communication from other townships has been shut down.” The latest spike in fighting has triggered further restrictions, with the military blocking urgently needed access to major roads, telecommunications services, and waterways. “All the nongovernmental organization work has been suspended and the roads and communication to the north and south have been blocked since the attacks on November 13,” an aid worker in Rakhine State told Human Rights Watch. “There are new checkpoints set up by the Border Guard Police at the town entry points. We’re already facing a food crisis because we can’t get essential goods and food from the blocked villages. The costs of everything have gone so high.” The authorities have prevented the humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) from operating its 25 mobile clinics in Rakhine State. “The continuation of these current blockages will have a catastrophic impact on people’s health,” MSF said. These restrictions sustain the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, designed to exert control over an area by isolating and terrorizing civilians. They also violate Myanmar’s international obligations on the rights to life, health, and shelter. The junta’s abuses are having an increasing impact beyond Myanmar’s borders as well, spilling over into China, India, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the 2022 Security Council resolution has not become the hoped-for on-ramp to stronger action, but the feeble peak of council activity on a country in harrowing crisis. The coup anniversary and the junta’s unrelenting repression should mobilize the UK to lead Security Council members into taking concrete steps. Members should pass a binding resolution instituting a global arms embargo, referring the country situation to the International Criminal Court, and imposing targeted sanctions on the junta’s leadership and military-owned companies. And if Russia and China block a resolution, then individual governments should use their own national sanctions capabilities to work toward a de-facto global arms embargo—in line with the UN General Assembly’s call for states to halt arms transfers to Myanmar back in 2021. The Security Council should hold regular public meetings to be briefed on junta atrocities and people’s efforts to assert their rights. Governments should take more concerted measures to pressure the junta and support Myanmar civil society. The voices of the Myanmar people should be guiding international efforts, their resolute struggle for democracy and freedom a clarion call that global actors need likewise to persevere. There is no other way forward..."
Source/publisher: The Diplomat (Tokyo) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Description: "The Myanmar police on Tuesday handed six key leaders of Kokang telecom fraud gangs and four other major criminal suspects over to China, according to China's Ministry of Public Security. The ten suspects were escorted by Chinese police officers back to China via a charter flight that landed in Kunming on Tuesday evening, the ministry said, adding that it is another landmark achievement of Chinese and Myanmar police cooperation in law enforcement. It demonstrates the firm determination and strong will of the two countries to jointly combat transnational telecom fraud crimes and work together to maintain security and stability, it said. The ministry said that for a long time, multiple criminal groups in the Kokang region in northern Myanmar have openly organized armed fraud gangs and carried out telecom fraud crimes against Chinese citizens. They were also suspected of multiple and severe violent crimes such as intentional homicide, intentional injury, and illegal detention. On Dec. 10, 2023, the Chinese police issued a public reward for 10 ring leaders of the telecom fraud criminal gangs in the Kokang region and sent a working group to Myanmar. Tuesday's successful handover took place after China and Myanmar reached a consensus following multiple rounds of talks and consultations. An officer of the ministry said that 44,000 telecom fraud suspects have been handed over to China from Myanmar so far, including 2,908 fugitives. The Chinese police will always maintain a high-pressure posture to crack down on such crimes, and continue to deepen international law enforcement cooperation and arrest ring leaders of telecom fraud criminal gangs, said the officer. Criminal suspect Bai Suo Cheng is escorted by Chinese police officers at the Kunming Changshui International Airport in Kunming, southwest China's Yunnan Province, Jan. 30, 2024. The Myanmar police on Tuesday handed six key leaders of Kokang telecom fraud gangs and four other major criminal suspects over to China, according to China's Ministry of Public Security. The ten suspects were escorted by Chinese police officers back to China via a charter flight that landed in Kunming on Tuesday evening, the ministry said, adding that it is another landmark achievement of Chinese and Myanmar police cooperation in law enforcement. (Xinhua/Yin Gang) Criminal suspect Bai Suo Cheng is escorted by Chinese police officers at the Kunming Changshui International Airport in Kunming, southwest China's Yunnan Province, Jan. 30, 2024. The Myanmar police on Tuesday handed six key leaders of Kokang telecom fraud gangs and four other major criminal suspects over to China, according to China's Ministry of Public Security. The ten suspects were escorted by Chinese police officers back to China via a charter flight that landed in Kunming on Tuesday evening, the ministry said, adding that it is another landmark achievement of Chinese and Myanmar police cooperation in law enforcement. (Xinhua/Yin Gang) Criminal suspect Liu Zheng Mao is handed over to Chinese police officers at the Nay Pyi Taw International Airport in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, Jan. 30, 2024. The Myanmar police on Tuesday handed six key leaders of Kokang telecom fraud gangs and four other major criminal suspects over to China, according to China's Ministry of Public Security. The ten suspects were escorted by Chinese police officers back to China via a charter flight that landed in Kunming on Tuesday evening, the ministry said, adding that it is another landmark achievement of Chinese and Myanmar police cooperation in law enforcement. (Xinhua/Yin Gang) Criminal suspect Liu Zheng Xiang is handed over to Chinese police officers at the Nay Pyi Taw International Airport in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, Jan. 30, 2024. The Myanmar police on Tuesday handed six key leaders of Kokang telecom fraud gangs and four other major criminal suspects over to China, according to China's Ministry of Public Security. The ten suspects were escorted by Chinese police officers back to China via a charter flight that landed in Kunming on Tuesday evening, the ministry said, adding that it is another landmark achievement of Chinese and Myanmar police cooperation in law enforcement. (Xinhua/Yin Gang) Criminal suspect Wei Huai Ren is handed over to Chinese police officers at the Nay Pyi Taw International Airport in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, Jan. 30, 2024. The Myanmar police on Tuesday handed six key leaders of Kokang telecom fraud gangs and four other major criminal suspects over to China, according to China's Ministry of Public Security. The ten suspects were escorted by Chinese police officers back to China via a charter flight that landed in Kunming on Tuesday evening, the ministry said, adding that it is another landmark achievement of Chinese and Myanmar police cooperation in law enforcement. (Xinhua/Yin Gang) Criminal suspect Xu Lao Fa is handed over to Chinese police officers at the Nay Pyi Taw International Airport in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, Jan. 30, 2024. The Myanmar police on Tuesday handed six key leaders of Kokang telecom fraud gangs and four other major criminal suspects over to China, according to China's Ministry of Public Security. The ten suspects were escorted by Chinese police officers back to China via a charter flight that landed in Kunming on Tuesday evening, the ministry said, adding that it is another landmark achievement of Chinese and Myanmar police cooperation in law enforcement. (Xinhua/Yin Gang) Criminal suspect Bai Ying Cang is handed over to Chinese police officers at the Nay Pyi Taw International Airport in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, Jan. 30, 2024. The Myanmar police on Tuesday handed six key leaders of Kokang telecom fraud gangs and four other major criminal suspects over to China, according to China's Ministry of Public Security. The ten suspects were escorted by Chinese police officers back to China via a charter flight that landed in Kunming on Tuesday evening, the ministry said, adding that it is another landmark achievement of Chinese and Myanmar police cooperation in law enforcement. (Xinhua/Yin Gang) Criminal suspect Bai Suo Cheng is handed over to Chinese police officers at the Nay Pyi Taw International Airport in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, Jan. 30, 2024. The Myanmar police on Tuesday handed six key leaders of Kokang telecom fraud gangs and four other major criminal suspects over to China, according to China's Ministry of Public Security. The ten suspects were escorted by Chinese police officers back to China via a charter flight that landed in Kunming on Tuesday evening, the ministry said, adding that it is another landmark achievement of Chinese and Myanmar police cooperation in law enforcement. (Xinhua/Yin Gang) Criminal suspects are escorted by Chinese police officers at the Kunming Changshui International Airport in Kunming, southwest China's Yunnan Province, Jan. 30, 2024. The Myanmar police on Tuesday handed six key leaders of Kokang telecom fraud gangs and four other major criminal suspects over to China, according to China's Ministry of Public Security. The ten suspects were escorted by Chinese police officers back to China via a charter flight that landed in Kunming on Tuesday evening, the ministry said, adding that it is another landmark achievement of Chinese and Myanmar police cooperation in law enforcement. (Xinhua/Yin Gang)..."
Source/publisher: "Xinhua News Agency" (Beijing)
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Description: "THREE YEARS OF POST-COUP ATROCITIES IN MYANMAR Tomorrow, 1 February, marks three years since the military in Myanmar (Burma) overthrew the civilian-led government. Since then, the people of Myanmar have endured war crimes and crimes against humanity as the military has imposed crackdowns on anti-coup protests and perpetrated an increasingly violent campaign in anti-junta strongholds across the country. The military has perpetrated mass detentions, indiscriminate bombardments and arson campaigns, targeted attacks on schools and religious buildings, rape and the weaponization of vital humanitarian aid. Since the coup, at least 4,400 people have been killed, including 1,600 in 2023 alone, and 2.6 million displaced while nearly 20,000 people remain detained. In October a group of ethnic revolutionary organizations – known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance – launched Operation 1027, targeting the junta’s outposts and strongholds across the country. Operation 1027 – the most significant challenge to the junta since the coup – has galvanized other armed groups to launch attacks, with fighting now engulfing two thirds of the country. Fighting has particularly intensified in Rakhine State, where clashes on 26 January between the Arakan Army and the military in Hpon Nyo Leik village killed at least 12 Rohingya civilians. The military repeatedly shelled the village, destroying infrastructure. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Arakan Army allegedly positioned its troops in and around this Rohingya village in anticipation of the military’s attacks. Since October, at least 554 people have been killed and 800,000 newly displaced. On 30 January the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, warned, “As the military have suffered setback after setback on the battlefield, they have lashed out, launching waves of indiscriminate aerial bombardments and artillery strikes… Military tactics have consistently focused on the punishment of civilians who they view as supporting their enemies. As a result, the military has routinely targeted civilians and protected objects under international humanitarian law, especially medical facilities and schools.” Targeted attacks on civilians and civilian objects, the use of human shields and the indiscriminate bombardments of civilian-populated areas violate international humanitarian and human rights law and may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Three years into the crisis, both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the UN Security Council are paralyzed by divisions and have made little progress on a coordinated response as civilians continue to endure atrocities. The Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Savita Pawnday, said, “In the three years since the military coup, populations across Myanmar have suffered from atrocities and daily abuses at the hands of the military who have been emboldened by impunity. The international community must collectively cut off the junta’s access to the jet fuel, funds and the legitimacy it needs to continue committing atrocities against civilians.”..."
Source/publisher: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Description: "Shipping data suggests attempt to evade sanctions in aviation fuel supply chain Direct sales of fuel diminish; instead intermediaries appear to aid purchase of fuel to Myanmar At least seven shipments of aviation fuel to Myanmar in 2023, with direct links to storage unit in Viet Nam 2023 the worst year for air strikes in Myanmar since coup three years ago New evidence suggests Myanmar’s military is using new tactics to import aviation fuel after sanctions were imposed in response to air strikes that have unlawfully killed and injured civilians, Amnesty International said today ahead of the third anniversary of the 2021 coup. Shipping, satellite, trade and customs data analysis by Amnesty shows significant changes to how aviation fuel entered Myanmar over the past year, with the military appearing to use new routes and rely on storage units to obfuscate the origin of the fuel. “After the international community took action on this deadly supply chain, the Myanmar military is ripping a page out of the sanctions evasion playbook to continue importing jet fuel,” said Montse Ferrer, Deputy Regional Director for Research. “Air strikes have killed or injured hundreds of civilians across Myanmar in 2023, and left many feeling nowhere is safe. The best way to stop the Myanmar military from carrying out lethal air strikes is to stop all jet fuel imports into the country.” Multiple buyers and storage units that conceal origin The supply chain of aviation fuel to Myanmar appears to have shifted considerably since sanctions were passed by the UK, the USA, the EU and others last year. Buyers in Myanmar are no longer purchasing fuel directly but apparently relying on multiple purchases and sales of the same fuel to distance themselves from the original supplier of the aviation fuel. Amnesty’s new research uncovers this apparent ruse. The findings show that in 2023, as pressure built on companies and states to suspend shipments of jet fuel to Myanmar in the wake of an Amnesty International investigation into the supply chain, there was a lull in imports between January and March. In April that year, they picked up again, and vessel tracking data, satellite imagery and customs and trade data show that at least six shipments entered the country between April and August in 2023. Then, in August, the US passed its latest round of sanctions on jet fuel, which appears to have led to another lull in imports from September to November, after which Amnesty identified one final jet fuel shipment in December 2023. The seven shipments, adding up to at least 67 kilotonnes of aviation fuel, represent an increase in shipments compared to 2021-2022, year on year. While in 2021-2022 the majority of aviation fuel entered Myanmar as direct sales of fuel shipments – making it much easier to trace the supplier – in 2023, the fuel appears to have been bought and sold more than once, before arriving to Myanmar. Further, the vessels identified by Amnesty picked up the aviation fuel at a storage unit in Viet Nam immediately prior to traveling to Myanmar. “This is significant because storage units make fuel notoriously hard to trace,” explains Ferrer. “A lot can happen at a storage unit – fuel can be blended to mask its origin; sellers can lose track of buyers as fuel changes hands; storage unit owners or managers can claim ignorance once the fuel arrives at rented-out tanks. In addition, the larger a storage unit, the more ships arrive with different types of cargo, making the tracing of goods by external actors virtually impossible. “This could be a way to evade sanctions. Fuel is no longer sold by the supplier directly to a Myanmar – possibly sanctioned – entity, but through one or more intermediaries, while also ensuring that the vessel’s last stop before arrival in Myanmar is a storage unit which cannot be easily linked to the actual fuel supplier.” Viet Nam connection The seven shipments in 2023 loaded aviation fuel at a small storage terminal called Cai Mep Petroleum terminal close to Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam, which is operated by local company Hai Linh Co. Ltd. Shipments occurred in April, May, June, July, August and December. Vessel tracking and customs data has made it possible to identify what likely occurred during these shipments. First, the original supplier sold the jet fuel to a trader. That trader would have then off-sold it, once or multiple times, but in all cases, the second-to-last sale of the jet fuel before transfer to Myanmar was from a trader to a Vietnamese company. This Vietnamese company then received the fuel at a storage terminal in Cai Mep managed by Hai Linh. After storing the fuel for anywhere between a few hours to days, that fuel was sold to Myanmar and transported by vessel. Amnesty has identified three shipments to Viet Nam that were immediately preceded by deliveries from recognizable locations. In one case, a shipment of jet fuel in August originated (although having been transported by a different vessel) from the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) terminal in Huizhou, the third-largest national oil company in China. According to vessel tracking data and satellite imagery, two other shipments in April and May onloaded the jet fuel at the Pengerang Independent Terminals, a storage terminal in Malaysia partly owned by Vopak, before arriving in Viet Nam and subsequently travelling to Myanmar (also by a different vessel). Vietnamese customs data has also made it possible to identify the fuel traders that made the second-to-last purchase of jet fuel that transited through Viet Nam. The most prominent of these is BB Energy (Asia) Pte. Ltd., the Singapore branch of privately owned BB Energy, based in Dubai and described as “among the world’s leading independent energy trading companies”, with 30 offices around the world, including one in London. At least three of the seven shipments that transited through Viet Nam before arriving in Myanmar involved BB Energy (Asia). It is unclear whether the trading companies knew the fuel they were selling to Vietnamese companies would soon thereafter end up in Myanmar, or whether their actions could run afoul of existing sanctions. These traders sold the fuel to a Vietnamese company, which then appears to have sold the jet fuel to a Myanmar purchaser. Customs data indicates one of these companies to be Hai Linh Ltd., the company that owns and operates the storage terminal at Cai Mep. Jet fuel offloaded in sanctioned-linked Yangon terminal All seven aviation fuel shipments were offloaded at the former Puma Energy terminal in Thilawa area port, Yangon, Myanmar. Following Puma Energy’s departure from Myanmar in December 2022, it sold its assets and transferred the management of the Thilawa terminal to a joint venture between Shoon Energy Thilawa Terminal Co. Ltd. (formerly Asia Sun Aviation) and a state-owned and military controlled entity, MPE. Several Shoon Energy companies – although not the company managing the terminal – have been sanctioned by the UK, the USA, the EU and others for their role in the import and distribution of aviation fuel. “The fact that these shipments are arriving at the same terminal with direct links to sanctioned companies and individuals and to the Myanmar military raises real questions about sanction effectiveness and compliance for those involved in the supply chain,” Ferrer said. Six of the seven Vietnamese shipments were transported by the Chinese-flagged oil tanker HUITONG 78 (IMO 9646479); the remaining shipment was done by Liberian-flagged oil tanker YIDA 8 (IMO 9936941). Amnesty was unable to confirm the current owners of these vessels. Companies’ responsibility and countries’ obligations across entire value chain As outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, companies have a responsibility to seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts by conducting human rights due diligence. In conducting such due diligence, international standards establish that companies should assess the entire value chain for human rights risks and harm. In fact, companies can become directly linked to the harm – and in certain cases, liable under sanctions regimes – as a result of the irresponsible usage of the products or services they supply or manage. This includes jet fuel suppliers, fuel traders and storage terminal managers such as BB Energy, CNOOC, Hai Linh, Vopak and others. “We have been told time and time again by companies that they are not responsible for what happens to the products after they sell them; or that they cannot control what happens at the storage terminals they themselves own and operate. However, the reality is that companies *can *know and should know what happens to their entire value chain if they are at all serious about human rights due diligence,” Ferrer said. Under international law, all states have a duty to protect against human rights abuses by all actors, including companies. This means that states must protect individuals and communities from the harmful activities of corporate actors through effective policies, legislation, regulation and adjudication. “The role played here by Viet Nam is particularly problematic. The Cai Mep port is essential for this new supply chain to work – and so the Vietnamese government has an obligation to make sure its ports are not being used for activities linked to human rights violations,” Ferrer said. 2023 worst year for air strikes Myanmar military air strikes continued over the same period, with the UN reporting in September 2023 a significant increase compared to the first year after the coup. In December 2023, Amnesty International documented, among other potential war crimes, the military’s indiscriminate air and ground attacks on Pauktaw town in Rakhine State, as well as its likely use of banned cluster munitions in northern Shan State. Amnesty International also documented how, on 9 October, an air strike followed by mortar fire on a camp for internally displaced persons in Mung Lai Hkye village, Kachin State killed at least 28 civilians including children, and injured at least 57 others. According to media reports, air strikes resulting in civilian deaths also took place in Bago and Sagaing Regions and in Chin, Kayah, Kayin and Mon states. For example on 27 June, air strikes near a monastery in Nyaung Kone village in Sagaing Region killed a monk and at least nine other civilians. On 11 April, in the single deadliest aerial attack since the coup, military aircraft bombed a gathering of people who were inaugurating a new local administrative office in the village of Pa Zyi Gyi, also in Sagaing Region. At least 100 civilians were killed, including 35 children, as well as 18 people aligned with armed opposition groups. The military admitted the attack but claimed that explosives stored at the site where the gathering was taking place were responsible for the scale of the fatalities. “There’s an epidemic of deadly, unlawful air strikes in Myanmar, but the cure is clear. We have to stop jet fuel imports from ending up in the hands of the Myanmar military,” Ferrer said. Background Since the 1 February 2021 coup, air strikes have killed, maimed and displaced civilians across the country, targeting schools, IDP camps and other civilian infrastructure. In response, Amnesty International published Deadly Cargo: Exposing the Supply Chain that Fuels War Crimes in Myanmarin November 2022, which it published in collaboration with Justice for Myanmar. The report revealed how aviation fuel reached the country, how it ended up with the Myanmar military and how it reached bases from which air attacks that constituted war crimes were conducted. In March 2023, Amnesty published updated findings on new shipments. Following evidence linking foreign and domestic companies to the supply of aviation fuel to the Myanmar military, the UK, the USA, Canada, the EU and Switzerland imposed sanctions on companies and individuals in Myanmar and Singapore involved in the procurement and distribution of aviation fuel into Myanmar. In August, the USA extended the reach of potential sanctions, stating that anyone involved in this industry was at risk. All companies named in this press release were contacted for comment with the exception of Shoon Energy Thilawa Terminal Co. Ltd, who were contacted by Amnesty International at the time the findings against them were originally published. The only company to respond to Amnesty International for this press release is Royal Vopak who emphasised their respect for human rights and claimed to have no record of a vessel birthing at Pengerang storage terminal on or about the dates we identified. This conflicts with Amnesty’s own evidence..."
Source/publisher: Amnesty International
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Description: "The Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the European Union, gave a statement marking three years since the military coup in Myanmar. Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the European Union, marking three years since the military coup in Myanmar: "Three years ago, on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military overthrew the democratically elected government, undoing a decade of progress. "Under the military regime, violence against civilians has escalated, with thousands jailed, tortured and killed. Airstrikes, shelling and arson have been used to destroy civilian infrastructure, including homes, schools, healthcare facilities and places of worship. Systematic discrimination against members of religious and ethnic groups, including Rohingya, is rife. Many are displaced and continue to face horrific conditions, and others have been forced to flee across Myanmar’s borders. The military’s actions have fuelled a growing humanitarian crisis with 2.6 million people displaced from their homes, and more than 18 million people in need. "We condemn in the strongest possible terms the military regime’s ongoing atrocities and human rights violations, such as sexual and gender-based violence, and the restriction of fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression, through peaceful protests and the media. We reiterate our call for the Commander-in-Chief and the military to change course, immediately ceasing violence against civilians, releasing all unjustly detained political prisoners, allowing full humanitarian access and creating space for inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders. "We strongly encourage unified efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to resolve the crisis. We commend the constructive efforts of the ASEAN Chairs and Special Envoys. We call on the military regime to implement ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and engage meaningfully and positively with ASEAN representatives, in order for Myanmar to transition towards an inclusive democracy. "We continue to support the full implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and underline our support for UN Security Council activities to support ASEAN’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. We call on the UN to strengthen its efforts on Myanmar including via the timely appointment of a Special Envoy and a Resident Coordinator and urge UN Member states to maintain their support to address urgent humanitarian needs in Myanmar. "We call on all members of the international community to support efforts to push the Myanmar military to cease violence, to bring about genuinely inclusive dialogue, in order to establish a credible, peaceful democratic future for Myanmar; to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of people in Myanmar and refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries, including its most vulnerable communities, and to cease providing the Myanmar military with the arms and equipment that are necessary for them to commit atrocities. "Three years on from the military coup, we continue to stand in solidarity with the Myanmar people and their desire for an inclusive and genuine democracy in Myanmar."..."
Source/publisher: European Union, Government of Australia, Government of Canada, Government of New Zealand, Government of Norway, Government of Switzerland, Government of the Republic of Korea, Government of the United Kingdom, US Department of State
2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Sub-title: UN Security Council Should Impose Global Arms Embargo, Jet Fuel Sanctions
Description: "UN Security Council Should Impose Global Arms Embargo, Jet Fuel Sanctions (Bangkok) – Myanmar’s military junta has increasingly carried out unlawful airstrikes harming civilians in its military operations against a coalition of opposition and ethnic armed groups, Human Rights Watch said today. Governments that provide transfers or assistance of arms or materiel to the junta forces risk being complicit in war crimes. Three years since the February 1, 2021, coup in Myanmar, the junta’s widespread and systematic abuses against the population – including arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians – amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. In 2023, Human Rights Watch investigations found that the military’s unlawful airstrikes in Sagaing Region and Kachin State were apparent war crimes. “Concerned governments should be doing more to curb the junta’s capacity to commit appalling laws-of-war violations,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “United Nations member countries should urge the UN Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar, including sanctions on jet fuel that facilitates unlawful air attacks on civilians.” The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said in a statement on January 30 that Myanmar’s deteriorating human rights situation was now in “free fall.” “The people of Myanmar have been suffering for too long,” Türk said. “Since the end of October last year, their situation has deteriorated even further as a result of the long-established tactics of the military to target them.” On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance – an anti-junta coalition of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army – began Operation 1027, an offensive that seized Myanmar military outposts in northern Shan State. The offensive also triggered opposition attacks on Myanmar security forces elsewhere in the country. The junta responded to the attacks with military operations that have involved serious violations of the laws of war. Amnesty International determined that junta forces most likely used cluster munitions during attacks on the town of Namkham in Shan State in early December. The use of cluster munitions, large weapons that include dozens of smaller weapons known as submunitions, is inherently indiscriminate and constitutes a war crime. The renewed fighting within weeks displaced about 600,000 people across Myanmar. Humanitarian agencies and local organizations have struggled to respond to the surge in displacement. An unknown number of civilians have been killed and injured in recent airstrikes. An aid worker in Muse township near the China border told Human Rights Watch that his friend fled from Namhkam after his wife was killed in a junta airstrike on December 1, an incident reported by the Shan Human Rights Foundation. “He managed to hide their two children in the bunker when they first heard the sounds of a jet,” the aid worker said. “But his wife was showering as it was morning. … She didn’t make it to the bunker and died right there when the junta dropped the bomb. He was injured too, and luckily the children are safe but now they don’t have a mother.” A spokeswoman from a local ethnic and women’s rights group, the Ta’ang Women’s Organization, said she fled Namhkam township on December 2 after repeated junta airstrikes in her village. “At first, I hid with my family in a dirt bunker we had dug near our home,” she said. “There were so many explosions … it was hard to tell whether it was all the same attack or many planes dropping bombs. The planes came day and night, and they also circled around us repeatedly even if they weren’t dropping bombs.” The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, which reports data on the Myanmar military’s air and drone strikes, found strikes to have substantially increased since early 2022. This data is compiled from media reports and may significantly undercount the military’s total air and drone strikes. Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have imposed and expanded sanctions since the coup, but sanctions on jet fuel have been inconsistent. Canada is the only country to have imposed comprehensive sanctions on the export, sale, supply or shipment of aviation fuel to Myanmar. In 2023, the EU, UK, and US also introduced some sanctions that targeted private actors supplying fuel, arms and funds to Myanmar. However, five British companies are still providing insurance cover for deliveries of aviation fuel to Myanmar. Governments in the region have not sent a clear message to Myanmar’s junta concerning ongoing rights violations, Human Rights Watch said. Laos, as the 2024 chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), should work with other ASEAN member countries to take a more robust approach that pressures the junta to end its abuses and remove restrictions on humanitarian assistance. The European Union, whose foreign ministers will meet with ASEAN foreign ministers on February 2, should urge ASEAN members, in particular Thailand and Singapore, to cooperate in enforcing sanctions in their jurisdictions. The UN Security Council should meaningfully follow up on its December 2022 resolution on Myanmar by imposing an arms embargo, including jet fuel, and refer the country situation to the International Criminal Court. Russia and China, which both abstained from the 2022 resolution, should not block stronger measures by the council. Russia and China have continued to sell weapons to Myanmar’s junta since the 2021 coup, according to the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. “Myanmar’s people have been suffering for years under a junta that shows them no regard,” Pearson said. “A stronger international response is still needed to press for an end to the military’s abuses.”..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2024-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-30
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Description: "Australian companies, executives and investors are continuing to operate in Myanmar’s junta-dominated mining sector three years after the military launched a brutal and illegal attempted coup. A new Justice For Myanmar report, Mines Against Humanity, reveals the Australian owned and led companies that are engaged in extraction, exploration and services that provide the junta with revenue, or support the maintenance of a sector that bankrolls junta atrocities. Companies are wrongly treating the illegal junta as if it were the government of Myanmar. The junta is not the legitimate government of Myanmar and has failed to take effective control of Myanmar’s territory because of the sustained and courageous mass resistance of the Myanmar people. The junta has responded with a war of terror through indiscriminate air strikes and shelling, the killing of more than 4,400 people, rape, torture, the arbitrary arrest of more than 25,800, the destruction of whole communities and the displacement of more than 2.3 million. The continued Australian presence in Myanmar’s mining sector is a result of Australia’s failure to impose sanctions on the junta’s sources of funds, and a lack of guidance on Australia’s expectations for responsible business in Myanmar. This report documents 10 company networks that have remained active in Myanmar following the coup attempt and highlights six company networks that are not currently active in the mining sector but remain registered in Myanmar and require monitoring should they resume operations under the junta. These include: Valentis, a sprawling network of companies backed by Australian investors set up by brothers closely connected to the military. Among Valentis’s activities, Justice For Myanmar’s investigation uncovered an apparent visit to a MEC coal project since the coup attempt, the provision of services to a Myanmar arms broker and business links to a militia under junta control. Cornerstone Resources – a company thought to be owned by prominent Australian prospector Mark Creasy, and that has an Australian address, has continued to mine and refine zinc in Shan state following the military’s coup attempt. Justice For Myanmar uncovered transactions with military conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which may breach UK sanctions given its previous registration in the British Virgin Islands at the time of the transactions. The Australian branch of the global consulting firm Knight Piésold is providing environmental services to the China owned Wanbao Mining for copper mines that operate in partnership with military conglomerate Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). Services were provided as recently as 2023 and it is uncertain whether Knight Piésold is interpreting their contractual obligations consistently with the due diligence exception in the Australian Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 to avoid breaching the sanctions against MEHL. The Australia-based miner PanAust has maintained its large-scale exploration licences in Sagaing, a region ravaged in the junta’s campaign of terror. By paying fees to the junta, it helps fund its atrocities. Asia Pacific Mining Limited, a company with Australian executives, has been communicating with senior members of the junta to continue and expand its exploration activities under cover of the military’s coup attempt. Even after the coup attempt and amid local opposition, Australian-led company Access Resources Asia has been pushing ahead with gold exploration in eastern Shan state. Australian Laboratory Services (ALS), listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, has maintained its business in Myanmar following the military’s coup attempt and has done mineral testing for Access Resources Asia and junta-controlled universities. Justice For Myanmar calls on Australia to immediately impose sanctions on mining enterprises controlled by the junta; to widen sanctions against the junta’s sources of funds, arms and jet fuel, in coordination with its allies; and to investigate sanctions-busting activity and penalise or prosecute companies and individuals as appropriate. Justice For Myanmar calls on companies operating in Myanmar to follow the laws, policies and guidance of the legitimate federal bodies, including the National Unity Government (NUG), National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), applicable state councils, and relevant Ethnic Resistance Organisations, and to fulfil their responsibilities under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Under the NUG’s Three-Pillar Framework Guiding Responsible Investment and Continued Operations, companies should avoid all business with the junta and fulfil contractual obligations to the state by paying funds into an escrow account for the lawful and legitimate government of Myanmar. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “It is unacceptable that three years after the military’s illegal coup attempt, Australia is still failing to take necessary action to block the junta’s sources of funds from mining and other lucrative sectors. “The Myanmar military operates as a cartel that is stealing the wealth of the people of Myanmar on a massive scale to fund its war of terror and enrich war criminals. “Yet, there are Australian companies, executives and investors in the mining sector that are continuing business as usual, financing the illegitimate junta and helping to keep a corrupt and destructive mining sector open for business. “Australia needs to act now to impose sanctions on the junta, its businesses, and cronies, and stop Australians from directly and indirectly providing funds and other forms of support to the junta. “Australian owned and led businesses in Myanmar should follow the laws, policies and guidance of the legitimate federal bodies, including the NUG, NUCC, applicable state councils, and relevant EROs, and fulfil their international human rights responsibilities.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
2024-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-30
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Description: "Three years of widespread, systematic violence in Myanmar and the evidence against perpetrators is mounting Geneva, 30 January 2024 – Three years ago, the Myanmar military overthrew the country’s elected government. A host of serious international crimes followed, starting with the violent suppression of protests and arrests of those daring to speak out against the military regime. Thousands, including political opponents and journalists, have been detained without due process of law, and these detentions have often been accompanied by torture and other abuses, including sexual violence. The military takeover also triggered an intensification of armed conflicts in Myanmar, during which brutal crimes have been committed, including indiscriminate air strikes killing numerous civilians, mass killings of detainees, dismemberment and desecration of bodies, rape, and the deliberate burning of entire villages. Thousands have been killed, and around two million have been displaced. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar has been collecting evidence of these crimes from hundreds of sources over the past three years. The evidence reveals a pattern that indicates that these are not isolated crimes but rather a manifestation of an organizational policy, implemented on a widespread and systematic basis by the military regime. No one has yet been held accountable for these crimes, which has deepened the culture of impunity in the country. Through our analysis of the information we have collected, including testimonies from survivors, defectors and eyewitnesses, we are assembling evidence which can reveal who is responsible for these crimes. This includes the identity of those who are directing this policy, and many of those committing the crimes on the ground, from the air, or inside detention facilities. We are investigating the perpetrators who ordered and executed these crimes, as well as those who failed to punish the crimes committed by those under their command. The Mechanism continues to collect and analyze new information it receives regarding past or ongoing crimes, and each piece of evidence takes us closer to seeing the perpetrators held to account. We stand ready to support relevant authorities from national, regional or international courts or tribunals who will prosecute these crimes, now or in the future. We believe that one day this evidence will be presented in a court of law and those responsible will face justice. *The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM or Mechanism) *was created by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 to collect and analyse evidence of the most serious international crimes and other violations of international law committed in Myanmar since 2011. It aims to facilitate justice and accountability by preserving and organizing this evidence and preparing case files for use in future prosecutions of those responsible in national, regional and international courts..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "excerpts 22.We discussed the developments in Myanmar and reaffirmed our united position that the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) remains our main reference to address the political crisis in Myanmar, with the sole objective of restoring peace, stability, and a Myanmar-owned and led comprehensive political resolution. We welcomed the ASEAN Leaders’ Reviews and Decisions on the Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus adopted at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits in 2022 and the 43rd ASEAN Summit in 2023. We reaffirmed ASEAN’s commitment to assisting Myanmar in finding a peaceful, comprehensive, and durable solution to the ongoing crisis, as Myanmar remains an integral part of ASEAN. We reaffirmed ASEAN unity and reiterated that any effort should support, in line with the 5PC and in coordination with the Chair of ASEAN. 23.ASEAN Member States welcomed the appointment of H.E. Mr. Alounkeo KITTIKHOUN, former Minister to the Prime Minister’s Office of the Lao PDR as the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar for 2024 as we continue our efforts to promote progress in the implementation of the 5PC in its entirety. We appreciated his efforts thus far in reaching out to parties concerned and are confident in his resolve to help the people of Myanmar find a Myanmar-owned and led solution towards a peaceful, stable and unified Myanmar contributing to peace and prosperity of the region. 24.We welcomed progress on the delivery of the ASEAN humanitarian assistance to Myanmar under Phase 2 by the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Management (AHA Centre), in particular the distribution of humanitarian assistance in January 2024 to the displaced and vulnerable people in Nyaung Shwe and Hsihseng township, Southern Shan State. We appreciated the resources contributed by ASEAN Member States, external partners, and the private sector thus far, and called for further support towards the more effective implementation of Phase 2. We urged for immediate cessation of violence by all parties in Myanmar to create a safe and conducive environment for ensuring the timely, unhindered, and safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need in Myanmar without discrimination. We urged all parties to exercise utmost restraint, uphold international humanitarian law and take all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of all civilians. 25.We welcomed the initiative between Thailand and Myanmar to scale up humanitarian assistance along the border through the Red Cross Societies of two countries to provide effective, credible, and transparent delivery of basic needs to those in need without discrimination. We look forward to engaging AHA Centre in joining the monitoring of the distribution of humanitarian assistance, as this initiative can contribute to ASEAN’s collective efforts in implementing the 5PC..."
Source/publisher: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
2024-01-29
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-29
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Description: "OVERVIEW In Myanmar, the humanitarian situation remained precarious following the escalation of violence since 26 October 2023 with armed clashes, artillery shelling, and indiscriminate shooting reported in about two thirds of the country. According to the UN, the number of displaced people inside Myanmar now exceeds 2.6 million. Almost 800,000 people have been newly displaced since late-October, out of whom 164,000 have either returned to their places of origin or fled for a second time across the North-West, North-East, South-East and Rakhine State. Deepening violence, rising poverty levels, and deteriorating living conditions are having a devastating impact on people’s lives. The situation has also been further compounded by the closure of roads and waterways, movement restrictions and telecommunication challenges, all of which are undermining humanitarian actors’ engagement with affected communities and limiting people’s access to critical services. UNHCR and partners are exploring ways to adapt to the volatile situation and respond to the urgent needs on the ground. In Thailand, some 1,400 refugees were sheltered in two Temporary Safety Areas (TSA) in Mae Hong Son Province (170 in Mae Sariang District and 1,249 in Mueang District), according to the Mae Hong Son Border Command Centre. In December, 968 refugees residing in different TSAs returned to Myanmar. Kyaw Pla Kee TSA in Mae Sariang was also closed during the reporting period. In India, around 59,200 individuals from Myanmar’s North-West region have sought protection since February 2021. Out of this population, some 5,500 individuals are in New Delhi and have registered with UNHCR. Since November 2023, more than 6,500 people have arrived in the Champhai and Siaha districts of Mizoram and 2,000 people in Manipur’s Kamjong District. New arrivals are currently living in cramped conditions in community halls, schools as well as with host families whose resources are already over-stretched. District administrations, NGOs and community-based organizations are providing critical humanitarian support. Food, water, core-relief items (CRIs), and shelter are the most immediate needs although resources are limited..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-01-26
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-26
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Description: "WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS In the South-East, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) has slightly increased from 690,300 last week to 695,400 this week. Due to intensified fighting, including airstrikes, 3,200 IDPs from Kyaukkyi Township were displaced to Phyu town, Phyu Township in Bago Region (East). In Kayin State, 530 IDPs from Kawkareik Township were displaced to the jungle near their village within the same Township due to indiscriminate shelling. In Tanintharyi Region, 1,400 IDPs from Tanintharyi Township were displaced within their Township..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-19
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Description: "Poor decision-making and an inflexible strategy are compounding the junta’s losses and driving discontent among army commanders. On 5 January, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) accepted the conditional surrender of the Laukkaing Regional Operations Command, giving it control of Laukkaing city, the prime objective of the joint anti-junta Operation 1027. One hundred kilometres to the west, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) has expelled junta forces from large towns and strategic roadways and gained near-total control of its primary area of operation. On the other side of the country, in Rakhine State, the Arakan Army’s (AA) campaign has accelerated in recent weeks, resulting in the rapid retreat of junta forces. And yet the impact of Operation 1027 is not confined to the battlefield, with the junta’s failure to stem its losses stirring deep dissatisfaction among its ranks according to sources close to the army and regime. After spending three years on the sidelines, the Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the MNDAA, TNLA and AA, entered the post-coup war by launching Operation 1027 along the border with China in late October 2023. The blitz has expelled the regime from swathes of territory in the country’s north and inspired fresh attacks by opposition forces elsewhere. This month’s conflict update explores recent battlefield developments and analyses what went wrong for the regime’s forces in northern Shan State, where a new ceasefire came into effect on 11 January.....Following two rounds of talks brokered by Beijing, junta forces ceded control of Laukkaing city to the MNDAA on 5 January. About 2,400 personnel, including six brigadier generals, were granted safe passage as a part of a negotiated withdrawal.....Junta soldiers managed to disable or destroy some of their larger weapon systems before leaving, but were required to surrender their small arms.....The Myanmar armed forces expelled the MNDAA from Laukkaing in 2009, so the city’s capture marks the end of a nearly 15-year campaign to ‘return home’. The MNDAA is now effectively in control of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (SAZ). In December 2023, Chinese officials began pressuring the Brotherhood Alliance to de-escalate and negotiate with the junta. The MNDAA mostly complied, having already won itself a favourable bargaining position. The TNLA’s progress had been more limited. The group responded to Chinese pressure by instead accelerating assaults on junta bases and towns. The MNDAA assisted its partner by sending units to fight in TNLA uniforms.....The TNLA is now effectively in control of the Palaung SAZ, the heartland of the Ta’ang people. It also secured a land bridge to the Myanmar–China border by capturing Namhkam Town on 18 December. The TNLA has made inroads outside the SAZ as well. Ta’ang fighters captured Namtu Town on 28 December, and occupied the town of Kutkai after the junta withdrew on 7 January.....TNLA fighters also captured Monglon and a small base outside Mongmit Town. The bases lie near or along a key weapons-smuggling route that links Shan to both Kachin and Myanmar’s interior.....Though the junta retains an isolated presence at Muse, the country’s largest border gate, it has lost control of the two most important roads linking Myanmar to China. Many of the units forced out by the Brotherhood Alliance have regrouped in Lashio......After a slow start, the AA’s offensive in Rakhine and southern Chin states began to accelerate in late December.....The AA has overrun more than 20 outposts across Paletwa Township, Chin State. On 15 January, AA fighters captured Paletwa Town.....Though some regime outposts remain, the AA is now the dominant force in Paletwa. Control here opens access to the Indian and Bangladeshi borders, and an alternative supply route via Matupi, Chin State.....The fighting between the AA and the regime has implications for regional development. A key segment of India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, a US$500-million effort to link Kolkata with Mizoram, runs through Paletwa.....On 7 and 8 January, the AA fired rockets at the Dhanyawadi naval base on Ramree island, just ten kms from the terminus of the Sino-Myanmar pipeline. China plans to build a Special Economic Zone and deep-sea port on the island.....Elsewhere in the country, opposition forces continue to experience advances and setbacks.....Inspired by Operation 1027, a coalition of Karenni resistance groups began a large-scale assault on Loikaw, the Kayah State capital, on 11 November. Despite the initial capture of about half the city, the offensive has stalled.....But the operation forced the regime to pull its forces from other positions around the state, allowing the Karenni resistance to consolidate control across remote areas and several small towns.....In the southeast, an opposition coalition involving elements of the Karen National Union (KNU) and People’s Defense Forces (PDF) tied to the National Unity Government (NUG) has not recreated the territorial successes seen elsewhere.....An early December assault on the town of Kawkareik failed, but the fighting over the past month has disrupted Asian Highway 1, the main trade route between Thailand and Myanmar.....In early November, coalition forces captured the police station and bridge at Chaung Hna Khwa, on the border of Mon and Kayin states. Regime forces retook the village on 29 December, though the bridge is now destroyed.....On 4 January, a joint KNU and PDF unit destroyed a small bridge along the road somewhere between the towns of Kyauktaga and Phyu. That same day, opposition fighters reportedly downed powerlines near the village of Zee Kone.....In early November, PDF fighters linked to the NUG took part in the capture of Kawlin and Khampat, the first towns to fall in Sagaing Region. The NUG now claims to administer both.....To deny the NUG’s ability to govern, the junta has adopted a strategy of attacking civilians in the towns, probably with the aim of making the areas uninhabitable.....On 28 December, junta soldiers stationed in Wuntho Town fired shells at Kawlin, which lies just 12 km to the south. Four civilians, including two children, were reportedly killed. Six more civilians were killed by a second artillery attack days later.....On 7 January, a regime airstrike on the edge of Khampat reportedly killed 17 civilians, including nine children. Twenty more civilians were wounded.....Junta missteps compound losses As early as the second week of Operation 1027, Chinese officials acting as mediators suggested to the junta that it allow the MNDAA and TNLA to administer their own areas. The junta refused to concede territories it had not yet lost, like Laukkaing, and opted to fight it out instead. But the army ultimately failed to launch a counter-offensive or utilise available resources to defend its remaining positions. Though some battalions pivoted to mobile defense, many were left to guard exposed or isolated hilltop positions and so they were overrun, partially destroyed, or forced to surrender. Sources indicated that Naypyidaw’s inflexible strategy and the avoidable losses that followed have harmed morale among ground commanders. The army’s withdrawal from Laukkaing on 5 January forfeited its greatest bargaining chip, yet it is unclear what, if anything, the junta received in exchange. According to various reports, the second round of talks held between 22 and 24 December had not produced a concrete agreement on the fate of Laukkaing. Surprisingly, the withdrawal took place before all sides convened in Kunming, China for a third round of talks on 10 and 11 January. This suggests that the city’s commanding officers may have prematurely withdrawn, leaving the junta with little to no leverage over its opponents. Media reported that the six brigadier generals were detained upon arriving in Lashio after the withdrawal. A source confirmed that at least five of them are facing court martial. The ceasefire deal struck on 11 January appeared to freeze the conflict along the new lines of demarcation that the Brotherhood won by force, so the regime’s acceptance is indicative of a decisive defeat, rather than a compromise. Moreover, the junta can no longer access the border area in Shan State, raising the prospect of a long-term inability to tax a significant portion of the country’s trade with China. Its losses now include large towns like Hseni and Kutkai, which were not necessarily primary objectives for the Brotherhood Alliance. By refusing to bargain, the junta has lost more territory, depleted its fighting strength, allowed the capture of large arms and munitions stockpiles, and precipitated a crisis of confidence among its officer corps. Several sources close to the regime and army have indicated widespread dissatisfaction with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and even consideration of a leadership change among at least some internal elements. While the territorial losses inflicted by Operation 1027 do not pose an existential threat to the regime, the embarrassment of the defeat and its impact on morale could potentially generate some internal instability. Yet any effort to sideline Min Aung Hlaing will be difficult. Since the coup, the junta leader has carefully consolidated his power by removing potential rivals from important positions (the regime announced a reshuffle of several senior officials immediately after the fall of Laukkaing). Although Min Aung Hlaing has lost respect, unseating him would also equate to challenging the long-standing norms of the Tatmadaw, which most senior officers still view as sacrosanct. Moreover, it would be hard for any reform-minded faction to initiate a negotiated transition, given how deeply the regime is reviled both at home and abroad..."
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Source/publisher: International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)
2024-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-19
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Description: "This Situation Update describes events that occurred in Bilin Township, Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton) District during the period between July 2021 and September 2022. The State Administration Council (SAC) increased operations, including regular troop rotations and transportation of rations between Meh Pray Hkee and Na Kyi army camps. SAC soldiers also entered villages and committed looting and deliberate shelling, causing displacement, and arrested at least 45 villagers to use them as human shields, forced labour and navigators. At least two elder villagers died due to shock. Several incidents of landmine explosions were also reported.[1] Background information: After the State Administration Council (SAC)[2] seized power in Burma in February 2021, military activities have been increasing both in rural and urban areas throughout Burma. The SAC, in cooperation with the Border Guard Force (BGF)[3], is mainly reinforcing its troops and army camps, and conducting regular military patrol and movements between camps in ethnic states. Meanwhile, ethnic armed groups (EAGs) are also defending their territory and administration, so the increase in SAC’s activities and intrusion into the EAGs-controlled territories results in armed conflict, dramatically impacting local civilians. This Situation Update is based on a document written by a local villager, and further KHRG documentation conducted in Bilin Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, recording human rights violations committed by SAC troops operating between the Meh Pray Hkee army camp, Meh Pray Hkee village tract, and Na Kyi army camp, Na Kyi village tract, in Bilin Township from July 2021 to September 2022. Military activities between Meh Pray Hkee and Na Kyi army camps Na Kyi army camp base is located in Na Kyi village, Na Kyi village tract, Bilin Township. Since the coup, the SAC military with some BGF soldiers patrolled between the Na Kyi and Meh Pray Hkee army camps, and used the paved road for military purposes. Whenever SAC troops patrolled, between one to seven BGF soldiers would accompany them, as the SAC did not feel safe to travel between the army camps. [The BGF soldiers] helped with [communication in] the local language and [shared knowledge on] the situation in the area. In the first four or five months [after the coup], the local Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[4] did not ambush them [SAC soldiers], only warned them [to not enter the areas under Karen National Union (KNU)[5] control]. But around July 2021, during the rainy and flooding period, the tension between the SAC and the local KNLA combined with People’s Defence Force (PDF)[6] forces came to a head. The SAC also set up a new temporary army camp to carry out their military operations close to H--- village, Aee Soo Hkee village tract, Bilin Township, and armed clashes constantly happened afterwards. The consequences of the skirmishes and the new temporary army camp being set up are that villagers had to displace themselves. Indiscriminate shelling caused damages [on civilian property], injuries, and the deaths of villagers and their livestock. Soldiers conducted looting [of villagers’ property], and arrested local villagers to use them as human shields and navigators. This occurred alongside landmine incidents and livelihood challenges [faced by villagers]. Villagers used as human shields, forced labour, navigators and porters [While the SAC conducted military activities between Na Kyi and Meh Pray Hkee army camps,] whenever SAC troops were patrolling, or attacked by local KNLA soldiers, they arrested any villagers they encountered on the way and in the villages to use them as human shields, while claiming to use them as navigators. As explained by a villager, the arrest of local villagers was not [to use them] as navigators, because the [BGF and SAC] soldiers knew the area well. Instead, whenever SAC troops travelled, they would usually arrest any villagers they would find to follow them as human shields. For instance, during the rainy season of 2021, the SAC from Na Kyi army camp arrested two villagers from H--- village, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, at their houses, [and ordered the villagers] to follow them as human shields to Meh Pray Hkee army camp.[7] These villagers were Saw[8] E--- and Saw F---. On the way to Meh Pray Hkee army camp, one of the SAC soldiers who was walking in front of Saw F--- stepped on a landmine. A piece of shrapnel from the landmine explosion hit Saw F---’s eye and burst his eye. That SAC soldier lost one foot. After the incident, an SAC soldier injected Saw F--- with an unknown medicine, and Saw F--- then had to follow the SAC soldiers until they arrived at the Meh Pray Hkee army camp, at night. When they arrived at the Meh Pray Hkee army camp, the SAC troops released the two arrested villagers and gave Saw F--- only 100,000 kyat [48 USD][9] to treat his injured eye. Saw F--- went to several clinics in Bilin Township and SAC-controlled territory in Na Kyi Town. As the medical treatment fee in Town was too expensive, the villager went to the G--- clinic, under the KNU, and was able to access free medical treatment. He took a very long time to recover and suffered pain throughout the recovery process. Saw F--- became blind in one eye. On May 2nd or 3rd 2022 [exact date unknown], at 3pm, SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[10] #403 troops, under Military Operation Commander (MOC)[11] #8, combined with Light Infantry Division (LID)[12] #44 and BGF Battalion #1011, from Meh Pray Hkee village (Meh Pray Hkee army camp), returned to Na Kyi army camp. On the way, before they arrived at J--- village, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, Bilin Township, two of their soldiers stepped on a landmine. When they were about to arrive at J--- village, they arrested two villagers [from an unknown village] they encountered on the way and tied the two villagers to follow them. Then the SAC troops entered J--- village and looted the stock and belongings from one of the shops owned by a villager. They also entered villagers’ houses and looted their belongings, including chickens and phones. The SAC soldiers were looking for male villagers to arrest as human shields, but they only saw one villager, Saw I---, from J--- village, because most of the men had fled before the SAC entered the village, fearing arrest. Saw I--- could not flee before the SAC arrived in the village, so the SAC shouted at him, violently slapped his face and ordered him to follow the troops as a human shield, from J--- village to T’Ray Loo Hkoh hill. They then released him. On May 5th 2022, the local KNLA attacked BGF troops combined with SAC troops under LID #44 that were travelling from Meh Pray Hkee army camp to Na Kyi army camp, while the soldiers were on the road beside H--- village, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, Bilin Township. After the fighting, at about 3:20pm, the SAC/BGF soldiers entered H--- village and ordered all villagers to gather at a particular place, and they then arrested seven male villagers to follow them as human shields. The seven H--- villagers were Saw K---, Saw L---, Saw M---, Saw N---, Saw O---, Saw P--- and Saw Q---. One of the BGF soldiers, who patrolled with the SAC, slapped Saw L---’s face two times because he could not reply to the questions immediately as he was scared. This BGF soldier is from La Nay village [in Hpa-an District]. The seven male villagers who could not flee before the SAC arrived at the village were arrested as human shields by the SAC/BGF. They were released after arriving at Na Kyi army camp. On June 17th 2022, another SAC troop from the Meh Pray Hkee army camp returned to Na Kyi army camp. When they arrived at J--- village, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, Bilin Township, they entered the village and arrested nine male J--- villagers they saw in the village. All the other male villagers had already fled to another place before the SAC arrived. The nine villagers were Saw R--- (age 55), Saw S--- (age 48), Saw T--- (age 45), Saw U--- (age 19), Saw V--- (age 20), Saw W--- (age 27), Saw X--- (age 24), Saw Y--- (age 36) and Saw Z--- (age 66). They ordered the nine villagers to follow them to Na Kyi army camp as human shields. As villagers were used as shields, the local KNLA did not attack the SAC going back to their base in Na Kyi Army camp. On June 18th 2022, the SAC released the nine villagers when they arrived at the Na Kyi army camp. Due to the practice of the SAC of arresting villagers in the community, whenever villagers received information about SAC troops patrolling and passing [through nearby] villages, men who live in the villages close to the vehicle road between Na Kyi and Meh Pray Hkee army camps would flee from their villages to avoid being arrested by the SAC and used as human shields. [This time], the male villagers returned home only a couple of days after the SAC passed their villages. However, on June 20th 2022, the SAC encountered four of the J--- villagers in a farm tent, as they were fleeing from the SAC, and arrested them. The four villagers were Saw A--- (age 62), Saw B--- (age 53), Saw C--- (age 22) and Saw D--- (age 25). The SAC also confiscated one machete, valued at around 10,000 kyat [4.76 USD], and one watch, valued at around 12,000 kyat [5.71 USD]. On July 14th 2022, the SAC troops LIB #402 from Noh Hpa Htaw army camp and LIB #403 entered H--- village, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, Bilin Township and ordered all men and women in the village to stay in the area surrounding them in the village, as human shields. As explained by a local villager named Saw Zz---: “Then they released all the women during night time and ordered the male villagers to sleep [in this place] one night. I also was in this incident [used as a human shield]. The next day, they came to my house and set up their base as an army camp for several months [until September 2022].” Setting of a new temporary camp in Aee Sooh Hkee village tract [As explained previously], in July 2022, the SAC LIB #403 and LIB #402 troops entered H--- village, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, Bilin Township and slept [there] one night. The troops included about 40 soldiers. The next morning, some of them went to Meh Pray Hkee army camp, but the LIB #402 troops remained in the village. The SAC LIB #402 troops, set up their temporary army base at a place outside of the H--- village, where there are six villagers’ houses, situated close to the main paved road between Na Kyi army camp and J--- village, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, Bilin Township. According to a local villager, the SAC soldiers used two of the six villagers’ houses, including their farm tents and gardens, for their army base. There, they had a good water supply from the stream, and safety provided by the mountains surrounding the area, which hindered any attack. The SAC settled there for their security and for troop reinforcement, ration and ammunition transportation between Na Kyi and Meh Pay Hkee army camps, so that KNLA soldiers could not easily ambush them. During night-time, SAC soldiers took security [rounds] separately, in different places surrounding their camp. The SAC also set up a checkpoint on the road and conducted troop rotation based on their schedule, and sometimes as a monthly troop exchange. The SAC Artillery Unit #402 had been based in this temporary camp for five days before SAC LIB #405 exchanged places with them. The SAC LIB #405 was then based in the temporary base for about one month and five days. Then the SAC LIB #404 exchanged places with the SAC LIB #405 [again], and they stayed in this army base for over a month before exchanging with SAC LIB #403. The SAC also dug communication channels in the villagers’ gardens. Due to the SAC setting up the camp in the villager’s houses, all villagers from the six houses moved to other places for safety. After the villagers left, the local KNLA ambushed the SAC many times, to force the SAC to withdraw from the villagers’ houses. As a result of several skirmishes between the SAC and the local KNLA, both armed groups planted landmines, so villagers felt even less safe to return to their houses. Moreover, the SAC looked for the houses of KNLA soldiers’ families, and asked villagers to tell them where they were, but villagers could not provide such information. Saw Zz---, a villager living in one of the houses outside of H--- village, said: “I continued to live in my house with them [SAC soldiers] for about one month [for a couple of weeks]. I was fearful, and they [SAC] were always asking me for information on [KNLA] soldiers’ houses and relatives in the village. The [KNLA] soldiers also [advised] me to move because it was inconvenient [for KNLA to attack SAC] when I stayed with them [SAC soldiers]. Therefore, I did not feel safe living in my house anymore, so I left my house when I could find a way to get out with my family, and go live in H--- village, at my mother’s place. Since then, I have not returned to my house.” As of September 28th 2022, the SAC troops were still based in this [temporary] camp, as reported by a local villager to KHRG. The KNLA also ambushed them [SAC soldiers] several times, and so he [the local villager] does not feel safe to check his house anymore. He was unsure about whether the fighting had hit [destroyed] his house. SAC soldiers using human shields to move between army camps [Between June 18th and June 30th 2022, the SAC conducted military operations between Na Kyi and Lay Kay army camps and the surrounding villages. During these operations,] they arrested 24 villagers in total [from different villages] to follow them as human shields, and forced them to work by clearing vegetation on the way for the SAC, and by carrying ammunition, food and materials they looted from villages on the way. The SAC soldiers were accompanied around the forest from J--- village, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, to the Lay Kay army camp by villagers, to avoid being attacked by the local KNLA. A. SAC use of villagers as human shields from Na Kyi army camp to Lay Kay army camp* On June 18th 2022, more SAC troops such as LIB #207 from Thein Za Ya Base, Kyeh Htoh Township, LIB #102 from Thaton army base, Tha Htoo Township and Infantry Battalion (IB)[13] #2 from Kyaikto base, Kyeh Htoh Township which are under control of SAC LID #44, left Na Kyi army camp. They entered and patrolled in KNU-controlled territory in Bilin Township, [with the intent] to go [all the way] to Lay Kay army camp for troop reinforcement. Villagers did not feel safe staying in the village. Villagers were also worried that major fighting was to happen in their village. Therefore, all 1,189 J--- villagers fled to the forest and to different villages nearby for their safety. On June 19th 2022, these three SAC troops from Na Kyi army camp arrived at Aee Sooh Hkee village tract and entered J--- village. On June 20th 2022, they looted villagers’ belongings and food, and they also arrested four villagers [who had returned to the village to check their houses and livestock, where the SAC found them] to serve as porters, navigators and human shields. These four villagers were Saw A---, Saw B---, Saw C--- and Saw D---, [previously mentioned]. On June 22nd 2022, the SAC [arrested] three PDF members and a villager from Ab--- village, named Saw Ai---, who was a driver for them, on Ac--- road, Ta Au Hkee village tract.[14] They tortured the three detained PDF members. According to one of the villagers who witnessed the incident, Naw[15] Ad---, from Ae--- village, Khaw Hpoe Pleh village tract, Bilin Township: “Because they were tortured, they had bruises all over their body. They were tied with nylon rope around the neck, the armpits and the hands. We did not dare to look at that because it was so terrible. They were full of bruises. The SAC killed them when they left the [Ae---] village [on June 29th].” On June 22nd 2022, these three SAC troops [LIB #207, LIB #102 and IB #2] arrived at Af--- village, Ta Au Hkee village tract. They arrested two civilians from Af--- village, Ta Au Hkee village tract: Saw Ag--- and another villager [unknown name]. On the evening of June 24th 2022, the SAC troops [together with the arrested villagers and PDF members] reached Ah--- village, Kyon Wine village tract. The Ab--- villager named Saw Ai---, who got arrested [on June 22nd on Ae--- Road, while driving the car], escaped when they were in Ah--- village. The SAC arrested two more villagers in Ah--- village, Saw Aj--- and Saw Ak---, and two other civilians, Saw Al--- and his friend, from Am--- village, Hpa-an Township, who were visiting Ah--- village. On June 25th 2022, the SAC troops [and the detained villagers and PDF members] arrived at An--- village, P’Ya Raw (Myit Kyo) village tract, Bilin Township, and arrested another three An--- villagers. The three villagers were Saw Ao---, Saw Ap--- and Saw Aq---. One of the villagers was under 18 years old. The SAC released them and the four J--- villagers on the same day when they arrived at Lay Kay camp. They did not release the three PDF members and the Ah---, Af--, and Am--- villagers. B. From Lay Kay army camp to K’Ma Moe \[Kamamaung\] Town* After the SAC military troops arrived at Lay Kay army camp, they stayed in the camp for two nights and kept the Ah---, Af--- and Am--- villagers detained in the Lay Kay army camp. Then, on June 27th 2022, the SAC went back to [their destination in] K’Ma Moe Town, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, and they ordered the still detained villagers [and PDF members] to follow them. They passed through Ar--- village, and released the Ah--- and Am--- villagers. On the same day of June 27th 2022, the SAC troops arrived Ae--- village, stayed in Ae--- village for two nights and looted villagers’ properties. They also arrested three Ae--- villagers, Saw Au---, Saw Av---, and Saw Aw---, and two [other] villagers, Saw Ax---and Saw Ay---, who were guests from Az--- village, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, to follow them to Ar--- village and then to Hkaw Taw Town, Dwe Lo Township. One of the victims from Ae--- village, named Saw Aw---, said: *“I was arrested when I was going to my paddy farm to stop cows [from] eating my paddy plants. […] We did not do anything, but they told us: ‘Don’t run! As we are soldiers, if you run, we will shoot you’.” * Saw Aw---, from Ae--- village, also testified about walking [amongst] the SAC as a human shield and carrying heavy loads for the SAC on foot for the whole day: “They asked us to carry loads for them. […] The weight was above 20 visses [30 kilograms]. […] It was heavy and we had to carry it with all the energy [villagers’ had]. […] We saw mortars [inside the loads villagers carried]. [...] They did not allow us [villagers] to walk in a group, so we had to walk separately from each other, and walk between them [SAC soldiers]. […] We did not have to ask for rice because the [soldiers] looted food from villagers [everywhere they went] and did not pay for food, so they had plenty of food for all of us. […] We slept in villagers’ houses so we received blankets. […] We mainly worried that fighting could happen. […] They arrested us to walk among them so it means they did it to protect themselves [from KNLA/KNDO[16] attacks] because if the fighting happened, we [villagers] would be shot as well.” Saw Aw--- continued: “It [the trip] took one day [just between two villages] because they did not travel straight on the road toward [another village]. They travelled in the bushes [so it took more time]. We walked the whole day, we did not stop walking to take a rest on the way.” One of the victims’ family members, Naw Ad--- from Ae--- village said: “When I saw that the SAC [LID #44] commander arrested my son, I climbed down to the ground [from my house]. My son also called me and I ran to him right away. Some rumour had spread that my son was being tortured by the SAC soldiers. However, it was good that I could get to him earlier. Since I talked to the SAC soldiers, they did not torture my son. Otherwise, my son would have been tortured to death. […] The SAC habit is like that [committing arrest, torture and killing of villagers]. They arrested anyone that they saw, not only my son. They arrested and questioned my son: they asked him to show them the place. So I told the SAC soldiers: ‘don’t ask my son about that. He doesn’t know anything. If you want to know something, just ask me’.” After the SAC troops left Ae--- village, they killed the three PDF members. On June 29th 2022, the SAC troops crossed Baw Naw river, between Ae--- and Moo Day villages, with a bamboo raft during the monsoon flooding, and some of their guns sank into the river. However, they continued their trip until they arrived at Ar--- village, P’Yah Raw village tract. The next morning, on June 30th 2022, the SAC returned to Baw Naw river and forced villagers, including two teenagers from Ae--- village, to search for the guns in the river for them, during major flooding. The villagers were able to find the weapons for the SAC. Then, they [SAC] headed toward Aad--- village, Kaw Heh village tract. As per usual, they looted villagers’ chicken and food, and they also arrested five Aad--- villagers on July 1st 2022 to follow them. Two of the arrested villagers were under 18 and one of the two was a student. The arrested Ae---, Aad---, Az--- and Af--- villagers were released when [on an unknown date] they reached near Hkaw Taw Poo Town, Meh Kyee hill, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District. One of the victims said: “Other porters received about 5,000 kyat [2,38 USD] each. As I did not follow them until the end of the trip, I did not receive any kyat [compensation], but I even wanted to pay them to be released.” This villager was released in Aad--- village, Kaw Heh village tract, Bilin Township as he is older [an elder; facing difficulties to travel long distances]. The SAC soldiers let him stay there. Due to past [history of] violence [committed by the Burma Army in Southeast Burma], human rights violations are the main root cause of villagers’ trauma. Since the coup, villagers face major security concerns of being tortured and killed by the SAC, especially when they or any of their family members are arrested by the SAC. Many of the victims’ parents worried due to their personal past experiences, and some of them even died from trauma [became sick or died due to shock]. The family member of one of the arrested villagers in Ae--- village, Naw Ad---, reported to KHRG: “One of the arrested [Az----] villagers’ father was sick at that time. When he heard that his son was arrested by the SAC, he was afraid his son would be killed or tortured. Since he was already sick, he got higher blood pressure and died. He was in my village. Those arrested [Az---] villagers from Hpapun Town were also coming here [Ae--- village] to send the sick mother to the hospital [but they were arrested in Ae--- village]. The mother also died on the same day as the other victim’s father [after her children were arrested by the LID #44].” Since January 2023, the SAC and BGF troops have not patrolled by foot in the area, and they have been using aircraft for transporting rations and for troop rotation, so there have not been such incidents for about three months [as reported by local villagers to KHRG on March 15th 2023]. Shelling committed by SAC soldiers Whenever the SAC troops travelled between Na Kyi and Meh Pray Hkee army camps, they shelled mortars to clear the way [of KNLA soldiers] before they arrived to another place, as well as when they received information about potential KNLA activities from their intelligence agents. From July 2021 until September 2022, SAC troops, especially from the Na Kyi army camp, conducted regular indiscriminate shelling in the area in the direction of Meh Pray Hkee army camp. These incidents happened about every day, so villagers could not count how many times [they happened, or give] the date of the incident. Every time the SAC shelled mortars near or in the community, villagers were deeply concerned for the security of their lives, livestock and properties. Many of the mortars shelled by the SAC exploded, but some remained unexploded. Both exploded and unexploded mortars can cause life risks and danger to the local community, so civilians are now living in an unsafe community [area]. Due to the large number of shelling incidents committed by the SAC, a local villager recounted [to a KHRG field staff] some higher-risk shelling incidents, as follows: Around November 2021, SAC soldiers shelled mortars that landed in H--- village, because they received information that KNLA soldiers had entered the village. No villagers were killed or injured, but one house was damaged by shrapnel and all villagers were in fear. On February 24th 2022, from 9:17am and 10:55am, SAC soldiers under LIB #404, from Meh Pray Hkee army camp, were bringing their soldiers in need of medical care to Na Kyi army camp. Before they arrived at J--- village, they shelled about five mortars in J--- village. As a consequence, shrapnel damaged one villagers’ house and all villagers fled in fear and hid in the bunkers under their houses. On April 4th 2022, at 9:10am, SAC soldiers from Na Kyi army camp shelled 120mm mortars that landed in Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, Bilin Township. One mortar round landed in Aaj--- place name, one round landed in Aak--- village and one round in Aal--- village. The SAC usually conducts indiscriminate shelling near and in communities. Local villagers were not given prior warning, and did not know why they [SAC] conducted the shelling. On April 12th 2022, SAC soldiers shelled two mortar rounds that landed in the jungle outside of Aal--- village. One of these rounds landed on Aam--- hill and the other landed in the valley. On April 18th 2022, LID #22 [mainly based in Hpa-an District] came to Thaton District and combined with [Infantry] Battalion #24 left Na Kyi army camp and entered Na Kyi village. On April 19th 2022, these SAC troops and Infantry Battalion (IB) #96, under LID #44, and LIB #404, under MOC #8, came back [from an unknown place] to Aan--- Pagoda place, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract. On April 19th 2022, the local KNLA ambushed them once as they [SAC] passed through Thaw Kheh Hta valley. Then, on April 20th 2022, at about 9:20am, the local KNLA ambushed them [SAC] again at Aan--- pagoda [place]. The SAC then shelled nine rounds of mortar; three of them exploded, but six of them did not explode [and remained as unexploded ordnances (UXOs)]. Two of the mortars landed on Aam--- [place] and exploded. Three other shells landed at Aaj--- [place]: one exploded and two remained unexploded. On May 2nd 2022 at about 10am, the SAC from Na Kyi army camp shelled mortars on the See Hpoe Poo farm, injuring a villager’s buffalo [bull] and a bull. On May 5th 2022, SAC troops under LID #44 were travelling from Meh Pray Hkee army camp when the local KNLA attacked them beside H--- village, as the SAC troops were about to arrive at H--- village. As a consequence, three buffalo and one goat died. During the fighting, SAC LID #44 shelled about five mortar rounds in H--- village which damaged one house owned by a local villager called Saw Za---. His house and household materials were damaged, including five dishes, one big plastic cup, the wooden floor, the roof and a ladder. After the shelling, the SAC entered H--- village and confiscated a villager’s hen, which [had an estimated cost of] about 15,000 kyat [7.14 USD] and was about 2.30 viss [3.7 kg]. [The SAC also conducted shelling during the operations and movements previously mentioned in this document.] On June 19th 2022, SAC troops LIB #207 from Thein Za Ya Base, Kyeh Htoh Township and LIB #102, from Thaton army base, Tha Htoo Township and IB #2, from Kyaikto base, Kyeh Htoh Township under LID #44 [commandment], entered [the KNU-controlled area] and planned to go to Lay Kay army camp. The SAC soldiers took Thaton Road, that passes through J--- village. On June 20th 2022, when the SAC troops arrived at Toe Thay Ba bridge, near J--- village, at about 2pm, they were attacked by the local KNLA. The SAC shelled mortars that landed in J--- village, so the village’s wood bridge was destroyed. On June 22nd 2022, at about 4:10pm, the SAC LIB #404 combined with LID #44, temporarily based on Si Kon Taung hill, located close to Aaz--- village, Meh Pray Hkee village tract, Bilin Township, fired one round of 60mm mortar at Aaz--- village. The shelling severely injured two Aaz--- villagers: Naw Aay--- (a 17-year-old) and Saw Aax--- (a 20-year-old). Both injured villagers received medical treatment at the local clinic in Aaw--- village, Ma Lay Ler village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District. On July 2nd 2022, at 6:30pm, the SAC LIB #404 combined with LID #44 in Na Kyi army camp shelled mortars at different places outside of Meh Pray Hkee village as well as other places near the army camp. This incident did not cause any destruction or injury, but it made civilians feel unsafe. On August 8th 2022, at about 7pm, the SAC from Na Kyi army camp shelled mortars close to a former KNLA checkpoint in Aal--- [place], close to the village. On August 9th 2022, at about 8:80pm, SAC soldiers in Na Kyi army camp shelled mortars again in Aee Sooh Hkee village tract area. On August 11th 2022, at about 11:15am, SAC LIB #403 combined with LID #44 [commandment] from Meh Pray Hkee army camp returned to the Na Kyi army camp. Before they arrived in J--- village, fighting broke out with the local KNLA on the [main] road in Aee Sooh Hkee village tract area and the fighting took place until 1:30pm. On August 12th 2022, from 3pm to 3:15pm, the local [KNLA troops] attacked them [SAC soldiers] again when they arrived at Na Kyi bridge. During the fighting, the SAC indiscriminately shelled mortars towards the Aal--- village area, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, Bilin Township. On September 26th 2022, the SAC from Na Kyi army camp shelled four mortars to Aee Sooh Hkee village tract. One mortar landed at the former KNLA checkpoint, in Aal--- [place], close to villages and three rounds landed near J--- village. Two rounds exploded, but one round remained unexploded. Looting incidents committed by the SAC Looting committed by Burma Army soldiers against villagers in rural Southeast Burma has been one of the [most] common practices documented by KHRG since the 2021 coup. After the SAC seized power, SAC troops under the LID #44 have regularly conducted property destruction of villagers and looting from villagers in Bilin Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. On June 17th 2022, the SAC troops from IB #96, under the Southeast Command Headquarters, and [LID] #44, coming from Hpapun Road, entered H--- village, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract, in Bilin Township. They broke into villagers’ houses and looted villagers’ properties, including two hot water storage bottles and seven pots. They also destroyed villagers’ properties, including six betel nut trees, 35 Hpway trees, and four Bambutan [baby] trees, and destroyed five sarongs [skirts], three shirts, five blankets, two dining tables and two plastic food covers [to protect food from flies]. All these looted and destroyed properties [had an estimated] cost [of around] 646,500 kyat [308 USD]. [As part of the SAC movements described above,] on June 18th 2022, soldiers from the SAC LIB #207, LIB #102, and IB #2, under the control of SAC LID #44, left Na Kyi army camp and patrolled in KNU-controlled territory in Bilin Township to go to Lay Kay army camp. The three troops combined comprised around 300 soldiers joining the patrolling trip. On June 20th 2022, the local KNLA attacked these three combined SAC troops on the main road before they arrived at J--- village, Aee Sooh Hkee village tract. After the fighting, the SAC troops stayed in J--- village and looted villagers’ belongings and food. The properties looted from the villagers include three machetes, one torchlight, 19 chickens, one rooster, five pots, two pans, one Vivo smartphone, one longyi, one pack of coffee mix, 1.5 kilograms of onions, one pack of monosodium glutamate [a flavour enhancer], three spoons, four Karen shirts, two t-shirts, 16 eggs, one power bank, and some other clothing. All of this [had an estimated] cost [of about] 290,000 kyat [138.16 USD] in total. On June 22nd, 23rd and 24th 2022, when these three SAC troops arrived at Af--- village, Ta Au Hkee village tract, they ransacked Af--- villagers’ houses and looted villagers’ food and belongings, including money and gold. On the evening of June 24th, 2022, when the SAC troops reached Ah--- village, Kyon Wine village tract, and on the 24th and 25th [of June], they repeated the same pattern, as they ransacked houses and looted villagers’ food and belongings, including money and gold. After the SAC military troops arrived at the Lay Kay army camp, they stayed in the camp for two nights and then they returned to Na Kyi army camp. Then on June 27th 2022, the SAC returned to K’Ma Moe Town and arrived to Ae--- village on June 29th 2022. They established a base in Ae--- village for two nights. When they were in the village, as per their habit, they ransacked houses and shops and looted villagers’ belongings, including food and anything they wanted from villagers. These SAC troops were based in Ae--- village for two nights, so the soldiers committed looting and confiscated villagers’ food, livestock and properties as much as they wanted all day and night. One of the victims, Naw Ad---, who did not flee as the SAC entered the village said: “They [SAC] stole and looted [all] the villages they crossed. […] ** It was the SAC LID #44. […] They ate a lot of my chicken. […] I also heard the sound of looting in the shop and I pointed [at] it with my big flashlight. Then I saw them running away, falling and slipping down. Then I shouted, ‘Hey, don’t loot other people’s property! Put it back [to its place] put it back!’ But they did not put it back. […] They entered people’s houses and looted property inside the houses and shops. [What] they looted included my tobacco box and betel nut box. I didn’t think they would eat it. I just placed it at the top of my bed. They slept in my bed and took it away. They also took two visses of garlic [3 kg] and around 1 viss of chili [1.5 kg]. I asked it back [saying] ‘Give my garlic and chilli back’ the whole night; they heard it full in their ears [asked relentlessly]. Then they returned me a few of the remaining garlic and chilli in the morning. I took back as much as was left over. When they killed my chicken, I cursed them [saying] that their children will also be calling for them [when they are killed]. However, I didn’t really mean it.” On June 30th 2022, the SAC reached Aad--- village, Kaw Heh village tract. They also committed the same violations of ransacking houses and looting villagers’ belongings and food, and arresting villagers. They then went to K’Ma Moe Town. Further background reading on the situation on human rights issues in Doo Tha Htoo District, Southeast Burma can be found in the following KHRG reports: “Doo Tha Htoo District Incident Report: SAC air strikes killed a villager and damaged civilian property in Hpa-an Township (March 2023)**”, December 2023 “Doo Tha Htoo District Incident Report: A DKBA operation commander tortured three villagers in Hpa-an Township (August 2023)**”, December 2023 “Striking Fear: Impacts of State Administration Council (SAC) shelling on villagers’ lives in Southeast Burma (January to October 2023)**”, December 2023 Footnotes: [1] The present document is based on information received between July 2021 and September 2022. It was provided by a community member in Doo Tha Htoo District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG. [2] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma/Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup. [3] Border Guard Force (BGF) battalions of the Tatmadaw were established in 2010, and they are composed mostly of soldiers from former non-state armed groups, such as older constellations of the DKBA, which have formalised ceasefire agreements with the Burma/Myanmar government and agreed to transform into battalions within the Tatmadaw. [4] The Karen National Liberation Army is the armed wing of the Karen National Union. [5] The Karen National Union (KNU) is the main Karen political organisation. It was established in 1947 and has been in conflict with the Burma government since 1949. The KNU wields power across large areas of Southeast Burma and has been calling for the creation of a democratic federal system since 1976. Although it signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015, relations with the government remain tense. [6] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma/Myanmar, which then formalized the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army. [7] KHRG: “Doo Tha Htoo District Short Update: Killing, torture and use of human shields and navigators by the SAC and BGF in Bilin Township, May to June 2022”, August 2022 [8] Saw is a S’gaw Karen male honorific title used before a person’s name. [9] All conversion estimates for Kyat in this report are based on the official market rate as of July 26th 2023 at 1 USD = 2,098.95 MMK, conversion rate available at https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/ . [10] A Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Light Infantry Battalions in the Burma military are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up-to-date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). LIBs are primarily used for offensive operations, but they are sometimes used for garrison duties. [11] Military Operations Command (MOC) is comprised of ten battalions for offensive operations. Most MOCs have three Tactical Operations Commands (TOCs) made up of three battalions each. [12] A Light Infantry Division (LID) of the Tatmadaw is commanded by a brigadier general, and consists of ten light infantry battalions specially trained in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, search and destroy operations against ethnic insurgents . They were first incorporated into the Tatmadaw in 1966. LIDs are organised under three Tactical Operations Commands, commanded by a colonel, three battalions each and one reserve, one field artillery battalion, one armoured squadron and other support units. Each division is directly under the command of the Chief of Staff (Army). [13] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations. [14] KHRG, “Doo Tha Htoo District Situation Update: Killings, landmine injuries, and insecurity in Bilin Township, January to June 2022”, July 2023 [15] Naw is a S’gaw Karen female honorific title used before a person’s name. [16] The Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) was formed in 1947 by the Karen National Union and is the precursor to the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Today the KNDO refers to a militia force of local volunteers trained and equipped by the KNLA and incorporated into its battalion and command structure; its members wear uniforms and typically commit to two-year terms of service..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
2024-01-12
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-18
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Jan 8 to 14, 2024 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Mandalay Region, Rakhine State, Chin State, Shan State, and Kachin State from January 8th to 14th. Military people arrested, beat, and extorted the civilians who did not have NRC cards or Smart cards in Ayeyarwady Region. Military Junta killed 8 civilians from Sagaing Region and Mandalay Region. About 20 civilians died and over 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 2 underaged children were injured and 2 died when the Military Junta committed abuses. Civilians left their places 8 times because of the Military Junta Troop’s matching and riding..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2024-01-17
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-17
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Description: "A new wave of fighting has gripped Myanmar over the past two months. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is providing medical humanitarian assistance in Shan, Kachin and Rakhine states, where we have witnessed healthcare facilities damaged or abandoned, and hundreds of thousands of newly displaced people attempting to flee for safety. On 13 November the conflict reignited in Rakhine state, breaking a year-long informal ceasefire. Since then, severe movement restrictions are preventing MSF from running any of the 25 mobile clinics that deliver around 1,500 patient consultations a week. Community health workers provide vital care For the past nine weeks, despite our attempts to find solutions to these blockages, such as providing tele-consultations between patients and doctors, our community health workers are some of the only people with direct access to our patients. Ann Thar Clinic in Min Bya supports over 4,000 displaced people from both Rakhine and Rohingya communities. MSF teams have been unable to run the clinic since 13 November. On 17 November, Min Bya General Hospital, a hospital that MSF uses for emergency referrals came under fire. “My name is Aung Aung*. I am a community health worker from Ann Thar clinic. The difference here before and after the current conflict is very clear. I was able to do my work regularly and peacefully before, but after the current fighting, I can’t. “Instead, I am constantly worrying that something might happen, feeling insecure while on the street, and so I take detours using the fields. It’s not safe anymore,” says Aung Aung. “I’m a community health worker, so my medical skill set is limited. In situations like these, what I can do is to call the doctors and look after the patients according to their instructions. But sometimes, mobile connections are not working, so I have difficulty reaching them. “There are patients with non-communicable diseases, such as diabetes and hypertension, too, but we don’t have medicines for them now. I’m still unsure how our team is going to arrange it. Currently, we have medicines for antenatal care and epilepsy patients,” says Aung Aung. “Rising petrol prices are one of the major challenges we face as well. If people wanted to go to the town to pay a visit to a clinic it would cost them around 60,000Ks (around US$29) for a round trip. The town is only five miles from our village. So, the travel cost would be more expensive than their actual healthcare expenses. This rise in cost has happened since the fighting broke out. It was only 2,000 Ks – 2,500Ks (around US$1) before. I am worried and concerned for our patients here in the village. In the future, for emergency patients, and for those who need a monthly prescription, they will face a lot of difficulties. As long as the roads are blocked and fighting continues, clinics and pharmacies in Min Bya town will remain closed.” Violent attacks and mass displacement Min Thu* is a community health worker in Kyein Ni Pyin camp for displaced people in the Pauktaw area of Rakhine state. Kyein Ni Pyin camp is home to over 7,500 people, most of whom are Rohingya who have been displaced since 2012. Pauktaw has been one of the most severely impacted townships of Rakhine state, confronted by heavy attacks and mass displacement. The Pauktaw hospital was forced to close and movements in and out of Pauktaw, including to the camps, are practically impossible. MSF and other organisations are facing serious obstacles to provide any form of assistance, and transport of patients in need of lifesaving emergency care is increasingly challenging. “My name is Min Thu*, I am a community health worker with MSF and I provide health education for people in the camp. I help with almost everything, including translation for patients during clinic opening days. When there are emergency patients, I refer them to the clinic as well. “We face challenges in transportation and food because of the current conflict. We do not receive rations regularly and the prices are high. We were able to move around before the fighting if we informed the authorities of our movement, but now it’s completely prohibited,” says Min Thu “We are not able to open our clinics like we used to before, which is affecting our patients in many ways. For emergency patients, we try to contact MSF doctors on the phone to ask for advice and try following any instructions given by them. However, it is very hard when they cannot see the patients in person. The doctors just have to prescribe or advise what to do according to what they hear from the patients, and we follow the instructions over the phone from the doctors and help treat the patients. “We fear for the future. If we are not able to open our clinics due to the travel restrictions and conflict, our patients will be severely impacted.” The constant threat of conflict In Rathedaung, there are many camps for displaced people close to the town, where mostly ethnic Rakhine people who have been displaced since 2019 due to past conflict are living. When recent fighting broke out in the area, the people in these camps fled into more rural areas for safety, including MSF’s community health workers. “Currently, there is fighting near our camps. People from the camps in the city area had to evacuate to other places. There was heavy firing near our camps, so everyone had to escape and seek shelter elsewhere, including myself,” says Yan Naing*, MSF community health worker. “It’s inconvenient and challenging for us to settle in different places because we’re constantly on the move, and scarcity of basic commodities has a negative impact on us as well. [When we are displaced] there is also no electricity, so we have to conserve our phone batteries. “I don’t think we can go back to the city yet due to the intense clashes. People are afraid to move around because we hear rumours from other areas about civilians getting arrested or being used as human shields,” says Naing. "Shortages in food supplies are also impacting people. My only concern right now is about health and food for the people." - YAN NAING, MSF COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKER IN RATHEDAUNG “We have patients with non-communicable diseases in our camps, and they are some of our regular patients. They have been coming to our clinic for a long time. “Since there are transportation blockages, patients who need to go the clinic might not be able to do so. Shortages in food supplies are also impacting people. My only concern right now is about health and food for the people,” says Naing. Unprecedented violence across Myanmar The level of violence across Myanmar in the past few months is unprecedented and is severely impacting people living in and around the fighting areas where lifesaving services are either non-functional or limited and dangerous to reach. In Rakhine state, communities are already heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance and live with imposed restrictions that limit their freedom of movement. Assistance that was permitted in the state before the conflict was lifesaving, especially for communities in many of the rural areas, which our mobile clinics were serving, and who otherwise have no other affordable options for medical care. Access for humanitarian organisations into Rakhine state has always been meticulously controlled, but the continuation of these current blockages will have a catastrophic impact on people’s health. Our community health workers are seeing patients lacking their regular medication, with difficulties speaking to doctors, as well as patients being blocked from accessing specialised healthcare. According to the latest data from the Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management cluster, there have been over 120,000 newly displaced people in Rakhine since 13 November, and this number shows no sign of slowing down. Hospitals in central Rakhine have been hit during heavy firing or abandoned by staff forced to flee the area. Two hospitals in Central Rakhine where our teams usually take emergency patients are no longer functioning, while another, Min Bya General Hospital, was damaged on 17 November. In northern Rakhine, some emergency referrals have been possible through the support of our community health workers. Health facilities are operating, but some are functioning with only a skeleton team and limited medical supplies, or else they are shifting their resources into more remote areas to support displaced people looking for safety. With access routes blocked and without authorisations to provide assistance, we cannot run our 25 mobile clinics. These restrictions are impacting other humanitarian organisations, too, with many reporting that they cannot deliver regular interventions. All parties to the conflict should ensure that healthcare facilities and humanitarian workers can continue to operate and must guarantee safe access to healthcare for people in Rakhine. *Names changed to protect identity..."
Source/publisher: Médecins Sans Frontières
2024-01-16
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "HIGHLIGHTS AND KEY MESSAGES 2023 drew to a close with continued intense fighting across vast swathes of the country, record displacement, and pervasive protection threats facing the civilian population. The escalation in fighting since the end of October 2023 has persisted for more than two months and is the largest in scale and most extensive geographically since early 2021. At the end of 2023, more than 2.6 million people were estimated to be displaced nationwide, with an estimated 628,000 people forced to flee since the intensification of fighting at the end of October. Humanitarians continue to face heavy access constraints and bureaucratic impediment. More than 142 aid worker arrests and detentions by parties to the conflict were self-reported by humanitarian organizations between January and November 2023. Advocacy continues for expanded access to conflict areas, especially in areas where bureaucratic impediments have accelerated since the conflict escalation at the end of October. Humanitarians have stayed and delivered in 2023, reaching at least 2.5 million people with assistance in the first 9 months of the year and expecting to have assisted 3.1 million people by year’s end. However, this reach is not as deep or sustained as planned due to gross underfunding of the response, leaving significant unmet needs that are flowing into 2024. The 2023 Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan received just 32 per cent of requested funding in 2023, leaving a $600 million funding gap. The 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan has been published identifying a record 18.6 million people in need, up from 17.6 million in 2023. The Plan prioritizes 5.3 million people for urgent assistance in 2024 for which $994 million is required. The Myanmar translation of the 2024 HNRP executive summary can be found here. Nearly three years since the military takeover, the crisis in Myanmar risks becoming a forgotten emergency. The situation demands immediate and sustained international attention in 2024 to raise the funds required to alleviate suffering and save lives. KEY FIGURES* 2.6M Total people currently internally displaced across Myanmar 2.3M People currently displaced by clashes and insecurity since February 2021 306K People who remain internally displaced due to conflict prior to February 2021, mainly in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, and Shan 18.6M People in Need 2024 5.3M People targeted for assistance 2024 $994M Requirement 2024 * Displacement figures fluctuate during any given month. These figures represent the number of people currently verified as displaced. Cumulative numbers for returns and displacement are not always available. 2023 YEAR-END SITUATION OVERVIEW Myanmar stands at the precipice at the end of 2023 with a deepening humanitarian crisis that has spiralled since the February 2021. The civilian population is living in fear for their lives, with coping capacities stretched to the limit. The crisis is now marked by surging displacement, a fragile security environment, profound protection threats and escalating unmet needs. The humanitarian situation remains grim at year’s end, largely fuelled by protection risks and conflict, compounded by a myriad of challenges, including food insecurity, a health system in crisis, disrupted education, huge numbers of people on the move amid fears for their safety, and the aftermath of Cyclone Mocha which struck Myanmar in May affecting 3 million people. Inflation and conflict are driving up the price of food, fuel, and other basic items, leaving vulnerable households hungry and in economic distress with increasing numbers resorting to negative coping measures to survive. The final days of 2023 have been marked by continued intense fighting across a majority of states and regions, with civilians fleeing their homes often multiple times, in large part due to fears over attacks. As of 25 December, more than 2.6 million people estimated were displaced nationwide, with most surviving in terrible conditions, lacking adequate shelter, most often in informal sites and in desperate need of access to basic services such as clean water. People on the move continue to be exposed to escalating explosive ordnance risks, and those in situations of protracted displacement face intensification of their vulnerabilities over time..."
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2024-01-12
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-12
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Description: "Introduction: The villagers in Southeast Burma (Myanmar) have been facing conflict for as long as they can remember. Generations have grown up amidst the fighting, and have lived their whole lives under a fear of attacks. The 2021 coup reinvigorated the open and direct violence of the Burma Army, under the command of the State Administration Council (SAC), in locally-defined Karen State. These attacks are deliberately directed towards civilian areas and communities, including by indiscriminately shelling villages and plantations. From January to October 2023 alone, KHRG recorded more than 192 incidents of indiscriminate shelling committed by the SAC, which killed and wounded villagers, destroyed civilian houses, buildings, and plantations, affected livelihoods, and caused displacement. This briefing paper investigates the consequences of SAC shelling in civilian areas and its impacts on the lives of rural villagers in Southeast Burma. The first section gives an overview of the history of violence and oppression in the region by the Burma Army. The second section presents the immediate consequences of shelling on villagers, including deaths and injuries, the destruction of property, and livelihoods harmed. The third section analyses longer-term impacts, including displacement, persistent fear among villagers, restricted access to education, and the heightened risk of unexploded ordnance (UXOs). Finally, a security and legal analysis of the current situation is conducted, and recommendations addressed to relevant stakeholders are presented..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
2023-12-25
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Highlights More than 2.6 million people nationally are internally displaced and in need of life-saving assistance. The escalation of conflict has a disproportionate impact on children with suffering mental health and psychosocial impacts from witnessing or experiencing violence, as well as new or prolonged displacement. A total of 858 casualties have been reported nationwide in the first nine months of 2023, injured by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); 22 per cent of the casualties were children. 29,980 people received mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) at child-friendly spaces, community centres, from mobile teams, and by remote counselling. The funding gap of 84.8 per cent is severely affecting UNICEF’s capacity to respond effectively; especially children who need basic social services, will not be able to receive humanitarian assistance. Situation Overview & Humanitarian Needs At the end of 2023, more than 2.6 million people are internally displaced with the need for life-saving assistance. More than 660,000 people are estimated to be newly displaced in northern and southern Shan, Rakhine, the southeast and the northwest regions. In addition, at least 378 civilians have reportedly been killed and 505 injured since the escalation of armed conflict that began in late October. The key challenge for humanitarian workers is the restriction of movement, including the use of roadblocks. Inflation and the depreciation of the local currency is affecting the flow of commodities, depleting stocks in the markets and sharply increasing the price of essential items. The lack of fuel is affecting transportation, telecommunications, the agricultural and industrial sectors and is impacting the delivery of supplies to internally displaced persons in conflict-affected townships. Telecommunications and internet services in Kachin have been extremely unreliable, with limited or no access in some areas as well as in the northwest and Kayah impacting the displaced population’s access to services and information. The escalation of conflict has a disproportionate impact on children. Children suffer mental health and psychosocial impacts from witnessing or experiencing violence, as well as new or prolonged displacement. In northern Shan, the conflict remains intense with continuous fighting across several townships. Artillery shelling and multiple airstrikes have increased the number of civilian casualties, with unverified reports of 130 civilians killed and 210 injured since the fighting escalated. Some 104,300 people are newly displaced in northern Shan, as well as in Kachin and Mandalay, while almost 20,000 people have returned home, particularly to nearby villages at Lashio township. Lashio airport has been closed for seven weeks and access by road is worsening, with increased restrictions on humanitarian supplies at various checkpoints. All townships in Rakhine State continue to be affected by severe blockades, movement restrictions, arbitrary arrests, and artillery shelling; 37 civilian deaths and 121 injuries were reported. Arbitrary arrests have escalated across Rakhine, with more than 190 people placed in detention; humanitarian workers have also been affected by this. Some 114,700 people have been newly displaced due to the ongoing fighting. Across the northwest and central Myanmar, the intensifying conflict has resulted in 118 civilian deaths and 73 injured with more than 314,000 people newly displaced. More than one million people are now displaced in Sagaing region, and more than 60 per cent of the population displaced after February 2021 remains in the northwest region. Humanitarian workers and some 110 civilians have been reportedly arrested since early December. Landmines and unexploded ordnance pose a major risk in the northwest. An estimated 150,000 internally displaced people in Kawlin and Tigyaing townships in Sagaing have no access to humanitarian assistance. In the southeast, intense clashes are increasing, especially in Kawtkareik, Kyainnseikkyi and Hpapun in Kayin and Nyaunglebin and Kyaukkyi in Bago East. More than 136,000 people have been newly displaced since the escalation began with 93 civilians reported dead, and 101 injured, many of them along the Shan-Kayah border. Access to, and transportation of, essential supplies are heavily restricted, especially in Kayah..."
Source/publisher: UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-01-10
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-10
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Description: "Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Shan State, and Rakhine State from January 1st to 7th. Over 40 civilians died and over 30 were injured by the Military’s airstrikes within a week. Over 30 local civilians from Khin-U Township, Sagaing Region, were arrested as human shields. Prison staff from Daik-U Prison are threatening and torturing the female political prisoners in Bago Region. About 50 civilians died and over 60 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 8 underaged children were injured and 3 died when Military junta committed abuses. 2 civilians also died from the land mines by Military troops. Military junta also committed a massacre and 19 people died in Wuntho Township, Sagaing Region..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2024-01-09
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-09
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Sub-title: Thailand would need to implement essential refugee policies that align with international standards to deal with the ongoing humanitarian crisis
Description: "Thailand lies at a critical intersection in Southeast Asia, where the vibrant tapestry of cultures meets the complex weave of geopolitics. As the nation grapples with the escalating number of Myanmar refugees, it's not merely facing a geopolitical conundrum but a humanitarian crisis which demands global attention. Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin is actively advocating for Thailand to play a central role in engaging with the Myanmar military regime to address the two-year civil war. While agreeing to adhere to the peace plan proposed by the regional bloc Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he underscores the geographical proximity between Thailand and Myanmar, leading to an influx of displaced individuals seeking protection. This exodus, in turn, necessitates the provision of essential services to address their needs. While agreeing to adhere to the peace plan proposed by the regional bloc Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he underscores the geographical proximity between Thailand and Myanmar, leading to an influx of displaced individuals seeking protection. PM Srettha's recent statement indicates a shift in Thailand's approach from the previous government's stance, which largely supported the Junta, to a more humanitarian-focused role. However, the current government's engagement remains limited to the Junta, highlighting the need for broader connections with other groups. Roots of displacement The Kayin State, formerly the Karen State, has witnessed a history of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Junta, particularly against the Karen ethnic minority seeking greater autonomy. Well-documented instances of systematic violence, including rape, torture, and forced labour, explicitly targeting Karenni women and girls, showcase the severity of the situation. The military's use of both women and men as human shields violates international humanitarian law. The coup has exacerbated the crisis and made these people easy targets of violence. There are restrictions on travel and a shortage of essential resources in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar. Humanitarian workers are adapting by seeking alternative routes to deliver aid materials and avoid harassment and detention by military forces. Consequently, a growing number of individuals, including men, women, and children, are seeking refuge along the Thai-Myanmar border to escape the worsening conditions. Attending the displaced Bangkok's historical role as a haven for displaced people, mainly from Myanmar, is evident. Since the mid-1980s, the nation has provided shelter to approximately 90,801 displaced people from Myanmar across nine camps. However, following the coup in Myanmar in February 2021, an additional 45,025 displaced people sought refuge. Thailand's humanitarian efforts include providing temporary shelters, a few core relief items, food, and medical assistance. Humanitarian workers are adapting by seeking alternative routes to deliver aid materials and avoid harassment and detention by military forces. Despite allowing these new arrivals to stay in temporary shelters near the border, the Thai government has sporadically pushed them back. Notably, these recently displaced populations are not allowed to enter established refugee camps, and Thai officials impose stringent restrictions on their movement. In July 2023, around 9,000 hapless people sought safety in Thailand's Mae Hong Son district due to frequent airstrikes in Karenni State. Initially, Thai authorities permitted them to stay in temporary shelters, however, on 21 October, they were asked to return to Myanmar within two weeks. Consequently, the shelters were vacated as people walked back across the border into Karenni State, a journey taking four to five days. Many resettled in Doh Noh Ku, a settlement for internally displaced people at the Thai-Myanmar border. Pushbacks persisted until 27 October, coinciding with an offensive by a coalition of armed ethnic and resistance groups against the Myanmar military in northern Shan State. Subsequently, opposition forces elsewhere in Myanmar launched attacks against the military, prompting retaliatory airstrikes, including in Karenni State. By 27 November, over 2,387 Myanmar individuals had fled again, crossing back into the Mae Hong Son district. The Thai Foreign Minister's announcement on 3 December to construct shelters for displaced people underscores a recognition of the escalating violence and the potential for more people to seek refuge. Pushbacks persisted until 27 October, coinciding with an offensive by a coalition of armed ethnic and resistance groups against the Myanmar military in northern Shan State. On 8 December, Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed that Myanmar officials had reached an agreement to establish a task force to enhance humanitarian aid for those displaced within Myanmar due to the ongoing conflict. Despite good intentions, concerns arise about the effective distribution of assistance to all affected regions, considering the track record of the Junta. Predicaments Thailand's response to the crisis is challenging. The delicate balance between engaging with the Myanmar military regime and advocating for humanitarian provisions poses a diplomatic dilemma. The strain on resources and infrastructure due to the growing refugee population is a significant concern. The need for sustained efforts, both domestically and through international collaboration, is crucial to address the humanitarian crisis effectively. Thailand's response is constrained by its non-ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol. However, in 2018, Thailand voted in favour of the Global Compact on Refugees, and subsequently, the National Screening Mechanism (NSM) was established in 2019. The NSM aims to grant “protected person” status to foreign nationals in Thailand who are unable or unwilling to return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution, as determined by the NSM Committee. Despite delays in application due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2023, Thailand's Cabinet approved a regulation outlining the procedure and eligibility criteria for individuals seeking NSM status, which officially came into effect on September 2023. Additionally, the rollout of the NSM will occur incrementally as the Thai government, with technical assistance and advocacy from UNHCR, continues to develop the comprehensive set of procedural standards and policies needed for its implementation. The NSM aims to grant “protected person” status to foreign nationals in Thailand who are unable or unwilling to return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution, as determined by the NSM Committee. However, concerns exist regarding the NSM's effectiveness and legal subordination to the Immigration Act. While Clause 15 of the NSM regulation delays the deportation of individuals asserting protected-person status, it fails to shield them from arrest, detention, or prosecution based on their immigration status. Additionally, as the NSM is legally subordinate to the Immigration Act, the predominant experience for refugees seeking protection under the NSM in Thailand would involve initial encounters with arrest, detention, and prosecution. There also remains apprehension that the NSM excludes migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos under its provision from receiving adequate protection in Thailand. Actions required To address the challenges, the Thai government should utilise the power granted by Section 17 of the Immigration Act to exempt NSM applicants from arrest, detention, or prosecution. Explicit provisions for determining protected status under NSM need to be established. Exempting refugees from arrest, detention, and prosecution under the Immigration Act, as emphasised in an open letter by eight organisations on 12 December, will signal Thailand's commitment to the Global Compact on Refugees. Urgent action from Thai authorities is imperative to enhance efforts in granting appropriate status and protection to those fleeing persecution, aligning with international standards. The escalating Myanmar refugee crisis necessitates a comprehensive and swift response from Thai authorities. While challenges persist, Thailand can set an example in the region by implementing essential refugee policies. Addressing humanitarian concerns, engaging in regional cooperation, and enacting necessary policy reforms are imperative for Thailand to effectively manage the evolving crisis and provide sustainable solutions for refugees and displaced persons..."
Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
2024-01-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-05
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Sub-title: But high-profile prisoners such as Aung San Suu Kyi , and many of those serving long terms, were not part of the release.
Description: "UPDATED on January 4, 2024 at 4:08 p.m. ET Myanmar’s junta granted amnesty to 9,652 prisoners on Thursday, according to a statement released by the junta’s State Administration Council said. The prisoner release took place on the 76th anniversary of the country’s independence from the United Kingdom. The amnesty was conditioned on the agreement that, should they reoffend, they would be required to serve both the remaining sentence and any new punishment. About 114 foreign prisoners were included in the amnesty, according to a separate statement from the junta. It said they were released to maintain friendly relations with other countries. Among those released is Kaung Set Lin, a photojournalist from the Myanmar Press Photo Agency in Yangon, who had been sentenced to three years on charges of damaging public interest. Kaung Set Lin was arrested while injured when police and soldiers, using a vehicle, charged into an anti-coup protest he was covering on Pan Pin Gyi Street in Yangon's Kyimyindaing township. “Yes, he is freed. My son is among the released. Now we are about to go home. Needless to say, I am so happy. I wanted to see my son’s face before I died. Now my wish has come true,” Myo Myint, the father of the journalist, told RFA Burmese. Kaung Set Lin's mother died while he was incarcerated. “My mother died of cancer. I didn’t get a chance to see her at the last moment. But as a son, I was dutiful," he told RFA Burmese. "Until now, I never made my mother feel she had a low prestige. I want all my remaining [political prisoner] brothers to be released as well.” 'Nothing but pray' Another six of Kaung Set Lin's co-accused were released today. However, Hmu Yadana Khet Moh Moh Tun, a reporter from the Myanmar Press Photo Agency, who was arrested the same day remains imprisoned. Her mother Myint Myint Maw said that she wanted her daughter to be released, though she could do nothing but pray. “Anyway, I'm expecting her release. But since she has been sentenced for two more charges, I don’t expect much," she said. "When the others were released, I just sent prayers and love for her. "[The authorities] have to release her, so I can do nothing but pray. She will be free only when they release her, so I feel bad.” However, another journalist, Hmu Yadanar Khat Moh Moh Tun from the Myanmar Press Photo Agency, who was arrested alongside him, has not been released. Actress Thin Zar Wint Kyaw and model Nan Mwe San, who faced criticism from the junta and were sentenced to several years in prison on charges of undermining Myanmar culture and sexual orientation, were also released, according to media reports. But RFA has not been able to independently verify this information. More than 1,000 prisoners were released from Mandalay’s Obo Prison on Thursday, and among them were Dr. Ye Lwin, former Mandalay mayor, and Kyaw Zeya, a member of the Mandalay City Development Committee, both served under the National League for Democracy-led government, lawyers said. While a few political prisoners were released today, detained former political leader Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint, who have received lengthy prison sentences under various charges, along with members of the NLD government, lawmakers, university students and democracy activists remain incarcerated. 'No hope' for those given long terms A family member of Tun Tun Hein, NLD-led government’s deputy speaker, said he has not heard any news about his release yet. Tun Tun Hein, the 72-year-old deputy speaker who also served as the chairman of the country’s lower house in the parliament, had been sentenced to more than 30 years. “I wished he would be released because he is old. I hope he comes out with amnesty and I am praying for it. I haven't heard any news yet,” said the family member. A lawyer, who is handling the cases of political prisoners and requested anonymity for security reasons, informed RFA Burmese that none of the political prisoners serving long-term sentences were among those released on Thursday. Only those who had been sentenced to terms between two and three years and were close to their scheduled release dates were freed, the lawyer added. A family member of a political prisoner who was sentenced to a long jail term in Thayet Prison in Magway region said that there was no hope for those who have been given long prison terms. “There is no expectation for their release. They [the authorities] released the inmates who have just two, three or four, five more months to serve. They don’t release people who have to serve for four, five or six more years," he said. Based on the junta statements, there have been 14 amnesties granted since the coup, including the one on Thursday. In total, more than 92,000 prisoners have been released during these amnesties, but only a small number of them were political prisoners. According to the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, or AAPP, in 2023 alone, the junta released more than 20,000 prisoners, but only 2,400 political prisoners were among them..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
2024-01-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Dec 22 to 31, 2023 Military Junta Troops launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Mandalay Region, Bago Region, Shan State, Rakhine State, and Kayin State from December 22nd to 31st. Military Junta Troop also burnt and killed 7 civilians from Bago Region, Nattalin Township. 2 political prisoners who were tortured in Insein Prison, Yangon Region, and Pathein Prison, Ayeyarwady Region, died because of the lack of medical treatment. Over 50 civilians died and over 50 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. Over 10 underaged children were injured and over 10 died when the Military Junta committed violations. A civilian was also injured by the Military Junta’s landmines. A bridge and a road from Northern Shan State were destroyed by the Military Junta Troop..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2024-01-03
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနှံ့အပြားတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှု အခြေအနေများကို လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနက စုဆောင်းကောက်ယူခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ ကောက်ယူရာတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုဖြစ်စဥ်များနှင့်ပတ်သက်ပြီး ခိုင်မာသည့် သတင်း မီဒီယာများကို စောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာမှု၊ Online Monitoring တို့မှတဆင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှု ဖြစ်ရပ်ပေါင်း (၄၆၅၆)ခု တို့ကို ကောက်ယူရရှိခဲ့ပြီး၊ မြေပြင်အခြေအနေနှင့် ဆန်းစစ်အတည်ပြုနိုင်သည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုဖြစ်စဥ် စုစုပေါင်း (၆၅၇)ခု ကို မှတ်တမ်းတင်သိမ်းဆည်းထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ထိုဖြစ်ရပ်များထည်းမှ အင်တာဗျူး၊ ဓာတ်ပုံမှတ်တမ်း များအပါအဝင် အချက်အလက်များရရှိပြီး မှန်ကန်ကြောင်းခိုင်မာစွာ အတည်ပြု နိုင်ခဲ့သည့် ဖြစ်စဉ်ပေါင်း (၃၂၂)ခု ရှိခဲ့သည်။ IIMM နှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာသို့ ဖြစ်စဉ် (၁၆၅)ခု ပေးပို့နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ထိုကဲ့သို့ စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူထားရှိသည့် အချက်အလက်များအား အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ အစီရင်ခံစာတွင် ခေါင်းစဉ် (၇) ခုဖြင့် ပိုင်းခြားသတ်မှတ်၍ ပြည်သူသို့ လေးစားစွာ တင်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံး တန်းတူညီမျှမှုရရှိရေး၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့်တရားမျှတမှုရရှိရေးတည်းဟူသော ဦးတည်ချက်များကို ခိုင်ခိုင်မာမာလက်ကိုင်ဆွဲထား၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ကျုးလွန်မှုများကိုအပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူနိုင်ရေး အစွမ်းကုန်တာဝန်ယူဆောင်ရွက်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကတိသစ္စာပြုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Human Rights
2024-01-03
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 6.19 MB
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Description: "In Rakhine State, 157,169 individuals have been displaced across 12 townships due to the ongoing AA-Tatmadaw conflict that started in 2019. Additionally, 10,331 individuals have been displaced in Paletwa township in Chin State, bringing the total number of displaced persons to 167,500. Out of them, 118,786 individuals are newly displaced since the escalation of armed conflict on 13 November as of 25 December. In collaboration with partners and other UN agencies, UNHCR is responding to the humanitarian needs and continues to provide assistance to affected communities. Since January 2023, UNHCR has provided core relief items, emergency shelter support, dignity kits and cloth masks to some 51,619 individuals in Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw, Ponnagyun, Myebon, Sittwe, Pauktaw, Paletwa, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2024-01-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 9.11 MB 10.15 MB
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Description: "NUCC and NUG Issue Joint New Year Statement for 2024.....Spring Development Bank to Open First Branch in Kawlin Township.....Ministry of Defence: Resistance Forces Take Over the Military Base in Thabeikkyin Township.....Cabinet: Acting President Urges People to Escalate Perseverance for the Success in 2024.....Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration....Acting President States to Respect for Justice and Human Dignity in His Christmas Greeting Message.....Central Committee for Implementation of Interim Local Administration.....Ministry of Defence: Officers of Myanmar Military Council Desert Naung Gyi Ine Police Station in Ayadaw Township.....Interim Board for Heritage Administration.....National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).....December 2023 Military Affairs Brief Review.....New Year Greetings..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2024-01-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "1။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူကို ဗဟိုပြုသည့် စံတန်ဖိုးများကို ဖော်ဆောင်သော ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး တည်ဆောက်ရန် ရည်မှန်းထားသည်နှင့်အညီ လွတ်လပ်၍ တက်ကြွပြီး ဘက်မလိုက်သော နိုင်ငံခြားရေးမူဝါဒကို ချမှတ် လိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးလျက်ရှိသည်။ 2။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံတို့သည် နှစ်နိုင်ငံအကြား သမိုင်းကြောင်း အရ အလွန်ခိုင်မာ၍ နီးကပ်သည့်ဆက်နွှယ်မှု အစဉ်အလာများရှိသည်သာမက တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသည် ကမ္ဘာ့အင်အားကြီးနိုင်ငံ တစ်နိုင်ငံ ဖြစ်သည့်အားလျော်စွာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက် အထူးအရေးပါသည့်နိုင်ငံဖြစ်သည်ဟု ခံယူသည်။ 3။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံတို့သည် နယ်နိမိတ်အားဖြင့် ကီလိုမီတာ နှစ်ထောင်ကျော် ထိစပ်လျက်ရှိပြီး၊ ကမ္ဘာတည်သရွေ့ အတူယှဉ်တွဲ နေထိုင်သွားရမည့် အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား စစ်မှန်သည့် “ဆွေမျိုး-ပေါက်ဖော်” ဆက်ဆံရေးတည်ဆောက်သွားမည်။ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံအတွက် အိမ်နီးချင်းကောင်း ဖြစ်ရေး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံက အမြဲ ကြိုးပမ်း၊ ရပ်တည်မည်။ 4။ တရုတ် တစ်နိုင်ငံတည်း မူဝါဒကို ဆက်လက်ထောက်ခံကျင့်သုံးမည်။ 5။ တရုတ်နှင့်မြန်မာ နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား ပြည်သူနှင့်ပြည်သူ ဆက်ဆံရေးကို အလေးထားလျက် အပြန်အလှန် ချစ်ကြည်မှု၊ ယုံကြည်မှုနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို အစွမ်းကုန် မြှင့်တင်၊ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။ 6။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား လူမှုစီးပွားအရ အကျိုးတူ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို အစဉ်သဖြင့် ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ မြှင့်တင်၊ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။ 7။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံပြည်သူများ၏အကျိုးစီးပွားဖြစ်ထွန်းရေးကိုမျှော်ရည်လျှက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်းရှိ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ၏ စီးပွားရေးအရ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုများနှင့် အခြားလူမှုစီးပွားလုပ်ငန်းများ၏ လုံခြုံရေး ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းကာကွယ်မည်။ 8။ အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများ၏ နိုင်ငံတော်လုံခြုံရေးကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်နေသည့် မည်သည့် အဖွဲ့ အစည်းကိုမျှ မြန်မာ့ပိုင်နက်အတွင်း အခြေချခွင့်မပြု။ 9။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုမတိုင်ခင် နှစ်နိုင်ငံ နယ်နိမိတ်သတ်မှတ်မှုစာချုပ်များ အပါအဝင် နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား သဘောတူချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့သည့် စာချုပ်များအားလုံးကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ တာဝန်ယူ ဆက်ခံမည်။ 10။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံ နယ်စပ်တည်ငြိမ်ရေး နှင့် လုံခြုံရေးသာမက ဒေသတွင်း တည်ငြိမ်ရေးနှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကိုပါ ထိခိုက်စေသည့် ကျားဖြန့် အွန်လိုင်း လိမ်လည်မှုနှင့် လောင်းကစားလုပ်ငန်း၊ လူကုန်ကူးမှုလုပ်ငန်း၊ မူးယစ်ဆေးဝါးလုပ်ငန်းများအပါအဝင် နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် ရာဇဝတ် မှုခင်းများကို တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ အပါအဝင် ဒေသတွင်းနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း၍ တိုက်ဖျက်သွားမည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2024-01-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "HIGHLIGHTS: The situation of children has worsened and remains a significant concern in Myanmar, with ongoing and escalating conflict leading to multiple displacements and the deterioration of social services in conflict-affected communities. Cyclone Mocha, which hit in May 2023, caused widespread destruction in five states, and seasonal monsoons negatively impacted already vulnerable communities. More than 18.6 million people, including 6 million children, are in need of humanitarian assistance. UNICEF's humanitarian strategy focuses on working with local civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations and other United Nations agencies to broaden the humanitarian response for children in all conflict-affected states and regions. For 2024, UNICEF is appealing for $208.3 million to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to 3.1 million people, including 2.1 million children. UNICEF aims to reach 850,000 people with critical WASH supplies; 350,000 children and women with primary health care services; and more than 890,000 children with education. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND NEEDS The worsening situation of children remains a significant concern in Myanmar, with ongoing and escalating conflict leading to multiple displacements and the deterioration of social services in conflict-affected communities. Nearly 2 million people were displaced internally as of the end of October 2023, including 306,200 people who had been displaced prior to the military takeover in February 2021. Adding to this, in 2023, Cyclone Mocha caused widespread destruction in five states, and seasonal monsoons negatively impacted already vulnerable communities. Altogether, more than 18.6 million people, including 6 million children, require humanitarian assistance. Grave child rights violations persist, mainly due to the indiscriminate use of heavy weapons, airstrikes, explosive ordnance and recruitment and use of children. Attacks on schools and hospitals continue at alarming levels. Approximately 4.5 million children need education support because of disruption to safe learning opportunities.12 Women and children face significant risks of violence, including gender-based violence, exploitation and abuse. Children and adults with disabilities are especially vulnerable and have limited access to services that meet their disability-specific needs. A deteriorating economic situation has limited livelihood opportunities, further worsening the plight of the most vulnerable people. More than 55 per cent of children live in poverty, while three quarters of displaced households’ basic needs are unmet. Access to water and life-saving services has deteriorated: a significant number of children are still not able to access basic health and nutrition interventions due to insecurity and other forms of restriction. The under-five mortality rate of 42 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2022 remains the highest in the region, and up to 75 per cent of children aged 6–23 months do not eat a minimum acceptable diet. Although immunization coverage increased to approximately 70 per cent in 2022 from 37 per cent in 2021, an estimated 1 million children missed basic vaccines from 2018 to 2022. Camp closures and the forced return or relocation of displaced people, particularly in Kachin, Shan and Rakhine States pose protection risks for children. Armed clashes, widespread presence of landmines and unexploded ordinance and a lack of basic services remain obstacles to return. And the proposed Rohingya repatriation from Bangladesh in the absence of conditions for voluntary and safe returns will present further protection concerns in 2024. Military operations, ongoing hostilities and administrative constraints (e.g., travel authorization-related delays and movement restrictions) impede access of humanitarian actors to people in need, impacting the timely delivery of programme supplies. The politicization of humanitarian assistance compounds this challenge..."
Source/publisher: UN Children's Fund (New York) via Reliefweb (New York)
2023-12-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Introduction The shelter design is contextual considering the response phase, cultural and specific aspects of geographical area and users. It is fundamental that shelter programs consider the use of local materials, skills and building techniques, as well involve the affected communities from the initial stages. Considering the diversity of Myanmar and complexity of context, the cluster together with partners developed this catalogue compiling in a single document the shelter designs across the country for quick consultation, comparative analysis and support decision making within shelter programs. It was designed for use by cluster partners, nonetheless the information may be relevant to partitioners that are supporting shelter programmes. Future revision should be consider for upgraded and new designs, thus this catalogue should be consider as a ‘live’ document. The designs in this catalogue follow three sessions as the response phase and hubs covered: SHORT - TERM (Up to 1.5 years) solutions with materials that are intended to be removed once the next stage of shelter solution is offered or when the crisis is over and IDPs can return to their homes. Usually, these are constructed with limited costs. MID- TERM (Up to 5 years) that are made with materials and techniques that are designed to transition into more permanent structures. The shelter should be upgradeable, reusable, resaleable or moveable from temporary sites to permanent locations. LONG- TERM It is a solution designed with more permanent and durable solution structures/materials. Over 5 years..."
Source/publisher: Shelter Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees
2023-12-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Introduction: The Myanmar response showed an increase in Cash and Vouchers Assistance (CVA) to support people affected by crisis while in displacement or in the immediate phase following a disaster such as the Mocha Cyclone in May 2023. When cash is feasible following the situation analysis through needs assessment, market functionality, financial service provider and risks, it is often perceived as faster and more cost-effective than in-kind assistance. In programs with shelter focus, CVAs have traditionally been provided to the affected population by staggered payments related to conditions and restrictions to be able to meet sector-specific technical, protection objectives and outcomes. The conditionality and restrictions will often minimize the risk to beneficiaries caused by a very unregulated shelter value chain. As Shelter-NFI response cover a wide range of interventions, also considering the specificities of each region such as Northeast, Northwest, Rakhine and Southeast, this is an initial guidance shelter cash interventions for further detailed guidance to be incorporated due course of the coming year..."
Source/publisher: Shelter Cluster, UN High Commissioner for Refugees
2023-12-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "SITUATION ANALYSIS Description of the crisis Cyclone Mocha caused significant damage in Myanmar, particularly in areas that are already grappling with civil unrest, a high number of internally displaced people, armed clashes, and fragile economic conditions. The cyclone that brought about intense wind and heavy rainfall led to significant flooding and damages in Rakhine, Chin, Magway, Ayeyarwady, Mandalay, and Sagaing states and regions. The states of Rakhine, Chin, and Magway regions were particularly hard hit, prompting the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) to respond. The MRCS, operating as an independent humanitarian organization, mobilized resources and personnel in accordance with the Myanmar Red Cross Society Law of 2015 to provide emergency aid, including medical assistance, shelter, and essential supplies to the affected communities. This cyclone occurred in an already challenging humanitarian context in Myanmar. OCHA's 2023 Humanitarian Needs Overview projected that over 17.6 million people would require humanitarian assistance in Myanmar in 20231 . As per MRCS's branch analysis, the cyclone affected around 1.1 million individuals from more than 237,000 households across the country. A large number of semi-permanent and temporary shelters were damaged or destroyed, leaving over 200,000 houses in need of repair. Critical infrastructure, including water systems, sanitation facilities, hospitals, clinics, schools, and transportation networks, suffered severe damage or complete destruction. Livelihoods were disrupted, with the loss of livestock and floods impacting croplands. The aftermath of the cyclone has led to a rise in the prices of basic goods, affecting the physical and mental health of the affected population. Healthcare access is disrupted, compounded by shortages of medicine. Summary of response Overview of the host National Society and ongoing response The Myanmar Red Cross Society is an independent humanitarian organization that operates impartially and neutrally. Its role as an auxiliary to the state in the humanitarian field, operating in line with the Red Cross Red Crescent Fundamental Principles, is enshrined in the Myanmar Red Cross Society Law of 2015. The MRCS has a strong presence with over a thousand trained Emergency Response Team (ERT) volunteers and 44,000 members nationwide, including 7,994 core Red Cross Volunteers (RCV) active at the community level. The organization has 23 warehouses strategically located throughout the country to support preparedness and response efforts. It also has regional and state branches across the country and a substantial presence in various operational hubs in Rakhine State, under the management of the MRCS Rakhine Operations Management Unit established over the past decade. During this reporting period, 962 volunteers were deployed to aid the most affected communities since the cyclone made landfall. The MRCS has established communication channels with local authorities, communities and other stakeholders in the affected areas through its local staff, volunteers, and branches. This enables them to reach vulnerable communities and provide immediate humanitarian assistance. Through its community presence, MRCS has access to the ground and has collected data as well as assessed the impact of Cyclone Mocha in Rakhine State and Magway and Ayeyarwady regions in particular. In anticipation of the cyclone, the MRCS activated its Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) one week before landfall and initiated preparedness measures and early actions well in advance. The national MRCS EOC has also regularly communicated and received information from the State and Branches EOC. As a result, MRCS was on standby and ready to mobilize the volunteers and dispatch the NFI items. Prior to landfall, MRCS volunteers in the projected path and impact zone assisted with evacuations, conducted awareness campaigns and gathered preliminary data. After the cyclone made landfall, on 14 May 2023, MRCS branches mobilized their volunteers to engage in rescue operations, clear roads and debris, provide first aid and psychological first aid, and collect initial observations and data. MRCS also mobilized its existing operational resources to respond to the aftermath, deploying trained expert personnel to provide assistance and support services such as logistics and supply chain directly. The response in Rakhine state has focused on communities whose vulnerability was increased by Cyclone Mocha as part of the MRCS ongoing humanitarian activities in Rakhine. As of 17 November 2023, MRCS has reached 290,003 people from 58,000 households in relief assistance, including, shelter, livelihood, health and hygiene items, and multi-purpose cash assistance. A total of 19,586 individuals from 4,277 households received shelter assistance through the distribution of tarpaulins, family kits, and blankets. In the hardest-hit region of Rakhine State, MRCS distributed a total of 982,507 litres, of which 919,237 litres from water trucks and 63,270 litres in the form of 1L bottles, of clean drinking water, along with 19,000 litres of domestic water to affected communities, reaching 50,042 households (250,210 people). To uphold the dignity of the affected communities, hygiene parcels for families, specialized hygiene kits for men, and dignity kits for women were distributed in various affected regions, including Rakhine, Magway, Yangon, Ayeyarwady, Bago, and Mandalay. 12,586 individuals were reached with these items. Additionally, MRCS distributed 468 sets of children's clothing to support affected children. MRCS's mobile health clinics in Rakhine have provided assistance to 1,826 individuals since it started on 17 May 2023. In the initial response to Cyclone Mocha, 19 people received first aid and ambulance service from MRCS. Furthermore, 1,989 individuals attended health education organized by MRCS. Lastly, a total of 451 million MMK or CHF 193,930 in multi-purpose cash grants (MPCG) were distributed to 2,328 households benefitting 10,381 people. It is worth noting that some households received multiple support, thus a comprehensive approach was adopted when calculating the total people reached to avoid double counting. Operational coordination meetings are regularly organized to update the partners in collaboration with the IFRC, involving in-country partners and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to provide technical and planning support to MRCS for the response. MRCS, IFRC, and ICRC meet in Movement tripartite meetings at a strategic level. The regular tripartite security cell meetings are being used for regular risk analysis and security planning. Moreover, MRCS and IFRC are observers in HCT meetings and Cluster coordination as part of their external coordination efforts. The development of the Federation-wide Operational Strategy involved a shared leadership approach, drawing upon the expertise of the IFRC network and past experiences from drafting the Unified Plan. To ensure efficient communication and reporting, the monitoring and reporting mechanisms are coordinated under one single reporting system, aiming to streamline reporting channels between the MRCS and the IFRC members. In addition, the IFRC mobilized five rapid response personnel (surge) for the operation, including for the combined Myanmar Shelter/ NFI/ CCCM Cluster to enhance and complement the existing coordination structure. The MRCS, supported by the IFRC network, has been actively engaged in long-term programming in Rakhine state since the large-scale violence in 2012. Despite some challenges in maintaining continual access to communities in need (as faced by most humanitarian actors), MRCS has been a well-recognized humanitarian actor, advocating with relevant stakeholders based on its humanitarian mission. In alignment with its established functions under national law, the MRCS, with IFRC support, is actively involved in humanitarian diplomacy. This involves securing access to reach populations in need during the response operation and ongoing programmatic actions. The IFRC continues to provide strategic and operational guidance, collaborating with other humanitarian actors as needed, to enhance the National Society's capacities, ensuring it remains and is perceived as an effective and efficient principled humanitarian actor. The 5 in-country Partner National Societies (Swedish Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, German Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, and Danish Red Cross) together with 9 other Partner National Societies contributed to Cyclone Mocha Operation through this Federation-wide Emergency Appeal. The Myanmar Red Cross Society expresses its gratitude to all contributing partners for their support thus far. The ICRC is also providing support to the MRCS for its response, as reported separately2 ..."
Source/publisher: International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies
2023-12-26
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: How HRW Documents Wartime Abuses, Advocates to Protect Civilians, and Promotes Justice
Description: "Armed conflict dominates the headlines, from the hostilities in Israel and Palestine, to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, to the militaries and militias committing atrocities in Sudan. For nearly four decades, Human Rights Watch (HRW) researchers have investigated international armed conflicts and civil wars, reporting on violations of human rights and the laws of war, and working to protect civilians caught in the crossfire. But what exactly does this look like? We sat down with Human Rights Watch’s Executive Director Tirana Hassan to discuss how the organization – which has been defending human rights since 1978 – operates in times of armed conflict and how teams of people specializing in research, communications, and advocacy work together to compel world leaders to protect civilians and push for justice. What does Human Rights Watch do when conflict erupts? We seek to keep civilians safe during fighting by pressing warring parties to respect international humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war, which are the rules that guide and limit warfare. Human Rights Watch’s job is not to say whether war should be waged or not, but to make sure the conduct of warring parties respects the law. It’s clear what humanitarian organizations do during conflict – they work to get civilians food, water, and shelter, and help those at risk to be protected. What is our role? We have worked in armed conflicts for decades, from the civil wars in the Americas in the early 1980s to the current hostilities in Israel and Palestine today. We have warned the international community of potential armed conflicts and the risks that violations of the laws of war pose for civilians. Our researchers document the conduct of the parties to the conflict and any laws they have violated during the fighting. We analyze this evidence and bring it to the warring parties, using our findings to lean on them – or convince governments around the world to lean on them – to change their conduct and protect civilians caught in the middle, as is their legal duty. We also campaign for justice and accountability before national courts and global courts, like the International Criminal Court, when violations amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. Your answer leads me to another question – can Human Rights Watch’s work prevent conflict before it starts? Our work can help prevent armed conflict by shining a spotlight on the human rights abuses that are the root cause of so much fighting in the world. When security forces abuse the populations they are meant to protect, when governments repress ethnic, national, or religious groups, when free media or the internet is shut down and when journalists are killed, allowing disinformation to flourish, when weapons flow into places that lack governance. Our research on violations like these, and our advocacy to get governments to change course and respect rights, can help stem tensions that often lead to armed conflict. What type of laws-of-war violations do we look at? The laws of war that we use today to protect civilians – also known as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its additional protocols – were created in response to the atrocities and inhumanity of World War II. These laws have been adopted by all countries and govern how a war is fought to limit civilian suffering as much as possible. Warring parties – including national armed forces and non-state armed groups – don’t have carte blanche to do anything they want. They must respect international humanitarian law as well as international human rights law, which remains in effect. International humanitarian law says that the warring parties are required to distinguish between civilians and combatants when carrying out attacks. Detainees are also protected from mistreatment and torture. The laws make sure civilians have access to food, water, and somewhere safe to live. International humanitarian law also protects essential civilian institutions and services, including hospitals, medical staff, markets, schools, and aid workers delivering life-saving assistance. Taking hostages is a violation, as is recruiting children to fight. Places of worship, such as mosques and churches, and key cultural and historical sites are also protected. For example, when Taliban forces detained and then summarily executed some members of the former Afghan government’s security forces, that was a serious violation of the laws of war. We have people with different research specialties across Human Rights Watch. When conflict hits, who does what? We deploy multidisciplinary teams because conflict affects people in different ways. We have teams of country experts who have been working in and on these situations for a very long time. So, for example, when covering the conflict in Sudan, our Sudan researcher helped gather evidence on the ground and led our efforts to push governments to do more to stop abuses and protect civilians. For the conflict in Ukraine, our researchers specializing both in Ukraine and Russia are essential. The overwhelming majority of abuses are by Russian forces in Ukraine, but some also take place in Russia. Human Rights Watch also has a Crisis and Conflict division, with researchers who are trained for and have experience working in conflict zones and crisis situations. This year they documented abuses in Sudan, Ukraine, Haiti, and Israel/Palestine. Armed conflicts also affect different groups of people differently. In Ethiopia’s Tigray region, we documented how Ethiopian and Eritrean military forces, as well as local militias, used sexual violence, including rape, mainly against women and girls. Our Disability Rights Division documented that civilians with disabilities and older people in Gaza were unable to flee the Israeli government’s bombing and faced difficulties accessing necessities and aid under Israel’s blockade. Our health and human rights experts can speak to the health effects of sieges and blockades, which are violations of international law if they are used to deny civilians food and water. Children, we know, are disproportionately affected by conflict, and our colleagues specializing in children’s rights have documented how schools have often been used by warring parties as bases or weapons depots. Our work has led to soldiers vacating schools in Thailand, Somalia, Yemen, the Central African Republic, India, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Increasingly in conflict, our researchers can’t get close to where the abuses are happening because it’s unsafe or they are blocked from entering the country. Thanks to our Digital Investigations Lab, we can use technology to corroborate and strengthen our on-the-ground research and eyewitness testimony we’ve been told over the phone or a messaging app. These researchers scrape the internet for open-source evidence from photos and videos that people post on social media. They also conduct digital analyses to confirm that what they find is true, and they triangulate photos or videos depicting abuses with satellite imagery and geospatial analysis to confirm their accuracy. We used satellite imagery in Myanmar in 2017 to help show the torching of 700 buildings in an ethnic Rohingya village in Rakhine State. The images show large burn scars and destroyed tree cover consistent with widespread destruction, corroborating accounts from refugees who described killing and arson by Burmese military, police and ethnic Rakhine mobs. Our Arms Division specializes in all-source weapons analysis and treaty compliance monitoring. Among other activities, they conduct field investigations, book-research, and collaborate with technical sources and research teams to identify the specific type of weapons used by analyzing any remnants, impact craters, and other information that munitions leave behind after they are used. The division also monitors and documents when controversial weapons are used, including incendiary weapons like white phosphorous, which leave people with severe thermal burns. We report on new use of cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines, which are banned internationally because they are inherently indiscriminate against the civilian population. In addition, the division advocates for stronger international law to better protect civilians from problematic means or methods of warfare in future armed conflicts. And our advocates campaign to stop weapons transfers to armed forces or groups that are likely to use them in violation of the laws of war. What types of research have we done recently? We have been documenting unlawful attacks by Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza and Israel. Israeli forces have apparently unlawfully struck hospitals and medical facilities in Gaza and put civilians at risk by using white phosphorus in populated areas. They have also used explosive weapons in densely populated areas on a massive scale. These strikes have caused large-scale destruction and loss of civilian life. In Lebanon, Israeli forces have killed a number of civilians in unlawful attacks amounting to apparent war crimes. We have also documented that Palestinian armed groups have deliberately killed civilians, taken hostages, and launched rockets indiscriminately into Israel’s civilian areas, which are war crimes. The Israeli government has also cut off basic services, like electricity and water, to the civilian population in Gaza as collective punishment, blocked all but a trickle of aid and food, and used starvation as a weapon of war. These acts amount to war crimes. We use our research to push for justice. Human Rights Watch was the first human rights organization to publish in-depth research on the issue of forced transfers and deportations of Ukrainians. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and his children’s rights commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, for alleged war crimes involving the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia. How do we get our research in front of key people? Part of our strategy is through the media and strategic communications. We share our unique research with journalists, who cover our work in the news. We leverage new and sometimes local communications channels to get the information not only to those in power, but also the communities who are affected. Our reports are based on detailed investigations, which are more important than ever in a world rife with disinformation. When the world has forgotten about certain armed conflicts, we work to keep them in the news and on policy makers’ agendas. We advocate with people who are in positions to make the changes we want to see. For example, if we document an armed group using cluster munitions, we will go to the warring parties and say these are illegal under international law. If we can identify who manufactured and sold these weapons, we can go to those countries, show them our evidence, and tell them they may be complicit in war crimes. We have also focused on identifying the leaders – like senior commanders in the armed forces – who are responsible for the abuses taking place. Then we can work with governments to implement targeted sanctions or travel bans. For example, we are now pressing the European Union to use sanctions against those responsible for grave violations in the armed conflict in Sudan. It is our job to hold governments and their leaders accountable when they violate their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, no matter how powerful they are. When a military coalition including the United States and United Kingdom invaded Iraq in 2003, we documented their laws of war violations, including indiscriminate airstrikes that killed civilians and the torture of detainees. We also reported on Iraqi violations. Many years later, that work isn’t over. Righting wrongs is usually a marathon, not a sprint. But it can take time. Human Rights Watch’s documentation of abuses in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s contributed to the creation of war crimes tribunals and the prosecutions of leaders for war crimes. These trials began in the 2000s and continue in 2023. When it comes to our advocacy, where are our advocates located and what does their work look like? Our advocates take our research and engage with people in power to influence the political response to fighting on the ground. Sometimes they are engaging with the warring parties themselves, and sometimes they are urging change among those funding and supporting the warring parties. Our advocates’ goal, in the most general sense, is to make sure human rights are centered in these policy responses. We advocate with multilateral institutions at the global and regional level, whether it be the United Nations, the African Union, or the European Union, or other local and regional bodies that have responsibilities to protect civilians. We have a research presence in about 100 countries, and our advocates and researchers can advocate with governments in each of these countries. We have other advocates based all over the world, including in Tokyo, London, Washington DC, and Johannesburg, and in Australia, Brazil, and across Europe. Here’s an example of what our advocacy looks like. Starting in 2014, we worked to expose the violent crackdown on dissent by Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro government, which led to a spiraling humanitarian emergency and the exodus of millions of people. We shared our research at the UN Security Council and pushed for a UN response, and the pressure we helped generate ultimately resulted in more aid reaching people. Our research was cited by the Biden administration to grant temporary protected status to Venezuelans living in the United States, and by the Brazilian refugee agency to grant thousands of Venezuelans legal status. In short, our research, communications, and advocacy all work together in an incredibly effective way, ensuring that we deploy information in a way that compels those in power to take action. Who does Human Rights Watch work with during conflict? Our advocates and researchers work closely with partners – local human rights and other civil society groups, like humanitarian organizations, labor unions, and faith communities. For example, after armed conflict broke out in Sudan in April 2023, we knew we needed more power behind documenting – and preserving evidence of – the atrocities. Sustained advocacy by Human Rights Watch, combined with the power of the voices of Sudanese and regional partner organizations across Africa, helped lead the UN Human Rights Council to establish an independent international fact-finding mission for Sudan. What are the challenges you face? Today we see a number of conflicts raging where one side or the other – or both – shows little respect for these laws. I know some people can be skeptical of whether international humanitarian law and human rights law helps while a conflict rages. There are armed conflicts where the warring parties don’t seem to be showing any restraint – they seemingly flout these laws without consequence. We’ve seen this in the Horn of Africa since 2020. Government forces and allied militias in Ethiopia’s Tigray region have used rape as a weapon of war and destroyed infrastructure critical to civilians’ survival. They also had cut off the region from food, power, and communications for almost two years. This year, in neighboring Sudan, war has broken out – despite consistent warnings about escalating abuses by the country’s notorious security forces. Eight months later, we’ve documented ethnically motivated attacks on civilians in Darfur, how explosive weapons repeatedly used in urban areas have killed civilians and damaged critical infrastructure in the capital, Khartoum, and widespread obstruction of aid. In both countries, perpetrators of the crimes have faced very few consequences. In Ethiopia, after warring parties signed a cessation of hostilities agreement, international investigations into conflict-related atrocities were jettisoned as Ethiopia’s international and regional partners sought to normalize relations with the federal government. In Sudan, despite investigative efforts, accountability for crimes is just not being made a priority in political discussions. That doesn’t mean we give up. And the laws of war do matter, as they give us a framework to render meaningful judgments against combatants, affording victims and their families a measure of justice. Also, we know that when the laws of war are enforced, including through trials, they can help prevent atrocities by breaking cycles of violence and impunity. Our research shows that, all too often, when justice is scrapped to protect the powerful, these crimes just recur, creating new generations of victims. We’ve seen this in Afghanistan, when warlords granted themselves immunity, and when the International Criminal Court downgraded investigating US abuses in its investigation of alleged war crimes. We’ve also seen this in the Democratic Republic of Congo. If you want to stop recurring abuses, you need justice. And sometimes justice in a courtroom is a long time coming. In Syria, Human Rights Watch and many other groups spent years painstakingly documenting human rights violations and war crimes while those responsible were seemingly getting away with murder. Over 10 years on, though, we see that prosecutions for these crimes are gaining steam. You mentioned that we also campaign for support for justice, including before courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). One of our ultimate goals is justice and accountability for abuses. This includes shaping investigations and pressuring governments to arrest people wanted for serious crimes. We also push for effective war crimes courts, and work to secure financial and political support for accountability efforts. We sustain these campaigns for justice over many, many years. This often starts by making sure our published reports are brought to the attention of the international community and to authorities working before national courts, international courts – including the International Criminal Court – and hybrid courts, which are domestic courts containing international elements. Human Rights Watch has also advocated for national authorities to put in place the laws and expertise needed to support the practice of “universal jurisdiction,” under which national judicial authorities investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed in other countries, regardless of the nationality of the suspects or their victims. Over the course of 2020-2022, a German court held a trial on state-sponsored torture in Syria, ultimately convicting a former Syrian intelligence officer of crimes against humanity. A Human Rights Watch report documenting torture in Syria’s detention centers was referenced by the court during the trial. Any last thoughts? If I could wave a magic wand and stop conflicts around the world and bring people to an understanding, I’d do it. But that’s not reality. This is what we do instead. We document war crimes and other abuses. We make sure the world knows what’s happening, and we push for change. It’s not a perfect system, and sometimes it’s a long road to justice. But Human Rights Watch has done this work for decades, and we know from experience that justice is possible, and we do everything we can to make it probable..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2023-12-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Abductions, Forced Recruitment Violate Laws of War
Description: "(Bangkok) – An ethnic armed group in northern Myanmar has abducted and forcibly recruited civilians fleeing fighting in Shan State, Human Rights Watch said today. Myanmar’s military also has a long record of using adults for forced labor and recruiting children, but getting recent information about unlawful practices in junta-controlled areas is difficult. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group, should immediately end its abusive practices against civilians, and take all available measures to protect them during hostilities against Myanmar’s armed forces and pro-junta militias. “The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army is violating the laws of war by abducting and forcibly recruiting civilians, putting them at grave risk,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Civilians should be able to seek safety from fighting without fearing that the Myanmar military or ethnic armed groups will force them into their armies.” On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance – a coalition of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army – began Operation 1027, an offensive targeting Myanmar military outposts in northern Shan State. The offensive triggered attacks by opposition armed groups elsewhere in the country. Since late October, fighting between opposition forces and the military has displaced more than 600,000 people, including almost 100,000 in Shan State. Tens of thousands have fled Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Special Autonomous Zone in northern Shan State, in advance of an anticipated MNDAA assault on the town, which the group formerly controlled. Although the MNDAA assisted those fleeing by opening up previously closed forest roads, the armed unit also confiscated mobile phones and detained an unknown number of people as they left Laukkai, local media and witnesses said. On November 24, the MNDAA abducted seven men as they traveled from Laukkai to Chin Shwe Haw, near the Myanmar-China border. Relatives told the Shan News Herald that the men’s friends last saw them detained on the roadside just outside Chin Shwe Haw, before Alliance Army fighters took them away. The Shan News Herald reported that an MNDAA spokesperson said that Sai Ai Naw, 18; Maung Nyi Ka, 19; Sai Lianghan, 20; Sai Ilaw, 26; Maung Nor Goon, 26; Sai Aung Heng, 27, and a seventh, unnamed 20-year-old man would be assigned to military service. On November 25, a doctor who left Laukkai along the same route said he witnessed many young men pulled over and detained by MNDAA fighters outside Par Hsin Kyaw, a village between Laukkai and Chin Shwe Haw. “They [MNDAA fighters] were pulling over men who were on motorcycles in groups of twos and threes,” he said. They did not pull over couples, and I had one of the female nurses riding pillion, so we didn’t get stopped. But there were scores of young men pulled over and I saw them being rounded up. I was too afraid to stop and look but they were being gathered together and taken away somewhere.” On December 12, the parents of seven other young men who did not arrive home after fleeing Laukkai in late October issued a letter to the MNDAA, pleading for their release. The families wrote, in the letter obtained by Human Rights Watch, that they last saw their sons being led away by MNDAA fighters near Chin Shwe Haw. All those abducted were of Ta’ang ethnicity and came from Man Khite village, Namhsan township, in northern Shan State. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army operates in northern Shan State along the China-Myanmar border. It was founded as the Communist Party of Burma collapsed in 1989 and agreed to a ceasefire with the Myanmar military later that year. The ceasefire ended in 2009, when a military-aligned faction of the Alliance Army became the Kokang Border Guard Force and was put in charge of Laukkai, where illegal activity, most recently cyber scam centers, has thrived. The MNDAA has attempted multiple times to regain the territory, including Laukkai, that it lost in 2009. Some ethnic armed groups, including the MNDAA, impose quotas requiring villages or households to supply a recruit, who in some cases may be willing to serve. Myanmar’s military and pro-junta militias also use forced recruits, including children, to bolster their armed forces or for other roles such as porters, cooks, or cleaners. In a widely shared video dated December 5 that Human Rights Watch reviewed and verified, an MNDAA official in uniform warns families not to shirk their responsibilities and to ensure those recruited were at least 15 years old and younger than 50. “If [you don’t] have a boy … if you have a girl … if you have three [one must serve],” the official tells a crowd gathered at a monastery in Pang Hseng village, Monekoe township, in northern Shan State. “If you have five, two of them must serve. Got it? If you have five males at home, two of them must serve.” He continued: “So, if you’re thinking about not bringing your sons and daughters because you’re concerned, don’t do that. … One day when they come back because things are peaceful, we are going to collect household registrations and we will know that they did not serve, and we will arrest them for it.” Under international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, applicable to the non-international armed conflicts in Myanmar, warring parties are prohibited from arbitrarily depriving anyone of their liberty, including through abductions and forced recruitment. Parties must treat all civilians humanely; arbitrary deprivation of liberty is incompatible with this requirement. In September 2019, Myanmar ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which obligates non-state armed forces not to, “under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18.” The 2019 Myanmar Child Rights Law also forbids recruiting anyone under 18 into the armed forces or non-state armed groups. In 2023, the United Nations secretary-general's annual report on children in armed conflict identified the Myanmar military as responsible for the majority of the cases the UN had verified as recruiting and using children the previous year. However, the report also named the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army as having recruited up to seven children and separately, abducting up to seven others. The UN special rapporteur on Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has also received various reports that the Myanmar military’s recruitment and use of children has increased since the 2021 military coup. “Governments with any influence over opposition and ethnic armed groups in Myanmar should impress upon them that violations by the Myanmar armed forces never justifies abuses by their own forces,” Pearson said..."
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch (USA)
2023-12-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Yangon, MYANMAR / Bangkok, THAILAND, 20 December 2023 – During conflicts, women and girls bear the brunt with increased risk of gender-based violence and loss of access to life-saving sexual and reproductive health supplies and services. In Myanmar, 9.2 million women and girls are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, and over the last three years more than 2 million people have been internally displaced, of which more than half are women and girls. UNFPA, the UN's sexual and reproductive health agency, is on the ground in Myanmar working closely with UN agencies and partners to ensure women and girls continue to receive life-saving services, including psychosocial support to survivors of gender-based violence. “I recognize the selfless dedication and commitment of our staff and partners on the ground in Myanmar, working under extremely challenging circumstances. Our work is saving lives, and together, despite the challenges, we can and will stay and deliver for the women and girls of Myanmar to ensure their health, protection, and dignity is upheld at all times”, said UNFPA Regional Director for Asia-Pacific, Mr. Pio Smith, concluding a three-day visit to Myanmar, during which he met with UNFPA personnel, partners, donors, civil society, and youth organizations. During his visit, Mr. Smith noted the operational challenges that UNFPA and its partners face in effectively and efficiently delivering life-saving services to women and girls within the current political context in Myanmar. As part of his visit, Mr. Smith also met with authorities in Nay Pyi Taw where he discussed the impending operational challenges, and stressed on the urgent need for visas to be issued to UNFPA staff and for UNFPA and its partners to be granted travel authorization to the affected areas across the country to ensure continued and undisrupted delivery of life-saving services to women and girls in Myanmar. During the discussions, Mr. Smith reaffirmed UNFPA’s stance on the 2024 census, noting the UN agency’s inability to support the census given the current political and conflict context in Myanmar, a decision rooted in UNFPA's commitment to ensuring data collection is transparent, neutral, and respectful of human rights. UNFPA's dedication to supporting the sexual and reproductive health and rights of women and girls in Myanmar remains unwavering, noted Mr. Smith, reaffirming UNFPA’s continued commitment to stay and deliver. This pledge reflects the enduring mission to ensure that every pregnancy is wanted, every childbirth is safe, and every young person's potential is fully realized, at all times, especially in challenging environments..."
Source/publisher: United Nations Population Fund (New York)
2023-12-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Bago Region, Rakhine State, Shan State, and Kayin State from December 8th to 14th. 7 civilians including a child who liked and shared the posts about against Military Junta on social media, were arrested and charged. Military Junta arrested 8 locals from Ywangan Township, Southern Shan State, as hostages on December 12th. Military Junta Troop forced to plant the sunflower to the farmers in Ayeyarwady Region. 16 civilians died and over 20 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. 6 underaged children were injured and 5 died when the Military Junta committed violations. Over 80 civilians were arrested and over 30 were tortured within a week by the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-12-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 210.36 KB 199.99 KB 614.52 KB
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Description: "This Incident Report describes events that occurred in Bu Tho Township, Mu Traw (Hpapun) District in February 2023. On February 16th 2023 at 9 am, Saw Y--- (55 years old) and Naw W--- (32 years old) from H--- village, Ma Kah Heh village tract, stepped on landmines when they went to cut bamboo. From the landmine explosion, Saw Y--- was injured on his right leg and Naw W--- was injured on both of her legs, resulting in amputations. They were treated at two different hospitals. No organisation has provided support to the victims, but H--- villagers provided some support for food and medical costs. Saw Y--- and Naw W--- have been facing problems to secure their families’ livelihoods after they were injured. The landmine contamination in the surrounding areas creates fear for villagers living in H--- village.[1] (Excerpt) Part 3 – Complete Description of the Incident Describe the Incident(s) in complete detail. For each incident, be sure to include 1) when the incident happened, 2) where it happened, 3) what happened, 4) how it happened, 5) who was involved, and 6) why it happened. Also describe any villager response(s) to the incident, the aftermath and the current living situation of the victims. Please use the space prepared below, and create an attachment if needed. On February 16th 2023 at 9 am, two villagers, father and daughter, from H--- village, Ma Kah Heh village tract, Bu Tho Township, Mu Traw District, went to cut bamboo to fence their farmlands. When approaching the place to cut bamboo, Saw Y--- (55 years old) stepped on a landmine, injuring his right leg [that had to be amputated]. His daughter, Naw W--- (32 years old), stepped on another landmine when she went to help her father. Her legs were seriously injured by the landmine’s explosion, resulting in amputations of both legs. Hearing the sound of an explosion, H--- villagers learned about the incident, and contacted other villagers nearby, as well as local Karen National Union (KNU)[6] leaders working in the area. After hearing about the incident, the local KNU leaders and some villagers from H--- village went to get the two injured villagers from the incident location [close to the village] and brought them back to the village. The two victims were later sent by car to a hospital managed by the State Administration Council (SAC)[7] located in Hpapun Town. One of the victims explained that the SAC healthcare workers did not want to provide proper care to them because it was not an SAC landmine that the injured villagers stepped on. To be able to receive proper healthcare, [H---] villagers discussed among themselves and agreed to provide food, such as chicken and other, to [SAC] healthcare workers [to ensure the victims received treatment]. Residents of H--- believe that the landmines that injured Saw Y--- and Naw W--- were planted by KNLA soldiers from Battalion #15 because the KNLA had informed some villagers about the planting of landmines in the area beforehand. KNLA soldiers had informed some villagers one week earlier when they planted the landmines in the surrounding area, where Saw Y--- and Naw W--- had stepped on the landmines. The KNLA also asked A--- villagers, from Ma Htaw village tract, Dwe Lo Township, to inform villages nearby about the contaminated area. The place of this landmine incident is located close to SAC Infantry Battalion (IB)[8] #19 and #642 camp. The villagers from H--- village, including the victims, have never attended Mine Risk Education (MRE) training [The Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) is running an MRE program in the region]. Neither Saw Y--- nor Naw W--- received support from any organisation since they were injured from the landmines’ explosion. In the fourth week of February 2023, after one week at the SAC-managed hospital in Hpapun Town, they were sent to another hospital in town [unknown name]. It has not been possible to contact the victims since they were visited and interviewed in the [first] hospital [in Hpapun]. Saw Y--- and Naw W--- did not receive any support even after they had been discharged from the hospital [as explained by a local villager]. Saw Y--- used to secure his family’s livelihood by working as a daily labourer and Naw W--- used to wash clothes at hospitals and houses for her income before the 2021 military coup. The victims are facing difficulty securing their livelihoods because their [injured] legs were amputated and so they cannot work. Villagers living in H--- village are afraid to work on their farmlands because of landmine contamination in the surrounding areas, and it has created more fear now that two villagers have been seriously injured from landmine explosions..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
2023-12-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Size: 558.68 KB
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Description: "Foreword As we publish this 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), escalating fighting, surging displacement and extreme protection threats are now impacting vast swathes of the country, compounding the devastating impacts of Cyclone Mocha in May, and placing the people of Myanmar in increasing peril. Three years on from the military takeover, the humanitarian landscape for 2024 is grim with a third of the population – 18.6 million people – now estimated to be in humanitarian need. Children are bearing the brunt of the crisis with 6 million children in need as a result of displacement, interrupted health-care and education, food insecurity and malnutrition, and protection risks including forced recruitment and mental distress. The economic situation is placing families in increasing financial distress and coping capacities are stretched to the limit. Interruptions to agriculture and rapid inflation are making it increasingly difficult for people to access and afford adequate food, raising the spectre of climbing malnutrition. The health system is in crisis and millions are without safe shelter or drinking water. Women, girls, persons with disabilities and stateless Rohingya people are among those impacted the most by this dangerous environment. Development gains are concurrently under extreme threat with poverty now back at levels not seen for 15 years. This Plan paints a deeply disturbing picture that demands global attention and a dramatic increase in funding. Humanitarians require almost a billion dollars to reach 5.3 million people who have been prioritized for urgent assistance. We cannot afford a repeat of the gross underfunding seen in 2023 with only 29 per cent of requirements received. This lack of funding and severe access constraints meant that an estimated 1.9 million people who had been prioritized for support missed out on assistance altogether, while most of the 3.1 million people who were reached with some support did not receive the intended multi-sectoral assistance required to fully meet their needs. Brave aid workers – the majority of them local organizations on the front line of the response – remain committed to staying and delivering and have scaled-up wherever they can over the past three years. However, de-politicization of aid, as well as significantly expanded access and greatly increased funding will be critical to preventing the suffering of everyone prioritized for support in this Plan. Complementary funding is also needed across the nexus to address the persistent growth in humanitarian needs. The absence of large-scale preventative and resilience-building interventions by the broader development community is placing unprecedented pressure on humanitarian caseloads. To reverse current humanitarian trends, greater funding is simultaneously needed in 2024 for broader community development. We thank our generous donors for their ongoing solidarity with the people of Myanmar as needs continue to spiral. But in 2024, we need donors to dig deeper and speak louder to amplify the voices of affected people on the world stage. Millions of lives are at stake and we all must do everything we can to prevent Myanmar becoming a forgotten emergency..."
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-12-18
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 7.3 MB (95 pages) - Original version
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Description: "Theme: Contributions..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2023-12-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 375.92 KB
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Description: "Joint media release with: The Hon Andrew Giles MP, Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and, Multicultural Affairs The Hon Pat Conroy MP, Minister for Defence Industry, Minister for International Development and the Pacific The Albanese Government has pledged $265 million at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-led Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in Geneva to support refugees and to sustain humanitarian assistance in protracted crises. As the world faces a deepening crisis with more than 114 million people displaced across the globe, Australia is working to take a leading role in international resettlement efforts. In response to the ongoing displacement crisis, Australia will provide: $235 million to support displaced Rohingya and communities in need in Myanmar and Bangladesh. $20 million to support people in Afghanistan and those displaced to neighbouring countries. $10 million to support people in Sudan and those displaced to neighbouring countries. At the GRF, Australia reaffirmed its commitment to the Global Compact on Refugees, enhancing refugee self-reliance, and expanding access to third country solutions through resettlement and complementary pathway places. Australia's Humanitarian Resettlement Program has been increased to 20,000 places, the highest core intake in over a decade, and we are committed to growing skills-based pathways. Australia is also working to support other countries to establish and grow their own resettlement programs. The Australian Government recently established a Refugee Advisory Panel to Government to ensure those with lived experience can advise Australia's settlement programs. Australia's official delegation to the GRF includes one of its members Mr Danijel Malbasa, an advocate, writer, lawyer, and a former Yugoslav refugee, who co-delivered Australia's National Statement. Quotes attributable to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong: “We are seeing the largest displacement crisis unfolding in modern history, with more than 114 million people displaced globally. “Our humanitarian assistance is part of a broader effort to address the causes of displacement and find durable solutions. “Through our partners, Australia will deliver vital support to vulnerable people displaced by conflict.” Quotes attributable to the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the Hon Andrew Giles MP: “Our pledges aim to ease pressure on host countries and demonstrate our commitment to responsibility sharing, in recognition of the shared global challenge of displacement. “Through our pledges, Australia is firmly committed to supporting refugees globally and the communities that host them at a time where there are more people forcibly displaced than ever before. “The Albanese Government is committed to working with others globally to find practical, and sustainable solutions for the increasingly complex situations driving displacement, such as through the adoption of machine-readable refugee travel documents”. Quotes attributable to the Minister for International Development and the Pacific, the Hon Pat Conroy MP: “Australia is deeply concerned by the unprecedented number of displaced people around the world. “We are making an important contribution to the humanitarian response in partnership with other countries and international organisations at the Global Refugee Forum.”..."
Source/publisher: Government of Australia
2023-12-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "OVERVIEW: In Myanmar, the humanitarian situation deteriorated following a significant escalation in violence across the country. According to the UN, the number of displaced people inside the country now exceeds 2.1 million. In many parts of Myanmar, a shortage of various goods and supplies across multiple states and regions has been reported as vital roads and supply routes remain blocked. Many people remain cut-off from communications, which has impeded access to services and heightened protection risks and vulnerabilities. UNHCR and partners are continuing to deliver life-saving assistance to displaced and affected communities where possible despite the challenges posed by the ongoing clashes and movement restrictions. In Thailand, the Royal Thai Government reported that over 2,300 refugees were sheltered in three Temporary Safety Areas (TSAs) in Mae Hong Son province as of 30 November. Some 4,400 people returned to Myanmar in November following the closure of the TSAs. However, another 1,000 refugees who returned to Myanmar on 10 November came back to Thailand on 16 November after the resurgence of conflict in Kayah State. There are currently no new arrivals in Mae Hong Son TSAs. Sao Hin TSA in Mae Sariang District closed on 16 November as did Mae Ki TSA in Khum Yuam District on 25 November although Nai Soi TSA remains open. In India, approximately 57,100 individuals from Myanmar’s North-West region are reported to have sought safety in India since February 2021. Out of this population, some 5,500 individuals are in New Delhi and have registered with UNHCR. Over 6,000 individuals are estimated to have made their way to India following the recent escalation in conflict in Myanmar since late October. Since then, more than 5,000 Myanmar nationals have reportedly arrived in Mizoram and nearly 1,300 in Manipur. District administrations, NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) provided immediate humanitarian support such as food, water, and shelter. New arrivals are staying in cramped conditions in community halls, schools as well as with host families who are unable to support arrivals for long. Currently, the district administrations, CBOs and NGOs are providing food, shelter, core-relief items (CRIs), water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and health support although resources remain limited, and more funding is needed to scale up this assistance as well winterization support to new arrivals..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2023-12-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-15
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Description: "OVERVIEW: In Myanmar, the humanitarian situation deteriorated significantly after people across North-West, North-East, SouthEast and Rakhine States were newly forcibly displaced due to intensified fighting which erupted on 26 October. IDPs fled to existing and new displacement areas, including along Myanmar’s international borders. Martial Law was imposed on additional townships in multiple states. Key transport routes in various townships became restricted, impacting civilian movement and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Most IDPs and other conflict-affected communities have been unable to access basic services, assistance and protection with humanitarian organisations facing access restrictions due to renewed conflict and insecurity as well as bureaucratic and administrative challenges. In Thailand, the Royal Thai Government reported that 6,800 refugees were sheltered in five Temporary Safety Areas (TSAs) across three districts in Mae Hong Son Province as of 31 October 2023. Some 429 people returned to Myanmar during the reporting period. The Royal Thai Army oversees the TSAs and humanitarian access to these remains limited. In India, approximately 50,600 individuals from Myanmar’s North-West region have sought protection since February 2021. Out of this population, 5,479 individuals were in New Delhi and have registered with UNHCR. Over 120 individuals reportedly returned to Myanmar from Manipur due to the security situation in the state. In late October, community-based organisations (CBOs) reported some new arrivals from Myanmar fleeing armed clashes. Access to healthcare remains restricted due to curfew and security issues in Manipur. Many government facilities in areas affected by unrest are currently dysfunctional. As a result, the local population and Myanmar arrivals rely on the already over-stretched CBOs and NGOs, which have limited resources. To support Myanmar arrivals’ education needs in Manipur, informal learning spaces run by host communities and Myanmar arrivals have partially or completely waived off school fees for the most vulnerable children in Kamjong and Churachandpur districts. CBOs have reported food as the most urgent need in both Mizoram and Manipur although the situation is particularly alarming in Manipur's Kamjong District. More support is needed to address their nutritional needs to reduce the risk of malnutrition..."
Source/publisher: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva) via Reliefweb (New York)
2023-12-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Highlights: • Fighting between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and various groups, including Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), persists across much of the country. • More than 660,000 people are estimated to have been newly displaced since the escalation of armed conflict on 27 October, with some people displaced several times and others already starting to return home. Total current displacement now stands at 2.6 million people nationwide. • The volatile context is generating significant protection risks including increased civilian casualties, arbitrary arrests, exploitation, forced recruitment and forced labour. • Food, safe shelter, non-food items and hygiene kits, basic health services and protection support remain priorities with shortages of essential supplies being reported in many areas due to commercial and humanitarian transport blockages. • Despite insecurity, access, and telecommunication challenges, provision of essential humanitarian assistance to affected people continues where possible using a variety of flexible approaches. Humanitarian partners have now reached more than 80 per cent of those displaced in northern Shan. • The UN and partners continue to seek to access a greater proportion of affected people. An inter-agency mission was completed to Wa earlier in December and another is approved for the delivery of assistance to IDPs in southern Shan. • Despite surging needs, the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan is just 29 per cent funded days before the end of the year. An urgent injection of funds is desperately needed to sustain the response into the new year. Situation Overview Conflict between the MAF and multiple armed groups, including EAOs and PDFs, persists in many parts of the country involving armed clashes, airstrikes and artillery shelling and causing a surge in civilian casualties, displacement and destruction of civilian properties in numerous townships. Unverified field reports indicate that at least 378 civilians, including men, women, and children, have reportedly been killed and 505 others have been injured since the escalation began in late October. Since the intensification, more than 660,000 people are estimated to have been newly displaced in northern and southern Shan, Kayah, Rakhine, Chin, Sagaing, Mandalay, eastern Bago, Kayin, Mon, and Tanintharyi. There have been reports of some displaced people returning home while others have moved multiple times for safety. Some are reportedly reluctant to leave current displacement sites in northern Shan due to the risk of forced recruitment. Total current displacement nationwide now stands at a record 2.6 million people. The movement of people and transportation of goods is being heavily curtailed, while interruptions to phone and internet services are impacting on the sharing of civilian safety information and humanitarian operations. The lack of humanitarian and commercial access to transport routes is creating a scarcity of food, shortages of essential household items, soaring commodity prices and a fuel crisis in affected areas. Partners have identified the most urgent humanitarian needs across conflict-affected areas as food, safe shelter, non-food items and hygiene kits, basic health services and protection support. Faith-based organizations and local responders, in collaboration with international organizations, continue to provide lifesaving assistance to displaced and affected communities wherever access is possible. Despite an extremely challenging operational context, including supply stockpiles that are heavily depleted due to underfunding, access constraints and the rapid and unpredictable escalation of needs, humanitarian partners are reaching growing numbers of affected people. The vast majority of displaced people in northern Shan (82,000) have now received assistance and work continues to expand the response in other impacted areas such as the Northwest where 50,000 people have already been reached. A rapid response allocation of US$7 million from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) will provide survival support to people most affected in the coming weeks..."
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-12-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-15
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Description: "1. Today marks the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948. The democratically elected representatives of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw are striving for a future where human rights and dignity are upheld for everyone in Myanmar. At a time when the resistance movement has made dramatic gains against the illegal military junta, we once again can glimpse a future where human rights are promoted and protected in our country. We call for the international community to support us in our efforts to realize this future at this critical juncture. 2. As of today, human right abuses in many forms continue in many countries, including Myanmar where the situation is worsened by conflict. In Myanmar, we have witnesses the military junta carrying out unspeakable and horrific human rights violations against civilians, including the democratically elected lawmakers in the 2020 general election since the unlawful attempted coup on February 1 2021. 3. The military junta’s atrocities include arbitrary arrests, inhumane torture, extrajudicial killings, massive killings, sexual abuse and gender-based violence, property loot, seizure and destruction, mass arson and targeted aerial attacks against civilians and civilian objects. Some of them amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The executions of four democratic defenders including former lawmaker U Phyo Zeya Thaw constitute some of the most heinous human rights violations committed by the junta. 4. Since the attempted coup, over 4,250 civilians have been killed and 25,522 detained. An estimated 80,000 civilian houses and other infrastructure has been burnt down and destroyed. Schools, hospitals, religious buildings and even IDPs camps have been targeted frequently by airstrikes. The recent airstrikes on Mung Lai Hkyet Village in Laiza Township, Kachin State killed 28 people including 11 children and injured over 60 persons. The unlawful coup and unspeakable violence of the military junta’s armed forces has resulted in nearly 2.5 million people displaced and 18 million people including women and children in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. The international community is reminded again that it is very necessary to make practical cooperation with the National Unity Government and ethnic resistance organizations for the effective humanitarian aid to those in need of help. 5. In order to end the human rights violation and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, we must strive to reverse the coup and return Myanmar to democracy. The people of Myanmar are bravely resisting the brutal military junta in the cause of upholding their freedom, human rights, human dignity and justice. The military junta and those involved in human rights violations must be held accountable for their long reign of terror against all people of Myanmar including ethnic minorities and the Rohingya people. This is a critical step to progress towards a political transition to an inclusive federal democratic nation. Our vision is of a world where human rights and democracy are protected for all, not only in Myanmar but across Asia and in all countries worldwide. 6. We call on the global community including the United Nations and ASEAN to understand the current situation in Myanmar which is in a new phase. Democracy’s supporters are united in moving forward towards an end of military dictatorship and the victory of the Spring Revolution. This is an essential time for support from the international community. We welcome the coordinated sanctions of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada and urge all countries to take such actions. 7. We mark this Human Rights Day by reiterating our call to the United Nations, ASEAN, democratic countries, human rights organizations and individuals to help us to end the military coup and support the country’s democratically-elected representatives, legitimate institutions and ethnic representative organizations to restore democracy, peace, human rights and the rule of law in Myanmar. The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
2023-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-10
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Description: "၁။ ယနေ့သည် ၁၉၄၈ ခုနှစ်၊ ဒီဇင်ဘာလ ၁၀ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအထွေထွေညီလာခံ၌ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကြေညာစာတမ်းအား အတည်ပြုခဲ့သည့် (၇၅) နှစ်ပြည့်မြောက် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက် တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူသားတိုင်းအတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် လူ့ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာအားခံစားနိုင်မည့် အနာဂတ်အတွက် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက် ရှိပါသည်၊၊ တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီအပေါ် ခုခံတွန်းလှန်မှုများသည် သိသာထင်ရှား သောရလဒ်များ ပိုင်ဆိုင်နေသည့် ယခုအချိန်တွင် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့နိုင်ငံတွင် လူ့အခွင့် အရေးအား ကာကွယ်မြှင့်တင်ပေးမည့် အနာဂတ်ကိုလည်း မြင်ယောင်ကြည့်နိုင်ပြီ ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းအနေဖြင့် ယခုကဲ့သို့ အရေးကြီးသည့်အချိန်အခါတွင် မျှော်လင့်ထား သည့် ထိုအနာဂတ် အောင်မြင်စေရေးအတွက် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှုများတွင် ပံ့ပိုးကူညီ ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်၊၊ ၂၊၊ ယနေ့ခေတ်ကာလတွင် ပဋိပက္ခကြောင့် အခြေအနေပိုမိုဆိုးရွားနေသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံအများအပြားတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများသည် ပုံစံမျိုးစုံဖြင့် ဆက်လက် ဖြစ်ပေါ်နေဆဲဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ဥပဒေမဲ့အာဏာသိမ်းယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းသည့်အချိန်မှစ၍ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ်၊ အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှ ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက်တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူများအပေါ် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့ကြောင်း သက်သေများစွာရှိပါသည်၊၊ ၃။ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်တပ်၏ ဆိုးရွားသောအကြမ်းဖက်မှုများတွင် အကြောင်းပြချက်မဲ့ဖမ်းဆီး ခြင်း၊ လူမဆန်စွာ ညှဉ်းပန်းနှိပ်စက်ခြင်း၊ တရားလက်လွန်သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ လိင်ပိုင်းဆိုင်ရာစော်ကားခြင်းနှင့် လိင်ဖြစ်တည်မှုအပေါ်အခြေခံသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် ခြင်း၊ ပိုင်ဆိုင်မှုများကိုခိုးယူခြင်း၊ သိမ်းဆည်းခြင်းနှင့် ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်း၊ နေအိမ်များကို မီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ပြည်သူ များနှင့် အများပြည်သူဆိုင်ရာနေရာများကို ပစ်မှတ်ထား၍ လေကြောင်းဖြင့်တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းများ ပါဝင်ပါသည်၊၊ ယင်းတို့အနက် အချို့သည် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုမြောက်ပါသည်၊၊ လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်ဟောင်း ဦးဖြိုးဇေယျာသော် အပါအဝင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ ကာကွယ်သူ ၄ ဦးကို သေဒဏ်ပေး ကွပ်မျက်ခြင်းများသည် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အဆိုးရွားဆုံးသော လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများထဲမှ အချို့ပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ ၄။ အာဏာသိမ်းယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခဲ့သည့်အချိန်မှစ၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ပြည်သူ ၄,၂၅၀ ဦး အားသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ပြီး ၂၅,၅၂၂ ဦးအား ဖမ်းဆီးခဲ့သည်၊၊ ပြည်သူ့အိုးအိမ်နှင့် ပြည်သူပိုင် အဆောက်အအုံ ၈၀,၀၀၀ ခန့်ကိုမီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ဖျက်ဆီးခြင်းများ လုပ်ဆောင်ခဲ့သည်၊၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဆေးရုံများ၊ ဘာသာရေးအဆောက်အအုံများသာမက စစ်ဘေးရှောင်စခန်းများကိုပါ လေကြောင်း ဖြင့် မကြာခဏပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့သည်၊၊ မကြာသေးမီက ကချင်ပြည်နယ်၊ လိုင်ဇာမြို့ရှိ မုန်လိုင်ခတ်ကျေးရွာအား လေကြောင်းဖြင့် တိုက်ခိုက်ခဲ့မှုကြောင့် ကလေးငယ် ၁၁ ဦးအပါအဝင် ပြည်သူ ၂၈ ဦး သေဆုံးခဲ့ပြီး ၆၀ ဦးကျော် ထိခိုက်ဒဏ်ရာရခဲ့သည်၊၊ ဥပဒေမဲ့ အာဏာသိမ်းမှုနှင့် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီ၏ တပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၏ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကြောင့် ၂.၅ သန်းကျော်သော ပြည်သူများ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်နေရသည်၊၊ ထို့အပြင် အမျိုးသမီးနှင့် ကလေး သူငယ်များအပါအဝင် ၁၈ သန်းကျော်သည် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီများ အရေးတကြီး လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိပါသည်၊၊ ယင်းအကူအညီလိုအပ်နေသူများထံသို့ လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီများ အမှန်တကယ်ရောက်ရှိရန်အတွက် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်း အနေဖြင့် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများနှင့် လက်တွေ့ ကျကျ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ရန် အထူးလိုအပ်ကြောင်း ထပ်လောင်းအသိပေးလိုပါသည်၊၊ ၅။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဖြစ်ပေါ်လျက်ရှိသည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများနှင့် လူသားချင်း စာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ ပဋိက္ခများ အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရန် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုကို အဆုံးသတ်ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအား ဒီမိုကရေစီပြန်လည်ရရှိစေရန် ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်ရမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ မြန်မာ ပြည်သူများသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ လွတ်လပ်ခွင့်၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး၊ လူ့သိက္ခာနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့ ရရှိနိုင် ရန် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်သော အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီကို ရဲရင့်စွာ ခုခံတွန်းလှန်နေဆဲ ဖြစ်ပါ သည်၊၊ အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများတွင် ပါဝင်ခဲ့ကြသူများ အနေဖြင့် လူနည်းစုတိုင်းရင်းသားများနှင့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးများအပါအဝင် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ အပေါ်၌ ခေတ်အဆက်ဆက်က ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သည့် ရက်စက်အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအတွက် တာဝန်ယူ ရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ ယင်းသည် အားလုံးပါဝင်သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသို့ လျှောက်လှမ်း နေသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအကူးအပြောင်းအား ပိုမိုချောမွေ့စေမည့် အရေးကြီးသော အဆင့်တစ်ခုလည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်သာမက အာရှအပါအဝင် ကမ္ဘာတစ်ဝှမ်းရှိ နိုင်ငံများတွင် လူသား အားလုံးအတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် ဒီမိုကရေစီအား ကာကွယ်ပေးနိုင်မည့် ကမ္ဘာကြီး ဖြစ်တည် စေရန်မှာ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ မျှော်မှန်းချက် ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ ၆။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂနှင့် အာဆီယံအပါအဝင် ကမ္ဘာ့အသိုက်အဝန်းအနေဖြင့် တိုးတက်အောင်မြင် မှုအဆင့် အသစ်တစ်ခုရှိနေသော လက်ရှိ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အခြေအနေကို နားလည်ရန် တောင်းဆိုလို ပါသည်၊၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီ ထောက်ခံအားပေးသူများသည် စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ် အဆုံးသတ်ရေးနှင့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး၏ အောင်မြင်မှုအတွက် ဆက်လက်လုပ်ဆောင်သွားရန် စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်လျက် ရှိပါသည်၊၊ ယခုအချိန်သည် နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုက်အဝန်းထံမှ အကူအညီပေးအပ်ရန် အရေးကြီး အချိန်တစ်ခုလည်း ဖြစ်ပါသည်၊၊ အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စု၊ ယူကေနှင့် ကနေဒါနိုင်ငံတို့၏ ပူးပေါင်း အရေးယူ ဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများကို ကြိုဆိုပြီး အခြားသော နိုင်ငံများအနေဖြင့် အလားတူ အရေးယူ မှုများ ချမှတ်ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုပါသည်၊၊ ၇။ ယနေ့ကျ‌ရောက်သည့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနေ့တွင် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှု အား အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရေး ကူညီဆောင်ရွက်ပေးရန်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဒီမိုကရေစီ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့ ပြန်လည်ရရှိရေးအတွက် ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ ရွေးကောက် တင်မြှောက်ထားသည့် လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များ၊ တရားဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား ကိုယ်စားပြုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား ပံ့ပိုးကူညီပေးရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် ထပ်မံ တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
2023-12-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Since the attempted military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, Myanmar has fallen into a state of despair. Two-thirds of the Karenni population, one of the country’s minority groups, have been displaced. Gender-based violence is a widespread problem, and the conflict has made the situation for women and girls in the country increasingly worse. “Since conflict broke out, social violence has become widespread, and the military is notorious for its brutal sexual and structural violence. Women face potential danger everywhere, and it’s getting worse by the day”, says a representative of The Karenni National Women's Organization (KNWO), a women’s grassroots organization that was established by refugee women in a Karenni refugee camp in 1993. Due to the sensitivity of her work, she will remain anonymous. Situated in the eastern part of Myanmar, Karenni State has a population of around 300,000 people. In 2022, the amount of internally displaced people reached a devastating 280,000. According to the activist, with the ongoing fighting between the military and the People's Defence Force in the state capital of Loikaw, an additional 30,000 people are likely to be displaced. KNWO works to promote equal rights and opportunities for Karenni women in political, economic, and social spheres. In addition, the organisation provides support and services for the survivors of domestic and gender-based violence. With nearly the whole population displaced, the majority of the organisation’s activities take place in refugee camps in Karenni State’s internally displaced people (IDP) sites. “Joining KNWO has led to a great transformation in my life. The women are highly inspirational and have made me see things differently and truly understand the mechanisms we need to change in our society, and not the least highly motivated me to work for that change”, says the woman activist. Myanmar has a long way to go when it comes to transformation of gender norms: “Domestic violence is a common problem. The patriarchal system is deeply rooted in society, and the cultural mindset is very fixed. In addition, there are no proper mechanism or policies in place for the protection of women and girls. The perpetrators go unpunished”, KNOW’s representative explains. 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence has become an annual event for KNWO. “Being part of the global women’s movement is important to us, and ‘16 Days’ is great for awareness building. Before the attempted coup, we conducted 16 days activism in Bawlakhe Township in Karenni State. But our event was forced to stop. They didn’t allow us to celebrate. But we still mark this global moment, especially in our refugee- and IDPs areas,” she says. KNWO counts around 400 staff and volunteers in refugee camps and IDP camps. The organisation is part of a larger network of woman organisations located in different townships across the state, as well as nation-wide organisations. “We all work to promote women’s rights, but we cover different areas. We have a widespread network in Karenni state. On national level, we are a member of Women's League of Burma, an umbrella organisation for all the ethnic women organisations,” the woman activist says. A key issue for KNWO is to push political institutions for political change and promote participation and representation of women in public society. Currently they are pushing for the Karenni state consultative council, which is the political platform where all revolutionary organisations are represented, to adopt a gender policy framework. An executive pillar and judicial pillar have already been established. What remains is the establishment of a legislative pillar. So far, the women's organisations have been able to get two positions in the Karenni state consultative council. “With two civil society representatives in place, carrying the wisdom of all the women organisations with them, we can advocate within the system we are trying to change”, she says. In her experience, women issues are always being depoliticised. “My message for this year’s 16 days campaign, is that women’s issues are political issues, and something that all political decision makers need to take seriously”. Through awareness building on how women are being marginalised throughout political processes, the revolutionary actors in the conflict have slowly become aware that during the revolution, women are also being captured and targeted. “This is not an issue for female soldiers only, it goes for medical staff, teachers, homemaker, and mothers taking care of children. Many of the roles traditionally occupied by women are considered low status, making them especially vulnerable during conflict. This is important to acknowledge, and we see attitudes slowly changing”, she adds. It is not without risk that Myanmar’s women activists have taken on the fight against gender inequality. “There are lots of obstacles and we constantly get threatened, both from the perpetrator and from the local community”, the activist explains. “That is why we have organised. Working alongside other women gives us courage”..."
Source/publisher: Norwegian People's Aid
2023-12-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Dec 1 to 7, 2023 Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Mon State, Rakhine State, Shan State, and Chin State from December 1st to 7th. Military Junta also burnt and killed 11 civilians in Monyea Township, Sagaing Region on December 2nd. 2 Sittwe locals who shared Rakhine News on Facebook, were arrested and opened cases by the Military. The Military Junta also arrested a Community-Based Organization member from Kyaukme Township in North Shan State. 15 civilians died and almost 18 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. 4 underaged people were injured and 1 died when the Military Junta committed violations. Over 32 civilians were arrested and 12 were killed within a week by the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
2023-10-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Highlights: • More than half a million people are estimated to have been newly displaced due to the escalation of armed conflict since 26 October, although figures are fluid due to returns and redisplacement, while communication challenges are making numbers difficult to verify. This adds to the 2 million people who were already displaced before the current escalation of violence. • Fighting between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and various groups, including Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), persists in about twothirds of the country. • Intense clashes have been reported in many townships across northern and southern Shan, Rakhine and Chin, Sagaing, Magway, Kayah, eastern Bago and Kayin in early December, causing further humanitarian needs and challenges. • Despite insecurity, access, and telecommunication challenges, provision of essential humanitarian assistance to affected people continues where possible using a variety of flexible approaches by humanitarian responders and partners. • In northern Shan, an estimated 85 per cent of the newly displaced population in northern Shan have received some form of basic humanitarian assistance at least once although this is not sufficient to fully meet their needs. • Extensive needs and gaps remain in providing regular support to all people in need with displaced people in some parts of the country normally heavily reliant of humanitarian assistance for their survival. • The UN and partners are exploring pathways to access a greater proportion of affected people, particularly at the China-Myanmar border. • Key challenges include road closures, movement restrictions, as well as the safety and security of aid workers. The response is further complicated by a fuel crisis, serious banking issues, and soaring commodity prices. • In Rakhine, high market prices and the scarcity of food and household items have added layers of hardship for entire populations and vulnerable communities, including internally displaced people (IDPs) who have been facing the consequences of years of conflict and the aftermath of Cyclone Mocha. • The 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) is grossly under-funded with only 29 per cent of required funding received from the donor community. An urgent injection of support is critical to enable humanitarians to respond effectively and at-scale to the escalating needs in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
2023-12-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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