Formal Sanctions

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Description: "The European Union established an arms embargo on Burma at some point prior to the agreement on a Common Position on Burma/Myanmar 1996/635/CFSP in October 1996. The Common position reaffirms the following measures that had already been adopted in 1990 and confirmed in a Declaration by the General Affairs Council on 29 July 1991:..."
Source/publisher: Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Date of entry/update: 2010-10-17
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Date of entry/update: 2010-10-19
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Texts of the EU Council and Commision Regulations and of the EU?s Common Position, updated from November 1996. Contnets include: * Publication of visa ban list. * Freezing of funds of certain persons. * Confirmation of expulsion and withdrawal of all military staff attached to representations. * Confirmation of the embargo on arms and military equipment. * Prohibition to grant visas to leading members of the regime, to authorities in charge of tourism sector, and high-ranking members of the armed forces. * Suspension of official bilateral visits. * Prohibition on the export of equipment which may be used for internal repression or terrorism.
Source/publisher: European Union
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Individual Documents

Topic: Business , Crisis and Conflict
Sub-title: Governments Should Take Stronger Steps to Cut Natural Gas Revenues
Topic: Business , Crisis and Conflict
Description: "Governments and energy companies should follow up a recent decision by Chevron and Total SA to suspend payments from a gas pipeline project in Myanmar with additional steps to cut off funding to the country’s military junta, Human Rights Watch said today. While the May 26, 2021 announcement reflects a shift in corporate dealings with the junta that seized power on February 1 and has engaged in a brutal crackdown since, the payments are just a modest amount of the military’s overall gas revenues. Governments and all energy companies operating in Myanmar should take stronger action to block natural gas revenues flowing to the Myanmar military. Natural gas revenue is the military’s largest source of foreign currency income, including approximately $1 billion in duties, taxes, royalties, fees, tariffs, and other profits. The dividends suspended by Chevron and Total are a minimal part of the overall payments the government receives from natural gas. “Chevron and Total’s recent decision is a step in the right direction, but it affects less than 5 percent of the natural gas revenue the Myanmar junta receives,” said John Sifton, Asia advocacy director. “To have real impact, governments and companies need to go further to stop the junta from receiving funds or accessing bank accounts that receive payments.” The decision announced by Total and Chevron concerns only a 15 percent dividend paid by a pipeline company, the Moattama Gas Transportation Company (“Moattama”), from profits from transportation fees it earns moving gas from Myanmar’s offshore Yadana gas field to Myanmar and Thailand. Total said the payments were suspended as of April 1. Total and Chevron together are the majority owners in Moattama, with 31.2 percent and 28.3 percent of the project, respectively. The military-controlled company Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), owns 15 percent, and the Thailand state-owned gas company PTT owns 25.5 percent. Total acts as the “operator” of the Yadana wellheads and Moattama’s pipeline infrastructure. The suspended payments are dividends to these companies based on their ownership share. According to Moattama financial records, the company paid MOGE about $38 million in 2018 and approximately $52 million in 2019, consistent with EITI reporting indicating that MOGE’s overall gas transportation dividends from gas operations are less than 7 percent of overall state revenue from natural gas. Total’s and Chevron’s statements do not mention the hundreds of millions of dollars in additional tariffs, fees, and tax payments that Moattama pays to Myanmar military-controlled bank accounts. The statement does not apply to hundreds of millions of dollars more that MOGE receives from its share of revenues from selling gas to PTT. “While only a modest amount of the overall revenues was suspended, Total and Chevron’s decision signifies that at least some companies in Myanmar recognize that their cash payments to junta-controlled accounts create major reputational risks,” Sifton said. Total acknowledged the dire situation in Myanmar and suggested in its statement that further action might be taken: “Total condemns the violence and human rights abuses occurring in Myanmar and reaffirms that it will comply with any decision that may be taken by international and national authorities, including applicable sanctions issued by the EU or US authorities.” Chevron’s statement noted that the company “condemns the violence and human rights abuses occurring in Myanmar. We stand with the people of Myanmar and the global community in urging for a peaceful resolution that respects the will of the people.” The company said that it would respect sanctions imposed on additional gas revenue but cautioned against them. Total and Chevron should provide more information on the value of the dividends that have been suspended. They and other energy companies operating in Myanmar should also clarify their positions on sanctions and explain why carefully applied sanctions would not allow their operations to continue while revenues to the junta were blocked. The companies should also adhere to applicable international sanctions and make public information about all payments they make to military-controlled and state-owned entities. Total has not yet replied to a May 11 letter in which Human Rights Watch asked about the potential effects, if any, of the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and others imposing sanctions on Myanmar military-controlled entities or imposing economic measures to block Myanmar military-controlled bank accounts from receiving revenues. Specifically, the letter asked whether such measures would prevent Total from continuing to operate in Myanmar. Governments considering new sanctions on gas revenue should focus more attention on PTT, a shareholder and primary purchaser of the gas that Moattama transports, and the banks that send and receive its payments to Myanmar military-controlled accounts. All the revenue from Total’s joint ventures in Myanmar come from PTT in the first instance, and the company separately pays military accounts hundreds of millions of dollars yearly. PTT alone also operates a separate smaller gas field, Zawtika, which provides the Myanmar junta hundreds of millions of dollars in additional payments. Another gas production and pipeline venture run by the South Korean company POSCO operates in the country’s third major field, Shwe, and receives payments from a Chinese-owned company that pays the junta several hundred million dollars per year. Total, Chevron, PTT, and POSCO should signal support to authorities in the US, EU, Thailand, and other jurisdictions for sanctions or other measures to block royalties, share dividends, tariffs, and tax payments to Myanmar military-controlled accounts. “If governments effectively sanction or suspend the natural gas revenue generated for the military junta, it will lose $1 billion a year being used to hurt Myanmar’s people,” Sifton said. “That kind of economic impact could put real pressure on the military to stop its brutal repression and return the country to a democratic path.”..."
Source/publisher: "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
2021-05-28
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Description: Summary: "Is now the time for the U.S. Government to drop all sanctions on Myanmar (also known as Burma)? A network of corporate lobbyists and business associations are seeking to convince the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama to lift all remaining sanctions on the country by letting the existing sanctions authority expire this month. At the core of their argument is the idea that the situation in Myanmar has fundamentally changed for the better and that economic sanctions are no longer necessary or productive. Fortify Rights and United to End Genocide interviewed 43 eyewitnesses and survivors of human rights abuses as well as U.N. officials and others in Yangon Division, Rakhine State, and Kachin State in Myanmar in March and April 2016 to assess whether the U.S. Government should maintain its authority to sanction Myanmar or let it lapse this month. Given the current political landscape in Myanmar and ongoing egregious human rights violations, this report recommends that President Obama renew the sanctions authority on Myanmar for at least another year..."
Creator/author: Tom Andrews, David Baulk, Matthew Smith, Amy Smith, Daniel Sullivan.
Source/publisher: Fortify Rights, United to End Genocide
2016-05-00
Date of entry/update: 2016-05-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : pdf
Size: 1.83 MB
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Description: Eine Analyse ?ber den Charakter und die Geschichte des Milit?rregimes, die Rolle der intnernationalen Gemeinschaft, der EU, USA und China und die Wirkung von Sanktionen, insbesondere nach den Aufst?nden 2007. M?glichkeiten und Grenzen eines UN-Engagements; character and history of the military regime, international community, USA, EU, China; impact of sanctions, uprisings 2007, UN-Engagement
Creator/author: Marco Buente
Source/publisher: German Institute of Global and Area Studies
2007-11-00
Date of entry/update: 2010-10-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: German, Deutsch
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Description: "Trade Policy Analysis No. 1" Executive Summary: The U.S. policy of imposing unilateral trade and investment sanctions against Burma has proven to be a failure on all fronts. By forcing U.S. firms to disengage from Burma, that policy has harmed American economic interests and done nothing to improve the living conditions or human rights of the people of Burma. Sanctions have denied Burmese citizens the benefits of increased investment by American multinational companies--investment that brings technoloygy, better working conditions, and Western ideas. State and local sanctions against Burma have compounded the problem caused by federal sanctions and raised troubling constitutional questions.
Creator/author: Leon T. Hadar
Source/publisher: US Treasury
1998-10-26
Date of entry/update: 2010-10-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Overview lists Political Context; Legal basis of EU relations; Trade/Economic Issues; Community Aid, General data. Other sections include: Conclusions of the General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC), Updates on the EU position.
Source/publisher: European Commission
2003-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2010-10-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Source/publisher: European Council via EUR-Lex
2001-10-30
Date of entry/update: 2010-10-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English (10 other languages avaialble)
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Description: Council Regulation (EC) No 1081/2000 of 22 May 2000 prohibiting the sale, supply and export to Burma/Myanmar of equipment which might be used for internal repression or terrorism, and freezing the funds of certain persons related to important governmental functions in that country
Source/publisher: European Council via EUR-Lex
2000-05-22
Date of entry/update: 2010-10-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English (18 other languages available)
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Description: "The recent report by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), Badgley, J.H. (2004) ?Reconciling Burma/Myanmar: Essays on U.S. Relations with Burma?[3 March 2004], presented a shamelessly one-sided set of arguments for changing United States policy towards Myanmar. This paper tries to redress the balance, and to present both sides of the argument concerning what is, after all, a complex and heated issue. Two ?core arguments? of the NBR report are identified and discussed, and in contrast the author develops two ?core counter-arguments? for maintaining, with modifications, the existing U.S. policies with respect to Myanmar..."
Creator/author: Adam McCarty
Source/publisher: Mekong Economics Ltd.
2004-03-31
Date of entry/update: 2010-08-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : htm
Size: 83.36 KB
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Description: This legislation was signed into law by the US President on 28 July 2003.
Source/publisher: U S Government via Trillium Asset Management
2003-07-28
Date of entry/update: 2010-08-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Articles on the Massachusetts Burma Law and selective purchasing laws
Source/publisher: "Burma Debate", Vol. VI, No. 2
1999-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2010-08-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : pdf
Size: 693.5 KB
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Description: Burma verf?gt ?ber das weltweit gr??te Vorkommen von Rubinen. Unter unmenschlichen Bedingungen abgebaut, flie?en die Erl?se direkt in die Taschen des diktatorischen Regimes, egal ob offiziell exportiert oder illegal gehandelt. Boykott von Rubinen; Kimberley-Prozess; Boykott of Rubins, Kimberley-Process
Creator/author: Jolien Schure
Source/publisher: Fatal Transactions - Eine europ?ische Kampagne zur Rohstoffgerechtigkeit
2007-11-00
Date of entry/update: 2010-06-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: German, Deutsch
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Description: Die jüngsten Demonstrationen in Burma sind eine erneute Bewährungsprobe für demokratische Werte in einer Welt, die zumindest in politischer Hinsicht größtenteils demokratisch ist. Ebenso wie der Kampf der Werte auf den blutigen Straßen in Teilen Burmas sichtbar war, beschloss die benachbarte "größte Demokratie der Welt", die gleichzeitig ein strategischer Partner des Landes ist, eben jene Werte, die es tendenziell vertritt, aufs Spiel zu setzen. Der Rest der Welt ? insbesondere die USA und Europa ? tat kaum mehr als diplomatische Statements abzugeben und Indien und China zu drängen, entschieden vorzugehen. Indisch-burmesische Beziehungen, Burma-US Amerikanische Beziehungen, Burma-EU Beziehungen, Sanktionen; Indian-burmese, US-Burmese, EU-Burmese relations; sanctions;
Creator/author: Sachin Joshi
Source/publisher: Südasien
2008-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2008-02-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: German, Deutsch
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Description: Mit welcher Strategie ist den Menschen in Birma am ehesten geholfen? Die USA und die EU, auch die Bundesregierung schon zu Zeiten von Rot-Grün setzen auf Sanktionen; die asiatischen Nachbarn Birmas eher auf Diplomatie und Einbindung. Darüber diskutierten am Dienstag, 4.12.2007, beim Jour Fixe der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung und der tageszeitung (taz) der birmanische Menschenrechtsexperte und Oppositionelle Dr. Maung Zarni, der heute an der Universität Oxford in Großbritannien tätig ist, der Birma-Experte Dr. Hans-Bernd Zöllner, der am Asien-Afrika-Institut der Universität Hamburg lehrt, sowie Kerstin Müller, die außenpolitische Sprecherin der Bundestagsfraktion von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. Debate on the efficiency of sanctions
Creator/author: Schaaf Stefan
Source/publisher: Heinrich Böll Stiftung
2007-12-00
Date of entry/update: 2007-12-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: German, Deutsch
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Description: "...Since 1990, most Western governments have taken a self-consciously principled approach to Myanmar, applying coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions in an effort to force the military government to implement the results of the multiparty election held that year. The 30 May 2003 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her followers increased both political pressure and justification for strengthening this approach. However, the military government today is more entrenched and more recalcitrant than when it took power. The prodemocratic opposition -- although it maintains broad popular support -- has lost much of its momentum, and international actors have demonstrably failed to protect even Aung San Suu Kyi, not to speak of less prominent figures, from persecution. Meanwhile, the socio-economic conditions for a majority of the population have greatly deteriorated. In short, things are moving the wrong way. The much gentler 'engagement' policy embraced by most of Myanmar's Asian neighbours for most of the period of military rule has been equally unproductive. In the absence of any external pressure at all for change, it is highly unlikely that any change at all will occur. The people of Myanmar need greater say in the governance of their country. The failure of 40 years of military rule to provide human welfare and security consonant with the country's great natural potential is closely linked to the absence of popular participation in decision-making. For now, however, the configuration of power and interests inside the country are not conducive to major, quick change -- and there are no "magic bullets", no realistic policy options that can change that. In such circumstances, efforts are required to change political, social and economic realities over a longer period in ways that would facilitate better governance and the gradual introduction and consolidation of genuinely democratic institutions. That is only likely to happen if coercive measures are allied to a more flexible, intensive and sustained diplomatic strategy that does not in any way embrace the military government, but rather includes a greater willingness to pursue some half-measures, small steps and even limited cooperation in order to begin to move the country forward while protecting those who suffer under the status quo or might be hurt by future reforms. International objectives have to be rethought, new benchmarks for change adopted, a more supportive approach toward creating a positive internal climate of change adopted, and more support given to the UN in its important mediation and facilitation role. The road map put forward by the SPDC and realignments within the military government offer a sign of movement, slight though it may be, in the political situation. This provides an opportunity to encourage progress and should not be dismissed out of hand. Any government or institution that deals with Myanmar needs to maintain an acute sense of the realities of the country: change is often painfully slow and easily reversed, the military is an intensely difficult institution with which to deal, and outside influence on any of the actors is very limited. The international community should take whatever opportunity is presented to encourage whatever progress is possible. That means developing a new policy approach -- containing elements of the present sanctions approach of the West and engagement policy of the region, but more productive than either -- that brings together international actors rather than divides them, creates an environment for change in the country and offers a way out for all parties that has a chance of being accepted..."
Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (ICG)
2004-04-26
Date of entry/update: 2004-04-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives... Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights... Statement of Chairman Elton Gallegly... Developments in Burma... March 25, 2004.
Creator/author: Elton Gallegly
Source/publisher: Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives
2004-03-25
Date of entry/update: 2004-04-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives... Statement by Representative James A. Leach, Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific... Joint Subcommittee Hearing on Developments in Burma... March 25, 2004
Creator/author: James A. Leach
Source/publisher: Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives
2004-03-25
Date of entry/update: 2004-04-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Committee on International Relations U.S. House of Representatives... House International Relations Committee Joint Hearing Between Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific And Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights... TESTIMONY BY DAW SAN SAN ELECTED MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY, BURMA... March 25, 2004.
Creator/author: Daw San San
Source/publisher: Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives
2004-03-25
Date of entry/update: 2004-04-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Testimony by Assistant Secretary Lorne W. Craner Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau U.S. Department of State At a hearing entitled Developments in Burma By the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights March 25, 2004
Creator/author: Lorne W. Craner
Source/publisher: US Dept. of State via Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives
2004-03-25
Date of entry/update: 2004-04-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Matthew P. Daley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights Washington, DC March 25, 2004
Creator/author: Matthew P. Daley
Source/publisher: http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/h/tst/2004/
2004-03-25
Date of entry/update: 2004-04-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Human Rights and U.S. Strategy in Burma... Testimony by Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch.
Creator/author: Tom Malinowski
Source/publisher: Human Rights Watch via Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives
2004-03-25
Date of entry/update: 2004-04-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Testimony by Veronika A. Martin Policy Analyst, U.S. Committee for Refugees... Developments in Burma... Before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific and The Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Human Rights... March 25, 2004... Myanmarese Refugees in Thailand and The Human Rights Situation in Eastern Myanmar.
Creator/author: Veronika A. Martin
Source/publisher: US Committee for Refugees via Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives
2004-03-25
Date of entry/update: 2004-04-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: 1 FOREWORD BY ARCHBISHOP DESMOND TUTU; INTRODUCTION:- 3 FLAWED IMPLEMENTATION; 3 MOVING AHEAD; 4 RESISTANCE; 4 BROKEN PROMISES; 5 NO DELAY; 6 SMART SANCTIONS... PART 2: THE STORY SO FAR:- 7 CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS; 9 ROADMAPS LEADING NOWHERE: * Thai �road map' _ Much Ado About Nothing; * The SPDC Roadmap_ the Perfect Stalling Tactic; * National Convention background; * What's missing from the �road map'; * What the convention does offer; * NLD & ethnic nationality participation not required; 12 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; 14 BROADER INDIRECT IMPACT OF SANCTIONS; 17 LIMITATIONS OF SANCTIONS: * �Carroty Sticks'; 18 SANCTIONS & THE ECONOMY... PART 3: CURRENT SANCTIONS:- 21 CANADA'S SANCTIONS ON BURMA; 22 EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS ON BURMA; 23 JAPAN'S POLICY ON BURMA; 24 UNITED STATES SANCTIONS ON BURMA; 25 SANCTIONS & ACTIONS: AN ASSESSMENT; 25 IMPORT BAN: * Direct Impacts; * Room For Improvement; 26 BAN ON REMITTANCES TO BURMA: * Direct Impacts; * Room For Improvement; 28 FOREIGN INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS: * Direct Impacts; * Room For Improvement; 30 ARMS EMBARGO / NON-PROVISION OF ARTICLES/SERVICES THAT COULD BE USED FOR REPRESSION * Direct Impacts: * Room For Improvement; 33 ASSETS FREEZE: * Direct Impacts & Room For Improvement; 34 TRAVEL/VISA BAN: * Direct Impacts; * Room For Improvement; 35 BAN ON DIRECT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: * Direct Impacts & Room For Improvement; * Japan Suspends Aid to Burma; * Drug Eradication Assistance; * Direct Impacts & Room For Improvement; 37 SUSPENSION OF MDB & IFI ASSISTANCE: * Direct Impacts & Room For Improvement; 38 TRADE PREFERENCE SUSPENSIONS: * Direct Impacts; * Room For Improvement; 40 DIPLOMATIC DOWNGRADES; 40 INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO): * A Model For Sanctions; 43 UNITED NATIONS: * SPDC Thumbing Their Nose At The UN; * UN Interventions; * Extreme Violations; * Broad Based Support; 46 WHAT ABOUT THE UNSC? 47 UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL ENVOY TO BURMA: * Turning of the Tide; * A New Strategy; * UN Special Envoy's Mandate; 49 THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR'S OBLIGATION: * A Different Tune; 50 UNDERMINING ITSELF; PART 4: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS & SANCTIONS:- 51 �RECIPE FOR RECONCILIATION'; 51 PRINCIPLED ENGAGEMENT: * Nominations for the Burma Diplomatic Squad; * Components of the Recipe; * Reconstruction of Burma; 54 NO MORE TOYS FOR THE BAD BOYS; 54 WIDEN BAN ON REMITTANCES TO BURMA; 55 IMPORT BAN ON GOODS FROM BURMA: * 10% of Exports Profits Directly Fund the Regime; 58 BAN ON CONFLICT RESOURCES: * SPDC Involvement; * Examples of SPDC �unofficial' involvement in logging; * Local Communities � Logging often hurts more than it helps; * Gems; * Environmental Destruction; * Employment; * Forced Labor; * Ethnic Nationalities � Between A Rock & A Hard Place; * Drugs, HIV/AIDS & Money Laundering; * Resource Diplomacy; * Who's Operating? * Some of the Big Boys... 70 BAN ON NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM BURMA; 71 RESTRICTION ON FUEL SALES TO BURMA; 72 BAN ON OIL & GAS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI): * Oil & Gas; * New Pipeline Proposal; * Yadana Partners Strike Again; * Greater Mekong Subregion Project; 74 FULL INVESTMENT BAN: * Major FDI Players; * FDI 2001-2002; * Trade Fairs; * FDI Exposure to Money Laundering; * What About the Workers? 79 SPECIAL FOCUS: TENTACLES 'S HOLD ON THE FORMAL ECONOMY: * The BIG Tentacles � A Snapshot! * Ministry of Defense; * DDP: Directorate of Defense Procurement; * DDI: Directorate of Defense Industries; * MEC: Myanmar Economic Corporation; * UMEH (UMEHL): Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings; * MOGE/MPE/MPPE; * Ministry of Industry I; * Ministry of Industry II; * Myanmar Agricultural Produce Trading (MAPT); * Myanmar Timber Enterprise (MTE); * Myanmar Export-Import Services (MEIS); * Ministry of Post and Telegraphs (MPT); * Ministry of Hotels & Tourism; * Myanmar Electric Power Enterprise (MEPE); * Directorate of Ordnance; * State-Owned/Controlled Banks; 86 A CLOSER LOOK: UNION OF MYANMAR ECONOMIC HOLDINGS LTD (UMEH/UMEHL/UMEHI): * Gems; * Jade; * UMEH Business Ventures; * Keeping It In The Family: Industrial Estates; * It Gets Worse; * Six Degrees Of Separation; * Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA); * Na Sa Ka: Making Human Rights Violations Profitable... 95 WIDEN THE ASSETS FREEZE; 95 IMPLEMENT FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF) RECOMMENDATIONS; 98 WITHHOLD ASSISTANCE FROM IFI/MDBS: * Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS); * East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC); * Power Trade Operating Agreement (PTOA); * Technical Assistance; * Withhold GMS Funding For Projects In Burma... 102 SUSPEND JAPAN'S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) TO BURMA: * Options; 105 PRESSURE ON JAPAN; 105 BOYCOTT AND DIVESTMENT CAMPAIGNS; 108 DELAY TOURISM: * Benefiting Whom? 109 ASEAN TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY: * The Reality; * Credibility on the Line; 111 INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE REGIME'S KEY PARTNERS; 112 SPORTS EMBARGO; 113 OFFICIAL RECOGNITION FOR THE CRPP; 113 INCREASE CAPACITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT; 114 PUT SPDC ON PROBATION; 114 TAKE BURMA TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC): * Rampant Military Growth; * Known weapons procurement during 2001-July 2003; * Civilian Military Porters; * Child Soldiers; * Drugs; * Civil War; * Displacement of People; * Systematic human rights abuses; * Failure to recognize democratic elections; * Regional Implications... PART 5: MYTHS & REALITIES:- 132 MYTH 1: Sanctions on Burma have not worked.; 133 MYTH 2: The effectiveness of sanctions is too limited to beconstructive; 134 MYTH 3: The SPDC is not influenced by international pressure; 135 MYTH 4: Sanctions can be used as a scapegoat by the SPDC for internal policy failures; 136 MYTH 5: Sanctions will alienate the �moderates' in the regime; 137 MYTH 6: Sanctions take away incentives for the regime to make progress; 138 MYTH 7: Constructive engagement would be successful in bringing reforms in Burma; 139 MYTH 8: Sanctions and principled engagement cannot work as complementary approaches; 141 MYTH 9: Western nations' economic stake in Burma is not large enough for sanctions to be effective; 142 MYTH 10: Sanctions will not impact the regime but will mostly hurt civilians: * Formal and Informal Economy; * Reality Check; * Jobs Lost? 146 MYTH 11: Sanctions are starving the population: * Very Low Nutrition and Life Expectancy Rates; * More Displacement in Ethnic and Central Areas; * Logging and Increased Poverty; * Military Forces and Arms Procurement Have Increased; * More Oppression; * Four-Cuts Program; * Mawchi Township: Impoverished by the SPDC; 151 MYTH 12: Investment and trade has brought better working conditions; 153 MYTH 13: Sanctions destroyed Burma's investment climate: * Mandalay Brewery: A Cautionary Tale; 156 MYTH 14: Sanctions created Burma's current financial crisis; * Foreign Exchange Certificates (FECs); 158 MYTH 15: Burmese people do not want sanctions; 159 MYTH 16: International pressure & sanctions will isolate the regime, push it closer to China; PART 6: IRREVERSIBLE STEPS FORWARD:- 162 LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN: * A Few Steps Behind; * Engagement & Reward � A Dangerous Game; * Transformation; 164 SANCTIONS FOR CHANGE: * Clear Recipe; * Period of Leverage & Enforcement Actions; * Timing & Strength; * Committee oversight; * Communication; * Moderates?; * Lose-Lose Situation; * Premature Action; 172 EU'S NEW STRATEGY APRIL 2003 � WHY IT DIDN'T MEASURE UP; 174 LESSONS FROM HAITI, NIGERIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA: * Haiti; * Nigeria; * South Africa; 179 RECIPE FOR SUCCESS: * A Non-Zero Sum View of the Conflict; * Sticks as Well as Carrots; * Asymmetry of Motivation Favoring the State Employing Coercive Diplomacy; * Opponent's Fear of Unacceptable Punishment for Noncompliance; * No Significant Misperception
Source/publisher: Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma)
2003-11-20
Date of entry/update: 2003-11-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: "...The United States has begun to implement the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, which immediately prohibits financial transactions with entities of the ruling military junta in Burma and will bar the importation of Burmese products into the United States after 30 days, according to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC issued a bulletin July 29 that includes the text of President Bush?s July 28 Executive Order regarding the blockage of the Burmese junta?s property, the prohibition of financial transactions with entities of the Rangoon regime, and the ban on Burmese imports into the United States. According to President Bush?s executive order, such steps are necessary due to the military junta?s "continued repression of the democratic opposition in Burma" and the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13047 of May 20, 1997. Following is the text of the OFAC bulletin:..."
Source/publisher: Office of Foreign Assets Control via US Dept of State
2003-07-29
Date of entry/update: 2003-08-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: As the French government examines Total?s involvement in Burma, Win Htein asks if the oil giant is facing the same fate as US-based Unocal.
Creator/author: Win Htein
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy", Vol. 7. No. 7
1999-08-00
Date of entry/update: 2003-06-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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