7-Step Roadmap (Step 1): Reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996. (commentary)
|Title:|| ||An Assured Political Future
|Date of publication:|| ||March 2006|
|Description/subject:|| ||Under the guise of national reconciliation, the Tatmadaw tightens its hold on the State...
"The National Convention went into recess at a critical phase for the junta at the beginning of February, but most observers suspect they know which way the pendulum will swing once the constitution-drafting body reconvenes later this year.
After 13 years of stop-start deliberation, delegates are on the brink of finalizing exactly what role the Tatmadaw (armed forces) will play in Burma's future. Unsurprisingly, the military's prospects look very good. One of their objectives is to have the armed forces play a leading role in politics.
The National Convention Convening Committee's Secretary-1 Lt-Gen Thein Seinâ”has proposed 14 principles concerning the role of the Army which look certain to be approved in the next session..."|
|Author/creator:|| ||Clive Parker|
|Source/publisher:|| ||"The Irrawaddy" Vol. 14, No3|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||01 May 2006|
|Title:|| ||Junta’s Ethnic Overtures Sideline Opposition
|Date of publication:|| ||04 December 2003|
|Description/subject:|| ||December 04, 2003— "The National Convention is once again the talk of the town in Burmese political circles. When Burma’s new Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt announced the junta’s seven-point homegrown recipe for democracy, the first step was the resumption of National Convention that adjourned in early 1996.
The regime has now succeeded in persuading almost all the ethnic groups—ceasefire and non-ceasefire—to climb on the road map bandwagon. With the legitimacy they will add to the National Convention, the junta can undermine Aung San Suu Kyi’s election-winning National League for Democracy (NLD) party, since the opposition also depends on an alliance with ethnic groups..."|
|Author/creator:|| ||Min Zin|
|Source/publisher:|| ||"The Irrawaddy"|
|Alternate URLs:|| ||http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=402|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||04 December 2003|
|Title:|| ||THE NATIONAL CONVENTION
|Date of publication:|| ||21 October 2003|
|Description/subject:|| ||"Tabayin (Depayin) Massacre which occurred on May 30 diminished all the expectations for the progress of a homegrown national reconciliation process as an aftermath of confidence building talks between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) since October, 2000 and her subsequent release in July, 2003. Evidences and testimonies of eyewitnesses confirmed conclusively that it was a premeditated attack by the pro-military thugs under the instructions of authorities and thus, the SPDC is accountable for it.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the key dialogue partner for the military if a substantive political dialogue takes place, narrowly escaped from the attack but was immediately detained by the regime. The entire National League for Democracy (NLD) leadership was either put under house arrest or detained in prisons and all NLD offices were closed down.
Tabayin (Depayin) Massacre was the biggest violent suppression of political dissidents after 8888 democratic uprising. In response to such a situation, there has been growing international pressure including countries from the region. Since the possibility for a homegrown national reconciliation process was no longer valid, consideration was given to formulate a framework or roadmap for democratic transition in Burma with the coordination of the UN Special Envoy, taking into account the visions of all parties concerned. Thailand joined the process and took unilateral initiative to outline its proposal and started to consult with SPDC and some countries in the region.
To encounter international efforts to formulate a roadmap for transition with a particular time frame and build up more pressure to materialize the democratic transition, SPDC made a reshuffle within its establishment and appointed intelligence chief, “Gen. Khin Nyunt” who was perceived as a pragmatist among Burmese generals by the international community, as the new Prime Minister. Immediately, Gen. Khin Nyunt delivered a policy speech on 30 August and announced a seven-point roadmap for transition to a "disciplined democracy"..."|
|Source/publisher:|| ||National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma|
|Format/size:|| ||html (49K), Word (58K)|
|Alternate URLs:|| ||http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/briefing-paper-ncgub.doc|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||24 October 2003|
|Title:|| ||Wa sets conditions for junta convention
|Date of publication:|| ||19 October 2003|
|Description/subject:|| ||"...A "tripartite" meeting held in Panghsang, 13-15 October, agreed on a 5-point position as a prerequisite for the upcoming "National Convention" to be summoned by Rangoon, according to a joint statement that was received by S.H.A.N. this morning (19 October)...
The 5 conditions jointly set by Mongla, Shan and Wa representatives are as follows:
* Freedom of meeting among leaders of ethnic nationalities prior to the convening of the National Convention;
* Delegates to the National Convention to be chosen freely by each nationalities concerned;
* The National Convention must be all inclusive and participated by "proper" delegates;
* Freedom of discussion and freedom of activities during the National Convention;
* To lay down democratic principles in order to establish a modern and developed new democratic state.|
|Format/size:|| ||html (13K)|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||28 October 2003|
|Title:|| ||Burma’s National Convention: New Resolve, Same Hurdles
|Date of publication:|| ||18 September 2003|
|Description/subject:|| ||"On August 30, Burmese Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt announced that Burma would reconvene the long-suspended National Convention, the first step in the "road map of Myanmar" he laid out in his inaugural address. A week later, a panel of high-ranking army officers was appointed to the National Convention Convening Committee.
Rangoon has tried for the past eight years to produce a junta-friendly constitution through the National Convention. Clearly, it has failed. But the new moves—the decision to resume the convention and the reorganization of the Convention Committee—may signal that the junta is more resolute about achieving the goals of the convention. Nevertheless, the Burmese generals will face the same hurdles experienced in the previous efforts to draft a constitution..."|
|Author/creator:|| ||Aung Naing Oo|
|Source/publisher:|| ||"The Irrawaddy"|
|Alternate URLs:|| ||http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=383|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||20 September 2003|
|Title:|| ||The National Convention in Burma (Myanmar): An Impediment to the Restoration of Democracy
|Date of publication:|| ||02 April 1996|
|Description/subject:|| ||This important 1996 analysis of Burma's National Convention , which has not convened in plenary since 1996, may be of interest to those who are concerned about the military regime's intention to resurrect it, in a renewed effort to bypass the results of the 1990 elections...
"Rather than moving Burma toward democracy, the National Convention is impeding the democratization process by failing to create structures of accountability and transparency and by obstructing processes for growth of independent political life...
The National Convention and the SLORC's repression of political freedoms and genuine political dialogue violate Burma's UN Charter obligations, illuminated by the Universal Declaration [of human rights] ..."...OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY;
I DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE NATIONAL CONVENTION;
II. THE NATIONAL CONVENTION:
A. Supplanting the Will of the People expressed by Electoral Mandate;
1. Permanent Minority Role for Elected Representatives;
2. Restrictions on Freedoms of Convention Delegates ...
B. Obstructing Genuine Dialogue...
C. Dismantling Political Structures and Suppressing Independent Activity:
1. Nullification of Elected Candidates' Status;
2. De-registration of Political Parties;
3. Political Restrictions on Parties and Activists...
D. Ensuring Permanent Military Control over Law and Politics:
1. Constitutional Principles that Entrench Military Control;
2. Development of a Nationwide Patronage System for Political Support...
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. Obstruction of Political and Associational Rights;
2. Violations of Economic and Social Rights...
III. RECOMMENDATIONS... ANNEXES:
I Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, State Law and Order Restoration Council Law No. 14/89, 31 May 1989;
II Letter from Aung Shwe, Chairman of the National League for Democracy, to Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of the
State Law and Order Restoration Council, dated 25 March 1996 (to arrange for convening of the first Pyithu Hluttaw (legislature)) (official translation);
III Law Amending the Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, State Law and Order Restoration Council Law No. 10/91,10 July 1991;
IV Letter from Aung Shwe, Chairman of the National League for Democracy, to Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of the State Law and Order
Restoration Council, dated 28 March 1996 (protest against lawless proceedings) (official translation).|
|Author/creator:|| ||Janelle M. Diller|
|Source/publisher:|| ||International League for Human Rights, Rights and Democracy (International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development)|
|Format/size:|| ||html (237K)|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||03 September 2003|
|Title:|| ||The National Convention
|Date of publication:|| ||July 1995|
|Description/subject:|| ||Extract on the National Convention from "Burma: Entrenchment or Reform? Human Rights Developments and the Need for Continued Pressure" (Human Rights Watch/Asia, July 1995)|
|Source/publisher:|| ||Human Rights Watch/Asia|
|Format/size:|| ||html (33K)|
|Alternate URLs:|| ||http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/entrenchment.html (full text of the HRW report)|
|Date of entry/update:|| ||09 March 2004|