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Description: "Introduction The third wave of democratisation,[a] spanning the last quarter of the 20th century, transformed the global political landscape.[1] While the details varied across nations and regions, almost all of them shifted away from dictatorship and towards more democratic forms of governance. However, there has been rising concern about the substance of democracy in the recently transitioned countries. Studies have pointed out that while nearly 100 countries are deemed as “transitioning,” most are settling into new forms of semi-democratic yet authoritarian systems, instead of true democracy.[2] Moreover, the formal democratic institutions established in most nations, such as elections, continue to suffer serious deficits.[3] The onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic has intensified a trend of escalating authoritarianism across the globe.[4] Several nations have slid down the democracy scale, Myanmar being the latest. A fledgling democracy,[b] Myanmar witnessed a coup in February 2021, as the armed forces, the Tatmadaw, refused to accept the results of the 2020 elections that gave the National League for Democracy (NLD) a second term. Against this backdrop, this brief explores the challenges to democratic consolidation in Myanmar, with a focus on NLD–military relations. The first part analyses the factors that led to a change from autocratic to democratic regimes in 2011. The second part examines the dynamics between the NLD democratic leadership and the military junta, to understand how it has shaped Myanmar’s struggle for democracy in recent years. Finally, the brief considers the key factors that are weakening Myanmar’s prospects of stable democracy. Myanmar’s Shift to Democracy: 2010–15 The Military as an Institution Analysts have offered various explanations to Myanmar’s post-2010 democratic reforms—from the country’s military government wanting to resist the growing influence of China, to growing public demands for democracy. For the most part, political changes in Myanmar are driven by the willingness of military leaders to implement them. American political scientist Samuel Huntington, in his theory on democracy, says that the most common form of transition from a military regime to democracy is “transformation”—this occurs when the military regime itself initiates the shift.[5] Such transitions are peaceful but often transient, as military regimes have the capacity to reacquire power through non-democratic means if they disapprove of the direction of the transformation. In most such cases, military leaders do not define themselves as the permanent rulers of the country, instead claiming to briefly assume power to “save the country” from instability. Thus, for military rulers, the return to civilian rule is always a political possibility. In Myanmar, too, the military had claimed that once the country became stable, it would leave its temporary stint and return to its previous military duties.[6] As Huntington theorised it, three factors can accelerate the military’s decision to withdraw from power: (i) a guarantee that there will be no prosecution of military officers for acts they committed while they were in power, (ii) guarantees about the preservation of the autonomy and role of the military, and (iii) the attitude of the opposition. The democratisation process, meanwhile, is shaped by interactions between three groups of actors: (i) reformers within government; (ii) those who resist reform; and (iii) members of the opposition.[7] Within these groups, there are diverse opinions on the possibilities and prospects for reform, with the constitution of each group and the relationship between them subject to change throughout the process. For example, those within the military who oppose the reforms may come to accept democracy if their suspicions about it are not confirmed. Members of opposition groups initially opposed to government-led reforms may accept opportunities to participate if they are convinced of the intentions of the military government. Post-2010 Reforms Since 2010, many of these interactions have unfolded in Myanmar, as amendments were made to the election laws, the ban on the NLD was lifted, and Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest.[c] Freedom of speech was restored, and the ban on social media platforms was revoked. Consequently, both the Opposition and the general public began to accept Thein Sein as a reformer open to democratic changes. At the same time, Thein Sein and fellow reformers reassured the military about its continuing independence and power, in keeping with the 2008 Myanmar Constitution’s emphasis on the centrality of the armed forces in the new life of the country, and the provisions relating to the non-prosecution of army officers. Thus, the 2008 Constitution is a tool designed to ensure the military’s prominence at all times, whether elected or not. Further, it acts as a roadmap to “disciplined democracy,” and dictates the parameters and extent of reforms during a regime change. Ultimately, the playing field remains heavily tilted toward the military-dominated party. In 2011, the NLD and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, made the critical decision to accept the government’s approach to working together to attain the goal of multiparty democracy. The new government’s strongest claim to credibility, both internally and externally, was Aung San Suu Kyi’s endorsement of the government’s path of reform and her evident faith in Thein Sein. That there was no insistence on accountability for the acts of the former military rulers indicated that the Opposition, i.e. the NLD or Aung San Suu Kyi, would behave “reliably” in the transition to democracy. In the past, Suu Kyi had openly confronted the government by arranging rallies and organising campaigns for civil disobedience.[8] However, aware that such tactics could hinder the progress towards democracy and lead to a return to power by hardliners, or else a substantial increase in the power of the military, the NLD subsequently adopted policies of moderation and cooperation with the government. It also agreed to be involved as a junior partner in the process of democratic reform. This culminated in the seamless and peaceful transition to a democratic government in 2015. Post-2016 Civil-Military Relations Since coming to power in 2016, the NLD government has sought to maintain an amiable relationship with the junta. This was evident in the softer stance it took towards the military’s actions in the matter of the ethnic conflicts within the country. In May 2016, the NLD government set up the “Central Committee on the Implementation of Peace, Stability, and Development of the Rakhine State”.[9] It also established an advisory commission, with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as Chair, to provide recommendations on the complex challenges facing Rakhine. However, the meetings held and studies organised to understand the situation did little to prevent the conflicts between the junta and militant groups fighting for autonomy in the Kachin and Rakhine regions, such as the Arakan Army, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The conflicts have resulted in the displacement of millions of people, severe food shortages, and loss of livelihoods. For its part, the NLD government has done little else beyond appealing to the military to practice restraint, choosing to focus on other agendas instead. Similarly, in the ongoing case of the Rohingya ethnic cleansing, both the NLD government and Aung San Suu Kyi have not only refrained from intervening against the inhuman treatment of the stateless people, but also categorically denied wrongdoing and imposed media censorship on the issue.[d] Indeed, international spectators expressed concerns over the ex-state counsellor shielding the military’s action and calling the situation an “internal matter,” despite millions being forced to cross the border to live in neighbouring nations.[10] In the face of censure from the international community, Aung San Suu Kyi maintained her stance, standing for the junta in the International Court of Justice in 2019 and denying all accusations of genocide.[11] Second Transition and Rising Conflict According to theorists, a transition from military regime to democracy is often followed by a second transition—towards the effective functioning of a democratic regime.[12] During the first transition, the “military challenge” for members of the Opposition is to inaugurate a democratic government without military resistance. During the second transition, the challenge is to establish functional institutions of civilian control over the military. Bringing the GAD under Civilian Rule While the NLD government sought to balance its civilian-military relations, it slowly attempted to create powerful civilian positions in otherwise militarised institutions. This step was deemed essential to establishing functional units of civilian control. In a pivotal move, in 2019, the NLD sought to bring Myanmar’s main public administration body, the General Administration Department (GAD), under civilian control. The GAD has traditionally operated under the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). Designated as the “bureaucratic backbone of the country,” it directly controls all state bureaucracy at the local level, including in the districts, townships, and village tracts. Its 36,000 staff members, many of whom are transferred military personnel, are responsible for issuing licenses, handling land management and disputes, and collecting taxes. Since April 2011, the GAD has also handled the increased engagement from international aid donors. Thus, placing the GAD under the civilian Ministry of the Office of the Union Government will be an important step in breaking the military dominance. The reform is aimed at stimulating decentralisation and is necessary for any real progress towards peace and stability. To be sure, such a reform may not lead to immediate changes to local administration. However, it can allow state- and region-level civil services to emerge in the long run, beyond the exceptional municipal offices.[13] Amending the Constitution The 2008 Constitution is the biggest source of military power in Myanmar. In addition to granting the military a prominent role in politics, it ensures that state institutions reflect the ideology advocated by the Tatmadaw. This ideology draws from Tatmadaw’s three national clauses: the non-disintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of national unity, and the perpetuation of national sovereignty.[14] To safeguard the implementation of these clauses, the Constitution allocates 25 percent representation of unelected military officers in Myanmar’s Parliament. This provides them with veto power, as articles 436 (a) and (b) require more than 75 percent of members to vote in favour of approved amendments. The Constitution also grants sovereign powers to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces during emergencies,[e] including rights to exercise control over the executive, legislature, and judiciary. These provisions have allowed the military to maintain its position as “guardian” over a steady process of democratisation, and to protect its core ideological and private interests. Thus, any amendments to the Constitution can severely damage the Tatmadaw’s grip on the Myanmar government. While the NLD had been vocal about the undemocratic nature of the Constitution since 2007, it took little initiative to modify it after assuming office in 2016. After losing the 2018 by-elections, however, it returned its focus to amending the Constitution. In January 2019, a parliamentary Charter Amendment Committee was set up, consisting of 149 lawmakers—50 from the military, 50 from the NLD, 26 from Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), and the remainder from ethnic parties. They took part in the debate, which spanned seven days. The structure of the Parliament included the NLD holding 59 percent of the seats, the ethnic minority parties 11 percent, the USDP five percent, and the military its constitutionally mandated 25 percent. The proposed amendments focused on reducing the military’s influence. Some of the proposals from NLD included scrapping the military’s veto over constitutional change, limiting its parliamentary seats, reducing its political leadership role, and revoking army chiefs’ right to assume power during an emergency. The NLD has proposed changing the requirement for approving a charter amendment from more than 75 percent of Parliament to “two-thirds of elected representatives,” excluding the military appointees. It also proposed gradually reducing the military’s share of seats from 25 percent to 15 percent after the 2020 election, 10 percent after 2025, and five percent after 2030. A quarter of all seats in the national and regional legislatures are occupied by unelected military officers under the Constitution’s Article 14 and related provisions. The military generals strongly objected to this proposal, with the commander-in-chief calling the amendments discriminatory and asserting that such demands could harm national unity and civilian-military relations.[15] The NLD also proposed amending Section 59 (f), which bars Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president, since her husband and sons hold British citizenship, and Section 59 (d), which requires military experience. However, these proposals failed to garner the required vote in the assembly. According to one junta official, senior positions should steer clear from any foreign influence.[16] In total, the NLD proposed 114 amendments to the Constitution, of which only minor ones concerning changes in the language of clauses pertaining to the appointment of state and regional ministers were approved. One can argue that the NLD’s objective for attempting to introduce such a large number of changes was to improve its public image, by convincing the populace that the military and the USDP stood in the way of the party’s efforts to bring about democratic reforms. The strategy did not go unnoticed by the army or the USDP, and to combat this narrative, the Tatmadaw and the USDP proposed amendments of their own. The military bloc proposed revising Article 261 by electing regional chief ministers through local legislatures instead of being appointed by the Central government through the president. Such an amendment primarily seeks to make the nation-state federal in structure, by distributing more powers among peripheral regions. While this contradicts the Tatmadaw’s previous stance against federalism, where it equated federalism with the disintegration of the country,[17] analysts contend that the underlying motive is to take advantage of the ethnic minorities’ growing disillusionment with the NLD.[f][18] Persistent Obstacles to Democracy In addition to the discontent of the military generals at the NLD’s growing intent to achieve democratic consolidation—which would result in the power shifting to the civilian government—a few other factors have affected the growth of stable democracy during NLD’s tenure. NLD’s Centralised Character Under the 2008 Constitution, the NLD has the right to choose the central and local governments at all levels of the legislatures. Following its 2015 victory, the NLD, instead of acknowledging nationality parties in the ethnic states, appointed its own representatives and party members as the chief ministers of all the states and regions—even where the NLD had won a minority of state seats—with no prior consultation with its once-allied ethnic parties. The Arakan National Party (ANP) and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) are two prominent ethnic parties in Myanmar. A veteran Rakhine politician, U Aye Tha Aung, was approached to act as the vice-speaker of the Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw) in the national parliament. But this decision was made without transparent discussion or agreement with the ANP.[19] Similarly, the NLD refused to grant administrative power or representation to SNLD, its former ally at the state level. Instead, party officials suggested that the SNLD consider the position of an “Ethnic Affairs Minister.” Such acts alienated ethnic groups and damaged the NLD’s image. The party’s imposition of political hegemony through ‘Burmanisation’ and the centralisation of projects further exacerbated negative sentiments amongst the ethnic groups. For example, the erection of statues of General Aung San in Kayah and other states with sizeable ethnic minority populations sparked opposition and protests, which the NLD’s local officials chose to handle in a largely violent manner. There were also protests in Mon state, when the NLD decided to change the name of a bridge in Mawlamyine to General Aung San Bridge. [20] Disillusioned by these trends, some NLD members along with other pro-democracy leaders, formed their own parties before the 2020 elections, such as the People’s Pioneer Party, Union Betterment Party, and People’s Party.[21] The military leveraged this development against the NLD during the deliberations on the amendment of the Constitution. Weakness of Democratic Political Leadership Following the 2015 elections, the NLD party grew in strength. Before 2015, its membership had predominantly been symbolic and solidaristic, and the increase in party members created concerns regarding the new members—who tried to maximise their power and status—in the absence of a stable democratic ideology. Further, selecting ground leaders became a challenge, as people voted for Aung San Suu Kyi instead of specific local candidates. Consequently, leaders at the local levels were decided after the party office won the election, reflecting the disjointed power dynamics within the NLD.[22] Since the NLD government was new and inexperienced in governance, it failed to invest in the training of party members and next-generation leaders. Of the existing leadership, few personnel are trained professionals, and the majority lack management experience. While the management styles of some party members are consistent with the democratic culture and genuine policy openness, most are concerned only with modes of behaviour and control akin to socialist centralisation.[23] Faultlines of National Reconciliation Throughout its rule and as the defence authority during the NLD tenure, the junta had continued to rely on a divide-and-rule tactic for monitoring the ethnic militant groups. During the 1990s, the military managed to integrate some into their force, but those who did not acquiesce remain in a state of constant war with the state. The junta orchestrates and controls the entire process by fighting against some groups while entering into ceasefire agreement with others—selectively allowing some groups to keep their arms and territory, tax their constituents, build state-like structures, and profit from legal and illegal businesses.[g] Its tactics are facilitated by the failure of the armed groups to act in unison instead of learning from each other’s experiences. Thus, using ceasefire politics, the Tatmadaw has established itself as the most powerful military, political, and economic actor in the borderlands. Furthermore, by entering into joint ventures with the local leaders or “elite groups” of ethnic minorities, the military exploits and extracts from the borderlands’ natural resources, in mining, logging, and agriculture. This has allowed the military to exercise power in areas where it had no previous influence and profit from ethnic armed groups, without ever fully meeting their demands. To turn such a situation around would require the government’s sustained effort, driven by a vision for peace. Since the armed groups have overlapping territorial claims, and conflicting goals, and failed to successfully align their military and political strategies, the onus of peace-making must be on a representative Union government. In 2020, the International Crisis Group rightly recommended that the government engage in political dialogue and negotiations with all the country’s ethnic groups, and establish participatory institutions where each group could work for its goals. However, this could not be implemented at the time due to the shifting civil-military relations. Misplaced Security Priorities For the last five years, the central purpose of Myanmar’s security and justice institutions has been to defend the state either from local resistance or to maintain order while protecting their own economic interests. The criminal justice apparatus has been geared primarily towards disciplinary action against political dissidents, while non-traditional security threats, such as drug abuse and human trafficking, have only received curbs and routine punishment.[24] Moreover, since the security institutions are dominated by Bamar Buddhists, the judiciary is independent only on paper: it remains full of juries and magistrates who previously served within the military or under the former military government.[25] To be sure, the transfer of powers from the military to civilians does not automatically create more just and peaceful outcomes. Reforms in the justice system must be carefully planned and executed, including service orientations of the military and police, skill training for enhancing tactical approach without the use of extreme violence, people-oriented mechanisms, gender inclusivity and sensitivity, rehabilitation of the prison system, and overall inclusivity. Research organisations have highlighted the three steps needed to democratise Myanmar’s autocratic system:[26] Giving more power to elected civilians as representatives of the people Transforming the security culture Protecting and building civic space So far, the civilian government has been unable to take any action, due to the reservations of the junta. The factors discussed in this section are responsible for the lack of democratic progress in Myanmar. However, while the military leaders had hoped to capitalise on the NLD’s poor performance to garner support, the public’s trust in Aung San Suu Kyi as a protector who would act as a bulwark against the possible return of military rule remains strong, and much of the mistrust is directed at the military regime that is viewed as despotic.[27] Indeed, the USDP declined into electoral irrelevance in the 2020 polls, and the landslide victory of the NLD government substantially reduced the influence of the military over the legislative branch. Going forward, the NLD is likely to introduce more reforms to the Constitution, resulting in further erosion of the military’s influence. While this will fortify the NLD’s position,[28] an open challenge to the junta’s sovereignty as an institution may lead to another coup. Conclusion Scholars who study regime transitions in different parts of the world agree that the democratisation of a country depends not only on electing a new government through free, fair, and competitive elections, but also on a comprehensive political refurbishment. The new political leaders must enjoy sufficient effective power to govern. The transformation of authoritarian civil-military relations is, therefore, a key element of any regime transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule. However, since the prerequisites of this transition are set by the military rulers from a position of strength, they often continue to exercise substantial control over the process and outcomes, and the armed forces retain their acquired entitlements. A successful democratic transition requires establishing functional institutions of civilian control over the military, which is especially difficult in countries with a strong legacy of militarism and where the military is able to secure political and institutional privileges. While international mediation can be useful in such instances, Myanmar has previously been called a “diplomatic graveyard,”[h] due to the UN’s failure to successfully intervene—from providing humanitarian assistance to facilitating national reconciliation between the junta and their democratic opponents. Despite the progress made by the NLD in establishing democratic processes in Myanmar, the military coup of February 2021 showed that the government had failed to exercise civilian control over the junta. The coup has pushed the country and its future into uncharted territory, and how the conflict will play out will depend on the public protesters and the military’s response to them. Sreeparna Banerjee is a Junior Fellow at ORF, Kolkata. Endnotes [a] A group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite directions during that period of time. According to political scientist Samuel Huntington, the third wave began from 1974 onwards. [b] A system or an institution that is not yet developed. [c] Giving in to domestic and international pressures, the military government called an election in 1990, which the NLD won by a landslide. The generals, however, refused to recognise the result and instead placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. They argued that the country lacked a constitution through which a proper transfer of power can be conducted. [d] The Rohingyas are a minority Muslim community who have lived in the Rakhine State of Myanmar for centuries. In recent years, they have become a brutally oppressed, “stateless” community as the state of Myanmar continues to deny them citizenship under the country’s nationality law of 1982. [e] In Myanmar, an emergency is defined as any situation that could lead to the nation’s disintegration, loss of sovereignty, or attempts to forcefully take power through insurgency. [f] The ethnic minorities are reportedly unhappy with the state of affairs and the centralised approach of the NLD that goes against the spirit of federalism that the centre had promised to uphold. [g] In 2015, eight groups signed a ”Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement” (NCA) with the government, and two more joined in 2018. Five others have bilateral ceasefire agreements. However, as of October 2020, four important groups stood without any such agreement: the Arakan Army (AA); Kachin Independence Army (KIA); Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA); and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).[g] For two years, from December 2018 to November 2020, the Tatmadaw focused on fighting the AA, while mostly avoiding clashes with the others. In November 2020, right after the national elections, the Tatmadaw and AA agreed on an informal, temporary ceasefire. [h] The six UN special envoys—starting with Japanese diplomat Sadako Ogata, who was appointed in 1990 as an independent expert of the UN Commission on Human Rights, to the Malaysian businessman Razali Ismail, the UN secretary-general’s second special envoy to the country—quit their job in deep frustration. Their missions to Myanmar were routinely rebuffed by the Junta, and at least one of the diplomats, the UN’s second special rapporteur, Mauritian Rajsoomer Lallah, wasn’t even allowed to enter the country because of his sharp criticism of the regime. [1] Samuel Huntington, “How Countries Democratize”, Political Science Quarterly, 1991, Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. 579-616 [2] Carothers, Thomas (2002). The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1): 5-21. John Hopkins University Press. [3] Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A. (2010). Why Democracy Needs a Levels Playing Field. Journal of Democracy, 21(1), pp. 57-68. John Hopkins University Press. [4] Global State of Democracy Report 2021 Building Resilience in a Pandemic Era, 2021. [5] Samuel Huntington, How Countries Democratize [6] Samuel Huntington, How Countries Democratize; Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, “Democratic Transformation and Regional Institutions: The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, April 1, 2013. [7] Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, “Democratic Transformation and Regional Institutions: The Case of Myanmar and ASEAN”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, April 1, 2013. [8] Barkey, Henri J. (1990), Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition, in Armed Forces & Society, 16, 169–192. [9] K Yhome, “Elections and civil-military relations in Myanmar”, Observer Research Foundation, August 18, 2020. [10] Hannah Beech, “What Happened to Myanmar’s Human-Rights Icon?”, The New York Times, September 25, 2017. [11] Sreeparna Banerjee and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, “ICJ’s judgement on the Rohingya and its challenges”, Observer Research Foundation, February 10, 2020. [12] Samuel Huntington, How Countries Democratize, [13] Matthew B Arnold, “Why GAD reform matters to Myanmar”, East Asia Forum, August 24, 2019. [14] Htet Naing ZAW, “Military Presence Still Needed in Parliament, USDP Says”, The Irrawaddy, February 27, 2019. [15] San Yamin Aung, “Flashpoints: Myanmar’s Eight Most Hotly Contested Constitutional Amendment Proposals”, The Irrawaddy, March 7, 2020. [16] San Yamin Aung, “Myanmar’s Suu Kyi Still Barred From Presidency as Proposed Charter Change Fails”, The Irrawaddy, March 11, 2020. [17] Annabelle Heugas, “Myanmar’s Constitution Amendment Process in the year 2020”, KAS, June 2, 2020. [18] Annabelle Heugas, “Myanmar’s Constitution Amendment Process in the year 2020” [19] Kyaw Lynn, “The National League for Democracy: A Party for Democracy or Federalism?”, TNI, October 2, 2020. [20] Ye Myo Hein, “Visions of a Federal Future for Myanmar are Fading Fast-Part II”, The Irrawaddy, September 2, 2021. [21] Yuichi Nitta, “Myanmar pro-democracy forces form new parties as elections loom”, Nikkei Asia, July 21, 2020. [22] Richard Roewer, “Three Faces of Party Organisation in the National League for Democracy”, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, February 14, 2020. [23] Naing Ko Ko, “Democratisation in Myanmar: Glue or Gloss?”, Australian National University, 2019. [24] Nicholas Whitridge Cheesman, “The politics of law and order in Myanmar”, January 2012. [25] Kim Jolliffe, “Democratising Myanmar’s security sector: enduring legacies and a long road ahead”, Saferworld, November 2019. [26] Kim Jolliffe, “Democratising Myanmar’s security sector: enduring legacies and a long road ahead”, [27] Hannah Beach and Saw Nang, “Myanmar Election Delivers Another Decisive Win for Aung San Suu Kyi”, The New York Times, November 11, 2020. [28] Sreeparna Banerjee, “Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi Verdict and Its Aftermath”, Observer Research Foundation, December 20, 2021..."
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Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
2022-05-09
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-09
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Description: "Daw Su Su Lwin, the wife of former President U Htin Kyaw and a National League for Democracy (NLD) lawmaker, has refused to meet the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) special envoy to Myanmar, according to NLD lawmakers. The special envoy, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn, was set to meet Daw Su Su Lwin at the Park Royal Hotel in Yangon. However, Daw Su Su Lwin refused to meet the envoy, citing health issues, an NLD lawmaker told The Irrawaddy on condition of anonymity. Even if Daw Su Su Lwin had met with him, she could only have do so as a private individual and not as a representative of the NLD, added the lawmaker. “One point of the five-point consensus is for the ASEAN special envoy to meet all stakeholders. Without Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, it is impossible to represent the NLD as well as democratic forces,” said the NLD lawmaker. Junta spokesman Major General Zaw Min Tun also told the BBC that Daw Su Su Lwin could not meet Prak Sokhonn because of her health. One Myanmar-based political analyst said Daw Su Su Lwin deliberately avoided meeting the ASEAN envoy because she is concerned that it might result in friction within the NLD. “If she meets him, I am not sure about other results, but it will definitely cause friction within the party. As the ASEAN envoy is the guest of the regime, meeting him amounts to recognizing the regime. That could lead to friction within the party, so Daw Su Su Lwin evaded the envoy,” said the political analyst. The central executive committee of the NLD also told the media that Daw Su Su Lwin’s meeting with the special envoy couldn’t be as an official representative of the NLD, while the NLD leadership is being detained by the military regime. Another political analyst said that while the junta has detained senior NLD leaders to try and kill off the party, it was attempting to make use of Daw Su Su Lwin to show the international community that the NLD still exists. “China apparently does not like [the regime] ditching the NLD. China accepts that the NLD should exist in Myanmar’s politics. Although the regime dares not continue with its plan to dissolve the NLD under such circumstances, and it also dares not release NLD leaders, they want to show that the NLD still has representation. So they arranged a meeting between Daw Su Su Lwin and the special envoy. But Daw Su Su Lwin backed off as she can’t represent the NLD,” said the political analyst. ASEAN’s special envoy arrived in Myanmar on Monday and met junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, foreign minister U Wunna Maung Lwin, international cooperation minister U Ko Ko Hlaing and People’s Party chairman U Ko Ko Gyi. As Prak Sokhonn wrapped up his Myanmar visit on Wednesday, political analysts said that he only met regime representatives and failed to meet with all stakeholders, which goes against the five-point consensus. Another political analyst said: “As he did not meet other stakeholders, the ASEAN consensus can’t be implemented. One of the points in the consensus is to bring all the concerned parties to constructive dialogue. But the regime is not willing to engage in dialogue. So the ASEAN envoy can’t implement the ASEAN consensus.”..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2022-03-23
Date of entry/update: 2022-03-23
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Description: "Former National League for Democracy lawmaker U Phyo Zeya Thaw, who has been accused of masterminding deadly attacks on regime targets in Yangon, was arrested by junta forces during a raid on the outskirts of the city on Thursday. The arrest came after a monthlong manhunt for the 40-year-old former parliamentarian, whom the regime accuses of supporting local civilian resistance forces and orchestrating several fatal hit-and-run attacks on junta troops in Yangon in recent months. The regime claimed the covert attacks include incidents in which soldiers manning security checkpoints in the city have been sprayed with bullets, and the deadly shooting of four police officers on board a Yangon Circular Rail train in August, among others. Prior to his arrest, the regime charged U Phyo Zeya Thaw under the Counter-Terrorism Law and the Public Property Protection Act. There has not yet been any official announcement about the arrest, which comes as the regime steps up its hunt for members of the People’s Defence Force (PDF)—a network of local civilian resistance groups—in Yangon. Late last month, the regime arrested veteran Myanmar democracy activist Ko Kyaw Min Yu, better known as Ko Jimmy, one of the leaders of the 88 Generation Students Group. It claimed that he was the leader of Operation Moonlight, which it said was a series of planned attacks in the city to be carried out by a PDF group. Another 47 suspects were also arrested in Yangon this month. The junta’s mouthpiece Myawady News said they were involved in the attacks in Yangon masterminded by the ex-lawmaker and others. Sources close to the matter confirmed the raid and U Phyo Zeya Thaw’s arrest, saying “his laptop was also seized.” That means information about the resistance forces opposing the regime, and their supporters, has potentially been exposed, raising the likelihood of more arrests. Following the junta’s brutal crackdowns on anti-coup protesters, Myanmar has seen deadly attacks by civilian resistance fighters on regime targets including administration offices, police stations and army convoys. The junta has accused ousted NLD lawmakers and party members of masterminding most of the attacks. U Phyo Zeya Thaw served as an NLD MP in the Lower House of Parliament from 2012 to 2020. Prior to that, he made his name as a member of Acid, Myanmar’s first hip-hop band. Acid emerged in 2000, when the young Myanmar audience was growing bored of the country’s mainstream rock music and looking for something new. Their debut release—Beginning—was the first rap album by local musicians and propelled the band to nationwide stardom, as well as paving the way for other Myanmar hip-hop artists. After the junta’s Feb. 1 coup and its subsequent crackdowns on peaceful anti-regime protesters, U Phyo Zeya Thaw went into hiding but appears to have been active against the junta. As he didn’t stand for Parliament in the 2020 poll, he is unlikely to be a member of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, a group of ousted elected NLD lawmakers that the military regime has branded a terrorist organization..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-11-19
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-19
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Description: "Being unbowed, defiant and outspoken are trademarks of Nan Khin Htwe Myint, the detained Karen State chief minister of the ousted National League for Democracy government. When the military staged a coup on Feb. 1, the 67-year-old was detained, like other NLD government officials. She told The Irrawaddy in February that during her house arrest, the Karen woman challenged the commander who detained her, saying, “If the military thinks there is vote fraud, I am ready to contest with you via an open ballot system anytime, rather than a secret ballot.” That was her response after the commander read her the regime’s official notice announcing the coup, which said the military seized power due to electoral fraud. The commander responded with an uneasy laugh. Even under house arrest, she urged the people to continue their anti-regime strike in whatever ways possible, whether by raising three-finger salutes—a symbol of defiance against military rule—banging on pots and pans, or joining the civil disobedience movement (CDM). She herself engaged in all these different means of anti-regime protest. As she still had access to her phone, Nan Khin Htwe Myint gave interviews to the media, urging public support for “final efforts” to strike against the regime and to speak up for the release of detained leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. She even posted a video online calling on people to unite to fight against military rule and urging soldiers to defend the people and unite with the general public. On Feb. 8, two days after tens of thousands of Myanmar people took to the streets rejecting the military coup, she was taken to Hpa-an Prison in the Karen State capital. In May, she was sentenced to two years in prison for comments she made following the Feb. 1 coup calling for people to show unity in striking against the regime, which were deemed by the junta to be incitement. Then on Nov. 9, the NLD Central Executive Committee member was sentenced to 75 years in prison on four corruption charges—which she denied—by the junta court inside Hpa-an Prison. She is now serving a total of 77 years in prison, a move by which the junta hopes to ensure that the core NLD member stays behind bars. Her family and people close to her say it shows the depth of the military’s grudge against her for her outspokenness and defiance. Dedicated democracy activist Nan Khin Htwe Myint has made many sacrifices due to her activism and family history of opposing military rule. Her father was the Karen State head of the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League) in the years shortly before and after independence from the British. Through family discussions Nan Khin Htwe Myint gained a homegrown knowledge of federalism, as well as political and ethnic history. Under Myanmar’s military rulers, her family was targeted for persecution for their political ties. She has inherited her father’s commitment to working for ethnic rights and equality. She told The Irrawaddy in 2016 that she “is dedicated to establishing my country as a federal-based democratic nation.” She was detained for the first time in 1975 for taking part in the student movement and imprisoned for six years. She continued to be imprisoned; she was jailed for two years in 1997, and then arbitrarily detained multiple times throughout the 1990s, without any charges. She became a dedicated member of the NLD upon its formation in 1988, following the nationwide uprising that year. She contested and won a seat in the 1990 general election, in Hpa-an Constituency, the same constituency she represented in the 2015 and 2020 general elections. The military regime’s targeted acts of oppression against her include prison sentences and numerous arbitrary detentions. Now, she is being defamed by the junta with corruption charges. The allegation is ironic given that as chief minister of Karen State, Nan Khin Htwe Myint was known for her anti-graft stance. “We are really surprised by the charges and the verdicts,” said her younger brother Saw Than Htut, who won election to an Upper House constituency in the 2020 election. “We, ourselves, loathe committing graft. She has never committed any corruption. The charges are a complete swindle,” said the brother. “The junta’s charges against her are totally based on grudges as she is a decisive, outspoken and courageous politician.” Those who know her well speak of her as leading a very simple and far from luxurious life, even though she was the chief minister. She didn’t even own a car. A senior NLD leader who has known her for more than 30 years, and who spoke on condition of anonymity, said she is loyal to both the party and the country and “a role-model” in the NLD after chairperson Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Trumped-up charges After they were detained in prison in the second week of February, the regime filed complaints against Nan Khin Htwe Myint and U Than Naing, Karen State’s municipal minister under the NLD government, accusing them of violating tender and financial regulations related to infrastructure development projects in Karen State. She was given 75 years while her colleague got a total of 92 years for corruption and sedition. The pair told the court that they “didn’t commit the offenses,” according to their lawyer U Aung Thein. A source close to the court said that “the rulings were unjust” because they were entirely based on the prosecutors’ arguments, neglecting the defense lawyers’ arguments. The judge just read out a prepared ruling, the source said. Some lawyers said such cases could be solved through departmental inquiries and did not need to be brought to trial. “These cases are simply based on grudges,” said a lawyer who is familiar with the cases. Knowing her integrity, a judge reportedly apologized to her during one proceeding, according to the source close to the court. Junta’s grudges against NLD Reflecting their desire for NLD members to stay behind bars, the Myanmar junta’s grudges against the party’s leaders become more obvious by the day. Nan Khin Htwe Myint’s cases are just the latest examples. Similar charges have been brought against other senior leaders including detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other chief ministers. The junta has filed 11 charges against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD party chairperson, including for sedition, alleged breach of COVID-19 restrictions, violating the Official Secrets Act and corruption, which are also widely believed to be trumped-up charges. The 76-year-old Nobel Laureate faces up to 102 years in prison if found guilty. In the 10 months since the military coup, the junta’s courts across the nation have handed jail sentences to 286 people including NLD members, former lawmakers, students and civilians participating in the peaceful anti-regime movement, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, which documents rights abuses and killings. Civilian courts have sentenced them to terms ranging from at least two years to life imprisonment, while fewer than a dozen civilians have been sentenced to death by a military court. Among them, 80-year-old NLD patron U Win Htein was sentenced to 20 years in prison for high treason by a court inside Naypyitaw Prison for criticizing the coup on Oct. 29. Rakhine State Chief Minister U Nyi Pu was sentenced to two years in prison for incitement by Sittwe Court on Oct. 8. Magwe Region Chief Minister Dr. Aung Moe Nyo was sentenced to the same term on June 8. Mandalay Region Chief Minister Dr. Zaw Myint Maung, who is also the NLD’s vice chair, is also accused of sedition and corruption, and awaits trial..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-11-19
Date of entry/update: 2021-11-19
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Description: "Myanmar’s National League for Democracy will attend a summit for Asian political parties hosted by the Communist Party of China (CPC) on Thursday. The CPC is planning to hold a virtual meeting with political parties from Southeast and South Asia on Thursday. The party has invited four out of Myanmar’s 93 political parties, including the NLD. The invitation can be seen as Beijing’s official recognition of the NLD despite attempts by Myanmar’s regime to dissolve it. The NLD won the 2020 general election by a landslide but the regime accused it of vote-rigging and nullified the results. The party leadership, including State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, have either been arrested or went into hiding. U Bo Bo Oo, a Yangon regional NLD lawmaker and a member of the Committee Representing Yangon Region Hluttaw (CRYH), told The Irrawaddy that he will represent the party. Military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party’s spokesman Dr. Nandar Hla Myint wrote on Facebook on Wednesday that central youth affairs committee member Dr. Thant Zin Lwin will attend the “Strengthening political parties’ cooperation in joint pursuit of economic development” meeting. In last year’s general election, the NLD won over 80 percent of all elected constituencies. The junta says it will hold a new election and has since taken steps to disband the NLD. In early August, in an online meeting between the junta-appointed foreign minister U Wunna Maung Lwin and China’s ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, the envoy referred to the State Administration Council (SAC), the governing body of the regime, as the Myanmar government but also voiced concerns over plan to dissolve the NLD. Sun Guoxiang, a Chinese special envoy for Asian affairs who was in Myanmar from Aug. 21 to 28 at the invitation of the regime, reportedly asked to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. His request was denied and the regime was tightlipped about the visit. According to sources, Chinese officials have told the regime that Beijing wants the NLD to continue as a political party. In late July, the CPC also sent a letter of thanks to the NLD’s central executive committee in response to its congratulations on the centenary of the Communist Party’s founding..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-09-08
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-09
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Description: "Myanmar’s military regime has charged at least 100 elected leaders, ministers and prominent members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) with high treason, corruption and incitement over the past seven months, as the junta steps up its efforts to destroy the party. Senior NLD figures who have been arrested and charged since the military’s February 1 coup include at least four government ministers, 10 chief ministers, 30 ministers of state and regional cabinets, 44 elected lawmakers and members of party offices nationwide, and seven other senior party members. There are 93 political parties in Myanmar, but the NLD is the only one that has been targeted by the military regime. Most notably, the junta has brought various charges against ousted State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint in an effort to keep them behind bars for years. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi faces a total of 10 cases and a potential prison sentence of 75 years in total. The junta has accused her of accepting cash and gold, as well as of abusing her authority and funds donated to a charity foundation she leads. She also faces charges for the illegal possession of walkie-talkies, breaching COVID-19 restrictions, incitement and one case under the Official Secrets Act. Myanmar’s military detained Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint and other senior officials of the NLD-led government before dawn on the day of the coup. Chief ministers of the states and regions, parliamentary speakers at union and state and regions level were also detained during the takeover, along with other senior leaders and members of the NLD’s Central Executive Committee (CEC). Coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has claimed that the coup was staged because the NLD committed “election fraud” during the 2020 general election that the NLD won by a landslide. The results of the election have since been annulled and the party faces the possibility of being disbanded. NLD members continue to face arrest, including those who won seats in the 2020 election. Several detained party members have been killed while in detention. Numerous members face arrest warrants and have gone into hiding, while NLD offices have been raided, vandalized and forced to close. Over 300 NLD leaders, ministers, elected lawmakers and other members at party offices are currently being detained. The four detained ministers of the NLD-led government have been accused of violating the Official Secrets Act and the Anti-Corruption Law. U Win Myat Aye, the ousted Minister of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, and ousted Upper House Speaker Mahn Win Khaing Than have been charged with corruption and high treason respectively. Both were re-elected in the 2020 election. Since the coup, U Win Myat Aye has been made the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management for the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), while Mahn Win Khaing Than has been appointed as NUG prime minister. Corruption charges have also been brought against NLD ministers and officials who were renowned for their good reputations while in office and who enjoyed the support of the general public. Of the 13 chief ministers who are still being detained, nine have been accused of bribery, abuse of their authority and embezzlement of public funds under the Anti-Corruption Law, all charges that carry long prison terms. One chief minister has also been charged with incitement. The other chief ministers are likely to be charged soon. Members of the NLD’s CEC face harsher charges. Detained NLD vice-chairman Dr. Zaw Myint Maung, who is also the Mandalay Region Chief Minister, has been charged with alleged corruption, incitement and breaching of COVID-19 restrictions. Dr. Zaw Myint Maung, who has blood cancer, caught coronavirus while being detained in Mandalay’s Obo Prison and was put on oxygen support. On June 7, the Magwe Chief Minister Dr. Aung Moe Nyo, who is also a member of the CEC, was sentenced to two years in prison on an incitement charge. He was accused of publishing statements saying that the junta’s State Administration Council is not an official government. The ousted chief minister also faces corruption charges along with three ministers of his cabinet. Around 50 ousted ministers, advocate generals and auditor generals of state and regional cabinets are also still being detained. At least 30 of them face charges such as corruption, incitement, violating COVID-19 restrictions and disobeying military regime orders. NLD CEC members U Nyan Win, U Han Thar Myint, U Thein Oo, U Mya Thein, the party’s patron U Win Htein, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s personal physician Dr. Tin Myo Win and the party spokespersons, Dr. Myo Nyunt and Monywa Aung Shin, were also arrested by the junta. They have been charged with sedition and incitement. 79-year-old U Nyan Win, who was also Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s long-time personal lawyer, died of COVID-19 on July 20 while being detained in Yangon’s Insein Prison, where he caught coronavirus. At least 13 NLD members, including the Bago Region parliamentary speaker and elected lawmakers, have been sentenced to two to three years in prison, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. NLD CEC member U Aung Kyi Nyunt, who chairs the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), said the arrests and charges against NLD members are a plot to ensure that the regime illegally wins the next general election. U Aung Kyi Nyunt is the subject of arrest warrants for sedition and other charges, along with other NLD leaders, members and other anti-regime forces and ethnic minorities who managed to evade arrest and form the CPRH and the NUG to oppose the junta. The number of detained NLD members is rising as the regime continues to crackdown on the party across the country. In the last month alone, at least 38 NLD members, including elected lawmakers and chiefs and members of state and region offices at the township and ward level have been arrested. Youth members of the NLD have also been detained. Regime-controlled media has stated that those arrested will be prosecuted for supporting the Civil Disobedience Movement and the NUG, as well as supplying civilian resistance fighters with food and financial aid. “As the junta knows, there is no way the military can compete against the most popular party so they are trying to eliminate the NLD before holding an election,” U Aung Kyi Nyunt told The Irrawaddy in June. “But that won’t be possible as it is has been clear from the beginning that this is not fair and that the people won’t accept it,” he added..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-09-01
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Maung Moe Thu, a prominent writer, director and former political prisoner who worked closely with detained State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the founding of the National League for Democracy (NLD), died peacefully aged 85 at his Yangon home on Wednesday. He took an active part in the pro-democracy movement in 1988 as the secretary of the writers’ union together with former major and well-known writer Maung Thaw Ka and journalist Hanthawaddy U Win Tin. He was a member of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s inner circle during the founding of the NLD. He actively worked for the party, collecting donations to rent an office, finding artists to draw the party’s flag and accompanying Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in her campaigns. When she was put under house arrest for the first time on July 19, 1989, Maung Moe Thu was taken to Insein Prison for the first time together with journalist Maung Wuntha and U Win Htein because of the party slogan: “Let’s always defy any law that oppresses the people.” He was released in 1992 but the military regime barred him from engaging in any form of artistic expression. As a supporter of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, he was detained for a second time under Article 5 of the Emergency Provision Act in 1996 and spent four years in prison. He was allowed to attend his wife’s funeral in December 1999. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi told him at the funeral: “Neither of us has been dutiful to our spouses.” Some eight months earlier, her husband, Michael Aris, died in England. Aris repeatedly tried to visit before he died but was denied a visa. After his release from prison in 2000, Maung Moe Thu worked as an editor and columnist for magazines and painted. He was affectionately referred to as Bagyi Moe or Uncle Moe while staying involved in literature, movies, art, sculpture, music and politics. He served as consultant editor for the D-Wave Journal published by the NLD and patron of the Hanthawaddy U Win Tin Foundation. He directed numerous films and videos and wrote scripts. He wrote many poems, novels and translated books with Leon Uris’ 1958 bestseller Exodus his most popular translation..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-09-02
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "1. On February 1, 2021, the Tatmadaw (Burman military) issued Order Number (1/2021), the promulgation of seizure by it. We, the KNU Concerned Group, strongly protest and denounce Tatmadaw's seizure of power, because according to the promulgation letter, it was the seizure of the political power from the NLD, the winning party of the general election held on November 8, 2020. 2. Though the NLD Party did not accept the 2008 Constitution, the NLD had contested in elections with a positive outlook starting from 2012. It won a landslide victory in 2015 general election and though it made the effort to amend the Constitution within the parliament, there was no success. On the other hand, the Ethnic Armed Revolutionary Organizations (EARO) tried to amend the Constitution on the basis of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), without success. Accordingly, it is entirely evident that the 2008 Constitution cannot be amended either in the parliament or on the basis of the NCA. 3. Similarly, the KNU Concerned Group do not absolutely accept the administrative services set up by Tatmadaw, after the seizure of power. In the Karen revolutionary areas, we will perform, maintain and defend our administration, in accordance with the administrative system laid down by the KNU and on the basis of self-determination. 4. For that reason, we earnestly urge: ^ The Karen armed organizations, the DKBA, KNU/KNLA PC, BGF etc., to join up with the KNLA as the Kawthoolei Army, to defend together the Karen people, together with the entire people made up of all the ethnic nationalities; ^ The entire people to unanimously oppose the seizure of power by the Tatmadaw; ^ The international community not to recognize the military government set up by the Tatmadaw. KNU Concerned Group..."
Source/publisher: KNU Concerned Group
2021-02-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-09-02
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Description: "ဝမ်းနည်းကြောင်းသဝဏ်လွှာ ===================== ဇူလိုင်လ ၂၁ ရက် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်။ ------------------------------------------ ပြည်ထောင်စုဥပဒေအထောက်အကူပေးရေးအဖွဲ့ ဥက္ကဌ ၊ အမျိုးသားဒီမိုကရေစီအဖွဲ့ချုပ် ဗဟိုအလုပ်အမှုဆောင်အဖွဲ့ အတွင်းရေးမှူးအဖွဲ့ဝင် ဦးဉာဏ်ဝင်းသည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဖေဖေါ်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက် နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးထိန်းသိမ်းခြင်းကို ခံခဲ့ရပြီး အင်းစိန်ထောင်အတွင်း COVID-19 ရောဂါပိုးကူးစက်ခြင်းကိုခံခဲ့ ရပါသည်။ အင်းစိန်ထောင်မှတဆင့် ရန်ကုန်ပြည်သူ့ဆေးရုံကြီးသို့ ပို့ဆောင်ဆေးကုသမှုခံယူစဉ် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် ဇူလိုင်လ ၂၀ ရက်နေ့ နံနက် ၉ နာရီ ၁၀ မိနစ် အချိန်တွင် ကွယ်လွန်အနိစ္စရောက်သွားကြောင်း ကြားသိရ ပါသည်။ ယုံကြည်ချက်ကြောင့်အကျဉ်းကျခံရသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများကို လုံလောက်သည့် ကျန်းမာရေးစောင့်ရှောက်မှုပေးရန် ပျက်ကွက်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတွင် တာဝန်အပြည့်ရှိသည့် အပြင် အဆိုပါကိစ္စရပ်များအတွက် တာဝန်အပြည့်ယူရမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း သိစေအပ်သည်။ ကွယ်လွန်အနစ္စရောက်သွားသော ဦးဉာဏ်ဝင်း၏မိသားစုနှင့် ထပ်တူဝမ်းနည်းကြေကွဲရပါ ကြောင်းနှင့် မပြီးဆုံးသေးသော စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်ကျဆုံးရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ဆက်လက်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားမည်ဟု ကတိပြုပါကြောင်း သဝဏ်လွှာပေးပို့အပ် ပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH)
2021-07-21
Date of entry/update: 2021-07-21
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Description: "Myanmar’s military regime on Monday sentenced the National League for Democracy (NLD)’s detained Magwe Region chief minister, Dr. Aung Moe Nyo, who is also the party’s secretary, to two years in prison on an incitement charge. He is the first head of a state or region to be sentenced to a prison term by the regime since the Feb. 1 coup. Dr. Aung Moe Nyo sits on the NLD’s secretariat board. He was charged under Article 505(b) of the Penal Code, accused of publishing statements declaring the junta’s State Administrative Council to be unlawful. A regime court on Monday handed down the maximum penalty to the deposed chief minister, who has been detained for more than four months, an NLD member in Magwe Region said. In addition to the case in which he was sentenced, Dr. Aung Moe Nyo faces an additional charge brought by the regime under the Natural Disaster Management Law, the party member said. If found guilty, he would likely face an additional three-year prison sentence. The chief minister was reelected in his constituency in Magwe Region in the 2020 general election. All 14 state and regional chief ministers appointed by the NLD were detained on Feb. 1 when the military staged a coup. Only the Chin State chief minister has been released; the 13 others are still in military custody or prison, or under house arrest. Four other chief ministers have also been charged with incitement under Article 505(b). The same charge was also brought by the regime against NLD chairwoman Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and vice chairs U Win Myint and Dr. Zaw Myint Maung, who were also arrested on Feb. 1..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-06-07
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Myanmar/Burma, China, ASEAN, sanctions, pariah states, authoritarian transitions, Aung San Suu Kyi
Topic: Myanmar/Burma, China, ASEAN, sanctions, pariah states, authoritarian transitions, Aung San Suu Kyi
Description: "Abstract: Myanmar’s liberalizing reforms since late 2010 have effectively shed the country’s decades-long “pariah state” status. This article evaluates competing explanations for why Myanmar’s leaders made the strategic decision to pursue reform and opening. We examine whether the strategic decision was motivated by fears of sudden regime change, by socialization into the norms of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or by the geopolitics of overreliance on China. Drawing on newly available materials and recent field interviews in Myanmar, we demonstrate how difficult it is for international actors to persuade a pariah state through sanctions or engagement, given the pariah regime’s intense focus on maintaining power. However, reliance on a more powerful neighbour can reach a point where costs to national autonomy become unacceptable, motivating reforms for the sake of economic and diplomatic diversification.....Acknowledgments: We gratefully acknowledge the participation of interviewees in Yangon, Naypyidaw, Seoul, and Washington, DC. Research assistance was provided by Andrew Choi, Esther Pau Sann Cing, Li Xuan, Li Zimeng, Wang Qichao, Wu Shangwei, Zhang Xiaorui, and Zhou Xin. We also wish to thank the editor, three anonymous reviewers, and participants at the 2014 Murdoch-Macau Colloquium on Political Change and Governance in Asia, whose comments greatly improved this article. We thank the Asan Institute for Policy Studies for supporting Leif-Eric Easley’s research travel to Myanmar in 2014. Research for this article was funded in part by a grant from the University of Macau (SRG2013-00057-FSS). For over two decades, Myanmar suffered the reputation of an international pariah. After the 1988 coup that inaugurated 22 years of military rule under the State Law and Order Restoration Council / State Peace and Development Council (SLORC/SPDC),1 Myanmar incurred international condemnation and sanctions for human rights violations, including annulling the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) electoral victory in 1990; detaining opposition leaders, including NLD General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi; killing civilians during military campaigns against armed ethnic minority groups; violently suppressing civil protests in the 2007 “Saffron Revolution”; and muzzling free speech and the press.2 The junta appeared unmoved by sanctions and international exhortations to pursue reform and opening. Its apparent steps toward ending military rule under the 2003 “Roadmap to Discipline-Flourishing Democracy” were often marred by process irregularities, lack of inclusiveness and transparency, and restrictions on and sometimes violent repression of opposition parties. Though the SPDC held landmark elections for a civilian government in November 2010, supporters of democracy were not encouraged when the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) swept the polls and elevated Prime Minister Gen. Thein Sein to the presidency. Many were surprised, however, when Thein Sein initiated extensive reforms in 2011: releasing political prisoners, loosening media and civil society restrictions, and allowing Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition members to run for parliament. Myanmar’s pariah status quickly abated as a parade of foreign leaders visited the country and eased sanctions. In November 2015, Myanmar’s first general election under nominally civilian rule saw the NLD defeat the USDP in a landslide, marking a new era in Myanmar’s politics.3 The manner in which Myanmar pursued transformative reforms raises important questions. Why did the SPDC pursue reform and opening when it did? What motivated the strategic decision to pursue transformative policies? Several scholars have argued that domestic factors drove Myanmar’s reforms. Jones maintains that the junta’s co-optation of ethnic militias allowed it to resume a democratization process it had begun and aborted in 1990 and again in 1996.4 Bünte, along with Croissant and Kamerling, emphasizes the aging SPDC leaders’ desire to manage succession politics through institutionalization.5 Roger Lee Huang argues that the junta sought to retain political control but did not foresee the extent of reforms under Thein Sein, an assessment shared by MacDonald.6 Other scholarship emphasizes international factors as primary catalysts for reform. One argument is that Myanmar’s leaders implemented domestic reforms to pursue rapprochement with the European Union, the United States, and other sanctions-imposing countries, and to counterbalance China’s growing political and economic influence.7 Another possible factor behind Myanmar’s transition is the socializing role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and more generally, Myanmar’s desire for international prestige.8 While more than one of these factors may have motivated Myanmar’s reforms, an “all of the above” answer leaves the country’s political transformation over-determined and under-examined. This article weighs the theoretical logic and empirical evidence for three competing explanations for Myanmar’s strategic decision to pursue transformative policies: first, junta leaders’ desire to maintain power and avoid sudden regime change; second, socialization into ASEAN norms; and third, the desire to reduce China’s political and economic influence over Myanmar.9 We base our research on numerous interviews with key informants in or engaged with Myanmar, as well as on primary documents. We find that while multiple factors motivated Myanmar’s strategic decision, the most important driver was concern about China’s growing influence. To frame the analysis, the next section defines pariah states and what it means to make a strategic decision to pursue transformative policies and exit pariahdom. We then briefly outline our interview methodology before discussing the timing of Myanmar’s transformative reforms. Subsequent sections review theoretical bases and empirical support for each of the three competing explanations. In the conclusion, we summarize our findings and discuss possible implications for other pariah states and for Myanmar’s political future..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Pacific Affairs (Canada)
2016-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-28
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Sub-title: Toppled democratic leader makes clear in a military court appearance that she and her party represent Myanmar's agitated people
Description: "Myanmar’s deposed and detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi appeared in court on Monday, her first public appearance since a February 1 military coup toppled her elected government and set off waves of popular dissent and resistance. Although it was only a first 30-minute hearing, the legal process could lead to her eventual imprisonment and the dissolution of her political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). Suu Kyi stands accused by the military of several charges ranging from possession of illegally imported walkie-talkies to violating the 1923 colonial-era Official Secrets Act. But the reality, most Myanmar observers say, is that the top brass wants to punish the government she led since 2016 and nullify the outcome of the November 2020 election where the NLD scored yet another landslide victory, as it did in 2015 and 1990. The military’s accusations of electoral fraud are not what independent, international election observers saw when they monitored the poll last year. With the military now firmly in charge of the country’s central institutions since the coup, the eventual outcome of the court cases against Suu Kyi is not in doubt – she will inevitably be found guilty and banned from politics. That, in turn, could set the stage for new elections rigged in favor of the military and without the participation of the NLD. Those verdicts, whenever they are handed down, will surely spark more furious unrest in a country that has descended into chaos and anarchy since the military made the fateful decision to seize power on the day a newly elected parliament was scheduled to meet for the first time in Naypyitaw. The coup has also restored Myanmar to pariah status internationally, with Western criticism and sanctions heaped on the coup makers. At the same time, coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is coming under fire from within the military — not because of the power grab as such, but for his inability to consolidate it. Internally, he has reportedly been mocked as only being good at making donations to pagodas and for being “the prince of bangs and pots”, a reference to the way people across the country are venting their anger at the coup by banging pots and pans. The coup was immediately met by massive demonstrations all over Myanmar, with pro-democracy protesters often waving Suu Kyi’s image on banners and signs, and has been followed by a fierce response from the military. More than 800 protesters and bystanders have been killed and about 4,000 people detained since the putsch. And the violence and persecution are far from over. What began as peaceful protests have morphed into violent clashes between the military, the police and anti-coup activists who in some places have organized their own armed bands. In Kayah state in the east armed partisans overran and burned down a police station on May 23. According to the Kantarawaddy Times, a local website, at least 15 policemen were killed in the raid and four captured alive. Twenty-six Myanmar army soldiers have reportedly been killed elsewhere in Kayah state over the past few days. The same news source reported that one resistance fighter was killed and five wounded during the clash. In Mindat in the west, resistance fighters armed with hunting rifles and homemade guns took over the town before the military responded with heavy artillery and fire from helicopters. Elsewhere in Myanmar, bombings are becoming daily occurrences and the targets are military-controlled banks, companies and local governmental offices. A huge fire raged at a government building in the northern city of Myitkyina in Kachin state on May 23. On the same day, a bomb exploded in front of the municipal office and explosions as well as gunfire could be heard in Sanchaung in the country’s largest city and commercial capital Yangon. Apart from igniting armed resistance by locally raised and previously unknown forces, the war between ethnic armed groups in Kayin and Kachin states and the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, has flared anew. In Kayin state, more than 20,000 people have had to flee the fighting while the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has overrun a number of army positions and police stations, most recently in Hkamti in northern Sagaing Division on May 22. Airbases in Meiktila, Magwe and Toungoo have come under rocket attacks in what appears to be ethnic rebels working with urban dissidents. Among those arrested by junta forces are journalists, activists, health workers and teachers who have taken part in protests against the coup. According to a May 23 Reuters report quoting an official of the teachers’ federation who declined to give his name for fear of reprisals, 125,000 school teachers of the country’s total of 430,000 have been suspended. The number of doctors and nurses who have lost their jobs is not known, but is thought to be considerable. Many educated people, fearing arrests, have managed to leave the country leading to yet another brain drain, similar to those after the first military takeover in 1962 and the crushing of a pro-democracy uprising in 1988. The country could tilt towards further anomie without a circuit breaker. Banks are not functioning and the economy is in a shambles amid countrywide strikes and unrest. There are rising reports of soldiers and police seemingly at random breaking into people’s homes, destroying furniture and stealing whatever they can lay their hands on. Other reports indicate that soldiers and policemen have been given methamphetamine pills to jack them up before being deployed to crack down on protesters, which could explain their often erratic and wildly violent behavior. The only statement that came out of the May 24 court hearing was that a defiant Suu Kyi said that the NLD “was established by the people so the party will be there as long as the people are.” It’s impossible to predict how that short utterance from the country’s iconic democratic leader will impact or ignite an already volatile situation on the ground. What is clear, however, is that she acknowledged her followers are now pitted against the military, an institution she had tried to accommodate and work with while in power. It’s also clear that whatever sympathy and support the public may have had for the Tatmadaw are long gone as soldiers rampage, kill and loot with increasingly reckless abandon – a point that some say may be forming schisms in the military. If Min Aung Hlaing is eventually replaced, which is still far from certain, it doesn’t mean his successor would take a more conciliatory approach to the country’s civilian leaders, including Suu Kyi, and her affiliated pro-democracy movement. But as long as he remains in place and Suu Kyi is in the dock on trumped-up charges, Myanmar’s people-versus-the military struggle will likely accelerate and spread..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-05-24
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The European Union on Sunday denounced a proposal by Myanmar's junta-appointed election commission to dissolve deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which overwhelmingly won the general election in November. "If the Commission were to proceed with this proposal, it would show yet again the junta's blatant disregard for the will of Myanmar's people and for due legal process," a spokeswoman of the EU's executive Commission said in a statement. On Friday, media cited the chairman of the junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC), Thein Soe, as saying the panel would have to dissolve the NLD for committing vote fraud in the November election. Myanmar's army seized power on Feb. 1, overthrowing and detaining the elected civilian leader Suu Kyi, who led a non-violent struggle against dictatorship in the last two decades of the military's 1962-2011 rule of Myanmar. The military justified its coup by accusing the NLD of obtaining a landslide victory through a manipulated vote, though the electoral commission at that time rejected its complaints. The NLD says it won fairly. The EU echoed the NLD's position, underscoring the party's victory had been confirmed by all independent domestic and international observers. "No repression or unfounded pseudo-legal proceedings can grant legitimacy to the junta’s illegal takeover of power," the spokeswoman for the EU Commission said. "The EU will continue to denounce all attempts to overturn the will of the Myanmar people and to alter the outcome of the last general elections."..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2021-05-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "We have heard the statement of U Thein Soe, the junta-appointed chairman of the Union Election Commission, according to which the Commission may dissolve the National League for Democracy, which overwhelmingly won the last general elections in November. If the Commission were to proceed with this proposal, it would show yet again the junta’s blatant disregard for the will of Myanmar’s people and for due legal process. The EU reiterates that the elections in November faithfully represented the will of Myanmar’s people. This was confirmed by all independent domestic and international observers. No arbitrary decision by the military junta and their illegally-appointed members of the Electoral Commission can cancel that. The EU will continue to denounce all attempts to overturn the will of the Myanmar people and to alter the outcome of the last general elections. No repression or unfounded pseudo-legal proceedings can grant legitimacy to the junta’s illegal takeover of power. Only respecting the will of the people can bring Myanmar back onto its democratic path and deliver stability and sustainable development..."
Source/publisher: European External Action Service
2021-05-23
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar's junta-appointed election commission will dissolve Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy Party (NLD) because of what it said was fraud in a November election, news outlet Myanmar Now said on Friday, citing a commissioner. Myanmar Now said the decision was made during a meeting with political parties that was boycotted by many parties including the NLD. The election fraud conducted by the NLD was illegal "so we will have to dissolve the party's registration", the chairman of the junta-backed Union Election Commission (UEC), Thein Soe, was cited in the report as saying. "Those who did that will be considered as traitors and we will take action," said Thein Soe. A spokesman for the junta and for a pro-democracy national unity government, which includes ousted members of the NLD, did not immediately respond to requests for comment. A spokesman for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party said it had representatives at the meeting, which was still going on, and he was not aware of the outcome. Myanmar's army took power alleging fraud in a November election that was swept by the party of Suu Kyi, who fought for democracy for decades before tentative reforms began a decade ago. The electoral commission at the time had rejected the army's complaints. The security forces have killed more than 800 people since a wave of protests broke out after coup, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners activist group says. Fighting has also flared between the security forces and ethnic minority guerrilla groups. The turmoil has alarmed Myanmar's neigbours and the broader international community, but the generals have shown no sign of any intention of seeking a compromise with the pro-democracy movement. Since her arrest hours before a Feb. 1 coup, Suu Kyi has been held in detention and faces numerous charges filed in two courts, the most serious under a colonial-era official secrets act, punishable by 14 years in prison. Suu Kyi, 75, has been permitted to speak with lawyers only via a video link in the presence of security personnel. Her co-defendant is Win Myint, the ousted president. Opponents of the military have formed a National Unity Government, which operates under cover or through members based abroad. It has announced it is setting up of a People's Defence Force to challenge the junta. Japan, a major donor to Myanmar, will have to rethink its aid provision to Myanmar if the situation in the Southeast Asian nation does not improve, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said in Tokyo..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2021-05-21
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "၁။ ကရင်နီပြည်နယ်အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက် - အမှတ် (၁/၂၀၂၁) ၂။ အမျိုးသားဒီမိုကရေစီအဖွဲ့ချုပ် ကြောညာချက်အမှတ် ၂/၀၄/၂၀၂၁ ၃။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံလုံးဆိုင်ရာဆရာဆရာမများအဖွဲ့ချုပ် ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၈/၂၀၂၁)..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
2021-04-19
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: civil disobedience movement, Coup, Democracy, Human Rights, military in politics, Min Aung Hlaing, National League for Democracy, November 8 general election, Rule of Law, State Administrative Council, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Tatmadaw, Yangon
Topic: civil disobedience movement, Coup, Democracy, Human Rights, military in politics, Min Aung Hlaing, National League for Democracy, November 8 general election, Rule of Law, State Administrative Council, State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Tatmadaw, Yangon
Description: "What is the new normal for Myanmar today? As people have been trying different forms of civil disobedience to fight the military coup it has become a new normal in Myanmar. The words “civil disobedience” comes from State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal before she was detained. She urged people to “oppose the military coup together in any way possible”. For her, as she often said, “the people are the most important force”. A veteran journalist asked another National League for Democracy (NLD) leader, U Win Htein, about the message and what Daw Aung San Suu Kyi wants people to do. U Win Htein said she wanted a civil disobedience movement rather than mass street protests because of COVID-19 and the potential for bloodshed. As her message was not clear enough, people were puzzled about what to do. NLD members have waited for instructions from the party’s central executive committee who are being held in Naypyidaw. The strict hierarchy of the NLD left people feeling bereft on the first day of the coup. My 78-year-old mother kept asking me, “Is there any luck?” She cried the whole day because her beloved leader, “Mother Suu”, was detained. It is heartbreaking for her because she did not expect to return to military rule. One day after the coup, people started banging pots and pans and honking car horns to oppose military rule. Banging pans is a traditional way of driving out ghosts. That initiative reached the international media and was dubbed the “drum revolution”. Thais have followed suit in an attempt to drive out Thailand’s military regime. But pots and pans are not enough for young citizens who have been hit the hardest by the forced internet shutdown ordered by the authorities. My son and his student friends have lost their online jobs, they cannot play virtual games and their online shopping businesses have folded. Food Panda delivers lost their jobs as online ordering has broken down and most bank cards have stopped working because of connection failures. Shops only want cash as the banking system is unstable and the Grab taxi app just says, “no connection found”. The internet shut down is causing a long list of problems. Facebook was blocked after the authorities forced telecoms operators to ban the most popular social media network. People immediately searched for virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass Myanmar’s networks. Anti-coup posts and protest photos returned to Facebook..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-02-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
Format : pdf
Size: 287.29 KB
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Topic: MYANMAR, AUNG SAN SUU KYI, NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY, 2020 ELECTIONS, UNITED DEVELOPMENT AND SOLIDARITY PARTY
Sub-title: Businesses are bracing for a slowdown and possibly worse ahead of risk-laden 2020 polls
Topic: MYANMAR, AUNG SAN SUU KYI, NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY, 2020 ELECTIONS, UNITED DEVELOPMENT AND SOLIDARITY PARTY
Description: "Myanmar-based executives and investors are bracing for a business slowdown in the run-up to next year’s general elections, as uncertainty rises over the Southeast Asian nation’s political and policy directions. The election, tentatively scheduled for November 2020, will essentially pit de facto national leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) against the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the country’s two major political parties. The NLD romped to victory in 2015 in the nation’s first competitive election in 25 years, a shift from quasi-military to quasi-democratic rule that many then hoped would fuel a foreign investment-led economic boom. But Suu Kyi’s ability and willingness to orchestrate that boom has been constrained by a power-sharing arrangement with the autonomous military, which controls the crucial defense, home affairs and border affairs ministries, as well as her singular focus on flagging peace process..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2019-11-25
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) has named four senior members who will steer the party towards electoral victory in the 2020 general election, according to party spokesperson Dr. Myo Nyunt. The party’s election campaigns will be led by party Vice Chairman and Mandalay Region Chief Minister Dr. Zaw Myint Maung, Magwe Region Chief Minister Dr. Aung Moe Nyo and NLD Central Executive Committee secretaries U Nyan Win and U Han Tha Myint. “Facilitating the functions of the party and rallying public support on a wider scale will all contribute to the party’s electoral victories,” Dr. Myo Nyunt told The Irrawaddy. Dr. Aung Moe Nyo, previously a member of the Central Executive Committee, was promoted to third secretary of the committee on Oct. 29. Dr. Myo Nyunt said that the promotion was intended to answer widely asked questions about the hierarchy within the party regarding who would succeed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The NLD currently has no plans to change Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s position as party chairperson. “I have to try to the best of my ability to perform this duty,” said Dr. Aung Moe Nyo. “It is not about promotion, it is about greater responsibility.” According to Dr. Myo Nyunt, the NLD’s candidates for state and regional chief minister positions will include many incumbents, adding that the ministers’ five years of experience in the executive branch are an invaluable asset to the party..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2019-10-30
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Central Social Assistance Team under National League for Democracy (NLD) has held a ceremony for the first time to provide stipends to the children of former political prisoners who sacrificed and devoted their lives to political struggle and the life of the party. This ceremony was held at NLD party head office in Bahan Township, Yangon on November 8, 2019. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi is the chairperson of the Central Social Assistance Team and the ceremony was held in honour of former political prisoners who joined hands with the party with firm belief in political struggle. In the ceremony, stipends were given to 92 children of former political prisoners who are pursuing studies at different levels of university, higher secondary, secondary and primary. The Central Social Assistance Team gives assistance to former political prisoners for their healthcare, rehabilitation of their lives and stipend money for their children’s education but because of financial constraints the team still needs more funds for those struggling for their livelihoods and living in poverty..."
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2019-11-09
Date of entry/update: 2019-11-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "New political groups are emerging to contest Myanmar’s next election in 2020, aiming to challenge the hegemony of national civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi after she has been weakened by escalating ethnic conflicts and slowing economic growth. Those factors were blamed by party officials for the poor performance of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) in by-elections in November, when it won only seven of the 13 seats up for grabs as regional and army-linked parties made gains. “Now that ethnic parties have allied with one another and prepared, we can’t fully rely on the power of the party. We must try harder than before to win the trust of the people,” said Dashi La Seng, an NLD lawmaker from the northern state of Kachin, where the party lost a seat in November. At stake is the future of Myanmar’s transition to democracy. The NLD swept to power in a landslide in 2015, winning a comfortable majority in parliament despite 25 percent of the seats being reserved for the army..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2019-02-14
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Topic: National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, Ethnic based political parties, Myanmar
Topic: National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, Ethnic based political parties, Myanmar
Description: "When the military-backed government of Myanmar began a series of political reforms in 2011, the country’s political landscape changed for good. The political reforms carried out by Myanmar’s then government included the release of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, general amnesties for more than 200 political prisoners and many others. The culmination of such reforms was seen in 2015 when the country held its first openly contested elections since 1990. There were also general elections held in 2010, however that election was widely discredited as fraudulent. The 2015 elections saw the National League for Democracy (NLD) party led by Aung San Suu Kyi obtain a landslide victory, paving the way for the country’s first non-military president in 15 years. At the time when Aung San Suu Kyi was elected, the political landscape was completely different. Large segments of the population were unhappy living under the authoritarian rule of the military junta. The junta was notorious for its various human rights abuses and refusal to be held accountable. The military junta was also responsible for fuelling the many ethnic conflicts that has plagued the country’s history since..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The ASEAN Post" (Malaysia)
2019-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2019-10-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Topic: MYANMAR, AUNG SAN SUU KYI, MIN AUNG HLAING, TATMADAW, NLD, 2020 ELECTIONS, USDP
Sub-title: Civil-military relations are deteriorating as opposed pro-democracy and military forces gear up for 2020 elections
Topic: MYANMAR, AUNG SAN SUU KYI, MIN AUNG HLAING, TATMADAW, NLD, 2020 ELECTIONS, USDP
Description: "As a general election draws near in Myanmar, a contest that will pit pro-democracy against military forces, political parties are already preparing for the 2020 race. On September 27, the National League for Democracy (NLD) party that won the 2015 election commemorated its 31st anniversary with a spokesman’s lament that the nation’s democracy was not yet “genuine.” In a gauntlet-dropping pronouncement, NLD delegates gathered in the old capital of Yangon said that the military-drafted 2008 constitution, which grants vast powers to the men in green, must be amended to promote more democracy. At the same time, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, has recently acted more like a politician than both incumbent president Win Myint and nominal national leader State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. The military chief, who some suspect has presidential ambitions, has recently visited and donated to Muslim mosques, Christian churches and Hindu temples, in an apparent bid to raise his grass roots profile and soften his public image..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2019-09-30
Date of entry/update: 2019-09-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "After two years of delicate accommodation, Myanmars military backed government and the main pro-democracy opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) are on a collusion course ahead of general elections scheduled for next year. An NLD-led campaign launched last month to amend the 2008 constitution is openly challenging the militarys political power and testing political stability ahead of the pivotal polls. The national drive for charter change aims broadly to accelerate the countrys still tentative transition from decades of authoritarian military rule towards democracy. In particular, the campaign is geared towards diminishing the role of military appointees to parliament who currently control 25% of its seats. The campaign however is not geared towards changing article 59(f), which bars NLD leader and pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi from assuming the presidency because she was married to a foreign national."
Creator/author: Larry Jagan
Source/publisher: "Asia Times Online"
2014-06-12
Date of entry/update: 2014-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: Suu Kyi steps into the fray at a time when the NLD desperately requires fresh ideas and strong leadership
Creator/author: Aung Zaw
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 18, No. 12
2010-12-00
Date of entry/update: 2010-12-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: "...Embassy Rangoon pol/econ chief departs Post this week after ending a two-year tour that saw the largest political uprising in Burma in twenty years, the arrest and imprisonment of the pro-democracy opposition?s most talented leaders, and the worst natural disaster in Burma?s recorded history. We asked her to share her candid observations on the current political situation, and her recommendations on how best to advance our democratic goals..."
Source/publisher: US Embassy, Rangoon, via Wikileaks
2008-07-14
Date of entry/update: 2010-12-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: "Since Burma?s independence from British rule in 1948, the Burmese polity has been fraught with contentious politics ranging from armed insurgencies to non-violent movements against the state. The history of Burma?s opposition movements, originating from the colonial period, can be understood as five different forms of struggle—legal political means, armed insurrections, underground (clandestine) activities, above-ground engagements (through civil society groups and the domestic media), and international advocacy (through lobbying, grassroots campaigns, and the foreign media including Burmese language broadcasts). This paper will examine how opposition movements since 1988 have played out until now and how they will remain relevant after the 2010 elections. Generally, relevancy is defined as a means to increase the likelihood of accomplishing the professed goal,1 treating the goal more in terms of consequence (the actual outcome as opposed to the morality of intention). Public support or legitimacy plays a key role in determining relevancy. However, in the context of opposition movements in Burma, we must consider their moral ground. This paper will probe the question of relevancy for Burmese opposition movements from two perspectives— legitimacy and outcome."
Creator/author: Min Zin
Source/publisher: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.
2010-11-00
Date of entry/update: 2010-11-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
Format : pdf
Size: 173.1 KB
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Description: In early May, shortly before the National League for Democracy (NLD) officially ceased to exist under the Burmese regime?s election law, The Irrawaddy spoke with Tin Oo, vice chairman of the NLD, about its past and future.
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 18, No. 6
2010-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2010-08-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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Description: What lies ahead for the party that has led Burma?s democracy movement for more than two decades now that it has refused to register for this year?s election?... "The decision by the National League for Democracy (NLD) not to register for this year?s planned general election should come as no surprise. Given the regime?s unjust election laws, which were designed to prevent NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners from participating in the election or even remaining as members of their respective parties, it was perhaps inevitable. But even so, it raises serious concerns about how the party plans to continue its push for democracy in Burma now that its very existence is in jeopardy..."
Creator/author: Aung Zaw, Yeni
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 18, No. 4
2010-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2010-04-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language: English
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