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Description: A wide-ranging collection of (largely EBO) papers on the civil war, cease-fires etc. back to 2009. In English apart from one video in Burmese
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
Date of entry/update: 2016-01-21
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English, (+1 video in Burmese)
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Description: EBO?s vision for the future of the Union of Myanmar: The ?Pyidaungsu” (Union of Myanmar) is established as a federal democratic country after a well-negotiated and sustainable peace process. Just and fair negotiations have ended the 65-year old civil war and there is peaceful co-existence, where multi-ethnic communities thrive and participate actively in the political arena. The National Dialogue during the peace process has led to good governance and the establishment of a developed and prosperous nation. The international community supports the transition process and assists in the country?s development. Human rights are widely understood, fulfilled, promoted and respected. mission statement In support of the vision, EBO will: Encourage and strengthen the capacity of decision makers (the executive, army, parliament, civil service & political parties) to seek a more inclusive and democratic solution to peace through engagement processes with other stakeholders to develop policies and strengthen democratic practices. Facilitate ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to consult amongst themselves; provide information, training and resources to develop policies and strategies for negotiations; and to implement their agreement with the government. The program will also build the capacity of EAOs to interact with the general public and political parties to strengthen collaboration and cooperation in support of a position to negotiate with the government. Strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations and (especially ethnic) media by facilitating access to information, training and funding to enable them, especially women and youth, to participate in the peace process and have a more active role in social and political processes. Provide the international community, foreign governments and INGOs with information on developments within Myanmar to help develop their policies to support democratization and to help coordinate their response and involvement in the peace process..."
Source/publisher: Euro-Burma Office (EBO)
Date of entry/update: 2015-04-25
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Description: Useful, Systematic compilation of analyses of the civil war, peace processes, including the Nationwide Ceasefire Accord (NCA)... Some in Burmese....Information on the 2010 Elections...Statements on the elections on 7 November...Laws, decrees and regulations relating to the 2010 Elections (texts)...Texts on the Election laws and Registration Law in Burmese and English... News and commentary on the Election laws and Registration Law in Burmese and English...Information on the 7-Step Roadmap.
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
Date of entry/update: 2016-01-21
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English, Burmese (မြန်မာဘာသာ)
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Description: Selected documents back to 2007. Recent years, multiple sources. Many reports by the Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies (numerous dead links) and Harn Yawnghwe.
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
Date of entry/update: 2016-01-21
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
Language: English
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Individual Documents

Description: "Renewed Rakhine-Rohingya Tensions?: On 29 July 2021, the Rohingya Post first reported that hundreds of Arakan Army troops and Buddhist Rakhine had sealed off a Rohingya village in Minbya Township, since 24 July 2021. The village was running out of essential supplies and villagers were being tortured in the local mosques. Burma Campaign UK reported that the Arakan Army had occupied and laid siege to Let Ma (also known as Lumbashor by the Rohingya) Village, Minbya Township, Rakhine State, but had withdrawn in the afternoon of 2 August taking two villagers with them. Burma Campaign UK called on the Arakan Army to immediately release the two villagers and to commit to ending all abductions and hostage taking of civilians. Burma Campaign UK also reported that the Arakan Army had forced villagers to sign documents and be filmed stating that no human rights violations had taken place. The Development Media Group, a Rakhine news agency promoted for its professionalism and unbiased news, denied the report claiming that it is propaganda against the Arakan Army and its growing influence on the people of Arakan/ Rakhine State.....What Happened and Why?: Letma or Lumbashor is a big village with quite a large population. The villagers are well known for being very united and strong in protecting themselves from the excesses of successive authorities, even during the Japanese occupation. There is no Tatmadaw base near the village but there are some AA bases which means the area is likely ‘administered’ by the civilian arm of the AA – United League of Arakan. According to local sources, on 21 July before Eid ul Adha, the festival commemorating Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son, AA troops demanded that every household making kurbaan (animal sacrifices) in the village pay Kyat 15,000 and provide 3 kilograms of meat (beef or mutton). Some villagers did not comply. Therefore on 24 July, AA troops arrived at Letma from three directions. Rakhine villagers from surrounding villages then surrounded the village. The family and relatives of 12 villagers who refused to pay were detained and kept imprisoned in a mosque without food for three days. During the occupation, AA soldiers apparently made the villagers cook and provide meals for them. Soldiers were reportedly also stealing cattle and goats owned by the Rohingya villagers. According to Burma Campaign UK, the AA troops were commanded by Lt. Colonel Zaw Min Htun and Major Khaing Kyaw. The AA denies the allegations and claims that they were trying to capture bandits, who are engaged in smuggling cattle. It is true that cattle smugglers are active in the area but Twan Mrat Naing, Commander-in-Chief of the AA, posted an apparent threat to Rohingyas on his Twitter account today, stating: “We promote ethnic diversity and religious tolerance but can’t afford to provide safe haven and breeding ground for the terrorists and criminal gangs. Be aware that you are just about to turn your best friend into (an) enemy by using your best tool of disinformation.” Given the rapid expansion of the AA and its ‘administrative’ areas due to the absence of local authorities following the 1 February coup, it is possible that as one observer noted, “Twan Mrat Naing, sometimes may not know what is really happening on the ground. Some of his commanders may have been misbehaving and intentionally wrongly reporting to him. It is likely that they did something that was not right. But even if Rakhines do not like what has been happening on the ground, nobody (especially Rakhine) dares or wants to criticise the AA openly even on social media.” If this is true, the AA leadership will need to redouble its efforts and make a sincere attempt to improve. Compared to fighting, governance is difficult and good governance is even more difficult. The culture of impunity so prevalent in the Tatmadaw must not be allowed to grow in the AA and ULA. Twan Mrat Naing is a good leader and he needs to face problems head-on. The goodwill of the Rakhine and Rohingya people as well as that of the Myanmar and international communities must not be squandered..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2021-08-04
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "It has been four months since the Myanmar military seized power from the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) and arrested most of the NLD leaders including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. The reason originally given was irregularities in the voting process and lack of redress by the Union Election Commission, which was controlled by the NLD, although such reasoning, especially amidst new accusation of corruption amongst other things remains suspect. Soon after the coup, the military formed a body, the State Administration Council (SAC), under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces Min Aung Hlaing. Not unsurprisingly the return to military rule was met with widespread protests in the country and condemnation from the international community while Myanmar security forces took to the streets to brutally suppress the protestors, known as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Security forces used not only riot control techniques but live-fire resulting in the deaths at the time of writing over 860 civilians had been killed, including children, and more than 4,840 civilians convicted or arrested. 1 Protests have taken place throughout the country including areas under the control of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). The EAOs, before the coup, had been involved in an NLD led and ostensibly military supported, peace process – the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. While the peace process had been flawed and at one point stalled for two years it was expected that 2021 could see some progress made in addressing many of the problems that had occurred. The EAOs largely came out in favour of the protestors and the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) an alliance of the 10 NCA-signatories2 immediately issued the following statement 1). We condemn the Myanmar military’s way of addressing the current political crisis by carrying out a coup d’état. 2).We demand the immediate and unconditional release of all leaders who are detained and arrested. 3).We urge the resolution of political problems by peaceful means and negotiation, rather than by force of arms. 4.) We stand firm on the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and act accordingly regarding the peace process. 5.) We call for the unconditional declaration of a nationwide ceasefire. 6.) We will collaborate with the public in seeking solutions, as we are aware of the difficulties faced by the people by the coup as well as the global pandemic (COVID-19). 7.) We call on the support of the international community including the UN in resolving the current crisis.3 That said, however, at least one ethnic political party the Arakan National Party (ANP), the biggest Arakanese political party in Arakan State, released a statement signalling that it would cooperate with Myanmar’s military. In its statement, the ANP said it will work together with the Tatmadaw to resolve specific Arakanese crises including the removal of the terrorist label for the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army, which the SAC later did. On March 11, the PPST, which had already suspended all political dialogue with the military on February 20, held a meeting to discuss strategies to stop the Myanmar military’s ongoing violent crackdown on anti-coup protesters and also future dialogue with the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a shadow NLD government.4 According to reporting there had been concerns among some EAOs that it could be dangerous for the PPST to prioritize coordination with the CRPH. One leader was quoted as saying, We were a dialogue partner of the military. We were a dialogue partner of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Now we cannot stand the people’s suffering. The main discussion is how to calm the situation down. We are thinking of the plight of the citizens,5 Despite several concerns, the Karen National Union, the Restoration Council of Shan State and the Chin National Front still held separate talks with the CRPH. In addition, the Karen National Union’s Chairman Mutu Say Po wrote a letter on 22 March 2021, after Min Aung Hlaing had sent a letter requesting a meeting. The reply from Mutu Say Po stated, The KNU finds it completely unacceptable that police and Tatmadaw personnel, whose responsibilities are to protect and defend its own people, have killed, attacked, and threatened peaceful protesters. Such events have damaged our country's reputation and caused great pain and suffering of our people. These included a number of requirements the military had to meet before further discussions could take place these were, 1. Withdraw all riot squads and Tatmadaw troops which have been deployed against protesters and withdrawal of all Tatmadaw troops which have been deployed in ceasefire areas and send them back to their outposts and bases; Declare and implement a nationwide ceasefire. 2. Release and remove charges against those detained since Tatmadaw took over power on the 1" February 2021. 3. Fully allow access for medical assistance and healthcare to support the people's protest movement. 4. Issue orders to police and Tatmadaw troops to comply with all NCA provisions — and urgently release the following provisions regarding proper treatment of civilians: A. Stop acts violating a person's dignity, violence, extrajudicial detention, kidnapping, torture, inhumane treatment, imprisonment, killing or causing the disappearance of individuals B. Stop forcibly taking money, property, food, labour or services from civilians; in addition, halt unlawful and arbitrary arrest, entrapment, forced confession, lawsuits and prosecution against civilians; C. Stop denying individuals' right to healthcare and restriction of public health resources; and halt blocking the legal transportation of medicines for public use; D. Stop the destruction or actions that would lead to the destruction of schools, hospitals, clinics, religious buildings and their premises and the use of such places as military bases or outposts; E. Immediately stop any form of sexual attack on women, including sexual molestation, sexual assault or violence, rape and sex slavery; End all killing or maiming, forced conscription, rape or other forms of sexual assault or violence, or abduction of children. 5. Abolish laws issued by Tatmadaw since Feb 1" that violate human rights. 6. Agree to address the root causes of internal conflict of over 70 years through negotiations. 7. Agree to accept international mediation to support negotiations to end the current military administration and transfer power to a National Unity Government. 8. The Tatmadaw should publicly declare its commitment to democracy and federalism and withdraw from active engagement in politics..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2021-06-17
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "While most media attention continues to focus on the domestic political problems that have engulfed the country since the 1 February military takeover, little has been said about continuing inter-ethnic fighting in Shan State between the Restoration Council Shan State (RCSS) the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and its ally the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). A large part of the current discourse in relation to the military takeover suggests that armed ethnic organisations will be able to come together in a ‘Federal Army’ to free the people in the cities. But if there is one thing the continuous fighting in Shan State suggests is that there remains much discord between ethnic actors themselves. Clashes between the two Shan factions have been a constant and have also heavily involved the Ta’ang National Liberaion Army (TNLA) which has sided with the SSPP. In large part the increase in fighting was exacerbated in 2015 after the RCSS signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). After the NCA was signed, the RCSS established bases in Namtu, Hsipaw and Kyaukme townships. The move sparked fighting between the RCSS and the Shan State Progress Party, which controlled some areas outside of major towns there, and the TNLA. Similarly, the SSPP also allied itself not only with the TNLA, but also the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the then Kachin based Arakan Army (AA). Politically, the SSPP/SSA had no particular objective and instead sought guidance in such matters from the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD). However since the emergence of the TNLA, the SSPP seems to have allowed the Ta’ang group to hold major influence over the SSPP in its current strategy making processes. It also appears the TNLA’s territorial ambitions are perhaps driving, or at least adding to current hostilities with the RCSS in which the SSPP is playing a part. In 2018, media reported that the RCSS claimed it had the right to operate wherever there are ethnic Shan while the SSPP and TNLA say it belongs in the south of Shan State only. However, according to one individual close to the RCSS it had said that it will operate in every township outside the SelfAdministered Zones (SAZs) and Self-Administered Division (SAD). Meaning the TNLA should not operate outside the 2008 constitutionally mandated Namhsan and Mantong. If it wants to, it must be in agreement with the RCSS.1 The RCSS/SSA has maintained control in the north through its Brigade-701 in Muse District, Namkham Township. The claims to have set up Task Force 701 in 2006 after the PSLA was disarmed and SSA 3rd Brigade was ordered to move south of LashioMandalay Road. The TNLA claims the RCSS used its membership in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the central government as justification for stationing fighters in the north of Shan State. 2 A claim the RCSS has vehemently denied.The TNLA has also accused it of not consulting them on territory demarcation or joint operations, obstructing established administrative structures of TNLA and SSPP and forced conscription on pretext of combating drug addiction. 3 For its part, the RCSS claims that local ethnic Shan in Northern Shan State invited them to set up bases in the area to protect them against TNLA oppression, which the SSPP allegedly failed to do due to its alliance with the TNLA against the Tatmadaw.4 Most recently, it has been suggested that one of the main reasons for the continuing conflict is the fact that Northern Shan State has become a key point for border trade between Myanmar and China, especially with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China has plans to build a railway link to Myanmar. It has therefore been posited that the underlying reasons for continuing ethnic conflict is related now more to business interests and securing territorial gains rather than previous grievencies or ideological issues.5..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2021-05-27
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: An EBO commentary on the ICG’s ‘Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process’
Description: "The following paper has been written in response to the International Crisis Group’s latest Report No.308/Asia of 19 June 2020, ‘Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process’ and is designed to further complement and put forward some of our conclusions to facilitate further discourse. ICG’s Executive Summary The Panglong-21 peace conference would be largely symbolic and do little to address the fundamental obstacles on Myanmar’s road toward sustainable peace… the primary objectives for both sides are modest. The NLD sees the Panglong-21 meeting mostly as a way to boost its political campaign, while ethnic armed groups want to ensure that the peace process continues after the vote, regardless of who comes to power. The ICG fails to understand that ensuring the peace process continues after the elections is not symbolic and it is not a modest objective. It would be a very significant achievement. The Tatmadaw has never believed in negotiations and still does not. In 2011, for the first time in over sixty-four years, Thein Sein, decided to try to find a political solution to the civil war. If the talks do not continue after the elections, it means a return to war. The Commander-in-Chief has in the recent past stated that the peace talks must end by 2020 and that the ethnic forces must be either disbanded or demobilized. Aung San Suu Kyi has also said that she wants the peace talks to end by 2020. If both of them can be made to agree to continue the peace talks beyond 2020, it would be a major achievement indeed. The election period, however, will also be an opportunity to reflect on how to take the peace process forward… The current government, the military and ethnic armed groups should use this period to review their own strategy and goals, ramp up informal dialogue and examine crucial issues that have so far been put aside, such as the growth of the illicit economy and the mounting might of military-aligned militias… This downtime constitutes a unique opportunity for all parties to reflect on how to restart the process with a more constructive approach in 2021. The downtime may apply to the government and the Tatmadaw. ICG has mistakenly assumed that the ethnic armed organizations (like the government) have been idle during the two-year period when the peace talks were deadlocked (2018 and 2019). The ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have been very busy reviewing their strategy and goals, having intense internal dialogue and examining crucial issues in order to see how they can be addressed in a way that will be acceptable to all stakeholders. They do not want to go back to war and are committed to trying to find political solutions. They have not had, and will not be having, any downtime. The problem lies with the government and the Tatmadaw..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The need for a combined Ethnic approach in the 2020 election
Description: "Many expected the 2016 election which saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy gain power to be a major step forward, not only towards democracy but also ethnic equality. Such hopes now seem somewhat misguided in retrospect, with many ethnic political parties feeling abandoned by the NLD and especially Aung San Suu Kyi, therefore the 2020 election will allow ethnic representatives to redress the balance at the ballot box. The NLD had been able to win the majority of seats in ethnic states based largely on the iconography of its leader and the perception that she would rule justly. While the ethnic political parties had been able to secure seats in Rakhine and Shan states, their power was largely curtailed by the NLD appointing non-ethnic State Ministers, or those with NLD loyalties. The winning ethnic political party representatives were forced to accept NLD appointments and the NLD largely ignored ethnic political parties in the governing process. During by-elections in 2018, the NLD retained its overall parliamentary majority but lost several seats previously held in minority-dominant areas. According to NLD spokesman Myo Nyunt, We lost five out of six seats in ethnic areas. Ethnic people are not satisfied with our performance on the peace process . . . This result is a lesson for us. We will come up with a strategy for each constituency for the coming election.1 While the NLD appears to be insistent on tying its electoral future, and its ability to retain ethnic votes, to the peace process, it is unlikely to see progress made on the issue before the election date. The NLD turning its back on ethnic political parties (EPPs) has not gone down well with ethnic leaders and as the election draws nearer, they need to rally their constituents around ethnic aspirations. Also, what needs to be taken into account, is the fact that it is not necessarily in the military’s best interests to have the NLD in power for another four years as the NLD continues to try to chip away at the military-drafted constitution. Already, pro-military demonstrations have taken place in Yangon seeking to prevent constitutional amendments that would weaken the military’s 25% grip on power in the legislature.2 It would, therefore, be better for the military, and the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) the most likely challenger to the NLD, to delay the peace process until after November regardless of current constraints due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While some ethnic political parties have seemingly learnt from the mistakes in the last election and have organised along state lines, joining together to create united fronts, large scale communication strategies need to be implemented putting forward the benefits of ensuring a much larger voice for ethnic representation in the governance of the country..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The current tripartite (government/Tatmadaw, EAOs, and political parties) Framework for Political Dialogue in the peace process was based on an assumption of ethnic unity, not to mention, a unified stance between the government and Tatmadaw, and amongst the political parties. However, this unity remains more of an ideal in all three cases, rather than an actuality. It was widely expected that the EAOs would at least have similar aspirations on what the future federal union would look like. But past years have shown that this assumption was inaccurate. The more substantive and detailed the negotiations have become, the more divided and fragmented the EAOs have turned out to be. This fragmentation could not only be seen between the different EAOs (horizontal fragmentation) but also potentially within the EAOs (vertical fragmentation). At the horizontal level, different factions have emerged indicating the groups’ different interests and the different realities each group is trying to cope with. Particularly, the division is clear between the Ethnic Armed Organisation – Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Signatory groups (EAO NCA-S) and the EAO NCA Non-Signatory groups (EAO NCA-NS), currently consisting of the Northern Alliance, and the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP). Horizontal Fragmentation – NCA Non-Signatories: Within the Northern Alliance (NA) 1, federalism is not a key issue. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA – Mong La) have never articulated a desire for federalism. In fact, the two organizations, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (originally formed in 1989, forcibly disbanded by the Tatmadaw and its proxy in 2009, and re-emerged in 2014), which is a member of the NA’s splinter Three Brotherhood Alliance, are offshoots of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) which collapsed in 1989. The UWSA and NDAA managed to not only continue operating but to also secure their territories through a ceasefire (‘gentlemen’s agreement’) brokered by intelligence chief Khin Nyunt. Rather than a federal Union, the UWSA would likely be more comfortable with a one-country, twosystems arrangement – a reverse of the China-Hong Kong situation where a Communist country tolerates a democratic enclave, i.e., a democratic country tolerating a Communist enclave. Chinese officials have informally suggested that unless and until the Myanmar economy catches up with that of Wa State, they do not see how Wa State could integrate into the Myanmar system. In the case of Hong Kong, China’s economy has caught up with that of Hong Kong, and the process of trying to integrate the democratic enclave into the main system has begun. Given their background, the NDAA and the MNDAA might have similar aspirations albeit with less chance of succeeding. The situation of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), however, may be more complicated. Its ideology may be more aligned with its three ex-CPB colleagues, but it cannot afford to be seen as not supporting the cause of Shan nationalism. If it did, it would lose popular support to its competitor, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), which in its opinion is using its legal status in the peace process (and NCA) with the government to encroach on both its territory and legitimacy. The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) which like the UWSA enjoyed from 1995, 17 years of a pretty autonomous existence until 2011, might like a similar arrangement but not being Communist, it does not enjoy the same kind of patronage from China as the USWA does. And with the Kachin State being a signatory of the original 1947 Panglong Agreement, the KIO has thrown in its lot with the groups demanding ‘genuine’ federalism. However, what constitutes ‘genuine’ federalism is a point of contention. Not being an NCA signatory, it is also hampered in trying to ensure that its version of ‘genuine’ federalism is reflected in the 21st Century Panglong peace talks. Unlike its ‘big brothers’ in the NA, the Arakan Army (formed in 2009) and a member of the NAsplinter, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, is demanding confederate status for Rakhine State,2 The position on federalism of the remaining NA member, the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (current iteration formed in 2009 with military activities starting 2011), is unclear. It definitely wants equality and autonomy for the Ta-ang people, but how that can be achieved within a federal system and within Shan State where the Ta-ang people live, has not yet been articulated or made public. It is also continuing to clash with both the Tatmadaw and the RCSS. The last NCA Non-Signatory, the Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP), has also like the KIO, thrown in its lot with the groups demanding ‘genuine’ federalism. However, in terms of its true aspiration, the KNPP harks back to 1875 when the British recognized the sovereignty of the Karenni States. Recognizing the difficulty of claiming independence, ‘genuine’ federalism is seen as the next best-case scenario, however, it would likely opt for confederation like the AA if that option were open. But not being an NCA signatory, like the KIO, it is also hampered in trying to ensure that its version of ‘genuine’ federalism or confederation is reflected in the 21st Century Panglong peace talks..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-08-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The continued use of Militias in Shan State
Description: "On March 26, the Tatmadaw abolished one of its local proxy armies, the Khawngkha militia, amid accusations that some of its leaders were involved in the illegal drugs trade, or had failed to inform the authorities about drug trafficking in the area.1 Since the 1950s, various Myanmar Governments have officially created and sanctioned the operations of militia forces in the county’s ethnic states. These groups have been used primarily as a military force to fight against ceasefire and non-ceasefire ethnic groups, to control the lives of ethnic populations, and to further secure the country’s border areas. These militias quickly became notorious for taxing the local population, drug trafficking, illegal gambling, and a wide variety of human rights abuses. They have been allowed to do this with the express permission of local military commanders who have themselves allegedly earned money from the variety of illegal activities that the groups operate. Article 340 of the 2008 constitution states that: With the approval of the National Defence and Security Council, the Defence Services has the authority to administer the participation of the entire people in the Security and Defence of the Union. The strategy of the people’s militia shall be carried out under the leadership of the Defence Services. The Kawngkha Militia had previously been the 4th Brigade of the Kachin Independence Army and was based out of its headquarters at Kawngkha, eight miles east of Kutkai, and was responsible for a largely Kachin area north of Lashio town. It opened a number of refineries in the area and was responsible for the transhipment of heroin north to the border of Manipur State. In addition to its narcotics involvement, it also derived some of its income by operating a number of gambling dens.2 In 1991 it signed a ceasefire with government forces before becoming a People’s Militia Force (PMF) in 2010. The Myanmar Army had attempted, unsuccessfully, to get the KDA to surrender all of its weapons in May 2010 after Yaw Chang Fa, the KDA treasury official and Bang Hpik village military officer was involved in a shootout with Police and Special Branch. Yaw Chang Fa and his troops had opened fire on the officials on the road between Mung Hawm and Bang Hpik villages when they illegally arrested villagers from Bang Hpik and took them to Mung Hawm police station. Six were shot dead, seven fatally injured and three were detained. Consequently, more than 300 Myanmar soldiers from Infantry Battalion No. 45, No. 241 and No. 242 from Kutkai Township surrounded the KDA’s Kawngkha HQ. and asked for Yaw Chang Fa to be handed over. Yaw Chang Fa and a number of KDA troops fled..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-06-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-12
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Sub-title: The Peace Process Steering Team’s role in the peace process
Description: "On October 15, 2015, the government led by the then president U Thein Sein and eight ethnic armed groups signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. The original signatories were the PNLO, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the Chin National Front (CNF), All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Karen Nation Union Peace Council (KNUPC) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The original eight groups would be later joined, in February 2018, by the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU). To ensure a common negotiating position the original eight groups formed the Peace Process Steering Team on 26 March 2016 under the leadership of General Mutu Say Poe of the KNU and General Yawd Serk of the RCSS as deputy leader. The team stated, Purpose: 1. to provide leadership (guidance and supervision) when meeting with non-signatory groups and the new government. 2. provide direction when making urgent decisions. 3. direct projects for the JMC (Joint Monitoring Committee) and the UPDJC (Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee) Guidelines: 1. Convening of NCA signatory EAOs, together with observers and technical advisors, totalling 79 persons; 2. Reassess NCA implementation; 3. Welcome the new government for its peace commitment and the EAOs readiness to cooperate: 4. The necessity for all EAOs to participate and be represented in the forthcoming 2nd Union Peace Conference; 5. Believe in the need for all EAOs’ enthusiastic participation until an agreement to form a federal union is achieved through political negotiations; 6. The formation of EAO Peace Process Steering Team (EAO PPST); and 7. Pledge to adhere to the NCA and cooperate with the new regime and the Tatmadaw (Military) to implement the agreement.1 Two days later on March 28 2016, at the 2nd EAO-8 summit, the Delegation for EAO Unity (DEU) led by Khaing Soe Naing Aung with members including Padoh Kwe Htoo Win, Than Khe, Saw Kyaw Nyunt, Lian Sakhong, Dr Sui Khar and Mi Su Pwint. The purpose of the DEU was ostensibly to focus on further discussions with non-signatories EAOs and meetings with the then United Nationalities Federal Council’s Delegation for Political Negotiation (DPN) about how both can work together under an NLD government.2 Numerous meetings have taken place between the PPST and the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) prior to the election, and the NLD’s successor peace broker the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC). The PPST has actively involved itself in the various Union Peace Conferences that have taken place under the auspices of the NLD government. The first UPC saw 73 proposals made but resulted in no agreements. The second saw agreement on 37 points, and the third UPC on 14 points. The agreement or Union Accord currently covers political, economy, social, land and environment categories, however, a major sticking point has been with the composition of a single armed force and the ethnic states non-cessation. However general dissatisfaction with the peace process and perceived disagreements within the organisation itself led to the KNU suspending its participation in the NCA process,3 . . . in order to create meaningful participation of the organization in the peace process and to seek enough time for the creation of the unified participation of the whole organization.4 In response to what was perceived to be a lack of movement on the peace process, General Mutu resigned his position in the PPST in March 2019. He was replaced by KNU Secretary-General Ta Doh Moo. General Mutu was quoted as saying the peace process had deviated from the goal of creating a federal democratic union that includes ethnic equality and rights of autonomy.5 He also noted that The ethnic armed organizations that comprise the PSST have common goals for reaching a federal system, but their views on what kind of federal system they want differ from those of the ethnic armies implementing the terms of the NCA. 6 The PPST also formed a working group to discuss with government officials three agenda items outlined in a letter to Aung San Suu Kyi and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. These issues related to earlier assurances by Min Aung Hlaing to secure peace by 2020 and by Aung San Suu Kyi that three Union Peace Conference sessions would be held in 2019; a review and renegotiation of all NCA mechanisms to ensure they are fair for all parties; and the formation of a consensus among differing opinions on the degree of federalism.7 In May 2019, the PPST held its fourth conference, which included the participation of the KNU and formed two working groups with one group responsible for addressing the deadlock and federal issues while another group would work on the structure of all-inclusive participation.8 At the same meeting, EAO leaders discussed the possibility of transforming the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) into the Peace Process Consultative Meeting (PPCM), but there were disagreements on how or if this should take place.9..."
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2020-01-00
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Description: "Despite a ceasefire that began on 10 May and the COVID-19 pandemic, low-intensity conflict continued throughout 2020. The Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (UPC) was held from 17-19 August 2020, and while there remains far to go, the general outcome of the meeting was treated favourably by several ethnic leaders and it is hoped there will be a stronger basis for future talks in 2021. That said, however, intermittent clashes continued in some ethnic states throughout the year and there is little to suggest that such clashes in some states will stop as peace negotiations continue in 2021. Skirmishes occurred in Karen State largely in areas controlled by the Karen National Liberation Army Brigade-5 area (Mutraw District). Clashes have largely been linked to the Myanmar military’s construction of a road linking Kyaukkyi in Bago Region and into Papun. The reconstruction of the old road originally began in early 2018. The construction was halted temporarily but has since resumed. The KNU has claimed that the reconstruction of the road would allow further Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) expansion into KNU controlled areas, while the Myanmar military has said that existing roads need to be upgraded or they will deteriorate.1 In large part, the reason for such continued clashes is the interpretation by both sides of clauses in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. On December 1, 2020, the KNLA’s 5th Brigade issued a statement expressing its impatience with the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. According to Brigadier General Tamala Taw the 5th Brigade G1, Even though we have signed the NCA, there has been no implementation, particularly, of the NCA Chapter 3 and Article 25 of Chapter 6. None of these issues – ceasefire areas, deployment of troops, the common definition of some terms used in the NCA, and the avoidance of using the public spaces mentioned in the NCA as military outposts or encampments – these have never been discussed. The lack of discussion of the interim period in the NCA Article 25 of Chapter 6 has led to a decline in trust. In the bilateral meeting of KNU and the Myanmar government in 2012, there was a KNLA proposal for the relocation of military bases from civilian areas and troop routes to be moved. We have been waiting for this to happen for more than eight years now, but so far no action has been taken, so it leaves us in a state of despair. This has been seen as giving the military a huge advantage in the ground – trust has now been further eroded.2..."
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2021-01-00
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Sub-title: Moving forward after the election
Description: "After the Myanmar peace process had been deadlocked from the end of 2018 until the beginning of 2020 the Government of Aung San Suu Kyi along with the military and a number of armed ethnic organisations (EAOs) were able to hold another Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (UPC) from 17-19 August 2020. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi had made resolving peace with the many armed ethnic groups in the country a priority after coming to power in 2015. And both the State Counsellor and Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing had voiced an opinion that talks must restart prior to the 2020 general election. Several criticisms have been made about the results of the UPC which saw representatives from all 10 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-signatory EAOs participate. Invitations had also been offered to non-signatory EAOs from Kachin (KIA), Wa (UWSA), Kokang (MNDAA), Mong La (NDAA), and Shan (SSPP) in the northeast, but all declined due to the exclusion of the Arakan Army (AA) which the government has designated a terrorist organisation. Regardless, the talks continued with the adoption of a further 20 principles for the Union Accords (UA), and an agreement among the parties to continue formal peace talks with the incoming government in 2021. While some believe there were no substantive results from the UPC, 1 the fact is that the UPC meeting has led to the reinvigoration of a stalled peace process and allowed further time for EAOs to reconsider their position in moving forward. At least one participant, Sai Leng from the Restoration Council Shan State Army, pointed out that, It is meaningful to agree on how to build a federal union beyond 2020. We also agreed on some guiding principles of building the federal union, such as power-sharing between Union and States,2 Similarly, the State Counsellor said the peace process was now back on track and the principles signed were “more sincere and have more substance.”3 Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, the military delegate and chairman of the Joint Monitoring Committee on the nationwide ceasefire, Now we can draw a conclusion that countless negotiations have reduced the mistrust that has been deep-rooted on both sides . . . [stakeholders] should not leave the negotiation table, whatever the reason.4 According to one EAO advisor, one of the more important points was that, Part 3.3 (a) Power, resource, tax and finance will be divided between the Union and regions/states in line with the federal system (official translation). But he also noted, [But] Some observers have pointed out that it was only a repetition of UA#1 (political sector) 4 (d). But according to the negotiators, the difference is the emphasis shown here, which was not in UA#1. Therefore, they [ethnic leaders] say, the key to a federal union is now open. Accordingly, it can be regarded as a second breakthrough after the NCA.5 Another negotiator in the talks had suggested that the talks were ‘more disappointing’ but expressed the desire to move forward regardless.6..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2020-11-00
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Sub-title: Challenging Christianity in Wa Special Region
Description: "On 13 September 2018, Myanmar’s largest non-state armed actor, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), issued a statement saying it was curtailing the practising of Christianity. The statement said that all churches built after 1992 would be destroyed as they had been built illegally and that only churches built between 1989 and 1992 were legal. It also noted that authorities would also check on the number of Christian schoolteachers and students in the region.1 In addition, it also said authorities would monitor the activities of organizations that support churches in the region and Evangelical Christians would not be allowed to proselytize at schools.2 Only ethnic Wa would be allowed to train as religious leaders, and they would be under the authority of the UWSA central government. Myanmar media quoted Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) chairman Rev. Samson as saying that that action had been prompted by the work of ‘extremist missionaries’ and, You can’t call them typical Christians. They are just people who want to attack established churches. They are against what we Christians believe.3 According to another media report, the UWSA detained 92 Lahu Christian leaders and 42 Wa students in Shan State, and the students were forced to serve as soldiers.4 There is an estimated 221,000 Lahu living in Myanmar - 80% of whom are Christians with 43% believed to be Evangelical.5 In a statement dated Sept. 25, Lahu Baptist Convention (LBC) said that 52 churches had been closed and stripped of all Christian symbols. Three other churches were demolished, and religious schools shut down, the LBC is based in Kengtung, eastern Shan. In addition, to closing down LBC churches the UWSA have also closed those operated by the Kachin Baptist Convention and the Wa Baptist Convention. On 5 October, 100 ethnic Wa Christians the UWSA had detained were freed, but the group continued to hold more than 100 ethnic Lahu Christians..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-01-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: Territorial Concerns in Karen and Mon States
Description: "The death, on 17 October, of a Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) soldier in a clash with troops from the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) furthers highlights territorial concerns that need to be addressed within the peace process and also at a local level. According to reports, the KNLA attacked two MNLA bases in response to what Saw Edward, a spokesman for the KNLA at the Three Pagodas Pass, because,. . . the MNLA destroyed a Karen flag three days ago after his armed group [KNLA] put it up on the dividing line between Karen and Mon territory at Thee Ba Dot. 1Major Nai Aye Mann from the MNLA said the KNLA had put its flag in front of an MNLA base, so it was destroyed, but also asked why the KNLA also attacked another base at Ma Yang Chong if the dispute was just about the flag. The KNLA is the armed wing of the Karen National Union and the MNLA is the armed wing of the New Mon State Party. Both have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the government and have had previous disputes in the past. It had been hoped that with both groups now signatories to the NCA such disputes could easily be negated, but such a belief belies the fact that the situation on the ground still remains tense. Somewhat bizarrely, it has been suggested that the KNLA action was undertaken in response to what has been described in the media as the arrest of seven DKBA-splinter group members.2 According to one report, the KNLA was unhappy that the MNLA arrested seven members of the group and seized 11 firearms in an attack on a base, which they said was inside Mon territory, although such a proposition is unlikely to be the case.3 The Mon State government had addressed the DKBA-splinter issue and asked that all members of the group, believed to have around thirty troops, be arrested as ‘insurgents’ according to a statement signed by Colonel Nay Htut Oo, the border and security and affairs minister in Mon State, The group’s intention is to profit politically from creating instability and disrupting the peace process,4 That said, a number of smaller armed ethnic militias, many of which are under Myanmar military control, each with their own vested interests, continue to operate in ethnic areas controlled by NCA-signatory groups further complicating the peace process. But perhaps, more worryingly, regardless of the reasoning for the recent clash, the fact remains that territorial claims, the most likely cause, have yet to be addressed. In an attempt to prevent further conflict, officers from the MNLA and KNLA met at the Three Pagodas Pass on the Thai border and verbally agreed to stop fighting. Major Nai Aye Mann from the MNLA said low-level officers on the ground could not resolve the territorial dispute and future meetings between the groups’ leaders would be needed to end the issue..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-11-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: The Role of the KNPP in the Union Peace Process
Description: "Despite the fact that thus far ten groups have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement1 the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) still maintains a number of reservations in relation to the signing of the agreement. While a number of other groups, primarily situated in Shan State and along the border with China have also held out,2 the fact that the KNPP, one of the remaining members of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) has not yet signed is somewhat surprising.3 Given its geographical location between Karen State and Shan State, it had been expected given the signing of the NCA by KNPP allies and UNFC members the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) that the KNPP would also sign. However, the KNPP is still concerned about signing the agreement and attending the Union Peace Conferences that the government initiated to further the peace process. Although a number of doubts remained, the KNPP met with the Government’s Peace Commission for two days on April 26-27, 2018 in Loikaw and agreed on the implementation of bilateral terms through regular discussions at the state level.4 According to a joint statement issued after the meeting, The Karenni National Progressive PartyKNPP has committed to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-NCA and has agreed to follow the following points in the short term before signing the NCA. (a) Issues concerning holding negotiations at the state level for Local Monitoring Team & JMC issue, movement of troops of both sides and communications to hold regular negotiations between Kayah State Government and the KNPP as agreed by both sides (b) To reassign liaison officers at the state level and Union level to carry it out through the agreed communication channels agreed by both sides at the state level and Union level (c) Progress was achieved in the military sector, and both sides are to proceed with the work as agreed. 3. As the above points were agreed at the Peace Talks, the Karenni National Progressive Party-KNPP hereby announced that it had agreed at the talks to keep on its efforts for signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-NCA.5 The KNPPs Gen Bee Htoo said that while the two sides have not yet been able to reach an understanding on signing the NCA, “It is important to keep peace in Karenni State.”6 One of the main issues of concern for the KNPP was the killing of three of its soldiers and one civilian who was allegedly murdered by Tatmadaw troops at the regional operation command based in Loikaw in December 2017. Although, the Tatmadaw has said it is conducting an inquiry into the incident no further progress has been made. The incident has further weakened trust in relation to the Myanmar military and its presence in Karenni State. Shwe Myo Thant, Secretary of KNPP Central Committee, was quoted as saying The KNPP maintained the bilateral agreement with the government since 2012 but we need to watch the condition of the relationship between us and Tatmadaw,7 To further negotiations, a meeting between the Peace Commission had been planned in May but the Commission cancelled the meeting after the KNPP had asked for further clarification in relation to the subjects to be discussed.8..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-11-00
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Description: "Since 9 June 2011, Kachin State has seen open conflict between the Kachin Independence Army and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military). The Kachin Independence Organisation had signed a ceasefire agreement with the regime in 1994 and since then had lived in relative peace until the ceasefire was broken by the Tatmadaw in June 2011. The increased territorial infractions by the Tatmadaw combined with economic exploitation by China in Kachin territory, especially the construction of the Myitsone Hydropower Dam, left the Kachin Independence Organisation with very little alternative but to return to armed resistance to prevent further abuses of its people and their territory’s natural resources. Despite this, however, the political situation since the beginning of hostilities has changed significantly. Although a number of groups agreed to a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015, with the continuing conflict in Kachin State, the KIO has sought a number of different methodologies to realise their political aims and secure its people’s legacy. Strategy One – The UNFC Alliance The origins of the UNFC began in May 2010 when three 1990s ceasefire groups, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and three non-ceasefire groups, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Chin National Front (CNF), formally announced the creation of the Committee for the Emergence of a Federal Union (CEFU). The Committee’s purpose was to consolidate a political front at a time when the ceasefire groups faced perceived imminent attacks by the Tatmadaw. However, in November 2010 shortly after the Myanmar elections, the political grouping was transformed into a military united front. At a conference held from the 12-16 February 2011, CEFU declared its dissolution and the formation of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). The UNFC, which was at that time comprised of 12 ethnic organisations1 , stated that: The goal of the UNFC is to establish the future Federal Union (of Myanmar) and the Federal Union Army is formed for giving protection to the people of the country. Shortly after, wide-scale conflict occurred throughout areas controlled by the SSPP and a number of their bases were lost to the Tatmadaw. Then, in June 2011, the KIO ceasefire broke down, resulting in the current conflict in Kachin State. The formation of the UNFC had occurred at a time of increasing uncertainty in relation to how the new Myanmar Government would settle the 1990s ceasefire groups issue. It could be argued that the Tatmadaw’s insistence that the ceasefire groups become Border Guard Forces precipitated the fighting, or that the creation of a military alliance consisting of both ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups precipitated the fighting..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-09-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: Ethnic Political Parties and the 2020 elections
Description: "As Myanmar moves towards the 2020 election, ethnic political parties now, more than ever, need to work together and find common ground if they ever want to influence the future politics of the country and ensure ethnic equality. Minority ethnic groups make up a third of the country's 51.5 million people.1 Currently, ethnic politics can be defined as consisting of five main actors: merged ethnic political parties, the NCA non-signatory armed ethnic groups, NCA signatory groups, the Nationalities Brotherhood Forum (NBF), and the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA). All of these groups have divergent interests and it is these interests that may weaken ethnic policymaking in the future. While all groups profess a singular goal – ethnic equality and a genuine federal union, it is how they work together, if they can, that will ultimately decide the future of ethnic representation in the country after the 2020 election. One of the main ethnic alliance is the United Nationalities Alliance which was formed after the 1990 election and was considered one of the most influential and experienced political alliances operating in the country.2 The UNA encompassed a varied spectrum of ethnic political parties, dominated by the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), which had contested and won seats in the 1990 general election. Originally, in the UNA there were 12 different political parties. Today, there are 15 parties:..."
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2021-09-00
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Description: "The Karen National Union (KNU), alongside the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), were instrumental in encouraging a number of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) to sign Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on 15 October 2015. It was the actions of these two groups and the positions they have held within the armed ethnic resistance movement that allowed for the peace process, no matter how flawed it may be, to move forward. That said, however, despite their support for the process and the current government’s efforts, through the Union Peace Conference, to secure a more permanent peace, both groups have found themselves attacked by the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. While such skirmishes were expected initially due to little official demarcation of territory and a lack of conflict solving mechanisms,1 one and a half years later it would appear the Myanmar military is selectively applying the NCA in areas where it operates. Most recently the Tatmadaw has attempted to exert its influence further into the KNU controlled 5th Brigade area of Mutraw (Papun) resulting in human rights abuses, displacement and the unlawful killing of a local environmental activist. The main reason given for the incursion was the reconstruction of an all-weather road, the Bu Hsa Kee Road, connecting the Myanmar military camps at Ler Mu Plaw and Kay Pu. The original road had been built during the Tatmadaw's offensives in 2006 and 2007, Tatmadaw soldiers had the north-south road built to connect their camps, and many small security outposts were built at intervals along the side of the road. According to Free Burma Rangers, roads built by the Myanmar Army served three purposes in the projection and expansion of Myanmar army power and control in Karen State, namely, 1. To resupply and connect camps 2. To more rapidly launch offensives and patrols and 3. To compartmentalise and isolate ethnic communities to better be able to control them within a network of roads and camps..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-04-00
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Description: "The recent change of leadership within the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K) further draws attention to the future of the group and that of the role it plays not only in Myanmar’s peace process but also the country’s ethnic landscape. 1 On 17 August, the group removed Lt-Gen Khango Konyak, who is a western Naga and an Indian national, from his role as chairman following a three-day meeting from 15-17 August at its HQ in Taga. Konyak, 70, is a Naga of Indian origin and a China-trained rebel, he had taken over as chairman of the NSCN-K after Khaplang died in June 2017 after a prolonged illness.2 He was replaced by Yung Aung, the deputy minister of the NSCN-K defence department, as interim chairman and also the head of the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) which holds sway over the Naga inhabited region in Myanmar’s northern Sagaing Division. Yung Aung, 45, is the nephew of the group’s founder SS Khaplang and is a Hemi Naga from Myanmar. The move has been seen by many as an attempt by the Myanmar Naga to expel their Indian brethren. How this will change the situation in regards to the peace processes in India and Myanmar remains unclear. According to reports, Yung Aung has deep links with China and maintains close ties with the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) ‘commander-inchief’ Paresh Baruah and the Manipuri militant leadership.3 According to an NSCN-K statement, Konyak had been impeached because He was found guilty of absolute control of powers and functions without collective leadership, nondistribution of powers and functions exposing a one-man government policy, incompatible traits…4 However, an NSCN-K official based in India said, “For quite some time, Konyak was unable to assume an active role in the organisation and discharge his duties due to his sickness.’ Also, He had been away from Taga for a long time which widened the gulf that existed between him and other top leaders,” 5 In addition, there appear to be some issues in relation to tribal affiliations. A number of senior leaders were unhappy at his appointment. Many of them belong to the Pangmi tribe, a conglomerate of several tribes inhabiting a large area from the border in Arunachal Pradesh to the hills bordering Hukawng Valley in Myanmar. 6..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-10-00
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Description: "The date for the next Union Peace Conference (UPC) is scheduled for May, but their remains some doubts in regards to the likely achievements to be made. At the beginning of the year, two Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) members showed they were displeased with the process. The Karen National Union (KNU) called for its postponement while the Restoration Council of Shan State suggested it would not attend due to constant obstruction by the Myanmar military of state-level dialogue. Although two more groups, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) signed the agreement on 13 February a number of other groups are still not prepared to move forward. While such delays and indecision have been indicative of the entire peace process, what needs to be considered, however, is who is likely to gain by yet further delays in the process. There is little doubt that the process has significant flaws, the problems that have plagued it since it was taken over by the NLD-led Government are many. While it is essential that ethnic armed organisation try to ensure they get the best deal possible it must also be noted that the only stakeholder likely to gain through postponement of the process is the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, which will see its position strengthened for every delay made..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2018-04-00
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Sub-title: The future of the NSCN-K
Description: "In what appeared to be a coordinated effort between the Myanmar and Indian militaries, operations against Indian insurgents on the Indian side of the border and the Naga Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K) in Sagaing, Myanmar, have largely been successful in diminishing the threat the NSCN-K posed to both governments Hostilities between the Tatmadaw and the NSCN-K heightened after 400 soldiers from six battalions led by the Hkamti district tactical commander under the Tatmadaw’s North-West Command took control of the NSCN-K’s headquarters in Taga area of Nanyun township on January 29, 2019. A month later ‘Operation Sunshine-1’ from February 22 to 26, occurred with the Indian Army acting against suspected Arakanese Army (AA) camps inside Indian territory, with fleeing Arakan troops arrested by the Myanmar Army on their side. The move was largely seen as a tit-for-tat action to encourage Myanmar to increase operations against anti-India rebels. The latest operation known as ‘Operation Sunshine-2’, took place between May 16 and June 8, and included two battalions of the Indian Army — along with Special Forces, Assam Rifles and infantry Ghataks (commandos) — on the Indian side of the border, while clearance action was taken by four brigades of the Myanmar Army resulting in around 70-80 insurgents being detained. 1 Although, the NSCN-K is based in Myanmar’s Sagaing division its primary dispute is with the Indian Government as it wants to create a united independent Nagaland based on a federal system2 that is to include parts of Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh in India and parts of Sagaing Division. 3 That said, however, the group's presence, its support for Indian rebel groups, and its refusal to take part in the Myanmar Peace Process remain a contentious issue within the Myanmar government..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-07-00
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Description: "There had been much hope regarding an end to ethnic conflict in Myanmar with the then Thein Sein’s government’s attempts to bring long-term armed ethnic organisations around the table. The international community including the United States and Europe were quick to remove sanctions and offer support to the government, even more so when the National League for Democracy was elected. However, with the length of time so far taken and differences over what individual actors want, the possibility of an actual ceasefire in conflict affected areas and an eventual political solution seem far away. While eight armed ethnic organisations signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on 15 October 2015, many others remain reluctant to do so as competing interests and objectives vie with the overall demand for equality in a federal union. Many observers see the conflict, and the peace process, through a singular black and white prism. This view sees the Military/Government pitted against armed ethnic organisations the latter all wanting the same outcome. However, this is not the case, the number of actors involved and their motivations is what currently drives the conflict, and the solution to it, in the country. Before 2010, armed ethnic resistance was seen as a unitary issue. Armed ethnic groups were united in the common aim of overthrowing a military regime that was seen to have invaded ethnic states and trampled on the rights of ethnic peoples in favour of the predominant Burman, or Bamar, majority. While some groups had come to an accommodation with the military government, it was primarily the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) that had decided to break with perceived ethnic unity and try and find an alternative to conflict. Putting trust in the then military Government and what was called the National Convention these two groups believed that their voices would be heard only to find this would not be the case. As a consequence, and as the Myanmar military gradually eroded ethnic territory given to those groups, fighting once more broke out in Kachin State in 2011. It is therefore understandable that some, the Kachin especially, are wary of further negotiation with the government. It was believed that with the arrival of the NLD-led Government that more progress would be made towards securing peace and achieving genuine federalism. Two Union peace conferences have been held, and while some view the recent concessions about 37 agreed on points as positive, many ethnic leaders believe that the current peace process is being badly mis-managed and that the process under Thein Sein yielded better results..."
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Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2017-10-15
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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Sub-title: Refocussing Rakhine Nationalism
Description: "Many observers have characterised the recent events in Rakhine State in which the Arakan Army attacked Myanmar Police Posts as a further extension of ongoing ethnic armed conflicts in Myanmar. However, the underlying objectives of the Arakan Army do not correlate with the objectives of most other armed ethnic organisations that have been fighting for equality over the last sixty years. Rather, the Arakan Army’s creation and its later political position does not just seek equality and federalism but rather an autonomous Rakhine State.1 This is in itself should also be seen in the context of connections between Rakhine nationalism and the possible involvement of the Arakan Army/United League of Arakan (AA/ULA) in furthering that nationalist agenda. As AA/ULA Commander-in-Chief Major General Twan Mrat Naing notes, We prefer [a confederation of states] like Wa State, which has a larger share of power in line with the Constitution, adding that, . . . a confederation is “better” than federalism. . . And we think it [a confederation] is more appropriate to the history of Rakhine State and the hopes of the Arakanese people,2 He also continued, In a confederation, we have the authority to make decisions on our own. But there would be a common defence system. And there would be cooperation on market regulation and foreign affairs. To have control over our own destiny—selfdetermination—is the aspiration of every ethnic group. We can try,3 It remains unlikely the AA will ever see it objectives realised, seventy years of ethnic conflict suggests that the Myanmar Army, is unlikely to allow it to achieve any form of confederation. Instead the conflict is likely to continue and put further burden on an already over burdened populace. An issue the AA is acutely aware of the AA’s deputy chief, Brigadier General Dr. Nyo Twan Aung in a video message told ordinary Arakanese that if the current fighting in northern Rakhine State continues to worsen, it could spread to other places in the state. 4 In the same address he gave advice to residents in relation to an authorisation by the Rakhine State government giving permission to state police and military to carry out household checks in seven townships of northern Rakhine State, in an attempt to find..."
Source/publisher: Euro Burma Office
2019-04-00
Date of entry/update: 2021-04-11
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