“One Belt, One Road” initiative

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Description: Belt & Road News (Website), Dedicated News, Views & Analysis.
Source/publisher: "Belt & Road News"
2019-08-30
Date of entry/update: 2019-08-30
Grouping: Websites/Multiple Documents
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Description: "The Meeting: On 25-26 September 2023, China hosted the Global Sustainable Transport Forum in Beijing. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng attended the opening ceremony and read a congratulatory letter from Chinese President Xi Jinping. The forum, reported by Chinese media, was an opportunity for China to stress that it is committed to ‘promoting global transport cooperation and providing the world with new opportunities through its own development.’ In attendance, among others, was Mya Tun Oo, deputy prime minister and transport minister of the State Administration Council (SAC), formed by the Myanmar military. On the sidelines of the meeting, he reportedly discussed the Muse-Mandalay rail project with the Chinese. The Project The proposed Muse-Mandalay railway project (MMRP), unveiled in 2011, is a major part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China that includes the construction of a Pan-Asian Railway Network running through Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia. Proposed to be built by Myanmar’s state-run Myanma Railways and the China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group (CREEG), the MMRP would link Kunming, the capital of China’s southern Yunnan province, and Mandalay in central Myanmar through the Muse border in Shan State. It is projected as a 431-kilometre-long standard-gauge railway project with an estimated cost of US$9 billion. Under the CMEC framework, the proposal is also to further extend the line from Mandalay to the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (KP SEZ) and the New Yangon City, the two other key sites of China-Myanmar infrastructure projects. China is developing a deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, a city on the Bay of Bengal in Rakhine State. An 800-kilometre China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipeline, which began operations in 2009, has been running from Kyaukphyu through Mandalay and Magway regions, and northern Shan state. Once completed, the rail line will allow Chinese trade to bypass the congested Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia and boost development in landlocked Yunnan. More crucially, Beijing wants to avert the worst-case scenario of a foreign power disrupting its oil shipments from the Middle East by blockading the straits. Mya Tun Oo’s visit to China included a trip to the headquarters of China Railway Group Co Ltd, where he reportedly discussed a feasibility study for Muse-Mandalay and Mandalay-Kyaukphyu rail sections. The Myanmar military’s official media said that he also met Vice Premier He Lifeng and Chinese Transport Minister Li Xiaopeng to discuss transport cooperation, the acceleration of existing projects, and the possibility of new projects. Delays, Opposition, and the Restart There are widespread apprehensions as to the MMRP’s impact on the environment and Myanmar’s sovereignty. The Myanmar military has remained unconcerned with either of these dangers. The MoU between the two countries was signed in 2011 when the Military headed a quasi-civilian government. However, work on the project halted in 2014 after strong protests and activism in the Rakhine state. In 2018, the project was revised during the National League of Democracy (NLD) government’s term. The preparation of the bilateral MoU for the MMRP project was executed in 2019. The railway projects were among the 33 agreements signed by President Xi Jinping during his visit to Myanmar in January 2020. To date, however, the project has remained largely in the planning stage, delayed further by the onset of COVID-19 and then the coup of February 2021. The Myanmar military’s urgency to move ahead with the project emanates from its bid to please China, which provides it with diplomatic protection in international forums. For the SAC to continue, in a widespread civil war situation, support from China remains a critical factor. The Symphony Chinese bid to access the Bay of Bengal, through the CMEC, has synchrony with the Myanmar military’s avowed aim of establishing the country as an economic corridor and attracting Chinese investment. This has assumed more significance due to the country’s growing isolation, which appears to have hurt the regime. The frequency and intensity of engagement between the two countries, in fact, has picked up, as have expressions of commitment to their economic relations. Lately, indications to this effect have been provided by military chief Min Aung Hlaing. In September of this year, at the Myanmar Economic Committee, he hailed the potential trade benefits of a Kyaukphyu-Mandalay railway. He said the regime also assessed the feasibility of a Muse-Mandalay railway and even suggested building another line between Chinshwehaw and Lashio near the Chinese border. Not surprisingly, nine SAC ministers visited China in September, reflecting the regime’s deepening ties with Beijing. On 26 September, Mya Tun Oo attended the Comprehensive Transport Investment Promotion Conference in Beijing and said that his government was committed to establishing Myanmar as an economic corridor by firmly partnering in the BRI project as well as the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation projects. The latter is a sub-regional cooperation mechanism jointly established by China, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam in 2017. In March 2023, media reports indicated that work might have started on the MMRP project. The military spokesperson observed that “field inspection and reports have been completed. The implementation to resume the projects is still being discussed [sic].” Consultations may have indeed begun between the two sides to kickstart the long-delayed project. The military is expected to take care of the domestic concerns, whereas Beijing appeared to have taken responsibility for dealing with the ethnic armed organisations that operate in northern Myanmar in Shan and Rakhine states. In late February 2023, China’s special envoy for Myanmar affairs, Deng Xijun, held meetings with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) to discuss trade and economic cooperation with a focus on the MMRP. Deng reportedly pushed the insurgents to reach some form of a cease-fire with the military government. In July, three groups — the MNDAA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Rakhine Arakan Army (AA) – released a joint statement (in Burmese and Chinese) vowing to protect international investment in their regions, which are home to several key Chinese-led projects, and also to “crush perpetrators of violence” in Shan and Rakhine states. The Tail Piece Both Myanmar and China continue to grow dependent on each other. Myanmar’s military critically depends on Beijing for its survival. For China, Myanmar remains a key constituent of its BRI project. The project is not intended to benefit the hosts but the Chinese economy and its strategic expansion. The final chapter in the MMRP project, however, is yet to be written. While Myanmar and Chinese state-run media would like to highlight the swift progress achieved, the current civil war situation poses a substantial challenge to actual implementation. The opposition’s Peoples Defence Forces (PDFs) and the EAOs that operate in Kayah and Sagaing regions remain bitterly opposed to all military initiatives, including the MMRP. Defeating this opponent will be necessary for the military to execute the project. That feat has not been achieved in the last two-and-a-half years since it grabbed power. The coming months are likely to witness the continuation of the military’s efforts to bring stability to the areas through which the project passes. This translates into more violent action against the opposition with severe collateral damages. About the author: Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray is the Director of Mantraya. This analysis has been published as part of Mantraya’s ongoing “Fragility, Conflict, and Peace Building” and “Regional Economic Cooperation and Connectivity in South Asia” projects. All Mantraya publications are peer-reviewed..."
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Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
2023-10-13
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "A new report by the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT) links escalating abuses by SAC troops in Kachin and northern Shan State to the regime’s attempts to secure transport routes for expansion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The report documents a sharp increase since mid-2022 in the number of casualties of aerial bombardment, up to nearly 200, and in the number of villagers forced to be human shields, up to 221, compared to the previous fifteen months. Other widespread SAC abuses documented by KWAT include thirty incidents of shelling into populated areas, inflicting 61 civilian casualties, and arbitrary arrest of 441 people, including Kachin religious leader Dr. Hka Lam Samson. Dozens of those arrested have disappeared. Mapping shows most SAC abuses clustered along the main transport routes in northern Burma, vital gateways for development of BRI infrastructure. KWAT analyzes this as a deliberate strategy of collective punishment to secure control of key transport arteries. “With conventional warfare failing against resistance forces, the regime is increasingly resorting to attacks against civilians,” said KWAT spokesperson Ja Ing KWAT exposes that the devastating airstrike on the concert in Hpakant last October, which inflicted over 170 casualties, was direct retaliation for heavy SAC losses suffered a day earlier during a failed attempt to seize KIA positions on Lung Ja mountain – the highest vantage point in southeast Kachin State, overlooking key transport corridors to China. The attacks and abuses have fueled fresh displacement of nearly 14,000 villagers during the past fifteen months, even as the regime has been pushing ahead with plans to close down existing camps in northern Burma housing over 107,000 IDPs. KWAT is calling urgently for increased diplomatic and economic pressure on the SAC regime to stop their attacks on civilians throughout Burma, and for donor countries to step up aid to existing and newly displaced IDPs, prioritizing cross-border channels. KWAT also calls on China to halt its planned acceleration of BRI projects in Burma. “China is taking a huge risk by pushing ahead with BRI projects in partnership with the military regime,” said Ja Ing “There are no guarantees of security, and China will find itself complicit in the mounting atrocities associated with the planned projects.”.....ကချင်အမျိုးသမီးများအစည်းအရုံး-ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံ (KWAT) ၏ ဤအစီရင်ခံစာသစ်တွင် ကချင်ပြည်နယ်နှင့် ရှမ်းပြည်နယ် မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များ၏ အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ပြင်းထန်လာမှု အခြေအနေ များသည် တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်း တိုးချဲ့ရေးအတွက် သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းများကို လုံခြုံရေး ပေးရန် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ကြိုးပမ်းမှုနှင့် ဆက်စပ်ပုံကို ချိတ်ဆက်ဖော်ပြထားသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သည့် ၁၅ လနှင့် နှိုင်းယှဉ်လျှင် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် နှစ်လည်ပိုင်းမှစ၍ လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် ထိခိုက်သူ ၂၀၀ နီးပါးနှင့် လူသားဒိုင်းအဖြစ် အတင်းအဓမ္မ ခိုင်းစေခံရသူ ရွာသူရွာသားဦးရေမှာ ၂၂၁ ဦးထိ သိသိသာသာ တိုးမြင့်လာကြောင်းကို အစီရင်ခံစာမှ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားသည်။ KWAT မှ မှတ်တမ်းတင်ထားသော စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ကျယ်ကျယ်ပြန့်ပြန့် ကျူးလွန်နေသော အခြားချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ထဲတွင် အရပ်သား ၆၁ ကို ထိခိုက်သေဆုံးစေခဲ့သော လူနေထူထပ်သော ဒေသများသို့ လက်နက်ကြီးပစ်ခတ်မှု အကြိမ် ၃၀ နှင့် ကချင်ဘာသာရေးအကြီးအကဲ ဒေါက်တာ ခလမ်ဆမ်ဆွန် အပါအဝင် လူပေါင်း ၄၄၁ ဦးအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်းတို့လည်း ပါဝင်သည်။ ဖမ်းဆီးခံရသူများထဲမှာ ဒါဇင်ပေါင်းများစွာသည် ယနေ့ချိန်ထိ ပျောက်ဆုံး နေဆဲဖြစ်သည်။ မြေပုံများအရ စစ်ကောင်စီကျူးလွန်သော ချိုးဖောက်မှု အများစုသည် BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်းအောက်ရှိ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများ၏ အရေးကြီးသော တံခါးပေါက်များဖြစ်သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ အဓိက သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးလမ်းကြောင်းများတစ်လျှောက်တွင် ဖြစ်ပွားသည်ကို ပြသနေသည်။ ၎င်းအခြေအနေသည် အဓိက သယ်ယူပို့ဆောင်ရေးသွေးကြောများထိန်းချုပ်မှုကို ကာကွယ်ရန် စုပေါင်းပြစ်ဒဏ်ပေးခြင်းကို ဗျူဟာတစ်ခုအနေဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ လုပ်ဆောင်နေခြင်းဖြစ်သည်ဟု KWAT မှ လေ့လာသုံးသပ်သည်။ “ခုခံတော်လှန်ရေးတပ်တွေကို သမားရိုးကျ စစ်ဆင်ရေးရှုံးနိမ့်လာတော့ စစ်တပ်က အရပ်သားတွေကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားတိုက်ခိုက်တဲ့ နည်းလမ်းကို ပိုပြီးသုံးလာကြတယ်ဟု KWAT ၏ ပြောရေးဆိုခွင့်ရှိသူ” ဂျာအိန်က ပြောသည်။ ပြီးခဲ့သည့် အောက်တိုဘာလအတွင်းက ဖားကန့်မြို့ ဖျော်ဖြေပွဲတွင် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော လူပေါင်း ၁၇၀ ကျော် ထိခိုက်ခဲ့သည့် ပြင်းထန်သည့် လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုသည် ထိုတိုက်ခိုက်မှုမတိုင်မီ တစ်ရက်အကြိုတွင် ဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့သော စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ကချင်ပြည်နယ်အရှေ့တောင်ဘက် တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသို့ အဓိက ကုန်သွယ်ရေး လမ်းစင်္ကြန်များကို အပေါ်စီးမှမြင်ရသည့် အမြင့်ဆုံးနေရာဖြစ်သော လုံဂျာတောင်ပေါ်ရှိ KIA စခန်းများကို သိမ်းယူ ရန်ကြိုးပမ်းမှုတွင် အကြီးအကျယ် အထိနာခဲ့မှုအတွက် တိုက်ရိုက်လက်တုံ့ပြန်မှုဖြစ်သည်ဟု KWAT မှ ဖော်ထုတ် ထားသည်။ စစ်ကောင်စီသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ မြောက်ပိုင်းရှိ IDP ၁၀၇,၀၀၀ ကျော်နေထိုင်သော ရှိရင်းစွဲ စစ်ဘေးရှောင် စခန်းများကို ပိတ်သိမ်းရန် အစီအစဉ်များ ဆက်လက် တွန်းအားပေးလုပ်ဆောင်နေသော်လည်း လွန်ခဲ့သော ၁၅ လ အတွင်း တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများနှင့် အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကြောင့် နောက်ထပ် ရွာသူရွာသားပေါင်း ၁၄,၀၀၀ နီးပါးကို နေရပ်စွှန့်ခွာ ထွက်ပြေးစေခဲ့သည်။ KWAT အနေဖြင့် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ အရပ်သားများအပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထားသော ပြင်းထန်သည့် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများကို ရပ်တန့်ရန် ၎င်းတို့အပေါ် သံတမန်ရေးနှင့် စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာ ဖိအားများ တိုးမြှင့်ပေးရန်နှင့် အလှူရှင် နိုင်ငံအနေများဖြင့် နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော်လမ်းကြောင်းများကို ဦးစားပေးကာ ရှိရင်းစွဲနှင့် နောက်ထပ် တိုးပွားလာသော IDP များအတွက် အကူအညီများ တိုးမြှင့်ပေးရန် အရေးပေါ် တောင်းဆိုလိုက်သည်။ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ၎င်းတို့၏ BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်းတိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်မည့် အစီအစဉ်များကို လည်း ရပ်တန့်ရန် KWAT မှ တောင်းဆိုထားသည်။ “တရုတ်နိုင်ငံဟာ စစ်တပ်နဲ့ ပူးပေါင်းပြီး BRI-ပိုးလမ်းမ စီမံကိန်းတွေကို ရှေ့တိုးလုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် ကြီးမားတဲ့ အန္တရာယ်တွေကို ယူနေတယ်”ဟု ဂျာအိန် ကပြောသည်။ “စီမံကိန်းတွေအတွက် ဘာလုံခြုံရေးအာမခံချက်မှလည်း မရှိဘူး။ ပြီးတော့ စီစဉ်ထားတဲ့ စီမံကိန်းတွေနဲ့ ဆက်နွယ်နေတဲ့ တိုးမြင့်လာတဲ့ ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုတွေထဲမှာပဲ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံကပါ ကြံရာပါ ဖြစ်လာလိမ့်မယ်”..."
Source/publisher: Kachin Women’s Association Thailand
2023-10-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Over the last fifteen years, an illicit economy – comprising everything from unregistered casinos to online scamming operations – has boomed along a stretch of the Mekong River separating Laos and Myanmar. Regional states will need to work together to rein in the criminal syndicates behind it.
Description: "What’s new? Myanmar’s Shan State and northern Laos’s Bokeo province have become a contiguous zone of vibrant criminality, much of it beyond the reach of state authorities. The Mekong River, which bisects the zone, is also an axis of geopolitical competition, complicating efforts to combat organised crime. Why does it matter? The sheer size of illicit businesses, which dwarf the legal economies of both Shan State and northern Laos, means that they have an enormous local impact, entrenching corruption, weakening governance institutions and damaging community bonds in both these areas. The effects ripple throughout the region and beyond. What should be done? Though geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China may get in the way, a coordinated regional approach to addressing criminality should be a top political priority. In addition to intelligence sharing and joint law enforcement operations, interested governments should work together to address underlying governance and socio-economic issues. Executive Summary Myanmar’s Shan State and Laos’s Bokeo province, which straddle the Mekong River, have emerged as a contiguous zone of vibrant criminality, much of which is beyond the reach of national authorities. Unregulated casinos, money laundering, drug production and trafficking, online scamming operations, and illegal wildlife trade all thrive, entrenching corruption, weakening governance and damaging the bonds that create community. The criminal networks involved have regional – in some cases, global – reach and can rapidly shift from one jurisdiction to another to minimise risks to their operations. A coordinated regional approach is thus vital for tackling them. But geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. complicates coordination. Regional states continue to rely heavily on unilateral criminal justice responses, but collaborative law enforcement is needed, as are multi-state efforts to ameliorate the governance and socio-economic problems that allow these criminal syndicates to prosper. Ideally, these efforts would involve agencies with migration, development and other relevant expertise. Parts of the Mekong, particularly the 100km section that forms the Myanmar-Lao border, have long been a frontier of unregulated and illicit trade, far from centres of power and commerce. Given its importance as a conduit between China and South East Asia, in recent decades governments have aspired for the Mekong to become a major transport route. But along with physical obstacles – sandbanks, shoals and rapids – insecurity has impeded riverborne trade, most commonly in the form of piracy and extortion of boats plying the route. The situation came to a head in October 2011, when thirteen Chinese merchant mariners were murdered – the deadliest attack on Chinese nationals abroad since World War II. China pinned the blame on Myanmar pirates, whose leader it captured in Laos and executed following a complex extra-territorial police operation. (It later emerged that others may have been primarily responsible.) Beijing then initiated joint gunboat patrols with neighbouring countries, allowing it to project force down the Mekong. While these actions put an end to piracy on this key stretch of river, they did not deter other forms of crime. Since 2011, the territories on the Myanmar and Lao sides of the Mekong have emerged as hotbeds of illegal activity, from drug production and trafficking to online gambling, money laundering and cyber-scam operations that often use captive workers from around the world. Not only do transnational criminal organisations operating in this zone benefit from lax or non-existent regulations, but they also take advantage of its multi-jurisdictional character, quickly shifting operations from one place to another to evade crackdowns. Coordinated law enforcement across the region is crucial if governments want any chance of tackling these expanding criminal activities, but other capabilities must also be brought to bear. Authorities in the region need to acknowledge that any solution to this transnational problem will involve government agencies from several jurisdictions – as opposed to the typical security or police approach that treats immediate symptoms, but not the fundamental causes of the problem, including weak governance and rampant corruption, not to mention a willingness or desire of some jurisdictions to court illicit investments. The Mekong is a locus of big-power rivalry, where longstanding U.S. ties with Thailand and other countries are being tested by China’s rising power. So far, however, a coordinated response is lacking, in large part due to geopolitical considerations. The Mekong is a locus of big-power rivalry, where longstanding U.S. ties with Thailand and other countries are being tested by China’s rising power and regional ambitions. The contestation has greatly limited cooperation between Western governments and China on transnational crime in the Mekong, while making it difficult for other countries to balance their relations with the two. China is by far the most influential actor and could play a critical role if it chose to. China could adopt a more consistent approach to criminality in the Mekong sub-region, using its influence over regional governments and non-state actors to curtail illicit activities. But Beijing is also guided by strategic considerations, including its inclination to view economic investment, even if it is partly illicit, as something that can help build peace along its borders, and its desire to leverage enclaves in its neighbourhood controlled by pliant entities in order to project its power. It has thus far tended to focus on law enforcement only selectively, responding only when it considers its national interests under direct threat, including with crackdowns on online gambling and efforts to shut down online scam operations across South East Asia. At the same time, it has ignored much of the crime in locations controlled by entities and enterprises friendly to China. Ideally, the U.S. and China should set aside their geopolitical rivalry when it comes to cooperating on combating transnational crime in the Mekong. Doing so could encourage greater Chinese cooperation with initiatives such as the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, as well as the Thai operations and intelligence centre on transnational organised crime in the Mekong. Although this scenario is more aspirational than likely, the two powers could also bring about enhanced regional collaboration by focusing on ways in which their respective Mekong cooperation platforms (the Mekong-U.S. partnership and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation) could support initiatives to tackle the governance and socio-economic factors that allow organised crime to flourish, with programs designed to foster good governance, fight corruption, alleviate poverty and create jobs. It is equally important to address the human cost of transnational crime. States should provide more assistance to secure the release of, and support, the thousands of people from countries across the world being held against their will and often severely abused in online scam centres where they are forced to carry out criminal activities in Myanmar, Laos and elsewhere in the region. Too often, these people, even if they are rescued or able to escape, are held on immigration offences or charged for the crimes they were forced to commit. A more proactive approach from their embassies in the relevant countries is needed, as is a victim-centred approach from the countries where they were held or fled to. Reining in the sprawling illegality that has grown along the Mekong will not be easy. But the consequences of permitting the region’s illicit businesses to keep booming are too great for governments not to try their best. Better coordination is the place to start. I. Introduction Over the last decade and a half, a vibrant criminal economy has arisen in the Mekong sub-region, based on illegal drug production, unregistered casinos, online gambling and money laundering, and most recently, sophisticated online scamming operations. The tens of billions of dollars in illicit profits have driven criminal syndicates to make huge casino and infrastructure investments, which have flowed into poorly governed jurisdictions with weak regulatory enforcement or into semi-autonomous enclaves beyond the state’s reach, particularly in Myanmar. The bribery and other corruption that allows these criminal activities to flourish have further corroded state institutions in the region. Two areas have emerged as hotspots: Laos’s Bokeo province, home to the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, and Myanmar’s Shan State, particularly the district to the east of the Salween River bordering China, Laos and Thailand, known in British colonial times as Trans-Salween (see the map in Appendix B). Together, these form a transnational zone of criminality straddling the geopolitically important Mekong River. The 2021 coup in Myanmar has unleashed centrifugal forces that have eroded Naypyitaw’s influence over trans-Salween Shan State. Non-state armed groups have subsequently tightened their grip in the area, resulting in a surge of illicit activity. This report examines the political and economic dynamics at play and the associated security and governance risks. It also explores the geopolitical context, looking in particular at how insecurity and piracy along this stretch of the Mekong has prompted extraterritorial Chinese projection of force downstream, at the same time that the U.S. is increasing its security cooperation with Thailand just to the south. The report is based on Crisis Group field research, including trips to Thailand in April and November 2022 and February 2023, as well as to northern Thailand and Laos’s Bokeo province in March 2023. Interviews were conducted with a wide range of interlocutors, including police, anti-narcotics officials and representatives of foreign law enforcement agencies, as well as analysts and journalists. The majority of interviewees were men, reflecting the make-up of law enforcement agencies in these countries; the cohorts of analysts, journalists and residents were more gender-balanced. Research in Myanmar was conducted remotely, facilitated by Crisis Group’s longstanding relationships with key sources in the country. II. Political Economy and Geopolitics of the Golden Triangle A. Commerce, Connectivity and Crime The Mekong River, which flows almost 5,000km from the Tibetan plateau to the delta in southern Vietnam, is the third-longest river in Asia and a key trade route between China and South East Asia.1 The 100km section of the river linking China to the Golden Triangle – where Myanmar, Laos and Thailand meet – has for decades been a zone of unregulated and illicit commerce (see map in Appendix B). Located at the junction of different kingdoms and principalities, the Golden Triangle was historically a locus of trade and migration.2 But its distance from key commercial and political centres also meant it was little controlled or taxed. From the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, opium cultivation expanded in the region, and in remote areas opium resin became a key means of exchange.3 After World War II came to an end, conflict persisted in the Golden Triangle. Fleeing Mao Zedong’s communist army, the Chinese nationalist Kuomintang armed forces occupied parts of Myanmar’s Shan State, while communist insurgencies in Laos and Thailand set up bases in the area. Opium was a convenient cash crop for farmers in conflict-affected areas, and the opium trade helped fund the various armed groups operating in the region. The Kuomintang became particularly prominent in the trade. By the 197os, the Golden Triangle was the largest source of illicit opium in the world, before declining significantly in the 1990s as a result of opium cultivation bans and a drug market shift to methamphetamines.4 The Mekong, as both a natural border and a conduit, played an important role in the opium and other illicit trades, as well as in licit sub-regional business. China and other countries had ambitious plans to make the Mekong into a major licit trade route. In recent decades, trade volumes have increased, but the many rapids, sandbanks and rocky shoals along the river’s course from China to the Golden Triangle – as well as the threat of ambush by insurgents and criminal gangs – have kept it from becoming the transport corridor Asian strategists hoped it would be.5 B. The 2011 Naw Kham Incident The most serious security incident on the Mekong in recent decades occurred on 5 October 2011, when thirteen Chinese merchant mariners were killed execution-style and their bodies thrown overboard from the two cargo barges they were crewing. The killings took place on the stretch of river passing through the Golden Triangle, just inside Thai waters.6 It was the deadliest attack on Chinese nationals abroad since World War II, eliciting a furious response from Beijing. For the first time, China sent gunboats down the Mekong, beyond its own territory – patrols that it subsequently made regular.7 Thailand’s elite Pha Muang anti-narcotics unit stated that it had seized a large quantity of drugs in a raid on the barges, during which it claimed to have engaged in a shootout with heavily armed smugglers; it alleged that these men had then fled upriver in speedboats, leaving one barge’s captain dead in the wheelhouse.8 Over the following days, locals found the bodies of twelve more of the Chinese crew, most of whom had been bound, gagged and shot at close range, floating in different locations just downstream. The Thai authorities immediately blamed the murders on a criminal gang from Myanmar led by a notorious but elusive Shan warlord named Naw Kham, who as discussed below had been responsible for previous acts of piracy and kidnapping on the Mekong.9 Naw Kham maintained his innocence, but he was found guilty and executed with three accomplices in March 2013. Chinese authorities put considerable pressure on Thailand, Myanmar and Laos to cooperate closely with the director of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security’s anti-drug bureau, who was heading the task force investigating the killings.10 Beijing reportedly secured agreement from these countries that its task force could pursue and apprehend suspects in their territory, as well as for joint patrols along a 337km section of river.11 After failed attempts to capture Naw Kham in Laos and then in Myanmar’s Shan State, he and several members of his gang were finally caught in April 2012, in a boat anchored along the Mekong in Laos, near the port of Ban Mom.12 Lao authorities extradited them to China, where they were tried for killing the Chinese sailors. Naw Kham maintained his innocence, but he was found guilty and executed with three accomplices in March 2013; his final moments were broadcast live on state television.13 The investigation had revealed some inconvenient facts, however. The initial claims by Thailand’s Pha Muang unit about its raid on the barges were inconsistent with witness testimony. In a shocking twist, Thai and Chinese investigators concluded that it was actually members of the law enforcement unit who had likely shot the sailors, allegedly in coordination with Naw Kham’s gang.14 A month after the killings, Thai authorities announced that they had arrested nine Pha Muang soldiers, including two commissioned officers, for murdering the merchant mariners, dumping the bodies and tampering with evidence.15 The soldiers subsequently “disappeared from the justice system” according to the Bangkok Post, and there is no record of them ever being charged or convicted.16 In Naw Kham’s Chinese trial, prosecutors claimed that the soldiers were a rogue unit on the gang’s payroll, though without providing evidence in court.17 Some experts on the Golden Triangle drug trade have suggested that the killings were a false flag operation by unknown persons intended to frame Naw Kham – and more broadly, to present Mekong security issues as stemming from lawlessness in Myanmar – noting that he would have been unlikely to order the murders given that they were certain to trigger massive retribution from China (discussed further in Section III.A below).18 C. Security Cooperation and Geostrategic Rivalry The killings brought a much more assertive Chinese security posture on the Mekong. Several factors were at play: domestic pressure to safeguard the lives of Chinese citizens overseas; the growing importance of the licit Mekong trade, which had tripled in volume between 2004 and 2011; and concern about the far greater illicit trade flows, particularly drugs. The Mekong’s geopolitical importance, which Beijing views as part of its neighbourhood but where the U.S. has longstanding security cooperation and development programming, was a fourth element.19 Beyond the operation to capture Naw Kham itself, the most visible aspect of this new posture is what Beijing presents as “joint river patrols” by the four riparian states – China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand – to which it secured agreement in December 2011 (see Section II.B above).20 Chinese gunboats – which bear police markings but carry military-grade firepower – form the backbone of these monthly patrols. A Lao boat accompanies them for the final few kilometres from Ban Mom (160km downstream from the Chinese border) to the Thai-Lao-Myanmar trijunction; a Myanmar boat occasionally also joins.21 The vessels that Laos and Myanmar use are old patrol boats donated by China.22 Thailand, on the other hand, has never agreed to these patrols entering its waters, so in practice the joint China-Lao-Myanmar patrols stop at its border near Sop Ruak.23 The patrols quickly achieved their immediate security objective, ending piracy on this part of the Mekong, but they had little impact on other criminal activities such as drug smuggling (see Section III).24 Western security experts who spoke to Crisis Group have presented this situation as Laos “laundering a Chinese presence” on the river, allowing Beijing to extend its reach far beyond its borders; they also suggested that, for China, the patrols are a “signal of its capability and intent, which could be rapidly stepped up if needed”.25 Such comments reflect the geopolitical sensitivity of the Mekong, where a more powerful and assertive China is increasingly challenging long-term U.S. security interests (discussed further in Section V). III. Laos’s Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone A. An Emerging Hub of Illicit Activity Along with the growth in legal trade on the Mekong over the last two decades, and despite the suppression of piracy, there has been an even more rapid surge in illicit economies, including drug smuggling, gambling and associated criminal activities. The sprawling Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Laos’s Bokeo province, which includes the Kings Romans casino, has emerged as a hub for these (see the map in Appendix B). In January 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the casino for “drug trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and human and wildlife trafficking” it was alleged to be facilitating.26 A leading business intelligence analyst has since called the development “the world’s worst special economic zone”.27 Located on the banks of the Mekong, just across from Thailand, the SEZ is operated on a 99-year lease held by Kings Romans Group (also known as Dok Ngiew Kham Group), a Hong Kong-registered company founded by Chinese national Zhao Wei, who is the SEZ’s chairman. The Lao government also has an equity stake in the SEZ.28 Construction began in 2007, and while the investment promotion materials promised an ambitious manufacturing, agribusiness and tourism development, the Kings Romans casino was the first venture to be built.29 The SEZ covers an area of 10,000 hectares, of which 7,000 are forested hills and a nature reserve; the urban development area takes up 1,000 of the remaining 3,000 hectares.30 A veteran of Macao’s casino industry, Zhao Wei made his name (and likely his fortune) running casinos in Myanmar’s ethnic armed group-controlled town of Mongla on the Chinese border from 2001, catering to Chinese getting around Beijing’s ban on domestic gambling.31 In 2005, China closed the crossing into Mongla and cut off the town’s electricity supply after such a casino held several Chinese citizens for ransom for non-payment of debts, amid claims that Chinese provincial officials had also been gambling there with state funds.32 Deprived of clients, the casinos closed down, likely prompting Zhao Wei’s move to Laos. In 2018, U.S. sanctions named Zhao Wei as the head of a Transnational Criminal Organization.33 In China, however, he is regularly interviewed in state media, which hails his rags-to-riches story; the SEZ itself is portrayed as a development achievement.34 Authorities have alleged that the Kings Romans casino engages in money laundering, drug smuggling and other illegal activities. Thailand claimed the casino was the intended destination for the drugs found on the barges at the centre of the October 2011 murders of Chinese sailors (see Section II.B above), and the month before that, a joint Lao-Chinese law enforcement operation found a large haul of methamphetamines (known as yaba) on casino grounds.35 The emergence of Kings Romans as a centre of illicit activity likely represented unwelcome competition for Naw Kham, who was the biggest smuggler on the Mekong at the time.36 In April 2011, Naw Kham’s henchmen seized a casino boat and held the nineteen passengers and crew hostage until Zhao Wei paid a reported $750,000 ransom, which Naw Kham reportedly described as a “protection fee”.37 Thus, whatever the truth of the October 2011 killings, Kings Romans was a clear beneficiary in the aftermath: Naw Kham’s capture rid the casino of its main rival in illegal trade, and Chinese-led river patrols improved security a great deal in the SEZ. China also made out well. Naw Kham’s protection racket was an impediment to Chinese trade down the Mekong, and though it is a private entity, the SEZ has close ties to China (as evidenced by the treatment Zhao Wei receives in the Chinese press). Bejing can use it to project Chinese power in a geopolitically important area. B. Expansion of the Special Economic Zone Over the last decade, the SEZ has expanded significantly. On a two-day visit in March, Crisis Group witnessed a city-scale development, featuring more than twenty hotels, dozens of high-rise office buildings, schools and hospitals, water treatment and sanitation facilities, and an international airport nearing completion. The lingua franca in the enclave is Chinese, as is most signage, and nearly all goods and services must be paid for in Chinese yuan rather than Lao kip. Interviews with residents, as well officials in the region, indicated that SEZ authorities have sole de facto jurisdiction, with law enforcement handled by a “public security bureau” – a private police force operated by the SEZ, modelled on China’s units of the same name.38 Lao police and other authorities reportedly need permission from the SEZ to enter.39 The Kings Romans Group, which runs the casino as well as a number of other projects in the zone, also leases land and commercial and residential property to other businesses and individuals. Residents told Crisis Group that 70,000 Chinese nationals live and work in the zone, although many had left during the COVID-19 pandemic and were returning gradually; there are also several thousand professional workers from other countries, and many thousands of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, the majority from Myanmar.40 SEZ authorities claim that infrastructure and services are expanding beyond their current 100,000-resident capacity to accommodate 300,000 (a population 50 per cent larger than that of Chiang Rai, a nearby Thai city), as well as two million tourists annually, which is what the airport can handle.41 The Kings Romans Group claims to have invested $2 billion in the SEZ, the equivalent of more than 10 per cent of Lao GDP.42 The airport is particularly important for the SEZ’s future, as it will allow visitors, particularly those from mainland China, to fly in directly, thereby bypassing other jurisdictions. The nearest major airport at present is in Chiang Rai – a 61km drive across the Thai-Lao border. Other gambling centres are more conveniently located for mainland Chinese visitors, particularly the string of more than a dozen casinos in Myanmar’s south-eastern Myawaddy township, including the massive Shwe Kokko development, which are located a few kilometres from Thailand’s Mae Sot airport, and can be reached via informal border crossings with no Thai or Myanmar immigration procedures.43 The new airport will make the Golden Triangle at least as handy. At first, the builders planned to put the airport inside the SEZ, but the Golden Triangle’s proximity to Thai and Myanmar airspace precluded that option, so Zhao Wei instead reached agreement with Laos on a joint venture at the site of an existing airstrip at Tonpheung, a 5km drive from the SEZ along a recently completed four-lane highway.44 When Crisis Group visited in March, construction of the terminal appeared nearly finished, ahead of its slated mid-2023 opening. The first test flight to the airport was completed in December 2021, with some domestic flights taking place in 2022.45 The SEZ is also planning to establish a significant port facility on the Mekong. In 2020, a Kings Romans Group subsidiary reportedly paid the Lao government $50 million for a majority stake in a port development project at Ban Mom, a few kilometres upriver from the SEZ.46 When completed, the port development – which covers an area of more than 2,000 hectares, twice the size of the SEZ’s main development area – will include hotels, office buildings and large warehouses. It is to handle cargo coming into the SEZ. Law enforcement officials have expressed concern about the development, given that the SEZ is a known storage and trans-shipment point for drugs and other illicit goods.47 This new infrastructure could attract many more people to Bokeo province outside the SEZ. Chinese residents of the SEZ are already beginning to move to nearby towns, where rents are lower.48 It could also enable significant new criminal activity in the province. When Crisis Group visited the SEZ, it was clear that the zone was rebounding quickly post-COVID. New construction included a golf resort, a Venice-inspired “water street” and a major land reclamation project on the Mekong riverfront, which, according to signage and interviews, was for hotel and restaurant development.49 Crisis Group also found evidence of illegal activities in the SEZ, including: The operation of scam centres. As reported elsewhere and corroborated by Crisis Group interviews with participants and others with direct knowledge, these centres are run mostly by ethnic Chinese criminal gangs who pay or trick young men and women from China, Malaysia, Thailand and South Asia, and as far away as Nigeria, Brazil and the Republic of Georgia, to work on sophisticated operations targeting victims around the world online with fake investments, sham romances and other such scams.50 Locals identified several buildings where they said scam centres operate or previously did, some of which were being refurbished. These locations did not have window bars or other obvious security, reportedly because the workers were employed willingly and were paid, which locals and experts said was the most common arrangement.51 That said, Crisis Group identified a suspicious compound in the central part of the SEZ, consisting of four high-rise buildings with bars on the windows and strict perimeter security (high fences, razor wire, spotlights). The sole entrance was under 24-hour guard, and exiting vehicles were searched. Locals told Crisis Group that people from China and some other countries were locked up and forced to work as scammers in the compound.52 Money laundering. As stated in the U.S. Treasury sanctions designation and as experts told Crisis Group, significant money laundering takes place in the Golden Triangle SEZ, in particular at the Kings Romans Casino.53 Crisis Group witnessed multiple separate million-dollar cash transactions at the cashier’s desk on the gaming floor of Kings Romans casino, with the bills (in bundles of 100-yuan notes) transported in plastic shopping bags or holdalls.54 In addition to in-person gambling, online casino operations represent another opportunity for money laundering, although the Lao authorities have attempted to crack down on such operations at China’s behest.55 Organised crime experts have also identified major construction projects in the SEZ (see above) as potential channels for money laundering.56 Wildlife crime. Crisis Group identified what an employee said was a bear and tiger farm, ie, a facility for breeding these protected species for the purpose of wildlife trafficking. While marked as a “zoo” on a map displayed in the SEZ, the employee prevented Crisis Group staff from entering the compound, stating that it was not open to the public, but confirming that the site held “many” bears and tigers, which were bred there. The employee declined to call the owner or manager, saying he was instructed not to give out their contact details. The Environmental Investigation Agency, an NGO, named this same location as an illegal tiger and bear farm and abattoir.57 Other sources said the Kings Romans Group has obtained a zoo licence from the Lao authorities to avoid a 2018 government ban on tiger farms.58 Crisis Group also spotted bottles of tiger bone wine on sale in the SEZ, which the vendor said was locally produced.59 Previously, caged bears and tigers had been on display for visitors in the compound of the Kings Romans casino, but these were moved to the new “zoo” location around five years ago.60 In addition, a Lao women’s rights organisation has claimed that there is widespread human trafficking not only of scam centre workers, but also of young women for sexual exploitation in entertainment establishments in the SEZ, and that some scam centre workers are forced into prostitution if they are unable to perform well as scammers.61 There is, however, evidence that the SEZ authorities are becoming more cautious about overt illegal activities. Examples include the removal of protected species from cages near the Kings Romans casino following the 2018 Lao ban on tiger farms, as well as a crackdown on online casinos (see above). More recently, authorities have shuttered several scam operations, particularly those using enslaved workers. This action followed pressure on SEZ management from the Lao government, and pressure on both from Beijing, as the plight of trafficked workers from numerous countries has become a prominent diplomatic issue in the region.62 As a result, many of the scam centres, as well as online gambling operations, are relocating to Myanmar, in particular Tachileik in Shan State as well as Shwe Kokko and other spots close to Myawaddy in Kayin State.63 This shift is not limited to the Golden Triangle SEZ: other such casino and crime zones are located in Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines and Vietnam, and some of these have also started to relocate to Myanmar in response to increased pressure from local authorities, at China’s behest.64 There is also evidence that scam operations are quickly evolving, with increased professionalism and technical sophistication, while reports of human trafficking and forced criminality in this sector continue.65 Interpol issued a global warning on scam centres in the Mekong sub-region on 7 June, noting that their rapid spread represents a “serious and imminent threat” to public safety.66 IV. Myanmar’s Trans-Salween Shan State A. Armed Groups and the Illicit Political Economy The theatre of decades of conflict between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups, Myanmar’s Shan State has long been the epicentre of illicit activities in the Mekong sub-region. It is one of the largest global production centres of crystal methamphetamine, as well as amphetamine tablets and heroin – a drug trade so large and profitable that it dwarfs the state’s formal economy. Drugs lie at the heart of Shan State’s political economy, fuelling both criminality and conflict.67 Shan State is also home to at least 60 casinos, most of which are unregulated and therefore hotspots for money laundering and other crimes, according to the Financial Action Task Force, the international watchdog in charge of tackling money laundering and terrorist financing.68 Both casinos and drug production facilities tend to be located in parts of Shan State held by militias and other paramilitary units allied with the Myanmar military, as well as in enclaves controlled by non-state armed groups.69 Casinos are mostly aimed at Chinese gamblers, so have generally been situated close to the Chinese frontier – particularly in and around Laukkaing and Mongla.70 In recent years, however, China has increasingly cracked down on casinos and online gambling operations sitting along its borders. As a result, these businesses have moved farther afield, including to the Golden Triangle SEZ in Laos (see Section III.B above) and to the nearby town of Tachileik in Shan State, next to Thailand, which hosts more than a dozen casinos.71 (They have also moved to the area around Myawaddy in Kayin State, where Shwe Kokko is located.72) Criminals ... need good transport links to China ... Some parts of Shan State meet these requirements well. These illicit businesses require a kind of predictable insecurity. Areas controlled by militias or non-state armed groups that have ceasefire deals with the Myanmar military are ideal from their perspective, as they allow both casinos and drug production and storage facilities to remain beyond the reach of law enforcement, while keeping the significant investments safe.73 Criminals also need good transport links to China – the source of most of the precursor chemicals used to produce the drugs and the place where most of the gamblers come from.74 Some parts of Shan State meet these requirements well. The first are areas under the control of Border Guard Forces (such as BGF1006 in the Kokang region on the Chinese border and BGF1009 in Tachileik on the Thai frontier) and other militias allied with the Myanmar army.75 Some of these groups are large, well-armed and involved in a range of licit and illicit businesses. In return for carrying out security duties in their areas (essentially, preventing the emergence or incursion of anti-government armed groups), and at times fighting alongside the military, they are given the authority to carry arms and permission to conduct business. The military appears to turn a blind eye to their illicit activities – which, not surprisingly, they engage in liberally, given that they receive no funding or other resources from the military. These groups operate checkpoints to restrict access to their areas or businesses, giving them a great deal of autonomy. Also fitting the bill are enclaves under the control of ethnic armed groups that have durable ceasefires with Naypyitaw, such as the special regions run by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA, or “Mongla group”) on the Chinese border, as well as the UWSA’s 171 military region abutting Thailand. Both groups agreed to ceasefires in 1989 that were reaffirmed in 2011, and neither has had serious clashes with the Myanmar army over those accords’ three decades in effect. At the same time, these enclaves are defended by large, well-equipped forces, and neither the Myanmar military nor civilian authorities can enter without permission. Illicit enterprises that dwarf legitimate ones have fuelled a political economy inimical to peace and security. On one hand, the militias and other armed actors that control areas where crime flourishes have a major disincentive to demobilise, given that they need weapons and territorial control to keep their revenue flowing. They make the money through informal taxation of legal and illegal trade. On the other hand, the Myanmar military, which – at least in theory – has ultimate authority over militias and Border Guard Forces, views such semi-autonomous entities as necessary for helping it combat the various ethnic armed groups. As discussed below, the military has become even more reliant on such groups as conflict has proliferated following the February 2021 coup. B. Impact of the 2021 Coup The February 2021 coup transformed the security landscape and political economy of Myanmar’s border areas. The numerous armed resistance groups formed in response to the coup, many of which have received support from established ethnic armed organisations, have left the Myanmar military battling an array of foes across a wide geographical area.76 Stretched thin, the military has, as noted, become more reliant on Border Guard Forces and other militias to contain the armed resistance, reducing its willingness and ability to constrain these allies’ activities. It is a contrast to the pre-coup situation, when the military sought to impose limits on its allied militias – including disarming the Kaungkha Militia and pressuring the Kayin Border Guard Force, for example – out of concern that they could become too rich and well-armed to rein in if the need arose.77 This transformed security landscape and political economy is particularly striking in Shan State, which has seen much less fighting than other areas since the coup. As the Myanmar military has shifted its focus – and more recently, some of its troops – to more restive areas, the local balance of power has changed.78 The shift has been to the detriment of some groups, such as the Restoration Council of Shan State. The ethnic armed group, which has a ceasefire agreement with the military, has lost considerable territory and power now that it no longer has the same level of backing in its expansionist moves against rival groups that do not have ceasefires, such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP).79 Other groups have benefited from the post-coup situation, most significantly the UWSA, the country’s largest ethnic armed group. Other groups have benefited from the post-coup situation, most significantly the UWSA, the country’s largest ethnic armed group. The UWSA’s goal is for Myanmar to formally recognise its autonomous areas as a separate Wa State, with the same status as other ethnic states in Myanmar – and preferably to expand its territory so that its two separate enclaves are connected.80 Since the coup, the group has enlarged its area of influence to cover much of Trans-Salween – the part of Shan State between the east bank of the Salween (Thanlyin) River and the Chinese, Lao and Thai borders (see the map in Appendix B).81 In the past, the Myanmar army operated bases and checkpoints to limit UWSA expansionism, but it no longer has the ability to do so.82 Since the coup, UWSA has also been more assertive in projecting force across the Salween River in several locations, which analysts suggest is an attempt to tip the balance of power toward its allies (such as the TNLA and the SSPP) in these areas, and thereby protect its flank, rather than a plan to expand its territory west of the Salween.83 While the Myanmar military controls Kengtung and other towns and main roads in trans-Salween Shan State, its grip is weaker in the hinterland. The same is true of the Restoration Council of Shan State, which has mostly retreated to its base areas. Border Guard Forces allied with the Myanmar military have a powerful presence in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone and the town of Tachileik, but they are focused on running illicit businesses rather than challenging the UWSA.84 Weaker state institutions and a curtailed Myanmar military posture in Trans-Salween have also made criminal activity easier and thereby boosted the illicit economy. The drug trade, particularly in opium, has thrived since the coup, and large-scale methamphetamine production has migrated from northern Shan State to the areas around Tachileik (controlled by the Lahu BGF1009) and Monghsat (controlled by the UWSA).85 In addition, scam operations and online gambling have relocated from the Golden Triangle SEZ in Laos to Tachileik and other parts of Trans-Salween and Kayin State (see Section III.B above). While swathes of Myanmar are in the midst of violent conflict, and economic conditions for most people are extremely difficult, Tachileik is a boomtown, with casinos, nightclubs and video karaoke (“KTV”) establishments doing a roaring business.86 The coup also appears to have resulted in an increase in funds flowing from groups in the Trans-Salween into the broader Myanmar economy.87 Many assets and businesses have declined in value following the coup, even as these groups have gained purchasing power, due to the sharp devaluation of the Myanmar kyat (most illicit profits are in foreign currency).88 In addition to Mandalay and Yangon, the northern Shan State capital Lashio has seen a wave of new property-related investment, with Wa and Kokang companies building hotels, condominiums and even a casino, something that the authorities would likely not have allowed before the coup.89 Myanmar has long had a poor record on seizing the proceeds of organised crime and on combating money laundering. Its prospects of improving this performance evaporated after the coup, which contributed to its blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force in October 2022.90 V. An Unmet Challenge: Geopolitics and the Mekong Sub-Region A. A Transnational Challenge As described above, Myanmar’s trans-Salween Shan State and northern Laos’s Bokeo province have become a contiguous zone of vibrant criminality, much of which is beyond the reach of either state’s authorities. The sheer size of the area’s illicit economies, which dwarf the legal economies of Shan State and northern Laos, means that they have an enormous impact – entrenching corruption, weakening governance institutions and damaging social capital (that is, the networks of trust and cooperation that contribute to a community’s wellbeing).91 The effects ripple well beyond Myanmar and Laos. For example, the majority of victims of trafficking for scam operations are foreign nationals. Narcotics produced in the Golden Triangle are distributed across the region, reaching as far as Australia and Japan.92 Illicit profits also move to be laundered or invested, including in the legal economies of Yangon, Mandalay and Vientiane, as well as farther afield. Tackling the sub-region’s vast criminality is a daunting task for several reasons. The riparian topography of this zone is part of the challenge. Bisecting the area is the Mekong River, which marks the Myanmar-Lao border. Because of the large volume of legal trade along the river within which contraband can be hidden, and control of several ports by non-state entities, the river serves as an enabler of criminal activity rather than any sort of barrier to it. The multi-country nature of the criminal zone ... provides jurisdictional hedging opportunities for criminal organisations. The multi-country nature of the criminal zone spanning Trans-Salween and Bokeo Province creates further difficulties. It provides jurisdictional hedging opportunities for criminal organisations, allowing them to quickly relocate from one country to another in response to threats, such as the recent migration of scam operations from the Golden Triangle SEZ to Tachileik (see Section IV.B above). It also allows criminal organisations to leverage the comparative advantages of the two jurisdictions. For example, the operators of illicit methamphetamine labs prefer to set them up in parts of Trans-Salween that are beyond state control. Precursor chemicals for these labs used to come mainly from China, directly across the border. While Chinese measures have reduced the flow, many are now arriving via Laos, where unlike Trans-Salween there are licit industries with a legitimate need for such chemicals – and hence fewer restrictions.93 The Mekong provides an easy way to get the chemicals undetected. For these and other reasons, addressing the upper Mekong’s sprawling criminality is a transnational challenge that requires a transnational solution. But any such effort would need to be mounted in a geopolitically sensitive region, where the major state players are either outright competing or seem to feel they gain most by working separately. Progress has therefore been halting at best. B. U.S.-China Competition China and the U.S. have major interests in the upper Mekong but show little appetite for cooperation when it comes to tackling crime. Indeed, they have been increasingly competing for influence over the Mekong sub-region, which both consider vitally important.94 From Washington’s perspective, a powerful and assertive China is increasingly challenging long-term U.S. security interests, including its alliance with Thailand, which has drifted in recent decades with the demise of its anti-communist strategic rationale and Bangkok’s hedging in the face of major- power competition.95 From Beijing’s perspective, Washington continues to meddle too close to its borders, while China believes its efforts to assert itself as the dominant regional country are consistent with its status as a world power. Other Mekong countries report feeling increasing pressure to choose sides between the two superpowers, something that most have resisted doing.96 The Mekong River itself is at the centre of the sub-regional competition, given that it is both a key source of water supply and a strategic transport and trade route. As noted, Beijing has – particularly since the 2011 Naw Kham incident – increased the projection of its economic and security clout down the river, up to Thailand’s border. China has also built eleven dams on its section of the Mekong mainstream. In recent years, other states and think-tanks have accused Beijing of using these to hold back water during droughts and taking other steps that adversely affect downstream countries – including U.S. ally Thailand and U.S. partner Vietnam.97 While there is debate about the extent to which China’s dams contribute to downstream droughts, the lower Mekong countries are quietly concerned that China may use the dams as a source of leverage.98 Competing sub-regional cooperation frameworks are another manifestation of this growing rivalry. As part of the Obama administration’s pivot or “rebalance” to Asia, the U.S. launched the Lower Mekong Initiative in 2009, which became the Mekong-U.S. Partnership in 2020.99 The Partnership emphasises “soft infrastructure” to support lower Mekong countries’ “autonomy, economic independence, good governance and sustainable growth” through programs on development cooperation, transboundary water and natural resources management, non-traditional security, energy and infrastructure.100 The Partnership has broad membership, aiming to keep extra-regional powers engaged in the region.101 While U.S. efforts in the lower Mekong are mainly pitched at capacity building and engaging local institutions, they are also linked to its strategy of securing a “free and open Indo-Pacific”; at the East Asia Summit foreign ministers’ meeting in August 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called for “a free and open Mekong”.102 In 2016, China launched its own initiative, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation framework (the Mekong is known as the Lancang in China), at least partly in response to the Lower Mekong Initiative.103 The framework is exclusive, including only China and the five lower Mekong countries.104 Under Beijing’s leadership, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation is an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative. It has emphasised concrete outcomes, launching projects to step up regional connectivity through Chinese investment in hard infrastructure.105 At the same time, observers have noted that the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation serves as Beijing’s “own regional house where it can enjoy almost exclusive influence over other Mekong capitals”.106 Because these competing frameworks are aimed at advancing U.S. and Chinese strategic interests, Washington and Beijing tend to subordinate their development agendas to those larger goals, making them captive to the global rivalry between the superpowers, leading to zero-sum approaches. Thus, for example, the U.S. has criticised the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation for trying to sideline pre-existing U.S.-led initiatives, and China has pushed Mekong countries receiving its aid to accept Beijing’s vision for the region, termed a “community of common destiny”, to the exclusion of other initiatives.107 Some analysts see China-U.S. rivalry in the Mekong sub-region as “driving a wedge between mainland and maritime South East Asia” – since Beijing’s growing economic and diplomatic influence has led some Mekong countries, notably Cambodia and Laos, to rein in their criticism of China when maritime disputes are discussed in regional forums like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) – and potentially being as consequential as the South China Sea dispute, with “sentiment growing in the region that because ASEAN focused so much on the ‘sea’, it forgot about the ‘land’”.108 Big-power competition is an obstacle to U.S.-China cooperation on issues of shared concern in the region, such as organised crime. This big-power competition is an obstacle to U.S.-China cooperation on issues of shared concern in the region, such as organised crime. For example, U.S. officials, members of Congress and experts close to the U.S. government are often vocal in criticising China for not doing enough to combat crime, whether it is the export of precursor chemicals used to produce synthetic opioids such as fentanyl that are trafficked to the U.S.; the export of precursor chemicals for the production of heroin and methamphetamine in the Mekong sub-region; or money laundering and other illicit activities by transnational criminal gangs with links to Chinese nationals.109 For its part, China complains – with some justification – that these criticisms fail to acknowledge actions that it is taking to address these issues. It also points out that critics deliberately conflate the Chinese state with criminals who are Chinese nationals or of Chinese ethnicity, as part of an effort to smear China.110 Such competitive dynamics serve to undermine vital cooperation. For example, Thai authorities have established an operations and intelligence centre in northern Thailand, focused on transnational organised crime in the Mekong, inviting a range of international partners to take part in the centre’s work, including Mekong states, the U.S. and other Western countries.111 As a Mekong riparian state, China is eligible to take part, but it has reportedly not done so, due to the prominent involvement of the U.S.112 In another example, on 7 July the Biden administration launched a Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats to “prevent illicit drug manufacturing, detect emerging drug threats, disrupt trafficking, address illicit finance, and respond to public safety and public health impacts”.113 Although mainly aimed at addressing illicit fentanyl trafficking to the U.S., the focus of the initiative was broadened to synthetic drugs more generally, in order to secure the more active support of U.S. allies such as Thailand and the Philippines, whose primary concern is methamphetamine.114 U.S. officials say China has been invited to join, although an expert Crisis Group spoke to suggested that Beijing was unlikely to do so if it saw the forum as a vehicle for criticising China over illicit fentanyl. The upshot is that the U.S. would be wise to engage in less finger-pointing and ensure that the initiative includes issues important to China, such as ketamine.115 This approach – toning down accusatory rhetoric and working on issues of shared concern – could be adopted more generally to facilitate U.S.-China cooperation on organised crime. C. China’s Outsized Influence China has more influence than any other country in the Golden Triangle. Yet it has a complicated agenda – including the importance it attaches to maintaining good relations with the Myanmar armed groups along its border – that keeps it from doing all it could to rein in transnational crime. 1. China in the Trans-Salween China’s own development path was based on the idea that economic growth would create stability, and stability on the border with Myanmar is a key objective for Beijing. Since the collapse of the Chinese-backed communist insurgency in northern Myanmar in 1989, Shan State’s economy has become bound up with that of south-western China.116 As the connections multiply, the area is being pulled further into China’s orbit – due partly to the sheer size of China’s economy but also to a Chinese policy of using economic engagement as a means of achieving strategic goals. Over recent years, apart from a hiatus due to COVID-19, Chinese investment has surged: huge plantations growing everything from watermelons to bananas to rubber have been established to serve the Chinese market and cross-border trade volumes have skyrocketed.117 Transport infrastructure has improved to accommodate the increased flows, which also facilitates illicit trade.118 One of the biggest challenges to tackling transnational crime in the region is the enclaves, in Trans-Salween and elsewhere in Myanmar, controlled by non-state armed groups, who monetise their quasi-autonomy by collaborating with transnational criminal organisations (see Section IV above). China has much greater influence over many of these groups than the Myanmar military does, particularly in the enclaves along its border in Trans-Salween, controlled by the Kokang BGF, the UWSA and the NDAA (Mongla). Beyond economic relations, Beijing has cultivated political ties with [non-state] armed groups ... giving it significant leverage for limiting armed conflict on its border. Beyond economic relations, Beijing has cultivated political ties with these armed groups, some of which it also directly or indirectly supplies with weapons, giving it significant leverage for limiting armed conflict on its border. Just in the last few months, Deng Xijun, the Chinese special envoy for Myanmar, has met with these groups twice (in December 2022 and February 2023).119 Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang also made a rare visit to the Myanmar frontier in Yunnan province prior to his May 2023 trip to Naypyitaw, calling for a “clear and stable” border.120 Keeping fighting away from its border through statecraft is a higher priority for Beijing than stamping out crime. When it comes to illicit activities, Beijing’s view – right or wrong – is that economic development tends to promote stability, even when it includes criminal activities that cause it problems.121 Thus, China tends to balance its action toward such criminal activities with its other objectives, including maintaining a peaceful border and influence over armed groups. Nevertheless, it has occasionally demonstrated its coercive capacity when persuasion proved insufficient, for example by closing its border with enclaves controlled by these groups in order to stop the flow of people, goods and services (including electricity and telecommunications) that those territories rely on. Away from its border, China deploys other methods. In Shwe Kokko, on the Thai border in Kayin State’s Myawaddy township, China has no direct leverage, and so has used more coercive methods to crack down on criminal activities of particular concern, such as online casinos targeting mainland Chinese gamblers and scam operations. Thus, it asked Thai authorities to arrest the zone’s chairman, She Zhijiang, which they did in 2022.122 China has also sent half a dozen police officers on a months-long deployment to a task force in Mae Sot, Thailand, close to Shwe Kokko.123 The task force is targeting scam centres that are detaining scores of Chinese workers as well as those of other nationalities.124 Chinese envoys have also pressed the regime in Naypyitaw to do more to tackle the problem, in coordination with Beijing and Bangkok.125 2. Beijing, Vientiane and the Golden Triangle SEZ China also exerts considerable influence over the Golden Triangle SEZ in Laos. Although it is controlled by private commercial entities, the quasi-autonomous regulation of the SEZ, and its Chinese character, mean that it can be exploited by Beijing for intelligence gathering and power projection.126 Beijing also has sway over both the SEZ’s Chinese promoter, Zhao Wei, and the Lao state. While Laos is not a client state of China – the two countries have a history of strained relations in the 1970s and 1980s, and analysts describe Laos as playing off China, Vietnam and Thailand – Beijing does exercise significant clout with its small neighbour, in part because of Laos’s huge public debt to China.127 Still, Laos appears to be a willing partner, having made a deliberate choice in agreeing to the establishment of the Golden Triangle SEZ and its subsequent expansion. One reason may be that Lao elites feel they profit from the arrangement.128 Thus, while the SEZ appears to be an example of “sovereignty for sale”, the Lao authorities may not see it as such.129 Rather, they are likely to view the SEZ as having provided economic benefits to the country and development opportunities to a poor province, lengthening the state’s reach.130 To some extent, this assessment may be correct. At the macro level, investment and foreign visitors flowing into the SEZ have no doubt helped boost Laos’s foreign currency reserves and its ability to service a huge external debt.131 In addition, since the SEZ was launched, Bokeo has gone from an impoverished agrarian frontier province over which Vientiane’s writ hardly extended, to a more prosperous area with modern infrastructure. Indeed, Bokeo has experienced the steepest reductions in poverty of any Lao province since 2013, going from one of the poorest in the country to one of the best-off.132 The reality, however, is that residents of Bokeo province perceive drug use, crime and inequality to have risen. Local people interviewed by Crisis Group acknowledged that the SEZ has brought better infrastructure, jobs and other economic opportunities, but still expressed resentment at the illegal activities they saw taking place in the zone, the growing problem of drug addiction (and more generally the erosion of community cohesion and cultural values) and the very visible economic disparities.133 In the longer term, quasi-autonomous enclaves such as the Golden Triangle SEZ corrode state institutions and the rule of law, with local but also regional consequences.134 For the time being, Laos appears to be discounting these costs because of the gains coming from the arrangement, whereas Beijing is using its leverage over Laos and the SEZ’s operators to deal with its most serious concerns about criminal enterprises, like the scam centres, without losing the benefits that also accrue to it from the zone. Normally, these issues might attract Washington’s attention, but the U.S. has played its hand cautiously. Although the U.S. has applied sanctions to the Golden Triangle SEZ, Washington has also been mindful of China’s delicate relationship with Laos in deciding how much pressure to apply to Vientiane. Indeed, it is partly due to U.S., Thai and Vietnamese concerns about pushing Laos more firmly into China’s embrace that Washington has opted not to lean too hard on the government – for example, by not extending Treasury sanctions on the Golden Triangle SEZ to cover Lao entities (such as state banks), even though the state is an equity holder in the SEZ.135 VI. Recommendations There are no easy solutions to the problem of sophisticated, extremely lucrative criminality in jurisdictions – both state and non-state – with weak enforcement capacity and high susceptibility to corruption or collusion. The sums of money at stake are larger than some of the region’s national economies.136 While it is conceivable that concerted action in a single jurisdiction could achieve progress, the criminal networks involved have shown that they have the capacity to quickly shift operations to another nearby jurisdiction when under threat. A coordinated regional approach with enhanced political leadership is therefore indispensable. It is clear that taking a narrow security and criminal justice approach to these issues is insufficient, since such methods mainly addresses the problem’s short-term symptoms without tackling the underlying causes in governance, social, economic and political factors. Dealing with transnational crime in this manner can lead to an over-reliance on repressive measures – such as increased surveillance, restrictive border controls and police raids – that are often ineffective. The security-centred approach may be particularly inadequate when countries act unilaterally, thereby hindering international cooperation. Because the challenge is so multi-dimensional, a wide range of expertise will be required to address it. Multilateral intelligence sharing, joint law enforcement operations and multi-agency collaboration are likely to be more effective than stove-piped efforts. While police action and criminal justice are undoubtedly necessary, policymakers in Mekong countries need to involve other agencies including those with jurisdiction over customs, immigration, finance and trade. In this way, illicit financial flows can be flagged more effectively and money laundering schemes better identified. Coordinated action across jurisdictions can help prevent crime syndicates from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. The difficulty of the problem, and the coordination challenges it entails, require it to be a political priority for countries in the region. Given the scale of the problem, regional governments need increased support from other countries, particularly the U.S. and China. Unfortunately, the intensity level of big-power rivalry is standing in the way. U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific broadly, and in the Mekong sub-region more narrowly, inhibits cooperation and evidence-based policy approaches, with the two powers focused on outdoing each other rather than collaborating to solve problems. Such zero-sum behaviour may be unavoidable against the current geopolitical backdrop, but it is important to insulate these transnational challenges from the bigger picture as much as possible. So far, there has been a failure on all sides to do so. The U.S. and China should ideally set aside their geopolitical rivalry when it comes to cooperating in combating transnational crime in the Mekong. While this scenario may be somewhat aspirational, the U.S. and China should ideally set aside their geopolitical rivalry when it comes to cooperating in combating transnational crime in the Mekong. China could participate in the recently launched U.S. initiative on synthetic drugs. Both countries could also cooperate with Thailand’s operations and intelligence centre on transnational organised crime in the Mekong (see Section V.B above). The two powers could also foster enhanced regional cooperation by focusing on ways in which their respective Mekong cooperation platforms (the Mekong-U.S. partnership and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation) could support complementary, mutually beneficial initiatives to tackle the underlying governance and socio-economic factors that allow organised crime to flourish. A good first step would be for both sides to share more information about their objectives and activities in the Mekong sub-region, both bilaterally and via their respective cooperation platforms. For its part, China should adopt a more consistent approach to deterring crime in its neighbourhood, using its influence over regional governments and non-state actors to curtail such activities. So far, it has used this influence only when it has seen its national interests directly and significantly threatened – for example, in recent years pushing the Philippines and Cambodia to crack down on online gambling operations targeting mainland Chinese punters, and in recent months launching a diplomatic and law enforcement attempt to shut down online scam operations in South East Asia that have employed trafficked Chinese workers and targeted mainland Chinese victims.137 At the same time, it has turned a blind eye to much of the criminality in locations controlled by entities and individuals friendly to China, including the Golden Triangle SEZ and UWSA and NDAA enclaves in trans-Salween Shan State (see Sections IV and V.C above). Finally, while efforts to tackle these criminal activities are essential, it is important to address their human impact. For example, there are thousands of people from various countries being held against their will and suffering often brutal treatment at the hands of scam centre operators in Myanmar, Laos and elsewhere in the region. Raids are often ineffective, as the criminal gangs running these centres receive advance warnings from corrupt officials.138 According to groups helping victims get away, the best means of securing the release of individual detainees is intervention by the person’s embassy in the relevant jurisdiction, once officials are aware of the individual’s plight.139 Countries where these scam centres operate, as well as neighbouring countries where victims may escape to and the victims’ own jurisdictions, should also refrain from charging freed forced labour victims for the crimes they were forced to commit, or for immigration violations, bearing in mind international norms on dealing with “forced criminality”.140 VII. Conclusion Myanmar’s Shan State and northern Laos’s Bokeo province have become a single, transnational zone of criminality that is largely beyond the reach of the two countries’ authorities. The Mekong River, which bisects the zone, is also an axis of geopolitical competition, complicating efforts to combat transnational criminal organisations operating in the region. The impact of this rampant illegality is significant. The illicit activities dwarf the legal economies of both Shan State and northern Laos in size. They entrench corruption, weaken governance institutions and deplete social capital. The consequences are felt not just across the region, but around the world. Regional governments have thus far opted for criminal justice responses, but by focusing on often unilateral efforts, they are failing to address the full breadth of the challenge, much less the underlying governance and socio-economic factors that fuel this growing illicit economy. Given the adaptability of criminal networks, a coordinated regional approach involving intelligence sharing, joint operations and transnational multi-agency should be a top political priority for governments in the region. Ideally, China and the U.S. should support such a regional effort, setting aside their rivalry in order to tackle a phenomenon that has not just regional, but global, implications..."
Source/publisher: International Crisis Group (Belgium)
2023-08-18
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-18
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Sub-title: Myanmar’s junta has deployed Russian arms to lethal effect in an escalating civil war but is highly vulnerable to a disruption of those supplies
Description: "CHIANG MAI – When Myanmar’s military regime drops bombs and launches air strikes on civilian populations, a rising component of its intensifying war against anti-coup and ethnic rebel groups, the aerial assaults owe largely to Russia. In recent months, Myanmar’s Air Force has used Russia-made Yak-130 jets and Mi-35 helicopters to drop munitions in areas where resistance fighters are known to be active but that have also often hit civilian populations, indiscriminate attacks that rights groups say are tantamount to war crimes. Myanmar is believed to have at least 20 Yak-130 jets, two-seaters designed to train pilots but commonly used for counterinsurgency operations, including six it received in December 2021. In October, Janes Information Group reported it had received imagery showing a Russian Kamov KA-29TB assault transport helicopter in operation in the northern Sagaing region, apparently one of five of the gunships Myanmar’s military agreed to buy earlier this year. In a more recent November delivery, Myanmar received either four or six – reports vary – Russia-made Sukhoi Su-30 multi-role fighters replete with Russian trainers and technicians. Russian military instructors have also been spotted at airfields in Myanmar, presumably to help maintain their attack helicopters but also possibly for targeting advice. But as Myanmar’s military regime, known as the State Administration Council (SAC), escalates its air war against rebel forces highly vulnerable to aerial attacks, its dependence on Moscow for its arms, supplies and assistance is both a source of strength and weakness that could have a significant bearing on the future course of the civil war. Russia’s war against Ukraine, by any honest measure, has been a military disaster, with Moscow losing more men and materiel than in any armed conflict since World War II. As the losses mount and conflict intensifies, it is questionable whether Russia will have enough surplus military hardware and parts for export to far-flung customers like Myanmar. Myanmar’s junta sought to enhance its alliance with Moscow last year, seen in its frequent expressions of support for its invasion of Ukraine. On February 25, SAC spokesman Major-General Zaw Min Tun said that Russia’s military had “carried out what is justified for the sustainability of their country’s sovereignty” and that the war proved Moscow’s “position as a world power.” Junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has visited Russia at least three times since seizing power in a February 1, 2021 coup. He reportedly told Russia’s defense minister in June of that year that “thanks to Russia, our army has become one of the strongest in the region.” During Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Moscow in September last year, the general met with President Vladimir Putin and toured a plant producing fighter jets. Moscow, meanwhile, has backed the democracy-suspending junta’s bid to be recognized as Myanmar’s legitimate government by officially referring to Min Aung Hlaing as “prime minister.” Myanmar’s special relationship with Russia began nearly three decades ago when the ruling generals sought to mitigate their heavy dependence on China for military hardware. Then, Beijing filled the gap when the country was placed under Western sanctions following the bloody suppression of a nationwide uprising for democracy in 1988. The first contacts were forged in the 1990s when Russian dignitaries began visiting the country. Moscow sold its first consignment of four MiG-29 jet fighters to Myanmar in 2001, which was followed by another ten MiGs the following year. Russia has since sold Myanmar’s generals Hind Mi-35 helicopter gunships, Mi-17 transport helicopters, Yak-130 ground attack aircraft, light armored vehicles as well as heavy machine guns and rocket launchers. As many as 5,000 Myanmar soldiers and scientists have studied at Russian military schools since the early 1990s, more than from any other Southeast Asian country including old Cold War ally Vietnam. In 2007, Russia also signed an agreement to build a nuclear research reactor in Myanmar but construction was delayed due to costs and the controversial project was not apparently any longer on the drawing board before the February 2021 democracy-suspending coup. However, Alexey Likhachev, director of the state-owned Russian firm Rosatom, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with junta science and technology minister Myo Thein Kyaw in July last year covering “cooperation in training and skills development in the field of nuclear energy and shaping positive public opinion on nuclear energy in Myanmar.” In September, Likhachev met Min Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok where the two agreed to strengthen atomic energy cooperation including through the possible construction of a modular nuclear reactor in Myanmar. Despite such big bang pronouncements, no doubt calculated to raise antenna in the West, betting on Russia rather than China as its closest security partner may not turn out as Min Aung Hlaing and his SAC members hope and expect. If Moscow starts to falter in its military deliveries to Naypyidaw, as some analysts see as likely, Myanmar’s generals may soon be forced to swallow their pride and again go hat in hand to Beijing for military arms and related assistance in yet another hour of sanctions-induced need. Russia, for its part, has vowed to honor arms deals signed before the coup in Myanmar, including for missile defense systems and fighter jets, but that was before the war in Ukraine took such a heavy toll on Russia’s weapons supplies. It is no secret that Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to restore the erstwhile Soviet Union’s old glory, a drive seen in his expansionist war in Ukraine and search for new strategic allies such as Myanmar. While China has vital strategic interests in Myanmar as the only neighboring country that provides Beijing with direct access to the Indian Ocean, Russia has always been more interested in making money from its arms sales and other commercial engagements with Myanmar. To be sure, Myanmar is not the only Southeast Asian country to buy military equipment from Russia – others include Vietnam, Indonesia and even Malaysia – but the relationship between Moscow and Myanmar’s generals goes way beyond lucrative arms deals. Putin’s autocracy and Myanmar’s junta share a similar disdain for Western democracies, human rights and civil liberties. Russia is trying to bomb Ukraine to literal smithereens while junta leader Min Aung Hlaing and his cohorts are doing the same in their own country. They are, as one Asian analyst who requested anonymity put it, “birds of a feather.” Xi’s China may be in the same autocratic league but China is perceived by the generals as too close for comfort and Russia never supported the once-powerful Communist Party of Burma, which waged a bloody civil war against the government then in Yangon. The generals have not likely forgotten that the communist rulers in Beijing provided massive military aid and support to their then-ideological comrades in Myanmar during the decade spanning 1968-78. Moscow has been able to leverage that lingering distrust, despite its comparative lack of commercial offerings. In August last year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Myanmar to discuss what the official news agency Tass described as “security and economic issues.” That was followed in November by a visit to Moscow by SAC minister for transport and communications, Admiral Tin Aung San, where several new cooperative agreements were concluded. Among them, Russia vaguely pledged to help develop Myanmar’s railroads, an infrastructure area where Beijing is active through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Less strategically, the two sides announced that Myanmar International Airways will as of “early 2023” operate direct flights between Yangon and the three Far East Russian cities of Vladivostok, Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk. It is hard to imagine that there will anytime soon be an influx of tourists to Myanmar from Siberia, where those cities are located, or that Myanmar vacationers would want to spend their holidays in such frigid locales. However, there are important military installations and training facilities in the far-flung Russian cities, meaning the flight agreement is likely more militarily than commercially motivated..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2023-01-23
Date of entry/update: 2023-01-23
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Sub-title: Chongqing-Mandalay railway route is launched, saving 20-day delivery time
Description: "A new international railway route from Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality to Mandalay, southern Myanmar, has officially started operation, with the first freight train departing from Chongqing on Monday, which will arrive in Mandalay about 20 days earlier than what it takes on traditional routes. The new route is expected to strengthen Chongqing's connectivity with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) members, said Ba Chuanjiang, an official from Chongqing. The train loaded with 60 TEUs of machinery equipment, electronic components, auto parts, departed from the Liangjiang New Area in Chongqing on Monday, which will head to Mandalay, passing through Lincang, in Southwest China's Yunnan Province, Chinese media outlet cnr.cn reported on Tuesday. The successful operation of the new route opens another logistics path for exports from Chongqing and neighboring regions, as products can reach Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia through the seaport of Mandalay, according to Yuxinou Logistics, a local rail logistics company operating the Yuxinou (Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe) Railway. Chongqing will further promote the integration and development of other transportation methods from the metropolis to Myanmar, while the returning train from Myanmar to Chongqing could be loaded with products of Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries, said Xi Dan, manager of Yuxinou Logistics. The total route is 2,000 kilometers starting from Chongqing, passing Lincang and the Mengding-Chinshwehaw border gate to Mandalay. The delivery time is 15 days, which is 20 days shorter than the traditional route and the logistics cost can be lowered by 20 percent. The route will shorten the transportation distance and time, while optimizing the international logistics model for transporting goods from the inland region of the western part of China to many ports in the Middle East and Europe. The new route comes as China and ASEAN members are bolstering logistics connectivity after the launch of the China-Laos Railway, a major project under the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative, in December 2021. The railway has seen significant passenger and freight transportation, underscoring the booming trade between China and ASEAN. As of earlier this month, the China-Laos Railway had handled more than 2.7 million passenger trips and 2.9 million metric tons of cargo since it opened, according to official data..."
Source/publisher: "Global Times" (Beijing)
2022-05-24
Date of entry/update: 2022-05-24
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Sub-title: The 30th anniversary of China-ASEAN relations was marked by the reiteration of the mutually beneficial relationship that both enjoy. Is this a shadow play by China is yet to known?
Description: "China and ASEAN held a special summit to commemorate the 30th anniversary of their dialogue partnership (DP) on 22 November 2021. It was co-chaired by the Sultan of Brunei, and the Chinese President, Xi Jinping. It elevated the relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The event was held virtually even though the 30th anniversary Foreign Ministers meeting was held physically in Chongqing, on 7 June. China made every effort to bring Myanmar to the Commemorative Summit. Ultimately, the ASEAN position to keep Myanmar’s leadership away from ASEAN summits till they kept their promises, prevailed. The joint statement recognises ASEAN-China relations amongst the most dynamic and mutually beneficial partnerships for ASEAN amongst all its DPs. The relationship is guided by the Joint Statement of 1997, the Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership of 2003 and the vision of the strategic partnership for 2030 adopted in 2018.The preamble recognises ASEANs leading role in the regional security architecture and the inclusive principles of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The 31-paragraph joint statement covers overall the Chinese-ASEAN relations, political-security cooperation, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation. The main takeaway is that ASEAN centrality is maintained and cooperation in the four areas identified in the AOIP is pursued. The preamble recognises ASEANs leading role in the regional security architecture and the inclusive principles of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). ‘Mutually-beneficial cooperation with the BRI’ is included. Chinese support to the ASEAN comprehensive recovery framework is emphasised. It proposes to enhance defence exchanges A specific paragraph to preserve Southeast Asia free from nuclear weapons perhaps draws reference to AUKUS, with which some of the ASEAN countries have been uncomfortable. There is a long paragraph upholding international law, including UNCLOS. Enhancing mutual trust and maintaining peace in the SCS are reaffirmed; freedom of navigation and overflight and self-restraint in the conduct of activities without threat or use of force are written in. This is interesting because they also go on to talk about implementing the declaration on the Code of Conduct (COC) which is still in force and look forward to the early conclusion of an effective and substantive COC in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS within a mutually agreed but undefined timeline. The open multilateral trading system, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic partnership (RCEP) are welcomed. China’s support to the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 in correlation to the BRI is reiterated. Support from the AIIB is specifically mentioned. China’s support to the COVID-related public health processes and recovery and the positive role of the ASEAN-China centre in promoting socio-cultural and P2P exchanges are appreciated. The commitment to multilateralism and an inclusive regional framework by supporting ASEAN centrality are indeed important. Xi mentioned in his speech to abide by most of these principles and said that China would not be the neighbourhood bully or hegemonic. They will live in peace and tranquillity with their neighbours; the Philippines President complained about transgressions against their ships and territorial waters. “This does not speak well of the relations between our nations,” President Duterte said. China’s support to the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 in correlation to the BRI is reiterated. During the 30th year, China is invoking its economic capabilities to enhance the partnership while challenging the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) which was designed to keep it out but instead the USA decided to leave! With ASEAN, it shows its policy of “Asia is where China must establish its prestige or “reputation for power.” It is important to note the growth in China-ASEAN relations over the last 30 years. Trade increased by 80 times from US $8 billion to US $680 billion. Since 2009, China is ASEANs largest trading partner. During the pandemic, ASEAN became China’s largest partner. In 2021, trade grew by 48 percent in the first six months. At US $140 billion, the ASEAN trade is 15 percent of China’s global trade. China’s imports from Vietnam and Indonesia increased significantly manifesting the growing regional supply chains. Electronics, specially integrated circuits, contributed to the increase. China imported US $14.9 billion of ICs in 2020. Chinese FDI into ASEAN increased 185 percent US $3.6 billion in 2010 to US $9.1 billion in 2019. This is 5.7 percent of ASEAN’s FDI inflows. In 2019, China was ASEAN’s fourth largest source of FDI, after the US, Japan, and the EU. People-to-people exchanges crossed 65 million before the pandemic, when there were nearly 4,500 weekly China-ASEAN flights. About 200 ASEAN cities have sister-city linkages with Chinese cities. 200,000 students participate in exchanges. 2017 was designated as the ASEAN-China Year of Tourism Cooperation and 2018 was the ASEAN-China Year of Innovation to enhance cooperation under the 4.0 Industrial Revolution. Similarly, 2019 was ASEAN-China Year of Media Exchanges and 2020 was designated as the ASEAN-China Year of Digital Economy Cooperation to promote digital transformation, infrastructure, AI, big data, smart cities and in using digital technologies to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak. 2017 was designated as the ASEAN-China Year of Tourism Cooperation and 2018 was the ASEAN-China Year of Innovation to enhance cooperation under the 4.0 Industrial Revolution. Chinese policy towards ASEAN currently can be seen working for a post pandemic world. Their ‘active cooperation and coalition building’ and ‘periphery diplomacy’ have become core policy. The world is certainly focusing on the Indo-Pacific, particularly the ASEAN. The Quad Summit Joint Statement is clear on this. The Chinese are much ahead of the curve in an organised manner. They have undertaken a broad four-pronged effort. Priority To ASEAN ASEAN is a priority in Chinese foreign policy. To maintain this, China promotes economic partnership with it. While prioritising ASEAN, China impresses upon them that their cooperation is practical and in mutual interest. China is using the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party to project leadership in creating a better development matrix by opening its markets and providing economic impetus for ASEAN. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership would enmesh ASEAN into a stronger matrix through BRI, COC, and the 50 partnerships they have with China. While China desires inclusive approaches, all its efforts are exclusive of others. It is up to ASEAN to have openness of the region rather than let China be the determinant for its future. The ASEAN often seems allergic to challenging the Chinese hegemony as it will upset the current ‘stability’! Spirit of partnership Tackling major challenges in a spirit of partnership. Dealing with the pandemic of COVID-19 is the latest in the disaster management support that China has provided ASEAN. China is perceived as an effective partner in the fight against COVID and a reliable friend. This is a gain for China, to receive such unequivocal faith from a region where it has grabbed several maritime resources including territory. It calls for Asian values to determine their relations. This allows acquiescence in coups in Thailand and Myanmar. ASEAN appears happy with the non-intrusive Chinese behaviour towards their domestic politics. For that they are often willing to sustain economic muscle flexing and rise in hidden debt. Benefits for trade and investment ASEAN believe that the China-ASEAN FTA and the emerging RCEP will benefit them. They don’t have apprehensions like India. ASEAN and China signed the ACFTA in 2002. They upgraded the ACFTA and developed linkages for value chains which can compete with the US and Europe. Today ASEAN countries attract RVCs related FDI for China-plus-one efforts from Quad partners too. The regional production bases that China envisages in ASEAN includes a joint production base for vaccines. Focusing on ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework, China pursues its objectives of 5G and beyond. China intends to keep ASEAN as the prime market for its digital technologies. The Quad intends to challenge this but China is quite ahead. Focusing on ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework, China pursues its objectives of 5G and beyond. China intends to keep ASEAN as the prime market for its digital technologies. Develop mutual respect The Chinese perception is that the aspiration of preserving regional peace and stability is shared. Despite China dragging its feet for years on the COC, ASEAN sees the situation as hopeful, rather than express frustration. This is a marvel. Despite several ASEAN members losing island territories to China and suffering IUU in their waters, they still remain optimistic. The longer that COC discussions prolong, the more satisfied ASEAN appears to be! Contrast this with the India-China border talks. China which is critical of the term Indo-Pacific and Quad policies, is benign in its view of the AOIP. Wang Yi told the media in 2019, after the ASEAN policy was enunciated, that it was part of regional cooperation and ‘adhering to ASEAN’s core positions’. China intends to use the expectation of the COC to temper ASEAN and avoid ‘unilateral actions’ by ASEANs other partners. Assessment The summit seems like a shadow play, to present a unified view in light of growing global dynamics. The ASEAN-China contradictions are papered over in the hope that they would be resolved sooner or later. For the long term, ASEAN interlocutors believe that this has set a tone for the diverse China-ASEAN partnership. This could become stronger. In the medium term, there is a sense of achievement within ASEAN that China has gone along with the AOIP and its principles. This is important, since China refrains from supporting references to the Indo-Pacific. An immediate concern to ASEAN was whether China would abide by its decision on Myanmar. Despite Chinese efforts ASEAN is satisfied that the absence of Myanmar was maintained..."
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Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
2021-12-04
Date of entry/update: 2021-12-04
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Description: "The decision of ASEAN to block coup-maker and junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing from attending its ongoing summit, which started Tuesday and ends on Thursday, has taken the world by surprise. ASEAN does not normally make any decision that could be seen as “interference” in one of its 10 member states’ internal affairs. The military-appointed Foreign Ministry in Naypyitaw issued a statement saying that the decision “was done without consensus and was against the objectives of ASEAN.” Junta spokesman Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun, not surprisingly, blamed foreign powers for the snub, claiming that the United States and the European Union had pressured ASEAN to exclude Min Aung Hlaing from the online meeting. But it may be much ado about nothing because the leaders of Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, are in the long run unlikely to pay much attention to what ASEAN does or doesn’t do. The generals’ decision to join the grouping in 1997 had more to do with finding allies in their altercations with critical Western powers than a desire to change their ways. There is, in fact, only one foreign power that has the power and the means to influence and manipulate the internal situation in Myanmar: the People’s Republic of China. China is also the only neighboring country that has fundamental strategic and economic interests in Myanmar—and it is prepared to do whatever it takes to protect those interests. We all know about the multi-trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which President Xi Jinping launched in 2013. Described as a global infrastructure development strategy, it includes investments in nearly 70 countries worldwide as well as some international organizations, such as those engaged in protecting the environment and even wildlife. The aim is evidently to connect China with the outside world in a way that has never been done before and, ultimately, make China the world’s foremost superpower. But it is often forgotten that this policy of finding new outlets for trade with the outside world predates the BRI—and that it was first conceived in the 1980s in relation to Beijing’s plans to exert a new kind of influence in Myanmar. I have written a lot about this in the regional and international media, but it’s worth reminding readers of an article outlining those plans which I have quoted numerous times in the past. The article appeared, at the time almost unnoticed, in the Beijing Review as early as Sept. 2, 1985. Titled “Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion,” it was written by the former Vice Minister of Communications Pan Qi and outlined, in detail, the possibilities of finding an outlet for trade from China, through Myanmar, to ports at the coast of the Indian Ocean. Pan mentioned the Myanmar railheads of Myitkyina in Kachin State and Lashio in northeastern Shan State as possible conduits for the export of Chinese goods. But he refrained from mentioning that all relevant border areas were then not under central Myanmar government control. At that time, nearly the entire, 2,192-km Sino-Myanmar frontier was actually controlled by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and other non-state armed groups who had ties―political, ethnic or both―to China. But by early 1987, the Tatmadaw had managed to recapture a few CPB strongholds along the frontier, including the booming border town of Panghsai, where the fabled “Burma Road” crosses into China at Wanding, east of the city of Ruili. At the same time, the Chinese, whose policies had changed dramatically since the Cultural Revolution, had already begun to penetrate local markets through an extensive economic intelligence reporting system within Myanmar. This network monitored the availability of domestically manufactured Myanmar products, as well as the nature and volume of illegal trade from other neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and India. China could then respond to the market conditions by producing goods in its state sector factories. Before long, more than 2,000 carefully selected items were reported to be flooding the Myanmar market. Chinese-made consumer goods were not only made deliberately cheaper than those from other neighboring countries, but were also less expensive than local Myanmar products. Then, in March-April 1989, to the surprise of many, the hill tribe rank and file of the CPB’s army mutinied and drove the party’s Maoist leadership into exile in China. The mutiny came after years of simmering discontent between the hill tribe cannon fodder, who had been forcibly recruited into the CPB’s army, and the ageing Burman intellectuals who were still clinging to their orthodox Maoist ideals. The government in Yangon quickly and shrewdly exploited the mutiny: the leaders of the new forces that emerged from the ashes of the old CPB, primarily the United Wa State Army (UWSA), were promised that they could engage in any kind of business, if they agreed to a ceasefire with the government. The most potent military threat to the regime was neutralized, and, as a result, the cross-border trade flourished—and so did the newly won friendship between the leaders of two of Asia’s most repressive regimes. At the same time, China could, through its peculiar two-tier foreign policy, maintain government-to-government relations not only with the ruling military, but also party-to-party relations with Myanmar’s many ethnic armed groups, including the UWSA. In more recent years, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has established relations with both the Union Solidarity and Development Party and the National League for Democracy. It is important for the leaders in Beijing not to put all their eggs in one basket because no one knows who will rule, or be influential, in Myanmar in the future. In the early 1990s, I was at Jiegao, a small enclave of Chinese territory on the south side of the Shweli River opposite Muse and saw a giant monument showing four figures wheeling a circular object between them, their determined faces pointing south. The Chinese characters on the base say “Unite, Blaze Paths, Forge Ahead!” Or, in more mundane terms: “Southeast Asia, here we come!” There was no doubt that the monument and the message on its base appeared provocative to people in Myanmar. In the early 1990s, there was little more than bamboo huts and rice fields in the Jiegao enclave. But today, 25 years later, Jiegao is full of high-rise buildings, luxury hotels, and stores selling all kinds of wares. There is also a huge jade market where buyers from all over China come to shop for the precious stone, which is found in its imperial green form only in northern Myanmar. Every morning—until the COVID-19 pandemic forced a closure of the border—caravans of trucks laden with Chinese consumer goods left Jiegao through a border gate for points beyond Muse: the towns of Lashio, Mandalay and Yangon, and even as far as Moreh on the Indian border. Not only Myanmar but also northeastern India was being flooded with cheap Chinese merchandise. And not far from Ruili are pipelines through which oil and gas are being transported from the Myanmar coast to Yunnan. It is not clear when the border will be open for trade again, but given the strategic importance of what’s now known as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), Beijing is not likely to abandon its long-term plans for Myanmar and the region. Myanmar is the only neighboring country that provides China with direct access to Indian Ocean ports, bypassing the contested South China Sea as well as the congested Malacca Strait. The CMEC is one of the most important pillars of Xi’s BRI; without it, China would not be able to fulfill its plans for global dominance. For that very reason, whatever government is in power in Naypyitaw, China would court it in order to safeguard those strategic interests. Beijing may prefer a like-minded authoritarian regime, but we also have to remember that it was State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who signed up to the BRI when she attended the Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing in May 2017. But how—and where—do the ethnic armed groups, with which China also maintains close relations through its security services, fit into the picture? If we venture further back in history, and then before Pan Qi wrote his article for the Beijing Review, Myanmar was also of utmost strategic importance to Beijing, but then at a time when China wanted to export revolution, not consumer goods. The CPB’s 20,000-sq.-km base area along the Sino-Myanmar border was there not only to support the intended revolution in Myanmar, but also to serve as a springboard from where Maoist communism, the CPC hoped, would spread to other parts of Southeast Asia. The mastermind behind that plan was Kang Sheng, a dreaded hardliner who, during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and early 1970s, worked for China’s internal security and intelligence apparatus—and was in charge of the CPC’s contacts with fraternal Maoist parties in Asia and beyond. The plan—and CPB Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin told me this when I interviewed him at the party’s Panghsang headquarters in 1987—was to link up with the Communist Party of Thailand’s (CPT) guerrillas; the Communist Party of Malaya, which was led by Chin Peng, a hero of the struggle against the Japanese during World War II; the Communist Party of North Kalimantan (the Malayan communists did not recognize the Malaysian Federation, so there was a separate communist party in Sarawak and Sabah); the once powerful Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI); and, eventually the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist), actually a tiny Maoist party led by Edward Fowler Hill, a fairly prominent lawyer and barrister. Thakin Ba Thein Tin and Hill met in Beijing, relations with Chin Peng were maintained through intermediaries in Kunming, and CPT activist stayed in Panghsang until they returned to Thailand in 1983. When I was at Panghsang in 1986-87, I saw a concrete well with Thai writing on it, built by CPT cadre. When I was out in the field with the CPB’s troops, I heard numerous stories about “the Indonesian comrades” and their exploits. Among them were two daughters of PKI chairman D.N. Aidit, who was killed in Indonesia in 1965. The CPC had sent a dozen or so PKI militants, who happened to be in China in the 1960s, down to the CPB’s base area where they were going to learn guerrilla warfare. CPB leaders told me they were used as radio operators during battles with the Tatmadaw when messages could not be encrypted. The Tatmadaw interceptors did now know what they were saying—because they spoke in Bahasa Indonesia. The PKI militants had left when I was there, and I was told they had gone into exile in the Netherlands and Canada. Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s return to the political fold, China changed its policy towards the region. However, whether China wants to export revolution or expand and protect commercial interests, to safeguard and even control the “Myanmar corridor” has always been of vital importance to Beijing’s security planners. In the past, the epicenter for that policy was Panghsang. Today it is Jiegao. But the ethnic armed organizations are also important. A strong UWSA provides China with a strategic advantage and is also a bargaining chip in negotiations with Naypyitaw. Significantly, when President’s Office Minister Aung Min visited Monywa in November 2012 to meet local people protesting a controversial Chinese-backed copper mining project at Letpadaung northwest of Mandalay, he openly admitted: “We are afraid of China… we don’t dare to have a row with [them]. If they feel annoyed with the shutdown of their projects and resume their support to the communists, the economy in border areas would backslide.” Aung Min was right, but by “the communists” he clearly meant the UWSA and its allies, the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, whose weaponry and vast quantities of ammunition had been supplied by the UWSA. The Kachin Independence Army has also benefited from some support from the UWSA, but not to the same extent as the other groups in what is usually referred to as the Northern Alliance. While the UWSA is not engaged in any fighting itself, it has become a major source of the weaponry that is being used in the war in northern Myanmar. The Chinese may be denying giving any material support to the UWSA and indirectly supporting its allies, but what the Wa have received from China is not the kind of equipment that “falls off the back of a truck”, or could be sent to them by some local officials in Yunnan. The deliveries were almost certainly directed from the highest level of China’s intelligence and military authorities in Beijing. And it is no secret that Chinese security officials have had several meetings with representatives of the Northern Alliance—and told them not to fight too close to the border or to damage the oil-and-gas pipelines. The CPC’s position above the government as well as the military, the People’s Liberation Army, in the Chinese hierarchy explains why China could publicly praise Myanmar’s now collapsed peace process while quietly providing the UWSA with heavy weaponry. Support for the UWSA and its allies serves as a “stick” in Beijing’s relationship with Myanmar, while diplomacy and promises of aid and investment are the “carrot.” In the official rhetoric in Beijing as well as Naypyitaw, relations between China and Myanmar have always been characterized by pauk-phaw, a Burmese word for siblings, but nothing could be falser than that cliché. Sino-Myanmar relations have always been anything but brotherly, and decades of history show us how China plays games with Myanmar to achieve whatever strategic goals the leaders in Beijing might have. Forget about ASEAN’s actions, statements and awkward attempts at exercising influence. It is China and its plans and strategic maneuvers that count. Bertil Lintner is a Swedish journalist, author and strategic consultant who has been writing about Asia for nearly four decades..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2021-10-27
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: China-Laos railway will open on December 2 but it's not clear the BRI-built line will extend anytime soon to wider SE Asia
Description: "Laos will never be the same again on December 2, the day the first high-speed train on the Belt and Road Initiative-built railroad is scheduled to roll into the capital Vientiane arriving from the southern Chinese province of Yunnan. Running for 414 kilometers from the border with China, the new line will transform Laos from a land-locked to land-linked country, as the Chinese state news agency Xinhua has trumpeted in several dispatches on the US$6 billion project. According to Xinhua, Laos’ underdeveloped economy will blossom as the new modern train speeds in Chinese tourists and businesspeople, facilitates faster and greater trade, and thus enhances Laos’ connectivity and post-pandemic economic recovery. Beijing is seeking to showcase the China-Lao train as a Belt and Road Initiative success story, one that encourages other Southeast Asian states to more firmly embrace the $1 trillion infrastructure-building scheme that has stalled on various fronts in the neighboring, resource-rich region. That includes stop-and-go progress on a similar rail line in Thailand and a port project in Myanmar, both of which are key to the BRI’s vision of a better-connected regional economic sphere with China at its powerful center. That trade-geared vision is all the more important to China’s economic security as tensions continue to rise with the US and its allies in contested sea lanes. There is no doubt that the China-Laos railroad is a remarkable feat of engineering. The deal between China and Laos was first struck in 2015 and work began in December 2016. Since then, Chinese engineers have built 75 tunnels, 165 bridges and 20 stations through some of the most mountainous terrain in all of Southeast Asia, according to a Chinese general manager of the Lao-China Railway Company (LCRC), the joint venture that will operate the railroad. The only railroad in Laos before the BRI-funded project was launched was a 3.5-kilometer Thai-built meter-track built in 2009 across the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge to Dongphosy village, 20 kilometers east of Vientiane, and a seven-kilometer, 600-millimeter narrow gauge line that was built in the late 19th century when Laos was a French colonial possession. The latter bypassed some waterfalls on the Mekong in the south, but was closed in the 1940s. Today, only some rusted locomotives remain on Don Khon island in the Mekong. The new, 21st-century project is only the beginning of a massive infrastructure drive that aims to transform all of mainland Southeast Asia. If all goes to plan, the railroad will continue from Vientiane across a planned new bridge on the Mekong River to Nong Khai in Thailand and then, eventually, all the way down to Singapore. But there are downsides to the grand plan which has put Laos heavily in debt to China. Around US$3.6 billion of the railway’s total $5.97 cost has been financed a loan from the Export-Import Bank of China and the remainder by the LCTC, which is comprised of three Chinese state-owned firms holding 70% and a Lao state-owned enterprise with 30%. But even the Lao share of the project’s expense is covered in part by loans from China. The bills are coming due while Laos’ $20 billion economy is weighed down by an estimated $12.6 billion in foreign debt, including US$5.9 billion owed to China for the railroad and other projects. Fitch Ratings described Laos’ external debt repayment profile as “challenging” in an August 9 report with around $422 million due over the remainder of 2021 “and an average of $1.16 billion due per annum between 2022 and 2025.” To fulfill those requirements without having to take out more loans, and then most likely from China, will be more than a “challenge”, the Fitch report said. Concerns are rising that Laos will soon be submerged in debts it can’t service and thus will fall victim to what critics of China’s lending practices call sovereignty-eroding “debt-traps.” Unable to make repayments in hard currency, Laos has already turned to repaying loans to China through debt to equity swaps. In September last year, Vientiane ceded majority control of the debt-ridden state utility Électricité du Laos to China Southern Power Grid Co to cover debts owed. Reports noted at the time that means Laos’ national power grid is now de facto controlled by a state-owned Chinese company. That erosion of sovereignty is no doubt ringing alarms in other Southeast Asian nations – not least Thailand – that Beijing is pressing to more fully commit to its BRI. Thailand already has an extensive railroad network but with one-meter gauge tracks while the China-Lao high-speed trains will roll on a standard 1,435-millimeter. That means that an entirely new railroad would have to be built on the Thai side and beyond. Even Malaysia and Singapore have meter-gauge railroads that would not be suitable for China’s high-speed trains. Whether China’s plans will materialize in the foreseeable future is an open question. Strict Covid-19 travel restrictions in China and much of Southeast Asia have raised new questions about the desirability and feasibility of the BRI’s vision of fast and open borders. Thailand seems more interested in connecting Bangkok with Nakhon Ratchasima in the northeast, Chiang Mai in the north, and to beach resorts like Pattaya and Hua Hin, than being part of some broader Chinese scheme for the entire region. Most of those plans, despite Bangkok’s years of repeated assurances to Beijing the plan is on track, remain on the drawing board. The only visible progress so far is the construction of a new railroad hub at Bang Sue, a northern Bangkok suburb, which will replace the old, downtown Hualampong Central Station. From Bang Sue, new railroads will branch out to different destinations in Thailand. In Malaysia, tentative agreements for the construction of high-speed railroads involving Chinese partners were allowed to lapse in May. That leaves Myanmar as the only reasonably secure outlet for China to connect its railroad networks with Southeast Asian markets other than little landlocked Laos. That route, dubbed the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, forms a vital part of the BRI as it would provide the Chinese with direct access to the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean ports. A railroad has been built from China’s Yunnan province capital of Kunming to Ruili, a border town opposite Muse in the far north of Myanmar’s Shan state. Another newly-built line, ceremonially opened on August 25, stretches from Sichuan’s provincial Chengdu to Lincang in Yunnan, with a road connection to the border at Chinshwehaw in northeastern Shan state. But ever since those Chinese-side projects were launched more than a decade ago, skeptics have pointed out that widespread insurgencies across the border in Myanmar would make it difficult, if not impossible, to extend those lines through northern Shan state to the central city of Mandalay. From there a new railroad was planned down to the old capital Yangon and, more importantly, the deep seaport at Kyaukphyu on the Bay of Bengal in Myanmar’s western Rakhine state. On October 22, 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a railroad from the border to Mandalay was signed between the now-ousted Myanmar government and China Railways. Another MoU for the route from Mandalay to Kyaukphyu was signed on January 10 this year. The China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group has carried out some feasibility studies along the route from the border to Mandalay but little, if any, concrete progress has been made on the ground. The Covid-19 pandemic is now running rampant in Myanmar, prompting China to close the border. And the insurgencies in northern and northeastern Myanmar have only intensified since the MoUs were signed less than a month before Myanmar’s destabilizing February 1 coup. The railroad to Vientiane could thus be the beginning and end of China’s lofty BRI plans for the region, particularly as China starts to turn inward and the economy shows new signs of overleveraged weakness. In the end, China may not achieve the access to Southeast Asian ports it has so long desired while Laos is stuck with a hefty bill for infrastructure that is of marginal use and questionable commercial viability without wider connections..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2021-10-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-10-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Since the “Going Out Policy” was initiated in 1999 by the Chinese Government to promote Chinese investments abroad, the footprint of Chinese enterprises has expanded considerably. This has been further accelerated by President Xi Jinping’s launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)1 in 2013, after which China committed to work “together with other countries to foster the environmentally-friendly and sound development of the Belt and Road, featuring peace and the exchange of wisdom, and to build a global economy more vibrant, open, inclusive, stable and sustainable.”2 These efforts have facilitated a massive expansion of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), which is valuable as developing countries need FDI to boost their development. To support these overseas development goals, the Chinese Government, state agencies and business associations continue to issue a growing matrix of policies, regulations and guidelines to establish social and environmental safeguards for its FDI. In regulating the diverse economic activities of private and state-owned enterprises overseas, these documents seek to reinforce social integrity, environmental protection, workplace and personnel safety, among many other goals. As Chinese businesses – particularly energy, construction, and mining and metals companies – continue to venture abroad3 , civil society and the media have reported an unfortunate increase in social, environmental and human rights violations – particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America (See Section 3.1). All FDI from any country must now be informed by and directed to meet the twin challenge of addressing worsening inequality of power and wealth, while also tackling the challenges associated with climate change. It is therefore important for Chinese companies to ensure they address these issues. Between 2013 and 2020, the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (Resource Centre) recorded 679 human rights abuse allegations linked to Chinese business conduct abroad, and 102 company responses to these allegations. In analysing the data further, this report intends to support civil society organisations in host countries of Chinese investments to make informed decisions about their advocacy for responsible business conduct of Chinese companies. This report also presents data and analysis to assist businesses, investors, the Chinese Government and governments of states hosting Chinese investments to take further action to fulfil the development commitments related to China’s international economic cooperation4 and the responsible business conduct guidelines established through the years..."
Source/publisher: Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC)
2021-08-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-08-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Land confiscations, illegal casinos, money laundering, and environmental degradation plagues a Myanmar SEZ.
Description: "Like more than 100 areas in the Mekong River region earmarked as development zones, the Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Myanmar was promoted as a way to spur economic growth and deliver material benefits to the local community. But instead the Chinese-backed U.S. $15 billion real estate mega-project along the Thaungyin River in southeastern Kayin state has gained notoriety in recent months as a bastion of illegal activity, according to a report released Wednesday by the Washington-based Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), an independent research outfit that studies transnational organized crime networks. Shwe Kokko New City, as the area is called, was funded by Hong Kong-registered developer Yatai International Holding Group in partnership with the Chit Lin Myaing Company owned by the Kayin State Border Guard Force (BGF), an ethnic Karen force aligned with the Myanmar military. It includes the Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone. But the area became a hub for illicit activity because of weak national laws, a diffusion of responsibility, and a lack of development plans, says the 76-page report titled “Zoned Out: A Comprehensive Impact Evaluation of Mekong Economic Development Zones.” The study identified 110 official and unofficial foreign-invested EDZs in the Mekong region, including 40 in Cambodia, 15 in Laos, 20 in Myanmar, 16 in Thailand, and 19 in Vietnam, and used publicly available information to assess them in terms of economic development, illicit activity, and geopolitics. To assess the impact of EDZs, the researchers examined both quantitative indicators derived from personal activity intelligence, including mobile phone location data, change detection in satellite imagery, and nightlight data, along with qualitative research on illicit activity and geopolitical trends. Because of the strong correlation between nightlight data and economic activity, the researchers measured nighttime luminosity in the EDZs to objectively evaluate the relative economic performance of the zones. They also used information from publicly available reports that detailed illegal activities, including corruption, environmental degradation, land conflict, drug trafficking, and wildlife trafficking. Shwe Kokko is not the only example of an EDZ gone wrong. The study found that while the establishment of the zones speeds up development, the EDZs themselves can facilitate adverse outcomes that undermine economic growth benefits. They also found that limited data access concerning the Mekong region’s EDZs can hurt host governments and local communities, and that collaboration among stakeholders from government, grassroots organizations, the private sector, and civil society will increase transparency and better match objectives to end results. “Without proper management, EDZs can serve as staging grounds for multiple types of transnational illicit activity and geopolitical machinations,” the report says. “Further complicating the situation is a paucity of accessible data, leaving policymakers and observers alike struggling to draw informed conclusions on the effects of zones.” Lack of regulatory oversight In the case of the Shwe Kokko SEZ First, the developers allegedly received a 70-year land lease with the possibility of extending to 99 years, violating Myanmar law which limits lease terms to 50 years for official Economic Development Zones (EDZs). Then the BGF confiscated land for the site, but shortchanged residents paying them only U.S. $1,600 an acre — half the amount they sought. A lack of regulatory oversight enabled the illegal land confiscations along with Chinese gang activities once the project had been built, illegal casinos, money laundering, and environmental degradation, the report says. It also notes that She Kailun, Yatai International’s China-born chairman, had a previous conviction for operating an illegal lottery business that earned nearly U.S. $300 million. In response, Myanmar’s civilian-led government announced plans in January to address alleged irregularities, including the land confiscations, illicit activities, and local concerns about the impact of the casinos. The government also cracked down on Chinese criminal groups in the area and requested that the national military enforce the law in Shwe Kokko. When Myanmar’s military overthrew the government in a Feb. 1 coup, it became unclear what would happen next in Shwe Kokko. “A combination of legal ambiguity, limited host government enforcement, and poor zone management have created numerous negative externalities in Shwe Kokko, including increased criminal activity, decreased geopolitical power, and environmental degradation — all without delivering economic gain for the region itself,” the report says. Aung Naing Oo, minister of investment and foreign economic relations under the State Administrative Council, the official name of Myanmar’s military government, told RFA that the Myanmar Investment Commission had examined and approved the Shwe Kokko project during the previous civilian-led government, but determined that its scope was much larger than the original proposal. “Then we checked the project again and ordered that business activities not included in original proposal be stopped, he said. “Because the project was much larger and there were other issues such as land use, we ordered the project to be halted since previous government. They were ordered to do only what had been approved.” “The activities that were not included in the proposals were the building of hotels among other [sites],” he said. “We asked them to stop, [and] the order has remained unchanged…We have supervised them very closely about the suspension.” The report details other case studies of other zones plagued by illicit activities, such as the Boten SEZ in Laos, rife with illegal sales of wildlife, such as endangered pangolins, and the Golden Triangle EDZ, also in Laos, a hub for a hub for illicit drug and wildlife trafficking. An official in the Special Economic Zone Control Department of the Lao Ministry of Planning and Investment told RFA that he could not comment on whether there is illicit activity in the Boten and Golden Triangle SEZs. China ‘used its influence’ Cambodia’s Sihanoukville SEZ, considered part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, suffered from high crimes rates among other factors, the report said. “The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promises benefits for local communities. In the case of the Sihanoukville SEZ, however, development was greatly undercut by increasing crime rates, rising rents, overwhelmed infrastructure, and the suppression of local culture in the city of Sihanoukville,” the report says. “China allegedly used its influence to pressure Cambodia to ban online gambling as part of a broader campaign against gambling by China. This ban further disrupted the city of Sihanoukville by devastating the local gaming economy and causing thousands to leave the city,” it said. The Cambodian Investment Board did not respond to an email request for comments on the report’s findings concerning the Sihanoukville SEZ. Emails sent to two contact addresses listed on the website of the Cambodian Special Economic Zone Board were undeliverable. Both government agencies deal with investment projects in SEZs. To improve the impacts of EDZs in the Mekong region, the researchers recommend the development of open, centralized repositories of information on EDZs, the use of emerging technologies such as nightlight capture, satellite imagery, and machine learning to create monitoring processes, and the convening of cross-sector interdisciplinary task forces to address negative impacts. “Through collaboration and data-driven analysis, host governments can ensure that EDZs serve the needs of the host country economy and the local population,” the report says..."
Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
2021-06-25
Date of entry/update: 2021-06-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China promised to continue to support Myanmar’s peace talks with ethnic minority groups and to boost its coronavirus aid on the first stop of the foreign minister’s six-day tour of Southeast Asia. During Monday’s meetings with President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, Wang Yi also urged Myanmar to speed up construction work on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor – a key element of the country’s Belt and Road Initiative. “China will support the new Myanmar government in revitalising the economy, improving people’s livelihoods and accelerating the industrialisation process. We hope that both sides will work together to effectively implement the agreement on building the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and promote connectivity at the western, northern and eastern ends of the corridor,” Wang told the president, according to a report by state news agency Xinhua. China shares more than 2,100km (1,300 miles) of border with Myanmar’s north, an area that has long been troubled by the fighting between government and ethnic minority rebel groups, making China a crucial player in peace talks between the government armies and ethnic armed groups. Wang said Beijing would do whatever it could to support the peace negotiations, adding: “China supports Myanmar government’s commitment to national reconciliation in the country … and will continue to provide assistance within its capabilities, as well as upholding justice and safeguarding Myanmar’s legitimate rights and interests in the international arena.” In response, Win Myint told Wang that Myanmar was keen to cooperate with China on vaccine distribution and would continue to support Beijing’s positions on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, according to Xinhua..."
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Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2021-01-12
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Infrastructure is high on China’s agenda in Myanmar, but it is also making headway in other important sectors.
Description: "A year after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first state visit to Myanmar, Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to arrive in the capital Naypyidaw today for a two-day official visit. The trip to Myanmar follows an African tour that has taken Wang to Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Botswana, Tanzania, and the Seychelles. The agenda of his Myanmar trip is yet to be confirmed, but the ongoing progress of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), along with COVID-19 diplomacy, is very likely to be high on the list. First signed between China and Myanmar in 2018, the CMEC envisions the construction of a network of railways, roads, ports, and new cities running overland from China’s Yunnan province to the sea. Although numerous memorandum of agreements related to CMEC and Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have been in place for years, progress has lagged considerably. Indeed, progress on the CMEC seems to have been slowed further by Beijing’s pandemic-induced belt-tightening and the unprofitable nature of many of the infrastructure projects that fell under its aegis. This had prompted Beijing to adopt an alternative model of engagement in Myanmar: one that is more economically feasible, and that leverages its strategic assets, innovation, and technology to expand its sphere of influence, rather than focusing on infrastructure alone. This is consistent with China’s recently announced Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), which signaled a significant shift in China’s economic and development strategy toward increased domestic consumption. This shift has been prompted by its trade tensions with the United States and the opportunities and challenges offered by a post-COVID-19-world. This re-calibration may impact Beijing’s ability to realize the CMEC as it is currently envisioned..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2021-01-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Steady Continued cooperation on regional integration between China and Myanmar gave a sharp contrast to India, which turned a blind eye toward such development trend and let go opportunties, a Chinese analyst said on Monday. The comments came after China and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on Sunday to conduct feasibility study of a 650-kilometer-long railway linking Mandalay, the country's second largest city in Myanmar's central region, with Kyaukphyu, the major town in Myanmar's Rakhine state. Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, told the Global Times that the signing of the MoU is an important step toward a very significant project under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. When the concept of the corridor was first introduced in 2013, India was initially involved in the regional integration project, only to withdraw further into the process. The continued development of the Mandalay-Kyaukphyu railway shows that regional integration is moving forward even as India, which could play a major part in the program, has chosen not to participate, Zhao said..."
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Source/publisher: "Global Times" (China)
2021-01-11
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to arrive in Myanmar on Monday on a critical two-day visit. It is intended to further strengthen Chinese influence in the country, in light of the changing international dynamics in the region, amid fears that China's sway is beginning to wane. Beijing is increasingly concerned with a plethora of issues, including recent Indian and Japanese initiatives with Myanmar, which Beijing fears may prove to be to their detriment, but also to take stock of the continued economic cooperation, strengthen its support for the peace process and to boost China's support for Myanmar's battle to control the Covid pandemic. Mr Wang's primary purpose on this visit is to show China's unswerving support for the country and its civilian leader, the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi -- and to congratulate the National League for Democracy (NLD) on its landslide electoral victory. He will be the first international diplomat to visit Nay Pyi Taw in person since the elections last November. The visit seems to have been arranged at short notice -- and tagged onto Mr Wang's current trip to Africa. It is low-key and being handled discreetly, according to Myanmar government sources. Foreign diplomats believe this may reflect some discomfort on the part of Nay Pyi Taw at the visit, and what is seen as "vaccine diplomacy"..."
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Source/publisher: Bangkok Post (Thailand)
2021-01-09
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: A long-running war and COVID-19 muddle development in Kyaukphyu, Myanmar.
Description: "Kyi Kyi Hnin sits beneath a fan on a bright morning in her village along the coast of Kyaukphyu, a township in Myanmar’s Rakhine State on the edge of the Indian Ocean. “The government just signs laws, but they are committing violations,” she says. “The government should consider the communities’ desires and interests.” Kyi Kyi Hnin is a local community organizer and her speech is quick and resolute: She knows the challenges facing Kyaukphyu and spends her days working to support local residents. Kyaukphyu is home to a cluster of busy fishing towns and villages. But in the past few years, the township has been thrown into the center of geopolitics, armed conflict and, more recently, Myanmar’s struggle against COVID-19. For months, the country recorded relatively few cases of the virus, until a new outbreak began in August with Rakhine at the epicenter. After the state capital, Sittwe, Kyaukphyu has recorded the most cases of any township in Rakhine for much of the outbreak..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-12-03
Date of entry/update: 2021-01-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The “Association of South-East Asian Nations” or “ASEAN” was formed from the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok on 8th August 1967 (as a successor to the Association of South-East Asia, “ASA” in 1961), and is just four years younger than the EEC (now the EU). ASEAN is now a grouping of ten geographically, culturally and politically diverse countries, although initially consisted only of those countries which avoided any socialist experimentation: Singapore/Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia. Most of the Mekong countries joined later: Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. ASEAN has 651 million people and a land mass of 4.5 million sq kms (50% larger than India and one-half the size of China), and a nominal GDP of US$ 3 trillion (on a PPP basis 4x higher at $13 trillion) and US$ 4,600 nominal GDP per capita. By comparison, the EU has twenty-eight countries, 513 million people, and an almost identical land area of 4.48 million sq kms, but it has a nominal GDP that is 7X higher than ASEAN at US$ 19 trillion (or $23 trillion translating to just 2X on a PPP basis), and a US$ 37,300 nominal GDP per capita. The likelihood is that ASEAN will narrow the gap between its nominal and PPP GDP over the next few years, generating substantial gains for investors. What is common to all ASEAN countries is the agricultural economic base (except for Singapore & Brunei) and their consequently more manageable workforces, their Chinese (mostly Fujian) diaspora business culture, and their Japanese/Taiwanese/Korean led industrial investment. The Mekong countries share a common Buddhist heritage, but are a mixture quasi-democratic, and factional 1-Party States. The oldest cultures in ASEAN, the Mekong countries are the least developed, due to their proximity to China and its socialist sphere of influence from 1950-1980. That proximity is now a positive as China embarks on its “Belt & Road” initiative and its manufacturers rush to avoid rising labour costs and US/China trade friction, diversifying production to Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar. Currently the former closed countries, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos, “continental ASEAN” or the old Indochina, are now leading ASEAN in growth from their lower economic bases, and after a temporary lapse in 2020, are all expected to be back to 6-7% growth rates in 2021..."
Source/publisher: "The Asia First Newsletter''
2020-07-10
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Pakistan-China Institute (PCI) convened the first ever Non-Governmental Online Conference on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which CPEC is the flagship, which was attended by 8 countries. The conference, which lasted for 2 hours and 45 minutes, had participants from Pakistan, China, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Myanmar & Sri Lanka. There was a wide-ranging discussion on different dimensions of BRI, which was followed by a 35-minute Question and Answer session. Five key consensus areas regarding BRI emerged from the conference: The coronavirus crisis has underlined the need for global interdependence to forge closer cooperation to tackle common challenges; BRI is the way forward as it promotes regional connectivity, based on the principles of equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit while acclaiming CPEC as "BRI success story". The propaganda about the so called 'Debt trap' was rejected by participants as in the case of Pakistan and Sri Lanka, total debt from China is a very small percentage of what is owed to other countries or multilateral institutions; 'New Cold War', demonization or stigmatizing any country using COVID19 as a political weapon or targeting BRI on geopolitical grounds were rejected; The India factor was recognized by countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka as they are neighbors and they would like good relations with both China and India and it was made clear that neither BRI is a military alliance nor it is directed either against India or against any Western country. Senator Mushahid Hussain, in his opening remarks, termed BRI as the biggest and most significant Diplomatic and Developmental initiative of 21st century. He said that CPEC, as flagship of BRI, is already a success story and has entered its the second phase successfully. Energy and infrastructure projects have been completed on schedule, 75,000 Pakistanis have got jobs in BRI projects and 28,000 Pakistani students are studying in China. He also thanked China for support to Pakistan during COVID-19 crisis and he mentioned the two resolutions passed by the Pakistan Senate, February 12 and May 14, in which the parliament of Pakistan appreciated China's role and support. Afghanistan’s former Ambassador to Pakistan and China, Janan Musazai, gave a specific five-point plan for Afghanistan’s role in BRI and he referred to CPEC as well, since Afghanistan can be a land bridge for connectivity and he said that China could facilitate to provide market access for BRI countries..."
Source/publisher: "china.org.cn" (China)
2020-07-10
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "In the meetings, President Xi focussed on three main projects under the Belt and Initiative and part of the CMEC (China-Myanmar Economic Corridor). These were the New Yangon Project, the Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Port with the SEZ (the latter only to sweeten the deal and keep the Myanmar side interested) and the China-Myanmar Border Cooperation Zone. China in the mean time had already completed an oil pipeline project from Kunming to Kyaukpyu and also a gas pipe line between the two ports. The Gas pipe line was started in 2013 and the Oil Pipe line started functioning fro April 2017. The projects were rushed through despite local objections. The Gas and Oil pipe lines together with the Kyaukpyu deep sea port are ostensibly meant to develop the south western hinterland of China, but the real reasons were strategic. The Port would help China avoid the vulnerable straits of Malacca. The ongoing spat with United States and the countries in the region looking for strategic alliances like India with Australia, the need for an alternate route for safety and security of supplies to the Chinese hinterland has become critical to China. While the Chinese side initially pushed for a large project with an investment of over 7 Billion Dollars, the Myanmar side in its negotiations reduced the project to 1.3 billion and also increased Myanmar’s stake in the project to 30 percent. Even this amount is too big a sum for Myanmar and there were always fears that Myanmar by borrowing from Chinese Banks may get into a debt trap as it happened to Sri Lanka vis a vis Hambantota. While the deep Sea Port will only help China and not Myanmar, the deal was sweetened with a parallel project of a special economic Zone for which the stakes for the two sides are yet to be finalised. At that point of time, Myanmar was not aware of the possible spread of the deadly Virus unleashed by China. With the rapid spread of the Virus in other countries and the possibility of its economy being very adversely affected, Myanmar launched an Economy Relief Plan on April 27, 2020. It was an effort to meet the exigencies that surfaced in Myanmar after the Covid-19 (Wuhan Virus) was officially (though delayed) declared by WHO. The Plan consisted of 7 objectives or Goals, 10 Strategies, 30 Action Plans, and 76 Actions. Without going into full details of all actions contemplated we shall restrict ourselves to the seven goals. These included..."
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Source/publisher: "Sri Lanka Guardian" (Sri Lankan)
2020-06-29
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "FOR the Southeast Asian state of Myanmar, the decision to expand ties with China despite Western pressure was a no-brainer. Significant economic ties have been expanded and the prospect for several large-scale infrastructure projects has been firmed up. Chinese president Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Myanmar could be considered a victory lap of sorts; the cementing of long-standing and ever-expanding ties between Myanmar and China and the final displacement of significant US and British influence in the former British colony. An op-ed on China’s CGTN website titled, ‘Xi’s New Year visit to Myanmar: A milestone in bilateral relations,’ would help frame the significance of president Xi’s visit while comparing and contrasting Myanmar’s ties with China and the US. The op-ed would note that president Xi’s trip to Myanmar was his first major trip abroad made during 2020. It is also the first major visit by a Chinese leader to Myanmar in nearly 20 years. Even US proxies can’t deny America’s decline THE op-ed also noted that Myanmar’s state counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, picked China for her first major visit abroad after her National League for Democracy party came to power in 2016. To understand the significance of this it is important to understand that Suu Kyi and her rise to power were primarily driven by support from Washington. She and her political party along with a large army of US government-funded fronts posing as nongovernmental organisations and US-funded media networks were selected and groomed for decades by Washington to seize power and serve as a vector for US special interests both in Myanmar itself and as a point of leverage versus Beijing. However, despite America’s expertise in political meddling, what it lacks is, as the op-ed calls it, any concrete economic pillars; something China does have on offer. No matter how much covert or overt financial and political support any client regime in Myanmar may receive from Washington it does not address the genuine need for real development within Myanmar itself. Without such development and the financial and economic incentives it brings with it, enemies and allies of the client regime alike will turn towards those who can offer such incentives..."
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Source/publisher: "newagebd.net"
2020-07-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar has decided to expedite India-backed infrastructure projects and widen security ties with India as it seeks to balance China's expanding presence in the country in the backdrop of Beijing's active cross-border support for rebel groups and push for early completion of BRI projects. Myanmar’s all-powerful generals, who have controlled the country for decades, are upset with the Chinese strategy of arming rebel groups, including Islamic radicals. They are also upset with China's pressure on Myanmar to implement Belt-Road-Initiative (BRI) projects in spite of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, ET has learnt China is planning a China-Myanmar-Economic Corridor (CMEC), on the lines of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), to get access to the Bay of Bengal and the eastern part of the Indian Ocean Region. Several other BRI related projects threaten to push Myanmar to a debt trap. Speaking to journalists in Russia last month on the occasion of Victory Day parade, commander-in-chief of Myanmar armed forces Senior General Min Aung Hlaing called for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, saying that terrorist groups exist because of “strong forces” Many analysts in Myanmar say Gen Hlaing’scomment was targeted at China, which the Myanmar military (or Tatmadaw) suspects is continuing to provide arms to rebel groups on the Myanmar-China border and to the ArakanArmy (AA), which is now operating in northern Rakhine state as well as the radical ArakanRohingya Salvation Army. The general's comments broadly reflects the sentiment among the top military leadership of the armed forces in Naypyitaw, ET has learnt.Interestingly the comments were made in Russia -- Myanmar's old defence partner..."
Source/publisher: "The Economic Times" (India)
2020-07-09
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar has indirectly called out China for arming 'terrorists' on its soil. WION's Palki Sharma tells you how Myanmar fears that this situation could endanger Indian development projects along the Myanmar-Mizoram border..."
Source/publisher: "WION"
2020-07-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-07-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: It’s important to distinguish between China and oversees ethnic Chinese when discussing three controversial projects in Kayin State, despite claims they are being implemented as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Description: "Since 2019, the narrative about private Chinese investment in Myanmar’s illicit economy, especially casinos and online gambling in Kayin State, has become increasingly rampant, holding China responsible for the audacity of private Chinese investors. However, a careful examination of the identity of the investors, their business background and registrations, as well as the management structure and funding sources of their operations, reveals a different reality: that these investments involve overseas ethnic Chinese through companies registered in Hong Kong with funding from outside China. Despite their efforts to paint their projects as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the investments are outside China’s jurisdiction and China should not be held accountable for their existence. Nevertheless, China should be wary of the damage that these projects pose to its national interests. It should distance itself from the projects and where possible take measures to oppose them. Since 2019, three allegedly private Chinese investment projects in Kayin State’s Myawaddy Township have captured the attention – and imagination – of many Myanmar observers. The first and the most sensational is the Yatai New City Project at Shwe Kokko. More recently, the Saixigang Industrial Zone Project and the Huanya International City Project have emerged. Despite their grandiose mission statements about tourism and industrial development, it is widely agreed that they are actually casino resorts and will host online gambling scam operations that primarily target Chinese users. These projects are the latest chapter of the broader spread of casinos and online gambling schemes throughout Southeast Asia, which came to Myanmar partially because of a government crackdown on such operations in Cambodia in 2019..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2020-06-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Belt & Road Initiative, Shweli River
Sub-title: The waters of the Shweli river in northeastern Myanmar have turned red, prompting concerns about pollution along a major corridor of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Residents and politicians blame Chinese factories upstream, raising questions about accountability for the impacts of cross-border development.
Topic: Belt & Road Initiative, Shweli River
Description: "Local reports say a river that forms part of the China-Myanmar border has turned red, prompting major concerns about pollution and accountability along a key trade route for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure and industry plan. The Shan Herald reported that the Shweli river, on the border between Myanmar’s Shan State and China’s Yunnan province, changed color around June 10. Local residents suspect the change is due to factories upstream in China dumping waste into the river. “We have never seen water color changes like this before. This is the first time I have ever seen the water red. I don’t know what China has done,” said local resident Sai Aye, who lives on the bank of the river in the border town of Muse. The Chinese portion of the Shweli river, known as the Ruili river in Chinese and Nam Mao in indigenous Shan, is lined with factories that process sugar, paper, fish for canning and meat. The Shweli is a tributary of the Irrawaddy river, the largest river in Myanmar and the source of irrigation for much of the country’s agriculture. “I think a factory in China dumped polluted water into the river. We have already sent an opposition letter to China’s external affairs department in Shweli [Ruili] city in Yunnan province,” Sai Kyaw Thein, a Shan State parliamentarian for Muse, told the Shan Herald. “We already sent a water sample from the Shweli river to a laboratory in Mandalay.” Though the cause of the red color hasn’t been found, the possible pollution raises major questions about environmental regulations and accountability around the BRI in Myanmar..."
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Source/publisher: "ASEAN Today" (Singapore)
2020-06-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The draft bill is a step in the right direction, but falls short on screening the export of fossil fuel technologies.
Description: "In May, China’s energy authority announced a public consultation for a draft energy law, setting the agenda for “green, low-carbon” production and a “safe and efficient” energy system. The draft law, which has been 13 years in the making, is an omnibus bill that seeks to unify China’s diverse laws governing coal, renewables and energy conservation. Five years after the signing of the Paris Agreement, references in the bill that position it as a “response to climate change” are welcome. Unfortunately, the proposed legislation also specifies the need for further exploration of fossil fuel energy sources such as coal, oil and natural gas. This matters because under the Paris Agreement, China committed to peak carbon dioxide emissions around 2030 or earlier if possible. China is the largest public financer of fossil fuels, providing US$20.2 billion a year for oil and gas and US$4.4 billion for coal, according to a recent report on G20 financing. China also ranks as the world’s largest producer and investor in clean energy and while coal still occupies the top spot in the country’s energy mix, its share is declining. However, the country’s effort to reduce emissions is being undermined by a relaxation of coal-power restrictions, which has led to approximately 10 gigawatts of new approvals at home and the financing of coal projects overseas..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Eco-Business" (Singapore)
2020-06-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The strategically vital Mekong subregion has been gaining salience in Beijing’s strategic calculations as China faces growing pushback from the US and other countries. The global pandemic appears to be consolidating a few trends in China’s ties with the Mekong nations. In this emerging scenario, it is likely that China will keep its focus on the Mekong subregion in the post-COVID-19 period. Cooperative partnerships with some countries have been further deepening, while China’s “mask diplomacy” has raised concern among citizens who want their governments to adopt a more cautious approach and there have been new factors that have been added to existing difficult relationships often viewed through the confrontational lens. Apart from China-ASEAN cooperation in engaging with the Mekong subregion, Beijing has been using the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC)–––a subregional cooperation mechanism jointly established by Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam–––in engaging with the subregion in the fight against the global pandemic. In February, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Vientiane, Laos, to participate in the fifth LMC foreign ministers’ meeting where he called for “concerted efforts” to fight against the COVID-19 epidemic. The global pandemic provided Cambodia and China to further consolidate their cooperative partnership. During Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s visit to China in early February at a time when “anti-Chinese sentiments” were rising has been interpreted as demonstrating “solidarity” and China-Cambodia relations has described as “a model” for neighbourhood diplomacy..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Observer Research Foundation (ORF)" (India)
2020-06-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "When Myanmar announced its seven-point economic relief plan to mitigate the economic impact of COVID-19 in late April, one item immediately raised eyebrows among China analysts in the country. The initiative’s third main objective is stated as “Easing the Impacts on Laborers and Workers”, and one of the ways the government intends to achieve this is putting laid-off laborers and returning migrants to work on “Implementation of Labor-Intensive Community Infrastructure Projects” before the end of this year. At first glance, it seems a worthy goal, as it aims to benefit workers affected by the coronavirus pandemic. However, with several megaprojects in the planning stages as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), experts are concerned that the COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP)’s emphasis on reviving the economy will see Myanmar push ahead with the implementation of BRI projects without properly assessing their risks in terms of conflict sensibility, potential for incurring unsustainable debt and commercial viability, among other criteria. Adding to their worries, shortly after the plan was unveiled, Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai and Myanmar’s Deputy Minister for Planning, Finance and Industry U Set Aung met to discuss how to move forward on the development of China’s ambitious projects in Myanmar in the context of the CERP. The New Yangon City; Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and Industrial Zone; and China-Myanmar Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zone projects—all of which were agreed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in January—were among those discussed at the meeting..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-11
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "New Delhi: Myanmar government’s discomfort with China is on the rise. After Myanmar’s auditor general in a startling announcement cautioned government officials about continued reliance on Chinese loans, the Myanmar government has formed a tribunal to investigate irregularities surrounding a controversial China-backed city development project near the Thai border in Karen State. The project has been criticised due to a lack of transparency, land confiscations, confusion over the scale of construction and the growing influx of Chinese money as well as suspected illicit activity and local concerns about the social impacts of casino businesses, according to a report in leading Myanmar English media The Irrawaddy. “The planned mega resort and city expansion project is controlled by the Karen State Border Guard Force, a Myanmar military-backed armed group led by Colonel Chit Thu and formerly known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA),” according to the media report..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Economic Times" (India)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: casinos, China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs, Colonel Chit Thu, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Development, Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), Karen State, Karen State Border Guard Force, Land Rights, Myanmar Yatai Company, Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone, Myawaddy, Shwe Kokko, U Tin Myint, Yatai International Holding Group (IHG)
Topic: casinos, China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs, Colonel Chit Thu, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Development, Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN), Karen State, Karen State Border Guard Force, Land Rights, Myanmar Yatai Company, Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone, Myawaddy, Shwe Kokko, U Tin Myint, Yatai International Holding Group (IHG)
Description: "The Myanmar government has formed a tribunal to investigate irregularities surrounding a controversial China-backed city development project near the Thai border in Karen State. The planned mega resort and city expansion project is controlled by the Karen State Border Guard Force, a Myanmar military-backed armed group led by Colonel Chit Thu and formerly known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The project is a collaboration between a Hong Kong-based company called Yatai International Holding Group (IHG) and Col. Chit Thu, officially dubbed the “Myanmar Yatai Shwe Kokko Special Economic Zone.” The project has sparked criticisms due to a lack of transparency, land confiscations, confusion over the scale of construction and the growing influx of Chinese money as well as suspected illicit activity and local concerns about the social impacts of casino businesses. At a press conference in Naypyitaw on Monday, Union government office Deputy Minister U Tin Myint said he has been selected as chair of an investigative tribunal for the Shwe Kokko project. U Tin Myint said that the team has yet to make a site visit due to COVID-19, but he has instructed officials from the Karen State government, the General Administration Department and the Settlement and Land Records Department to inspect conditions of the project on the ground..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s Ministry of Construction has unveiled four projects to be implemented under China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including expressways, a bridge and a tunnel, which will form crucial links in trade routes with China. Speaking at a press conference on Monday in Myanmar’s capital Naypyitaw, Deputy Construction Minister U Kyaw Lin said the government had agreed with China to implement the four “early-harvest projects” as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is a key component of the BRI. The four projects were not among those announced when the two countries drew up their initial agreements on implementing BRI projects. During the 2nd BRI Forum in Beijing last year, which was attended by Myanmar State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar and China signed a document referring to nine early-harvest infrastructure projects under the CMEC. However, the only details released by the government at that time concerned three economic cooperation zones in Kachin and Shan states and the Muse-Mandalay railway project. Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with China establishing the CMEC in 2018. The 1,700-kilometer-long corridor will connect Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan province, with Myanmar’s major economic hubs, linking first to Mandalay in central Myanmar before branching east to Yangon and west to the Kyaukphyu SEZ in Rakhine State. The ministry said it plans to construct an expressway connecting Muse in Shan State with Mandalay via Tigyaing in eastern Sagaing Region. Muse, which sits across the border from Yunnan province, is the largest trade portal between the two nations. Mandalay is central Myanmar’s commercial center and the country’s second-largest city. The expressway is envisioned as another lifeline for China-Myanmar border trade. China earlier announced plans to implement the 431-km-long Muse-Mandalay Railway, which would connect with China’s rail network in Ruili, Yunnan province across the border from Muse. The railway is also expected to be a key part of the economic corridor..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The Myanmar government says it is receiving help from a Swiss company to scrutinize a China-backed study on Beijing’s ambitious railway project to connect Mandalay with Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province in southwestern China. At a press conference in Naypyitaw on Wednesday, Myanma Railways Managing Director U Ba Myint said the Swiss company has already stepped in as a third party to review the feasibility study for the Muse-Mandalay Electric Railway, submitted by China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group (CREEG). The managing director did not disclose the name of the Swiss company, but said the company will cover all their own expenses for the review. The US$8.9 billion Muse-Mandalay Railway project is part of the backbone of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is itself part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing’s grand Asia-Pacific infrastructure plan. The Muse-Mandalay Railway is expected to be a key part of the economic corridor and connect with the Chinese rail network at the Chinese border town of Ruili in Yunnan Province. The railway an initial part of the strategic China-Myanmar High Speed Railway, which aims to connect Kyaukphyu in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State with Kunming via Muse, in Shan State. In 2011, Beijing and Naypyitaw first signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to build a railway from Ruili to Kyaukphyu via Muse. The entire rail line was to run 810 km. However, the government of then-president U Thein Sein suspended the project due to strong local objections and concerns about unfair terms, including interest rates and revenue sharing as well as security. The agreement expired in 2014..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-06-11
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Myanmar’s auditor general in a startling announcement has cautioned government officials about continued reliance on Chinese loans both pre-BRI and BRI loans that come with high rates of interest. Myanmar's current national debt stands at about $10 billion, of which $ 4 billion is owed to China, Auditor General Maw Than told a news conference in Naypyidaw on Monday. This can push Myanmar to debt trap like Sri Lanka and some African states. "The truth is the loans from China come at higher interest rates compared to loans from financial institutions like the World Bank or the IMF [International Monetary Fund]," he said. "So, I would like to remind the government ministries to be more restrained in using Chinese loans." The country has to repay as much as $500 million annually to China in both principal and interest. Analysts have pointed out that Myanmar’s involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) meant that it continued to take new debts to finance its huge infrastructure projects..."
Source/publisher: "The Economic Times" (India)
2020-06-13
Date of entry/update: 2020-06-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "When Myanmar’s military regime began opening up the country politically and economically in 2010, one motive was to alleviate the country’s overreliance on China. Ten years down the road, in the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the threat of new Western sanctions triggered by human rights violations against the Muslim Rohingya minority, China’s influence appears hardly diminished. When the quasi-civilian government under former president Thein Sein took over from the military junta in 2011, it launched a plethora of reforms to liberalise Myanmar’s economy and its political system. Driven partly by the desire of rapprochement with the West, the new administration introduced free elections, restored civic and political rights and released political prisoners. In response, Western nations started to re-engage with Myanmar — lifting sanctions, writing off debt and disbursing development aid again. On the economic front, signature reforms included the Foreign Investment Law of 2012, which facilitated the flow of foreign capital into Myanmar. The state’s monopoly in the telecom sector was ended and licenses issued to three foreign providers. In 2014, the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Law was introduced to spearhead business environment improvements. The government also liberalised international trade by lifting state controls, easing licensing requirements and opening previously closed sectors to private sector trading. The economic reform momentum slowed down when a new government led by the former opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), took over in 2016. Under the leadership of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, its initial focus was on peace, national reconciliation and cementing the democratic transition. In October 2016, the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State pushed economic policy-making further to the back seat, disenchanting the business community..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
2020-05-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: With the economy taking a battering, Myanmar will have less room to negotiate over big infrastructure projects
Description: "The economic blow dealt by the coronavirus pandemic may put Myanmar in a weaker position as it negotiates with China over a series of large infrastructure projects, analysts have said. Myanmar plays a key role in China’s global Belt and Road project, a strategy to deepen trade and economic ties with over 60 countries by building railways, ports, bridges, roads and other infrastructure. Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke with President Win Myint by phone this week about pushing ahead with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which will link China’s landlocked Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal via a deep sea port in Rakhine state. Some observers believe the call signals that China intends to exploit the coming economic slowdown to push ahead with projects on its own terms. “Myanmar was very cautious about dealing with these projects before,” said Khin Khin Kyaw Kyee, a China analyst at the Yangon-based Institute for Strategy and Policy. “But Covid-19 has compromised that and the projects are going to get momentum here because there aren’t a lot of options,” she added. Myanmar’s GDP is likely to drop by 2-3% as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, with the poor set to be hardest hit, the World Bank warned..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
2020-05-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Suu Kyi is now close to old adversary China while long-ruling military is skeptical of Beijing's intent ahead of pivotal polls
Description: "Elections are scheduled for November in Myanmar, and there is no indication so far that the polls will be postponed due to the Covid-19 crisis. Neither is there much doubt about the outcome. Most political observers believe that State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) will win again, though not in the same landslide fashion as in 2015 as recent by-elections show she and her party have lost significant support in ethnic areas. But the bigger electoral question is how her party’s delicate relationship with the autonomous military will play out and in that context how her government’s ties to its powerful northern neighbor China will be portrayed and potentially politicized on the campaign trail. An entirely new paradigm has emerged in Myanmar, one where Suu Kyi is now seen as a trusted ally of Beijing and the military as a nationalistic bulwark against China’s strong advances. That’s a significant reversal, one that could have implications for stability in the lead-up to polls. When Suu Kyi was under house arrest during military rule or active in non-parliamentary politics, China viewed the long-time pro-democracy icon with suspicion. That was at least in part because her late British husband, a Tibetologist, maintained ties with many Tibetans in exile..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-05-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed hope that Myanmar will speed up cooperation with China to implement its ambitious infrastructure projects in the country during a recent call with Myanmar President U Win Myint. In the phone conversation on Wednesday, Xi said that he is expecting the two sides will cooperate closely and speed up the implementation of projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that were agreed to during his visit to Myanmar earlier this year. During Xi’s visit to Myanmar, both sides agreed to speed up the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) backbone projects including the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in western Rakhine State, New Yangon City in Myanmar’s commercial capital and Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zones in Shan and Kachin states. He branded all three projects as crucial pillars of the CMEC that are needed to deepen “result-oriented BRI cooperation” and move from “the conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation” of building the CMEC. In January, the two sides inked a concession agreement and shareholders’ agreement for Kyaukphyu SEZ, a letter of intent on the development of Yangon City and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to accelerate negotiations around the Ruili-Muse Cross-Border Economic Cooperation Zone. Among the backbone projects, the Kyaukphyu SEZ is crucial for China, as it is expected to boost development in China’s landlocked Yunnan Province and provide China with direct access to the Indian Ocean, allowing its oil imports to bypass the Strait of Malacca. The two sides signed an agreement on CMEC in 2018 and the corridor is part of the BRI, Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy project. Unveiled in 2013, the international plan is also known as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The project aims to build a network of roads, railroads and shipping lanes linking at least 70 countries from China to Europe, passing through Central Asia, the Middle East and Russia and fostering trade and investment..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-05-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: At present, fears that China is using the pandemic to exert excessive pressure and push through BRI projects in Myanmar are exaggerated.
Description: "With the COVID-19 pandemic past its peak in China, attention has turned to the Chinese government’s deployment of “COVID diplomacy.” This term frames how China’s government is sending medical supplies and personnel across the world — including to Myanmar — to build goodwill and show global leadership in fighting the pandemic. Some Southeast Asian observers say it is an overt propaganda campaign, with others going further and warning of the region’s acceptance of Chinese government soft power. For Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partners, some view China’s government are using such soft power to push through projects that may not be in the recipient’s best interests. In Myanmar, some saw Chinese Ambassador Chen Hai’s May 6 meeting with Deputy Minister for Planning, Finance and Industry U Set Aung regarding the implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) project — which falls under the BRI — as an attempt to push such projects through. The discussions took place soon after Myanmar released its COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP), which was published on April 27. The CERP details the country’s short- and medium-term plan to deal with the economic impact of the pandemic and includes stipulations to expedite the solicitation of strategic infrastructure projects, as well as approve and disclose large investments by reputable international firms that are experiencing delays. For the time being in Myanmar, however, fears that China’s government is using the pandemic to exert excessive pressure and push through BRI projects are exaggerated. The suspicion surrounding Chen Hai’s meeting is questionable given that discussions were on projects for which MoUs had been signed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in January this year, the first such visit by a Chinese leader in 19 years. Indeed, the acceleration of the BRI in Myanmar was already underway before the global ramifications of the COVID-19 outbreak were known. Ahead of his arrival in Myanmar in January, Xi called for the “deepening of results-oriented Belt and Road cooperation and [to move projects] from a conceptual stage to concrete planning and implementation in building the CMEC.” During Xi’s visit, the Kyaukphyu SEZ and deep-sea port, Myanmar-China border economic zones, and New Yangon City developments were described as the “three pillars” of the CMEC. These were the three projects reportedly discussed during Chen Hai’s May 6 meeting. Certainly, the Chinese government will be hoping to improve its image to ease BRI project implementation. Projects may be accelerated to mitigate the expected economic downturn in Myanmar. Yet, there has been no major shift in BRI project implementation because of the pandemic. Given the scale of BRI projects and importance to Myanmar’s economy, it would have been astonishing if such a meeting had not taken place soon after the CERP was released..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-05-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "FOUR years ago I wrote a story about the Myanmar cattle industry with the heading “Myanmar’s Enigmatic Beef Cattle Industry: Please ring back in 2026.” I have just spent two weeks in Myanmar (formerly Burma) in mid-January 2020 and must review my predictions for the future of the cattle industry as a lot has happened in the last four years. In my first article I presented the following summary of the main problems that needed resolution before the live cattle trade with China could commence in earnest: Solve all the ethnic disputes across Myanmar to ensure free movement of people and trade goods throughout the country and across national borders; Eradicate Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) which is endemic in Myanmar; Mechanise Burmese agriculture so that diesel hand tractors take the place of draft cattle; Convince the new Burmese government and general population that after their 54 year bitter struggle for democracy, embracing Chinese offers of trade and infrastructure will not automatically lead to a new form of domination by the overwhelming commercial and political muscle of China. You can put a line through the barriers listed above as they are all now resolved to a point where trade has already commenced in significant volumes. I was told by a number of sources that during the period of three months prior to our visit in January 2020 that the average daily live exports into China through the Shan state border crossing of Muse were in the order of 1000 slaughter cattle per day..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Beef Central"
2020-05-15
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Covid-19 pandemic has not slowed Beijing's increasingly crucial plan to build a railway connecting China to mainland SE Asia
Description: "Under fire for bullying neighbors in the South China Sea, China is patting itself on the back for the progress it is making on the 411-kilometer China-Laos railway through a sparsely populated nation that has barely been touched by the Covid-19 pandemic. The official Xinhua News Agency reported on April 25 that all the beams are now in place for the 1,458-meter Luang Prabang cross-Mekong super-bridge, one of the biggest undertakings on a track that includes 169 other bridges and 72 mountain-blasting tunnels. Construction resumed on the signature Belt and Road project only 23 days after Vientiane’s communist government closed its borders on April 1 with China, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia in response to the discovery of its eighth Covid-19 case. Although there is skepticism about the official figures, landlocked Laos still has only 19 confirmed coronavirus infections among its 7.3 million people, less than any of the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) states, ahead of Cambodia (122), Myanmar (178) and Vietnam (288)..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-05-11
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Beijing is turbocharging its Belt and Road and other game-changing plans despite Covid-19 and US hybrid warfare
Description: "Amid the deepest economic contraction in nearly a century, President Xi Jinping had already made it very clear, last month, that China should be ready for unprecedented, relentless foreign challenges. He was not referring only to the possible decoupling of global supply chains and the non-stop demonization of every project related to the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative. An allegedly leaked internal document, secret and invisible inside China, but nonetheless obtained by some obscure Western-connected source, even stated, essentially, that the blame game against China over the virus is like the backlash over Tiananmen all over again. According to the secret, invisible document, China would have to “prepare for armed confrontation between the two global powers” – a reference to the US. It’s as if this was an aggressive strategy deployed by the Chinese state in the first place, and not in response to the massive escalation of hybrid warfare 2.0 by the United States government..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-05-07
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China’s ambassador to Myanmar pushed on Wednesday to gear up for the implementation of Beijing’s key infrastructure projects in Myanmar despite the fact that both countries’ economies are facing a significant slowdown due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai and Myanmar’s Deputy Minister for Planning, Finance and Industry U Set Aung met for ‘in-depth discussions’ Wednesday on the implementation of outcomes from Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in January, according to the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar. The Chinese Embassy said that the two discussed how to move forward on the development of China’s ambitious projects in Myanmar based on the Myanmar government’s COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP). The projects discussed included New Yangon City, Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port and Industrial Zone and the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone. Launched last week, the CERP seeks to mitigate the economic impact of the pandemic by implementing new measures and response plans. The measures include steps to expedite the solicitation of strategic infrastructure projects and to approve and disclose large investments by reputable international firms that may be currently experiencing delays, through fast-track procedures..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-05-07
Date of entry/update: 2020-05-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China and Myanmar inked dozens of deals on Saturday to speed up infrastructure projects in the Southeast Asian nation, as Beijing seeks to cement its hold over a neighbor increasingly isolated by the West. But no major new projects were agreed during the two-day visit by President Xi Jinping, the first of any Chinese leader in 19 years. Analysts said Myanmar was generally cautious of investments by Beijing and was also being careful ahead of elections later this year. Still, Xi and Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi signed 33 agreements shoring up key projects that are part of the flagship Belt and Road Initiative, China’s vision of new trade routes described as a “21st century silk road”. They agreed to hasten implementation of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor, a giant infrastructure scheme worth billions of dollars, with agreements on railways linking southwestern China to the Indian Ocean, a deep sea-port in conflict-riven Rakhine state, a special economic zone on the border, and a new city project in the commercial capital of Yangon. They did not address a controversial $3.6 billion Beijing-backed mega dam, where work has been stalled since 2011, reflecting the contentiousness of Chinese investment in Myanmar, where many are uncomfortable with the sway Beijing has over its smaller neighbor..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Since 2010, China has been casting its eyes on Myanmar’s rich natural resources for commercial exploitation.
Description: "The Chinese “project of the century” — the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is a transcontinental network of roads, railways and ports, covering dams, mines and pipelines is causing major environmental deterioration in Myanmar. The BRI has profound consequences, involving soil contamination and erosion, air pollution, water pollution, habitat and wildlife loss. Some projects have been stalled due to local opposition, however it won’t be for long before China resumes these projects. Local activists in few instances have also been arrested and suppressed by the central government of Myanmar. Myanmar, also known as Suvarnabhumi in Sanskrit (Golden Land), has been famous for its natural resources since ancient times. The raw materials include oil, gas, minerals, timber, forest products and hydropower potential. China since 2010 has been casting its eyes on Myanmar’s rich natural resources for commercial exploitation. The issues of Myitsone dam project, Letpadaung copper mine project and Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar have been elaborated in detail below, highlighting China’s continuous defence of its wrongdoings in Naypyidaw..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Observer Research Foundation (ORF)" (India)
2020-04-15
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Southeast Asia expected to remain a focus as Beijing prioritizes home front
Description: "The new coronavirus is straining economies to the breaking point, but China says its Belt and Road Initiative will proceed intact. Analysts are not so sure. Some think a weakened China will have little choice but to step back and reassess its foreign investments in the post-pandemic world. But a Belt and Road 2.0 could also present new opportunities to wield influence -- especially in Southeast Asia -- as the European Union and other investors nurse their own wounds. Despite the raging pandemic, China has not stopped committing to new infrastructure projects across the Southeast Asian bloc. In the months since the outbreak started, it has sealed deals for an $800,000 dam in Cambodia, a $22.4 million business park in Myanmar and a large solar energy farm in Laos. "Keeping foreign trade and foreign investment stable is vitally important, as the Chinese economy has been deeply integrated into the world economy," state media quoted Premier Li Keqiang as saying on March 10..."
Source/publisher: "Nikkei Asian Review" (Japan)
2020-04-02
Date of entry/update: 2020-04-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping likes to travel big. His visit to Myanmar in January — the first for a Chinese leader in almost two decades — was no exception, capped off with no less than 33 bilateral agreements. However, the number alone overstates things. Some of the "agreements" merely saw Xi's entourage hand over feasibility studies for proposed projects. Many are not new. The number does, however, underscore the ever-tighter orbit Myanmar has been tracing around its giant neighbor since a detente with the West hit reverse over a massacre of the country's Muslim Rohingya minority in 2017. Crucially, a few of the deals advance China's plans to turn Myanmar into a secure new route to the Indian Ocean, valuable to Beijing for strategic and economic reasons. Whether China's coming spending splurge spells boom or bust for threadbare Myanmar — and peace or more war for its restive fringes — remains a worry. A pair of Chinese-built oil and gas pipelines already bisect Myanmar, from Kyaukphyu on the country's Bay of Bengal coastline to its border with China's landlocked Yunnan province. As part of Xi's signature Belt and Road Initiative, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor would add a rail link to the route, an industrial park along their shared border and — most critically, and controversially — a deep sea port at Kyaukphyu to anchor it all..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
2020-03-04
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Most of deals meant to speed ambitious Chinese plan to connect Asia with Africa, Europe via land and maritime networks
Description: "Myanmar and China on Saturday signed scores of deals, most of them set to spur China’s landmark Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious project to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks to boost trade and stimulate economic growth. On his first visit to China’s Southeast Asian neighbor, President Xi Jinping met Myanmar President Win Myint, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, and military chief Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing. Xi and Suu Kyi witnessed the signing of 33 agreements, protocols, and memoranda of understanding of infrastructure projects. The pacts include a concessional agreement for a deep sea port project in Myanmar’s western Rakhine state, giving Beijing strategic access to the Indian Ocean and cutting its reliance on maritime trade on the narrow and congested Strait of Malacca between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. China also handed Myanmar a feasibility study for a high-speed railroad line connecting Kumin, China to the Rakhine port. The agreements also include developing a special economic zone along the two countries’ shared border and a new city next to Yangon, Myanmar’s biggest city. Most of the deals are to strengthen the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a plan to connect China's Yunnan Province with Myanmar's second-largest city Mandalay, leading to Yangon and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. It is widely seen as a strategic economic corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Anadolu Agency" (Ankara)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: As Xi connects the region, Philippines weighs 'shutdown' risk
Description: "Philippine Senator Sherwin Gatchalian has not been sleeping well. "It is very difficult for us to sleep every night without lingering fears," he said in early February, as he presided over an investigation into potential security risks stemming from Chinese part-ownership of his country's power grid operator. The Philippines is far from the only country running on China-backed electricity. As a complement to President Xi Jinping's signature Belt and Road infrastructure initiative, Beijing is pushing what it calls Global Energy Interconnection -- a vision of a multi-trillion-dollar worldwide electricity network. China already has a number of power lines connected to other countries, including Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, while lines into Thailand, Pakistan and Bangladesh are under consideration. For emerging economies hampered by chronic electricity shortages, such investments may be a blessing. Critics, however, worry that China's expanding presence in regional power grids could leave partner countries vulnerable. Xi himself proposed Global Energy Interconnection in 2015 at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit, as a way to meet the world's demand for clean power. Like the Belt and Road itself, China frames the concept as beneficial for everyone. "It increases mutual trust in politics and creates a new pattern of energy security featuring cooperation, mutual benefit and win-win results," says the website of the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization, or GEIDCO, the body leading the charge..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Nikkei Asian Review" (Japan)
2020-03-03
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Xi’s recent voyage to Myanmar spotlighted the broader question about whether some key regional states are getting more cautious in responding to Beijing’s initiative.
Description: "One of the storylines that ran throughout Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to Myanmar in his current capacity was the inroads Beijing was hoping to make with respect to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the focus itself was not surprising, it nonetheless raised a broader question at play in the wider region: are key states getting more cautious in how they engage the BRI? Since China’s BRI first took off, there has been a near endless focus on the mix of opportunities and challenges it presents for various countries as well as how other major powers are responding to it But as I’ve argued before, a key part of that conversation, beyond what China wants or what the United States thinks and does, is how key regional states themselves are responding to the BRI. Getting a sense of regional reactions is challenging given the diversify of responses we have seen, the evolution of the BRI itself, which remains quite amorphous in some senses amid the periodic reports we see, and the relative availability of alternatives offered by other countries such as Japan. Indeed, regional engagement with the BRI is best seen not as a linear process, but a more dynamic one in response to changes in these variables and more..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
2020-01-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The Belt and Road Initiative, hailed for promoting development, is coming under fire as debt burdens grow, reflecting a growing wariness of Beijing’s posturing as a global leader-in-waiting on an international stage that seeks to promote debate rather than censor it
Description: "A good way to measure China’s appeal for the rest of the world is to gauge the success of its Belt and Road Initiative. As of last September, Beijing had signed more than 190 cooperation documents with more than 160 countries and international organisations in support of the trade initiative to link economies into a China-centred trading network. Its cumulative investment has exceeded US$100 billion, with construction projects valued at a staggering US$720 billion. Yet the initiative had begun slowing by 2018. This was due, in part, to a decline in Chinese funds available for investment. Chinese state banks had become more cautious about lending as the trade war with the United States commenced. Chinese state-owned enterprises were still moving car and steel capacity overseas, and building highways and cement plants in developing economies, but on a much smaller scale compared to their 2016 investment peak. Some countries (such as Myanmar, Sierra Leone and Tanzania) had become hesitant about continuing to borrowing large sums for fear of a debt trap..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-05
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Indian and foreign media may have missed it but the US-India joint statement will most certainly be scrutinised closely by Beijing for anti-China content.
Description: "Both the Indian and foreign media coverage of US President Donald Trump’s India visit went on and on about his mention of Delhi riots and Pakistan – but almost entirely overlooked the reference to the Blue Dot Network, which has given rise to growing unease in Beijing. The mellifluous language of the joint statement centres on a ‘Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership’ tick boxing the expected military, space, and energy cooperation, as well as concern about the high debt situation in developing countries and the need for “responsible, transparent and sustainable financing practises”. That’s diplomatic language to refer to the dire situation faced by countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives due to heavy debts to China.The next few lines refer to the Blue Dot Network as a “a multi-stakeholder initiative that will bring governments, the private sector, and civil society together to promote high-quality trusted standards for global infrastructure development”. That might seem rather tame, but here’s the carrot. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) expects that infrastructure development needs in the Indo-Pacific alone could be worth about $1.7 trillion per year through 2030. That’s what the Chinese are after. And now it seems, everyone else wants a slice of the pie, and the influence that goes with it..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Print" (India)
2020-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is nothing if not vague. Is it a blanket term for all Chinese overseas economic, social and political activities? Is it a specific set of coordinated policy that’s exclusive to Beijing-led international endeavors? What projects are officially Belt and Road? Where do the corridors actually go? What countries are truly participating? Nearly seven years into the initiative, we are still asking these questions as Beijing attempts to wrangle back its message from private firms and enterprising governments that have unscrupulously been using the Belt and Road brand for their own gains, dragging its reputation through the proverbial mud and putting the future of the initiative in jeopardy. The Belt and Road was announced in 2013 as an economic development initiative that would create new trade corridors across Asia, Europe and Africa, positioning China at the top of the geo-economic food chain, while providing mutual benefit to participants all the way down the line. Beyond that vague rendering, the rest was left to conjecture, with a large degree of meaning lost between China’s struggles to explain the initiative and the West’s inability to comprehend it.“I think the difference among policy makers is one of the biggest challenges of the Belt and Road,” said Moritz Rudolf, a China researcher, lawyer, and founder of Eurasia Bridges. “For the Chinese side it's unclear why the West doesn’t understand what they are doing and from the Western side it's ‘this is nothing because it doesn't follow our procedures that we know about.’”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Forbes" (USA)
2020-02-28
Date of entry/update: 2020-03-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: China’s overseas projects funded by debt from its own infrastructure banks are now viewed with trepidation, by both recipient countries for the potential debt trap.
Description: "Global business and strategy analysts will be watching with keen interest any attempts US President Donald Trump makes to convince India to join its ambitious plan to counter China’s ‘Silk Route’ programme of port and highway constructions. Last November, the US, Japan and Australia unveiled the ‘Blue Dot’ infrastructure network, ostensibly to certify and promote infrastructure development, but in reality, it was to take on China’s BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) that is currently building a chain of roads and ports connecting most of the world to Beijing. The Western alternative has been in the making for some time as nations have voiced alarm at the cheque-book diplomacy of China through its BRI projects and their security ramifications. Soon after Blue Dot’s launch, US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross lost no time in pointing out that American direct investment into Asia had topped $1.6 trillion and that “our numbers will only get bigger”. It was quickly noted by China’s Global Times, which said, “Although China was not mentioned by name, it’s widely suspected that Washington’s new plan is directed against the China proposed BRI.” China’s pique is natural as analysts say Blue Dot could be backed with funding by Japan’s JICA and America’s newly founded International Development Finance Corporation and Ausaid, not to mention a host of global development finance windows backed by the West..."
Source/publisher: "The New Indian Express" (India)
2020-02-25
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-25
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: China looks to Irrawaddy River as alternative trade route as high-speed rail plan stalls on security concerns
Description: "Ethnic wars, security concerns and official foot-dragging have all conspired to stall China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plan to build a high-speed railroad from its southwest down through Myanmar’s volatile northern regions to the Indian Ocean. But Beijing has an emerging alternate plan: Develop a safer trade route via Myanmar’s Irrawaddy River – a 2,200-kilometer waterway which flows north to south through the length of a nation known for its lack of modern roads and rail links. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a BRI-driven plan to link China and Myanmar via trains, roads and ports, aims to give Beijing an alternative route for fuel and other shipments through the congested Malacca Strait and the contested South China Sea, both potential conflict areas with the United States. That has made Myanmar a crucial cog in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature BRI, a US$1-trillion global infrastructure-building scheme that aims ultimately to put China at the center of a new global trade and security order..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The six Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) countries agreed on the need to elevate their cooperation from rapid-expansion to a comprehensive stage as their foreign ministers met in Vientiane on Thursday. The ministers of the MLC member countries - China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam – reached the agreement at their fifth meeting, Chinese State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi told a press conference shortly after the meeting. Participants welcomed the recommendation by the Global Centre for Mekong Study that the MLC countries jointly create the Mekong-Lancang Economic Development Belt. The ministers reaffirmed the need to further enhance regional connectivity by jointly promoting the MLC Economic Development Belt and to explore the possibility of synergising the MLC Plan of Action on Connectivity with global transport infrastructure – the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Master Plan on Asean Connectivity (MPAC) 2025, and the Asean-China New Western Land-Sea Corridor..."
Source/publisher: Eleven Media Group (Myanmar)
2020-02-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Louise was living from hand to mouth while helping her aunt sell noodle soup in the Laos capital of Vientiane, which sits on a curve of the Mekong River. Their lives were mostly untouched by the increasing Chinese investment in their country that in recent years has built billion-dollar dams, bridges and railways. Louise* was in her early 20s and had few professional prospects when she was approached by a woman who told her there were great opportunities in China, the country’s northern neighbour seen as a land of technological breakthroughs and booming cities. The woman said her relatives had been successful in China and she offered to take Louise there, too. Louise did not know then that this was her first step to being trapped in an abusive marriage with a Chinese man who felt he owned her. “I wanted to support my parents … I am poor and I was very curious to see China. I thought it would bring me a better life,” Louise recalls. Soon she was in a van with nine other Laotian women, travelling from Vientiane to the border with Thailand, and from there to Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi Airport, where they boarded a flight to Guangzhou in southern China. Louise is among thousands of young girls and women, mostly from Asian countries, who have been trafficked into marriages with Chinese men. She has since been rescued, but many others have not been so lucky...'
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-15
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China has had a setback in its infrastructure building along the Mekong River after Thailand cancelled a project on the vital Southeast Asian waterway. But observers say that without more coordination between downstream countries, China’s influence in the region will continue to go unchallenged. In a win for locals and activists concerned about the ecosystem and their livelihoods, Thailand’s cabinet called off the Lancang-Mekong Navigation Channel Improvement Project – also known as the Mekong “rapids blasting” project – along its border with Laos. Proposed back in 2000, the project aimed to blast and dredge parts of the Mekong riverbed to remove rapids so that it could be used by cargo ships, creating a link from China’s southwestern province of Yunnan to ports in Thailand, Laos and the rest of Southeast Asia. But it drew strong opposition from local communities along the river and environmentalists, who feared it would destroy the already fragile ecosystem and would only benefit Chinese. The decision two weeks ago came as a prolonged drought has seen the river drop to its lowest levels in 100 years, depleting fish stocks in downstream communities...."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "When President Xi Jinping made his first state visit this year to Myanmar and signed new infrastructure contracts, there was no indication of the obstacle about to trip up China’s plan for railways, ports and highways around the world: the coronavirus. Travel restrictions to prevent the spread of the disease, which has now killed more than 1,800 people, have idled much of the world’s second-largest economy and choked key elements of Xi’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Chinese workers cannot get to overseas projects, and factories are cut off from the Chinese imports they need to keep running, according to more than a dozen company executives and officials. “Many factories in China remain closed; those that are open cannot reach full capacity,” said Boyang Xue, a China analyst at Ducker Frontier. “Since many BRI projects tend to source equipment and machinery from manufacturers based in China, the disruptions in industrial production and supply chain will cause further delays.” One giant project, China Railway International Group’s $6 billion high-speed railway in Indonesia, is on a war footing..."
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Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
2020-02-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-21
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Description: "At the second Belt and Road forum in April last year, Xi Jinping stated that the infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would be financially and environmentally sustainable and deliver high quality infrastructure. The re-calibration of the initiative sought to dam the surge of criticism that had been miring the Chinese flagship foreign policy initiative the past two years. Myanmar was among the countries that had become wary over the infamous debt trap narrative, unflattering reports of poor standards in infrastructure and opaque and wasteful procurement practices disproportionately favoring Chinese companies. Back on track? Nonetheless, on 18 January 2020, BRI projects in Myanmar appeared to be back on track as Xi Jinping, on his first visit to Myanmar, and Aung San Suu Kyi announced their countries renewed commitment to cooperate. Myanmar’s eagerness for re-engagement with China, however, is driven largely by its international isolation due to the reported atrocities against Rohingyas. But has China also heeded to the criticism about BRI? It would appear that China’s new tune on BRI is not only a response to criticism but also about increased competition to its connectivity project. Competition Japan remains the largest infrastructure developer in Asia and in September 2019 announced a partnership to develop connectivity in Asia with the European Union (EU). This committed the partners to pursuing projects in a transparent and sustainable manner – a clear contrast to the BRI. Likewise, the EU’s connectivity strategy for Asia from September 2018 and it’s follow up a year later placed full emphasis on sustainability, good governance and transparency. The United States, South Korea, and a number of other OECD countries have also started infrastructure initiatives that seek similarly to differentiate from the BRI..."
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Source/publisher: "Eurasia Review"
2020-02-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-17
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Description: "The focus of this article is two-pronged. First, it highlights China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative as a Eurasia-centred project that, distinct from the twentieth-century Eurasianism, aims to introduce a new comprehensive integrationist agenda to the Eurasian strategic landscape. Second, it compares the US-led EuroAtlanticism and the emerging Eurasianism, holding that while the former has historically stressed security over development (development is seen as contingent on the establishment of a hard security regime), the latter prioritises development over security (security is viewed as contingent on the establishment of an inclusive economic regime). Thus, this research argues that, if implemented successfully, OBOR could challenge EuroAtlanticism as the long-held normative paradigm of interstate relations by offering a systemic alternative. EURASIANISM IS A CENTURY-OLD IDEA. EMERGING IN THE early 1920s and largely nurtured by the Russian immigrants settled in Europe, the concept, despite its various interpretations along different political and ideological lines, laid claim ‘to represent some unique synthesis of European and Asian principles’ (Bassin 2008, p. 281), defining Russia ‘not as a European and not as an Asian country; … as a third, special continent of Slav–Turkic cohabitation that bears the imprint of the great empires that have ruled over its expanses—from the Mongolian to the Russian’ (Laruelle 2009, p. 94).1 Although the Eurasian doctrine did not assume itself as a unified ideology but rather evolved into a multitude of different forms (Laruelle 2015), early Eurasianism in general argued a particular geographic, linguistical, ethno-cultural, and philosophical identity for Russia distinct from both Europe and Asia (Shlapentokh 1997, pp. 130–31; Senderov 2009, p. 25; Mileski 2015, pp. 177–79). However, despite the fact that early Eurasianist thought envisioned a unique political and philosophical space for Russia, it also ‘developed a positive but general discourse about the Orient’, holding that ‘Russia should be closer to Asia than to Europe’ (Laruelle 2004, p. 116). During the Cold War, under the weight of deep ideological confrontation with the West, the Eurasianist thought took a further Orientalist inclination, emphasising cultural and ideological differences from Europe (Von Hagen 2004, p. 450). Especially with the emergence of NATO and the expansion of US- and Soviet-led camps ‘beyond the original arenas of Europe and Asia’, the militarised This research was sponsored by the International Postdoctoral Exchange Programme of Shandong University..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Europe-Asia Studies via Academia.edu (USA)
2018-03-09
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "This article argues that the origins and theoretical underpinnings of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative can actually be traced back to the mid1980s, that is, almost three decades before the ofcial media unveiled the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). It examines the changing role of Myanmar in China’s grand strategy in general and in MSRI in particular by undertaking an investigation of trade and investment relations. This analysis of the geo-economic and geo-strategic implications of MSRI is undertaken in order to ofer a prognosis of benefts and costs for Myanmar. Both the extent and the limits of MSRI are illustrated in Myanmar. It ends with a discussion of possible roadblocks, detours, cracks and fault lines along the Maritime Silk Road.....Myanmar/Burma is the second-largest country in Southeast Asia and is located at the juncture of Southeast and South Asia. Given its resources, natural endowments and strategic location bordering China and India, Myanmar fnds itself at the center of political wrangling between major powers. While India’s culture and religion have infuenced the Burmese way of life over the centuries, China has traditionally exerted geopolitical and strategic pressure on Myanmar. As Tin Maung Maung Than notes: ‘Geopolitical ramifcations for modern Burma have been overwhelmingly determined by bilateral relations with China’, which date back to the early Pyu kingdoms of the ninth century AD.1 Myanmar sufers from centrifugal tendencies. Since independence in 1948, successive governments have battled around the country’s periphery with ethnic separatist movements and communist insurgencies, some of which received direct support from Beijing. Post-independence, Myanmar has ‘accommodated China as its “senior” in a paukphaw (kinsmen) relationship’, and avoided taking actions inimical to China’s interests..."
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Source/publisher: "Journal of Contemporary China"
2017-12-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 490.96 KB (18 pages)
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Description: "The “New Silk Road”, also known as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is a development strategy proposed by China, which aims to foster the economic cooperation and connectivity mostly between Eurasian countries. 1 The initiative is named after the “Silk Road”, an ancient route of 6,437 kilometer in length, that dates back to the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) and used to connect regions of East Asia with the Middle East and Europe, prospering numerous Eurasian civilizations for centuries.2 Therefore, with the implementation of the “New Silk Road” strategy, China aims to revive the 2.000-year-old network by investing on some serious infrastructure projects throughout the whole route, that largely resembles the legendary “Silk Road”. The promotion of regional economic development, the economic benefits for the countries involved and the tightening of the cultural ties of the participants, are the main goals of the OBOR initiative, in other words, OBOR is based on a win-win development strategy for the countries that are located throughout the path of the “New Silk Road”.3 The first signs of OBOR were brought to the surface during the Olympics of 2008. However, China’s ambitious plan was first stated on 2013, by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the 5th president of China. The OBOR project consist of two different “routes”, one land route and a maritime one, that both begin and end in China’s territory. The first route (Silk Road Economic Belt) begins from Xi’an in Central China and leads to Northern Europe up to Rotterdam (busiest port in Europe), coming all the way from Central Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Russia and the center of Europe. On the other hand, the maritime route (the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road) connects the Mediterranean Sea with the South China Sea, in a long route that comes through the Suez Canal, the Indian Ocean, the Malacca strait, etc. It is estimated that approximately 65-70 countries and a total of 4,4 billion people (as much as the 60% of global population) will benefit from the participation in the OBOR project that will require at least 30-35 years to be completed..."
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Source/publisher: KEDISA via Academia.edu (USA)
2017-00-00
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "This article explores the function of a transnational road in China-Myanmar relations from a perspective that reflects on Myanmar’s experience. It makes two key points. Firstly, Myanmar’s dependent relationship with China is illuminated if one applies a New Economic Geography perspective to economic processes. Secondly, these processes did not lead to a permanent dependency structure through which China assumed the dominant position; the structure is changeable, subject to action by Myanmar. The latter point indicates that China’s influence is greatly contested by the smaller country, and that the interaction of economic and political factors impact on the Myanmar-China relationship, particularly at local sites. This article focuses on economic activities at the city level, in order to assess advantages and disadvantages of the relationship. The cities that were chosen as the units of analysis are Ruili and Mandalay. As the cities are situated on the main road connecting Myanmar to China, the relationship is quite intense. This article explores the key characteristics of this economic relation via the road, focusing on the connectivity of Mandalay and Ruili. This article will focus on the processes of industrial relocation in Ruili and Mandalay to assess benefits Myanmar gains from the bilateral relationship. Using a New Economic Geography approach associated with the work of Krugman1 , a core-periphery pattern was applied as the theoretical framework to explain industrial relocation and agglomeration. Consequently, the analysis focuses on spatial relations and factors that form the relational structure. In addition, this article also highlights the political and economic transitions in Myanmar since 2010 that led to change in the relational structure. It also draws on fieldwork, which is used to illustrate how connectivity has impacted Mandalay and northern Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Chulalongkorn University (Bangkok)
2018-02-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
Size: 570.92 KB (19 pages)
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Description: "Myanmar is caught between a rock and a hard place. As the government seeks to pick up the pace of development, electrical power is needed and hydropower is touted as an “environmentally-friendly” solution in order to switch on the lights. But there are a number of problems with how this process is being handled and the negative effects that big dams typically could have on the country’s rivers and water supply. DAM BUILDERS VS DAM BUSTERS Dam builders face dam busters when it comes to the pros and cons of dams as a way to harness the power of Mother Nature. Hydropower and dams are touted by people in the industry as an answer to power and also a way to control rivers that tend to flood. Yet the standoff over the Chinese-run $3.6 billion Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State alerts us to the public opposition to the building of dams – and in this particular case, the questions over who was going to get most of the power, given the original plan to send most of the electricity to China, while Myanmar is thirsty for electricity. Interestingly, the Myitsone Dam was not mentioned publicly during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent state visit to Myanmar. A raft of close to three dozen development projects mostly linked to Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative were signed. But the Myitsone Dam was noticeable by its absence from the list, despite Xi being the main Chinese official, in his role as Vice President, to push for the signing of the deal back in 2009..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Mizzima" (Myanmar)
2020-02-08
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Lethal coronavirus outbreak highlights unforeseen risk of greater connectivity with China
Description: "In mid-January, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a historic visit to Myanmar with a pocket full of promises. Xi vowed to build and finance big new infrastructure projects to connect the two neighbors in unprecedented trade-promoting ways in a so-called China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which if realized as envisioned would serve as a poster child for his wider Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia. Fast forward three weeks to the coronavirus outbreak, which has killed at least 25 and infected over 24,000 in China, has spread contagion panic worldwide – and has suddenly put those grand Myanmar plans into certain doubt, as Beijing looks inward to contain the epidemic and Naypyidaw weighs new downsides of greater bilateral connectivity. Like other nations Myanmar has suspended visas on arrival for Chinese tourists, while the national hotels and tourism ministry has asked travel agencies to stop providing services to all Chinese nationals. Those measures could deal a hard blow to Myanmar’s nascent but crucial tourism industry. Chinese nationals accounted for over 17% of Myanmar’s documented 4.36 million visitors in 2019, a figure that is sure to fall drastically with the new visa ban..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-05
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Beijing is toning down its rhetoric for the grand plan and rethinking its massive international infrastructure programme, Raffaello Pantucci writes...Signs of a more modest approach from Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar when there was little official mention of an economic corridor involving the two countries.
Description: "Absent from almost all of the official coverage around Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Myanmar was any mention of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC). A belt and road route before the Belt and Road Initiative existed, the corridor was a concept first mooted in the late 1990s but has largely gone nowhere. The bigger question this poses is whether this is a harbinger of China shedding its grander overambitious belt and road visions over the next decade for a more focused and logical set of bilateral engagements. Certainly there has been a toning down of rhetoric around the belt and road, an infrastructure vision to link economies into a China-centred trading network. While it remains a hot topic in Beijing and a sure-fire way for leaders of other countries to be seen to be aligning themselves with China, its scattered record of success has meant there has been rethinking about how this grand concept will continue to fit into Beijing’s foreign policy repertoire. It continues to be a convenient tag for Chinese diplomats to use given its broad and positive conceptual basis but, it is not clear that China wants to continue to talk in the expansive corridor terms that it used to..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-02-03
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Continued mistrust of China – including from the Tatmadaw – ensured that there was little significant progress during President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Myanmar.
Description: "On January 17, Xi Jinping became the first Chinese president to travel to Myanmar in 19 years when he paid a two-day state visit. Although Xi visited Myanmar in 2009, it was the first time he had travelled here as president. The importance of the visit was heightened by the fact that the two countries are marking the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations this year – newly independent Burma was the first non-communist country to recognise the People’s Republic of China. During his visit Xi met top Myanmar officials including President U Win Myint, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and attended signing ceremonies for a number of agreements and memoranda of understanding. But did China gain what it expected from the visit? And what does it mean for China-Myanmar relations?
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2020-02-05
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: It doesn’t have many friendly nations to help it balance ties with Beijing
Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Myanmar last week is a vivid indicator of the region’s changing geopolitics, reflecting adversely on the West and its allies. Its real significance transcends the 33 agreements signed, although it is an impressive number in itself for a short sojourn of a day and a half. President Xi took his own time in coming to the southern neighbour which had to be content with largely one-way VVIP traffic, as Myanmar’s top leaders travelled to Beijing with noticeable regularity. As the Vice-President, he had visited Myanmar in 2009. The last visit by a Chinese President took place in 2001. The 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations was judged to be the ideal occasion to launch a major renewal and strengthen the process of the bilateral relationship. U. Nu, the first prime minister of Burma (Myanmar’s previous name), famously depicted his country’s position in the region as “hemmed in like a tender gourd amongst the cacti.” Then, it chose the policy of independence and non-alignment. Does the red-carpet treatment extended to the President of China show that today’s Myanmar, jointly led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the military, has taken sides?..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Hindu" (India)
2020-01-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-04
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Topic: Belt And Road, India, Myanmar
Sub-title: China’s inroads in Myanmar through its Belt and Road Initiative are forcing India to rethink its connectivity with Southeast Asia.
Topic: Belt And Road, India, Myanmar
Description: "On January 17 and 18, China’s President Xi Jinping visited Myanmar, the first visit by a Chinese president to Myanmar in 19 years. Xi Jinping’s visit brought both the status of India-Myanmar and China-Myanmar relations to the forefront of public consciousness. During the visit, a number of agreements were signed between both the countries, among them were several infrastructure projects and the extension of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to Myanmar. China has proposed the construction of a China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the development of Myanmar’s deep sea port at Kyaukpyu. China’s strategic and economic expansion on India’s doorstep is a cause of concern for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The BRI extension into Myanmar creates a strategic challenge for India which needs to be considered from three points of view – Myanmar as a part of India’s Act East Policy, challenges to land connectivity and the need to develop a maritime gateway..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "ASEAN Today" (Singapore)
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Irrespective of India’s Look East, US sanctions or UK sanctions in Myanmar, China has been out there in Myanmar, parked with a consistent policy and focus—and backed by economic muscle. When the mighty fall, they fall hard! What greater irony than witness the beacon of democracy, Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, defend the country’s military against genocide (of the Rohingya people, a Muslim minority) at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, and inch towards China’s orbit? Over the last decade, Myanmar has been open to the West, to India and the larger neighbourhood. Pragmatically speaking, because of the Rohingya issue, the ensuing sanctions and the clampdown by the West, Myanmar sees an economic lifeline in China. But China aside, Myanmar will continue to hedge its bets with other countries. The talk of Myanmar gravitating towards China’s orbit has emerged following President Xi Jinping’s two-day trip to Myanmar, a ‘historical moment’, as Xi called it. The trip, the first in 19 years by a Chinese leader, visibly shored up China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Myanmar, with 33 China-Myanmar deals inked through memorandums of understanding (MoU) and agreements. Xi also met military chief General Min Aung Hlaing, singled out for sanctions by the US for the abuses against the Rohingyas..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Financial Express" (Uttar Pradesh)
2020-02-01
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The trip produced a mixed outlook for New Delhi’s perceptions of Beijing’s inroads in the wider Indo-Pacific.
Description: "Last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping concluded a two-day visit to Myanmar, the first for Xi in his current capacity and his first overseas visit of 2020. Viewed from the perspective of growing Chinese inroads in the Indian Ocean, Xi’s trip spotlighted Beijing’s continued efforts to make geopolitical gains in line with its broader regional interests, which will be of concern to India. While there may have been some surprise about Xi’s choice of Myanmar for his trip, it is in fact in line with China’s continued interest in making inroads with respect to the Indian Ocean. With the Myanmar visit, Xi has effectively completed his key neighborhood trips, having traveled through the Maldives and Sri Lanka in 2014, Pakistan in 2015, Bangladesh in 2016, and Nepal in 2019. From India’s perspective, New Delhi can be none too pleased with China’s constant forays into the wider Indian Ocean region. But at least for now, India appears to be letting Myanmar’s natural caution limit China’s influence. The significance of Xi’s trip ought not to be understated. It has been nearly two decades since a Chinese leader has traveled to Myanmar. While consolidating political and strategic ties are important for China, like in Nepal, there has been skepticism in Myanmar about partnering with China on the Belt and Road projects. But at the same time, given the difficult times that Myanmar is faced with internationally, clearly Myanmar is looking for support from China, which comes at a price. Consolidation and implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor was an important item in Xi’s Myanmar agenda and China has been quite successful on that front as the joint statement clearly outlined. China has other security interests as well, seeing Myanmar as a potential gateway to the Indian Ocean..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan) via "Observer Research Foundation (ORF)" (India)
2020-01-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-02-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: China’s banks supporting BRI projects should apply environmental risk-management policies and oversight, says Divya Narain
Description: "China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is intended to catalyse the economies of countries around the globe. Yet BRI projects overlap some of the most ecologically fragile places on earth. The multi-trillion-dollar initiative – to build transcontinental networks of roads, railways and ports, studded with dams, mines, power plants, and solar and wind farms – has its environmental impacts. These include air and water pollution, soil contamination and erosion, habitat and wildlife loss. For project developers and funders, failure to address these impacts can translate into regulatory and reputational risks. So they need to take mitigation seriously. Risks confronting developers can include penalties, legal action and backlash from communities causing project delays and even closures. According to a 2018 study, 14% of BRI projects in 66 countries have faced some kind of local pushback..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Chinadialogue" (China)
2020-01-30
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Nation’s most volatile and fast shifting armed conflict complicates China’s Belt and Road ambitions
Description: "Historically ethnic conflict in modern Myanmar has been a glacially slow-moving disaster, debilitating the nation’s politics while shifting only incrementally from one decade to the next. In 2019, the eruption, spread and intensification of nationalist revolt in Rakhine state abruptly upended that familiar landscape with sobering implications for an already fragmented and floundering peace process and domestic security more broadly. The new war in Rakhine state, pitting the military against the local Arakan Army (AA), a widely popular force led by a young and ideologically committed leadership, is also increasingly impacting Myanmar’s regional standing at a range of levels. China’s push for economic connectivity to the Bay of Bengal, stage-center during President Xi Jinping’s recent state visit to Myanmar, will now need to navigate the hostilities already lapping close to the projected deep-sea port and special economic zone at Kyaukphyu, a crucial component of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Poor prospects for any repatriation of the Muslim Rohingya refugee population camped in neighboring Bangladesh, estimated as high as one million, are now further receding, while additional migrant flows out of the state towards Southeast Asia are slowly gathering pace..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-29
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China’s growing strategic ties with Myanmar, evident from Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping’s recent sojourn to the administrative capital of Naypyidaw, are causing consternation in New Delhi. Not only is Beijing’s outreach to Myanmar challenging India’s Neighborhood First policy, which seeks vigorous engagement with Myanmar and other South Asian neighbors, it is also an attempt to gain a back door to the Indian Ocean, foreign policy analysts say, describing it as ominous for geopolitical landscape of the Indian Ocean, apart from the ramifications for the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, which seeks to keep China’s regional ambitions in check. The US administration of President Donald Trump has simply ignored the country along with much of the rest of Asia after overtures by Barack Obama, who initiated diplomatic relations, suspended economic sanctions and laid on high-level visits in the wake of then-President Thein Sein’s attempt to build on the 2010 constitution with reforms and open the country to global investment. With Myanmar facing international sanctions over its near genocide against minority Rohingya Muslims and other countries backing away, China has stepped into the vacuum. Although Xi’s trip to Myanmar was described as a “goodwill visit” to mark the 70th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two countries, pretty much like all things Chinese, there was a considerable agenda..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Sentinel"
2020-01-28
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The guns of civil conflict fell silent during the visit by Chinese leader Xi Jinping – a pause in fighting that not even State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi can achieve.
Description: "WEEKS before the visit by President Xi Jinping, local media outlets were focusing on the relationship between China and Myanmar. I especially enjoyed two cartoons drawn by Myanmar cartoonists before Xi arrived. One showed a fat Chinese man dressed in red talking to three men sitting on the floor. “When we visit, we don’t want to hear any noises,” he’s saying. The three men, who are wearing uniforms and have rifles beside them, reply, “Yes”. The other cartoon is in two blocks, one above the other. The top one shows rats running in circles and antagonising each other. The bottom image shows the rats all smiles with arms around each other’s shoulders as a big red cat clad in the flag of the People’s Republic of China enters the room with a stern expression. Support more independent journalism like this. Sign up to be a Frontier member. The cartoons were caustic comments on the recent quiescence of ethnic armed groups. In the days ahead of Xi’s arrival, the guns of war were indeed silent..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar" (Myanmar)
2020-01-26
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Chinese leader Xi Jinping has vowed to “solve” persistent gunrunning to Myanmar insurgents
Description: "When Chinese President Xi Jinping met Myanmar’s military commander-in-chief Senior General Ming Aung Hlaing in Naypyidaw earlier this month, it was not clear which of the two raised the issue first. But side-stepping the 800 pound gorilla in the room — new Chinese weaponry fueling Myanmar’s civil wars — was never going to be an option. Over the past year, those Chinese weapons have cost the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, hundreds of lives. And as the fighting season gathers pace in western Rakhine state, the likelihood of another high death toll in 2020 will cast a long shadow in army circles over the triumphant hailing of a “new era” in Sino-Myanmar amity and cooperation that attended Xi’s historic state visit. Almost certainly not by coincidence, the day before the January 18 meeting – the sixth meeting between Xi and Min Aung Hlaing — the Tatmadaw’s public relations wing ensured that the “discovery” of a rebel cache of Chinese munitions made on January 15 in Hsenwi township in northern Shan state received wide media publicity..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-28
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Transparency must be improved and deep concerns addressed, says former presidential adviser Aung Tun Thet...A raft of infrastructure deals have just been signed, including for a strategically important deep-sea port project.
Description: "Chinese companies need to improve transparency when they invest in Myanmar, a former presidential adviser in the Southeast Asian nation said, after the two sides signed a slew of infrastructure deals. Deep public concerns in Myanmar, especially over Beijing’s intentions in the country, must also be addressed, Aung Tun Thet told the South China Morning Post. “It’s very important that people understand, because what has happened in the past is people do not know what went on, and because they don’t know, then they get worried,” said the prominent economist in Myanmar and adviser to former president Thein Sein. “They get worried not because they object to anything, they get worried because they don’t know what is going on,” he said. “I think a lot of work needs to be done to convince the general population … that it is for the good of the country and it’s good for the people.”..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-28
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Four priority BRI projects in Myanmar promise to make China a balance-of-power tilting Indian Ocean force
Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping’s historic visit to Myanmar this month did not attract much regional media buzz, with most reports portraying the trip as more well-worn official promotion of his signature US$1 trillion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). But if the four most important of 33 agreements Xi signed with his Myanmar hosts during his tour are actually implemented – a big if considering BRI’s spotty follow through on ballyhooed projects – they would have far-reaching economic, political and strategic implications for South and Southeast Asia. The first of those big four are ambitious plans to build a high-speed railroad from Myanmar’s northern border with southern China down to the central city of Mandalay and eventually to Myanmar’s southern coast. The second aims to push forward the stalled Kyaukphyu port project situated on the Bay of Bengal, an initiative that would give China de facto access to the Indian Ocean and shift that region’s strategic calculus, particularly vis-à-vis India. The third is a proposed mega-project to build a “new city” opposite Myanmar’s former capital Yangon, a scheme that would effectively give China a unique hold on the nation’s commercial hub and underscore Beijing’s tightening grip on the country’s broad economy..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: International Court of Justice ordered emergency steps to protect Rohingya, threatening Myanmar’s European trade privileges...China accounts for a quarter of all foreign direct investment into Myanmar, second only to Singapore, government data shows.
Description: "Myanmar signalled that closer ties with China offer an economic buffer if human-rights concerns cause Western nations to curb trade privileges or investment. The persecution of the country’s Rohingya Muslim minority has sparked global condemnation, and led to an International Court of Justice order last week for emergency steps to protect Rohingya from genocide. The controversy imperils Myanmar’s European trade privileges and is spurring calls for sanctions. “The more sanctions Western countries impose on us, the more likely that is to boost our ties with our Asian alliances,” Commerce Minister Than Myint said in an interview in the capital, Naypyidaw. “We’ve opened the door to everyone.” During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar earlier in January – the first state visit by a Chinese leader in almost two decades – the two countries agreed to expedite several projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Yet a tightening embrace of China risks leaving Myanmar overreliant on its giant neighbour, a concern that has long vexed some officials. “When it comes to mega projects, we always want to see more options,” Than Myint said in the January 21 interview. “So we usually encourage Western companies not to be worried about doing business here. If they decide not to come, then we will have no choice but to cooperate with Asian partners.” In records going back to 1988, China accounts for a quarter of all foreign direct investment into Myanmar, second only to Singapore, government data shows..."
Source/publisher: "Bloomberg News" (New York) via "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-27
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been a recurrent hostage to downturns in India-Pakistan relations, which has often led New Delhi to turn to subregional initiatives, as has been witnessed by the current prime minister’s invitation to the member countries of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) to his swearing-in ceremony last year. BIMSTEC comprises five countries in South Asia – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka – and two in Southeast Asia, Myanmar and Thailand. Going by the past records, India’s approach to subregional initiatives has been marred by a lack of leadership, resources and institutionalization. For instance, it took 17 years for BIMSTEC to establish a permanent secretariat in Dhaka, in 2014. Similarly, the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) remained a Track II initiative for India until 2013 despite the rhetoric as to the perceived importance of subregional groupings. However, India is poised to focus more on subregional initiatives considering that the possibility of a resurrection of SAARC seems remote. New Delhi’s endeavor in this direction, nonetheless, has met a powerful tide from the reverse direction in the shape of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)..."
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-23
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: For Delhi, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor derails efforts to discredit the Belt and Road Initiative
Description: "The state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Myanmar on January 17-18, the first of its kind in 19 years, was a transformative event in regional politics from the perspective of China-Myanmar bilateral relations as well as regional security, something that should be of major concern for India. A “comprehensive strategic partnership” is moving toward building a “Myanmar-China community with a shared future based on the aims of mutual benefits, equality and win-win cooperation,” as the joint statement issued after Xi’s visit frames it. Xi said in his banquet speech in the capital Naypyidaw that the reason the “Paukphaw (fraternal) friendship between the two countries can last thousands of years” is that they have “stood together through thick and thin, and adhered to mutual respect and mutual benefit.” He urged the two countries to be “good neighbors like passengers on the same boat” and create a more favorable environment for their economic and social development..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-24
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The flags of China and Myanmar waved side by side along the roads of Myanmar’s capital city over the weekend, as Chinese Paramount Leader Xi Jinping visited the Buddhist-majority nation to draw it more tightly into China’s orbit. “Let us work hand in hand to build an even closer China-Myanmar community with a shared future and write a new chapter for our millennia-old ‘pauk-phaw’ friendship,” Xi wrote in Myanmar’s Myanma Alinn Daily on the eve of his trip, using a phrase meaning “fraternal” in the Burmese language. Xi’s “hand in hand” work with Myanmar’s leadership over the following two days resulted in the signing of 33 agreements that will accelerate construction of infrastructure projects related to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This is the project China brands as a 21st-century version of the ancient Silk Road, to facilitate trade across Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. The most notable Myanmar-based bri projects are a railway running from China to Kyaukpyu on Myanmar’s west coast, and a full-scale operational deep-sea port there..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Trumpet" (USA)
2020-01-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Some of Myanmar’s ethnic political parties on Wednesday expressed concern over potential negative impacts of China’s planned multibillion-dollar mega-projects in their regions, days after the two countries’ leaders signed more than 30 memorandums of understanding regarding the deals. Myanmar State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed 33 MoUs for Chinese-backed projects in the Southeast Asia country, many of which fall under the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), on Jan. 18, the second day of the Xi’s two-day state visit to Myanmar. Among the deals signed was a concession and shareholders agreement on the U.S. $1.3 billion-dollar Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and economic zone in Rakhine state, a letter of intent for a new urban development in the commercial hub Yangon, an MoU on local cooperation under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) between southwest China and Myanmar’s Mandalay region, and feasibility studies for high-speed rail links and expressways, according to the official Global New Light of Myanmar. A signature policy of Xi’s, the multitrillion-dollar BRI infrastructure investment and lending program that will link China with Asia, Africa, and Europe entails the building of border economic cooperation zones in Myanmar’s war-torn Shan and Kachin states..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia (RFA)" (USA)
2020-01-22
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Rakhine State, Myitsone Dam, Myanmar, Xi Jinping
Topic: Rakhine State, Myitsone Dam, Myanmar, Xi Jinping
Description: "A high-speed rail line to the east, a deep-sea port to the west, and a makeover for commercial heart Yangon -- Chinese leader Xi Jinping arrives in Myanmar on Friday laden with investment pledges worth billions which could reshape the country. Here are five of the main projects -- and some of the issues plaguing them: The crown jewel of Xi's two-day visit will be a $1.3 billion deep-sea port off Myanmar's troubled western Rakhine state. The Kyaukphyu port will serve as Beijing's gateway to the Indian Ocean. Myanmar has successfully hammered down the price from $7.2 billion to swerve fears of a Chinese debt-trap, but will still pick up 30 percent of the bill. Alongside the port, swathes of paddy fields and teak forests are poised to be transformed into a vast industrial zone of garment and food processing factories. Officials insist ethnic Rakhine will be the first in line for some of the 400,000 jobs the zone is slated to bring -- but many suspect the benefits will mainly be siphoned off outside the state. The port is the centre piece of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) project -- a key thread in China's global Belt and Road vision..."
Source/publisher: "The Economic Times" (India)
2020-01-15
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping ended a two-day state visit to Myanmar on Saturday after attending the signing of a raft of agreements buttressing bilateral relations and advancing Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, in which his host country is a key player. The two sides exchanged memoranda of understanding, letters and protocols covering 33 projects in the fields of information, industry, agriculture, security and the resettlement of internally displaced people in Myanmar’s war-torn Kachin State, which borders China. The agreements were signed after a morning meeting between Xi and Myanmar’s leader, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi. READ MORE: To call China’s Belt and Road Initiative a ‘debt trap’ is prejudiced, says ex-ambassador to U.S. The most significant pact appeared to be a concession and shareholder’s agreement for the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone on the Bay of Bengal. With a deep-water port, it is the terminus of the 1,700-kilometre- (1,055-mile-) long China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a major link in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative whose other end is in China’s Yunnan province..."
Source/publisher: "Associated Press" (USA) via "Global News" (Toronto)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China and Myanmar exchanged a number of cooperation documents covering such areas as politics, trade, investment and people-to-people communications amid President Xi Jinping's state visit on Saturday. The exchange ceremony was attended by Xi and Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. The two countries issued a joint statement the same day. In his talks with Aung San Suu Kyi, Xi said the two countries should speed up connecting development strategies and jointly push the building of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Hailing the corridor as a flagship project for Belt and Road cooperation between the two countries, Xi said the two sides have initiated construction and the project should bring benefits to the people as soon as possible. The two countries should focus on the building of major projects and promote connectivity, Xi said, adding the two sides should integrate the building of roads, railways and electricity projects to formulate a network of connectivity. Xi pointed out China welcomes Myanmar to expand exports to China, and Chinese companies are encouraged to increase investment in Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "China Daily" (Beijing)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China and Myanmar agreed to accelerate several joint infrastructure deals and projects during President Xi Jinping’s historic visit to the country, giving new impetus to commercial relations that have revived under Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Xi visited Myanmar on January 17 and 18, marking the first time a Chinese leader traveled to the Southeast Asian country in nearly two decades and coinciding with the 70th anniversary of the two sides establishing formal diplomatic relations. The two governments inked 33 agreements involving key infrastructure projects while agreeing to accelerate the implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor scheme, part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Most significantly, the two sides agreed to concession and shareholder agreements for the China-backed port project at Kyaukphyu in central Rakhine state. There are five agreements still to be signed on the project, according to Myanmar Deputy Commerce Minister Aung Htoo. The deals are controversial, however, and could expose China to future political risks. Tun Kyi, coordinator of the community group Kyaukphyu Rural Development Association, said local villagers were not consulted during the negotiations of the two new agreements..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-21
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Beijing seeks to cement its hold over its neighbour increasingly isolated by West amid Rohingya crisis
Description: "China and Myanmar yesterday inked dozens of deals related to Belt and Road Initiative to speed up infrastructure projects in the Southeast Asian nation, as Beijing seeks to cement its hold over a neighbour increasingly isolated by the West. But no major new projects were agreed during the two-day visit by President Xi Jinping, the first of any Chinese leader in 19 years. Analysts said Myanmar was generally cautious of investments by Beijing and was also being careful ahead of elections later this year. Still, Xi and Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi signed 33 agreements shoring up key projects that are part of the flagship Belt and Road Initiative, China’s vision of new trade routes described as a “21st century silk road”. They agreed to hasten implementation of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor, a giant infrastructure scheme worth billions of dollars, with agreements on railways linking southwestern China to the Indian Ocean, a deep sea-port in conflict-riven Rakhine state, a special economic zone on the border, and a new city project in the commercial capital of Yangon. They did not address a controversial $3.6 billion Beijing-backed mega dam, where work has been stalled since 2011, reflecting the contentiousness of Chinese investment in Myanmar, where many are uncomfortable with the sway Beijing has over its smaller neighbour..."
Source/publisher: "The Daily Star" (Bangladesh)
2020-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Xi Jinping’s visit – and the billions in development and investment deals signed – opens the door to greater stability in the region
Description: "China and Myanmar have a long and complex history. But President Xi Jinping’s just-ended two-day visit, his inaugural foreign trip of the year and the first to the country by a Chinese leader in 19 years, was aimed at taking ties to a new level of friendship and trust, with mutual benefit at the core. On the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations, Xi and Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi signed 33 agreements shoring up key projects that are part of Beijing’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). They agreed to hasten implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a giant infrastructure scheme worth billions of dollars, with agreements on railways linking southwestern China to the Indian Ocean, a deep-sea port in conflict-riven Rakhine state, a special economic zone on the border, and a new city project in the commercial capital of Yangon. Completion of the projects will mean faster and more reliable delivery of crucial energy supplies to China from the Middle East and Africa while increasing Chinese infrastructure and investment opportunities, and for Myanmar, there will be development and jobs..."
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: The pacts were signed during president Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to Myanmar, a first by a Chinese president in almost two decades...This will give a significant push to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative to which Myanmar had signed onto in 2018 amid lack of investments from western countries.
Description: "China and Myanmar, over the weekend, signed 33 bilateral agreements that are expected to strengthen ties between India’s eastern neighbor and Beijing. The accords include those to construct a rail link and a deep-sea port – part of a China-Myanmar-Economic Corridor – that runs from China’s south-western region to the Bay of Bengal. This will give a significant push to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative to which Myanmar had signed onto in 2018 amid lack of investments from western countries. The pacts were signed during president Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to Myanmar, a first by a Chinese president in almost two decades. Xi’s visit to Myanmar was also his first abroad in the 2020 calendar year. The pacts were signed against the backdrop of Myanmar State Councilor Aung San Suu Kyi coming under increasing pressure from Western countries over its crackdown on Rohingya Muslims. A Myanmar military campaign in 2017-18 caused some 730,000 Rohingyas from Rakhine state to flee to Bangladesh. In December, Nobel Laureate Suu Kyi defended her country’s human rights record vis a vis the Rohingyas at a hearing at the Hague-based International Court of Justice and a ruling in expected this month..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "livemint" (New Delhi)
2020-01-20
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China and Myanmar inked dozens of deals on Saturday to speed up infrastructure projects as Beijing seeks to cement its hold over a neighbor increasingly isolated by the West. But no major new projects were agreed on during the two-day visit by President Xi Jinping, the first of any Chinese leader in 19 years. Analysts said Myanmar is generally cautious of investments by Beijing and is also being careful ahead of elections later this year. Still, Xi and Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi signed 33 agreements shoring up key projects that are part of the flagship Belt and Road initiative, China’s vision of new trade routes described as a “21st-century Silk Road.” They agreed to hasten implementation of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor, a giant infrastructure scheme worth billions of dollars, with agreements on railways linking southwestern China to the Indian Ocean, a deep sea-port in conflict-riven Rakhine state, a special economic zone on the border, and a new city project in the commercial capital of Yangon. They did not address a controversial $3.6 billion Beijing-backed mega-dam, where work has been stalled since 2011, reflecting the contentiousness of Chinese investment in Myanmar, where many are uncomfortable with the sway Beijing has over its smaller neighbor..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK) via "Japan Times" (Japan)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "China and Myanmar inked dozens of deals to speed up infrastructure projects in the South-East Asian nation, as Beijing seeks to cement its hold over a neighbour increasingly isolated by the West. But no major new projects were agreed during the two-day visit by President Xi Jinping, the first of any Chinese leader in 19 years. Analysts said Myanmar was generally cautious of investments by Beijing and was also being careful ahead of elections later this year. Still, Xi and Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi signed 33 agreements yesterday shoring up key projects that are part of the flagship Belt and Road Initiative, China’s vision of new trade routes described as a “21st century silk road”. They agreed to hasten implementation of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor, a giant infrastructure scheme worth billions of dollars, with agreements on railways linking southwestern China to the Indian Ocean, a deep sea port in conflict-riven Rakhine state, a special economic zone on the border and a new city project in the commercial capital of Yangon. At a welcoming ceremony on Friday, Xi hailed a “new era” of relations between the countries. “We are drawing a future roadmap that will bring to life bilateral relations based on brotherly and sisterly closeness in order to overcome hardships together and provide assistance to each other, ” Xi said..."
Source/publisher: "The Star Online" (Selangor)
2020-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Chinese president’s two-day trip comes as nations mark 70 years of diplomatic ties...US sanctions on Myanmar’s military leaders over alleged ‘serious human rights abuses’ described as a blow to Southeast Asian nation’s dignity.
Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar this week is special in several ways. It is Xi’s first overseas trip of the year and the first visit to the Southeast Asian country by a Chinese president since 2001. This year also marks the 70th anniversary of formal diplomatic ties between the two countries. A recent Xinhua commentary said that “a good neighbour is better than a far dwelling relative”, referring to China’s ties with Myanmar. Some observers view geopolitics concerning Myanmar in black-and-white terms: a National League for Democracy (NLD) government would lead to closer ties with the West and less so with China. The Rakhine issue effectively put paid to such earlier prognosis. If anything, there has yet to be any respite to the general downturn in relations between Myanmar and the West. In fact, the situation has worsened. Following a round of sanctions by Western powers in 2018, the US treasury department last month imposed new sanctions against Myanmar’s top military leaders over alleged “serious human rights abuses”, a move that Myanmar’s military (the Tatmadaw) criticised as “targeted political pressure” which “hurt the dignity” of the military. A month earlier, the Tatmadaw was accused by the US of possessing chemical weapons..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Deal strengthens ties with Beijing as Aung San Suu Kyi faces foreign criticism for Rohingya crackdown
Description: "Myanmar and China on Saturday signed 33 bilateral agreements that will bind the south-east Asian country closer to its giant neighbour, including rail and deep-sea port projects along an economic corridor linking China’s south-western interior to the Indian Ocean.  Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, and Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi agreed the projects — long under discussion as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative global infrastructure plan — on the second day of Mr Xi’s two-day visit to the capital Naypyidaw.  The agreements’ signing reflects deepening ties between Myanmar and China at a time when Aung San Suu Kyi’s government is under intense criticism internationally for the 2017-8 military campaign targeting minority Rohingya in Rakhine state, which killed thousands and exiled more than 730,000. As part of China’s signature BRI project for the country, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the two sides on Saturday signed agreements on railways linking China to Kyaukpyu on the Bay of Bengal in Rakhine, and a final agreement on the building of a deep-sea port there.  The two sides also inked agreements providing for a special economic zone at the Chinese border and made oblique reference to New Yangon City, a planned new industrial quarter in Myanmar’s biggest city that the Chinese state-owned construction company CCCC has proposed building..."
Source/publisher: "Financial Times" ( London)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-19
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping on Saturday called on China and Myanmar to maintain and develop their "Paukphaw" friendship, push forward bilateral cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative and bring more benefits to the two nations. Xi made the remarks during a meeting with Myanmar's Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services Min Aung Hlaing in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. The development of bilateral ties depends on the cooperation of the two peoples, and also the two militaries, Xi said. The Chinese president expressed his hope that the Myanmar military can enhance exchanges with the Chinese side to jointly safeguard the peace and stability of their shared border, and establish good conditions in order to boost the border's economic development. "China and Myanmar are champions of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China has always insisted on not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and respecting the development path chosen by the people of all countries," he said. "The two sides should continue to understand and support each other, strengthen cooperation, firmly safeguard our respective sovereignty, security and development interests, safeguard our common legitimate rights and interests, and safeguard the basic principles of international relations. China will continue to speak up for Myanmar in the international community," Xi continued..."
Source/publisher: "China Global Television Network (CGTN)" (China)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Sub-title: Trip helps cement ‘new era’ for Beijing’s ties with its neighbour, which is facing growing international criticism over its treatment of the Rohingya Muslim minority...Agreements see multibillion plan for Kyaukphyu port revived – a step that could allow China to bypass the Strait of Malacca where its South China Sea claims have faced a growing backlash.
Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping wrapped up his visit to Myanmar on Saturday after signing multibillion-dollar infrastructure deals, including one for a strategically important port in the Indian Ocean. This investment and what both sides hailed as “new era” in relations offered a timely boost for Myanmar, which is facing increasing isolation from the West over its treatment of the Rohingya Muslim minority. Following his arrival in the purpose-built capital of Naypyidaw on Friday afternoon, Xi met a number of key figures, including President Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi, the effective head of the government, as well as military chief General Min Aung Hlaing. He also meet politicians from areas, some racked by ethnic conflict, where Chinese infrastructure projects are being planned or are under way.According to local media, the two sides signed 33 memorandums of understanding, agreements, exchange letters and protocols, 13 of which were related to infrastructure. In a move that observers said could further cement Beijing’s economic and political influence, the two sides also agreed to push forward plans to develop the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, most notably the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone along the coast of the Bay of Bengal..."
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Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post" (Hong Kong)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Along the Bay of Bengal on the west tip of Myanmar, the town of Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State sits tranquilly on a 25-meter deep harbor. This deep-sea port, surrounded by superb natural conditions, could be developed into another demonstration project under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), mutually benefiting both Myanmar and China. During Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Myanmar on Jan. 17-18, the two sides agreed to strengthen their BRI cooperation, and work hard to push forward the construction of the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), according to a joint statement issued by the two countries on Saturday. Master plan In 2014, the Myanmar government invited bidders from around the world for its plan to set up the Kyaukpyu SEZ, one of the country's three national SEZs, in an effort to kick-start the local economy and raise living standards. The master plan includes a deep-sea port and an accompanying industrial park nearby. In 2015, a consortium of six companies led by the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) won the tender for building the Kyaukpyu SEZ. Three years later, after a marathon of negotiations, the CITIC-led consortium struck a framework agreement with Myanmar on the project..."
Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China) via "China.org.cn" (China)
2020-01-19
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks with Myanmar President U Win Myint here on Friday, stressing the importance of the "Paukphaw" (fraternal) friendship between the two countries. Xi said that Myanmar turns to be the destination of his first overseas trip this year when the two countries celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, highlighting the great importance of the "Paukphaw" friendship and deepening bilateral ties. The Chinese president said he hopes that his visit could send three messages as follows: First, the Chinese government and people firmly support the Myanmar government and people in pursuing development path suited to its own national conditions and continuously promoting the country's development. Second, the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between China and Myanmar has enjoyed sound foundation, and joint efforts to build a China-Myanmar community with a shared future will inject new impetus and vitality into the development of bilateral relations. Third, China stands ready to work together with Myanmar in advancing practical cooperation, speeding up the alignment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Myanmar development strategies, so as to bring more benefits to the two peoples..."
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Source/publisher: "Xinhua" (China)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "This year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of China-Myanmar diplomatic relations. As friendly neighbors, Myanmar has been generally associated with the silk road, which originated in China, throughout history and the friendship of two countries keeps vibrant thanks to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In ancient times, Myanmar was a transportation hub of both the southwestern Silk Road between China, Myanmar and India and the Maritime Silk Road, bringing great convenience to trade between China, the Indian Ocean and the western world. The long-term friendly bilateral economic ties have laid a foundation for Myanmar to participate in BRI in the new century. In 2015, Myanmar joined the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as one of the founding members. The two countries then signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to jointly build the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) in 2018, aiming to further enhance bilateral pragmatic cooperation within the framework of BRI..."
Source/publisher: "China Global Television Network (CGTN)" (China)
2020-01-17
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Topic: Belt and Road initiative, BRI, China, China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, CMEC, Kachin State, Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone, Myitkyina Economic Development Zone, Myitsone Dam, Xi Jinping
Topic: Belt and Road initiative, BRI, China, China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, CMEC, Kachin State, Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone, Myitkyina Economic Development Zone, Myitsone Dam, Xi Jinping
Description: "Nearly 40 civil society organizations (CSOs) have called on Chinese President Xi Jinping to permanently terminate the suspended Myitsone Dam project, saying that the project threatens the prosperity of the Myanmar people and that friendly relations between the two countries will deteriorate if the project goes ahead. On Wednesday, civil society organizations, mostly based in Kachin State, issued an open letter to Xi, two days before his planned visit to Myanmar. The visit aims to pave the way for Xi’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Myanmar and includes plans for a dozen agreements, including around the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which will grant China access to the Indian Ocean. A final decision on the controversial Myitsone Dam project may also be on the agenda for the visit. “We will have to lose more and more if the project is revived. Local residents have already suffered enough because of the project. We want to stop the project permanently,” Tu Hkawng, project coordinator for civil society organization Airavati, told The Irrawaddy. “We will never agree to restarting the Myitsone project.”..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
2020-01-16
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "Chinese President Xi Jinping said Friday that China firmly supports Myanmar in pursuing a development path suited to its national conditions. He made the remarks during talks with Myanmar President U Win Myint in the capital city of Nay Pyi Taw, stressing the importance of the "Paukphaw" (fraternal) friendship and deepening bilateral ties between the two countries. President Xi arrived in Myanmar earlier Friday for a state visit, making it his first overseas trip in 2020 and the first visit to the Southeast Asian nation by a Chinese president after 19 years. Hailing the strong foundation of the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries, Xi called for joint efforts to build a China-Myanmar community with a shared future and advance cooperation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework..."
Source/publisher: "China Global Television Network (CGTN)" (China)
2020-01-18
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Description: "The two governments will sign dozens of economic agreements. Naypyidaw represents a crucial junction for the Chinese "two oceans" strategy. Many Burmese, including even army generals, have developed a deep fear of China. It is widely believed that China wants a weak and unstable Myanmar in order to maintain control and influence. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrives today in Myanmar for a two-day visit with a strong geopolitical significance, in the year in which the two countries celebrate 70 years of diplomatic relations. The purpose of Xi's trip is to strengthen economic ties along the shared border, as well as Chinese investments in other parts of Myanmar under the Belt and Road Initiative (Bri) and infrastructure projects of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (Cmec) . According to analysts and observers, the two governments will sign dozens of economic agreements, projects to improve roads, promote commercial relations and assist social and economic development. The interests of the Chinese president are concentrated on the implementation of projects such as the seaport of the Special Economic Zone of Kyaukphyu, in Rakhine (western Myanmar); the Economic Cooperation Zone, on the northern and northeastern border of Myanmar; and the New Yangon City project. Beijing sees Myanmar as a crucial hub for the Chinese "two oceans" strategy - with reference to the Pacific and Indian oceans. It aims to redistribute the balance of power in the region in favor of the communist regime, expanding naval operations from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean, where Beijing is to conduct "offshore operations". But China's geopolitical, economic and strategic interests in Myanmar are currently the subject of much debate. Critics say that Myanmar is returning to China's orbit, or even struggling to maintain its neutrality and independence..."
Source/publisher: "AsiaNews.it" (Italy)
2020-01-17
Date of entry/update: 2020-01-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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