Panglong Peace Conference
Websites/Multiple Documents
Description:
"The 2016 Panglong Conference, officially known as the Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (Burmese: ပွညျထောငျစု ငွိမျးခမြျးရေးညီလာခံ ၂၁ ရာစု ပငျလုံ) is an upcoming peace conference which began on 31 Aug 2016 in Myanmar Convention Centre 2 of Naypyidaw, Myanmar.
The first Panglong Conference was held in the Panglong region of British Burma in 1947, and was negotiated between Aung San and ethnic leaders. Despite several meetings between ethnic insurgent groups and the government prior to the Panglong Conference in 2016, it is unclear how many of them will actually attend.
Eighteen ethnic insurgent groups are expected to attend the conference, whilst three ethnic insurgent groups (The Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta?ang National Liberation Army) are not expected to attend.Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations also attended the opening ceremony..."
Source/publisher:
Wikipedia
Date of entry/update:
2016-08-31
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Panglong Peace Conference
Language:
English
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Description:
48,700 results, 31 August 2016
Source/publisher:
Google
Date of entry/update:
2016-08-31
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Panglong Peace Conference
Language:
English
more
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" via Google
Date of entry/update:
2016-08-31
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Panglong Peace Conference
Language:
English
more
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times" via Google
Date of entry/update:
2016-08-31
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Panglong Peace Conference
Language:
English
more
Individual Documents
Description:
"Union Minister Dr. Sasa's speech on the 76th anniversary of the signing of the Panglong Treaty..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication:
2023-02-12
Date of entry/update:
2023-02-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Panglong Peace Conference
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637.49 KB
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Sub-title:
Fostering the untapped potential of Myanmar’s youth
Description:
"In January 2017, State Counsellor Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi gathered 18 young people from across
Myanmar for a Peace Talk in Nay Pyi Taw. These
youth, representing a range of ethnic identities,
shared their fears, hopes, and insights on how to
transform conflict into peace, and how to build
trust between, and within, communities. While the
Peace Talk was considered by some to be symbolic
rather than substantive, the meeting brought the
issue of youth inclusion to the fore and reaffirmed
previous statements delivered by State Counsellor
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi calling for greater
engagement of youth in peace.8
Throughout Myanmar’s history young men and
women have been active at the community level
in activities ranging from youth-led social affairs
groups (Tha-yay Nar-yay ah thin) to supporting
social and community projects such as free funeral
and wedding services, cultural activities, blood
donations, among many others. In the more formal
peacebuilding sphere, youth have supported and
sustained peacebuilding processes but have rarely
featured in formal, influential public decision-
making roles. In the lead up to the partial signing
of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)
in October 2015, young men and women were
the backbone of Government and Ethnic Armed
Organisation (EAO) coordination structures,
but were never selected as formal negotiators.
Furthermore, key documents guiding formal
peacebuilding efforts in Myanmar — such
as the NCA and the Framework for Political
Dialogue — do not contain provisions related to
youth inclusion. These documents also do not
consider youth as a cross-cutting issue across
thematic discussions. In other words, speeches
and statements articulating the importance
of youth inclusion have yet to be matched by
inclusion strategies and structures that secure the
meaningful engagement of young people in the
future of their country.
While low levels of youth inclusion in public
decision-making persist, there is an opportunity to
capitalise on nascent youth policy commitments
and harness the contributions of youth leaders,
innovators, facilitators, and policy-advocates to
increase the likelihood of reaching sustainable
peace in the country. Global evidence shows that
broadening public participation – including to
young people – in peace increases the prospects
for it lasting.9
Empowering young peacebuilders
has also been shown to create active citizens for
peace, to reduce violence and to increase peaceful
cohabitation.10 With the passing of United Nations
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250 on
Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in 2015, there
is also potential for Myanmar to lead globally
and set good practice for sustainably increasing
the involvement of young people at all levels of
decision-making, policy-making and peacebuilding.
Myanmar youth are contributing formally and
informally to a host of peacebuilding initiatives;
leveraging these contributions, often innovative
and catalytic in their approaches, can support the
multiple transitions the country is undergoing.
Bringing the role of young people to the forefront
of Myanmar’s transition also builds on Myanmar’s
history where students and youth movements
have influenced the trajectory of the country.
This Discussion Paper provides a starting point
for understanding the status of youth inclusion
in peacebuilding in Myanmar. In Section 1, this
Discussion Paper assesses the involvement of
youth and inclusion of youth perspectives in peace
at both national and sub-national levels since 2011.
Section 2 analyses the challenges young women
and men face to their substantive involvement in
peacebuilding. Section 3 draws upon national and
international good practice, articulating a strategic
framework for action to overcome obstacles
discussed in Section 2. (For a detailed overview of
the methodology used to inform this Paper, see
Annex 2.)
opportunities and challenges to young men. Other
identity factors often supersede age-related
identity. Thus, when discussing youth in Myanmar,
it is critical to understand other elements of
identity that intersect with age, such as: gender,
ethnicity, religion, class, disability, Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Questioning
(LGBTIQ), migration, nationality, drug use, among
others..."
Source/publisher:
Paung Sie Facility, UKaid, SWEDEN, Australian Aid
Date of publication:
2017-01-00
Date of entry/update:
2021-05-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Children, Education rights: standards and mechanisms, Children's Rights - studies, Women's rights, Ethnic groups in Burma: general studies and articles
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.86 MB (72 pages)
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Topic:
Myanmar, ethnic conflict, civil war, ceasefires, landgrabbing
Topic:
Myanmar, ethnic conflict, civil war, ceasefires, landgrabbing
Description:
"ABSTRACT: A reform process initiated in 2011 in Myanmar brought hope to end decades of civil war and ethnic conflict. But new ceasefires have not moved into real political dialogue, the ‘peace process’ has stalled, and fighting continues in parts of the country. Economic reforms have favoured foreign investment and local elites, and have had detrimental impacts on communities in ethnic borderlands. The new ceasefires facilitated this, and coupled with economic reforms brought loss of land and related natural resources, and strengthened the central government and the military’s political and economic control over ethnic borderlands. This article argues that this is a continuation of the ‘neither war nor peace’ policy of a previous round of ceasefires in the 1990s, but by different means. In the past this focused on coercion and military pressure, but now these military tactics have been complemented with the use of the new legal framework.....Introduction: Myanmar has suffered from ethnic conflict and civil war since independence in 1948, and the national armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw) have played a dominant role in national politics since it staged a coup d’etat in 1962. In 2011, a reform process started that brought hope at home and abroad that finally a political solution could be found at the negotiation table to more than sixty years of armed conflict. Almost a decade later, newly agreed ceasefires have not moved into real political dialogue, the so-called ‘peace process’ has all but stalled, and fighting continues in many parts of the country, causing new displacement of the civilian population.
Meanwhile, economic reforms initiated in the same period favouring foreign investment and local elites have had detrimental impacts on rural communities in ethnic borderlands.1 The new ceasefires have played a large role in facilitating these negative consequences. Rather than bringing peace and inclusive development that respects and promotes social justice and local customs, the ceasefires and economic reforms have brought loss of land and related natural resources and the destruction of local cultures. Legal reforms have further paved the way for these negative developments.
This article analyses why the new ceasefires have not transformed into a lasting political settlement, by comparing them with previous ceasefire attempts and by placing them into the larger conflict dynamics in Myanmar. It will explain the impact of these failed ceasefires on the right to land for rural communities in the ethnic borderlands. It will show how the ceasefires and the economic reforms strengthened the central government and Tatmadaw’s military, political and economic control over ethnic borderlands. It is argued that what is being experienced currently is a continuation of the ‘neither war nor peace’ policy of the first round of ceasefires in the 1990s (Kramer 2009a), but by different means. While in the previous round of ceasefires this involved mostly coercion and military pressure, in the present times these military tactics have been complemented with the use of the country’s new legal framework..."
Source/publisher:
The Journal of Peasant Studies via Routledge (London)
Date of publication:
2020-12-09
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-27
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Non-Ceasefire Groups, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Several Groups
Language:
Format :
pdf
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1.68 MB
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Sub-title:
An EBO commentary on the ICG’s ‘Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process’
Description:
"The following paper has been written in response to the International Crisis Group’s latest Report No.308/Asia of 19 June 2020, ‘Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process’ and is designed to further
complement and put forward some of our conclusions to facilitate further discourse. ICG’s Executive Summary The Panglong-21 peace conference would be largely symbolic and do little to address the
fundamental obstacles on Myanmar’s road toward sustainable peace… the primary objectives for both sides are modest. The NLD sees the Panglong-21 meeting mostly as a way to boost its political campaign, while ethnic armed groups want to ensure that the peace
process continues after the vote, regardless of who comes to power.
The ICG fails to understand that ensuring the peace process continues after the elections is not symbolic and it is not a modest objective. It would be a very significant achievement.
The Tatmadaw has never believed in negotiations and still does not. In 2011, for the first time in over sixty-four years, Thein Sein, decided to try to find a political solution to the civil war. If the
talks do not continue after the elections, it means a return to war. The Commander-in-Chief has in the recent past stated that the peace talks must end by 2020 and that the ethnic forces must be
either disbanded or demobilized. Aung San Suu Kyi has also said that she wants the peace talks to end by 2020. If both of them can be made to agree to continue the peace talks beyond 2020, it would
be a major achievement indeed. The election period, however, will also be an opportunity to reflect on how to take the peace
process forward… The current government, the military and ethnic armed groups should use this period to review their own strategy and goals, ramp up informal dialogue and examine crucial issues that have so far been put aside, such as the growth of the illicit economy and
the mounting might of military-aligned militias… This downtime constitutes a unique opportunity for all parties to reflect on how to restart the process with a more constructive approach in 2021.
The downtime may apply to the government and the Tatmadaw. ICG has mistakenly assumed that the ethnic armed organizations (like the government) have been idle during the two-year period
when the peace talks were deadlocked (2018 and 2019). The ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have been very busy reviewing their strategy and goals, having intense internal dialogue and examining
crucial issues in order to see how they can be addressed in a way that will be acceptable to all stakeholders. They do not want to go back to war and are committed to trying to find political solutions. They have not had, and will not be having, any downtime. The problem lies with the government and the Tatmadaw..."
Source/publisher:
Euro Burma Office
Date of publication:
2020-06-00
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Euro Burma Office, Burma's ethnic opposition, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
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pdf
Size:
158 KB
Local URL:
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Description:
"Despite a ceasefire that began on 10 May and the COVID-19 pandemic, low-intensity conflict continued throughout 2020. The Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (UPC) was held from
17-19 August 2020, and while there remains far to go, the general outcome of the meeting was treated favourably by several ethnic leaders and it is hoped there will be a stronger basis for future talks in
2021. That said, however, intermittent clashes continued in some ethnic states throughout the year and there is little to suggest that such clashes in some states will stop as peace negotiations continue in 2021. Skirmishes occurred in Karen State largely in areas controlled by the Karen National Liberation Army Brigade-5 area (Mutraw District). Clashes have largely been linked to the Myanmar military’s
construction of a road linking Kyaukkyi in Bago Region and into Papun. The reconstruction of the old road originally began in early 2018. The construction was halted temporarily but has since resumed. The KNU has claimed that the reconstruction of the road would
allow further Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) expansion into KNU controlled areas, while the Myanmar military has said that existing roads need to be upgraded or they will deteriorate.1 In large part, the reason for such continued clashes is the interpretation by both sides of clauses in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. On December 1, 2020, the KNLA’s 5th Brigade issued a statement expressing its impatience with the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.
According to Brigadier General Tamala Taw the 5th Brigade G1,
Even though we have signed the NCA, there has been no implementation, particularly, of the NCA Chapter 3 and Article 25 of Chapter 6. None of these issues – ceasefire areas, deployment
of troops, the common definition of some terms used in the NCA, and the avoidance of using the public spaces mentioned in the NCA as military outposts or encampments – these have never been discussed.
The lack of discussion of the interim period in the NCA Article 25 of Chapter 6 has led to a decline in trust. In the bilateral meeting of KNU and the Myanmar government in 2012, there was a KNLA proposal for the relocation of military bases from civilian areas and troop routes
to be moved. We have been waiting for this to happen for more than eight years now, but so far no action has been taken, so it leaves us in a state of despair. This has been seen as giving the military a huge advantage in the ground – trust has now been further eroded.2..."
Source/publisher:
Euro Burma Office
Date of publication:
2021-01-00
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Euro Burma Office
Language:
Format :
pdf
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104.47 KB
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Sub-title:
Moving forward after the election
Description:
"After the Myanmar peace process had been deadlocked from the end of 2018 until the beginning of 2020 the Government of Aung San Suu Kyi along with the military and a number of armed ethnic
organisations (EAOs) were able to hold another Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong (UPC) from 17-19 August 2020.
State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi had made resolving peace with the many armed ethnic groups in the country a priority after coming to power in 2015. And both the State Counsellor and Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces, Snr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing had voiced an opinion that talks must restart prior to the 2020 general election.
Several criticisms have been made about the results of the UPC which saw representatives from all 10 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-signatory EAOs participate. Invitations had also been offered to
non-signatory EAOs from Kachin (KIA), Wa (UWSA), Kokang (MNDAA), Mong La (NDAA), and Shan (SSPP) in the northeast, but all declined due to the exclusion of the Arakan Army (AA) which the
government has designated a terrorist organisation.
Regardless, the talks continued with the adoption of a further 20 principles for the Union Accords (UA), and an agreement among the parties to continue formal peace talks with the incoming
government in 2021. While some believe there were no substantive results from the UPC, 1 the fact is that the UPC meeting has led to the reinvigoration of a stalled peace process and allowed further time
for EAOs to reconsider their position in moving forward.
At least one participant, Sai Leng from the Restoration Council Shan State Army, pointed out that, It is meaningful to agree on how to build a federal union beyond 2020. We also agreed on some
guiding principles of building the federal union, such as power-sharing between Union and States,2 Similarly, the State Counsellor said the peace process was now back on track and the principles signed
were “more sincere and have more substance.”3 Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, the military delegate and chairman of the Joint Monitoring Committee on the nationwide ceasefire, Now we can draw a conclusion that countless negotiations have reduced the mistrust that has been deep-rooted on both sides . . . [stakeholders] should not leave the negotiation table, whatever the reason.4 According to one EAO advisor, one of the more important points was that, Part 3.3 (a) Power, resource, tax and finance will be divided between the Union and regions/states in line with the federal system (official translation).
But he also noted, [But] Some observers have pointed out that it was only a repetition of UA#1 (political sector) 4 (d). But according to the negotiators, the difference is the emphasis shown here, which was
not in UA#1. Therefore, they [ethnic leaders] say, the key to a federal union is now open. Accordingly, it can be regarded as a second breakthrough after the NCA.5 Another negotiator in the talks had suggested that the talks were ‘more disappointing’ but expressed
the desire to move forward regardless.6..."
Source/publisher:
Euro Burma Office
Date of publication:
2020-11-00
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Various groups, Euro Burma Office, Several Groups, The 2020 General Elections in Burma/Myanmar, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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Format :
pdf
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98.53 KB
Local URL:
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Sub-title:
The Role of the KNPP in the Union Peace Process
Description:
"Despite the fact that thus far ten groups have
signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement1
the
Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) still
maintains a number of reservations in relation to
the signing of the agreement. While a number of
other groups, primarily situated in Shan State and
along the border with China have also held out,2
the
fact that the KNPP, one of the remaining members
of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC)
has not yet signed is somewhat surprising.3
Given its geographical location between Karen
State and Shan State, it had been expected given
the signing of the NCA by KNPP allies and UNFC
members the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and
Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) that the KNPP would
also sign. However, the KNPP is still concerned
about signing the agreement and attending the
Union Peace Conferences that the government
initiated to further the peace process.
Although a number of doubts remained, the KNPP
met with the Government’s Peace Commission for
two days on April 26-27, 2018 in Loikaw and agreed
on the implementation of bilateral terms through
regular discussions at the state level.4 According to
a joint statement issued after the meeting,
The Karenni National Progressive PartyKNPP has committed to sign the
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-NCA and
has agreed to follow the following points
in the short term before signing the NCA.
(a) Issues concerning holding negotiations
at the state level for Local Monitoring
Team & JMC issue, movement of troops of
both sides and communications to hold
regular negotiations between Kayah State
Government and the KNPP as agreed by
both sides
(b) To reassign liaison officers at the state
level and Union level to carry it out
through the agreed communication
channels agreed by both sides at the state
level and Union level
(c) Progress was achieved in the military
sector, and both sides are to proceed with
the work as agreed.
3. As the above points were agreed at the
Peace Talks, the Karenni National
Progressive Party-KNPP hereby
announced that it had agreed at the talks
to keep on its efforts for signing the
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-NCA.5
The KNPPs Gen Bee Htoo said that while the two
sides have not yet been able to reach an
understanding on signing the NCA, “It is important
to keep peace in Karenni State.”6
One of the main issues of concern for the KNPP was
the killing of three of its soldiers and one civilian
who was allegedly murdered by Tatmadaw troops
at the regional operation command based in Loikaw
in December 2017. Although, the Tatmadaw has
said it is conducting an inquiry into the incident no
further progress has been made. The incident has
further weakened trust in relation to the Myanmar
military and its presence in Karenni State.
Shwe Myo Thant, Secretary of KNPP Central
Committee, was quoted as saying
The KNPP maintained the bilateral
agreement with the government since
2012 but we need to watch the condition
of the relationship between us and
Tatmadaw,7
To further negotiations, a meeting between the
Peace Commission had been planned in May but
the Commission cancelled the meeting after the
KNPP had asked for further clarification in relation
to the subjects to be discussed.8..."
Source/publisher:
Euro Burma Office
Date of publication:
2018-11-00
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Panglong Peace Conference, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Euro Burma Office
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Description:
"Since 9 June 2011, Kachin State has seen open
conflict between the Kachin Independence Army
and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military). The Kachin
Independence Organisation had signed a ceasefire
agreement with the regime in 1994 and since then
had lived in relative peace until the ceasefire was
broken by the Tatmadaw in June 2011.
The increased territorial infractions by the
Tatmadaw combined with economic exploitation
by China in Kachin territory, especially the
construction of the Myitsone Hydropower Dam, left
the Kachin Independence Organisation with very
little alternative but to return to armed resistance
to prevent further abuses of its people and their
territory’s natural resources. Despite this, however,
the political situation since the beginning of
hostilities has changed significantly.
Although a number of groups agreed to a
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in October 2015,
with the continuing conflict in Kachin State, the KIO
has sought a number of different methodologies to
realise their political aims and secure its people’s
legacy.
Strategy One – The UNFC
Alliance
The origins of the UNFC began in May 2010 when
three 1990s ceasefire groups, the Kachin
Independence Organisation (KIO), the New Mon
State Party (NMSP), the Shan State Progress Party
(SSPP) and three non-ceasefire groups, the Karen
National Union (KNU), the Karenni National
Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Chin National
Front (CNF), formally announced the creation of the
Committee for the Emergence of a Federal Union (CEFU). The Committee’s purpose was to
consolidate a political front at a time when the
ceasefire groups faced perceived imminent attacks
by the Tatmadaw. However, in November 2010
shortly after the Myanmar elections, the political
grouping was transformed into a military united
front. At a conference held from the 12-16 February
2011, CEFU declared its dissolution and the
formation of the United Nationalities Federal
Council (UNFC). The UNFC, which was at that time
comprised of 12 ethnic organisations1
, stated that:
The goal of the UNFC is to establish the
future Federal Union (of Myanmar) and
the Federal Union Army is formed for
giving protection to the people of the
country. Shortly after, wide-scale conflict occurred
throughout areas controlled by the SSPP and a
number of their bases were lost to the Tatmadaw.
Then, in June 2011, the KIO ceasefire broke down,
resulting in the current conflict in Kachin State. The
formation of the UNFC had occurred at a time of
increasing uncertainty in relation to how the new
Myanmar Government would settle the 1990s
ceasefire groups issue. It could be argued that the
Tatmadaw’s insistence that the ceasefire groups
become Border Guard Forces precipitated the
fighting, or that the creation of a military alliance
consisting of both ceasefire and non-ceasefire
groups precipitated the fighting..."
Source/publisher:
Euro Burma Office
Date of publication:
2018-09-00
Date of entry/update:
2021-04-11
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Euro Burma Office
Language:
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pdf
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223.87 KB
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Sub-title:
Despite her promise to welcome new voices into the peace process, many fine-grained obstacles to progress remain.
Description:
"In a New Year’s address to the nation on January 1, Myanmar’s State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi promised to take a new approach to long-delayed peace negotiations aimed at ending the country’s tangled web of civil conflicts.
According to a report in The Irrawaddy, Aung San Suu Kyi, whose second five-year term begins in March, announced plans for a “New Peace Architecture,” which would welcome participation by political groups, civil society organizations, and the public.
She said that the aim was to broaden the scope of who had a say in the ongoing talks, with the hope of consolidating inter-ethnic trust and inducing more ethnic armed groups to join the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in time for the 75th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence in January 2023.
“We recognize the important role of public participation [in the peace process],” Myanmar’s leader said, according to The Irrawaddy. “This depends on how much we can pave the way for all stakeholders to participate.” The NCA was signed in late 2015 between the Myanmar government and eight ethnic rebel organizations, while two more joined in February 2018. But the peace process continues to exclude some of the country’s largest and most prominent armed rebel groups, and since the signing of the NCA, fighting with some of them has reached levels not seen in years..."
Source/publisher:
"The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication:
2021-01-07
Date of entry/update:
2021-01-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Panglong Peace Conference, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Various groups, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
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Description:
"This report is the culmination of a year-long research project into the activities of civil society in
and around the ongoing Myanmar peace process. This includes the negotiations taking place in
the Union Peace Conference (UPC, also known as the 21st Century Panglong Conference
(UPC/21st CPC) the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), and the Joint Implementation
Coordination Meeting (JICM). It also includes civil society peacebuilding outside of the peace
negotiations and parallel structures. The research project aimed to identify:
• the drivers of confict in Myanmar,
• the civil society actors involved in peacebuilding in Myanmar,
• the types of peacebuilding activities performed by these CSOs, and to classify these activities into types,
• the contributions of these activities to ofcial and unofcial peacebuilding,
• as well as any factors enabling and constraining civil society peacebuilding.
The research was funded by the Joint Peace Fund Myanmar, and was conducted in partnership
between the Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation (EMReF) and the Inclusive Peace and
Transition Initiative (IPTI).3 The research team conducted interviews with 160 individuals from 123
organizations, including from civil society (including CSO networks and local and international
CSOs), donors, members of parliament, as well as representatives of EAOs, members of the Union
Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), members of political parties, and government representatives.4
The CSO sample was built by asking CSOs to nominate other CSOs working on peacebuilding,
hence the sample is shaped by these individuals’ understanding of peacebuilding in Myanmar. The
research was guided by the Civil Society and Peacebuilding (CS&PB) framework, developed by
Pafenholz and colleagues.5
In the context of Myanmar, the term peace process is generally used to refer to a sequence of
high-level peace negotiations and associated consultations and other supporting institutions. This
process began in 2011, under the government of U Thein Sein, and led to the Nationwide Ceasefre
Agreement (NCA) in 2015. The structure and sequence of the current negotiations were set out in
the NCA and the Framework for Political Dialogue (also negotiated and signed in 2015). These
negotiations are projected to lead to a permanent ceasefre, disarmament and demobilization of
non-state armed groups, government and constitutional reforms. Since 2015, the main forum for
these negotiations has been the UPC (21st CPC). The UPDJC acts as the secretariat for the UPC and
has responsibility for important aspects of the process such as pre-negotiations and consensus
building on issues to be brought before the UPC. This means that many issues are essentially
decided by the UPDJC, with the UPC frequently acting to confrm decisions taken in the UPDJC
(although this is not the sum total of its role)..."
Source/publisher:
Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation (EMReF) (Yangon) and Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative
Date of publication:
2019-01-21
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
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Sub-title:
Avenues for reform and decentralization and steps towards a federal system.
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"Ever since the Panglong Agreement was signed on February 12, 1947, only two weeks after
the Aung San - Attlee Agreement on Burma’s Independence of January 27, 1947, the issues of
federalism, minority rights and self-determination have been central to Myanmar politics, confict
and military-civilian relations. Accordingly, relations between the center and the periphery are
at the core of the constitutions of 1947 and 1974, as well as the 2008 Constitution. Yet, by any
standards, the Myanmar state has been unitary, and indeed centralized to an extreme degree,
since independence in 1948, leading to 70 years of confict.
To a large degree, the confict explains the other defning trait of the Myanmar state: for most
of the last seven decades, it has been dominated by the military. Relations between the military
and state institutions have been shaped by the relationship between the central government and
Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs).
The issues of democracy, federalism and the role of the military cannot be separated, and
together they form the basis for modern Myanmar politics. In this context, it is not surprising
that organizations representing the interests of ethnic nationalities spent the last two decades of
military rule, after the emergence of the democracy movement of 1988 and the NLD’s victory in
the 1990 elections, calling for a “tripartite dialogue” among the NLD, the military and themselves.
It is no coincidence that these were also the decades when the military was drafting the 2008
Constitution.
The current peace process was initiated by President U Thein Sein in 2011, the year Myanmar
embarked on its transition to democracy. Although democracy and the pursuit of peace are
undoubtedly two of Myanmar’s most pressing issues, the fact that two distinct processes – which
will be referred to in this paper as the political process and the peace process – developed from
there raises a number of issues..."
Source/publisher:
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Ltd (Yangon)
Date of publication:
2018-01-04
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-17
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
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"Myanmar President Win Myint on Thursday warned the country’s powerful military to limit its involvement in politics, citing a mandate issued decades ago by independence hero General Aung San, during a ceremony inaugurating a new statue of the general and father of leader Ang San Suu Kyi in the capital Naypyidaw.
Touching on a sensitive fault line in Myanmar politics as the country prepares for year-end elections, Win Myint said that Aung San issued a directive that members of the armed forces should refrain from participation in government administration, politics, and political party activities.
“I have read that he issued guidelines for the Burmese revolutionary military that they were not to interfere in the administration or in politics, while the military officers and soldiers were not to interfere in political parties and administrative activities,” he said in a speech marking what would have been Aung San’s 105th birthday.
“They are to work on the unity of the state,” Win Myint added.
Myanmar’s military known as the Tatmadaw, ran the country for five decades after a 1962 coup. Its political power is enshrined in the 2008 constitution drafted by the then ruling military junta, and efforts to amend the charter remain an uphill battle.
Military lawmakers who are appointed, not elected, control a quarter of the seats in parliament and retain a critical veto over proposed constitutional amendments. The military also controls three security and defense ministries..."
Source/publisher:
"RFA" (USA)
Date of publication:
2020-02-13
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, The Military's political role, Burma/Myanmar's political parties, Panglong Peace Conference
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Description:
"Civil Society: Civil Society is defined broadly as the space between the family and the state, but does not include political parties, professional unions and associations, private businesses, and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). For the purpose of this Discussion Paper, research was directed predominantly, but not entirely, to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) at Union and sub-national level and their emerging networks. Research also included ethnic literature and culture associations. It is important to note that many people “wear several hats” in Myanmar, meaning that the affiliations of individuals are not always limited to one organisation. The roles of as key stakeholders often change roles over time. Due to their importance in Myanmar, faith-based networks are also included in civil society. Civil society is not synonymous with communities. It is inherently heterogeneous; its diversity relates to a range of different ethnic, linguistic, religious, gender, and class identities among which ethnicity stands out as a particularly prominent marker of identity in Myanmar.
Social cohesion: A cohesive society is one that works towards the wellbeing of all, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers everyone the opportunity to prosper and advance peacefully.
Peacebuilding: Peacebuilding is defined as initiatives that foster and support sustainable structures and processes that strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict.1 Within this Paper, civil society engagement in peacebuilding refers to civil society-led initiatives that seek mitigate inter- or intra- ethnic, faith, and communal tensions and promote social cohesion.
Peace process: For the purposes of this research, the ‘peace process’ is defined as the national tri-lateral negotiations related to the ethnic armed conflict. Peace process architecture relates to government-led initiatives since 2011, spanning bi-lateral ceasefires, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), the Union Peace Conferences (UPCs), Joint Monitoring Committees (JMCs), and the national dialogue process. For the purpose of this Paper, participation in the peace process has been categorised into direct participation (contribution to decision-making and supporting roles within peace architecture), and indirect contributions, which are equally critical, that lie outside of the peace process and political structures.
Gender: The socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that determine our understanding of masculinity and femininity. The question of gender difference and the construction of masculine and feminine is not universal, but culturally specific and strongly influenced by other factors such as ethnicity, religion, race, and class.2
Youth: Myanmar’s National Youth Policy defines young people as between the ages of 15-35. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250 considers young people to fall between 18-29 years..."
Source/publisher:
Paung Sie Facility
Date of publication:
2018-10-18
Date of entry/update:
2020-02-15
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Panglong Peace Conference, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burma/Myanmar's political parties
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Description:
"A week after formal peace negotiations resumed, General Yawd Serk, who represents Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatories, urged all sides to work collectively to move the peace process forward.
The NCA signatories’ Peace Process Steering Team, currently led by Gen. Yawd Serk of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), meets from Friday in Chiang Mai to discuss future tasks in the peace process ahead of the implementation of the eight points agreed at the Joint-Ceasefire Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM).
The meeting, a gateway to the formal peace talks, was held on Jan. 8 in Naypyitaw, joining peace negotiators from the ethnic armed organizations that signed the NCA and the government.
Gen. Yawd Serk said: “In laying down future tasks, we have to do so in agreement” with the time set by the JICM for the convening of the fourth 21st-century Panglong peace conference, which is scheduled for no later than April.
He said reaching “the goal of building a federal Union” depended on the groups’ constant engagement in the peace process and keeping “the affairs of the Union in the forefront, rather than the affairs of one group”..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2020-01-17
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general
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Description:
"Myanmar has planned to hold the fourth meeting of the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference within the first four months of this year.
A total of eight agreements including holding the peace conference were reached at the 8th Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) on the nationwide ceasefire agreement held in Nay Pyi Taw on Wednesday, U Zaw Htay, the director general of the State Counsellor Office, told media after the meeting.
The 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference was held in August 2016, May 2017 and July 2018, respectively.
A total of 51 federal-related basic principles have been adopted into a union accord so far after the third conference.
At the meeting, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, in her capacity as the chairperson of the National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC), called for continued efforts for the emergence of complete federal-related basic principles on creating future union as the 51 ones previously adopted are not enough for the goal..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2020-01-09
Date of entry/update:
2020-01-09
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general
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Sub-title:
The success in implementing the peace process depends on enshrining a federal democratic union in the Constitution as a guarantee of the people’s aspirations, U Zaw Htay, spokesperson of the President’s Office, said.
Description:
"“Ethnic people believe that they can achieve their political rights in full only if there is a federal constitution, which they have consistently demanded,” he told a press briefing on Friday. “A federal constitution is needed to get a full political guarantee. It must be a union stipulated by all, not by a one-sided decision.”
Although Myanmar has had different political systems in different eras, it has not established a federal union acceptable to all ethnic people, so peace remains elusive, he said.
“We all pledged to build the union at the Panglong Conference held in 1947. Although the leaders and system changed, we couldn’t build the union. The federal building process has not been completed. There are barriers,” U Zaw Htay said.
As these problems can only be solved politically, meetings such as the 21st Century Panglong Conference are needed.
Ethnic armed groups, political parties, civil organisations, the Tatmadaw (military) and the government must all agree on a federal union..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2019-10-28
Date of entry/update:
2019-11-16
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Panglong Peace Conference, Non-Ceasefire Groups
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Description:
"The Fourth Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) Signing Anniversary, which supposed to be convened on the actual date of October 15, was held on October 28 in Naypyitaw with nine NCA-Signatory-Ethnic Armed Organization (NCA-S-EAO), as the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) delegation was absent. Reportedly, the RCSS issued a three-page statement underlining why it wasn’t able to attend the anniversary occasion.
It was a blow to conveners, especially the government, for the gathering was supposed to uplift the stagnated peace process, which has been halted since over a year, and should have helped paved the way for Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM), the highest organ in NCA-based peace process, that would outline the negotiation agenda and eventual implementation by the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC).
In short, the Tatmadaw blocking of the RCSS leader and his delegation travel using Maehongson – Homong-Langkhur-Nam Zarng-Taunggyi-Naypyitaw to attend the anniversary occasion was the real cause of setback..."
Source/publisher:
"Shan Herald Agency for News" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2019-11-02
Date of entry/update:
2019-11-05
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Panglong Peace Conference
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Description:
"Myanmar State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi on Monday stressed the need to have flexibility and broadmindedness in achieving genuine peace and emergence of a federal union.
Suu Kyi, who is Chairperson of both the National Reconciliation and Peace Center and the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee, made the remarks at a ceremony held in Nay Pyi Taw to mark the 4th anniversary of the signing of the government's Nationwide Ceasefire Accord (NCA).
Suu Kyi outlined three-step peace process to be pursued by the government in the future.
The first step, she said, is to lay down a common process on how to carry on the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference and to obtain framework agreements on the implementation of the NCA..."
Source/publisher:
"Xinhua" (China)
Date of publication:
2019-10-28
Date of entry/update:
2019-10-29
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Panglong Peace Conference, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general
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Description:
"SITTWE, Rakhine State—Ma Aye Myint, 24, has a bullet wound on her right arm from when Myanmar military troops were shooting near Mahamuni Village in Rakhine State’s Kyauktaw Township on July 31. When reporters from The Irrawaddy met her, she was sitting outside the rented guesthouse room where she lives. A baby, almost two months old, was lying next to her. In the Rakhine language, she told what happened to her.
Ma Aye Myint was hit when Myanmar military troops shot at a motorbike driver who refused to stop after the soldiers ordered him to, according to her husband Ko Zaw Zaw.
The couple’s home sits next to the Yangon-Sittwe highway, diagonally opposite from the village’s Mahamuni Pagoda, where Myanmar military troops were stationed until recently.
The soldiers shot the motorbike driver out on the highway and people in the surrounding houses hid when they heard the sound of gunfire.
All of Ma Aye Myint’s family members ran to hide inside the trench under the barn, or lay down, but she was pregnant and couldn’t hide as quickly. After she was hit, she was taken to Sittwe Hospital where she was treated for 21 days.
On Aug. 16, while still in the hospital, Ma Aye Myint gave birth to a girl, but because of her injuries, she still can’t hold her daughter. Someone else has to help her breastfeed, bathe the baby and change the baby’s clothes.
When The Irrawaddy asked the Myanmar military’s Western Command spokesperson Colonel Win Zaw Oo about the incident, he said at the time that there was no fighting near Mahamuni..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2019-10-11
Date of entry/update:
2019-10-12
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Armed conflict in Rakhine (Arakan) State, Panglong Peace Conference
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Substantial coverage of the Conference. Includes full reports on and texts of speeches..."Welcome to ?The Myanmar Times? coverage of the Union Peace Conference, the cornerstone effort of the new National League for Democracy government-led peace process. Dubbed the ?21st Century Panglong Conference? in reference to the landmark 1947 summit led by independence hero Bogyoke Aung San, the Union Peace Conference will be held in Nay Pyi Taw over 5 days, beginning August 31, and will bring together armed ethnic groups, political parties, military officials, and government representatives.
The NLD campaigned heavily on the importance of "national reconciliation" and has identified the peace process as bedrock effort of its opening agenda, but the new government has also indicated that it sees the conference as only a starting point in an ongoing political dialogue with Myanmar?s many ethnic and military players.
Scroll below to see our live coverage, or click here to read background and analysis.
You can also stream the opening of today?s Panglong conference on MRTV here!..."
Source/publisher:
"Myanmar Times"
Date of publication:
2016-09-01
Date of entry/update:
2016-09-01
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Panglong Peace Conference
Language:
English
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Description:
"Next Wednesday Burma will hold the ?21st Century Panglong Conference” — the latest step in the country?s long peace process. It will be a moment imbued with symbolism.
In 1947, Aung San Suu Kyi?s father, General Aung San, led the Burma delegation at the first Panglong Conference which reached a breakthrough agreement with three armed groups and is still etched in the popular memory of the country today. A lot is at stake with this Panglong Conference. As with the peace process generally in Burma, this is the opportunity to transform the country, into a state the people of Burma have wanted for several decades. But to do so it must be fully inclusive.
Getting all of the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) to the table is a major challenge in itself. There remain three groups, still in active combat, that were excluded from discussions on the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and how they will participate in the Panglong Conference is still confusing. There has been much focus on the inclusion of these groups and this is important, especially given human rights violations which are particularly prevalent in areas of continuing conflict.
But inclusivity is about more than just political players; it is also about all stakeholders. Experiences in other countries have shown time and time again the need for women to play an equal part, for grassroots organisations and civil society to have a strong voice and for information to be freely available for the people to follow developments. These are the ingredients for a sustainable, inclusive process which can propel the country forward and into the prosperous future for all.
Unfortunately, during my recent visit to Burma I saw signs that the peace process risked neglecting these fundamental aspects. Burma has only a couple of days before the Panglong Conference and quick changes should be made to ensure these vital aspects are addressed..."
Yanghee Lee
Source/publisher:
"Democratic Voice of Burma" (DVB)
Date of publication:
2016-08-26
Date of entry/update:
2016-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Panglong Peace Conference
Language:
English
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Description:
"The 21st Century Panglong conference is a symbolic step toward peace and national reconciliation, but huge challenges remain....It?s been a long time since the guns of war were silent in Myanmar.
Fighting erupted within months of independence in 1948, when the Communist Party of Burma launched an armed rebellion against the government. Since then, numerous armed groups have formed, allied and splintered, leading to one of the world?s most complex and long-running civil wars.
The military coup in 1988 ushered in a period of respite. The following year, the head of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, began negotiating a series of ceasefire agreements. In reality most were ?gentlemen?s agreements”; one of the only formal ceasefires was signed with the Kachin Independence Organisation in February 1994.
Many of the groups that signed the agreements were allowed to keep their arms and maintain some form of territorial control. But the lack of a substantive political settlement left the process vulnerable to backsliding into conflict.
The arrival of the Thein Sein-led government in 2011 marked a new and more ambitious phase, in which a multilateral ceasefire and political negotiations were introduced.
Despite facing substantial obstacles, it has achieved some success, most notably the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signed last October by eight ethnic armed groups. While its legitimacy has been brought into question by the refusal of most leading armed groups to sign, the NCA has been retained by the National League for Democracy government as the foundation of the peace process.
State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been a driving force behind the 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference, which opened in Nay Pyi Taw on August 31. She said in January that the peace process would be a major priority for her National League for Democracy government after it took office, and it would strive for an all-inclusive agreement. At the time of going to print, most ethnic armed groups involved in the process, including signatories and non-signatories of the NCA, were expected to attend the Panglong conference. This broad participation ? particularly the re-engagement of NCA non-signatories with the political dialogue process ? is likely to be the most substantive outcome of the conference, according to observers..."
Oliver Slow (text), Steve Tickner (photos)
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar"
Date of publication:
2016-08-31
Date of entry/update:
2016-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Panglong Peace Conference
Language:
English
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Description:
"The big difference between President U Thein Sein?s Union Peace Conference early this year and the 21st Century Panglong Conference is inclusion...AS GUIDED by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the 21st Century Panglong Conference will convene for the first time on August 31. It will be the first because it will re-convene at intervals of not more than six months. Now that important decisions have been made about convening the conference, we can imagine the shape and form of this historic event.
This week I would like to discuss what can be expected from the 21st Century Panglong conference and how it will differ from the Union Peace Conference held by President U Thein Sein in January.
The most important difference between the two conferences involves the participants. The main participants in the Union Peace Conference held by Thein Sein?s administration were past or serving military officers from the government or the parliament and the eight armed ethnic groups, including the Karen National Union, that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement last October.
The 21st Century Panglong event will bring together representatives from the government and the parliament, most of whom are members of the National League for Democracy elected in its landslide victory last November, along with Tatmadaw officers, signatories and non-signatories of the NCA, and members of civil society groups. It will be an unprecedented, genuinely all-inclusive peace conference.
Another important difference involves the classification and status of participants. At the Union Peace Conference, only signatories of the NCA were recognised as delegates and representatives of non-signatory groups were invited to attend as observers. In protest against what they called discrimination, most non-signatory groups boycotted the five-day event..."
Sithu Aung Myint
Source/publisher:
"Frontier Myanmar"
Date of publication:
2016-08-27
Date of entry/update:
2016-08-31
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Panglong Peace Conference
Language:
English
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