Description:
Cyclone Nargis struck southern Burma on May 2-3, 2008, killing at least 140,000 people and
bringing devastation to an estimated 2.4 million people in the Irrawaddy Delta and the
former capital, Rangoon. The Burmese military government?s initial reaction to the cyclone
shocked the world: instead of immediately allowing international humanitarian assistance
to be delivered to survivors, as did countries affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the
ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) prevented both foreign disaster relief
workers and urgently needed relief supplies from entering the delta during the crucial first
weeks after the cyclone.
The military government blocked large-scale international relief efforts by delaying the
issuance of visas to aid workers, prohibiting foreign helicopters and boats from making
deliveries to support the relief operation, obstructing travel by aid agencies to affected areas,
and preventing local and international media from freely reporting from the disaster area.
Rather than prioritizing the lives and well-being of the affected population, the military
government?s actions were dictated by hostility to the international community, participation
in the diversion of aid, and an obsession with holding a manipulated referendum on a longdelayed
constitution.
?I Want to Help My Own People? 8
In the face of the government?s callous response, Burmese civil society groups and
individuals raised money, collected supplies and traveled to the badly affected parts of the
Irrawaddy Delta and around Rangoon to help survivors in shattered villages. Many efforts
were spontaneous, but as the relief and recovery efforts gained pace, dozens of communitybased
organizations and civil society groups organized themselves and gained
unprecedented experience in providing humanitarian relief and initiating projects.
Access for United Nations agencies and international humanitarian organizations improved
starting in late May 2008 after UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited the delta, and the
UN and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) brokered a deal with the
Burmese government. They established the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), which became the
central vehicle for coordinating aid, improving access for humanitarian organizations to the
delta, and carrying out the ensuing recovery efforts.
The two years since Cyclone Nargis have seen an unprecedented influx of humanitarian
assistance to the delta, with a visible presence of local and international aid workers and
improved access to provide humanitarian relief. While this opening has been rightly
welcomed, it has not been the unmitigated success that many Burma analysts have
portrayed it to be.
Humanitarian access to the delta improved significantly by Burma standards following the
establishment of the TCG mechanism, but it has remained far short of international
standards. And partly because of the access restrictions imposed by the SPDC, humanitarian
funding has not been sufficient to meet the needs of people in the cyclone-affected zones.
As a result, two years after the cyclone, the recovery of many communities in the delta
remains limited, particularly communities far from the towns where most relief efforts were
organized. Such communities face continuing hardships and difficulties obtaining clean
water and adequate sanitation, health resources, needed agricultural support, and recovery
of livelihoods. Had the SPDC not continued to place unnecessary restrictions on the
humanitarian relief effort in the delta, the cyclone-affected population would be much
farther down the road to recovery.
The Burmese government has failed to adequately support reconstruction efforts that benefit
the population, contributing only paltry levels of aid despite having vast sums at its disposal
from lucrative natural gas sales. Although the government has not announced total figures
dedicated for cyclone relief and reconstruction, it allocated a mere 5 million kyat
(US$50,000) for an emergency fund immediately after the storm. It is clear that its
subsequent spending has also not been commensurate with available resources. Burma?s
government is estimated to have more than US$5 billion in foreign reserves and receives an
9 Human Rights Watch │April 2010
estimated US$150 million in monthly gas export revenues. The Burmese government
channels the limited assistance it does provide through its surrogates and contracts
awarded to politically connected companies, in an effort to maintain social control. In
addition, the government?s distribution of aid has been marred by serious allegations of
favoritism.
In most areas of Burma outside of the cyclone-affected areas, international humanitarian
access is much more limited than in the delta, despite significant levels of preventable
disease, malnutrition, and inadequate water and sanitation, particularly in the central dry
zone and the ethnic minority areas of the border states. All of the UN staff, Burmese aid
providers, and international humanitarian organization representatives Human Rights Watch
spoke with in Burma in early 2010 praised the humanitarian opening in the delta, but then
added that humanitarian space in the rest of Burma remains a major challenge. As one
senior aid official told us: ?We were all hoping that the Nargis experience would be the
wedge to open a lot of things, but this hasn?t happened.?
The statistics speak for themselves: approximately one-third of Burmese citizens live below
the poverty line. Most live on one to three US dollars a day, and suffer from inadequate food
security. Maternal mortality is the worst in the Asian region after Afghanistan. While the
economies of many of its neighbors rapidly develop, the people of Burma continue to suffer.
The SPDC fails to invest its own available resources to address urgent social and economic
needs and blocks the humanitarian community from doing all it can to help meet those
needs in other parts of the country.
A number of humanitarian aid experts we spoke with were hopeful that after national
elections scheduled for the end of 2010 are completed, they will then be able to build on
what was achieved in cyclone-affected areas, and expand the delivery of humanitarian aid to
other areas in Burma where it is desperately needed. While the record of the Burmese
government to date suggests this will be an uphill battle at best, the UN, ASEAN, and other
influential international actors in Burma should make it a priority to continue to press for
such expanded access.
Natural disasters can sometimes work as a catalyst for peace-building and reform in conflict
wracked societies, as occurred in Aceh, Indonesia, following the 2004 tsunami. In Burma,
the military government is stronger and more confident two years after the cyclone, but it is
no more accountable or respectful of basic rights...Finally, this reports details an under-appreciated positive legacy of the cyclone response:
the development of a group of new, truly independent and experienced civil society
organizations in Burma, which now seek to use their skills to address other humanitarian
and development challenges in the country..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch
Date of Publication:
2010-04-29
Date of entry:
2010-05-01
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- Individual Documents
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Language:
English
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pdf
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1.73 MB