"...Since 1990, most Western governments have taken a self-consciously principled approach to Myanmar, applying coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions in an effort to force the military government to implement the results of the multiparty election held that year. The 30 May 2003 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her followers increased both political pressure and justification for strengthening this approach. However, the military government today is more entrenched and more recalcitrant than when it took power. The prodemocratic opposition -- although it maintains broad popular support -- has lost much of its momentum, and international actors have demonstrably failed to protect even Aung San Suu Kyi, not to speak of less prominent figures, from persecution. Meanwhile, the socio-economic conditions for a majority of the population have greatly deteriorated. In short, things are moving the wrong way. The much gentler 'engagement' policy embraced by most of Myanmar's Asian neighbours for most of the period of military rule has been equally unproductive. In the absence of any external pressure at all for change, it is highly unlikely that any change at all will occur. The people of Myanmar need greater say in the governance of their country. The failure of 40 years of military rule to provide human welfare and security consonant with the country's great natural potential is closely linked to the absence of popular participation in decision-making. For now, however, the configuration of power and interests inside the country are not conducive to major, quick change -- and there are no "magic bullets", no realistic policy options that can change that. In such circumstances, efforts are required to change political, social and economic realities over a longer period in ways that would facilitate better governance and the gradual introduction and consolidation of genuinely democratic institutions. That is only likely to happen if coercive measures are allied to a more flexible, intensive and sustained diplomatic strategy that does not in any way embrace the military government, but rather includes a greater willingness to pursue some half-measures, small steps and even limited cooperation in order to begin to move the country forward while protecting those who suffer under the status quo or might be hurt by future reforms. International objectives have to be rethought, new benchmarks for change adopted, a more supportive approach toward creating a positive internal climate of change adopted, and more support given to the UN in its important mediation and facilitation role. The road map put forward by the SPDC and realignments within the military government offer a sign of movement, slight though it may be, in the political situation. This provides an opportunity to encourage progress and should not be dismissed out of hand. Any government or institution that deals with Myanmar needs to maintain an acute sense of the realities of the country: change is often painfully slow and easily reversed, the military is an intensely difficult institution with which to deal, and outside influence on any of the actors is very limited. The international community should take whatever opportunity is presented to encourage whatever progress is possible. That means developing a new policy approach -- containing elements of the present sanctions approach of the West and engagement policy of the region, but more productive than either -- that brings together international actors rather than divides them, creates an environment for change in the country and offers a way out for all parties that has a chance of being accepted..."