Description:
Introduction:
At
the end
of
March
2011,
Myanmar
began
an
ambitious political transition led
by
newly
elected
President
Thein
Sein.
Bold
moves
in his
first
year
included opening a dialogue with
opposition
leader
Aung
San
Suu
Kyi,
suspending
construction
of
the Chinese-funded
Myitsone
Dam,
and
abandoning
a
grossly
overvalued
exchange
rate
in
favor
of
a
market-
determined
rate.
These
moves
unleashed a
swarm
of
visitors
seeking
to
support
the transition
and
?make
a
difference?:
prime
ministers,
foreign
ministers,
heads
of
donor
agencies and
international
NGOs,
chief
executives
of
multinational
corporations,
and many
others.
The
question posed
in this
report
is whether the
outpouring
of
foreign
aid
to
Myanmar
expected
in the
medium
term
(three
to
five
years)
will
be
more
of
a blessing than a
curse.
The
question
may
seem
unfriendly
or
ideological
on
the
surface,
but
merits
being
taken
seriously
because
of
the
experience
of
a handful
of
countries
over
the
past
10
to
15
years
that
have
suffered
from
large
and
rapid
build-up
of
foreign aid.
As
posed,
however,
the
question
is
too
stark.
A gentler
version is:
what
steps
can
be
taken
by
aid
donors
and the
Government
of
Myanmar to
enhance the
effectiveness
of
aid
programs
and
projects,
and
mitigate
possible
adverse
consequences?
Our
report
begins with a
brief
discussion
of
the
dilemma
of
foreign
aid
to Myanmar:
how
it
can
be
harmful
despite
the
best
intentions
of
the
donors.
We then
present
the policy
implications
of
our
findings,
for
the
Government
of
Myanmar
and
for
the
donor
community.
The
next
two
parts
of
the
report
describe
the Government
of
Myanmar?s national planning
process
and the
steps
it is taking
to
manage
foreign
aid.
We then
assess
donor
performance
against
the principles
of
the
Paris
Declaration
and the
Busan
Partnership.
The
last
two
parts
describe
donor
activity in
general
terms
and then individually
for
Myanmar?s
major
development
partners.
In
1989,
the
military
junta
changed the
country?s
name
from Burma
to
Myanmar
and
this
change
was
officially
accepted
by
the
United
Nations.
We
generally
use
Burma
when
referring
to
the
country
before
1989
and
Myanmar
afterwards.
We
have included
four
appendices
with
different
audiences in mind.
Appendix
A
describes
the
historical, political, and
economic
context
for
readers
who
are
not
familiar
with
this
background.
Appendix
B
elaborates
on
the
standards
of
aid
effectiveness
contained in the
Paris
Declaration
and
Busan
Partnership.
Appendix
C highlights lessons learned
from
other
countries
that have
been
challenged
by
strong
donor
interest.
Appendix
D
recounts
newly
independent
Burma?s
first
experience
with national
development
planning, featuring the
work
of
the
American
economist
Robert
R.
Nathan, and calls
attention to
a
comparable Japan-
supported
effort
launched in
2001.
We
should
be
clear
about
the limitations
of our
report
on
foreign
aid
for
Myanmar.
In
particular,
our
knowledge
of
Myanmar
is limited.
Altogether
we
have
spent
less than
six
months
inside the
country
over
the
past
45
years
and
we
do
not
speak
any
of
the
local
languages.
Moreover,
with
our
50-year
perspectives
on economic
development,
we
know
that
the
world?s
leading
experts
are
still
unsure
how
to
explain China?s phenomenal
progress
or
Argentina?s
lack
of
progress. These
experts
are
even
more
unsure
about how
to
adapt
lessons
from
global
experience
to
a
country
like
Myanmar
that
is undertaking a
sweeping
reform
effort
with a
legacy
of
complex
internal conflicts and poverty-inducing governance.
Source/publisher:
FOR Nathan Associates Inc.
Date of Publication:
2013-03-00
Date of entry:
2013-03-24
Grouping:
- Individual Documents
Category:
Language:
Burmese/ မြန်မာဘာသာ and English, English
Local URL:
Format:
pdf
Size:
497.05 KB