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BP: A whimper in Rang
Bangkok Post June 7, 1998
GUEST COLUMN / BURMA
A whimper in
Rangoon
The efforts of the authorities to limit
news of the events in Indonesia may
indicate fears of overt discontent that
they feel they are required to suppress.
DAVID I. STEINBERG
Finally, on May 22, in an inside story sandwiched between
international stories of no significance, the government of Burma
fiqnally noted in its controlled press, and in only a paragraph or
two, that there was a change in the leadership of Indonesia. But
it was an article that just mentioned that Suharto had stepped
down. There was nothing in it of the turmoil, the discontent, the
stu dent demonstrations, or the mayhem preceding it that would
have given the average reader the context of this important event.
If its past was ignored, its signifi cance and future importance
was also unstated. It was a whimper of a story that purposefully
omitted the bang of the change or its impact on the future.
Members of the State Peace and Development Council, as the
State Law and Order Restoration Council was renamed, of
course knew the full story, as did many of the mid-level officials
who also had access to CNN and BBC, and on whose
programmes the images of Jakarta in turmoil seemed ubiquitous.
The motivation of the omission of the Indonesia events was
obvious. In donesia had been a model, and Su harto personally
was the friend of General Ne Win, Khin Nyunt and oth er who
have called on him in the recent past.
Even more importantly, Indonesia was the obvious model on
which Bur ma had hoped to build its future. The role of the
military in the National Assembly that is planned under a new
constitution whose approval in a heavily scripted scenario seems
inter minable, the army's ubiquitous posi tion in administration at
all levels, and its tight rein on the economy, all are part of the
Indonesian template.
Even the five-million-strong Burma Union Solidarity and
Development Association (USDA), under direct military
guidance and patronage, is seen as the Indonesian Golkar in its
pre-party stage. General Khin Nyunt had specifically stated in
December 1993 in a press conference in Jakarta that Burma
admired Indonesia's "sta bility". It was just this stability that was
overthrown. The immediate im pact on Burma may seem inconse
quential, but the future was impor tant enough for the state to
attempt to deny knowledge of Indonesia's tur moil to the general
population of Burma.
Although Burma has only peripher ally been affected by the
region's eco nomic crisis, Thai trade has dimin ished and foreign
investments from the other Asean nations have precipi tously
fallen. Burma has foreign exchange for only a few weeks of im
ports, the unofficial exchange rate hovers around 300 kyat to the
US dollar (against the official rate of about 6 kyat), and although
the gov ernment recognised an inflation rate of about 25 percent,
most observers believe it is double that figure.
Economic discontent is prevalent among those on fixed and
grossly in adequate government incomes, and political frustration
is said to be wide spread. But are such problems suffi cient to
cause people to emulate the students in Jakarta?
In the rise of "people power" in the Philippines in 1986, in South
Korea in 1987, in Thailand, and now in Indone sia, the military
may have been a part of the problem, but it has also been a part
of the solution. Significant ele ments either joined in the change
pro cess, or they remained neutral. If the events on those
countries may be termed "people power", then the militaries
were "people's armies".
In Burma, the situation remains different. Although many
observers discuss tensions among elements of the Burmese
military, there seems general agreement that they know they must
stick together for essential control of power or find themselves in
worse difficulties than those in other countries. The population
has memo ries of the bloodshed of 1988, in com parison with
which events in Indone sia of the past few weeks pale.
The Burmese economy may be in dire straits, but evidently there
is con siderable economic ferment in cities such as Rangoon,
even though the population does not benefit from change in any
equitable manner.
One of the major problems facing Indonesia was the status of
Suharto's family and their vast economic hold ings that many
regard as a product of favouritism or corruption, as well as their
alliance with some overseas Chinese families of vast wealth. In
Burma, the situation is different. Several ministers were dismissed
last year for corruption, and although the Chinese economic
influence is pro found (and is of concern to some in India and
Thailand), it is not focused on specific families. The children of
the military elite in Burma may have special status, but they are
not as evident or as greedy as those in Indonesia. There may be
mur murings against the role of the Chinese in the country, and
although there were government-induced dem onstrations against
the Chinese in 1967 to take pressure off of the eco nomically
inept Burmese regime, a widespread and directed campaign
against the Chinese in Burma seems unlikely.
Most of the schools have been closed since the demonstrations
of December 1996. There had been rumours that they would
reopen soon, but the events in Indonesia will prob ably cause
them to rethink such plans if indeed they had them. Volatile stu
dents even on their own campuses, whether college or high
school, are the last things the authorities want.
The Indonesian crisis is at least well-known in Rangoon and in
other places where international radio is heard. Government
attempts to sup press information, as other regimes have found,
are always unsuccessful over the longer term. But in the short
run, the efforts of the authorities to control knowledge may
indicate fears of overt discontent that they feel they are required
to suppress.
Indeed, the lessons from Indone sian events for the Burmese
authori ties, as the latter interpret them, may be that the
Indonesians were too le nient. They should have been tougher
and nipped the demonstrations early on, employing more, rather
than less, force. If this is how the regime in Burma responds, we
may see less, rather than more, openings in Burma. That would
increase the Burmese tragedy.
David I. Steinberg is director of Asian Studies at
Georgetown Univer sity, and representative of The Asia
Foundation for Korea. The views pre sented are his alone.
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Last Modified: Sun, Jun 7, 1998