"This brief, the third in a series, reviews Myanmar’s conflict trends for the month of September 2021. It focuses on the significance of the National Unity Government’s (NUG) September 7 declaration of “resistance war” against the junta, e.g., the long-rumored ‘D-Day.’1 This brief builds upon analysis presented in Brief 2: Myanmar’s Shifting Military Balance, which described how armed resistance to military dictatorship continued to expand in scope during July and August 2021. Particularly significant, by the end of August a total of 250 out of the country’s 330 townships had experienced at least some conflict incidents since 1 February. Key to armed resistance has been the increasing assertion and steady expansion of self-defense groups. Since the coup, approximately 240 such groups have declared themselves in one way or another. It is likely that at least 180 of them have been active to some extent. The NUG’s September 7 declaration was a major milestone in the country’s history.2 Since then, there has been a notable increase in attacks across the country on Tatmadaw forces and other State Administration Council (SAC) apparatuses. Self-defense groups and key EAOs are active in resistance actions across the length and breadth of the country aside from Rakhine.3 A strong argument can be made that resistance to military rule is now self-sustaining in terms of resourcing, safe havens, and personnel, and cannot be easily extinguished by the Tatmadaw.4 The Tatmadaw has had no success forcing key EAOs to sign ceasefires or to break their burgeoning relationships with the NUG and peoples’ defense forces (PDFs). Resistance forces now have established safe havens with both the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and Karen National Union (KNU) where they can safely train and equip fighters.5 Raids on villages are ineffective at killing PDF fighters. Tatmadaw ‘clearance operations’ in remote townships are costly and ineffective at controlling territory for the long-term. There are simply not enough security forces to move around. It is not assured that SAC will lose, but a month after D-Day, it certainly does not have the military initiative. The Tatmadaw is increasingly having to react to events driven by the resistance.6 As before, the analysis in this brief is underpinned by a ‘conflict incidents’ dataset compiled by the author. This dataset comprises approximately 3,400 incidents from 1 February to 30 September but focuses specifically on ‘conflict incidents’ from May onwards when the nature of resistance shifted towards nationwide armed revolt. This dataset draws on Exera daily briefs but is complemented by other sources, such as 74 Media, Khit Thit Media, and Mizzima’s daily updates. The author notes up front his own doubts about trying to quantify a highly fluid situation. Such datasets are useful for highlighting general trends and trajectories and the analysis below should be understood accordingly.7 Lastly, the brief intentionally provides a wide range of references to support policymakers interested in specific topics. Did D-Day have any effect? The September 7 announcement by NUG interim president Duwa Lashi La provoked a lot of interest around the world and a palpable sense of excitement within the country. After a month, it is possible to make some preliminary observations about whether it had any significance to the military situation on the ground. Over September there were approximately 779 conflict incidents, compared to 523 in August and 443 in July.8 This represents a 49 percent increase month-on-month.9 A review of the most conflict-affected townships, both overall and during September, highlights they are all over the country, including in major urban townships in Yangon and Mandalay. September saw new townships all over the country emerge as hotspots, such as: Ye Township, Mon State; Launglon Township, Tanintharyi Region; Thantlang Township, Chin State; and Ayadaw Township, Sagaing Region. Examined from another angle, daily national averages of conflict incidents increased from 16.9 in August to 26 in September.10 Mandalay saw the steepest change, nearly doubling its average with several townships in Mandalay city seeing sharp rises in conflict incidents (see Annex 1). Magway was also notable, increasing from 1.55 to 2.64 conflict incidents per day, driven by resistance attacks in Yesagyo, Gangaw, Pauk, Saw and Taungdwingyi Townships. Yangon and Sagaing Regions were already high in August but still increased over September; from 3.61 to 5.4 and 3.84 to 6.8 incidents per day respectively. Overall, Sagaing, Magway, Yangon, and Mandalay Magway Regions represented 68 percent of all conflict incidents in September. The widespread presence and quickening pace of armed resistance and conflict incidents in Bamar Regions is unprecedented. While the remaining three regions are not at the same levels, Bago, Ayeyarwady and Tanintharyi Regions also saw their daily averages of conflict incidents increase over September compared to August (see Annex 1). This was due to increased actions in townships with existing concentrations of conflict incidents – for instance Pathein, Bago, and Dawei – but more significantly by rapid increases in other townships that did not have extensive conflict histories. For instance, Thayetchaung Township in Tanintharyi Regions escalated markedly in September as did Kyaukkyi Township in Bago Region. Seven townships also became active for the first time in September in these three Regions, namely Einme and Ngaputaw Townships in Ayeyarwady Region; Daik-U, Gyobingauk, Kawa, and Monyo Towships in Bago Region; and Tanintharyi Township in Tanintharyi Region. The D-Day announcement did not significantly change the strategy and tactics used by self-defense groups. Rather, it signaled a distinct escalation in attacks utilizing available resources. Self-defense groups are utilizing the gamut of tactics applied to date, including IED and mine attacks, assassinations, arson attacks, attacks on police stations, and bombings of strategic routes, offices, and infrastructure. Several new tactics have also emerged, such as the routine sabotage of MyTel telecom towers. During September there was a clear escalation of bombings in both Yangon and Mandalay. By example, from September 1 to 22, there were at least 39 explosions in Yangon Region alone.11 Sabotage of MyTel telecom towers escalated significantly over September and by the end of the month over a hundred had been destroyed since the coup.12 As mentioned, conflict incidents have been consistently present in the States since the coup except for Rakhine. However, Shan State was relatively calm over September aside from consistently high levels of conflict incidents in Muse Township in the northeast and Phekon Township in the south, which has been the case for several months now. Overall, conflict incidents decreased across the State from 48 in August to 33 in September. That Shan State is relatively calm is a historic anomaly, but the ongoing fighting between the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) -- Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) coalition persists at comparatively low numbers of conflict incidents, albeit at high intensity as they are significant military forces engaging in battles. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an EAO from the Kokang community, has been active in Muse but was also increasingly active in Lashio Township during the last week of September. There were also notable attacks on Tatmadaw-allied forces in Kalaw Township.13 Although Chin State saw an overall increase in conflict incidents, both Kayah and Karen States saw slight decreases. Fighting over September was particularly pronounced in Chin State’s Thantlang, Hakha and Tedim Townships in the north and Kantpetlet Township in the south. September was also significant for the amount of coordination by Chin self-defense groups and those in nearby Sagaing and Magway 0 50 100 150 200 250 Conflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region Month Conflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region Month Conflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region Month Conflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region Month Conflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region Month Conflict Incidents Per State/Region Month Conflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region Month Conflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region MonthConflict Incidents Per State/Region Month May June JuneJune July JulyJuly AugustAugustAugustAugustAugustAugust SeptemberSeptemberSeptemberSeptember September SeptemberSeptember 4 Regions. Mon State also saw notable increases in conflict incidents over September, more than doubling compared to August. This was driven by marked increases in Ye, Bilin and Thaton Townships..."