2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état

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Title: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - (An official website of the National Unity Government )
Description: "Our people are resisting the military with any possible means so that the military cannot control the country. We all are determined to fight the military's oppression until we achieve our goals. This is exactly why we all share the solidarity believing that this is the last chance to uproot the dictatorship in our country - Union Minister H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung.....ပြည်သူလူထုဟာ ရတဲ့နည်းနဲ့ စစ်ကောင်စီအုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်မရအောင် အာခံနေကြတာ ဖြစ်တယ်။ အနိုင်ရမှဖြစ်မှာမို့ အဆုံးအထိ သွားကြမယ်ဆိုတဲ့ ပိုင်းဖြတ်မှုမျိုး အားလုံးမှာရှိနေကြတယ်။ ဒါကြောင့် ဒီတစ်ပွဲဟာ အာဏာရှင်ကို အမြစ်ဖြတ်မှရမယ့်ပွဲလို့ စိတ်တူကိုယ်တူ ဖြစ်နေကြတယ်လို့ပဲ မြင်ပါမယ်။ - ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication: 2021-05-31
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-31
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Title: National Unity Government: Ministry of Health (An official Website)
Description: "From 1962 to date 2021, how many of our patients have died, hurt and suffered due to the military dictatorships? Let’s make these dictatorships to extinct together even it means our career and lives are at risk! Let’s rebuild our health system for healthier lives and better access to quality health care.....ဒီစနစ်ဆိုးတွေကြောင့် (၁၉၆၂ မှ ၂၀၂၁ ထိ ) ငါတို့လူနာတွေဘယ်လောက်တောင်သေခဲ့ကြပြီလဲ ? ဘယ်လောက်တောင်နာခဲ့ကြပြီလဲ ? ဘယ်လောက်တောင်ခံစားခဲ့ကြရပြီလဲ ? ဒီအာဏာရှင်စနစ်ဆိုးတွေကို ဒို့မြန်မာပြည်မြေပေါ်မှာ နောင်ဘယ်တော့မှ လုံးဝ မရှိနိုင် မဖြစ်ပေါ်နိုင်အောင်.... ဒို့ခေတ် ဒို့ အချိန်မှာ ဒို့ဘဝ ဒို့အသက်တွေနဲ့ရင်းပြီး အပြီးတိုင်ချေမှုန်းကြစို့..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Health
Date of publication: 2021-05-31
Date of entry/update: 2021-05-31
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Title: Additional humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar affected by the coup d'état
Description: "Even three years after the coup d'état on February 1, 2021, the humanitarian situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate as airstrikes and fighting continue throughout the country, killing and injuring many innocent people on a daily basis. According to the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for Myanmar announced by OCHA last December, 18.6 million people, including 6 million children, are still in need of humanitarian assistance. Under these circumstances, the Government of Japan has continuously provided humanitarian assistance totaling more than US$109.5 million through international organizations and NGOs since immediately after the coup d'état, directly benefiting the people of Myanmar. In response to the further increase in humanitarian assistance needs for the people of Myanmar, the Government of Japan has now decided to provide additional humanitarian assistance totaling approximately US$37 million. Specifically, through international organizations such as UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, ICRC, UN Women, and AHA Center as well as NGOs. The assistance will include medical services, improved nutrition for pregnant women and infants, water and sanitation infrastructure, access to education, food and medicine distribution, support for women victims of trafficking in persons, and support for anti-drug measures and rehabilitation. This assistance will be provided not only in Myanmar but also in neighboring Thailand. The Government of Japan will continue to strongly urge Myanmar military to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access and will continue to provide diverse assistance so that as many people as possible can receive the support in need..."
Source/publisher: Government of Japan
Date of publication: 2024-03-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-03-08
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Title: Facing a Military Crisis, What Will the Myanmar Junta’s Next Step Be?
Description: "Notwithstanding the junta propaganda newspapers’ misleading reports about a state of “normality” prevailing, the Myanmar military is in the grip of a deepening crisis. It has lost vast swathes of territory in northern Shan as well as Rakhine, Chin and Karenni (Kayah) states to ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) over the past four months. In Kachin, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is attacking Waingmaw, a town across the Irrawaddy River from the state capital, Myitkyina. In Karen State, Karen resistance forces have taken control of trunk roads. Meanwhile, the Karen State Border Guard Force has broken away from the Myanmar military. Three of the signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)—the Karen National Union, the Chin National Front and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front—have been fighting the regime since the coup. Earlier this year, another NCA signatory, the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), took up arms against the regime, seizing control of Hsi Hseng town in Shan State. A splinter group from another signatory, the New Mon State Party, has also declared war against the military dictatorship. Both on their own and in cooperation with EAOs, People’s Defense Force (PDF) groups are fighting the regime in Kachin, Chin, northern Shan, Karen, Karenni and Mon states and in Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay, Bago, Tanintharyi and Yangon regions. Despite their widespread presence, however, they are still too poorly equipped to deal the regime a hard blow. Recent junta responses The regime recently activated the national conscription law, which allows the military to call up men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 to serve in the military for two to five years. The age limit rises to 45 for men and 35 for women who have professional skills in fields such as medicine or engineering. The junta’s spokesman said some 5,000 people would be drafted starting from April. Reports of arbitrary arrests of young people across the country suggest that the regime is determined to recruit more troops by any means. Also noteworthy was the large number of troops the regime devoted to retaking Kawlin Town in Sagaing Region from the KIA and the parallel National Unity Government (NUG). In Rakhine and Karenni, many towns have fallen to resistance forces, which are now threatening those states’ capitals. But while the regime has barely sent in any reinforcements to defend those towns, it deployed between 800 and 1,000 troops to attack Kawlin. The regime announced it had retaken the town after 15 days of fighting. So, why was the depleted military willing to expend so much manpower to take back Kawlin? Quite possibly it saw a high propaganda value in being able to claim that it can subdue the PDF in the key resistance stronghold of Sagaing Region. The victory may also give the regime a bargaining chip if there is a need to hold talks with the NUG and the PDF. Is dialogue likely? Myanmar’s military is both mentally and physically exhausted now, having fought on multiple fronts over the past three years. It is facing a serious shortage of personnel after being hit by casualties, desertions and a recruitment crisis. Normally, new recruits undergo six months of military training, but the regime said it would only spend three months training the new draftees. But recruitment alone will not be enough; there is a need to reorganize the combat units that have been left in disarray due to mass surrenders, casualties and other factors, and this will take time. With combat-hardened battalions and divisions having collapsed in the face of the ongoing revolt, draftees sent to the front after just three months of training will surely buckle in no time. For example, in Shan State’s Pa-O region, the regime has heavily armed pro-military Pa-O National Organization militias, but they are no match for the PNLO and its allies, which have seized Hsi Hseng. China is deeply involved in Myanmar’s peace process, having brokered a ceasefire in northern Shan State between the regime and a military alliance of three EAOs. But ultimately peace talks cannot be successful without the NUG and the PDF, which the regime has declared terrorist organizations. Both China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as Western countries, are aware of that. So far, the regime has consistently rejected talks with the NUG. Now, however, with the regime seriously depleted after three years of war and its own peace talks having totally failed to dissuade the EAOs from fighting, a meeting with the NUG is not out of the question. The regime sent a bureaucrat to a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Laos in January—a sign that it is planning to make concessions. ASEAN has barred junta generals from its key meetings over their failure to implement a peace plan agreed with the regional bloc two months after the coup. ASEAN has a policy of inviting Myanmar to send what it calls “non-political” representatives instead, but the junta had previously declined, furious over what it sees as ASEAN interference in its internal affairs. One of the requirements of the five-point peace plan is that a dialogue be held involving all of the stakeholders in the crisis. The regime might now be prepared to yield to this demand, and hold talks with the NUG and EAOs—if only to buy time so that it can recuperate. So, when the regime decided to retake Kawlin, it did so not for purely military reasons, but with the political objective of gaining a bargaining chip in any potential dialogue with the NUG. Dialogue is an inevitable part of armed revolution. Myanmar’s modern history is characterized by alternate fighting and dialogue. EAOs have long experience of dialogue. Though talks have never delivered results, the groups do not shun the idea of meeting around a table. While engaging in dialogue, they continue to expand their arsenals and consolidate control over their territory. Compared with the EAOs, the NUG and PDF have less experience with this process of fighting and periodically engaging in dialogue even as clashes continue. The NUG and PDF should be prepared for the regime to switch to a strategy in which it may try to buy time and find a way out of its current crisis. As long as military leaders are in power, it is unlikely that the country’s problems will be solved around a table. In Myanmar, political dialogue is nothing more than a game in which players make moves in an effort to gain advantages. The NUG needs to act shrewdly to handle any such possible moves by the regime. There is a need to defeat the junta not only on the battlefield, but on other fronts as well..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
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Title: Myanmar’s Struggle for Freedom Three Years After the Military Coup
Description: "Three years after the failed military coup in Myanmar, there is genuine hope within the country for democratic resistance. By the end of 2023 and into the beginning of 2024, Myanmar reached a turning point, with significant successes achieved by the revolutionary movement, particularly on the battlefield. For the first time since the coup, there is a growing possibility that the resistance movement may prevail against the military dictatorship. Three years after the military coup, approximately 17.6 million people in Myanmar are facing a humanitarian emergency, and 2.6 million people are homeless. The military has been responsible for the deaths of over 4,500 people, including about 500 children. In addition, more than 26,000 individuals have been detained, with 20,000 still languishing in prison. While the struggle in Myanmar is tragic, marked by a great deal of brutality and significant loss of life, it is also deeply inspiring. The previously deeply divided nation with various ethnic groups has united against the military, which illegally seized power on February 1, 2021. Likely driven by a combination of the military’s significant electoral defeat (in the form of a pro-military party, composed of formed generals) and the personal aspirations of coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the military arrested most of the country’s civilian leadership, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and halted all democratic processes, in order to install a new government, a military junta under the name State Administration Council (SAC). At first, the people of Myanmar faced daunting odds. However, they persevered, and now, three years later, we see the balance of power beginning to shift in their favor. The prospect of overcoming the junta seemed bleak in the aftermath of the coup, as the military seemed poised to violently suppress the initially non-violent protests that eventually escalated into armed defense. For the first two years, the resistance movement struggled to survive, clinging on despite the military’s vast advantage, eventually reaching a tipping point where the coup leaders could not quash the resistance, yet the resistance could not overcome the junta. The year 2023 brought a change to this situation: the first half of the year saw an improvement on the side of the revolutionary forces compared to previous years but without major victories. It was only in the second half of the year that the situation changed significantly. With Operation 1027, named after the date of its start – October 27, 2023 –it seems for the first time that the revolutionary forces may eventually emerge victorious. The duration of this process, however, remains uncertain and will depend on a number of factors, including internal, regional, and international dynamics. Key external players that can influence events in Myanmar include China, Thailand, and India, three neighboring countries. China deserves special attention because it has been extensively involved in Myanmar’s affairs for decades and is known for its ability to turn violence in Myanmar’s border regions on and off like a switch, depending on China’s needs. Moreover, the 2017 Operation has had a strong impact on Myanmar’s relations with China. For months, China’s central government pleaded with the SAC to crack down on cross-border cyber scam syndicates run primarily by Chinese criminals from guarded compounds on the Myanmar side of the border, controlled by local warlords, but to no avail. Then came the solution for China in the form of Operation 1027, essentially greenlighted by Beijing. In the short term, cracking down on scam centers took precedence over peace on the border. Publicly, China called for a de-escalation of the conflict. In October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, composed of three ethnic armed organizations joined by the people’s defense forces, known as PDFs (armed units formed post-coup to resist the military regime and recognized by the National Unity Government, the parallel legitimate government formed by representatives elected in the 2020 elections), launched an operation with a dual objective: to eliminate the scam syndicates operating in the region and to confront and defeat the military dictatorship. The first objective led to the liberation of numerous compounds, with the return of the enslaved, mostly Chinese, to their homes. The second objective resulted in unprecedented battlefield losses for the Myanmar military. The second outcome was unexpected by China, as the Myanmar military suffered unprecedented battlefield losses, highlighting the effectiveness and impact of the operation. Operation 1027, which is still ongoing, has emerged as the most significant threat to the military regime since the coup. The alliance has successfully blocked the junta’s access to the northern part of Shan State, seized key cities and town in the region, and gained control of the Myanmar-China border, thereby disrupting the lucrative border trade (which had previously funneled cash into the hands of the junta). Throughout these developments, China mediated talks between the military and the alliance (with the primary goal of averting a prolonged disruption of border trade). However, the negotiated ceasefires have been tenuous, with numerous instances of breakdown. There is an interesting dual dependency and influence at play. Operation 1027 was made possible by the broader resistance movement in Myanmar, as the junta has been under attack by a national uprising in various towns across the country over the last three years. This further stretched the junta’s already thinning forces. In turn, Operation 1027 not only capitalized on this weakening of the junta, but also served to significantly strengthen the revolutionary forces in other parts of Myanmar, such as Chin, Kachin, Karen, Sagaing, and Magway. The revolutionary forces in these areas accelerated and began to occupy military bases. As a result, the army suffered losses as several bases fell and many soldiers were detained. While serious battles between the military and the resistance movement continue, one thing is certain: there is no turning back at this point. At present, everything in Myanmar revolves around the removal of the junta’s cruel rule and, more broadly, the removal of the military’s influence from the country’s political landscape. The entire population shares the belief that the continued existence of a military junta in society is untenable. A return to a compromise situation in the form of a hybrid regime, similar to that of the 2010s, in which the military wields significant political power alongside the civilian government, is not a realistic solution for Myanmar’s future. While the people of Myanmar believe that victory is within reach, it remains to be seen how long this process actually takes – it could be years before we see a real change. But for now, we can look at it through a lens of hope..."
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Source/publisher: Reset Dialogues on Civilizations
Date of publication: 2024-02-22
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-22
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Title: ‘I don’t want to kill’: Conscription law sparks fear in war-torn Myanmar
Description: "(CNN) — Anna wakes up about four times a night from dreams in which she is being sent to the front lines of a bloody war and forced to fight. It’s a terrifying prospect that could become a reality for Anna and millions of her peers across Myanmar after the military junta activated a mandatory conscription law for all young men and women. “We are in panic mode and are considering a way to escape,” said Anna, an educator in her 20s from the country’s south who requested to use a pseudonym to protect her safety. “I don’t think I can keep living in Myanmar.” Three years on from its bloody coup, Myanmar’s military junta is facing the biggest challenge to its fragile hold on power as it struggles to fight a nationwide armed resistance on multiple fronts across the Southeast Asian nation. The junta’s surprise announcement that it’s seeking to boost its armed forces with compulsory service prompted a rush by young people to get visas out of the country. Videos shared on social media show long queues of people clutching documents at the Thai Embassy in Myanmar’s biggest city Yangon. Young people told CNN they’re scrambling to figure out how to avoid being sent to the barracks, with some planning hasty exit strategies – illegal if necessary – from Myanmar or weighing up leaving their homes and families to join resistance forces that have taken up arms against the military. Under the law, all men ages 18 to 35 and women ages 18 to 27 are required to serve for up to two years under military command. Specialists such as doctors up to age 45 must serve for three years. Evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine. Analysts say the law, which has been on the books since the previous military regime in 2010 but not enacted until now, will force a young generation to fight their own people and could be used to justify human rights abuses. It could also result in further regional instability by sparking a mass exodus of people fleeing conscription into neighboring countries, they said. Some say conscription is a desperate effort by the military to boost ranks depleted by death, desertions and defections. “While wounded and increasingly desperate, the Myanmar military junta remains extremely dangerous,” Tom Andrews, United Nations Special Rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, said in a statement. “Troop losses and recruitment challenges have become existential threats for the junta, which faces vigorous attacks on frontlines all across the country. As the junta forces young men and women into the military ranks, it has doubled down on its attacks on civilians using stockpiles of powerful weapons.” ‘We don’t have another choice’ Myanmar’s military has been weakened by unprecedented coordination between ethnic armed organizations and resistance groups known as People’s Defense Forces, analysts say. These groups, which support the National Unity Government in exile, and ethnic rebel armies have taken control of hundreds of strategic border towns, key military positions and vital trade routes since launching an offensive last October. Analysis from the United States Insitute of Peace suggests the military only has about 150,000 personnel, including 70,000 combat soldiers — “barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force” — and has lost at least 30,000 soldiers since the coup. Defense Minister Adm. Tin Aung San said the military has capacity to recruit up to 50,000 people a year and conscripts “will receive salary, rations, and entitlements according to their grades and qualifications,” according to the state mouthpiece Global New Light of Myanmar. People who have been temporarily exempted from serving in the military — those with a medical reason, civil servants, students and carers — must return to serve even if over the age of military service, Ting Aung San said, according to the paper. Veterans could also be called up, the Global New Light reported. Junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun said about 13 million young people would be eligible for conscription, with 60,000 men the first to be recruited reportedly beginning in April. There’s little detail about how they’d be called up – and what training they’d receive to fight. Young people CNN spoke to are scared that conscripts will be sent to the front lines – in mountainous, jungle terrain – without proper training. “People know for sure that no matter what is written in the conscription law, they will have to go to the front lines. That is one thing that every person in the country is sure of,” said Kyaw Naing, 28, a teacher from Yangon region who requested to use a pseudonym for his security. Myanmar's junta chief Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who ousted the elected government in 2021, presides at an army parade on Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw on March 27, 2021. Reuters Aung Myo Min, human rights minister for the shadow government in exile said it has received reports of mass defections to People’s Defense Forces, with some soldiers abandoning the military because “they don’t have enough food and they are forced to take up a position to fight against civilians.” Some of those former soldiers told the National Unity Government the military’s power has weakened, and it desperately needs recruits, according to Aung Myo Min. But both Anna and Kyaw Naing say they’ll refuse to join their ranks. Anna said she doesn’t have the money or connections to buy a visa out of the country, and worries the junta will be monitoring the airports, stopping those of age and arresting them. Her parents have urged her to escape as soon as possible, but that means finding a way to cross the border illegally to Thailand. “All the information on Facebook right now is about how to escape this country,” Anna said. “From my side, I will try and do as much as possible to escape but if not, I will join (the People’s Defense Forces),” Anna said. “It seems like we don’t have another choice.” Neighboring Thailand would likely be the country of choice for many of those deciding to flee. Thailand’s Foreign Ministry told CNN Monday its embassy in Yangon has experienced an “increase in the number of Myanmar citizens applying for Thai visas in recent days” and was implementing a token system to process 400 walk-in applicants per day. While Thailand has hosted Myanmar nationals fleeing conflict for decades in displacement camps along the border, it has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and considers those fleeing persecution to be illegal immigrants, who face jail and potential deportation. Reports of kidnappings and arrests For Kyaw Naing, fleeing to Thailand is not an option as he is the sole breadwinner of his family and cares for his elderly parents. “If I leave, no one is there to look after them. I just have to survive,” he said. Kyaw Naing says he’s stopped going out at night for fear he’ll be arrested and sent to the barracks. “My parents are afraid I might be kidnapped by police and soldiers when I’m on my way back home from work, or when I go outside to hang out with my friends, or even when I go out to throw litter into the dustbin in the street,” Kyaw Naing said. Even before the announcement of the mandatory conscription law, local media has reported an increase in the arrests of young people in several towns and cities and military vehicles picking people up in the street. There are also reports of dozens of young people detained at airports in western Rakhine state in recent days, with no official explanation. CNN cannot independently verify the reports and has reached out to the military for comment. Khin Ohmar, founder and chairperson of Progressive Voices, a Myanmar human rights research and advocacy organization, said the conscription law will “provide the junta legal cover for abusive forced recruitment practices — grabbing young men and women, especially the disenfranchised and impoverished including minors, from bus stops and factories in the cities.” Maung Nyein, 32, lives and works in Yangon, and worries how his wife and 8-year-old daughter will cope if he’s forced to serve. “In Myanmar, young people are not safe anymore,” said Maung Nyein, who also requested to use a pseudonym for safety reasons. “If you are forced to enter the military, there are so many things to worry about.” The prospect of being forced to fight and kill his compatriots terrifies him. “In other countries, this law is to train you in case of another country’s invasion, but here there is civil war going on. This is to force you to kill each other.” CNN has reached out to Myanmar’s military spokesperson for comment but has not received a response. The junta’s ministry of Immigration and Population said in a statement that there is “no restriction on overseas leave” and international airports and the entry and exit points with neighboring countries “are operating as usual,” according to Global New Light. The junta also denied that its “security forces and administrative organizations are conscripting youths for military training and arresting passers-by,” calling it “misinformation” spread by “malicious media networks.” Forced labor already happening Myanmar’s military has a long and documented history of using civilians as human shields or forcibly recruiting them to work in the army, either as porters – carrying military equipment to and from the front lines — or performing the risky task of clearing land mines from fields. A major concern is that the law will be used by the military to legalize this practice. A report from the International Labour Organization’s commission of inquiry from October 2023 found that since the coup, the Myanmar military junta “continues to exact different types of forced labor in the context of armed conflict … as well as forced recruitment into the army.” Wing Ko, a farmer from Shwebo in central Sagaing region, said he was forcibly recruited to work for the military for three months in 2023. “One day when I was in my tent, a military troop caught me and took me to carry their clothes and weapons,” Wing Ko told CNN, using a pseudonym for safety. “After that, I was forced to walk all day with their stuff,” he said. “There were days I didn’t get to eat and drink.” He says he was one of 42 men, most over the age of 50 with the youngest just 16, who were forcibly taken by junta troops from their villages. “If we knew the areas, we were forced to walk in front of them so that they don’t risk themselves (standing on) land mines.” Wing Ko said those who tried to escape were shot and killed. CNN cannot independently verify his account. “I never thought I would see my family again. When I got home, I felt like I came back from being dead,” he said. Maung Aye, also from Sagaing region, said six people from his village were taken by the military in June last year and forced to carry clothes and weapons. He said there’s no way his neighbors would willingly join them. “Our villagers won’t join the military forces or leave the country, instead we will join our resistance forces. I won’t let my children be taken by the military, instead I’d rather risk them joining the (People’s Defense Forces) for the revolution’s sake,” said Maung Aye, who also used a pseudonym for safety. Impact on millions of young people Conscription is not just about boosting troop numbers, analysts and human rights workers say, but a means to break up the powerful democratic resistance movement that has only gained in strength since the coup. “The junta’s decision to enforce the conscription law now is also a way to remove the young people who were spearheading the Spring Revolution from the civilian population and put them in positions where they are likely to be killed or to kill their fellow people,” said Khin Ohmar. The law would allow corruption, extortion and crime to flourish and could exacerbate a brain drain that’s already seen many young people leave Myanmar, impacting education and the labor market, which would “cause utter devastation to the country,” she said. Those too young to be conscripted are already feeling the weight of the law. “Today one of my teens asked me if all the lessons she is learning right now in class are still useful for her life in the future if she has to go to the front line,” Kyaw Naing said of his student. “I was deeply saddened by that.” Kyaw Naing says he’d join the resistance if faced with conscription. But he would offer to teach over holding a gun. “I don’t want to kill people,” he said. “But if the situation pushes me to do it, I will have to. I won’t have a choice.”..."
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Source/publisher: "CNN" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-02-21
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-21
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Title: A call for global solidarity and decisive action to end Myanmar’s military rule and ensure victory for the people resisting dictatorship
Description: " Three years ago today, on February 1, 2021, Myanmar’s military junta seized power in a violent and deadly coup. Since then, the junta has escalated its attacks, both online and offline, perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity, violating human rights every day. Despite thunderous silence and dwindling support from so-called global allies, the people of Myanmar are unwavering in their determination to courageously resist the military, and take back control of their country. 2024 is a critical turning point in their fight. The international community must urgently stand with the people of Myanmar, offering not only solidarity, but also concrete resources to help topple the military junta and consign this troubled chapter to the history books. The Myanmar people’s resistance to dictatorship needs international support to dismantle the digital “iron curtain” built by the junta to track and target the people of Myanmar. Otherwise these same people will continue to be crushed and terrorised by a surveillance state intent on destroying lives, livelihoods, and any resistance to their oppressive rule. Only when these oppressive structures fall can the people of Myanmar rebuild a new country that reflects their vision and courage. A digital “iron curtain” The military’s complete control of Myanmar’s telecommunications network allows it to use internet shutdowns and communications blackouts to facilitate vicious attacks and block humanitarian aid from reaching those who need it. In 2023, the military weaponised shutdowns and blackouts, especially in conflict zones where resistance is strong. Reports reveal that, before bombing towns and villages, the military frequently uses jamming devices installed on military scout aircraft to block all communication networks. This means that people seeking safe paths to flee the conflict are unable to communicate with each other, wounded people cannot seek medical assistance, and families are cut off from critical humanitarian support. It is difficult to document the exact number of regular internet shutdowns imposed by the junta, but they likely number in the hundreds. According to a report by the Myanmar Internet Project, 11 out of 14 states have experienced shutdowns, with prolonged shutdowns common in areas of escalating conflict, including Bago, Kachin, Karenni, Kayin, Magywa, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. The rise of a surveillance state Under the guise of creating e-government projects, Myanmar’s military is raising funds and collecting resources to strengthen its massive surveillance infrastructure, pushing forward with data collection projects like the national census, e-ID system, and the establishment of a “National Database”. In 2023, the military announced that it was developing an e-government masterplan to provide public services and sought support from international organisations, including the UNFPA, to do so. Despite no such support being provided, the military continues to seek support from other countries, including in the form of domestic and foreign technologies to run the projects. The military needs to track and target those who oppose its reign of terror. So far, the military’s e-ID system contains the personal data of 52 million people (including six types of geographic data) and data from over 13 million households. It’s also thought that the military has collected biometric data from 2.1 million people in Myanmar — this includes fingerprints, facial features, and eye pupil scans. The military also surveils people in several other ways: Checkpoints restrict people’s right to freedom of movement, with unlawful arrests occurring frequently. Random security checks, including indiscriminate inspections of ID documents and phones and other devices, are conducted on the street. Financial activities are monitored; Radio Free Asia reports that more than 700 mobile payment account were closed in the month of May 2023 alone.​​​ The international community must stop all forms of support that allow the military to strengthen its surveillance infrastructure against the people, even as they present them as “pro-people” propaganda projects. An ongoing campaign of terror The military is weaponising the law to violate fundamental human rights, including the right to information and freedom of expression, as part of efforts to legitimise its abusive acts: Failure to register a SIM can put you in prison for up to six months. The military is using section 72 of the Telecommunications Law to justify the SIM registration order. The military has adopted extensive by-laws to the Anti-Terrorism Law, giving them the power to censor activities against the military, intercept electronic communication data, and obtain people’s location data. At the start of 2024, documentary filmmaker, Shin Daewe, was sentenced to life in prison under this law. The military is criminalising online expression, criticism, and journalism. Data for Myanmar shows that an average of 65 individuals per month were detained for criticising the junta and supporting anti-juta activities on social media platforms, with more than 1,300 arrested for their social media content. Sixty-four journalists are in detention, making Myanmar one of the world’s biggest jailers of journalists, second only to China. In 2023, many artists, celebrities, and social influencers changed their Facebook profile pictures to black in solidarity with the victims of military atrocities. Many individuals who commented, liked, or shared posts or news reports about anti-coup movement activities were arrested. Byuhar, a hip-hop singer who criticised the military during a Facebook Live for its failure to provide a regular electricity supply was given a 20 year prison sentence. Meanwhile U Ye Htut, who served as Information Minister under the Thein Sein government in the early 2000s, was given a ten year jail sentence for his Facebook post criticising the military’s policies.​ To push back against the junta’s increasing campaign of repression against the people of Myanmar, the international community must: Establish and commit resources for a coordinated action plan to provide the people of Myanmar with alternative access to telecommunication services. Local communities in Myanmar struggle to use satellite communications or other means to resist the military’s control and authoritarian grip over communication networks. With a coordinated action plan, people in Myanmar can push back against worsening digital authoritarianism. In areas of crisis and conflict, recognize and fund alternative access to the internet and other communication channels as critical tools for protecting lives and fundamental human rights. Cut off or prevent financial, technical, and other forms of support that benefit the military’s massive surveillance infrastructure. In 2023, the military had difficulty securing funding from other countries or from international organisations for its e-government projects. This was a welcome step and must continue. The international community must deepen its efforts to stop the sale of dual-use surveillance technologies to Myanmar. Push tech and telecom companies to uphold human rights and make them accountable when they fail to provide effective remedy for violations. Governments must not allow companies to profit from the suffering of Myanmar’s people. Stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar. The international community must provide support to the people of Myanmar so they can resist the abuses of the military, while addressing the emerging challenges of building a new nation state. Companies must: Urgently explain how they conduct due diligence to ensure that their operations and products in Myanmar do not negatively or adversely impact human rights. Telcos must do this without delay, as their partnerships with the military significantly enable the military junta’s human rights abuses. Companies producing or selling other types of technologies, including dual-use surveillance technologies, must stop all transactions involving the military and its allies. If leaving the market becomes the ultimate decision after a thorough human rights due diligence process, ensure that comprehensive remedies are in place to address the human rights impacts of the departure. Companies must be held accountable for irresponsible exits out of areas of crisis and conflict. Conduct heightened due diligence to ensure that their products and services are not used in violation of human rights by the military or by military-controlled institutions, and immediately remove these products or services from the market if they are being used to facilitate rights abuses. Invest significant resources to implement human rights-based content moderation practices, data protection policies, and privacy safeguards to resist increasing attempts to extend surveillance, censorship, and rights violations. Pursue genuine public engagement in its decision-making process and implement effective remedies when human rights violations are committed..."
Source/publisher: Access Now
Date of publication: 2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-13
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Title: Myanmar's military government enforces conscription law
Description: "The government in Myanmar has announced compulsory military service for all young men and women as the country's turmoil continues. The army seized power from the civilian government in a coup in February 2021. But in recent months it has been defeated in a series of battles with ethnic militias and anti-coup fighters. The move announced on Saturday will require all men aged 18-35, and women aged 18-27, to serve at least two years under military command. No further details have been released. But in a statement, the junta said its defence ministry would "release necessary bylaws, procedures, announcements orders, notifications and instructions". The military has faced a series of humiliating defeats in recent months. At the end of last year, three ethnic insurgent armies in Shan State - supported by other armed groups that oppose the government - captured border crossings and roads carrying most of the overland trade with China. Last month, the Arakan Army (AA) said it had taken control of Paletwa in Chin State and the last military post in Paletwa township, the hilltop base at Meewa. The military-installed president of Myanmar, Myint Swe - a former general - has previously warned the country is in danger of breaking apart if the government could not bring fighting under control. A law allowing conscription was introduced in Myanamar in 2010, but has not been not enforced until now. Under the legislation, the terms of service can be extended up to a period of five years during a state of emergency. Those ignoring summons to serve can instead be jailed for the same period. A state of emergency was announced by the country's junta in 2021 and was recently extended for a further six months. Myanmar had endured almost 50 years of rule under oppressive military regimes before the move towards democracy in 2011. On 1 February 2021, the military announced it had taken control of the country. Disorders and fighting have affected the country ever since, with more than one million people being displaced and thousands killed. The performance of the army in its recent battles with ethnic armed groups - some of which have ended in defeats and retreats - has sparked criticisms and doubts among its supporters..."
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Source/publisher: "BBC News" (London)
Date of publication: 2024-02-11
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-11
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Title: Three Years After Myanmar’s Coup, China Emerges the Winner
Description: "When a country is strong and united, no one can manipulate and control it. But if, like Myanmar, it is weak and fragmented, this weakness will be exploited. China’s actions in Myanmar since the coup offer a textbook example of how superpowers take advantage of political crises in smaller countries to advance their own interests. In recent months, China has intervened in northern Myanmar to consolidate and strengthen its geostrategic position in the region, where the two countries share a more than 2,000-km-long border. There is no doubt that the West’s sanctions since the coup have weakened the economy in Myanmar and that China today is an important source of financial assistance and political backing for the regime. But when the junta was slow to respond to Beijing’s demands for a crackdown on transborder crime and online scam syndicates along the countries’ shared frontier, China decided to take concerted action. Beijing gave its tacit approval to ethnic armed organizations based in northern Shan State to launch Operation 1027 to target “pig butchering”, as the online scam and other crime . The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Arakan Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army—who together form the Brotherhood Alliance—launched coordinated attacks against the military regime in northern Shan State in late October. To the surprise of seasoned observers the operation was highly successful. The alliance’s forces seized Laukkai, the capital of Kokang, after about two months of fighting the regime’s troops and its allied militias. As a result, China, in collaboration with the ethnic armies in the north, was able to crack down on the online scammers and criminal activities on the Myanmar side. After losing a large swath of territory in northern Shan to the alliance, the regime in December asked Beijing to intervene on its behalf. Junta-appointed acting President Myint Swe commented that the offensive could “break the country into pieces” if left unchecked. China then forcefully intervened to halt the successful offensive after the MNDAA regained Laukkai City. In December, after the fighting spread to Rakhine State, China and the regime signed an addendum to their concession agreement for the massive China-backed deep seaport project in the state’s Kyaukphyu Township. And in late January, economic attaché Quyang Daobing of the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar met with junta investment and commerce officials to discuss cooperation on China-Myanmar megaprojects, the safety of Chinese citizens employed by those projects, and matters related to improving the quality of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor—a component of Beijing’s vast Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure development scheme—among other things. There’s only one word for it: Ingenious. China has minimized its costs and maximized its profits. Today, its protectorates are expanding in northern Myanmar along with its control and influence over ethnic armed forces in the region. And even as this relationship deepens, the regime continues to depend on China for investment and military supplies, not to mention political backing at the UN. Recently, the military regime handed over to Chinese authorities six alleged bosses of online scam empires in the Kokang region of Shan State along the Chinese border. It was widely suspected that the crime syndicates had been protected by the regime. The suspects were named in an arrest warrant issued by Chinese authorities in December for alleged involvement in online scams in Laukkai. When Operation 1027 started, China’s official position was that easing the situation in northern Myanmar would be in the interests of all parties and conducive to peace and stability in the China-Myanmar border area. Its Foreign Ministry said continually that China and Myanmar are friendly neighbors and that China has always respected Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. To Myanmar people this all just sounded like a joke—and not a particularly funny one at that. China maintains a number of geostrategic and economic interests in Myanmar, including infrastructure projects and a gas pipeline that connects with Yunnan Province, not to mention access to the critically important Indian Ocean, with its trade and transit routes. Beijing will invest more in northern Shan State as the “provinces” under China’s influence become more autonomous. The Wa and Kokang, as well as the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—better known as the Mongla Group—are effectively dependent on China for internet services, currency, and supplies and logistics. They issue their political statements and conduct their administrations in the Chinese language. Since Operation 1027, the MNDAA has forged a stronger alliance with the Wa and its new generation of leadership, who bring strengthened military and administration capacities. For its part, the Wa region is, in effect, a wholly autonomous buffer state between Myanmar and China with its own administration, schools, hospitals, courts and trading companies. It is like a small Chinese province, even if the Wa continue to fly the Myanmar national flag over it. This is only the beginning. China’s influence has become so strong that, as far as its neighbors are concerned—and whether they like it or not—having a poor relationship with Beijing is simply not an option. The Myanmar regime and the country’s ethnic forces know that China will always act in accordance with her own interests. So, of course, do Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, but Myanmar, with all its complexity and now devastated by civil war, is in a far weaker position than its Southeast Asian neighbors. Since the coup, only one “winner” has emerged so far—Myanmar’s powerful neighbor to the north..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-02-08
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-08
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Title: Myanmar faces increasing uncertainty
Sub-title: Will Myanmar’s instability subside anytime soon?
Description: "This year is the third anniversary of the military coup led by Myanmar’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing that ousted the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Over the last three years the Tatmadaw has plummeted the country into ever-increasing violence and despair. Millions of civilians have been forced to flee from their homes because of the fighting between the Myanmar military and the opposition forces -- a collection of experienced ethnic armies, civilian militias and recently formed activist-based defence forces. Throughout the country there is a burgeoning humanitarian crisis threatening to engulf the country in serious starvation. On top of that a major economic crisis that has sent the Myanmar currency, the Kyat, tumbling -- it is now more than 3,500 kyat to the dollar: Less than half its value before the coup. Sources in the country's central bank have confirmed the lack of foreign currency has made it difficult to pay for imports. There is an acute shortage of oil, gas, and petrol: Motorists face increasingly long waits at the pumps, and the price of fuel has sky-rocketed; electricity shortages and black-outs are worse than they have ever been -- reminiscent of the mid-1990s, when black and brown outs were endemic. Residents in Yangon and Mandalay complain that they get less than four hours of electricity a day, and even that is irregular and intermittent. In fact, some economic analysts believe the military government will run out of money by the end of February. On the ground, only the Tatmadaw's superior air power has kept them in the game. Only concerted carpet bombing of civilian targets, which has wreaked havoc and devastation on areas deemed to be giving assistance or are sympathetic to the so-called revolutionary forces, has helped them maintain a certain degree of superiority. But even that is now under threat with the Kachin forces having downed two aircraft recently. In the last three months, ethnic forces in the north of the country -- known as the Three brotherhood -- the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) -- have launched highly coordinated and well-planned attacks on Myanmar's Tatmadaw. During that time, the army has suffered severe losses on a scale not experienced since the days of independence. Since October 27, 2023, when the current ethnic offensive was launched, the Tatmadaw has lost nearly 40 townships, over 500 army outposts, and more than 10,000 troops have been killed, injured, or have surrendered or defected. Myanmar's military now faces an existential threat for the first time in its more than seven-decade history. Morale and discipline within its ranks are at their lowest ebb. Changes to training schedules and military preparations in the last decade under the current commander-in-chief has left the armed forced inadequately trained and unready for armed battle. The last time the Tatmadaw was engaged in full-scale military action was in the mid-nineties against the Karen National Union -- apart from an extended skirmish against the MNDAA in 2009. The current battles in the north have left the army further demoralized. And the sentencing of the handful of commanders in charge of the recent Tatmadaw surrender to the MNDAA won't have helped morale or discipline either. What's happened to the Tatmadaw in the last three years, especially the last three months, has been unprecedented, a former senior officer in the Tatmadaw has admitted. He blamed a lack of discipline in the lower ranks for the spate of surrenders, especially amongst the junior officers. Military families are also questioning the continued violence, fearing for their safety. The democratic forces' use of drones has been a major ingredient that has helped level the military playing field. They have proven crucial in the battle for territory, and instilled a measure of fear amongst all civilians, especially military families. The personal safety of leading government and business figures has also become a matter of serious concern. Several prominent businessmen who fled abroad after the coup are being courted by the regime and encouraged to return. Their hesitancy to do so however was interpreted as hinging on safety concerns. But this concern about personal safety extends right up to the very top, where it is increasingly accentuated. Sources close to top general, Min Aung Hlaing, have revealed that he has become increasingly paranoid and generally becoming more and more isolated. His concern for his personal safety has extended to having all Myanmar visitors, including the number two general, Soe Win, fully searched before they can see him. His precarious situation appears to be playing on his mind. He suffers from acute insomnia, according to sources close to the general. He cannot sleep without having an injection administered every night. To many, Min Aung Hlaing has become the most hated and despised army commander of all time. He is loathed throughout the ranks within the Tatmadaw. No one has a good word for him. He is universally blamed for the mess of the last three years. There is widespread ill feeling -- especially amongst nationalist Buddhist monks and the Ma Ba Tha. One of their number publicly called for Min Aung Hlaing to step down and hand power to Soe Win. He was briefly arrested after the outburst and quickly released. More crucially, Soe Win was moved from the War Office and replaced. In the meantime, the push for Min Aung Hlaing to step down is gathering support, albeit under the surface. A group of former senior military officers, mostly associated with former president Thein Sein, are marshalling their supporters and preparing to launch a putsch. They call themselves nationalist hardliners. For the present they are biding their time to see what the early days of February bring. Today, Min Aung Hlaing must convene the National Defense and Security Council. At that meeting he must either extend the current state of emergency for another six months or form a "civilian" provisional government to oversee the next steps towards his plans for an election, which he says will be in the first quarter of 2025. This is after a census is held this October which would pave the way for the electoral rolls to be compiled. For the time being, all eyes are on that meeting today -- the day of the anniversary: It may help clarify the direction Myanmar's military supremo is plotting, although by the same token it may also spell the end of Min Aung Hlaing's brutal and illegal reign -- but not immediately..."
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Source/publisher: "Dhaka Tribune" (Bangladesh)
Date of publication: 2024-02-07
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-07
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Title: JFM welcomes new sanctions on the illegal Myanmar junta and businesses on third anniversary of failed coup attempt
Description: "Justice For Myanmar welcomes the latest sanctions on the illegal Myanmar junta and its business associates, three years after the military launched a coup attempt that has failed because of the courageous mass resistance of Myanmar people. Since the attempted coup, the junta has committed widespread atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations with total impunity, enabled by a network of domestic and international companies. New sanctions targeted the military’s sources of funds and jet fuel. Australia’s second round of sanctions since February 1, 2021 designated Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB), state banks illegally seized by the junta. The banks are key nodes in the military cartel’s economic networks, supporting the junta’s campaign of terror. Australia also targeted three companies that are part of Shoon group (formerly Asia Sun), which is the junta’s main partner in the import, storage and distribution of jet fuel. The Shoon companies designated were Asia Sun Trading Company Limited, Cargo Link Petroleum Company Limited and Asia Sun Group Company Limited. The US sanctioned Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, a crony conglomerate founded by Thein Win Zaw, who is the group’s chairperson. Following the military’s coup attempt, Shwe Byain Phyu bought Telenor Myanmar, renamed ATOM Myanmar, providing the junta with enhanced surveillance capabilities and access to personal data. Justice For Myanmar exposed the business interests of Shwe Byain Phyu Group in 2022. The US also sanctioned Thein Win Zaw, his wife Tin Latt Min, and their adult children, Win Paing Kyaw and Theint Win Htet. In addition, the US sanctioned Myanma Five Star Line Company Limited, a shipping subsidiary of the US-sanctioned military conglomerate, Myanma Economic Holdings Limited. The UK sanctioned No. 1 Mining Enterprise (ME1) and No. 2 Mining Enterprise (ME2), state-owned enterprises illegally seized by the junta that play a central role in Myanmar’s mining sector. The two mining enterprises illegally channel funds and resources to the junta through production sharing contracts with local and foreign companies. Last year, JFM exposed Greenway Mining Group, a Chinese company that is using British Overseas Territories for its continued business in Myanmar with ME1. The UK also sanctioned Light Infantry Division 77 and Light Infantry Division 101, which are directly responsible for perpetrating international crimes. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “New Australian, UK and US sanctions are necessary to block the junta’s access to funds and jet fuel and come after sustained pressure from civil society. However, far more needs to be done to cut the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment, technology and jet fuel. “Sanctions continue to be too slow, lack coordination and are not covering whole networks of companies and individuals, leaving too many openings for the junta and its associates to bypass measures. “The slow pace of Australian sanctions in particular is clearly inadequate. Australia should start imposing regular rounds of sanctions, including against the mining sector, in which Australians continue to have a significant presence. “UK, US, EU, Canada and Australia should extend sanctions to the whole network of entities and key individuals in the junta’s natural resources ministry, join the EU in fully sanctioning MOGE, and join Canada in banning the export, sale, supply and shipment of aviation fuel to Myanmar. “The people of Myanmar have struggled against a terrorist junta for three years and successfully blocked it from taking control of Myanmar. The fight continues and should be supported by the international community through targeted sanctions, a global arms embargo and a UN Security Council referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. “The Myanmar military cartel must be dismantled.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication: 2024-02-02
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Message from TBC’s Acting Executive Director marking the third anniversary of the military coup
Description: "A Message from Timothy Moore, Acting Executive Director, The Border Consortium On this solemn day, marking the third anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar on 1st February 2021, we at The Border Consortium (TBC) pause to reflect on the profound and ongoing impacts of the crimes against humanity committed by Myanmar’s armed forces. As we look back over these three years, it is with a heavy heart that we acknowledge the continued and escalating violence perpetrated by the Myanmar armed forces against civilians and their homes, schools, hospitals and places of worship. Such actions not only violate fundamental human rights but also hinder the path to peace and stability in the region. TBC remains steadfast in its condemnation of these atrocities. Our mission is rooted in the principles of justice, human dignity, and the right of all individuals to live free from fear and persecution. We recognise that the path to healing and rebuilding for the people of Myanmar is a long and arduous one. However, we remain committed to standing in solidarity with the conflict-affected communities in Myanmar and Thailand. Our efforts, aimed at providing humanitarian assistance and advocating for the rights and needs of these communities, are more crucial than ever. We continue to work tirelessly together towards a just and sustainable solution for the nation of Myanmar, a solution that respects the rights of all its people. On this day of remembrance, we reaffirm our unwavering commitment to supporting the people of Myanmar. We urge the international community to join us amplifying the voices of conflict-affected Myanmar people, and working towards a future where every individual can live in dignity, security, and prosperity. Together, we can make a difference. Together, we can help build a future that is just and peaceful for Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: The Border Consortium (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-02-01
Date of entry/update: 2024-02-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: 3 Years Since Myanmar’s Coup, Stronger Global Action Is Needed
Description: "In the early morning of February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military sent armored vehicles through the capital, Naypyidaw, arresting the country’s elected civilian leaders. Three years on, the junta’s relentless efforts to consolidate power have caused a spiraling human rights and humanitarian catastrophe. Junta security forces have killed over 4,000 people, arrested over 25,000, and deliberately blocked humanitarian aid from reaching millions of people amid countrywide economic and infrastructure collapse. The number of people needing assistance has grown from 1 million before the coup to 18.6 million in 2024, including 6 million children. The military’s widespread and systematic abuses amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, fueled by decades of impunity and meager international efforts to stop the violations. While atrocities spiral and slivers of refuge disappear, the United Nations Security Council remains at a standstill. In December 2022, the Security Council passed its first resolution on Myanmar since the country’s independence in 1948, denouncing the military’s post-coup abuses. But the final text was troublingly watered down, with the calls for sanctions and arms embargoes in an initial United Kingdom-led draft removed to stave off threatened vetoes from China and Russia. The UK, the Security Council’s designated penholder for resolutions on Myanmar, has for years taken a hyper-cautious approach to the country, a strategy that failed to promote any chance of accountability in the wake of the military’s 2017 crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against the ethnic Rohingya. When the resolution passed—with 12 members in favor and abstentions from China, Russia, and India—the UK and others presented the compromised text as a first step, opening the door to heightened scrutiny of the atrocities taking place on the ground. “We stand ready to take further action,” the UK ambassador said. “We expect this resolution to be implemented in full.” One year on, that further action has not materialized. Without any leverage or enforcement mechanism in the resolution, the junta has disregarded the document’s calls, such as for the release of prisoners and full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access. Instead, since the resolution was passed, security forces have arrested more than 2,200 people, killed over 1,700, and bombed schools, hospitals, and displacement camps. The junta has ramped up its deadly blockages of humanitarian aid as a method of collective punishment against the civilian population. After Cyclone Mocha made landfall in May, junta authorities refused to authorize travel and visas for aid workers, release urgent supplies from customs and warehouses, or relax onerous and unnecessary restrictions on lifesaving assistance for millions of people in need. The UN estimates that 10,000 children under 5 died in 2023 due to the lack of treatment for malnutrition. Since late October, fighting between junta forces and alliances of ethnic and anti-junta armed groups has erupted across much of the country. Over 660,000 people have been forced to flee their homes in the months since, pushing the total number of internally displaced to 2.6 million. “We’re living in constant fear of attacks, arrests, and harassment by the military,” said a villager in Rakhine State, where fighting broke out in mid-November, ending a year-long unofficial ceasefire. “Most of the men from Rakhine villages have gone into hiding to avoid arrest. The fighting left so many of our houses destroyed to the ground. All communication from other townships has been shut down.” The latest spike in fighting has triggered further restrictions, with the military blocking urgently needed access to major roads, telecommunications services, and waterways. “All the nongovernmental organization work has been suspended and the roads and communication to the north and south have been blocked since the attacks on November 13,” an aid worker in Rakhine State told Human Rights Watch. “There are new checkpoints set up by the Border Guard Police at the town entry points. We’re already facing a food crisis because we can’t get essential goods and food from the blocked villages. The costs of everything have gone so high.” The authorities have prevented the humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) from operating its 25 mobile clinics in Rakhine State. “The continuation of these current blockages will have a catastrophic impact on people’s health,” MSF said. These restrictions sustain the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, designed to exert control over an area by isolating and terrorizing civilians. They also violate Myanmar’s international obligations on the rights to life, health, and shelter. The junta’s abuses are having an increasing impact beyond Myanmar’s borders as well, spilling over into China, India, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the 2022 Security Council resolution has not become the hoped-for on-ramp to stronger action, but the feeble peak of council activity on a country in harrowing crisis. The coup anniversary and the junta’s unrelenting repression should mobilize the UK to lead Security Council members into taking concrete steps. Members should pass a binding resolution instituting a global arms embargo, referring the country situation to the International Criminal Court, and imposing targeted sanctions on the junta’s leadership and military-owned companies. And if Russia and China block a resolution, then individual governments should use their own national sanctions capabilities to work toward a de-facto global arms embargo—in line with the UN General Assembly’s call for states to halt arms transfers to Myanmar back in 2021. The Security Council should hold regular public meetings to be briefed on junta atrocities and people’s efforts to assert their rights. Governments should take more concerted measures to pressure the junta and support Myanmar civil society. The voices of the Myanmar people should be guiding international efforts, their resolute struggle for democracy and freedom a clarion call that global actors need likewise to persevere. There is no other way forward..."
Source/publisher: The Diplomat (Tokyo) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
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Title: Three years of resistance has blocked the illegal Myanmar junta from taking control
Description: "The Myanmar military cartel must be dismantled In February of 2021, the Myanmar military launched its illegal attempt to seize power. In the three years since, the junta has failed to gain control of the country because of the courageous resistance of Myanmar people. The Myanmar military has a decades-long record of mass killings, torture, sexual violence and other gross human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities in particular. Since the attempted coup three years ago, the junta has committed widespread atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations with total impunity, and caused an economic and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The military's unprecedented violence and inhuman acts have been enabled by a network of domestic and international companies, illicit trade in natural resources and drugs, and ASEAN’s provision of diplomatic, military, technical, financial and intelligence. How has the resistance movement come this far? Spring Revolution: On the ground in Myanmar, ordinary people rose up across ethnic, religious, generational and class lines. They organised strikes against the illegitimate junta, boycotted military businesses and took up arms alongside ethnic armies to defend democracy. The Myanmar military has lost thousands of troops through defection and many others have surrendered. They continue to lose ground on all fronts to an alliance of ethnic armies and Spring Revolution resistance and defence forces. Humanitarian Aid: People-to-people community-based emergency humanitarian aid have supported and saved lives of the most vulnerable population displaced by the Myanmar military's campaign of terror. They continue to resist the military junta as frontline humanitarians. Sanctions: Courageous people throughout Myanmar, the diaspora and civil society organisations around the world acting in solidarity urged governments to act. Coordinated targeted sanctions are hitting the military’s global arms and financial network. Boycotts: Mass boycotts against military products have hit the generals’ hip pockets and irreparably hurt their corrupt network of businesses. Products like Myanmar Beer, Red Ruby cigarettes and Mytel sim cards have been removed from shops and publicly destroyed. Divestment: Under pressure, companies have cut ties with the military and its businesses, and shareholders have divested from companies that continued business as usual with the junta. Multinational corporations have divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the military. Together we can dismantle the military cartel. In 2023, Justice for Myanmar published a report identifying 22 foreign governments, 26 intergovernmental organisations (including 14 UN entities), 8 foreign financial institutions, and 8 other international organisations that have provided the junta with political and financial support. The report also recognises “an increasing number of governments and organisations that have taken steps to prevent or rectify their support for the military junta”. While rounds of sanctions have been imposed by the US, UK, Canada, EU and Australia on senior junta individuals and some of the junta’s business interests, ASEAN’s approach to the Myanmar military junta has been one of enablement and complicity. ASEAN has allowed the junta to participate in and even lead regional initiatives for military cooperation and training. Notably, Singapore remains the third biggest supplier of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military since its coup attempt, in a trade valued at $254 million from at least 138 Singaporean companies, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “For three years the people of Myanmar have successfully blocked the illegal military junta from taking control of their communities, country and future. “The people of Myanmar have refused to accept or legitimise the junta. “Myanmar’s federal democracy forces are rapidly expanding territorial, governance and administrative control and thousands of soldiers have defected or surrendered from the military itself. “Targeted sanctions have hit the military cartel’s global network and multinational corporations have divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the illegal junta. “It’s a three-year long losing streak caused by pressure from all sides. “The international community needs to unite around the use sanctions and step up to finally cut off the flow of revenue and arms, equipment, technology and jet fuel to the junta to protect civilian lives. “They must listen to the Myanmar people resisting the military and act in solidarity now.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication: 2024-01-31
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Three Years of Military Dictatorship in Myanmar
Description: "Opinion: “We Won’t Be Satisfied Until the end Of The World”[1] Over the past couple of years, it has not been uncommon to come across headlines such as “Why Has the World Forgotten About Myanmar?”, “U.N. Rapporteur: Myanmar Crisis ‘Has Been Forgotten’”, “Myanmar’s ‘forgotten war’”, and “Myanmar: the Forgotten Revolution”. To be sure, while the uprisings in countries such as Sudan (2019-2022), or the Palestinians’ ongoing resistance to settler-colonial genocide in the Gaza Strip, have received international coverage from major media outlets, it seems that the world has all but forgotten about the ongoing struggle against Myanmar’s military dictatorship, which will enter its third year in 2024. This is particularly striking in light of the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) most recent report on “The top 10 crises the world can’t ignore in 2024,” which listed Myanmar as the country that is currently undergoing the fifth most urgent humanitarian crisis and projects a worsening of the situation for, what IRC classifies as, approximately three million “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPS). According to the language of the report, in terms of the total number of persons in need, the crisis in Myanmar is rivaled by only four other countries: Sudan, the Gaza Strip and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, South Sudan, and Burkina Faso. And as of December 2023, outside of “Ukraine and Syria, Myanmar recorded the highest number of conflict-related incidents (more than 8,000) for the year.” The 1221 Coup[2] On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s Army (Tatmadaw) staged a successful coup which saw the arrest of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and the installation of the Army as Myanmar’s new governing authority, led by Army Chief, Min Aung Hlaing. In the weeks and months that followed, the country witnessed mass demonstrations against the military junta as well as its brutal repression by the military junta, including the army’s use of live ammunition against protestors. According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), “at least 6,337 civilians were reported as killed and 2,614 as wounded for political reasons in Myanmar in the twenty months between the military coup of February 1, 2021, and September 30, 2022.” Meanwhile, the United Nations Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) expressed concerns similar to those of IRC in their December 2023 report, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan: Myanmar, concluding that more than two years of a military junta has resulted in an all but “grim” humanitarian landscape “with a third of the population” now said “to be in humanitarian need.” According to the report findings, the military junta’s “attempt to suppress opposition and consolidate power” has included the use of “systematic violence against the civilian population resulting in over 4,000 deaths, tens of thousands of arbitrary arrests and other human rights violations, including the use of sexual and gender-based violence.” While the State of Emergency imposed by the military in 2021 remains in place alongside restrictions on the freedom of assembly in 127 townships, Martial Law has now been imposed on 59 out of 330 townships across the country. And to make matters worse, the difficulty in satisfying basic subsistence needs for a growing number of Myanmar’s population has been compounded by “the devastating impacts of Cyclone Mocha in May…placing the people of Myanmar in increasing peril.” In total, “some 18.6 million people are estimated to require humanitarian assistance in 2024 — one million more than the same time last year — with the number of displaced people expected to continue steadily rising during the year from the record 2.6 million at the end of 2023.” By 2024, an estimated $994 million will be required to address the needs of more than 19 million people in Myanmar. From 3D Printed Warfare to Operation 1027 A military dictatorship that the world has all but been happy to forget and the worsening effects of compounded political, social, and environmental crises: it is on all of this that the people of Myanmar, displaced in their millions, have nourished themselves and refined their struggle. What began as a popular uprising has transformed into an exodus to the countryside to take up makeshift arms — ranging from bow and arrows to refurbished wooden rifles — against Min Aung Hlaing’s military. Thus unfolded a now three-year-long protracted guerrilla war, wherein resistance fighters have reached the point of being able to 3D print drones capable of carrying explosives in various, nondescript, caves amidst an otherwise ordinary South East Asian landscape. Speaking with a Dutch journalist who spent time with one armed resistance unit, one guerrilla who goes by the name “3D” (a nom de guerre stemming from his overseeing of the manufacture of 3D printed guns and drones) said, “[the military] can’t win on the ground, so they resort to bombing us from above. We can’t defend ourselves. All we can do is hide…Drones are the only thing we have to make them feel even a fraction of the trauma we feel when they bomb us with their fighter jets.” Despite their capability to engage in warfare both on the ground and in the air, analysts have tended to view Myanmar’s armed conflict as a stalemate with no clear end in sight. However, on 27 October, the anti-junta coalition known as ‘The Brotherhood Alliance’ — made up of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Arakan Army (AA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) — “launched a coordinated offensive taking control of several military posts and towns near the border with China,” with additional news of the MNDAA having “closed the roads from the trade hub of Lashio to Chinshwehaw and Muse on the China border in advance of a ‘major offensive.’” After a mere two weeks, “anti-junta fighters operating with ‘unprecedented coordination’ have overrun 100 military outposts and the junta stands to lose control of key border crossings that account for some 40% of cross-border trade, and a vital tax revenue source.” According to analysts, “the current offensive poses the biggest threat to the junta’s grip on power since the 2021 coup.” Speaking with DW, Anthony Davis, a Bangkok-based security analyst, said, “the offensive has denied the military regime access to key trade hubs on the Chinese border and the revenue derived from them,” while emphasizing the offensive’s “potential to bring down a regime that is already facing deep economic and political crises.” Earlier this month, China succeeded in brokering “a ceasefire [agreement] in northern Myanmar between the junta and an alliance of rebels.” A few days into the ceasefire, however, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced that “it had taken control of the town of Namhsan in northern Shan state as well as the so-called 105-Mile Trade Zone, a key trading area on Shan state’s border with China.” Despite this shift in China’s regional policy and demonstrated willingness to assume a more active, diplomatic, and despite China’s interest in eliminating forms of illicit and illegal activity along its shared border with Myanmar, one of the main allies of the Brotherhood Alliance, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) — the military wing of the de facto ruling party, the United Wa State Party (UWSP) in Wa State, a self-administered division in the north-eastern part of the country — continues to be “entirely equipped with modern weaponry and equipment produced in China”. Hence, Davis noted, given China’s “powerful influence over the UWSA, [it] could undoubtedly affect a major reduction in munitions reaching northern groups if it wanted to.” As things currently stand, China has yet to show any interest in reducing the cross border flow of arms and munitions that make it into the hands of the UWSA. ‘Kabar Ma Kyay Bu’ Myanmar’s is a young war relative to those waged by imperial states from the global North, especially when the median age of the country’s population is 29.6 years. And the youthfulness of this armed struggle is something on full display amongst the various guerrilla camps spanning its countryside. Having previously lived as precariously employed workers, delivery drivers, university students, engineers, and the like; never having seen a day of military combat in their lives before the armed resistance against the military junta; Myanmar’s 20-somethings are now seasoned guerrilla fighters initiated into that long tradition of the struggle for liberation using armed resistance. [1] This title is taken from the Burmese-language anthem ‘Kabar Ma Kyay Bu,’ which was sung during the 1988 People Power Uprisings (also known as the “8888 Uprising”). On 8 August 1988 (8/8/88), in what was then still known as Burma (present-day Myanmar), a major wave of protests and strikes ushered in a period of national mobilizations. This wave of protests, which has come to be known as the People Power Uprisings, culminated in a harsh crackdown and eventual military coup on 18 September 1988. This 1988 anthem of the People Power Uprisings would be sung once again by demonstrators during the 2021 protests against Myanmar’s military (Tatmadaw) coup d’etat. [2] In a country known for auspicious dates, just as the People Power Uprisings have come to be known as the “8888 Uprisings”, the military coup of 1 February 2021 (1/2/21) was quickly dubbed the “1221 coup.”..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Zamaneh" (Amsterdam)
Date of publication: 2024-01-05
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar migrant workers say they won’t pay 2% income tax
Sub-title: They say the junta must first ensure their labor rights, while others refuse to fund a coup regime.
Description: "Myanmar nationals working abroad say they won’t pay income tax to their country’s junta as required by a newly passed law unless they are guaranteed protection of their labor rights, while others oppose funding what they see as an illegitimate military regime. Myanmar’s Union Taxation Law of 2023, signed by junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, went into effect on Oct. 1, requiring migrant workers to pay a portion of their income to the regime. The new law ends an exemption that had been in effect since 2012. On Dec. 13, the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok announced a tax rate of 2% on the earnings of migrant workers in Thailand. But workers in Thailand are questioning why they should be forced to make the payments when they are afforded little assistance from the junta in protecting their rights abroad. “We’ve witnessed many migrant workers suffering violations of their labor rights, but they don’t receive any assistance from Myanmar officials,” said Kyaw Zeya, a Myanmar national who works in Thailand. “So we won’t pay taxes without any protections.” Migrant workers in Thailand told RFA Burmese that they are already struggling to make ends meet on low wages and that the new income tax will mean additional burdens. Salaries for migrant workers in factories, workshops, agriculture and livestock, construction, and services is fixed at 7,500 baht (US$220) per month, meaning they will now be required to pay 150 baht (US$5) to the junta from each monthly paycheck. In Japan, the Myanmar Embassy in Tokyo also recently announced a 2% tax on migrant worker incomes. Under this taxation scheme, a Myanmar national in Japan who earned 200,000 yen (US$1,385) or more each month had to pay the junta 4,000 yen (US$30), while those who earned less had to pay 3,000 yen (US$20). Following resistance to the scheme, the requirements were reduced to 3,000 yen and 1,000 yen (US$5), respectively. And while labor rights are generally better protected in Japan, Myanmar nationals working in the country told RFA that they prefer to pay their income taxes to the host nation, where the money won’t be spent on funding a military that kills and arrests those who object to its seizure of power in a Feb. 1, 2021 coup d’etat. “Those [Myanmar nationals] who need to extend their passport cannot avoid the tax,” said Ye Zaw Htet, who lives and works in Japan. “But I refuse to pay a tax that can be used to harm people in Myanmar.” Migrant workers who have paid the tax receive a certificate, which is needed to renew one’s passport, apply for labor ID cards and request certain official documents. Funding a civil war Analysts RFA spoke with said that the junta wants additional revenue to fund its purchase of aviation fuel, arms and ammunition, even while Myanmar has seen its economy contract and foreign investment vanish amidst a raging civil war. With an estimated 5 million Myanmar nationals working in Thailand, the junta can expect to earn nearly 750 million baht (US$22 million) per month at a rate of 150 baht per worker. From Singapore, where around 300,000 Myanmar nationals work and are required to pay a tax rate of 2%, the junta can expect to earn some 2.4 million Singapore dollars (US$1.8 million) per month. One Myanmar citizen in Singapore who is working as a technician and spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns, said they will only pay taxes to a government with a legitimate mandate. “We aren’t talking about a tax payment,” the worker said. “We will pay taxes to both our home and host countries for the development of our country under an elected government. But we aren’t willing to pay the coup regime.” Sein Htay, an economist, said that regardless of how it is generated, government revenue “should be spent for public development programs and services, not for war expenses,” and certainly not to fund a civil war. Attempts by RFA to contact Myanmar’s embassies in Tokyo, Bangkok and Singapore, as well as the junta’s Planning and Finance Ministry, for their response to criticism of the taxation plan went unanswered by the time of publishing. However, Nyunt Win, the permanent secretary of the junta’s Labor Ministry, characterized the tax scheme as a way to pay for “work permits” for Myanmar nationals overseas. “Work permits abroad have no connection to the government in the homeland,” he said. “The tax is needed to pay to the home country.” In addition to the recent taxation plan, the junta has forced migrant workers to hand over 25% of their salaries to the regime when remitting money home through official transfer channels. Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand staged a protest against the monthly 2% taxation plan in front of the United Nations’ office in Bangkok on Dec. 17, which received a message of support from the Ministry of Labor under the country’s shadow National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2024-01-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Number of Children Killed by Myanmar Military Since Coup Tops 570, NUG Says
Description: "The number of children killed by junta forces in Myanmar since the February 2021 coup reached 578 on Wednesday, based on statistics compiled by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and additional casualty reports from the past few days. The figure covers those killed who were under the age of 18. Myanmar regime forces’ indiscriminate air strikes, shelling and raids on villages and other civilian targets across the country have killed large numbers of non-combatants including many children since the Min Aung Hlaing-led military seized power from Myanmar’s elected civilian government on Feb. 1, 2021, NUG Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy. He said his ministry recorded at least 576 child deaths from Feb. 1, 2021 to Monday. Since then, Nyan Min Hein, a 3-year-old child from Myauktaung Village in Rakhine State’s Kyauktaw Township was killed by junta shelling on Tuesday and Joseph Malsawmhlua, 9, from Let Pan Chaung Village in Sagaing Region’s Kale Township was killed in another junta artillery strike on Wednesday, taking the total death toll among children to 578. Already this year, junta troops have fired artillery shells indiscriminately at residential areas as well as schools and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in several parts of the country where clashes between regime forces and resistance forces are ongoing, resulting in fresh child casualties. The junta has been using aircraft and artillery to attack resistance forces in their stronghold areas of Karenni (Kayah), Kachin, Karen and Chin states and Sagaing and Magwe regions since the armed resistance movement started, but frequently targets civilian locations in those areas as well. According to the NUG, the junta committed nine mass killings in 2021 causing 147 civilian deaths, followed by 44 cases in 2022 killing 515 civilians. In 2023 the number of mass killings increased dramatically to 86, leaving 1,342 civilians dead. According to a report by the NUG’s Ministry of Human Rights, 172 children were killed last year alone, following 165 the year before. “The regime has targeted civilians as the enemy and this continues to affect children. In 2023 alone it killed 108 boys and 64 girls, including some who were just months old, in their indiscriminate attacks,” U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy. The Myanmar military has committed a number of crimes against humanity, the minister said. A few significant cases are the Pazi Gyi Village attack on April 11, 2023 in Sagaing Region in which 40 children were killed; the Let Yet Kone air strike, which killed 11 children on Sept. 23, 2022; the Mone Lei Khet IDP camp artillery strike in Kachin State, which killed 11 children on Oct. 11, 2023; and the A Nang Pa incident on Oct. 28, 2022, which killed dozens of people, although it is unclear exactly how many children died. All people under the age of 18 are protected and it is the responsibility of all armed groups to shield them from conflict, according to international laws and child rights principles, U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy. “Although we can confirm the total death toll of the children, the number of wounded and those who have been left disabled is beyond our capacity” to record, U Aung Myo Min said. In Karenni, Rakhine and northern Shan states the junta is currently facing its greatest military challenge since seizing power, having lost many bases and outposts to resistance forces including the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force and the Brotherhood Alliance of three powerful ethnic armies: the Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Amy and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2024-01-04
Date of entry/update: 2024-01-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Danger Beneath Our Feet - Landmine contamination in Southeast Burma and its impacts on villagers since the 2021 coup
Description: "“Right now, the SAC has planted landmines near villagers’ plantations and farms and we [civilians] don’t know where [exactly]. When there are no explosions, then things will be in peace. The SAC should not act this way. The SAC labels […] civilians as soldiers.” [1] Testimony of a villager from Noh T’Kaw Township, Dooplaya District. 1. Introduction Since the 2021 coup[2] and the subsequent intensification of armed conflict, the use of landmines has proliferated in Southeast Burma (Myanmar)[3]. Landmines are used by not only the State Administration Council (SAC)[4], but all armed actors in Southeast Burma, to both protect territory and attack opponents. Villagers are severely impacted by this proliferation and expansion of landmine use in the ongoing conflict and the SAC has been increasingly targeting civilians directly with these indiscriminate weapons. In locally-defined Karen State[5], this is causing civilian deaths and injuries and affecting the lives and livelihoods of villagers. This briefing paper presents incidents of landmine explosions in civilian areas since the 2021 coup and examines the impacts and needs of the affected communities. The first section provides a brief overview of the context of landmine contamination in Southeast Burma. Secondly, evidence of landmine casualties and the impact on local communities, as well as the challenges and risks that villagers face, are presented. Thirdly, a security and legal analysis of the situation is conducted, as well as a set of policy recommendations provided for local and international stakeholders. 2. Contextual overview Burma is the only country in the world where the ‘state security forces’ actively use landmines within its territory against their own civilian population[6]. Burma is not a party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and it is listed as one of the 12 remaining landmine producers by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)[7]. According to the United Nations’ Myanmar Information Management Unit, all states and divisions, as defined by the Burma government, have been contaminated by landmines over the past decades.[8] In the decades of conflict between the Burma Army[9] and armed resistance groups around the country, landmines have long been used to secure contested territory. However, the Burma Army has directly and actively targeted civilians with landmines as part of the “four cuts” strategy which aims to destroy links between insurgents, their families, and local villagers by cutting off food, funds, intelligence, and recruits to ethnic armed groups[10]. To prevent resistance forces from knowing where landmines are planted, the Burma Army has often deliberately withheld this information from civilians. Landmines remain in place from the decades of conflict, and the Burma Army is actively planting new landmines amid the intensified conflict as they seek to affirm nationwide military control following the 2021 coup. The current armed conflict has created immense difficulties preventing mine clearance programs from being implemented. Karen State has a high level of landmine contamination[11]. Human rights abuses related to landmines are not a new issue; landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) have posed a persistent threat to villagers throughout the decades of conflict.[12] With new landmines being extensively planted across Southeast Burma by both the SAC and armed resistance groups, there is now a combined danger of old and new landmines. These new landmines are being planted in areas unavoidable to villagers and they are increasingly not only accidental victims but are often targeted with landmines by the SAC and its affiliated armed groups. According to Article 2.2 from the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, a mine is defined as “a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.”[13] According to KHRG documentation, the SAC primarily uses factory-made mines whereas the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[14], mostly use handmade mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and anti-vehicle tripwire bombs.[15] KNLA handmade mines are not as powerful as SAC factory-made mines and, usually, factory-made can remain active for decades, whereas handmade mines usually have a lifespan of six months. Nonetheless, both pose a significant threat to local communities. The KNLA sometimes informs local villagers where soldiers plant landmines, but often not adequately. The SAC usually fails to inform local villagers where they plant landmines, or purposely conceals their location, presenting immense danger when this occurs in civilian areas. 3. Factual summary: Landmine incidents and impacts on local communities This chapter presents incidents of anti-personnel landmine explosions and their impacts on local communities in Southeast Burma since the 2021 coup. Since February 2021, KHRG has received reports from across all seven KHRG operational districts[16] containing evidence of 64 landmine incidents involving villagers, which resulted in at least 21 deaths and 60 people injured, including children. These reports were collected by local community members trained by KHRG to document the human rights situation in Southeast Burma. Landmine incidents are often underreported because of security concerns preventing researchers from travelling to certain areas and victims/survivors lacking knowledge of how to report incidents. Therefore, the actual number of casualties resulting from landmine incidents is expected to be much higher. Although both the SAC and armed resistance groups use landmines for military purposes −self-protection or territory defence− the main victims of landmine explosions are villagers as landmines are planted in villages, plantations and roads. From analysis of this information, some trends in landmine incidents in Karen State are explored: landmines are commonly stepped on when villagers are engaging in essential livelihood activities, landmines are harming villagers often in the aftermath of fighting between armed groups, and there is inadequate warning about landmine contamination. The impacts of landmine incidents are also presented, including coping with deaths and injuries, livestock being harmed, and restricted freedom of movement. I. Trends of landmine incidents in locally-defined Karen State since the 2021 coup a) Villagers stepped on landmines while engaging in livelihood activities The majority of landmine-related incidents documented by KHRG since the 2021 military coup involved villagers who stepped on landmines while engaging in their livelihood activities. These landmines were planted near or in villagers’ plantations and farms. Farming and crop plantations are the main source of livelihood for most rural communities in locally-defined Karen State and these landmines are unwittingly triggered when villagers are working, usually unaware of the contamination. For example, on February 16th 2023, two villagers, Saw[17] A--- and Naw[18] B--- (a father and his daughter), from C---, Ma Kah Heh village tract[19], Bu Tho Township, Mu Traw District, went out to cut bamboo in order to fence their farmlands.[20] Saw A--- stepped on a landmine and sustained injuries on his right leg, that later had to be amputated. Naw B---, also stepped on a landmine when she went to help her father. Her legs were seriously injured by the landmine explosion, resulting in a double amputation. Residents of A--- village believe that these landmines were planted by KNLA soldiers from Battalion #15 because the KNLA had informed some villagers about the planting of landmines in the surrounding area one week beforehand. Although villagers are sometimes aware of landmine contamination, they often have no choice but to pass through contaminated areas to carry out essential livelihood activities. For example, on June 20th 2021, Saw D---, a 32-year-old villager from E--- village, Aur’Naung Pat Kan Ywar village tract, Hpapun Town, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, stepped on a landmine while he was returning home from his fields in the hills.[21] Due to the injuries he sustained from the landmine explosion, doctors at Hpa-an Hospital had to amputate his right leg. His left leg was also broken by the explosion, and the landmine shrapnel injured his scrotum. He had stepped on a landmine on one of the paths in the forest, where there were no signs indicating landmine danger. His family and local villagers are unaware of who planted the landmines in this area, however they believe that they were planted in 2021. The local authorities had previously informed villagers about the contamination of landmines and told villagers not to go to prohibited areas. However, the victim’s sister explained that her brother cannot avoid going to the forest due to the need to sustain his family’s livelihood. Similarly, Naw F---, a villager from G--- village, Kheh Kah Hkoh village tract, Ler Doh Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, described. We are now afraid to use that road because of the two [landmine] incidents that happened in the same area. We do not dare to go to the areas surrounding the village. We are so worried. Even though we were told not to use the prohibited road, we need to go to town to buy goods. If we don’t, we will have nothing left to eat. […] The villagers living in this village buy their food in town. How can we survive without being able to travel to buy food?”[22] b) Villagers stepped on landmines left behind after fighting Landmines are actively used in the conflict areas of Southeast Burma. As a result, some villagers have stepped on landmines planted after fighting between the SAC and armed resistance groups. For instance, on November 26th 2022, fighting broke out in H--- village, Than Moe Taung village tract, Daw Hpa Hkoh Township, Taw Oo District, between SAC soldiers based in H--- village and the combined forces of the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[23] and Northern Than Taung Peace Group (Aye Chan Yay A’pweh)[24]. Following the clash, SAC soldiers repaired their army camp and planted more landmines in the area, including in locations further away from their camp and on villagers’ land. Two or three days after the fighting, SAC soldiers notified villagers not to use Than Moe Taung Road and restricted access to it because of landmines planted there. On January 13th 2023, Daw[25] I---, a 68-year-old female villager from H--- village, stepped on a landmine on Than Moe Taung Road when she was returning from collecting wood nearby. Her left leg below the knee was blown off and she sustained severe injuries to her right leg, left arm and face. Daw I--- died before other villagers could arrive to help. Although local villagers stopped using the road, the victim’s son believes that his mother might have forgotten the warning and restriction due to her advanced age. On other occasions, the SAC and its allies have purposely planted landmines inside villages to prevent civilians from returning to certain areas or near infrastructure, including medical clinics and religious buildings. For instance, on November 16th 2021, the junta-affiliated Border Guard Force (BGF)[26] Company #3 entered a village located in Pwa Gaw village tract, Hpa-an Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, and destroyed the medical clinic buildings and looted materials. They threatened local villagers not to enter the clinic compound anymore. Villagers assume the BGF planted a landmine in the clinic and did not feel safe going back.[27] c) Inadequate warnings and a lack of mine awareness training The SAC fails to adequately mark contaminated areas with signposting or inform villagers in Southeast Burma of the location of landmines they have planted in the area. Armed resistance groups usually inform villagers orally, however, these warnings are also often inadequate. The information villagers receive is incomplete and the precise location of landmines remains unknown and unmarked. For example, on June 29th 2021, Saw J---, a 10-year-old villager from K--- village, Ma Htaw village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, stepped on a tripwire that detonated a landmine while he was returning home from L--- village, where he had gone to retrieve a box that contained clothes and books.[28] From the explosion, the victim sustained injuries to his face, neck, leg and abdomen. After the incident, he was sent to the SAC military’s Tactical Battalion #340 hospital situated in Hpapun Town to receive treatment. The medical staff were able to remove all of the shrapnel that hit his body. The victim was discharged from the hospital on July 27th 2021. His injuries took many months to heal fully. Before the incident, villagers were informed by the local KNU authorities that there was landmine contamination in the area. They were told to remain only on the road and not to wander anywhere to the sides of the road. According to the victim’s brother, these landmines were planted in May 2021 by the local ethnic armed groups. Even though Mine Risk Awareness training was provided to the villagers in 2020, the family of Saw J--- was unable to attend that training; they only received pamphlets containing landmine awareness information. No one has previously been injured due to landmine explosions in K--- village, and this was the first time that any landmine has exploded in or near the village. Despite the warnings from the local authorities not to go to places where there is landmine contamination, landmines planted near the road and surrounding areas pose a danger to local villagers nonetheless. Furthermore, there were no signs indicating where landmines have been planted in the vicinity of the village. This lack of information provided on landmine contamination contributes to a high rate of incidents. Many local communities also lack Mine Risk Awareness training so they may not recognise landmine tripwires or contaminated areas. For example, on October 20th 2022, M--- , a villager from N--- village, Maung Khee village tract, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District accidentally triggered a tripwire landmine when he went to make charcoal beside an SAC military camp near the village.[29] Local villagers assumed that the landmine has been set by the SAC. The victim was sent to Waw Lay Hospital, Waw Lay Town, Kaw T’Ree Township, Dooplaya District. No Mine Risk Awareness training had been provided in N--- village. The victim does not have any relatives, so his neighbours and other villagers took care of him and supported him. No organisations financially supported him. M--- was discharged from the hospital and has since recovered from his injuries. According to KHRG documentation, many local communities in locally-defined Karen State do not receive Mine Risk Awareness training. Many villagers, especially children, have stepped on landmines because they were not aware of landmine contamination in their communities. One of the main challenges that villagers face in accessing mine awareness training in their communities is the ongoing armed conflict. These trainings are usually provided by local organisations such as Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) and the Karen Teacher Working Group (KTWG) in all districts in locally-defined Karen State. Due to the conflict, it is difficult for local NGOs or other service providers to provide training for villagers in a safe place. As villagers always have to flee for their safety because of fighting, shelling and air strikes, villagers do not have time to receive training. The few organisations providing such training to local communities cannot reach all rural areas since some communities are in remote, hard-to-reach areas. Thousands of people are internally displaced in Karen State, often many times over, due to the ongoing armed conflict.[30] When fleeing conflict, these internally displaced people (IDPs) must establish settlements in safe areas away from fighting and attack. Due to the high rate of landmine contamination across the state, rarely signposted, IDPs are at risk of landmine explosions when seeking safety in new areas. For instance, in early 2021, villagers from Xx--- village, Meh Way village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, had to flee fighting in their area and were displaced to a place in Bilin Township. As Ashin[31] Xc---, a monk from Xx--- village, explained, these villagers were deeply afraid of the landmine contamination in the area they fled to, as they had no way of knowing where the landmines were. Moreover, as landmines are often left behind after fighting, Ashin Xc--- explained that IDPs were also afraid to return home to their villages because of new landmine contamination.[32] II. Impacts of landmine incidents on local communities From KHRG reports, 21 villagers were killed and 60 villagers were injured, including children, by landmine explosions in Southeast Burma from February 2021 to November 2023. The survivors of these explosions are faced with many challenges, including coping with their physical injuries, the psychological impact of the traumatic incident, high medical costs, and livelihood challenges due to an inability to work or the loss of livestock from landmine explosions. This section will discuss the impacts on survivors of these landmine incidents and their families. a) Challenges facing landmine explosion by survivors and their family members For the survivors who lost limbs or sustained other serious injuries from landmine explosions, it severely disrupts their ability to work, particularly if they rely on manual labour for plantation farming. For example, on June 13th 2023, at around 2 pm, Saw O---, a 41-year-old man from P--- village, Yaw Ku village tract, T’Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District, stepped on a landmine as he was going to the forest to collect some wild plants from a place near to a deserted Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)[33] army camp.[34] His right foot was badly injured in the explosion. With his foot wounded, he travelled back alone from the jungle to a local villager’s tent. He was initially taken to the Q--- hospital, but they could not provide adequate medical care there. Therefore, he was transferred to R--- hospital, Pee T’Hka village tract, Ta Kreh Township, Hpa-an District, for medical treatment. He has now been discharged from the hospital however he was bedridden for months after the incident. Due to his injury, his inability to work threatens his family’s livelihood. Landmine survivors often face financial difficulties in getting treatment because of the high costs of medical care. For example, in October 2022, P---, a 36-year-old villager, from T--- village, Htee Moh Pgha special area, K’Ser Doh Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, stepped on a landmine while he was going to drink water in someone’s house in his village. After the incident, the victim was sent to the general hospital in Tavoy City, Mergui-Tavoy District, where his right leg was amputated. While he was in the hospital, the SAC soldiers came and told him that this incident happened to him because he had a connection with the PDF. They did not take any responsibility for him. The cost of the hospital treatment was around 3,000,000 kyats [1,427 USD][35] meaning he needed to sell his car and motorcycle to afford the treatment. Due to the loss of his leg, it was difficult for him to work and support his family in daily life; he has three children. After being discharged from the hospital, he returned to his village and stayed with his relatives. The lack of adequate support is also prominent in cases of landmine explosion incidents. Some victims received some support from various stakeholders after the incident and villagers and close relatives sometimes help victims and their family members in terms of transportation and providing a little financial support. However, the support is not sufficient to meet their needs and all victims and their family members would benefit from long-term assistance programmes to help overcome the consequences of the incident on their ability to secure their livelihoods. b) Livestock killed and injured In 11 instances reported to KHRG, villagers’ livestock were killed and injured in landmine explosions. This also resulted in villagers’ livelihood challenges because animals such as cows and buffalos are used for farming and selling as a source of income. For example, on September 7th 2022, at about 11 am, a herd of cows belonging to U[36] U--- from V--- village, Noh T’Kaw village tract, Noh T’Kaw Township, Dooplaya District, stepped on a landmine that was planted by SAC soldiers near Infantry Battalion (IB)[37] #283 camp while the animals were roaming near the camp in V--- village.[38] Local villagers knew that the landmine was planted by SAC soldiers because the soldiers themselves told them so. A cow was killed and two others were severely injured by the landmine explosion. The severely injured cows were killed to be sold by their owner. Other incidents also happened in Hpa-an District. In January 2023, one of the cows owned by a villager named W--- stepped on a landmine at A’Leh Bo Deh army camp (an SAC camp), Htee Wah Blaw village tract, T’Nay Hsah Township, Hpa-an District and broke a leg.[39] Again, in January 2023, one of the cows of a villager named X--- was killed by a landmine near Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[40] #356 located in Thin Gan Nyi Nuang military camp, Myawaddy Township, Hpa-an District. On January 24th 2023, three cows owned by a villager named Saw Y--- were injured and two of his cows were killed by a tripwire mine explosion. This tripwire mine was set up by SAC LIB #357 beside Saw Z---’s farm. The SAC had planted landmines near the villagers’ farms but did not inform the villagers about them, and so the villagers released their cows unaware of the mine contamination. After the landmine explosions, the SAC soldiers asked to whom the cows belonged but no one answered because they knew the owner would be made to pay for the landmines that exploded. After these incidents, the SAC informed villagers from Aa--- village and Ab--- village that the cows’ owners would have to pay for landmines if their cows stepped on landmines again. The SAC soldiers also restricted some areas in Htee Wah Blaw village tract so villagers could not let their cows go and pasture there. c) Restricted freedom of movement Landmine contamination remains a barrier to villagers’ freedom of movement and is an obstacle to their pursuit of everyday livelihood activities. Villagers can often not safely travel to their farms and plantations, nor to towns to buy food and other essential supplies. For instance, on March 1st 2021, three villagers from G--- village, Kheh Kah Hkoh village tract, Ler Doh Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, were hit by a landmine explosion at Ac--- place when they travelled to Ler Doh Town on two motorbikes to purchase goods for their shop.[41] The incident place was three miles away from G--- village. Saw Ad--- and Naw Ae--- died instantly and another villager sustained shrapnel injuries to his lips and legs. The injured villager immediately returned to the village and informed the victims’ families and the local authorities about the incident, after which they went to the incident location and brought back the bodies of the victims to the village. Local villagers have stopped going to certain areas and using the contaminated road since this incident. 4. Analysis: patterns of abuses and violations of international law Survivors and victims’ family members require long-term support in the aftermath of landmine incidents, including psychological care, medical rehabilitation and financial support to support livelihoods. The impact of landmine contamination on villagers across Southeast Burma is severe and increasing; their needs must be met by assistance from NGOs, community-based and civil society organisations (CBO/CSOs), and international organisations operating in Southeast Burma. The incidents presented in this briefing paper primarily involve landmines planted in farms, plantations or close to roads, which villagers unknowingly trigger while conducting their livelihood activities. Landmine incidents were also found to commonly occur as a direct result of fighting between armed groups in civilian areas: they are lain to control territory and not cleared in the aftermath of conflict, nor is adequate information of contamination spread among communities. Many children are victims of landmines in Southeast Burma; they are often even less aware of the location or dangers of contaminated areas than adults. A lack of mine awareness training in affected communities was a notable feature of many incidents. Villagers cannot avoid the risk of landmines when they lack knowledge of the location of contaminated areas and, as has been discussed, sometimes have to walk through known contaminated areas by necessity to secure their livelihoods. The use of landmines is an active and systematic strategy used by the SAC in Southeast Burma to attack both military and civilian targets. This is evident from the wealth of incidents documented in civilian areas, surrounding villages, on villagers’ land and plantations, and on roads used daily and the SAC’s often deliberate withholding of information on contaminated locations. Whilst armed resistance groups may use landmines to protect territory, including villages, from attack and sometimes inform villagers orally, civilians are nonetheless not adequately protected and contaminated areas are rarely signposted, which should be a minimum precaution. Landmines are always planted with intention to harm, and where civilians are targeted, severe violations of international law have taken place. Landmines do not distinguish between combatants and civilians in their victims, as anyone could trigger them. All parties of a conflict must ensure civilians are not targeted and are protected from their military operations. Landmine usage violates this principle of distinction between civilians and combatants, the basic tenet of international humanitarian law.[42] The Burma government is one of few non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty (1997), which prohibits the use of anti-personnel landmines, and is an international pariah in using them against domestic civilians.[43] As Matt Wells, Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Deputy Director, states, “at a time when the world has overwhelmingly banned these inherently indiscriminate weapons, the military has placed them in people’s yards, homes, and even stairwells, as well as around a church”.[44] Landmine usage by the SAC is one of many examples of civilians being targeted without distinction from combatants. Villagers are not inadvertent victims, the use of indiscriminate weapons inside villages and in areas unavoidable to civilians shows deliberate targeting and clear motivation. As specified in Article 51 (5) of Additional Protocol I of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980), weapons that cannot be exclusively directed towards military targets and thus cause indiscriminate damage, are prohibited.[45] When lain in areas roamed by civilians, landmines do not discriminate their victims, and so are prohibited. Despite the Burma government’s non-acquiescence of this Convention, its terms are nonetheless applicable according to the ICRC commentary of rule 81: Restrictions on the Use of Landmines of customary international humanitarian law.[46] State and non-state armed actors must adhere to the obligations outlined in the Convention to ‘take all feasible precautions to protect civilians from the effects of these weapons’, and to ‘take special precautionary measures such as marking and signposting of minefields’.[47] The incidents presented in this briefing paper attest to the failure of all armed actors in Southeast Burma to do so. Whilst some armed groups may use landmines to protect areas from SAC attacks, including villages or bases, the incidents documented demonstrate their usage does not take sufficient precautions nor adequately inform villagers, and thus also fall short of customary laws to which they are also beholden to follow. Despite the Burma government not being a signatory of either the Mine Ban Treaty (1997) or the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980), customary international humanitarian law reaches beyond these Conventions; all armed actors must adhere to international standards, ensuring villagers in Southeast Burma are able to live in peace, with their right to life, livelihood, and security honoured and protected. Recommendations To international stakeholders and aid agencies: Acknowledge that the military junta is the reason for the current human rights and humanitarian crisis, and abstain from giving legitimacy to the junta, including by signing agreements with them and presenting them with credentials. Seek justice and hold the SAC accountable for their use of landmines against civilians, by prosecuting leaders in international courts, including at international criminal court (ICC), and through universal jurisdiction proceedings. Broaden the scope of international investigations to include human rights abuses faced by the Karen people, especially in regards to injury, death, and displacement due to landmines. Implement further coordinated and strategic sanctions on the SAC, junta officials, and weapons/landmine suppliers, to weaken the junta’s capability to finance their campaigns and attacks on civilians. Support local organisations active in providing Mine Risk Education services, with an emphasis on educating children, in rural areas in Southeast Burma. Support, coordinate and promote local initiatives aiming at mapping contamination sites and landmine clearance programmes. Work with local service providers to establish and implement long-term assistance programmes for landmine victims and their families, as well as communities whose livelihoods are affected by landmine contamination. To the Karen National Union (KNU) and affiliated armed actors: Refrain from planting new landmines and remove all existing landmines near or in villages. Demand that soldiers distinctly mark landmine-contaminated areas with signposting and properly inform local villagers about their locations. Continue to work with Karen civil society organisations (CSOs) to offer more Mine Risk Awareness programmes and increase victim assistance..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication: 2023-12-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-22
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Title: Myanmar: Military should be investigated for war crimes in response to ‘Operation 1027’
Description: "Attacks killed and displaced civilians in Rakhine State Myanmar military arbitrarily detained civilians and looted valuables Amnesty International documents military use of cluster munitions in Shan State Myanmar’s military has unlawfully killed, arbitrarily detained and stolen from civilians as it struggles to contain the heaviest outburst of armed resistance since the 2021 coup, Amnesty International said today. Drawing on interviews with 10 civilians from Pauktaw township in Rakhine State and analyses of photographs, video material and satellite imagery, Amnesty International has documented likely indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian objects as well as, in northern Shan State, the use of banned cluster munitions, all of which should be investigated as war crimes. “The Myanmar military has a blood-stained résumé of indiscriminate attacks with devastating consequences for civilians, and its brutal response to a major offensive by armed groups fits a longstanding pattern,” said Matt Wells, Director of Amnesty International’s Crisis Response Programme. “Nearly three years after the coup, the suffering of civilians across Myanmar shows no signs of easing, even as the issue has largely fallen off the international agenda.” Hostilities have significantly escalated since 27 October 2023, when three ethnic armed organizations — the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army — launched coordinated attacks on military posts on the country’s northeastern border with China, in an offensive known as ‘Operation 1027’. Other armed groups fighting the military have increased their operations as well, collectively seizing territory and military posts and capturing soldiers. The fighting represents the heaviest clashes since the coup, according to the UN. As of 15 December, the UN said the violence since 27 October had reportedly killed at least 378 civilians, injured 505 more, and displaced more than 660,000 people, adding to the nearly two million already displaced across the country. ‘Everyone was struggling for their survival’ On the morning of 16 November, Myanmar’s military began firing by air into Pauktaw town, Rakhine State, after the Arakan Army captured a police station. After its morning attack, the military ordered all civilians to leave within one hour. According to Amnesty International’s interviews with nine civilians present at the time and with a monk from a nearby village, most of Pauktaw’s 20,000 residents fled immediately. But at least several hundred were unable to evacuate before the military’s attacks resumed that afternoon. One community worker, who helped people flee but was himself unable to evacuate until 24 November, said many older people and people with disabilities were left behind despite local volunteers’ efforts. He said: “Cars, motorbikes and other vehicles were no longer available for hire. Everyone was struggling for their survival.” Many civilians sought refuge within the Lawka Hteik Pan pagoda compound on the town’s outskirts. “We thought that another plane and warships were coming, so [my wife and I] fled our home,” said a 65-year-old man. “We couldn’t run far.” The military attacked again on the afternoon of 16 November, firing from inside the town and the outskirts, as well as from the air and sea, according to witnesses. Videos and photographs analyzed by Amnesty International’s weapons investigator show that Mi-24 Hind helicopters fired 57mm S-5K rockets, and ships fired 40mm high-explosive shells, into the city on 16 November. Only the Myanmar military operates those weapon systems. The use of these inaccurate weapons in populated areas raises concerns about the Myanmar military’s ability to distinguish between military targets and civilians or civilian objects. The attacks may thus be indiscriminate and, as such, should be investigated as war crimes. After the firing stopped during the afternoon of 16 November, soldiers entered the Lawka Hteik Pan compound and arrested the people who were hiding there, according to four civilians present at the time. “I was arrested at gunpoint,” said a 24-year-old woman, who had sought shelter there with her family, including a young child. “The soldiers asked me if I was a member of the AA [Arakan Army]… I couldn’t say anything because I was so scared.” During the day on 16 November, three women — two teachers and a pregnant popsicle vendor — were killed while hiding inside the Lawka Hteik Pan compound, according to one person who was also taking shelter in the compound and another person who saw the bodies. Amnesty International could not independently determine how the women were killed, but the person who saw the bodies indicated they had gunshot wounds. The same day, a 76-year-old monk was killed in the same compound. A person who saw the body told Amnesty International the monk was killed by a strike, not gunfire. The Arakan Army has reported that the monk was killed by a naval artillery shell. Amnesty International has not been able to independently verify that detail, including after reviewing photographs of the monk’s body. ‘We slept in fear’ That night, soldiers forced the more than 100 civilians at the Lawka Hteik Pan compound to stay outside in the heavy rain. “Some people’s hands were tied behind their backs,” said the 24-year-old woman arrested at gunpoint. “We all had to sit in the rain all night. At dawn the next day, they forced us to enter the temple [and] locked the door.” A 28-year-old woman who stayed in the town with her parents said soldiers from the Myanmar military discovered the place where they were hiding with two other families on the afternoon of 16 November, taking all the men and leaving the women and children behind after stealing their valuables including gold, cash and mobile phones. At dawn the next morning, another group of soldiers came and arrested the rest. Soldiers also arrested a 60-year-old shopkeeper on 17 November, along with three other people with whom he had been hiding and two other people living on his street, bringing them to the Lawka Hteik Pan compound. “They threatened that they could kill all of us,” he said. Those trapped at the Lawka Hteik Pan compound described being locked inside the prayer hall and denied food and water for two days. They also said soldiers took their mobile phones and other valuables. After two days, the soldiers selected a handful of men to go take food from the town. “Some of the arrested men were called and forced to break into the stalls in the market and take food,” said the 24-year-old woman. The arrest and detention of persons sheltering in the Lawka Hteik Pan compound amount to arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The treatment of the detained civilians, including through denial of food and water and exposure to extreme weather, violates the principle of humane treatment. Moreover, the stealing of civilians’ private property amounts to pillage, which is prohibited under international humanitarian law and constitutes a war crime. A community worker, who was trapped in the town after helping others to flee, said that for the first five nights he could hear repeated gunfire and explosions. He hid with four other men in a house where they had no electricity, and their phone batteries ran out after two days. They also ran low on food and bottled water. “Some days we didn’t eat, and we slept in fear,” he said. At dawn on 24 November, he escaped to a nearby village. “[The military] has blocked any aid for IDPs [internally displaced persons] and prices are also skyrocketing,” he said. He said there had been severe health consequences for some displaced people, especially older people and young children, as they lacked adequate shelter and blankets during the heavy rain. ‘We had to run away through those bombardments’ On 21 November, the Arakan Army drove military forces out of Pauktaw and evacuated the captives from the Lawka Hteik Pan compound. Witnesses said that, as they escaped, the military fired on the town. “We had to run away through those bombardments,” said the 28-year-old woman who had been held in the temple and is now sheltering in a nearby village. “I feel that I am safer now than before. However, we can still see our Pauktaw town burning with smoke after being bombarded.” In the following days, the military continued to fire on civilian infrastructure in Pauktaw from the sea and air. Amnesty International reviewed satellite imagery of Pauktaw, though high-resolution imagery coverage is limited. A clear image captured on 01 December 2023 shows multiple areas with extensive burning, damage and destruction, including a probable market, probable civilian homes and areas around religious sites. In addition, the false-colour, near-infrared satellite imagery shows major destruction to buildings within a hospital compound and a crater nearby. The level of destruction and the size of the nearby crater suggest this damage was likely the result of air strikes. Imagery indicates the destruction occurred between 21 and 23 November. Evidence of cluster munitions Amnesty International also documented an attack on Namkham township in northern Shan State. Late in the evening of 01 December 2023 or very early on 02 December, the Myanmar military conducted an air strike on Namkham using bombs that were most likely cluster munitions. Cluster munitions are internationally banned as they are inherently indiscriminate, and their use constitutes a war crime. Amnesty International’s weapons investigator analyzed five photographs of ordnance scrap recovered at the scene, and identified the remains of a cluster munitions dispenser. In addition, two videos provided to Amnesty International, and confirmed by the organization’s Crisis Evidence Lab as newly posted online, show the moment of the attack. After the sound of a passing jet aircraft, there are approximately 10 detonations in a line over the course of three seconds. The videos are dark, as the attack was at night, but the aircraft use and pattern of detonations are consistent with the deployment of air-dropped cluster munitions. According to a report by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the attack killed one local resident, injured five others, and damaged some homes. The tail kit, exposed electronics, and internal plumbing of the dispenser scrap in the photographs match the remnants of previous cluster munitions used in attacks by the Myanmar military. Amnesty International has documented the military’s unlawful use of cluster munitions in attacks on a community gathering in a school in Mindat township in Chin State on 02 July 2022, on a village in Demoso township in Kayah State on 13 April 2022, and during fighting in Kayin State on 10 April 2022. “As the world stands by, the Myanmar military is again showing the brutality it unleashes on civilians. The UN Security Council must urgently impose an arms embargo to protect civilians from further catastrophe,” said Matt Wells. “The military’s impunity must finally end. We reiterate our call to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court and bring the perpetrators of crimes under international law to justice.” Background Since the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar has experienced a severe escalation of human rights violations. The military’s use of lethal force against nonviolent protesters in February and March of 2021 provoked an armed uprising that continues to intensify. In a May 2022 report, ‘Bullets rained from the sky’: War crimes and displacement in eastern Myanmar, Amnesty International found Myanmar’s military had subjected civilians to collective punishment via widespread aerial and ground attacks, arbitrary detentions, torture, extrajudicial executions, and the systematic looting and burning of villages. An August 2022 report, 15 days felt like 15 years: Torture in detention since the Myanmar coup, documented violations by the Myanmar security forces, including torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, when they arrested, interrogated, and detained individuals suspected of being involved in protests. A November 2022 report, Deadly Cargo: Exposing the Supply Chain that Fuels War Crimes in Myanmar, called for a suspension of the supply of aviation fuel to prevent the military from carrying out unlawful air strikes. On 09 October 2023, a military air strike followed by mortar fire on Mung Lai Hkyet, an internally displaced persons camp in Kachin State, killed at least 28 civilians including children, and injured at least 57 others..."
Source/publisher: Amnesty International (UK)
Date of publication: 2023-12-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-12-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Three Myanmar Ceasefire Signatories Vow to Topple Junta
Description: "Three of Myanmar’s armed groups say they will not hold talks with the regime until violence against civilians ends. The Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF) and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, which all signed the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), said they will snub Sunday’s ceremony in Naypyitaw to mark eight years since the deal was agreed. The three organizations, who are fighting the regime alongside resistance groups, said the 2021 coup destroyed the basic principles and objectives of the NCA and nullified the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. A joint statement said the junta’s repeated attacks on civilians violated international humanitarian law. “This reinforces our position that the NCA is no longer valid and demonstrates that the military has abandoned peaceful means to resolve problems,” it said. In establishing a federal democratic union and sustainable peace, the three groups said they had laid out common objects and positions, including toppling the regime and ending military involvement in politics. They agreed to reform and reorganize the military fully under civilian control, draft a new constitution based on federalism and democracy and seek justice for the victims of the conflict. The revolutionary groups said talks would not be held without the regime ending violence against civilians and accepting the common objectives. “We demand a system change, not a change within the regime. Changing one military regime to another or even an authoritarian civilian regime is not acceptable,” said the armed groups. A new constitution and electoral system will create future governments based on a nation-unity model with a transitional authority agreed by all stakeholders, the statement said. It called on the public, the other NCA signatories and the international community to boycott the regime’s activities. Since the 2021 coup, the KNU has provided military training to several thousand anti-regime activists who have joined resistance groups. It is fighting with its allies in Karen and Mon states, Bago and Tanintharyi regions and the capital, Naypyitaw. The CNF’s armed allies are fighting the regime along with the Chinland Defense Forces in Chin State and neighboring Sagaing and Magwe regions..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2023-10-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar’s military dictatorship won’t be around forever
Sub-title: It’s time to start thinking beyond the country’s nightmarish era of military rule and begin planning for a better future
Description: "In our decades of interactions with presidents, prime ministers, government ministers and diplomats all over the world, one flawed assumption has underpinned their understanding and approach to our country. That assumption is that Myanmar’s military is somehow invincible. It’s not a word they use, because the assumption is so deeply ingrained that they don’t even talk about it. The military cannot be defeated—that is their starting point. Their whole policymaking approach stems from this. Over the years, this has led them down paths so convoluted that at some points they have even argued that cross-border aid to ethnic communities fleeing Myanmar army attacks will fuel conflict. The false assumption of Myanmar military invincibility led the international community to pressure ethnic revolutionary organisations to engage in the sham “peace process” 11 years ago. We warned them that the military’s claims that it wanted peace were not genuine. For the military, this was just a pause button, not a stop button, we said. But Western governments didn’t listen and instead wasted—and still waste—millions of dollars of aid money trying to convince themselves that there can be peace with the Myanmar military. The assumption of military invincibility led them to pressure Aung San Suu Kyi to run for election and serve in parliament under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. In the 2000s, the assumption that the military was invincible led some Yangon diplomats to decide that they knew better than the people of Myanmar, who wanted nothing more than to see an end to military rule. Instead, these diplomats argued that sanctions should be lifted and that ways should be found to engage with the military for some imaginary gradual reform process, despite everything we know about the military mindset and behaviour. We were told we had to compromise with the military and “dialogue” with them, even as they bombed our villages, schools and clinics. Even now, when we try to defend our people and our land, we are accused of provoking the military and blamed for the attacks against us. In largely peaceful Yangon, in the bubble where foreign diplomats and United Nations agencies reside, this false assumption still underpins their approach. They assume that the military is there to stay. From that starting point, they like to talk about “creative” alternatives. They talk about whether there are any members of the military or the junta who are a little more open-minded and suggest supporting a younger, reform-minded generation of the military unhappy with the current situation. It’s the same fruitless debate that diplomats have engaged in since the 1990s. Gradually, in the Yangon bubble, diplomats and international agencies are deciding that the military is here to stay, and that they have no choice but to step up their engagement with the generals. They say they have to do so for the sake of meeting humanitarian needs, even as they provide little or no aid to parts of the country that are not under military control and where civil society is ready to deliver life-saving aid. Outside of Yangon, there is a very different situation. People are doing everything they can to resist military rule. From boycotts to taking up arms, people know that there can be no human rights, no economic development and no true federal democracy while the Myanmar military holds power. For the first time in decades, the military is losing control of significantly more areas of the country. “A Shifting Power Balance—Junta Control Shrinks in Southeast Burma,” a new report released by the Karen Peace Support Network last month, reveals that since the coup, the Myanmar military has lost 62 military bases to Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army and its allies. On the western and eastern boundaries of northern KNU territory there have been big strategic gains. The KNU’s expansion westwards and southwards also poses a significant threat to the junta’s main road and rail transport artery from Yangon to Naypyitaw, as well as to the Asia Highway trade corridor from Yangon to Myawaddy on the Thai border. Areas under KNU civilian administration are expanding fast. Schools operated by the Karen Education and Culture Department have tripled to more than 900. Meanwhile, schools operated by the regime’s education ministry in KNU and mixed administration areas have fallen from 370 to zero. In Sagaing and Magway regions, the military has faced unprecedented resistance, losing large areas to the control of the People’s Defence Force (PDF). The military has ceded administrative control to the Arakan Army in large parts of Rakhine State. In Kachin, Chin and Karenni states, the military is struggling to maintain or regain territory. We are not claiming that the Myanmar military is about to collapse. We know only too well about the vast manpower and weaponry that it has at its disposal, having both experienced attacks by the military ourselves. What we are saying is that there has been a major shift in dynamics on the ground. The military has not faced this kind of pressure in living memory. The appearance of normality in Yangon and a handful of other cities is an exception, not the rule. The external pressures that the military is facing from the armed resistance and its loss of territory are visible to all. Internal pressures within the military are also increasingly evident, with the regime making sudden and erratic economic decisions and purging and reshuffling its members and other military personnel. The shifting power balance in Karen State and other areas should already have prompted governments and UN agencies to reassess their approach, both politically and logistically for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In the areas where they can be most useful, they remain woefully behind the curve. History is full of examples of seemingly invincible regimes which no longer exist. Some collapsed suddenly and almost overnight. Some took years of struggle to overcome. At the moment, the international community seems to have put all its policy eggs in the basket of military invincibility and a long grinding conflict. It seems to have done very little short- or long-term planning for a scenario in which the Myanmar military is, at long last, defeated by the country’s people. We can’t say when the military will fall. But fall it will. There is no alternative for our people or our country. What does it say about international policy-making towards Myanmar that so little thought has gone into preparing for the day that the people of Myanmar are working so hard to reach? The defeat of the military is the essential first stepping stone towards a free Myanmar. We—and the world—need to be ready for what comes next..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Myanmar Now" (Myanmar)
Date of publication: 2023-10-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-09
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Title: The 2021 military coup killed its own 2008 constitution and the NCA
Description: "Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the universally despised leader of the deeply unpopular 2021 military coup that ousted the re-elected National League for Democracy (NLD) government, is preparing to hold a grand ceremony for the 8th anniversary of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which was signed on Oct. 15, 2015. The military leaders and endorsers of the 2021 coup, including Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, are a group of cunning, unprincipled and ruthless individuals, to belabour the obvious. They are not very bright, strategically speaking. They lack foresight. And they are anything but patriots. What kind of patriots would plunge their country into the abyss of nationwide violence, reignite the flames of civil war, condemn 30 percent of their fellow people to the worsening conditions of hunger or “food insecurity”, forcibly displace large segments of the population, including the majority Buddhists, order over 2,000 airstrikes in less than two-and-a-half-years against vulnerable civilians in clinics, hospitals, monasteries, resort to its colonial-style scorched earth operations, block the refugees’ access to emergency and humanitarian aid, burn down entire villages in the heartlands of the Bama majority, destroy nearly 80,000 homes across the country, and serially slaughter young men and women from all ethnic and faith backgrounds who staunchly resist the coup. I personally know well several of these coup plotters and endorsers, with blood on their hands, including the 3rd ranking coup leader General Mya Tun Oo (his former commander), and ex-Lt.-General Myint Swe who at the time of the coup was vice president in Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration, and Daw Yin Yin Oo (retired Foreign Service official and the military’s counter-intelligence agent) who serves as one of the two key female advisers in the coup regime. Daw Yin Yin Oo’s father the late Dr Maung Maung served as the legal adviser to the late military dictator General Ne Win until the latter’s death under house arrest. [The other woman who has the honour of being an advisor to the coup regime is Dr. Yin Yin Nwe, an ex-daughter-in-law of the late General Ne Win, who trained as a geologist at Cambridge University and worked as the head of UNICEF in China]. In the morning of the coup, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing instantly made Myint Swe “Acting President”, since the sitting President Win Myint refused to endorse the coup, while literally at gunpoint, as was required by the 2008 constitution. Twisting the military’s own constitutional requirement, Myint Swe play-acted the role of “President” and read out his presidential endorsement to Min Aung Hlaing’s coup. No such clause existed in the military’s 2008 Constitution that “the Commander-in-Chief shall instantly make the military’s handpicked Vice President “Acting President” in order to constitutionally endorse the coup in the event the real and sitting president refused to go along with the military’s seizure of power, even if a pistol is pointed to the latter’s head!” Joking and my personal assessment of men and women who made the coup aside, I offer my analysis of the coup and post-coup developments from an institutional perspective. Indeed, the Feb. 1, 2021 coup had inadvertently killed several birds with one stone, specifically the NCA and the 2008 Constitution birds. The constitution was the goose that laid the military’s golden eggs, whichever Senior General may serve as the Commander-in-Chief. This is precisely the most recent position – and analysis – of the Karen National Union: the coup had rendered null and void both the Constitution of 2008 and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015. The Myanmar military under the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing was a signatory, to the NCA, alongside the representatives of the parliament and the presidency, as well as eight other armed organizations, including the KNU and the Chin National Front (CNF). Its coup had abolished the parliament and the presidency, while imprisoning the sitting president and leaders of the legislature on trumped up charges, without due process, the KNU argues. According to the KNU reasoning, since the military as a key signer of the NCA had behaved in such a way that no other signatory has any moral or legal obligation to honour the otherwise legally binding treaty among the central state actors and the armed resistance organizations which signed the agreement, in good faith. The KNU is the country’s oldest pro-democracy and pro-federal union resistance organization founded in 1947 with 70-years of direct military and political experiences in dealing with the military in Myanmar. During the military-led reform period, the KNU leadership played an instrumental role in pushing for the peaceful political solution to bring an end to the country’s civil war of fluctuating intensities. First, a word about the 2008 constitution, which served as the basis of the NCA. To borrow the American lingo, it was the constitution of, for, and by the military. It was designed chiefly by the retired Senior General Than Shwe, who served as a young infantry officer under the command of my late great uncle the late Lt.-Colonel Ant Kywe over half a century ago. Than Shwe’s 2008 constitution was, for all intents and purposes, amendment proof and thus anti-democratic. That is to say, it was designed not to accommodate popular will or public opinion of the electorate as they “mature” or become more democratic and progressive. It contained no sunset clause for the military to allow itself to be phased out over a period of transitional electoral cycles, typical of all constitutions found in countries in a genuine democratic transition from the decades of military rule to a progressively democratic system (Indonesia, for instance). Furthermore, it also elevated the Ministry of Defence (or the Armed Forces) above any other institutions in society: the two other branches of the government, the legislature and judiciary, were to have no real control over the military, nor does the executive branch of which the military/Ministry of Defence was merely a component, theoretically. No political parties that enjoy a popular mandate from the people can influence the military’s policies or behaviour. It vested the power in the Commander-in-Chief to re-take power on any occasion which the number one soldier deems “a national emergency”. It gave the military, not just the Commander-in-Chief, the veneer of political legitimacy, and made lawful any future seizure of power even before such anti-democratic move took place. Alas, in a stroke of strategic genius, the military had killed both the NCA and its own constitution. When I was growing up during General Ne Win’s one party military dictatorship (1962-88), with the veneer of the “Burmese Way to Socialism”, the military propagandists had put in circulation that the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the political wing of the military, was a good system, badly administered by “bad” party cadres, taking and executing dictates from the erratic number one, that is, Ne Win. Those 26 long years had passed, and General Ne Win and his deputies are now fertilizer. The post-BSPP era (1962-88) in Myanmar has seen two military-drafted constitutions (1974 and 2008) while the control of the state has been passed on from one crop of generals to another. The names of the ruling military cliques – usurpers really – have changed. But the military has remained as the most corrupt, incompetent, mafia-like, economy-wrecking actor, not to mention it being the spearhead of Rohingya genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against Kachin, Rakhine, Karen, Shan, Chin, Mon, Muslims, Christians and defiant Buddhist Mons. Enter the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) with Senior General Saw Maung and General Khin Nyunt as Chairman and Secretary (1988-1992), the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) presided over by Senior General Than Shwe (1992-2010), the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) from 2010-15 and the National Security Council (controlled by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and his deputies who headed the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs) from 2015-2021, which constitutionally and effectively clipped the reformist wings of the NLD government of Aung San Suu Kyi, in a two-tiered system of power-sharing until it decided that the military could no longer tolerate the NLD’s directions and speed of the economic, legal and institutional reforms. To be sure, there are arguments that see some values and space for reform and federalism in the military’s 2008 constitution and some life in the NCA. They point out that the NCA and the constitution recognize the political nature of military conflicts in Myanmar – now in their 8th decade! And the constitution mandates the president – as opposed to the Commander-in-Chief – to seek peaceful solutions to these armed conflicts at the dialogue table. No one in their rational mind would argue against resolving political differences and ending violent conflicts and wars through negotiations, especially when the war is not going in your favour. In my recent visit to Neuengamme Concentration Camp Museum on the outskirts of Hamburg, Germany, I discovered that Heinrich Himmler, the dreaded head of the Nazi SS, of all the Nazis, was trying to incentivize the “neutral” Swedish government to reach out to Britain on its behalf for a ceasefire with the Allies: he freed 3,000 Norwegian and Danish inmates which the Swedish Red Cross came with white buses to fetch as the Nazi defeat was becoming apparent – to the SS leadership. Engulfed in the war at home with the society – and the popular resistance movements in virtually all regions throughout Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing and the coup regime has shown no inclination for suing for peace, NCA or not. Finally, no analysis of prospect for peace and reconciliation will be complete without a cursory glance at the military’s historical record at such endeavours. Whoever is the Commander-in-Chief, Myanmar’s single largest military force – out of roughly two dozen such armed organizations which are mostly ethnically organized, and thus so-named as Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) – has an unenviable record of failures after failures in making peace and seeking “negotiated settlements” in resolving political disputes. The ceasefire and peace negotiations did not begin in 2013, the year considered the origin of the NCA which the coup regime is trying to resurrect. The first coup regime of General Ne Win – the Revolutionary Council government with its BSPP wing – had held “peace talks” with “insurgent groups”, then less than six, including the Karens, Shan, Mon and Burmese communists – in 1963, 1972, and 1980. They all collapsed, with no exception as the Burmese generals attempted to make peace and negotiate ceasefires on their own terms, without addressing the root causes – the denial of basic human rights, the refusal to accept ethnic group equality and the need for the military to strictly adhere to the national defence, as opposed to meddling in the messy business of democratic nation-building. Throughout the last half-century, Myanmar’s resistance organizations have consistently sought peaceful resolutions with or without external support. In his letter addressed to Richard von Weizsacker, then President of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) dated Oct. 25, 1987 with the subject line “Regarding the Civil War in Burma”, M. Brang Seng, the late Chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and an authorized spokesman for the National Democratic Front, the then largest alliance of the 10 ethnic resistance organizations, wrote: As you are well aware, Burma has been plagued by civil war for the past forty years. The civil war (has) intensified since General Ne Win seized power in 1962, and established a totalitarian, centralistic and one party system of government….We have repeatedly called upon General Ne Win’s regime to solve the nation’s problem politically at the conference table. But he has responded to us with his armed forces only in the battle field …. Therefore, we, of the National Democratic Front, wish to earnestly request to you, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, to kindly help us find ways to peace negotiations between us and the Burma government. We have been and are willing still to end this forty year long drawn(-out) civil war to an end on the conference table.” Chairman M. Brang Seng was on a visit to West Germany at the time. Likewise, one of the leaders of the Shan resistance, the late Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, who commanded the 1st Military Region of the Shan State Army (1969-1972) and served as a peace negotiator in General Ne Win’s 1963 peace talks, expressed his fervent desire for ending the civil war in Myanmar. In his book “The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile” (first published in 1987, by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore), Chao Tzang wrote: “a military victory will not bring about any kind of nationhood, or lasting peace and stability. Uprisings will end and rebel armies disappear if and only if Rangoon accepts objective realities and gets down to the real business of providing the peoples of Burma, both the Burmese and the non-Burmese, with the kind of leadership which the country badly needs in the spirit that was displayed before independence of gained.” He was referring to the spirit of democracy, ethnic equality and federated union of independent Myanmar. Alas, ceasefire, peace, and reconciliation are a far cry in the country where the single largest military force – Myanmar military that seizes power at the whim of the senior military clique of the day, abolish or subjugate all constitutive institutions of the state – including executive, judiciary, and legislature – locking up democratic leaders, summarily executes dissidents, slaughters its own citizens in mass killings, burns down entire villages wantonly, and perpetrates the gravest crimes under domestic and international law. After six decades in power, the Myanmar military has proven itself to be no partner in peace. Its conduct is guided by neither principles of fairness, justice, equality or basic rights nor abiding sense of patriotism. It takes two hands to make the sound of peace. Even Himmler’s Nazi SS desperately sought an honourable exit, despite its heinous crimes. Not so with the coup-making military of Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Democratic Voice of Burma
Date of publication: 2023-10-05
Date of entry/update: 2023-10-05
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Navigating political upheaval: Rebel governance and trust dynamics in post-coup Myanmar
Description: "Findings from an online survey suggest establishing direct cooperation with Ethnic Armed Organisations can potentially foster trust towards the National Unity Government, and contribute to a more inclusive and stable political future of Myanmar. AUTHORS Jiwon KimPhD Candidate, Stanford University Since the 2021 military coup, politics in Myanmar has been increasingly tumultuous. The disorder has been especially pronounced in the ethnic minority areas where multiple political authorities were already fighting for control over the population. On top of the conflict between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) fighting for self-determination, the rise of the pro-democracy movement led by the National Unity Government (NUG) has added another dimension to conflict in the country. Against this backdrop, it is interesting to see where the ethnic minority communities will stand amidst this political upheaval. While some have joined the pro-democracy resistance, others have remained more neutral. It is crucial whether ethnic minority people would support and trust the new national political actor (NUG) as they assess whether it will truly represent their interests, or be another project led by the largest ethnic minority, Bamar? One key factor that differentiates the ethnic minority areas of Myanmar from the rest of the country is the presence of over twenty different EAOs. They not only ensure security but also provide social services like education, healthcare, and dispute resolution. This raises the question of whether exposure to EAO governance influences one’s perception of other political actors, particularly among ethnic minorities. To investigate this, an online survey targeting ethnic minority areas of Myanmar was run and Facebook advertisements were leveraged to recruit respondents. By providing translations into Burmese and six minority languages, the survey was able to collect 1,113 respondents from 35 different ethnic groups. They were asked whether they thought the NUG would care for the interests of their ethnic group, and how much they have experienced or heard of various governance activities by the EAO they have the most exposure to.....A high level of trust in NUG among ethnic minority communities.....Results of the survey show that in general, trust for the NUG is high among ethnic minority communities. 69% of all the respondents said they trusted the NUG and 79% said the NUG would be effective in providing social services to their ethnic group’s area. People were also mostly confident that the NUG would prioritise the interests of their ethnic group or ethnic minorities in general. Around 70% believed the NUG would advocate for their ethnic group’s interests, while 49% said the NUG would ensure representation of their ethnic group’s people in positions of power. Additionally, 51% felt they would prioritise the interests of Bamar and ethnic minority people equally.....Positive and negative EAO governance experiences influence trust in ethnic minority areas.....There is a moderate level of exposure to governance provided by ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) in ethnic minority areas. About 33-38% of respondents said they had either directly experienced or know someone who had experienced their EAO providing education and medical care, solving community problems, and dealing with crimes and drugs. When considering those who had only heard about these activities, the rate was as high as 71-79%. Exposure to negative governance activities including taxation, forcible recruitment, engaging in business with the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw), and violence against civilians was much lower in general. Although among respondents, 30% had directly or indirectly experienced taxation, direct or indirect exposure to other activities ranged from 8-15%. A significant correlation was found between exposure to EAO governance and trust in the EAOs. Greater exposure to positive governance activities resulted in higher trust for the EAOs, while those with more negative exposure had lower trust for the EAOs. These relationships remained true even after accounting for respondents’ strength of ethnic identity, exposure to violence by Myanmar military, and ethno-political beliefs.....Notes: The distribution of responses varies based on the level of exposure, with the majority of respondents reporting the lowest exposure levels (0 and 1). The majority of respondents reported exposure to governance related to education, medical services, and community issue resolution. Reliance on EAOs for social services may challenge the widespread popularity of the NUG in Myanmar The survey shows that EAO governance affects trust not only for the EAOs themselves, but also for the NUG. More exposure to positive EAO governance is associated with slightly lower trust in the NUG, as long as the EAO is not perceived as explicitly supportive of the NUG. When respondents believed that their EAO as neutral towards the NUG, then an increase in average exposure score from 0 (never heard) to 3 (experienced firsthand) moves their average perception of the NUG from 5 (somewhat positive) to 4 (neither positive nor negative). This is true even after accounting for factors such as respondent’s exposure to NUG governance, belief in democracy, strength of ethnic identity, and other demographic variables. This is a significant result considering the near universal popularity of the NUG in Myanmar. It indicates that those accustomed to receiving social services and governance from EAOs are less likely to trust that the NUG would prioritise their ethnic group’s interest if it assumes control of the country. Figure 2: Positive EAO governance, EAO stance on NUG, and NUG perceptions.....Notes: This figure illustrates the relationship between positive EAO governance and perceptions of the NUG among respondents, showing that increased exposure to positive EAO governance is associated with lower perceptions of the NUG. This relationship is most pronounced when the EAO's stance somewhat opposes the NUG. Conversely, when the EAO's stance somewhat supports the NUG, greater exposure to positive EAO governance leads to slightly higher perceptions of the NUG. Implications for Myanmar politics The study’s findings suggest that EAOs are important political actors with significant influence and enjoy a high level of trust among the ethnic minority population. Recognised as major providers of governance and social service providers as well as protectors of ethnic minority interests over many decades, they should be actively included in political dialogues and decision-making processes. The study also suggests that the NUG would benefit from direct cooperation with the EAOs in order to build trust among ethnic minority populations. Once an EAO is in direct collaboration with the NUG, governance provision by the EAO does not negatively undermine trust in the NUG. Building a cooperative relationship with EAOs would enable the NUG to more easily gain the trust of the ethnic minority communities..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: International Growth Centre
Date of publication: 2023-09-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: INTERVIEW: ‘I could never hate Myanmar’
Sub-title: In new book, Australian economist Sean Turnell talks about his prison experience.
Description: "Australian economist Sean Turnell was an economic policy advisor to Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021 when the country’s military ousted the democratically elected government in a coup and installed the State Administration Council or SAC, led by Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. Five days later he was arrested on charges of espionage and he spent the next 650 days – or about one year and nine months – in detention, mostly in horrible conditions in Yangon’s Insein Prison. In his soon-to-be released book ‘An Unlikely Prisoner: How an eternal optimist found hope in Myanmar's most notorious jail,’ Turnell tells the story of his time behind bars. He told RFA Burmese that although it is a story of great sadness, it is also one of courage for other prisoners jailed by the junta, especially Aung San Suu Kyi, who he calls ‘Daw Suu,’ a term of respect for women. The interview has been edited for length and clarity. RFA: What was your motivation for writing this book? Turnell: Well, it was something that I always intended to do. In fact, I wrote most of the book in my head during the time I was in prison. On many days, of course, I didn't really have much to do, so part of my pacing up and down the cells, I'd be trying to think of things to think about. And part of it was writing this book. So probably about one third of it was written inside my head before I even got out. As soon as I got back, it was a relatively easy process of then converting all the thoughts up here [in my head] onto paper. RFA: Can you discuss how much of the book deals with your time in prison, and before and after the coup? Turnell: About two thirds of the book is all about the experience post-coup. So I detailed my experiences on the day of the coup itself and then my subsequent arrest five days later, and then the next 650 days in Yangon’s Insein Prison, and then up in Napyitaw and then back to Insein and the court and meeting Daw Suu in the court and all of that. So that's the bulk of the book. But I have a section there on … background … Why was I there? And how was I involved at all in the NLD government? The basic background to the reforms, things like that, how those reforms increasingly ran up against the military and the difficulties, things like that. But most of it is a memoir about post-coup, but I've got a section there about Myanmar before the coup and some of the reforms that we were trying to do. RFA: Is there any subject that you avoid in the book? Was there at any time that you had to pledge to the junta not to write about as a condition of your release? Was there anything like that in your release agreement? Turnell: Oh, no. I made no pledge at all. None at all. I wondered whether they would ask me to do something like that. But they never, ever did. I never signed anything. In fact, I was very, very careful about that. On the very last day, as I was being released, we were wondering about exactly that. So, yeah. So I made no pledges, no promises to them whatsoever and wouldn't have done so. I hasten to add, I would not have signed anything if it was put in front of me. But since coming out, you know, I exercised my right as an Australian citizen, of course, back in Australia, which has complete freedom of speech. I was very vocal in talking about my situation and all that. I don't think – I mean, obviously I'm subjective in this issue – but I don't think I've been at all unfair or unreasonable in my comments about the regime or the conditions under which they held me and the nature of the trial and all the rest of it. I think any sort of objective account on any of those things would be identical to mine, would be my view. But obviously Myanmar now under the SAC regime is not a place where freedom of speech is welcome. So I’m to some extent not surprised that they've had a negative reaction to it. But it certainly didn't involve any pledge or anything like that. RFA: What are some of the most powerful memories from your time in prison that you talk about in this book? Turnell: Many memorable times. I think some really bad stuff. I think, hearing about the death of my friend Khin Maung Shwe or Yacob, as he was always to me, a wonderful man who protected me, was just a dear friend. I met him in the first six months when I was in Insein Prison, where again, he sort of held me and looked after me. I then went up to Naypyitaw Prison for a whole year as the trial went on, and I never found out about him at all until I was sent back to Insein after the trial. And I heard that he'd been murdered in the prison and that that was a real low moment. But certainly, you know, as I say, it's one that is very much in my head. Other than that, you know, I remember all the horrible stuff, the terrible cell, the terrible food, the awfulness of prison transfers. And I noticed reading some of the reporting on Myanmar, the internal media, that people like your organization have taken up the issue of transporting prisoners. And just to add my voice to that, it really is terrible. Some of the worst moments I experienced were being transported between the prison and the court and between different prisons, et. cetera. So I certainly remember all that. But I remember again, some of the good things, the incredible conversations that I had with some wonderful Burmese colleagues and so on. I remember the compassion that they showed me. I remember, you know, some funny issues. And yes, It’s a real mixed bag and a mixture of horror, but a mixture of really good things that not only gladdened my heart whenever I think about Myanmar and its people, but even about human nature. One of the things that struck me is that while some people behave badly under pressure, a great many more people and certainly many Myanmar people behave superbly under pressure. And I was the beneficiary of that. RFA: Is there any person or individual that you would like to dedicate this book to? Turnell: I'm dedicating it to my wife, who just championed me from the get go. You know, she knew what was happening on the first day, she was there the last day. And she just ran a massive campaign from here in Sydney. And she reached out to everyone to not only all the political leadership here in Australia, but even to people like Hun Sen in Cambodia. She wrote letters to Min Aung Hlaing’s wife. She tried to rope in the U.S. president. She got the king of England, Charles III, involved. She got everyone involved. It was the most incredible thing. So it was a no-brainer as to who I dedicate it to. But beyond her were my father, Peter, my sister Lisa, my nephews, my daughter, all of them were just, you know, just superb and then, you know, to the Myanmar people as well as other development friends and people from Australian foreign affairs and so on. But my Myanmar friends were very much in my thoughts beyond my sort of immediate family. In terms of the structure of the book, I begin with the sort of drama of the arrest, the early interrogation, a terrible two months I experienced in something that I just called “the box,” which was just a room that I was locked into for two months in complete isolation. And the worst treatment that I had was at that period. Then I have another chapter on being released into Insein Prison and spent a lot of time just talking about that, the conditions, describing it, because it's a most extraordinary place, particularly, I think, for people outside Myanmar. It would be very hard, I think, to visualize just just what inside is like. And a lot there obviously, again, about some great Myanmar friends. Then, a big section once we go up to Naypyitaw, the awful conditions there in the Naypyitaw detention center was in many ways even worse than Insein. Then the trial, the absurdity of the trial and the absurdity of the charges against me and against my friends. Notes about Daw Suu, of course, who it was a great honor to work alongside before the coup. It was a great honor just to see how fantastic she was in the court in the prison. She remains as far as I know, but certainly to my experience, which was only a year ago, undaunted, full of courage, compassion, again, just raw intelligence, the way that it just shows out, the very courteous way that she treated the people who were persecuting her. She was just an inspiration. And so I spend a lot of time talking about that, just how she kept the spirits of myself up, and everyone else up. I never saw her waver or weaken anyway. So, you know, I certainly deal with that. And then, the absurdity of the trial, the darkest moments immediately after that, transporting back to Insein is then the final thing where I was put amongst the death row prisoners, which was terribly depressing and inspiring as well, because again, even those people in a desperate, desperate situation, they were also incredibly generous and great friends to me. So that's sort of the second last section. And then I have finally the day in which I was told I was going home and the drama of going home and the incredible feeling and lift of going home. And then finally, just some of the events that I detail a little bit, how the regime became upset when I had the temerity just to say that I wasn't treated that well by them and a little bit on that as well. But overall, it's an uplifting story in many ways, even though along the way, unfortunately, I have to tell the terribly sad story for so many people in Myanmar. RFA: What kind of impact do you expect to make with this book? Turnell: Above all, I would like the world to pay attention to what's going on in Myanmar. As we who are interested in Myanmar know, the situation is desperate, and it doesn't give it enough attention. The world's eyes, very rightly, are on Ukraine, but Myanmar deserves attention as well. It's a terrible situation. The people need help. They deserve help. And so if the book can do anything at all, it would be to help draw attention to that. RFA: Do you have any messages for Aung San Suu Kyi and your other friends in Myanmar? Turnell: My message to both Daw Suu and my specific friends in Myanmar, but also people just generally is a big thank you. I love the place and still do. I was asked and I spoke to the media about this when I got released. A leading immigration official told me just as I was getting on the plane, he said, “Sean, please don't hate Myanmar.” And it was an odd moment because he just spent minutes beforehand giving me a lecture about how I would never be allowed back, et cetera. But then he sort of changed his whole demeanor and again just said, “Please don't hate Myanmar.” And I said back to him, “I could never hate Myanmar.” And again, for all the reasons that I've described here about just the love and compassion, the courage … that I witnessed all around me. So, yes, I have a very soft spot for Myanmar. I desperately hope to get back there one day, but that's not going to happen until we get dramatic political change. That, of course, is a very minor thing compared to the overall story of what the people in Myanmar are going through. Just to get that message and a big thank you across to them and to say to them that even though Myanmar is not getting the attention it deserves, and that's part of the book, but nonetheless, there are millions of people around the world who do follow events in Myanmar and who do care about what's happening. RFA: What about the regime? Do you have anything to say to Min Aung Hlaing and other regime leaders? Well, I would say to them to put their country first. To put the people of Myanmar first. Stop being so defensive, selfish. I mean, I could go on and I won't bother doing that, but I mean that very clearly. These are people who don't have the country's interests at heart. Perhaps some of them might have second thoughts. I like to think that probably not at the very top, but that there must be people, smart people, and for whatever reason, might be caught up in that regime who might just think, “This is terrible, we've got to stop this. This is enough.” I'm hopeful that that's the case. It's obviously very hard to know, but you just can't help but feel there must be people who look at the economy, look at the dreadful state of the country and just think, “We can't do this. We've got to stop.” And so to those people, I would encourage them to do so..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2023-09-18
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-18
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Title: Asean has united to send Myanmar’s junta a message. Can it work with stakeholders to end the crisis?
Description: "Asean has been much criticised over its failure to effectively respond to the crisis in Myanmar that was triggered by the military junta seizing power in the February 2021 coup. Thus, the deliberations of its leaders in Jakarta last week, and the subsequent release and implications of its “review and decision” statement, are under scrutiny. Many, especially the long-suffering people of Myanmar and humanitarian organisations on the ground, would not see this as a sign of tangible resolution, and they would be right. Yet the decisions reached indicate greater cohesion among different member states on how to move forward and, more importantly, in not yielding to the demands of the junta. The following from the nine decisions bear particular importance. First, the group was more direct in its condemnation of the post-coup violence which has driven the country down a path of civil conflict and humanitarian tragedy, and the failure of all parties to de-escalate the violence. The Tatmadaw’s indiscriminate use of force was particularly singled out for criticism, which only selected Asean member states had previously done. Second, Asean agreed to the formation of an informal troika made up of the incumbent, immediate past and incoming chairs to coordinate a more comprehensive management of Myanmar. This means that Asean’s next chair Laos, one of its smallest and least developed states, can count on the support of Indonesia and Malaysia on Myanmar-related matters, lessening the strain on other chair-related duties. This approach also draws lessons from Asean’s efforts to engage different stakeholders in Cambodia before its eventual admission to the regional grouping in the late 1990s. Third and most importantly, Asean’s leaders upheld their decision to disallow the junta’s participation at the Asean Summit and Foreign Ministers meeting and did not entertain the junta’s preference to “voluntarily defer” its role as Asean chair in 2026. The leaders decided instead that the Philippines will take on the role after Malaysia, and the rotation continue alphabetically until a different decision is made. This effectively blocks Myanmar from assuming its chairmanship for at least another decade and the international recognition that comes with it. The opportunity for non-political participation remains should Myanmar wish to take it. It is also notable, given the division among Asean member states over how to proceed on the situation in Myanmar and its current rulers, that the decisions above were endorsed by all Asean leaders, including by those countries that were either friendly or indifferent to the junta. Such is the loss of goodwill among Asean member states that the belligerence of the generals in Naypyidaw has achieved. That said, progress in this Asean summit is frankly measured by the lack of deterioration, rather than stagnation. Looking ahead, there are long-term considerations that Asean must keep in mind. The organisation must remain resolute in not being held hostage by the junta’s schemes or threats, and the indifference of some member states. The voices of members like Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines are important here, especially in adding heft to the organisation when lethargy sets in. Asean must also be consistent in its messaging and action that it is the junta – rather than Myanmar or its people – that is being targeted. It would be self-defeating for Asean to further lose the trust of the people of Myanmar. Closely related to that, Asean must find alternative pathways to engage multiple stakeholders in Myanmar to prepare the ground for a political solution. A crucial aspect in this is for Asean to engage all major stakeholders in Myanmar, including the Tatmadaw and National Unity Government. The lessons of Cambodia are again relevant here, where different member states and organisations can engage different stakeholders on various tracks. Such efforts, however, must be sanctioned by the troika and Asean as a whole. There must also be targeted and concentrated efforts to get dialogue partners, especially those who have influence with Naypyidaw like India, China, Japan and South Korea, involved in influencing the different stakeholders in Myanmar. Given Asean’s structural limitations, it can only effectively play a role if all parties in Myanmar are prepared to allow it. Many, including this author, argued in the weeks following the coup that things were liable to get worse, and Asean must be prepared for the long haul. The Five-Point Consensus is just a starting point, and an imperfect one at that. The decisions reached in Jakarta, while commendable, are far from the endgame or even the midpoint. While it cannot fully act to improve the situation, Asean must not fail to act to prevent further deterioration within the spheres that it does have a say in. Thomas Daniel is a Senior Fellow with the Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "South China Morning Post"
Date of publication: 2023-09-13
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-13
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Airstrikes in Kayah state
Description: "Key Event Details Date, time and location of Incidents: Airstrikes — 22 June 2023: Li Khu Pa Yar village (လီခူပရား), Hpruso Township (ဖရူဆို), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [19.288804, 96.968735]. K-8 plane crash — 30 June 2023: Ywar Thit sub-township (ရွာသစ်), Bawlakhe (ဘော်လခဲ), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [19.135286,97.520772]. Airstrikes — 9 July 2023: Hpasawng township (ဖားဆောင်းမြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.833424, 97.323086]. Airstrikes — 12 July 2023: Daw Noe Ku Internally Displaced Persons Camp (IDP) (ဒေါနိုကူး စစ်ရှောင်စခန်း) Shadaw township (ရှားတောမြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [19.32696180, 97.8187087]. Airstrikes — 12 July 2023: Hpasawng township (ဖားဆောင်းမြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.833068, 97.324233]. Airstrikes — 12 July 2023: Kyauk Su village (ကျောက်စု), Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.769276, 97.389804]. Clashes and airstrikes — 18 July 2023: Yar Do village (ယာဒို), Thantaunggyi township (သံတောင်ကြီး), Kayin State (ကရင် ပြည်နယ်), [19.358822, 96.802461]. Airstrikes — 26 July 2023: Kyauk Su village middle school, Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်), [18.769715, 97.3873880]. Alleged Perpetrator(s) and/or Involvement: Myanmar Air Force (MAF) Myanmar military State Administrative Council (SAC) People's Defence Forces (PDF) Summary After the February 2021 coup d'état, Kayah state has been the site of clashes between the Myanmar military and People's Defence Forces (PDF). The Myanmar military has struggled to exert and maintain control on the ground, and has taken to using airstrikes on areas of resistance. This has resulted in damage to not only PDF camps, but also IDP camps and residential areas. During July 2023, multiple Myanmar Air Force (MAF) airstrikes were reported in Kayah state. Myanmar Witness has investigated these events and geolocated user-generated content (UGC) purporting to show the different incidents. According to claims made in local media reports, the Myanmar military has conducted air and ground offensives to regain control of Mase town (မယ်စဲ့) in Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ) on the Thai-Myanmar border, as well as offensives in Hpasawng township, which sits on the banks of the Salwin River (သံလွင်မြစ်). Resistance groups reported daily battles, which have led to more than 3,500 people fleeing the area and crossing the border into Thailand, where Thailand's Mae Hong Son Inspection Department has been sheltering them. Myanmar Witness has identified UGC associated with a number of claimed airstrikes in Kayah state in late June and July 2023. On 22 June, the MAF reportedly carried out three airstrikes on Li Khu Pa Yar village, Hpruso Township, damaging four homes and a school and leaving a middle-aged man with significant injuries. On 30 June, a MAF K-8 light attack aircraft reportedly crashed in Ywar Thit sub-township, Bawlakhe. Accounts vary over whether the plane crashed due to bad weather or whether Karenni/Kayah PDF shot down the plane. However, this places a MAF plane which has the capacity to carry out airstrikes in the vicinity during the timeframe when airstrikes were reported. On 9 July, it was reported that the MAF carried out airstrikes in Hpasawng township (video no longer available online, however it was previously archived by Myanmar Witness). Myanmar Witness captured a still image from a video of the airstrike and used peakvisor to verify the location. Further airstrikes were reported in Kyauk Pe Nyo village, Hpasawng township, on 12 July. Myanmar Witness geolocated footage showing buildings that were allegedly damaged in the strikes. This was done by stitching together a panorama from video footage uploaded to social media and cross-referencing it with satellite imagery. Two other airstrikes were also reported on the same day. At around 0102 local time on 12 July 2023, it is reported that the MAF bombed an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp on the Kayah/Karenni-Thai border, killing a 10-year-old child and seriously injuring others. The airstrike also allegedly damaged houses which were sheltering IDPs who had already fled conflict elsewhere in the country. Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC showing the camp before and after the alleged airstrike. Additionally, an 11-year-old child and an IDP were reportedly killed in an airstrike in Kyauk Su village, Mese township, also on 12 July 2023. Although Myanmar Witness could not independently confirm the number of deaths, it was possible to geolocate the site of the airstrike using UGC. According to a Facebook user, a middle school in the same village, Kyauk Su, was also bombed on 26 July 2023 (source redacted due to privacy concerns). Although Myanmar Witness could not confirm the exact date, the location was verified. Finally, following a ground battle on 18 July 2023 near Yar Do village, Thantaunggyi township, the MAF allegedly carried out an airstrike. Myanmar Witness have analysed a video purporting to show the event and was able to verify the location of the airstrike. While efforts have been taken to collect as much information as possible on airstrikes in Kayah state over this time period, a number of other airstrikes reportedly took place in the region during this timeframe which Myanamr Witness were unable to verify or partially verify. Myanmar Witness has been able to verify: Myanmar Witness geolocated imagery posted on Facebook showing extensive destruction to structures in Li Khu Pa Yar village (လီခူပရား), Hpruso township (ဖရူဆို), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်) Myanmar Witness geolocated drone footage which purports to show the aftermath of a K-8 plane crash Ywar Thit sub-township (ရွာသစ်), Bawlakhe (ဘော်လခဲ), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်) Myanmar Witness geolocated footage showing buildings that were allegedly damaged in the strikes in Hpasawng township (ဖားဆောင်းမြို့). Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC showing the Daw Noe Ku IDP Camp (ဒေါနို့ကူးစစ်ရှောင်စခန်း) before and after the alleged airstrike and verified damage to structures there which is consistent with airstrike damage. Myanmar Witness geolocated UGC showing damage consistent with airstrikes in Kyauk Su village (ကျောက်စု) Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ ပြည်နယ်) Myanmar Witness geolocated video footage showing airstrikes in Yar Do village, Thantaunggyi township (သံတောင်ကြီး), Kayin State (ကရင် ပြည်နယ်). Clashes prior to the airstrikes It is reported that three SAC camps and the Mese police station in Mese township (မယ်စဲ့မြို့), Kayah state (ကယား/ကရင်နီ), were attacked simultaneously by local PDF on 13 June 2023, between 0500 and 1000 local time. According to the Karenni Military Central Information Organisation (KMIC), the three camps included Taung Hla (တောင်လှ) camp near Taung Hla village (တောင်လှရွာ), Meltangwe camp (မယ်လနွယ်) and the Myanmar-Thailand border post Number 14 on the east bank of the Salwin River (သံလွင်မြစ်) in Mese Township. At present, Myanmar Witness has not geolocated the camps. Approximately 40 automatic rifles were recovered from the three SAC camps, according to a KMIC spokesperson responsible for publishing the Karenni Army's (KA) military news. Additionally, the township police chief was reportedly killed at the Mese police station during the clashes. Clashes reportedly continued until the 25 June, when according to multiple sources, the entire SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 430 — made up of approximately 100 personnel, including Lieutenant Colonel Zana Aung and Deputy Battalion Commander Kyaw Thu Soe — surrendered to the Karenni joint forces from Mese Byuha Gone Military Camp no. 13. However, the surrender was contested by SAC sources. The area has been the site of previous conflict; other Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) and LIBs have operated in Kayah state. For example, following the coup, the LID 66 and its 10 subordinate battalions reportedly moved to west Bago (ပဲခူး), Thegon Township (သဲကုန််းမြို့), Kayah state. In September 2021, intense fighting between Karenni resistance forces and LID 66 reportedly led to heavy casualties. The struggle for control of Kayah state has continued since then, with the SAC increasing the use of air attacks in recent months. Loikaw, Demoso, Hpasawng, Mese, and Bawlakhe townships have come under fire and IDPs on the Kayah state/Thailand border have also been put at risk from airstrikes. Timeline of events The investigation walkthrough Airstrikes in Hpruso Township On 22 June 2023, at 0030, the MAF reportedly carried out three airstrikes on Li Khu Pa Yar village (လီခူပရား), Hpruso Township. Four homes and a school were allegedly damaged by the airstrikes, and a middle-aged man suffered significant injuries to his chest. The village houses a population of roughly 200 people, within 40 houses and has poor transportation links. According to the Hpruso PDF, there was no fighting going on in the immediate area when the MAF bombed the village and its surroundings. Myanmar Witness geolocated imagery posted on Karenni’s Voice’s facebook page, which shows extensive destruction to structures in the village [19.288804, 96.968735]. K-8 light attack aircraft crash On 30 June 2023, a MAF K-8 light attack aircraft reportedly crashed in Ywar Thit sub-township, Bawlakhe (tail number 3935). According to Myanmar Now, pro-SAC media channels claimed that the K-8 crashed because of bad weather and that the two pilots were still missing. However, Karenni/Kayah PDF claimed they shot down the plane. For example, the former SAC Border Guard Forces, Ka-La-La-Ta (ကရင်နီပြည်လူမျိုး ပေါင်းစုံပြည် သူ့ လွတ် မြောက် ရေးတပ်ဦး - ကလလတ) — a group which recently defected and joined the Karenni/Kayah resistance forces — claimed that they had fired weapons at the aircraft while it was flying at low altitude. The news of a K-8 crashing went viral on social media and on 5 July 2023, Ka-La-La-Ta facebook page posted drone footage purporting to show the crash site. According to the Khit Thit, Ka-La-La-Ta and local PDF repeatedly tried to take pictures using drones of the plane wreckage, located in the forest in the eastern part of Ywar Thit village; however, it was difficult to get a clear view and the site was heavily guarded by the SAC. As a result, drone footage was only possible from a distance (see figure 3 below). While markings on the ground suggest a crash could have taken place here, there is no visible sign of debris from the plane. Reports suggest that SAC personnel, who arrived quickly at the scene, cleared away all debris of the plane. The two pilots — Captain Thaw Zin and Captain Aung Phyo Kyaw — were posthumously awarded the rank of captain by SAC leader, Min Aung Hlaing, according to an official press release from the Department of War of Ka-La-La-Ta on 23 July. Khit Thit Media reported that the pilots were given awards of “Hero’s Degree” and “Hero Record Seal” as per SAC Order No. 125/2023. This corroborates claims that a K-8 light attack aircraft was active in the area and crashed. Airstrikes in Hpasawng township On 9 July, at 1740 local time, a MAF fighter jet reportedly bombed Kyauk Pe Nyo Village in Hpasawng Township, destroying a monastery. Two people were allegedly hurt during the attack. Myanmar Witness was unable to independently verify the casualties; however, the location of the attack was verified using a still image from a video of the airstrike posted on social media and peakvisor. It is reported that the MAF also carried out airstrikes in Hpasawng township on 12 July 2023. Myanmar Witness identified video footage purporting to show the aftermath of the airstrike and associated damage. This was stitched together to form a panorama of the scene, which was then geolocated and cross-referenced with satellite imagery. The video shows significant damage to buildings and religious sites in the area. Airstrike on IDP camp At around 0102 local time on 12 July, it is reported that the Myanmar Air Force bombed an IDP camp on the Karenni-Thai border, killing a 10-year-old child, seriously injuring others and damaging houses. Myanmar Witness has been unable to independently verify the casualties. The camp was housing a population of more than 5,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who had already fled conflict elsewhere in the country. These individuals are in need of shelter and food assistance. Images of the airstrike’s aftermath published by the media and local civil society organisations’ pages were identified and geolocated by Myanmar Witness, as well as UGC showing the site before and after the airstrike allegedly took place. Through this process, Myanmar Witness has identified that the events took place at the Daw Noe Ku IDP Camp, in Shadaw township, Kayah state and confirmed the camps location at [19.32696180, 97.8187087]. According to UGC, a middle school in the same village, Kyauk Su, was also bombed on 26 July 2023 (source redacted due to privacy concerns). Although Myanmar Witness could not confirm the exact date, the location was verified. Clashes and airstrike in Thantaunggyi township A fierce battle was reported on the morning of 18 July 2023 near Yar Do village, Thantaunggyi township. Soon after 0900, the MAF allegedly carried out an airstrike on the village. The airstrike was captured in a video posted on Facebook by the Kantarawaddy Times, and can be seen at 0.08 seconds. Myanmar Witness was able to verify the location of the airstrike. Additional unverified airstrikes While efforts have been taken to collect as much information as possible on airstrikes in Kayah state over this time period, a number of other airstrikes reportedly took place in the region during this timeframe which Myanamr Witness were unable to verify or partially verify. For example, on 1 June 2023, the Kayan Thit (ကယန်းသစ်) Security Gate in the western part of Mobye Township (မိုးဗြဲ) was reportedly hit by an airstrike. Additionally, on 14 June around 2125 local time, it is claimed that the Myanmar military fired at least 15 rounds of heavy weapons into the Mobye military camp. The following day, at 0200 local time, an airstrike was reported. Myanmar Witness will continue to look for more information on these events, and others in the area, in order to verify their occurrence. Future monitoring Kayah state has been the site of conflict since the February 2021 coup. Like other regions in Myanmar, the conflict is escalating and the use of airstrikes has become commonplace. Both Karenni resistance fighters and civilians have been caught up in the attacks. Myanmar Witness continues to monitor, document and investigate human rights violations, as well as SAC activity, in Kayah state. The impact of attacks on locations used by civilians, including IDP camps, must also be monitored. Abbreviations Border Guard Forces - BGF Internally Displaced Peoples - IDPs Myanmar Air Force - MAF People’s Defence Force - PDF Security Administrative Council - SAC User-generated Content - UGC Light Infantry Division - LID..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of publication: 2023-09-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar Coup Interview Series: ‘Surviving is sometimes the only way to live in Myanmar’
Description: "In the nearly three years that have passed since Myanmar’s coup d’état, the global media has shifted its attention to other crises, from the sudden withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan to Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. But despite a lull in headlines, the turmoil that resulted from the coup remains life-altering for the generation of young activists who have been displaced by the shattering of democratic ideals. Myanmar’s military — the Tatmadaw — staged a coup d’état on February 1, 2021, detaining top government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. The military claimed that the election results were fraudulent, but independent observers have dismissed these claims. The coup has sparked widespread protests and civil disobedience, with many people calling for the release of the detained leaders and the restoration of democracy. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a human rights organization dedicated to justice in Myanmar, more than 4,000 people have so far been killed by Myanmar’s military junta since the coup, and upwards of 24,000 have been arrested, charged or sentenced. For JURIST, coverage of the Myanmar coup is personal. Despite the risks, Myanmar law student correspondents – most of them women – covered the coup for JURIST from its beginning and have kept reporting in its aftermath. In a bid to keep the crisis in the public dialogue, we have conducted a series of interviews with some of the law students and young lawyers whose lives have been affected by Myanmar’s tumult, ranging from law students who fled abroad to save their futures and continue their studies to those who put down their textbooks and went into the jungle to take up arms against the junta as part of the pro-democracy resistance. Their accounts reflect the full range of emotional responses, from despair to anger to hope. The interviews, which will be published in a series of articles, explore the challenges and opportunities facing young people in Myanmar as they navigate a country in political turmoil. This is the first interview in a seven-part series. Please note that our interviewees’ names have been kept private to protect their security unless otherwise noted. Would you briefly introduce yourself? What was your life like before the coup? I am a third-year law student. I am a Myanmar woman in her early 20s. Before the coup, my life was pretty normal; I went to school regularly, joined many club activities, skipped classes sometimes for a little bit of fun, participated in moot court competitions, spent many hours in the library, and thought life would be just a straight-line till after graduation. Before the coup, Myanmar was not a completely democratic country, but it was a country that was able to offer endless possibilities for a young university student like me. At the time, I thought I could easily come up with a 5-year plan or a 10-year plan. How are you doing now, two and a half years after the coup? I am surviving. Surviving is sometimes the only way to live in Myanmar. Our daily life is filled with unpredictable political events. It’s hard enough to try to figure out how I’ll keep meals on the table for the next month, let alone making long term plans. Just as grocery prices continue to change overnight, my path toward legal education has been caught up in the storm. If things had gone as planned, I would be preparing to graduate this year and I would probably be planning for my Master’s study abroad. Being a law student who learned about concepts like the rule of law, justice, and human rights at school, I’m able to recognize the many unlawful and unethical acts the military junta carries out in plain sight; I can even identify specific actions as violations of specific norms of human rights and international law. In the beginning, I couldn’t see this as anything more than a curse; my heart just ached to witness it. But I have since come to look for opportunities in the darkness; I do everything I can to share news of our plight with the world. I have seen many traumatic things. I’ll never get used to seeing such horrible things. But at some point, I realized that I have a duty amid these historic events. I am no longer just a law student; I have taken on the role of a citizen journalist, and by virtue of my background, I have a legal perspective to share. As a law student, do you think the international community is showing enough support for the people of Myanmar? What more could they do to help? Many key actors of the international community have shown support for Myanmar. In my opinion, I think everyone has the capacity to do more than this. Failing to help Myanmar would not be recorded as just a minor event in a third-world country. This would be remembered as a failure of humanity. The whole international community will share this burden and will bear the consequences. Later on, a military coup could become just a mere trend and a genocide case could become just a temporary entertainment on the news. To prevent this collective failure of humanity, the international community needs to come up with more “actions.” Your voices of comfort and official statements have helped, but I respectfully remind you that this coup has been going on for more than two years and has resulted in over 3,000 deaths. In addition to sanctions, attempts to bring the military juntas to the International Court of Justice, and recognition for the National Unity Government, I would like to make a request. I hope that Myanmar updates are frequently highlighted in the global mainstream media. I hope that Myanmar news is accessible to the international audience in any possible way so that the whole international community stays “curious” about Myanmar, about a random law student from Myanmar, about the Myanmar people who grit every day to prove that truth and justice shall always win. The silence and ignorance of the international audience would strengthen the military juntas. If we think about this in common sense, would abusers think they need to stop committing a crime when nobody is watching them or taking action against them? I would like to tell the international community that Myanmar desperately needs their constant attention. The misery of Myanmar should not be buried among the world’s media trends. This is life-and-death news. What are your thoughts on the Civil Disobedience Movement as a law student when the military junta is pressuring all university students to go back to classes? The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is one of the most powerful counteracts against the military juntas. I made the decision to join the CDM since the beginning of the coup, and I have seen how far this movement has brought us in this revolution. Not only is this a clear message to the juntas that they cannot rule without our cooperation, but it is also a demonstration of individuals’ understanding of how democracy is all about ruling ourselves, not being ruled by a group of juntas. My stance is that I will never go back to the classrooms run by the professors under military rule. I take the ethical value “Legal profession is a noble profession,” which we learned in our freshman year, very seriously. Even when I went to law classes before the coup, I sought real educational experience through mock trials, moot courts, and internships when I felt that the class lectures at a local university in Myanmar could not offer “a quality education” that met my own standards. I was a law student who tried to be creative with all the resources available. So, for me, a quality education is more than a degree. However, I also understand the other view that thinks we should all go back to school for a college degree. No matter how talented a person is, an official certificate or diploma is needed in the local work environment. People with language barriers and financial difficulties cannot seek opportunities outside of Myanmar. For various reasons, I have seen my own classmates and close friends go back to school despite their promises at the beginning of the coup. On the other hand, many CDM students would view them as traitors and even discuss setting social punishment after winning this revolution. Now that the revolution is more than two years old, I see a slight change in the dynamics that individuals have their own limits on the extent of their active participation in politics. Many of the university students who decide to go back to school now, not since the beginning, may not have harmful thoughts against the whole revolution. They will surely have their own situations. They might have made a decision to join the CDM at the very beginning, but we cannot ignore the fact that the military juntas cause difficulties in basic human needs over time. Surrounded by waves of challenges for themselves and for their families, they might not be able to seek the common good but to look after themselves first. As we all know, this is a natural human tendency. I hope that the university students who go back to school do not cause any significant harm to this revolution, even if they cannot be of great help anymore for the time being. However, I do not think that social punishment for deciding what they think is best for them would be a fair solution. This will forever divide all the legal scholars and professionals in our generation. I hope that they can act upon their own beliefs and together contribute to Myanmar’s legal and political affairs in the future. As long as they are not acting out of fear, I sincerely hope that they act upon their own convictions. What do you think about the leadership of the National Unity Government as a parallel government of Myanmar? I think the NUG is making progress over the years. As a citizen who has vested her trust in the government she approves, I understand that the NUG focuses on earning strong recognition through diplomacy on the international horizon and leading the People’s Defense Force in the defensive war against the military juntas. Putting myself in the shoes of political leaders in the NUG, I can sympathize that this is not an easy job overall. Nonetheless, they must listen to the voices of people who call the NUG their government and keep trying everything with endless effort. As a citizen, we do our job which is to keep the NUG in check. There is something I would specifically like to point out as a law student. Recently, I attended a panel discussion titled “Ending Impunity Through Transitional Justice” held on June 15, 2023. U Thein Oo, the head of the Ministry of Justice, said that the ministry is working on collecting evidence and getting ready to take action after winning the revolution. In response to that, other panelists also discussed how we should come up with mechanisms to take action even before we announce a clear win in this revolution. I agree with the latter view and my main concern here is that the country will be in need of legal scholars and professionals who can execute the goals we are setting right now. As a law student, I want to demand that the NUG comes up with more actions on: How law students can continue their legal education either within or outside the country. How they will open doors for Myanmar students who pursue a legal education in different places and wish to contribute in Myanmar in the near future. On planting seeds in much younger generations who seek to become legal professionals. In the era of federal democracy, this revolution shall bring more human resources in the legal field, the merrier. How do you anticipate the Spring Revolution will end? I strongly believe we will win. It may take time, but we will win. This is more than intuition. Looking back at what Myanmar has gone through over the decades; we have always been meant to win this revolution. Do you have any parting words for law students and lawyers across the international community? If I could get the opportunity to exchange thoughts with law students from different parts of the world, I would like to ask them what kind of legal professional they want to become after graduating from law school. A very common thought is that many law schools teach us how to read and apply the existing laws. In a simple sense, we obey the laws. However, Myanmar’s experience should serve as a lesson that law students must also learn to challenge the existing laws when it is necessary. Merely knowing the law is not enough anymore. We need to see the intentions behind the formation of each law. Just in case a law becomes unjust or we have someone sitting above the law, we should be well-prepared with the techniques and stamina to resist unjust laws. I would like to tell fellow law students that it is now our duty to formulate constructive doubts about the existing legal systems, but be hopeful about the better changes we can bring. I believe that law students should be agents of change. We should use our knowledge of the law to challenge injustice and make the world a better place. We should not be afraid to stand up for what we believe in, even if it means challenging the status quo. I am hopeful that the next generation of law students will be up to the task. I believe that they have the power to make a real difference in the world..."
Source/publisher: JURIST
Date of publication: 2023-09-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar junta: the trouble within
Description: "THE Irrawaddy online reported on August 31 the Myanmar junta’s warning to residents of Nay Pyi Taw, the centre of the military regime, that ‘resistance forces may attack Nay Pyi Taw at any time.’ The day before, a team of junta officials led by Nay Pyi Taw council member Colonel Min Naung held motivational interaction with villagers in the capital’s Pyinmana Township, calling for ‘solidarity between the government, military and people against the danger of the regime’s enemies at the gate. Before the regime could appreciate the potential danger from resistance forces, fighters from the People’s Defence Force had sneaked into the capital to attack the target of opportunities on hit-and-run tactics. The People’s Defence Force claims to have killed in April a local administrator, a police officer and two soldiers and seriously injuring a lieutenant colonel at a bar near a military base in Nay Pyi Taw. In March, two People’s Defence Force fighters were arrested before launching an attack on the Armed Forces Day Parade. In June, the force seized a military outpost near the capital and killed 14 soldiers in three days of operation. The People’s Defence Force claims to have killed in December 2021 a dozen junta troops in landmine blast at Pyinmana Township near the capital. In recent months, the media have reported combined operations by the People’s Defence Force and the ethnic armed organisation against the regime forces. Of the 14 states and regions, intense fights have been reported in 13 states and regions. The Arakan Army in Rakhine State has been on informal but long ceasefire with the military regime since the coup on February 1, 2021. Among the 13 regions and states, Sagaing has been the stronghold of resistance forces from the beginning of the coup. The regime forces sustained the worst losses here. People suffered the worst atrocities at the hands of the regime forces. Fights intensified in Shan, Kachin, Kayah, Chin and Mon states. The People’s Defence Force and ethnic armed organisations are reportedly gaining grounds in all states and regions, forcing the regime forces to take defensive tactics since July 2023. Air power has been the regime’s crucial weapon to slow down the advances of resistance forces. Indian Defence Research Wing online reported on September 1 that Myanmar Air Force has grounded all its 11 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets because of technical reasons. This has been a blow to the regime’s air power. The grounding of the whole squadron of fighters have significantly disrupted Nay Pyi Taw’s plan for targeted airstrikes against PDF and EAO positions. The United States in August imposed sanctions on three companies which supply jet fuel for Myanmar’s air force. The sanctions will further constrain the regime’s air power. The military junta has lost control over almost all of the Sagaing region and many townships in Magwe and Mandalay regions because of relentless daily attacks, land-mine ambushes, drone strikes, shelling, and hit-and-run attacks from resistance groups and ethnic armed organisations. An analyst has said, ‘the junta is no longer able to defeat resistance forces there, so its troops can only raid and torch villages.’ The regime’s aggravated cause of concern over the centre has been the fight that has broken out in Bago region barely 100 kilometres south of the capital. The war in the Bago region has created grave insecurity for the regime because the People’s Defence force and Myanmar’s oldest ethnic revolutionary group, the Karen National Union, combinedly increased attacks against the positions that the regime holds. Security analyst in Myanmar say that the junta was struggling to defeat the resistance because it has to focus on multiple front lines across the country. Human resource shortage and defection from rank and files are making regimes struggle tougher. ‘Bago Region has been regarded as an epicentre of revolutionary movements in Myanmar since the country achieved independence in 1948.’ The KNU has long been active in the eastern part of the Bago region. Now, the western part is also contested. The Central Bago region on the west of the Sittaung River basin, is strategically important both to the regime and resistance forces. The road through the region connects Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon and the Tanintharyi region in the south. PDF forces along with KNU is trying to gain a foothold in the area because it would give them control over vital gateways to Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw. The fight is continuing since July 2023. Control of the vital roadways could also isolate the south-eastern areas of the country, including Karen (Kayin) and Mon states and Tanintharyi Region..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: New Age
Date of publication: 2023-09-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar junta: the trouble within
Description: "THE Irrawaddy online reported on August 31 the Myanmar junta’s warning to residents of Nay Pyi Taw, the centre of the military regime, that ‘resistance forces may attack Nay Pyi Taw at any time.’ The day before, a team of junta officials led by Nay Pyi Taw council member Colonel Min Naung held motivational interaction with villagers in the capital’s Pyinmana Township, calling for ‘solidarity between the government, military and people against the danger of the regime’s enemies at the gate. Before the regime could appreciate the potential danger from resistance forces, fighters from the People’s Defence Force had sneaked into the capital to attack the target of opportunities on hit-and-run tactics. The People’s Defence Force claims to have killed in April a local administrator, a police officer and two soldiers and seriously injuring a lieutenant colonel at a bar near a military base in Nay Pyi Taw. In March, two People’s Defence Force fighters were arrested before launching an attack on the Armed Forces Day Parade. In June, the force seized a military outpost near the capital and killed 14 soldiers in three days of operation. The People’s Defence Force claims to have killed in December 2021 a dozen junta troops in landmine blast at Pyinmana Township near the capital. In recent months, the media have reported combined operations by the People’s Defence Force and the ethnic armed organisation against the regime forces. Of the 14 states and regions, intense fights have been reported in 13 states and regions. The Arakan Army in Rakhine State has been on informal but long ceasefire with the military regime since the coup on February 1, 2021. Among the 13 regions and states, Sagaing has been the stronghold of resistance forces from the beginning of the coup. The regime forces sustained the worst losses here. People suffered the worst atrocities at the hands of the regime forces. Fights intensified in Shan, Kachin, Kayah, Chin and Mon states. The People’s Defence Force and ethnic armed organisations are reportedly gaining grounds in all states and regions, forcing the regime forces to take defensive tactics since July 2023. Air power has been the regime’s crucial weapon to slow down the advances of resistance forces. Indian Defence Research Wing online reported on September 1 that Myanmar Air Force has grounded all its 11 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets because of technical reasons. This has been a blow to the regime’s air power. The grounding of the whole squadron of fighters have significantly disrupted Nay Pyi Taw’s plan for targeted airstrikes against PDF and EAO positions. The United States in August imposed sanctions on three companies which supply jet fuel for Myanmar’s air force. The sanctions will further constrain the regime’s air power. The military junta has lost control over almost all of the Sagaing region and many townships in Magwe and Mandalay regions because of relentless daily attacks, land-mine ambushes, drone strikes, shelling, and hit-and-run attacks from resistance groups and ethnic armed organisations. An analyst has said, ‘the junta is no longer able to defeat resistance forces there, so its troops can only raid and torch villages.’ The regime’s aggravated cause of concern over the centre has been the fight that has broken out in Bago region barely 100 kilometres south of the capital. The war in the Bago region has created grave insecurity for the regime because the People’s Defence force and Myanmar’s oldest ethnic revolutionary group, the Karen National Union, combinedly increased attacks against the positions that the regime holds. Security analyst in Myanmar say that the junta was struggling to defeat the resistance because it has to focus on multiple front lines across the country. Human resource shortage and defection from rank and files are making regimes struggle tougher. ‘Bago Region has been regarded as an epicentre of revolutionary movements in Myanmar since the country achieved independence in 1948.’ The KNU has long been active in the eastern part of the Bago region. Now, the western part is also contested. The Central Bago region on the west of the Sittaung River basin, is strategically important both to the regime and resistance forces. The road through the region connects Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon and the Tanintharyi region in the south. PDF forces along with KNU is trying to gain a foothold in the area because it would give them control over vital gateways to Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw. The fight is continuing since July 2023. Control of the vital roadways could also isolate the south-eastern areas of the country, including Karen (Kayin) and Mon states and Tanintharyi Region..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: New Age
Date of publication: 2023-09-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ‘It’s a Catastrophe’: Ex-Junta Prisoner, NLD Aide Sean Turnell on Myanmar’s Post-Coup Economy
Description: "Australian economist Sean Turnell served as a policy adviser to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy government during its first term. He was detained by the military shortly after the February 2021 coup and later imprisoned on charges—widely dismissed as trumped up—of violating state secrets and immigration laws. After nearly two years behind bars he was released in November 2022 as part of a general amnesty and has continued to speak out against the military junta from his home country, prompting the regime to revoke its pardon. In the following interview with The Irrawaddy’s Justin Higginbottom, Turnell discusses in detail the economic fallout of the military’s disastrous ‘mismanagement’ of the economy—and whether or not that is in fact the correct term to describe its actions—the post-COVID economic recovery plans the NLD was preparing to implement in its stolen second term, as well as the regime’s access to foreign reserves and what actions foreign governments can take to limit it. He also discusses his forthcoming book describing his experiences as a political prisoner in Myanmar. THE IRRAWADDY: Can you talk about the general economic situation in Myanmar? What’s going on since the coup? What’s the general situation? Where do they find themselves right now? TURNELL: I mean it’s just awful.… “Catastrophe” is the word that I generally like to employ. And I don’t think that’s even hyperbole. No matter what you look at, it’s negative essentially. I mean if you begin with growth, economic growth in Myanmar took a bit of a knock with COVID, so we’d been expecting for 2020 a growth rate of about 7 percent, and similar for 2021, but then COVID arrived and growth went down to about 1.8 percent for [2020], and no one was clear about 2021. And it went [to] negative 18 percent [-18 percent] in 2021 [and has] recovered a bit since, but.. If you’d said, OK, where can you reasonably apply the trend line? So in other words you get the knock from COVID but then good policy sort of gets you back on track—which is exactly what’s happened all around the world and all around the region—so it’s not an unreasonable expectation [that] we’d have been back to those sort of growth levels – 6, 7, 8 percent—hopefully, because there actually had been a very aggressive reform program to come into place with that second term of the government; you know, many of the things that weren’t done in the first term were geared up and ready to go in the second term. So, anyway, just to say that growth rates of 6, 7 percent—we’d have been disappointed if we weren’t hitting those. But irrespective of that, even on the worst assumption of where we’d be at, the economy is now 30 percent below any sort of modest trend; the economy’s about 30 percent down. It’s about 20-odd percent down anyway, but by trend it’s nearly a third. Which is just catastrophic for a country like Myanmar, that is poor to begin with, one of the poorest countries in the world, and people are now one-third poorer than where they should have been. There’s no fat in the system; people are desperately poor now, and they can’t take a knock of one third of their income. But anyway that’s just growth numbers. No matter what the metric is: the budget deficit is now dramatically blown out. Taxation revenue has now shrunk dramatically along with it. The bond sales are not really proceeding as they could be. The banks are not really in a position to take up the bonds on offer; so all of that means the government is just printing money hand over fist. As a consequence of that we’ve got monetary instability, whether it be measured in terms of high inflation rates, particularly relative to peers in Southeast Asia. [And] a collapsing exchange rate, so the exchange rate is less than half of what it was before the coup. The trade situation’s dire: There’s a bit of holding up in terms of gas revenues, because hydrocarbon prices were quite high, but other than that even other energy prices and income are down; agriculture is down. There’s been a bit of a recovery from the really deep lows immediately after the coup in terms of textiles, but overall the trade situation is terrible. Debt levels have more than doubled. Unemployment, to the extent that it’s measured properly, a lot of the measures are not really there anyway, but we do know that there’s been a wholesale shift from the formal economy to the informal economy—and you don’t get a growing, transforming economy out of one that is based in informality. Informality is really just a coping mechanism and that is where most people are. On top of that, just the opportunities lost. Back in 2020, young educated Myanmar people had real prospects and had choices about where to get employment, and now people are scattered to the winds outside the country, within the country. People with expensive degrees that they thought would yield them a good income in a growing economy are now on the front lines or in prison. It’s just a catastrophe. I get depressed over so many things in Myanmar; obviously the loss of life and the violence above all, but if you look at the economy, compared to the hopes that people reasonably had for it, it just makes you want to cry. THE IRRAWADDY: So how much can we chalk this economic ruin up to mismanagement by the junta, or is a lot of it caused by sanctions, or just the general conflict, just the country being in a state of war right now? TURNELL: I’m probably a little bit biased in this obviously, but to me it comes from… In fact [it’s an] interesting word “economic mismanagement”. I wonder if that is the expression? It’s an expression I’ve used, I hasten to add… The more I think about it, it isn’t really economic mismanagement because in terms of policy—and that’s where a lot of the damage is being done—there is the damage of course being done by violence and so on as well, of course, perpetrated by the regime and instigated by them—but I’m just wondering about that term “mismanagement”, because in some ways what they’re doing is gearing the economy to a war economy and neglecting or abusing everything else, so to some extent it’s management for a purpose. It’s just that that purpose is greatly destructive. But in some ways, if you think about it, what they’ve essentially done is created a war economy, [so] the management that has yielded terrible economic outcomes is in once sense quite deliberate in terms of transferring resources into the military state. But anyway, it’s only “mismanagement” from an economist’s perspective, and what you’d think would be the objective of any sort of sovereign government. I think we’d have to locate it there, but I think it’s mainly because if we just go to the counterexamples around the world—you don’t have to go to the developed world or rich or even fast-growing economies. You just go to the region and you see the bounce-back [from COVID], and Myanmar is such an extraordinary outlier in terms of economies that just haven’t bounced back, so I think the blame for it is really there. COVID had damaged things but there were some very comprehensive plans to deal with that. Nothing too radical—it was more just the [same] playbook of just about anywhere else, about protecting incomes. And all of that was dismantled after the coup and of course the response to COVID itself was greatly mismanaged and the rest, and repression of medical workers, etc., so even though clearly there were external events, if we look at comparable countries around Myanmar you’d really have to slate most of the economic damage home to the regime and, again, it’s mismanagement, is the word we use for it. THE IRRAWADDY: We had a story recently that reported that the regime-controlled Central Bank of Myanmar had about US$6.8 billion in foreign reserves as of March 2023. More than half of that’s in Singaporean banks. Do you know how much of that is actually accessible to the regime? If the international community wanted to block access to those reserves what might they want to do? TURNELL: It’s an interesting one. In terms of “accessible”, it’s hard not to get technical here, because reserves by definition are financial assets that are either issued by other countries like US dollars, euros, Singapore dollars, Australian dollars or whatever, or commodities of some form—valuable commodities such as gold—so in a sense they’re accessible to the point that they still have value. By which I mean, if you have US dollars in a US bank account, those dollars only have value if you can access them at the US bank. So in some ways the question of accessibility is really the critical issue when we think of a country having assets because if they’re not accessible those assets in a sense don’t exist. That’s the first thing to say. That is nothing unusual in a way… It’s not like the regime could access them and bring them home. It could if it was gold. You could just store it at the central bank. But the only way for foreign currency-denominated assets to have value is to have them in foreign currency accounts and usually it’s the case that they’re going to be in foreign banks, so the question of accessibility is caught up with the value of those reserves. It’s a big thing to constrain access to foreign assets of governments. This is why you’ll notice that even with the suspension of access to funds at the [US] Federal Reserve, that that [suspension] is what we’re talking about, rather than the transfer of those assets to anywhere else. This gets into areas of untouchablity or…. a lack of precedent, I would say, for that. So measures to transfer those reserves to anyone else become quite problematic. Which doesn’t mean you still can’t do things. For instance, the NUG [Myanmar’s shadow, civilian National Unity Government] could come up with some quite creative measures to use the value of reserves in ways that they could … essentially financially engineer other financial assets out of reserves that are not accessible to the regime. I know that’s getting complex because we’re getting into the area of financial engineering and the extent to which [denying the regime] access to reserves—does that create value for anyone else, like an alternative government such as the NUG? And there I think you get into some interesting gray areas. But denial of access is one thing and transferring those assets somewhere else is a different thing, so it’s hard to imagine other countries doing that, apart from the US. The US would be the only one to move in that sort of direction and obviously they have to a certain extent in terms of blocking the regime’s access to the funds at the Federal Reserve, but the others, it’s hard to imagine blocking that. THE IRRAWADDY: So it’s not realistic to think that Singapore might just one day say, “All those assets you have with us – those aren’t accessible. You can’t take those out.”? TURNELL: It would be a big leap. Where I was going before with this whole issue of access, this is where this becomes important as well, you would probably have degrees of freedom of movement. So for instance, it’s hard to imagine a country actually blocking another country accessing its reserves. On the other hand, if a country decided that it was going to transfer all of its reserves, it’s hard to imagine that being an easy process either. And in the case of Myanmar, a process that wouldn’t involve extraordinary complications. So the degree to which those reserves are fully accessible to the regime would have to be questionable I think. THE IRRAWADDY: You’re writing a book about your experience in prison, I believe? Did you want to say anything about that? TURNELL: Sure. We’ll probably go on a big publicity thing in a few weeks. It’s finished. Just a few technical things with the publisher, which is Penguin. It starts with my arrest back on Feb. 6, 2021. I’ve got a couple of chapters that deal with what we were trying to do in Myanmar, just a broad outline of the reform process, things like that. But for the most part it’s all about the prison experience—arrest, Insein [Prison in Yangon], up to Naypyitaw, the trial, the incredible support I got from my fellow political prisoners and then from the Burmese people more broadly. It doesn’t hold back from detailing the horrors all around me but it’s still a little bit of a “love letter” to the Burmese people, because even though there were these terrible people who were keeping me in the prison, it was the case that 99 percent of the people I dealt with even in the prisons and so on were incredibly compassionate, and incredibly courageous in demonstrating that compassion. I’m very, very blunt in saying how awful the prison was and saying how absurd the trial was and what a terrible injustice was meted out not just to me but more importantly to my Burmese colleagues and people who weren’t even connected with my case, but whose cases I got to know about. I met people who were being tortured and so on, and ill-treated. They even ill-treated me—you know, one would have surely thought that I would have told the story once I got out and of course I did so, which caused the SAC regime [the State Administration Council, as the junta calls itself] to get extremely upset anew. So I think they’re going to get upset again in a few weeks when the book’s out. (Turnell concluded the interview by offering to add to his earlier reply to the question regarding the junta’s access to foreign reserves.) If you hold US dollars in a bank, obviously they’re not physical, all they are is on the balance sheet of a bank, and they’re just a promise from the bank to pay US dollars. So you open an account, let’s say it’s 1 billion US dollars, and that account is really just a liability of that bank to pay you. So you give them a billion dollars and they then open up a liability, which is just a deposit account, which says that they will repay that billion at some point in time. But it’s only an asset that sits on the balance sheet of that bank. I guess what I was trying to get at is that access to reserves depends on that relationship between you and the financial institution. Again, it’s so different to gold, etc. It’s not a physical commodity that can just be moved about. It depends on the decision [of the bank] and so if a bank grants access then those assets have value. If that access is in any way compromised, those assets no longer have value, and I think that was the nuance I was trying to get at with respect to even places like Singapore—that the extent to which there’s any doubt of you being able to access quickly and in full your reserves puts a shadow over those reserves, even if there’s no sanctions and so on.
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2023-09-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar’s post-coup economy comes crumbling down
Sub-title: Junta leaders are blaming saboteurs and speculators for inflation and devaluation caused by their mismanagement.
Description: "Amid the news of escalating violence, it’s easy to lose sight of two events in August 2023 that exposed the Myanmar military regime’s vulnerability. First, in a video message to the Moscow International Security Conference, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing complained about the weaponization of the dollar. Second, the August appointment of Lt Gen Nyo Saw to two special commissions on trade and foreign exchange that report directly to junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. Saw is a close confidant, but as the chairman of military-owned conglomerate Myanma Economic Corporation (MEC) and a director of military’s other holding company, Myanma Economic Holdings Ltd (MEHL), he’s also the military’s most experienced economic and business expert. It’s hard to overstate just how bad Myanmar’s economy is. Although the World Bank predicts GDP to grow at 2 to 3% this year, the economy has contracted by 12% since January 2021. A decade’s worth of economic growth was eviscerated. Nearly 60% of the population is now living beneath the poverty line, and the World Bank is warning about food insecurity across the country. Between war, climate change, and currency controls that limited the amount of the imports of fertilizer and pesticides, agricultural production is down. Although 2022-23 saw $1.6 billion in pledged foreign investment – almost all of which was from China or boomerang Myanmar investment via Singapore and Hong Kong – far less was actually realized. Other foreign investors are pulling out, citing poor market conditions, pressure from activists, and reputational costs. This has diminished the corporate tax base. With the exception of gas and oil sales to Thailand and China, exports have been hard hit. According to the military government’s Ministry of Commerce, in the first eight months of 2022, total exports reached $6.57 billion, giving the country a $172 million trade surplus. In the same period in 2023, total exports dropped by 9.8% to $5.93 billion, with a $500 million trade deficit. But if one disaggregates border trade, it’s even worse. Currency control confusion Exports to overseas markets fell by 21%. And it will worsen as key manufacturers, such as clothing makers H&M, Primark, and Inditex,- have left. Some retailers are now shunning Myanmar gemstones. Trade has been hard hit by a series of hastily implemented currency controls that change regularly, upsetting businesses. Some of the more recent currency controls have forced any individual or business with more than $10,000, without a permit, to purchase the kyat currency at the official exchange rate of 2,100 to the U.S. dollar. The black market rate for the greenback is 3,900 kyat , a 300% decline in the value of the currency since the Feb. 1, 2021 coup. Myanmar’s banks are increasingly isolated. U.S. sanctions on Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, which were responsible for the clearing of most U.S. dollar transactions, have forced costly workarounds, such as establishing new shell companies and bank accounts. Singapore’s United Overseas Bank Limited (UOB) announced that they would close the accounts of Myanmar, and had already stopped providing banking services for Myanmar Airways International. Other Singapore banks are expected to follow suit, following signaling from the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the additional reporting requirements due to the Financial Action Task Force blacklist. A Bangladesh bank froze the accounts of the two sanctioned banks. Government revenue is flat or declining. While officially a secret, projections built into the annual Union Taxation Law paint a grim picture. The Internal Revenue Department has warned that revenue from lotteries, income tax, corporate taxes, natural resource rents, and customs duties have all stayed flat or contracted since the coup; only rents from oil and gas exports have gone up. Tax authorities are now specifically hitting medical professionals with preemptive taxes. According to data compiled by the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), the Central Bank of Myanmar has compelled banks, state-owned enterprises and insurance companies to buy an estimated 26.5 trillion kyat in bonds, $3.1 billion at the black market rate, since the coup. With an inability to repay, and an NUG pledge that the bonds will not be honored, these are additional liabilities for banks that are already saddled with non-performing loans. The regime is broke and may have turned on the printing presses. The NUG estimates that the military government has printed up to 20 trillion kyat, roughly $5.1 billion at black market rates, since the coup, partially explaining the high inflation. Sanctions take a bite In July 2023, the junta issued a K20,000 note, the highest denomination, creating an inflationary spike and a further decline in the currency’s value. It’s supposed to be a limited issue currency, but with 14% inflation, a higher denominated note may be required. While international sanctions have not resulted in a massive seizure of funds, they’ve not been insignificant either. The U.S.immediately froze $1.1 billion of Central Bank of Myanmar assets following the coup. The European Union froze $503 million when it sanctioned the Ministry of Oil and Gas Enterprise. More importantly, the sanctions have made everything harder for the junta. The NUG has identified 13 other banks around the world that are holding some $5.5 billion in Central Bank of Myanmar assets, 67% of which are in nine banks in Singapore. Should the NUG ever convince the Singapore government to freeze those assets, it would deliver the coup de grâce. This degree of economic mismanagement is a crime in itself, right up there with the military’s daily war crimes. The economy is the regime’s Achilles heel and they don’t have the competence to fix it. Their penchant for control has brought banking to a standstill. An August meeting of the central bank and other top ministries tapped an intelligence agency to lead an investigation into the high rates of inflation and depreciating kyat. Meanwhile, the regime has revoked the licenses of 30 foreign exchange traders. This says so much about the junta’s way of thinking. They are oblivious to the fact that it’s their mismanagement that has caused both depreciation and inflation, yet the benighted and paranoid military is convinced that it’s the work of saboteurs and speculators. All the while, the generals are doing everything they can to enrich themselves and move assets overseas, before it all comes crumbling down..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2023-09-02
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Number of Civilians Killed by Myanmar Junta Since Coup Surpasses 4,000
Description: "The civilian death toll in Myanmar since the February 2021 coup surpassed 4,000 as of August 24 as the junta escalated its campaign of atrocities against its own people, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), which monitors civilian casualties and arrests by the regime. Number of post-coup civilian deaths in states and regions as of August 24, 2023 At least 1,080 civilians were killed between January 1 and August 24 of this year, as the junta intensified attacks on civilian targets, the AAPP estimated. An average of 130 civilians are killed each month by junta airstrikes, shelling, gunfire and other methods, it said. Junta forces killed nearly 3,000 civilians between February 1, 2021 and December 31, 2022. Estimated number of civilians killed in Myanmar so far this year (by gender) Graphic: The Irrawaddy Source: Assistance Association for Political Prisoners The resistance stronghold of Sagaing Region suffered the highest number of civilian causalities as junta troops conducted frequent raids, massacres, indiscriminate shelling and airstrikes in both rural and urban areas. Estimated number of civilian deaths by month so far this year Graphic: The Irrawaddy Source: Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Nearly 1,800 civilians were killed in Sagaing (45 percent of the total civilian death toll) while tens of thousands of homes were incinerated in the region by junta forces since the military takeover. So far this year, more than 600 women civilians were killed and 18 rape cases were reported, the AAPP reported..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2023-09-02
Date of entry/update: 2023-09-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar Coup Threatens ASEAN Centrality
Description: "US President Joe Biden’s decision to skip Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-related summits in the Indonesian capital Jakarta on Sept. 5-7 in favor of the G-20 leaders’ meeting in India just two days later has been greeted with howls of disappointment and criticism around Southeast Asian capitals and elsewhere that are concerned about America’s role in the region. Biden’s unwillingness to show up is said to undermine “ASEAN centrality”, the notion that the bloc should be the main convening platform for promoting regional peace and security. It would of course be ideal to have the American president take part in the ASEAN-US summit and the East Asia Summit—the latter a preeminent strategic dialogue which also includes Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and South Korea, apart from ASEAN member states. But ASEAN centrality can no longer be taken for granted or simply assumed to hold. It increasingly has to be earned. First and foremost among ASEAN’s critical shortcomings is its inability to address the Myanmar coup that occurred in February 2021, and the raging and violent civil war that has ensued ever since. It is common knowledge that ASEAN has been divided on both the United States-China competition and conflict, and the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Brunei, Laos and Cambodia appear to be in China’s orbit, whereas the rest more or less lean towards the US, especially the Philippines and Vietnam. Myanmar is an outcast, while Thailand has been more inclined towards Beijing than it needs to be since the military coup in 2014. On the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Laos and Vietnam have abstained from key United Nations resolutions to condemn the aggression, with Thailand joining the abstainers on one of the resolutions. Singapore is at the opposite end, putting its money where its mouth is by imposing sanctions on Russia. Notwithstanding these and other issues that have split ASEAN, such as human rights and China-Taiwan tensions, the most critical ASEAN divisiveness centers on Myanmar, because the war-torn country is a member state. If ASEAN cannot get its house in order with sufficient unity and common purpose, then it should not and cannot claim a central regional role to promote peace and security. Indonesia’s chairmanship this year has fallen short in effecting dialogue and a way forward in Myanmar. The Indonesian government did try, however, and should not be blamed for the lack of concrete results, because Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the junta known as the State Administration Council, has been devious and intransigent. He has taken ASEAN for a ride by agreeing to the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), which he personally signed on to after it was brokered by Brunei in April 2021. The 5PC calls for the cessation of violence, inclusive dialogue, humanitarian assistance, an ASEAN envoy, and a delegation visit to promote compromise and a way out. Yet the 5PC has floundered. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing’s apparent strategy is to exhaust and outlast other players in the mix. He has been instrumentally assisted by Thailand’s outgoing Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai and his envoy for Myanmar, Pornpimol Kanchanalak. The pair have organised and facilitated “Track 1.5” policy-related meetings and even ministerial gatherings to lend legitimacy to the SAC. Upholding the 5PC as the way to deal with Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have steadfastly refused to join the Thailand-hosted meetings. The Philippines falls in the same category, except Manila sent a mid-level diplomat to take part in one of the meetings. Under Thailand’s newly elected government, headed by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who has already stated his intention of restoring his country’s international standing, the ASEAN mix on Myanmar will likely be different. If the Philippines can stay the 5PC course, with Thailand’s recalibrated foreign policy posture and projection, including its approach towards the Myanmar junta, there will be a fundamental flip, whereby firm 5PC backers will be the five original founding members of ASEAN. The alignment of the original ASEAN-5 can bring a lot of diplomatic heft to the table. This is the way to reboot and recover ASEAN momentum. In turn, the ASEAN-5 from August 1967 can pressure the SAC to implement the 5PC, which Gen. Min Aung Hlaing duplicitously agreed to. The ASEAN-5 should also engage the National Unity Government (NUG), especially if Myanmar’s civilian-led parallel administration can be revamped for greater effectiveness. Indonesia and Malaysia have already interacted with the NUG. These two staunch ASEAN member states, along with Singapore, have maintained what’s left of ASEAN’s credibility and relevance by sticking to the 5PC and not recognizing the SAC and Gen. Min Aung Hlaing as Myanmar’s legitimate government. If the Philippines and Thailand, both with democratically elected governments, can follow suit, ASEAN centrality will be given a big boost. Other ASEAN member states can come in as they see fit. But they should not be allowed to hold ASEAN hostage on the Myanmar impasse because the 5PC was signed by representatives from each of the 10 member states. A newly configured regional grouping led by the ASEAN-5 will have the leverage and latitude to bring Gen. Min Aung Hlaing to heel because his military regime is losing in the country’s civil war. Reliable reports and datapoints suggest the ubiquitous People’s Defence Force units and ethnic armies are winning more territory and keeping Myanmar troops pinned down, and the latter are reluctant to fight without armour or air support. With a coup that has failed to consolidate and impose control over his territory and population, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing is vulnerable. Getting its act together on Myanmar would enable ASEAN to be taken more seriously. Dissatisfaction with ASEAN centrality has manifested in other forms of “minilateral” cooperation among outside powers, including the Quad among Australia, India, Japan and the US, and Aukus, a security pact of Australia, the United Kingdom and the US. If ASEAN wants to be back at the front and center in the region, it will need to regroup around the original core five states. The old ASEAN way of consensus and non-interference would need to be tweaked and nuanced correspondingly..."
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Source/publisher: "The Bangkok Post" via "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2023-08-31
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-31
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: B20 Summit Partners supplied arms and equipment to Myanmar military, including after coup attempt
Description: "Official partners of the 2023 Business 20 (B20) Summit, which is the business dialogue forum of the Group of 20 (G20), have supplied arms and equipment to the Myanmar military, including since its illegal February 1, 2021 coup attempt. India is hosting the 2023 B20 and G20 summits. Justice For Myanmar calls on G20 member states to urge India to end all support for the Myanmar military junta and impose an arms embargo. B20 Summit partners and participants should end all business with the junta and its conglomerates, in accordance with their international human rights responsibilities. Among official B20 Summit partners are TATA, Larsen & Toubro and Bharat Forge, which have supplied arms and military equipment to Myanmar, and JFW, which has supported the construction of a military-owned port. The Myanmar military has been producing trucks in the Magwe Region under an agreement TATA Motors originally signed with the military’s former junta in 2010. TATA Motors Limited is part of TATA Group and is publicly listed in India. The company manufactures civilian and military vehicles. A 2019 article published by the war criminal Min Aung Hlaing details a visit to the Magwe Tatmadaw Heavy Industries plant and confirmed TATA’s continued involvement in truck manufacturing following the military’s genocide against the Rohingya. Indian export records also show over US$13 million in TATA Motors’ shipments of vehicles and parts to Myanmar since August 2018, including to the Myanmar Army’s Directorate of Procurement, the military conglomerate Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and TATA Motors’ private partner, Apex Greatest Industrial Company Limited. Apex Greatest Industrial is an official service provider for TATA vehicles in Myanmar and is a current registered supplier of the Myanmar Army’s Directorate of Procurement. Larsen & Toubro Ltd is a publicly listed Indian conglomerate that manufactures arms and has supplied the Myanmar military with LWT-XP torpedoes. Days after the military’s coup attempt, Larsen & Toubro sent on-board spares and an alarm monitoring system to the Myanmar military arms broker, Star Sapphire Group of Companies, via its Singapore subsidiary, according to Indian export records. Bharat Forge Limited is a publicly listed Indian conglomerate that manufactures arms. Its subsidiary, Kalyani Strategic Systems, produces field guns. A document leaked to Justice For Myanmar shows that a delegation from Bharat Forge and Kalyani met with the Myanmar military in October 2017, during its campaign of genocide against the Rohingya. The meeting was to discuss India’s Garuda 105mm light field gun. News reports show that the Indian government was again in discussions with the Myanmar military as recently as October 2020 regarding the supply of 105mm field guns, which may involve Bharat Forge. 2019 Indian import and export records show that Kalyani Strategic Systems provided maintenance and spare parts for the Myanmar military’s T90 battle tank. JSW Steel Limited is a publicly listed subsidiary of JSW Group. According to the company’s 2021-2022 integrated report, the Adani Ports & SEZ container terminal in Myanmar is a JSW Steel showcase project. The newly constructed port, which Adani Ports recently divested from, is a partnership with the military conglomerate MEC. Adani Ports has paid MEC over US$90 million in rent, land use and “land clearance” fees, and MEC will take ownership of the lucrative and strategic port and its assets at the end of the lease, including the materials supplied by JSW. TATA Motors, Larsen & Toubro and Bharat Forge have all provided arms and equipment that have supported the Myanmar military’s international crimes. JSW has supported an infrastructure project that enriches a military conglomerate, benefiting war criminals and helping to finance the military’s atrocities. TATA Motors and Larsen & Toubro are both on the Burma Campaign UK’s Dirty List of companies doing business with the Myanmar military. Indian state and corporate complicity in the Myanmar military’s international crimes extends beyond the actions of B20 Summit partners. As Justice For Myanmar has previously exposed, Indian state-owned companies Bharat Electronics Limited and Yantra India Limited have supplied equipment and technology to the Myanmar military junta following its coup attempt. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “The Indian government’s support for the Myanmar military, with the complicity of some B20 Summit partners, should cast a shadow over the B20 and G20 summits and be a concern for participants and member states. “By selling arms and equipment to the junta, the Indian government and companies are choosing to ignore the voices of the Myanmar people, UN resolutions and their responsibilities under international law. “Justice For Myanmar calls for India to immediately impose an arms embargo on the Myanmar military and end its support for the junta. “India’s allies in the G20 should use their leverage to pressure India to finally stop the flow of arms to the murderous junta. “B20 partners and participants should cut all ties with the junta and its conglomerates.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-08-24
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-24
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Are People Happy Nowadays?
Description: "Insight Email No. 21 This Insight Email is published on August 22, 2023, as a translation of the original Burmese language version that ISP-Myanmar sent out to the ISP Gabyin members on August 18, 2023. For this week’s insight email to Gabyin community members, ISP-Myanmar discusses the suffocating lives under military rule. This sense of stagnation stems from the gradual decline of the Myanmar economy, which is now facing not just distress, but a slow demise. We also examine the expansion of conflict as the ongoing Myanmar crisis becomes more brutal and fought more vociferously. Furthermore, there are indications that the SAC could relinquish its responsibility to take up the alternate ASEAN Chairmanship in 2026. Additionally, this bulletin introduces U Ye Htut’s book, ‘Whither to… the Globe and Hlaingtharya?’ published this year. U Ye Htut is a former spokesperson of both the Myanmar government and the former Minister of Information. ∎ Key takeaways 1. Myanmar to shun ASEAN chairmanship in 2026 According to Thailand’s PBS News, Myanmar will defer its ASEAN alternate chairmanship to 2027 instead of the originally scheduled 2026, citing domestic circumstances and unpreparedness as the reasons. The ASEAN chairmanship rotation is based on alphabetical order. Following Indonesia’s (I) chairmanship, Laos (L) is set to assume the role in 2024, followed by Malaysia (MA) in 2025. Myanmar (MY) was initially slated for 2026, but the Philippines (P) will now take its place. This echoes a previous instance when Myanmar’s former junta postponed their ASEAN chairmanship responsibilities in 2006, allowing other ASEAN members to take up the lead. The ASEAN chairmanship was taken only in 2014 when the President Thein Sein’s government came in power with the 2010 general election. In practice, transferring the ASEAN leadership to other member nations is a complex process that demands extensive consultations. The host country must proactively allocate a budget for organizing events and related expenses. The ASEAN chair is responsible for hosting a minimum of two ASEAN summits, engaging with partner dignitaries, and orchestrating numerous ASEAN ministerial meetings and sessions for officials of various ranks. If Myanmar is unable to assume leadership, the replacement country must make substantial preparations beforehand. In the meantime, leaders of the Myanmar junta are still excluded from attending ASEAN Summit meetings due to their failure to effectively implement the five-point consensus (5PC) aimed at resolving the nation’s crisis. 2.Intensifying levels of conflict Even two years on from the military coup, conflict and civil unrest continue to escalate in Myanmar, with the total number of armed clashes reaching a minimum of 10,000 to July 2023. This figure represents a twofold increase compared to clashes that transpired over the entire preceding decade, spanning from 2010 to 2020 (which numbered at least 4,600). The conflict zones are widely dispersed, encompassing a significant geographical range. Following the coup, skirmishes occurred in at least 139 townships in 2021. This number surged to 193 townships in 2022 and further expanded to 211 townships in 2023. It is noteworthy that while in 2021 and 2022 clashes mostly occurred between the State Administration Council (SAC) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), but that the number of clashes between these two groups decreased in 2023. Clashes between SAC forces and Peoples Defence Forces, and Local Defence Forces (PDFs/LDFs) under various designations have also been steadily increasing. Besides which, the number of collaborative military operations between EAOs and PDFs has increased. These developments underscore the expanding capacity for force deployment of new forces that have entered the military-political theatre. In August this year, armed conflict reached the center of power, the plains areas surrounding the capital Naypyitaw. The presence and activities of PDFs and allied forces have emerged as substantial challenges to the authority of the junta. On the other hand, there is a growing debate about whether the Myanmar military is grappling with a waning potency and declining in strength. Nevertheless, the SAC still maintains military advantages, significantly including air superiority, advantages in heavy artillery, and more recently with the deployment of multiple-launch rocket systems. The SAC military command structure remains capable of maneuvering across diverse theaters of conflict and engaging adversaries in various offensives, although their effectiveness has been somewhat diminished. Nonetheless, the ruthless tactics and indiscriminate assaults employed by SAC forces have wrought significant havoc, disproportionately affecting urban and rural inhabitants, particularly in the Karenni, Chin, and Sagaing regions. One significant aspect of the resistance movement is the ad hoc and irregular nature of opposition forces’ movements and engagement. This lack of any apparent cohesive or coordinated strategy means that whatever clashes do occur, are unlikely to result in territorial advances or greater control projection. Civilian casualties though continue to grow country-wide, reaching almost 9,000 civilian deaths in two years (to July 2023). Additionally, instances of home looting and destruction of civilian property are on the ascent, accounting for around 80,000 affected structures (See ISP Data Matters No. 48). Conversely, the proliferation of diverse opposition armed factions has inherently given rise to intricate political dynamics among combatants, leading to challenges like resource distribution and rivalry for authority. The Defense Minister of the National Unity Government (NUG) recently asserted that the armed resistance could achieve success in the early months of the upcoming year. However, it remains premature to provide a comprehensive analysis at this juncture. 3.Myanmar’s suffocating economy While the military junta is struggling to maintain control, the foreign exchange value of the Myanmar Kyat is depreciating swiftly. On August 16, one Thai Baht fetched over 100 Kyats while the US dollar is trading at 3,850 Kyats in the informal market. The consequences of the rapidly devaluing Kyat has made imported goods more expensive while domestic commodity prices also rise, placing substantial strain on the populace as they struggle to make ends meet. The State Administration Council (SAC) is resorting to market price control measures through directives and leveraging threats against export-import traders. In June, the SAC’s Central Bank revoked the licenses of three foreign exchange companies and arrested 51 people working in currency exchange. On July 15, the SAC once again terminated licenses for ten additional foreign exchange companies. More recently, on August 15, an additional 13 foreign exchange companies were compelled to cease operations. The genesis of these financial problems traces back to the State Administration Council’s (SAC) imposition of foreign currency controls. The banks are compelled to convert all customer accounts denominated in foreign currencies into Myanmar Kyats at predetermined rates. Additionally, a mandate requires foreign exporters to convert 65% of their export income into Kyats within a single day, using the official designated rate, while the remaining 35% of companies’ export earnings are allowed to be converted at the market rate. However, there was a partial easing when, on July 30, the Central Bank shifted the ratio to 50-50. Despite this adjustment, the alteration has not significantly alleviated the competitive constraints faced by traders. On June 21, the U.S. Government imposed a new round of economic sanctions against two major state-owned banks, Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanmar Investment and Commerce Bank (MICB). This move had an immediate impact, triggering a decline in the value of the Myanmar Kyat. In a separate development, the SAC announced the forthcoming release of a new limited-circulation currency note with a value of 20,000 Kyats. This has heightened concerns about the Kyat’s stability, eroding people’s confidence in retaining the currency. In addition, on August 9, Singpore’s United Overseas Bank (UOB) announced its decision to sever correspondent bank relationships with Myanmar, which has worsened confidence in Myanmar’s financial system. The UOB decision complicates the military regime’s access to the global financial system. Furthermore, intensifying armed conflict and natural disasters have damaged crops, properties, and industries, leading to declining productivity. Myanmar’s economic landscape remains fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. The economy isn’t merely grappling with distress—it’s teetering on the brink of collapse. The brunt of these economic hardships is felt most acutely by the marginalized, impoverished, and grassroots segments of the population. They are enduring a gale of difficulty while fighting for survival. ∎ Trends to be watched Are people happy nowadays? In a recent episode of the ‘GPS’ program, hosted by Fareed Zakaria, a conversation unfolded with Bruce Feiler, the author of the New York Times bestseller ‘The Search: Finding Meaningful Work in a Post-Career World’. The discourse highlighted widespread discontent among workers with their employment, attributed to various factors such as the pandemic and the subsequent shift to remote work arrangements. However, the situation in Myanmar diverges significantly from global trends, as the populace faces a distinct challenge: the scarcity of viable job opportunities. According to a recent International Labor Organization (ILO) brief on Myanmar, dated August 2023, the rate of employment terminations increased by 23.5 percent following the military takeover on 1 February 2021. The data includes dismissals of workers increasing by 41 percent while workers’ resignations increased by 22 percent. Many of these ousted workers were from the wholesale and retail trade sector, followed by the textiles, apparel, leather, and related manufacturing sector, and the construction sector. It is significant that among the civil disobedience movement (CDM) many activists refused to collaborate with the regime, which was reflected in the labour statistics. The job termination rate in the public sector increased by 392 percent (comparing the ratio prior to and after the military takeover) following the military takeover, mostly from the education sector. Many dismissals were for ‘non-standard’ reasons and are outside of national labor laws. Such violations rose by 690 percent after the military coup. Their struggle is harsh, some found waged jobs again after termination or become self-employed, but the average time for a worker to return to wage employment was 167 days, ILO reported. It is definitely not a happy experience. Workers in Myanmar are encountering the most difficult situation. The SAC’s Cooperative and Rural Development Ministry website revealed at least 646 small businesses (SMEs) negated their registrations in the first seven months from early this year to July, as they could not continue their businesses. Simultaneously, a combination of human-caused and natural disasters has inflicted additional devastation upon the population. The situation in conflict-ridden areas has escalated to more dire proportions, with over 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) navigating treacherous terrains in search of safety. These adversities compound existing economic challenges, further compounding societal distress. The confluence of dim economic prospects, the continuous devaluation of the currency, and the State Administration Council’s (SAC) implementation of ad hoc economic policies has created an unfavorable environment for the creation of new job opportunities. The trajectory of employment dynamics and the voluntary or involuntary termination of jobs is a pivotal concern, as it directly influences the well-being of the majority of citizens. ∎ What ISP is reading? Whither to… the Globe and Hlaingtharya? Ye Htut, (April 2023). Whither to… the Globe and Hlaingtharya? Yangon: Ye Htut Publication. A book authored by a former spokesperson of the Myanmar government and Minister of Information has recently been released. Known for his adeptness in Myanmar prose writing, he has garnered a substantial following through his earlier published essays. This latest publication is an anthology of articles and essays drawn from his Facebook page, encompassing a diverse range of subjects: from personal anecdotes and reflections on pivotal events to intricate portrayals of grassroots communities, travel accounts and his freethought. The book comprises 60 essays in 274 pages. In the preface of his book, he recited Myanmar’s famous author, Mya Than Tint saying, ‘traveling is a type of politics.’ Against the backdrop of heightened security following the military coup in Myanmar, he documented his experiences and observations from routine local shopping excursions to journeys on the Yangon circular train. His essays maintain a message he wants to convey. As he writes in his book’s preface, ‘At the time of almost diminishing freedom, more vigorous conflicts and antagonisms, it is difficult to write about politics, economics, and social lives. Some ideas can be expressed openly, but some subjects can be only touched finely and left the readers to think further.’ The same paragraph is also printed on the back page of the book. Within the essays, as outlined by the author, a panorama emerges encapsulating “tantrum situations both in the mountains and on the plains.” These narratives underscore the widespread scarcity afflicting numerous individuals, encompassing persistent and often extended periods of electricity blackouts. Individuals are compelled to navigate these challenges by looking for ways to reduce spending, reducing their food costs, and for those people at the grassroots, to ignore the nutritional value of their foods, embark on troublesome long queues in front of banks and ATMs. Soaring prices change the way people use fuel, and people become disgruntled living lives among the three catastrophes of famine, war, and epidemic disease. There are cases of ‘strangers’ pillaging villages and destroying properties. The reader can see the social-justice sensitiveness of the author through the texts as he recurringly points out the growing inequalities. It is observed that if he has to say something, he regularly stands with the view of the grassroots people.
Source/publisher: ISP-Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-08-23
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Suu Kyi’s son urges young Burmese to ‘never give up’ on democracy
Sub-title: Kim Aris says in an interview with RFA that the junta hasn’t responded to his requests to contact his mother.
Description: "Radio Free Asia’s Soe San Aung spoke with Kim Aris, the son of former State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, last week. Suu Kyi served as Myanmar’s de facto leader following national elections in 2015, which her National League of Democracy won by a landslide. The party also won the 2020 national elections, but the military seized power from the democratically elected government on Feb. 1, 2021. The army immediately arrested civilian leaders, including Suu Kyi, who were in Naypyidaw for the convening of the newly elected lower house of parliament. She was held at Naypyidaw Prison until last month, when a source told RFA that she was relocated to “a more comfortable state-owned residence.” Aris is living in the United Kingdom and has been unable to contact his mother since the military coup. RFA: You’ve been involved in supporting the Burmese community in London and you’ve been finding funds to support back home. First, tell me what you’ve been doing to support the spring revolution, the nationwide wave of popular resistance to the Myanmar military following the 2021 coup. Kim Aris: But I never really wish to be a public figure. I kind of already stand by and see what others do and what is needed. And as my mother’s son, I have a unique position whereby I can speak out to the world. Outside of the Burmese community, people aren’t very aware of what’s happening. So I’m doing what I can to raise funds and awareness for the cause. RFA: As we know, your mother, Aung San Suu Kyi, was once given the chance to leave Burma, but chose to stay with the Burmese people over her family. How would you describe your mother? Kim Aris: It always saddens and angers me that my mother has sometimes been portrayed as cold hearted because she was unable to be by my father’s side while he was dying. I was nursing him at that time, and I can say that he did not wish for her to return to England. We wanted to be by her side in Burma. Unfortunately, the military couldn’t find it in their heart to allow him his dying wish. And from my point of view, I’ve never felt like she left me. I was with her when she was first put under house arrest in Burma. And it never felt like she abandoned me in any way. Also in Burma, everybody’s now lost their parents to the military. It’s not as though I’ve actually lost my mother. People in Burma are going through far worse than what I have been through. It’s lucky for me that my mother left me here in England, where it’s safe. I feel privileged. Compared to what’s happening to the people in Burma, I have a very easy life. RFA: Now your mother, Aung San Suu Kyi, is under house arrest again. Have you had any contact with her? Kim Aris: As far as I’m aware, she’s not actually under house arrest. She’s in prison somewhere. The military has said that she’s been moved into house arrest, but there’s been no evidence that that’s actually the case. I have had no contact with her. And the military hasn’t responded to any requests I have made for contact or to inform me of her whereabouts. In the past, I have had some contact when she was under house arrest in Yangon, but now I don’t know what condition she’s being kept under or where she is. RFA: We are aware that you went to the Burmese embassy to give a birthday gift to your mother, but they didn’t let you in and they didn’t even say anything to you. How many times have you sent a request to the junta to get in contact with her? Kim Aris: There’s actually very little point to corresponding with these people because I haven’t received any response ever. So I’ve tried various other avenues, such as through the British Foreign Office and via the International Red Cross, but they’ve had the same result, which is no response. RFA: I’m sorry to hear that. But in the last amnesty, they commuted some of your mother’s sentence. What was your reaction? Kim Aris: It’s a military gesture. The military has used these tactics in the past to try and appease the international community whilst they still continue to perpetrate all sorts of atrocities against their own people every day. And even with the reduced sentence, my mother would still be over 100 when she’s released. RFA: So you’ve been back to Burma, like when your mother was released in 2010. What was your perception about the country? Kim Aris: Well, obviously the situation there was incredibly sad, especially since the country was going through a period of development. There was a great deal to look forward to. Now, all of that has been taken away. The country has gone backwards since the coup. So it seems like it is worse now than it was back in 1988. RFA: Yeah, it’s like the country is in chaos right now. You know, young people are fighting back for their freedom. What's your point of view about today’s crisis? Kim Aris: Well, from what I can gather, the situation is not sustainable for anybody. The military aren’t as strong as people think they may be. They have lots of high tech weaponry, but they do not have the manpower that the people have. And I hope that this war cannot go on for too much longer. No more bloodshed. But obviously, that’s not going to happen any time soon. Hopefully things will play out before two years’ time. The military will collapse, but we’ll see. RFA: What if you had a chance to talk directly with Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the chairman of the junta’s governing body? Kim Aris: I would ask him to stop waging this war against his own people. The resolve and fortitude of the Burmese people is absolute. They will never accept the military rule, and the youth of Burma will never accept having their freedom taken away. Now, for the first time in a long time, all the different ethnicities are starting to work together, and that shows that the army will never win this war. RFA: What hope do you have for Burma? Kim Aris: I hope that Burma will achieve the freedom that it’s been looking for so many years now. And that people can start to rebuild their lives. In the future, hopefully people will be united and be able to work together in a more inclusive manner. RFA: Burmese people asking for international help. As Aung San Suu Kyi’s son, what is your message to the international community? Kim Aris: I would ask the international community not to stand by and let the military junta brazenly commit crimes against humanity. I would ask them to increase humanitarian assistance and support organizations that are actually able to get aid to the areas which are in need. Also, to impose more targeted and effective sanctions against the junta. Also to recognize a meaningful dialogue with the shadow National Unity Government. As stated in a recent UN report, war crimes committed by Burma’s military, including the vengeance bombings, is becoming increasingly frequent. 1.7 million civilians have been displaced, over 15,000 arrested and 6,000 killed. The military are conducting a war on their own people, regardless of race, ethnicity or religion. 17.6 million civilians are now in urgent need of lifesaving aid, protection and support. Recent floods triggered by heavy monsoon rains have added to this crisis, with a further 50,000 people displaced. A regime that uses airstrikes against civilian villages, then returns to kill mothers and children while they are collecting the dead for burial. It’s a situation that needs to be addressed by the international community, who seem to be happy to stand aside and let this happen. RFA: We have learned that your mother doesn’t want you to get involved in politics. Is that true? Did she ever say anything to you? Kim Aris: Yeah, she’s never wanted me to be involved in politics. I’ve never wanted to be involved in politics. As I said, I would much rather not be any sort of a public figure. But since the military are not allowing me any access to my mother at all, I feel like I need to do something to try my best to help the situation in Burma. After all, my mother cannot tell me what she thinks. So I have to think what she would want me to be doing. And I know she would want me to be helping where I can. RFA: Do you hold out hope that she would be set free again? Kim Aris: Absolutely. I cannot see the situation in Burma continuing as it is. I hope she will be free – along with all the other political prisoners in the country – and can find peace again. RFA: What is your message to the people who are fighting for democracy in Burma, especially young people? Kim Aris: I would say never give up. And this fight is one that cannot be lost. The military will never win. And the rest of the world is thinking about what is happening today, even though it doesn’t seem like it. Sometimes people around the world are trying to help. RFA: By the way, I have seen the pictures with your mother and Taichito (Aung San Suu Kyi’s dog). We know you left Taichito with your mother in Burma. What is his situation now? Kim Aris: I believe he is in Yangon. I’m not sure where exactly. He’s getting old. His eyesight isn’t as good as it was, and I’m sure he'll be missing May May (Burmese word for Mommy)..."
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Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2023-08-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-20
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Title: UN heavyweight faces off with Myanmar’s strongman
Sub-title: UN bigwig Martin Griffiths didn’t bow before Myanmar’s coup-maker but he picked an impolitic moment to call for more donor funding
Description: "The United Nations Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths made a visit this week to Myanmar’s military capital Naypyidaw, and went mano-a-mano with dictator Min Aung Hlaing, recently self-appointed prime minister and head of the State Administration Council (SAC) junta. Griffiths, also the head of the Office Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is probably the highest-ranking UN official to visit Myanmar since the February 2021 coup. The UN and international aid agencies have been facing severe restrictions on responding not just to spreading armed conflict throughout Myanmar, which has displaced nearly two million civilians, but also following Cyclone Mocha devastated large parts of Rakhine state and Magwe and Sagaing Regions in mid-May. The military continues to obstruct recovery efforts and reconstruction. State-run media ran this headline the day after Griffiths and Min Aung Hlaing met and shook hands in Naypyidaw; “Global community should seek accurate information on Myanmar’s situation.” From the military’s side, the topics for discussion ranged from “spreading misinformation on various situations of Myanmar in the international community, the need for the international community to know actual conditions in Myanmar, lesser aid of international organizations including the United Nations for Myanmar in the period when the Covid-19 broke out and storm (Cyclone) Mocha hit, and further cooperation in humanitarian aid.” This could be summarized as Min Aung Hlaing blaming the UN and the international community for the violence and dysfunction fueled by his failing military rule. We shouldn’t mistake Griffiths’ visit as a genuine gesture of cooperation from the SAC after years of foreign aid obstruction across the country. For Min Aung Hlaing it was a “kneel before me” moment, even if the OCHA head isn’t “a take the knee” kind of guy. A seasoned diplomat, founder of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Center) and advisor to Middle East peace envoys, Griffiths is a practiced interlocutor with despots. Maybe that’s the problem: he’s simply going through the motions. It was therefore glumly predictable Griffiths would release a tepid statement. “Successive crises in Myanmar have left one-third of the population in need of humanitarian aid. They expect more and better from their leaders and from the international community” is pointing out not just the obvious but the clear implication that the UN has been failing. Then, quite brazenly, Griffiths claimed the UN could do better with more access and more funding, reminding a miserly world that the UN humanitarian response plan was only 22% funded. It’s clear that UN communications messaging is comfortable with stark contradictions, but fund-raising after shaking hands with a war criminal and visiting disaster-racked Rakhine state? Indecorous, if not dehumanizing. And if the UN has been unable to credibly claim they were capable of doing more with increased funding, then why give them more cash? A hangdog foreigner with hat in hand pleading for mercy and more money doesn’t move a war criminal. The standard UN reproach after visits like this is wait-and-see the results: even small changes on the ground are evidence of progress and perhaps Griffiths’ was able to penetrate Min Aung Hlaing’s hard shell. Unlikely. There has been intense criticism of the UN and the international community for their lack of progress in moving the SAC. Griffiths’ visit should be proof that Myanmar hasn’t completely disappeared from the UN’s conscience, and regardless of the view on “success”, he made the effort and is trying. But this is short-term memory loss logic. Griffiths and the SAC have been at odds before. Responding to the Christmas Eve massacre at Hpruso in Kayah state, where SAC forces murdered 35 civilians and set fire to their vehicles, Griffiths released a statement two days later that stated: “I condemn this grievous incident and all attacks against civilians throughout the country. I call upon the authorities to immediately commence a thorough and transparent investigation…(and) call upon the Myanmar Armed Forces and all armed groups in Myanmar to take all measures to protect civilians from harm.” The SAC’s unconvincing response claimed: “Then, about 10 terrorists who were waiting on the hills of the village attacked with (assorted weapons)…KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party and PDF (People’s Defense Forces) terrorists, including newcomers for explosive training, were arrested dead…the seven vehicles carrying petrol, diesel and foodstuffs collected from the villages by force for the terrorist groups were burnt.” This has been the SAC’s response to UN accusations of war crimes since the 2021 coup: deny everything and wait for the UN to move on. It’s rumored it was Griffiths who defenestrated former UN special envoy Noeleen Heyzer. If there was valid criticism of Heyzer’s lack of progress, and a lot of criticism was misplaced, the SAC now sits squarely in Griffith’s inbox. Former special envoy on Myanmar Noeleen Heyzer visiting a Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh in August 2022. Image: Twitter / Screengrab Three further points from Griffiths’ visit are evident. First, the obstruction of aid after Cyclone Mocha provides ample evidence of the SAC’s insincerity in helping people in need. A recent report from the independent Center for Arakan Studies comparing responses to Cyclone Mocha and the devastating 2008 Cyclone Nargis indicated very similar military obstructing tactics to both disasters, and crucially in the weeks after the May storm, severe restrictions on Rakhine civil society aid workers – something Griffiths failed to mention in his statement. The UN and aid organizations have also not been able to ensure unfettered access in conflict areas in Myanmar’s northwest, let alone in Rakhine and eastern borderlands, and the majority of aid delivered is in firmly SAC-controlled territory. Second, Griffiths’ visit illustrates how utterly ineffective the UN Country Team has been, especially since Mocha. The Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (ad interim) Ramanathan Balakrishnan has displayed all the qualities of senior UN management in an authoritarian setting in order to achieve maximum ineffectiveness. Griffiths wouldn’t have had to visit if the country team had been able to do its job. It’s not a performance that compels donors to reach for their checkbooks. And third, Griffiths’ approach brings high-level international humanitarian mediation into further disrepute. A recent essay in Foreign Affairs by Natasha Hall and Emma Beals, entitled “Humanitarian Blackmail”, outlines the recent failures of UN engagement with authoritarian states, including Myanmar. They argue that “humanitarian negotiation are no substitute for conflict resolution.” Using the case of the captured Cyclone Mocha response, the essay states: “As conditions on the ground worsen, the junta has done nothing to alleviate the suffering of the people they govern, likely waiting for high-level visits from senior officials from the UN…such negotiations legitimize their role as the primary international interlocutor and decision-maker regarding aid.” It goes on to castigate international aid actors for failing to “reach communities outside junta control…in places where the government consistently impedes, manipulates, or diverts aid, it may be more effective for humanitarians to work outside the UN and in ways that do not require official consent.” Although there are significant programs already out of the SAC’s control, including cross-border assistance and expanding “resistance humanitarianism”, which has been a feature of aid work in eastern Myanmar conflict zones for decades, the issue is one of scale and increased funding in areas outside of UN operating zones: not easy to do when foreign donors have funneled so much post-coup aid through the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS), which has had no qualms with cooperating with the SAC. It is not clear if, as part of the official protocol, Griffiths was taken on a tour of the recently opened Maravijaya Buddha statue in Naypyidaw, the tallest sitting marble Buddha in the world, with Min Aung Hlaing as its prominent patron. Any courtesy visit would be potentially more scandalous that shaking Min Aung Hlaing’s hand. In recent days, there has been criticism over prohibitively expensive visiting and photography fees for the general public. The entrance fee for foreigners is US$10. Perhaps Griffiths could have started the fundraising right then and there?..."
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Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication: 2023-08-18
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: My Homeland Is Being Ruled by Terror. The World Must Pay Attention.
Sub-title: Myanmar’s military junta is committing indiscriminate atrocities. We shouldn’t look away.
Description: "My father passed away a few months ago in Australia, dreaming about returning one day to his homeland of Myanmar. Of course, going home was impossible. His health was poor and Myanmar isn’t safe, with a junta unleashing ever-worsening violence, unwilling to relinquish control since the generals staged a coup in 2021. But Dad’s thoughts were always of home. Even in his weakest moments, he would ask me about the ongoing resistance to military rule. Dad had seen Myanmar in the same circumstances before. That the country faces global opprobrium once again is not a surprise to many of its people. They have been subject to cycles of violence and dictatorship for many decades. I was born in the shadow of military oppression in the 1980s. Myanmar was in economic turmoil. Since a coup in 1962, the military had run the country according to the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” a warped ideological construct that loosely followed Communist principles. It was a pretext for the generals to take everything. The military seized properties and stole land from farmers; they monopolized the economy; they demonetized the currency, making what little cash people had useless. When the population resisted, the military imprisoned—or killed—them. In 1985, when I was 3 years old, my parents decided to leave the country after Dad received a fellowship as a doctor with the United Nations in Samoa, more than 6,000 miles from Yangon, Myanmar’s major city. They had never left Myanmar before and expected their time away to be temporary. I had an idyllic upbringing in Samoa. I ran to school barefoot and swam in shallow coral reefs the colors of rainbows. But Dad’s fellowship stipend was small, and while I benefited from an education that I wouldn’t have received in Yangon, I recall his worried look every time he couldn’t pack our lunch boxes full. By 1988, he was desperately homesick and hoped to go back to Myanmar by the end of the year. But it was not to be. That year, a people’s movement rose up in Myanmar. A series of student-led protests became a nationwide strike, with the population demanding an end to military rule, international isolation, and poverty. And on August 8, 1988—just over 35 years ago—the military opened fire on thousands of peaceful demonstrators. Among the dead were monks, doctors, lawyers, human rights advocates, writers, university students, and even schoolkids—some of them from my older sister’s school. We didn’t have a telephone at home, so Dad would sometimes sleep in his office, waiting to hear from his brothers and friends, who were all protesting. Sometimes I would catch him crying when he thought I was playing. Soon, I realized we weren’t going back. The international response to the killings—known in Myanmar as the “8888” uprising—was muted, fueling a culture of impunity within the military. In 1988, there were no smartphones to live stream military abuses over social media. Images leaked eventually, but the people of Myanmar were still essentially on their own as the military rounded up and detained thousands of activists, who were severely beaten or tortured. Many died in custody and others were reported “disappeared,” feared dead. Everyone knew someone with a friend or family member who had been killed. Myanmar rarely made the international news for many years after that, except for the endless house arrest of the political icon Aung San Suu Kyi. We distantly heard about her arrest and the dismantling of the party she chaired, the National League for Democracy. In 2010, the military began to ease restrictions, releasing Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, and even welcoming foreigners into the country. In 2012, censorship on print media ended; Myanmar would have a somewhat free press for the first time in decades. Soon after, the military announced they would allow the first truly competitive general elections in 2015, the first in almost three decades. I had been living abroad in Europe and Australia, but this was an opportunity for me to go back. I had become a journalist and I hoped to train local reporters and contribute to a society held back by consecutive generations of crooked generals. Dad had returned a few years before me to set up a clinic of his own. He understood my motives—I wanted to find my place in the country where I had been born. When the NLD won a landslide in the election on November 8, 2015, I was among the people running onto the streets of Yangon in jubilation. A young rickshaw driver grabbed me by the shoulders, grinning with tears streaming down his face. “It happened, sister!” he yelled as he shook me in joy. “I thought it would only happen in our wildest dreams.” That dream, so hard fought for, has become a nightmare. During the NLD government’s rule, the military ramped up abuses and in 2017, unleashed a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the minority ethnic Rohingya that amounted to crimes against humanity and acts of genocide. Aung San Suu Kyi distressingly backed the military to the hilt, but even that show of loyalty, which did huge damage to her international reputation, was not enough for the generals. On February 1, 2021, the military staged a coup, rejecting the results of the November 2020 elections, which the ruling NLD had overwhelmingly won. Although both international and domestic election observers deemed the elections credible, the military—without providing compelling evidence—claimed fraud and corruption. Once again, Myanmar’s population took to the streets in peaceful protest only for the military to suppress them with deadly violence. Dad and I watched from afar, feeling a familiar sense of loss and helplessness. The Covid-19 pandemic had forced us to leave Myanmar in 2020 and join the rest of our family in Australia. Again, we thought we would be away for a few months, but once the killings started, we knew that we couldn’t return. As a researcher with Human Rights Watch, I have been documenting the junta’s many atrocities since the coup: mass killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, sexual violence, and attacks on civilians in conflict areas that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. The United Nations human rights chief says the military has killed more than 3,700 people since the coup, while another 23,740 are arbitrarily detained although the numbers for both are likely much higher. According to the UN, the military has burned at least 70,000 homes across the country to destroy pockets of resistance, with 1.5 million people forcibly displaced. But I have also been watching Myanmar’s youth, who have refused to back down. They have shown a tenacity and strength unimagined before the coup, determined to return to a path of democracy and civilian rule. They have organized and have sought to resist the military in any way they can. Some have joined armed groups as they face an onslaught of military air and ground attacks. Young people equipped with smartphones want us to know what is happening. When the military began cracking down, I could document human rights violations because of the images they captured. From Australia, I watched footage of the military and police opening fire on and arresting human rights defenders and resistance leaders. Even now, two-and-a-half years since the coup, Myanmar’s youth take risks to send photos and videos of atrocities so the country’s suffering is not forgotten. The military’s recent “partial pardon” of Aung San Suu Kyi may be an attempt to deflect international concern. But the international community should not be deceived. The military’s deadly abuses are continuing. Governments around the world need to do more than watch. Targeted sanctions to pressure junta leaders and businesses with ties to the military have helped. Those efforts need to be better coordinated among countries and expanded to limit the military’s access to the aviation fuel it needs for air strikes, and to the revenue from Myanmar’s billion-dollar oil and gas industry it uses to buy weapons. We can’t use ignorance as a reason not to act..."
Source/publisher: "The National" via "Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication: 2023-08-16
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Military reshuffling aims to keep Myanmar’s ruling junta in place for the long term
Sub-title: One observer says it’s the ‘military’s attempt to dominate and control all departments.’
Description: "A recent reshuffling of top military personnel by the leader of Myanmar’s junta is part of an effort to gain control of the entire governing apparatus and remain in power for years to come, analysts and observers said. Among the top generals reassigned on Aug. 3 were the heads of the defense and home affairs ministries – the first changes since Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing seized power from the elected civilian-led government in a February 2021 coup. The two ministries are responsible for tackling armed anti-junta resistance fighters across the country. Former Transport and Communications Minister Gen. Tin Aung San was appointed as defense minister, making him a member of the National Defense and Security Council, and former Defense Minister Gen. Mya Tun Oo was made transport and communications minister. Both will continue serving as deputy prime ministers. Lt. Gen. Yar Pyae, the former Union Government Office 1 minister, replaced Lt. Gen. Soe Htut as head of the Home Affairs Ministry. Yar Pyae held on to his position on the State Administration Council – the junta’s governing body – and his roles of national security adviser to Min Aung Hlaing and leader of the junta’s peace negotiation team. The move came days after Min Aung Hlaing extended emergency rule in Myanmar for another six months on July 31, thereby delaying the date by which elections must be held according to the country’s constitution. The junta previously pledged to hold elections in August. It also occurred as Myanmar, already hit hard by economic sanctions, faces intense international criticism over the military’s attacks on civilian communities and execution of detained combatants in areas that are hotbeds of resistance to the regime. An annual report released publicly on Tuesday by the U.N.'s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar cited strong evidence that the military and its affiliate militias have committed “increasingly frequent and brazen war crimes.” New assignments at lower levels A leader of the nonviolent anti-junta civil disobedience movement, or CDM, said Min Aung Hlaing reassigned generals he trusts to important ministries to prepare for what he may face during the next state of emergency period. “The Defense Ministry is just like a correspondence office under the commander-in-chief,” the person said. “That’s why he transferred Gen. Mya Tun Oo, who is one of his major players, to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, which he will heavily use in the future to tackle the issues of airplanes and cyber communication.” Min Aung Hlaing appointed capable Yar Pyae as home affairs minister in place of Soe Htut, who is in poor health, to strengthen the operations of the State Administration Council over the next six months, he added. The CDM leader, who served in the military for 21 years and held the rank of a captain, moved to the civilian administration where he worked for nearly a decade until he was promoted to a director position. Following the 2021 coup, he left his job and joined other professionals who walked off the job to peacefully protest against the regime. Reassignments have also taken place among lower-ranking military officers. From January to the end of June, the junta transferred 40 lieutenant colonels, majors and captains to civil ministries to work as chief executive officers, or deputy and assistant directors, according to the junta’s weekly national reports. Among them were one lieutenant colonel, nine majors and 30 captains sent to work at the Myanmar Economic Bank, Election Commission, Union Civil Service Board, ministries of construction, industry and commerce, sports and youth affairs, hotels and tourism, and the Yangon and Naypyidaw City Development Committees. The largest number of military officers were transferred to the Myanmar Economic Bank with five majors as managers and 16 captains as assistant managers. The transfers indicate that the junta is trying to control the operation of civil departments as well, said former Captain Kaung Thu Win, a member of the CDM. “The junta aims to replace its people in senior positions in the civil departments such as directors to be able to control the head of the departments so that they will follow its instructions more faithfully,” he told RFA. “It transferred junior officers to the civil departments so that they can provide the military with the necessary information inside each department.” RFA could not reach junta spokesman Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun for comment on the personnel changes. ‘It’s called militarization’ Thein Tun Oo, executive director of the pro-military Thayninga Institute of Strategic Studies, said the new appointments would strengthen the military administration. “The bureaucratic mechanism makes the administration of a country run smoothly and easily,” he said. “In order for that mechanism including national security projects to operate, it is important for all the people involved to be able to work effectively. That’s why we need really capable people who can focus on their tasks.” More reliable replacements were made because many of the current government departments have experienced security breaches, he added. The appointment of military officers to both top and middle-level civilian positions is the junta’s attempt to dominate the entire government apparatus, political and military analyst Than Soe Naing said. “It’s called militarization,” he said. “It is a military’s attempt to dominate and control all departments.” Given the country’s current situation with anti-junta People’s Defense Forces, led by the shadow National Unity Government, and ethnic armed groups fighting junta forces, it is important for the military regime to have reliable people to back it, Than Soe Naing said. “They only work with their service members who they can trust, so that they feel safer,” he said..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2023-08-09
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-09
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar junta reducing Aung San Suu Kyi’s sentence is an empty gesture from a failing state
Description: "In a general amnesty announced on military television last week, Myanmar’s military junta removed six years from the jail term of Aung San Suu Kyi, the 78-year-old leader of the government removed by a coup in February 2021. This came a week after the junta moved her into house arrest following a year in solitary confinement. But it still leaves Aung San Suu Kyi facing a 27-year jail term on bogus charges. The junta also lopped four years off former president Win Myint’s sentence, and reportedly released more than 7,000 other prisoners. But we shouldn’t be persuaded that the junta has changed its stripes. It regularly uses mass amnesties in attempts to cultivate goodwill, either at home or abroad. But any major figures released in these amnesties shouldn’t have been locked up in the first place. The day before the amnesty, the junta extended its state of emergency for a fourth time, further delaying elections, due to relentless opposition to its February 2021 coup. The coup sparked ongoing and widespread violence, and shredded the military’s last claims to social esteem. This has left Myanmar impoverished, largely friendless, and without any clear plan for a positive future. Determined resistance The army’s top decision-makers, currently bunkered in the capital, Naypyidaw, struggle to maintain control of enough territory to seriously contemplate even a heavily stage-managed nationwide poll. Under these volatile conditions, people have been voting with their feet by fleeing abroad or taking up arms in a revolutionary mobilisation. The junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, reportedly told the National Defence and Security Council that elections couldn’t be conducted due to continued fighting in several regions. The reality for the generals in their fortified compounds is that any poll could further embarrass them – they cannot even reliably rig the national vote. Read more: As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options Many areas are off-limits to government forces, perhaps as much as half the country – which is Southeast Asia’s second-largest by land area. While aerial bombardments by regime aircraft might set back the resistance, the strategy is hardly a way to win hearts or minds. Inch by inch, the diminution of central government control raises questions about the country’s future. There’s increasing concern across the Southeast Asian region. An intractable civil conflict presents significant challenges for neighbours Thailand, China, India and Bangladesh. Diplomatic efforts to maintain Myanmar’s territorial integrity jostle with the discomfort felt almost everywhere about doing business with a blood-splattered regime. The regime tries to play the politics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to its advantage. But even there, sometimes in the company of other autocrats, Myanmar now faces the ignominy of an “empty seat” at the political level. And almost nobody wants to shake hands with regime representatives. An unnecessary crisis It’s a precipitous erosion of what was, until the coup, a relatively positive story for most Myanmar people. Before the coup, the most problematic issue was the military’s abuses of the Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority living in westernmost Myanmar. Other issues – such as longstanding ethnic grievances and yawning economic inequality – were, at the very least, subject to open debate in the media and sometimes in the country’s 16 regional and national legislatures. That political and social infrastructure, and the emerging civil society it helped sustain, has now crumbled. It’s been replaced by violence, mistrust, terror and martial chauvinism. Read more: Military violence in Myanmar is worsening amid fierce resistance and international ambivalence Myanmar’s young talent now banned from universities, bravely disobedient in the faces of tanks and bullets, face dismal options: the mountains, the jungle, the border. Some lie low. Others still seek to fan the revolutionary spark. Many are now in jail, others dead. The military, of course, blames its opponents for the devastation its coup unleashed. That sad fact hides a tremendous political and cultural miscalculation. It’s unclear whether Myanmar can recover from the army’s self-inflicted wounds. Some speculate the whole system will collapse, making it impossible for powerbrokers to keep up the increasingly flimsy charade of state power. It has all the ingredients of a failed state. No way out The decision to abandon the proposed elections, followed by last week’s amnesty, is hardly a surprise. But it does reveal the fragility of the military system and the paranoia of the men in charge. It’s also further evidence that nobody can trust the junta. Not only has it broken the faith of the Myanmar people, it constantly tests the patience of foreign governments, even those that offer some sympathy for its self-sabotage. With Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior members of the democratically elected government still locked up, the reality facing the generals is they will never beat her at any election. They are still betting that eventually the world – and, most importantly, their near neighbours – will lose interest and allow some type of partial rehabilitation. Maintaining links with China and Russia is a key strategy. Still, there’s no obvious path to fuller inclusion in ASEAN while the generals unleash such violence against their own people. The extension of the state of emergency and postponement of hypothetical elections will further invigorate resistance forces hoping to steadily weaken the army’s grip on power. A pointless reduction in the jail sentences for Myanmar’s democratically elected leaders is unlikely to quell the fires of opposition now burning across the country..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Conversation" (Melbourne)
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-08
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Title: Myanmar on fire
Description: "Executive Summary To read the full report, download the PDF. Since the February 2021 coup, the Myanmar military has violently suppressed political opposition and used disproportionate violence against civilians. As the Myanmar military struggles to exert control over areas of resistance, persistent fires have been on the rise - likely as part of both the Myanmar military’s offensive against PDF groups, and their attempts to subjugate the civilian populations. This report by Myanmar Witness seeks to provide insight into this modus operandi of the Myanmar military by assessing data and specific case studies. This paper reviews what are alleged to be intentionally set fires in Myanmar, which has been a consistent feature of the conflict. Figure: Map showing all fire data collected and analysed by Myanmar Witness as of 31 January 2023. The use of fire has increased, resulting in the destruction of thousands of homes. As part of enduring monitoring of fire, Myanmar Witness observed a sharp increase in the number of fires being reported around Myanmar at the end of 2022 - with the largest change being an astounding 454% year-on-year increase in December. In every month observed between September 2022 and January 2023, Myanmar Witness collected more fire incidents than in the corresponding months in the previous year. Myanmar Witness has sought to understand this increase through investigation and analysis of fires in the months of September 2022 to December 2022. To understand this phenomena, Myanmar Witness has analysed large patterns of fires, turning these into case studies that demonstrate the potential systematic nature in which villages are being affected by fire. Myanmar Witness has found that these fires appear to happen in ‘clusters’, with repeated incidents in the same villages over time, as well as multiple simultaneous incidents in multiple villages in the same area. This is a pattern also observed in the wider fire dataset and in operations between September 2021 and January 2022, which can be read about in more detail in Myanmar Witness’ report, Civilian Harm. Myanmar Witness has collected 347 reports of fires during the period of September 2022 to January 2023. The team have then selected five case studies that are representative of trends observed across the wider set. In some of the selected case studies, fires seem to correlate with People Defence Force (PDF) activity and it is therefore a realistic possibility that they can be explained as retaliation for said activity by Myanmar’s Military. The case studies also demonstrate the way in which fire is used as a weapon, repeatedly destroying civilian infrastructure and objects indispensable to survival. Myanmar Witness identified a large cluster of fires across Sagaing at the end of November until mid-December 2022. These fires are linked to reports of Myanmar military soldiers and Pyu Saw Htee militia moving from village to village during this period, leaving a wake of charred destruction, and allegedly using human shields. Whilst the time and location of fires matches on the ground reports, Myanmar Witness has been unable to find conclusive imagery showing the presence of the Myanmar military and thus is unable to verify who is responsible. In addition to the widespread burning of villages, Myanmar Witness has identified claims and evidence of the destruction of food supplies including rice storage facilities, a sesame warehouse, livestock, and rice supplies. Myanmar Witness has been able to geolocate and verify several instances of food infrastructure being destroyed. Fires in January 2023 in 3 villages across Ye-U Township, Sagaing, resulted in the destruction of more than 100 houses, a historic Christian church and a number of other buildings. Some of these villages had suffered fires in the previous month, all allegedly perpetrated by the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness has verified the locations and occurrence of fires at these sites, but is yet to find conclusive evidence of Myanmar military presence. Whilst there is a lack of conclusive evidence of the Myanmar military targeting civilians with fire, Myanmar Witness deems it highly likely that the fires identified in the below case studies were started by the Myanmar military. Myanmar Witness has identified and analysed considerable amounts of eyewitness testimony reported by local news media or by social media users which claimed the military or pro-military militias were responsible. The sequential and seemingly systematic use of fire in multiple villages, all in close proximity, and seemingly tied to PDF and resistance activity, adds weight to this conclusion. Additionally, Myanmar Witness has analysed footage showing military intent to burn villages in nearby areas, and has identified clear patterns of the use of fire by military units. It should also be noted that fires are markedly more common in areas subject to martial law and that have been subjected to SAC airstrikes in recent months. Since the Coup, Myanmar Witness has identified, investigated and verified footage relating to hundreds of fires in and around villages in Myanmar. As part of this data collection and monitoring, Myanmar Witness has produced several reports detailing some instances of these fires and the patterns they followed. These include: Civilian Harm: The impact of military operations in North-West Myanmar, Fire as a weapon in Sagaing and Burning Myanmar. Myanmar Witness also lays out these instances in the open-source Myanmar Witness Fire Map, making the data accessible for a wider audience to review..."
Source/publisher: Myanmar Witness
Date of publication: 2023-08-08
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-08
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Commentary: Myanmar crisis highlights limits of Indonesia’s 'quiet diplomacy'
Sub-title: Indonesia aspires to be a great regional power and its attempt to play peacemaker in the Myanmar crisis is an early test of how it might fare, says this international relations lecturer.
Description: "BANDUNG, Indonesia: With regional power comes regional responsibilities - as Indonesia is finding out. The world’s fourth most populous nation aspires to be a “great regional power” by 2030, playing a stabilising role in Southeast Asia. It is getting an early taste of what that entails. As the current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia has been called upon by international bodies, including the United Nations, to show leadership in resolving one of the region’s bloodiest conflict: Myanmar’s civil war. And progress has been slow. As a scholar of international relations and Indonesian foreign policy, I see the nation’s handling of the Myanmar crisis as an early test of how Indonesia could fare as the region’s great power. THE LIMITS OF “QUIET DIPLOMACY” The civil war between the military and the anti-military groups in Myanmar has claimed thousands of lives. It followed a 2021 coup that returned the country to military rule, with the junta embarking on a brutal crackdown of the opposition. Since then, the ruling generals have encountered fierce resistance from armed groups. In April 2021, a few months into the conflict, ASEAN leaders meeting in Indonesia’s capital Jakarta agreed to a Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar, calling for an immediate ceasefire, constructive dialogue between all parties, a special envoy to help mediate the conflict, humanitarian assistance from ASEAN and a delegation visit to Myanmar to facilitate the peace process. More than two years on, the first point of the Five-Point Consensus has still not been implemented, and chances of a ceasefire look remote under the current level of fighting. In May, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, responding to criticism over perceived inaction over the crisis, said Indonesia was relying on “quiet diplomacy”. Such a policy forms part of Indonesia’s attempts to balance the nonintervention principal of ASEAN - by which meddling in the domestic affairs of neighbouring states is unacceptable - with the need to address the internal crisis in Myanmar. But efforts to influence the behaviour of another state through discreet negotiations or actions have clearly not yet succeeded. It doesn’t bode well for Indonesia’s desire to be a stabilising factor in the region. In theory, Indonesia should be well placed to assume regional leadership. It is a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) gathering of richest nations and is poised to have the world’s fourth-largest economy within two decades. Its military is ranked the most powerful in the region. Added to this economic and military might is a willingness to assume the role of regional leader. Yet Indonesia’s calls for a ceasefire in Myanmar have fallen on deaf ears, in part because the warring parties know Indonesia is unwilling to punish Myanmar for failing to end the fighting. Any such punitive action would be deemed unacceptable under the ASEAN nonintervention principle..."
Source/publisher: "Channel News Asia" (Singapore)
Date of publication: 2023-08-06
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-07
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ACLED Regional Overview Asia-Pacific: July 2023
Description: "India: Violence in West Bengal spikes during local elections Political violence in India's West Bengal state escalated substantially during local elections in July, more than doubling compared to the month prior. The increase contributes to 2023 levels of political violence in the state -- already well exceeding the total violence recorded for all of 2022. The increase began in anticipation of the panchayat (village-level government) elections held on 8 July, with violence driven by deadly inter-party clashes. In the weeks leading up to the elections, several candidates were physically prevented by the ruling Trinamool Congress (TMC) from filing nominations, forcing them to file at remote locations.1 Clashes were also reported between TMC and former TMC members who contested the elections as independent politicians. The dominant TMC won decisively, though repolling was held in several locations due to the violence that continued after the election results were announced. The degree to which governance in West Bengal is devolved gives substantial power to the panchayat, which in turn fuels local political contention that lends itself to high levels of violence during panchayat elections in the state.2 Back to Map Japan and South Korea: Planned Fukushima water release leads to increased demonstrations Demonstrations opposing the planned release of treated water from the crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean increased in Japan and South Korea in July. The treated water was used to cool the damaged reactors after an earthquake and tsunami destroyed the plant in March 2011. The Japanese government is expected to go ahead with the release plan starting in August, arguing that the slow release of the treated water is safe and is needed to allow for the plant's decommissioning.3 Despite a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) backing the release plan,4 demonstrators oppose the release, arguing that the treated water is still radioactive and harmful to both humans and the marine environment. There are particular concerns about the potential impact on the fishing industry in the region.5 The issue has led to demonstrations in Japan, as well as in South Korea where a recent survey found 80% of South Koreans oppose the discharge plan.6 Around 90 demonstrations against the release plan were recorded in Japan and South Korea in July, with the overwhelming majority of these events recorded in South Korea. The issue has been taken up by the opposition Democratic Party in South Korea, which organized a mass protest on 1 July to call on the South Korean government to oppose the plan.7 Other countries in the region, including China and some Pacific Island nations, have also condemned the plan, arguing that a consensus needs to be reached among countries in the region regarding the water.8 Back to Map Myanmar: Clashes in Kachin state increase Fighting increased in Myanmar's Kachin state in July, with more than four and a half times the number of battles reported in July compared to June. The increase was driven by clashes between the military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and came after at least 1,000 military junta troops were moved into the region in early July.9 Heavy fighting began on 3 July as the military attempted to seize the village of Nam Sang Yang in Waingmaw township, located near Laiza, the headquarters of the KIA.10 Thousands of locals were forced to flee.11 The fighting continued throughout the month as the KIA defended the area by ambushing military reinforcements arriving from three different directions: Bhamo, Myitkyina, and Waingmaw townships.12 By the end of July, the military had resorted to airstrikes during clashes around Nam Sang Yang.13 Nam Sang Yang is situated on the strategically-important Myitkyina-Bhamo road, which the military aims to gain control over.14 Prior to the coup, fighting had previously flared in the area after the ceasefire between the military and the KIA ended in 2011. Back to Map Myanmar: Ongoing violence against political prisoners Political prisoners in Myanmar faced ongoing violence at the hands of the military junta in prisons across the country in July. In Bago region, the military removed 37 political prisoners from Daik-U Prison (also known as Kyaiksakaw Prison) on 27 June under the pretext of transferring some to Insein Prison and some to Thayarwaddy Prison.15 All 37 political prisoners subsequently went missing. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, at least eight of the 37 missing political prisoners were killed.16 Prison authorities sent letters to the families of the deceased victims in early July stating that the prisoners were shot dead during an attempted escape after a prison transfer van overturned in a road accident. However, the families believe the military used the prison transfer as an excuse to execute them.17 Human rights groups have highlighted the danger for prisoners during such prison transfers.18 The deaths come as anti-coup protests in July marked the one-year anniversary of the executions of four political prisoners, including a former National League for Democracy lawmaker and a well-known pro-democracy activist. Since the coup, the military junta has subjected prisoners, detainees, and prisoners of war to beatings or other forms of severe torture that often results in death. ACLED records over 400 events of violence against individuals in the junta's custody since the coup. However, due to underreporting on the issue, this number is likely far less than the true scale of the violence. Back to Map Thailand: Demonstrations triggered after prime minister vote Despite the Move Forward Party (MFP) winning the 14 May general election, parliament blocked the MFP party leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, from becoming prime minister in July. On 13 July, Pita -- who was nominated by a coalition composed of MFP, the Pheu Thai Party, and other smaller political parties -- failed to secure the majority vote in parliament, before another parliamentary vote blocked any further nomination on 19 July. Simultaneously, Pita was suspended from his position as an MP due to a case involving his shareholding in a media company.19 The votes, along with Pita's suspension from parliament, were condemned by pro-democracy protesters. They called for the resignation of senators, including the 250 senators appointed by the military, accusing them of hindering the democratic process.20 Tensions persist as protestors decry the military's efforts to undermine the democratic mandate granted to the MFP and its coalition partners. Protesters continue to call for senators to resign, coalition unity, and adherence to promised policy proposals, including the MFP's pledge to reform the lèse-majesté law. More than 30 anti-government demonstrations were reported in July. The next vote for prime minister has been postponed until August, with the Constitutional Court reviewing the rejection of Pita's renomination.21..."
Source/publisher: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
Date of publication: 2023-08-04
Date of entry/update: 2023-08-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar Junta Transfers Aung San Suu Kyi Out of Solitary Confinement
Sub-title: The 78-year-old leader is now reportedly being detained at a government building in Naypyidaw.
Description: "Myanmar’s military government has transferred deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to a government building in the capital Naypyidaw, an official from her party has confirmed, three days ahead of the expected extension of the current state of emergency. The AFP news agency cited an anonymous official from Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party that the 78-year-old Nobel laureate was “moved to a high-level venue compound on Monday night.” The NLD official confirmed earlier reports from Burmese-language media that Aung San Suu Kyi, whose government was removed by the military in February 2021, has been transferred to housing used by government officials. Rumors to this effect have swirled since the junta allowed Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai to meet Aung San Suu Kyi on July 9. The party official also confirmed to AFP that Aung San Suu Kyi had met Ti Khun Myat, the former speaker of parliament, and was likely to meet Deng Xijun, China’s special envoy for Asian Affairs, who it reported is visiting the country this week. The transfer comes ahead of the expected extension of the country’s state of emergency on Monday. Initially imposed for a period of one year following the coup, the state of emergency has since been extended twice – Monday’s extension would be the third – a testament to the level of resistance that it has since faced. Aung San Suu Kyi has been under tight control since the morning of the coup, which took place as she and other NLD lawmakers were preparing to be sworn into office at the parliament in Naypyidaw. After initially keeping her under house arrest at her residence in the capital, the junta put the 78-year-old ousted leader in solitary confinement in Naypyidaw Prison in June of last year. During that time, she has been sentenced to 33 years in prison on a number of outlandish criminal charges, including corruption, possession of illegal walkie-talkies, and the violation of COVID-19 restrictions. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. What this all means is hard to say. Nikkei Asia reported that there is “speculation the military could make further announcements regarding Suu Kyi next week, coinciding with the consecration of a new marble statue of Buddha in Naypyitaw on Tuesday.” The Buddha in question is the $7.6 million Maravijaya statue, purported to be the tallest marble sitting Buddha in the world, which is due to be inaugurated in the capital on August 2. It is hard to imagine that the transfer of Aung San Suu Kyi into slightly a less austere form of detention marks a sign of the junta’s genuine desire for reconciliation with forces that it has described as “terrorists” and pledged to eliminate by force. Like the military’s account of Aung San Suu Kyi’s meeting with Don Pramudwinai earlier this month, in which it claimed that she disavowed the anti-junta resistance and the National Unity Government (of which she is the titular head), this is probably best seen as an attempt to leverage Aung San Suu Kyi’s potent symbolic status in order to win over public sentiment and to ease mounting international pressure. For years, the military has been well aware of Aung San Suu Kyi’s totemic image at home and abroad, and sought to manipulate it to its own advantage. Indeed, the NLD leader’s willingness to endorse the military-led process of reform in the early 2010s was among the primary factors for Western governments going along and ultimately removing the economic sanctions and investment bans that they had erected since the 1990s. Angshuman Choudhury of India’s Centre for Policy Research today described the move as “literally a leaf out of the junta’s old, deadbeat playbook – designed to placate international audiences, quieten the resistance at home & sow divisions within the revolution.” Whether this gambit will have quite the same effect remains to be seen. In the West, Aung San Suu Kyi’s glow was tarnished considerably by her apparent collusion in the military’s vicious assaults against the Rohingya populations of western Myanmar. At home, too, the resistance to military rule, while still drawing inspiration from Aung San Suu Kyi, is no longer quite so reliant on her person and has in many ways moved above the old paradigm of political resistance with which she is inseparable. All this is to say that the shift of Myanmar’s most prominent political prisoner out of solitary confinement may represent a tactical shift on the part of the country’s military, but not a fundamental shift in its desired end goal..."
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Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication: 2023-07-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Current Mass Atrocities Facing Civilians in Burma: Key Takeaways from Experts
Description: "By Madeleine MacLean On June 21, 2023, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide brought together Burmese civil society leaders to discuss the mass atrocities being committed against civilian populations by the Burmese military and what the United States can do to mitigate these threats and prevent future atrocities. Speakers included Myra Dahgaypaw, Senior Partnership Officer for International Justice and Accountability for the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee; Wai Wai Nu, Founder and Executive Director of the Women’s Peace Network; Gum San Nsang, President of the Kachin Alliance; and Rosalinn Zahau, Advocacy Team Member for the Chin Human Rights Organization. Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, gave opening remarks. The following is a summary of the key points made by the speakers. Overview of Current Atrocities Facing Civilians in Burma The Burmese military is responsible for mass atrocities across Burma, including killings, arbitrary detention, the burning of villages, and the restricting of humanitarian aid and essential services. Different regions and minority groups have experienced unique harm. Kachin State had suffered mass atrocities at the hands of the military for a decade before the coup, including frequent burning of homes, airstrikes, and bombings. According to the Kachin Alliance, over 150,000 people have been displaced in the past ten years. The military is also responsible for the mass exploitation of natural resources and large-scale land grabs. The coup has exacerbated these dynamics and has increased the levels of violence against civilians. The human rights situation in southeastern Burma has also deteriorated drastically. Civilians live in a state of fear of being targeted by military attacks or arrested arbitrarily. About 4,000 civilians have been arrested and detained in the southern region alone, while about 1,000 civilians have been injured and over 300 have been killed. There are approximately 500,000 internally displaced people in Karen State alone. The military has blocked humanitarian assistance from reaching internally displaced people under the suspicion that the provisions are being taken to the resistance. Civilians in Chin State also suffered human rights abuses by the military prior to the coup that have only intensified since the military’s takeover. The military engaged in state-sponsored discrimination against religious minorities, including requiring non-Buddhists to apply for permission to practice their religion and taking children into the custody of state-run schools where they were forced to convert to Buddhism. According to Rosalinn Zahau, over 40,000 people were displaced even before the coup. After the coup, the civilians of Chin State were among the first to take up arms in resistance, and the military responded by sending large numbers of reinforcements. Fighting between the military and the resistance movement has intensified since then, and most of the state is currently under the control of resistance forces. Due to its lack of success on the ground, the military has resorted to airstrikes, from which civilians in Chin State do not have the capacity to protect themselves. Zahau reported that over 25 percent of the population has been displaced into neighboring countries, including India. The military also continues its history of violence and discrimination against the Rohingya people in Burma’s Rakhine State. Since the coup it has continued its policy of targeting Rohingya, including restricting their movement both within the state and across the country, issuing discriminatory “National Verification Cards,” engaging in abusive family check-in measures, and detaining Rohingya arbitrarily. The military is also systematically restricting Rohingyas’ access to food, water, and basic services. They have escalated the harm against civilians by denying humanitarian assistance to Rakhine State following Cyclone Mocha, which killed a disproportionate number of internally displaced Rohingya. Ms. Nu warned that the situation of the Rohingya people in Burma has not improved since the genocidal attacks six years ago, and she fears we will see future genocidal violence if the international community does not take action. Next Steps The speakers recommended a range of measures that the US can implement to support the protection of civilians experiencing mass atrocities: The US should accelerate the implementation of the Burma Act to provide comprehensive assistance to survivors of atrocities, and it should ensure that this assistance reaches Rohingya genocide victims and survivors. The US should provide assistance aimed at strengthening the capacity of communities in Burma to protect themselves. The US should convene a coalition of nations to increase the strategic coordination of actions to support human rights in Burma and stop the flow of money and resources to the junta. These nations should also enforce current sanctions against the military. UN member states should increase their contributions to the Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan and the Rohingya Joint Response Plan, which Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews noted are currently only 14 percent and 22 percent funded, respectively. The US should provide an early warning system for airstrikes, as well as more communication and jamming devices. Challenges and Recommendations Many humanitarian organizations have had to leave Burma for neighboring countries in order to continue their operations, and as a result they may not have official registrations or access to bank accounts at the moment. This has created difficulty for the organizations to comply with USAID’s standard procedures. Ms. Zahau recommended that USAID employ an intermediate agency to handle these administrative steps, as it has done in the past. The panelists also emphasized the need for more comprehensive and coordinated sanctions. This includes sanctioning Burmese oil and gas, which is one of the military’s biggest sources of revenue, and sanctioning companies that provide military supplies like jet fuel. The panelists recommended that the US implement individual sanctions against not just the top military officials but lower level officials as well. Local communities have not seen regional commanders be held accountable, and sanctions against them would help provide a sense of justice. The US should also take on a greater leadership role in advancing justice through the international legal system. While the US has provided funding to the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, it should also provide and enhance support to the local organizations who are documenting the military’s atrocities. The US government can take action to hold military officials accountable by setting up an international criminal tribunal or building international support for referring Burma to the International Criminal Court, as well as helping develop a comprehensive justice process for addressing crimes by lower ranking officials. The US can also provide more diplomatic, political, and financial support to the current legal cases against the Burmese military, such as assisting with investigations and offering witness protection..."
Source/publisher: US Holocaust Memorial Museum
Date of publication: 2023-07-27
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar military may move Suu Kyi to house arrest, media report
Description: "July 26 (Reuters) - Myanmar's military government may move ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to house arrest in the capital, Naypyitaw, two media outlets reported on Wednesday. The 78-year-old Nobel laureate has been in detention since her arrest in early 2021 when the military overthrew her elected government in a coup and unleashed a bloody crackdown on opponents that has seen thousands jailed or killed. The Associated Press cited an unidentified security official as saying the move was an act of clemency to prisoners as part of a religious ceremony due next week. The BBC Burmese-language service cited a "source close to the prison" as saying she may have already been moved to a house usually used by government officials. Reuters could not independently verify the reports or Suu Kyi's whereabouts. A spokesman for Myanmar's ruling military was not immediately available for comment. Suu Kyi's lawyers and a spokesperson for the shadow National Unity Government, which opposes military rule, could not confirm the reports. "News of improvements in conditions is welcome, but does not change her status as a prisoner of conscience," said NUG spokesperson Kyaw Zaw. Suu Kyi is appealing sentences adding up to 33 years in detention after being convicted of offences ranging from incitement and election fraud to corruption, charges she denies. Many Western governments have condemned the junta's treatment of Suu Kyi and others, calling for their release. This month, Thai Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai said he had recently met Suu Kyi, the first foreign official to be granted access to her since she was detained more than two years ago. The meeting came as Southeast Asian's regional grouping ASEAN struggled to agree on an approach on how to end the crisis in fellow member Myanmar. The daughter of Myanmar's independence hero was first put under house arrest in 1989 after huge protests against decades of military rule. In 1991, she won the Nobel Peace Prize for campaigning for democracy but was only fully released from house arrest in 2010. She swept a 2015 election, held as part of tentative military reforms that were brought to a halt by the 2021 coup..."
Source/publisher: "Reuters" (UK)
Date of publication: 2023-07-26
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-26
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The Day the Myanmar Junta’s Execution of Political Activists Shocked the World
Description: "Sunday marks the first anniversary of the deaths of veteran 88 Generation pro-democracy activist Ko Jimmy (Kyaw Min Yu) and former National League for Democracy lawmaker and hip-hop star Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, who were hanged by the regime in Yangon’s Insein Prison on this day last year. Two anti-coup protesters, Ko Hla Myo Aung and Ko Aung Thura Zaw, met the same fate. The deaths of the four marked the first executions of political prisoners since 1989 and shocked Myanmar people and the international community; many governments had appealed for their death sentences to be commuted. Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw, who were charged under the Counterterrorism Law, were allowed to meet their families on July 22, 2022 for the first time since their arrest. However, the meetings were conducted via Zoom, not in person. Their family members did not know it would be their last meeting with the pro-democracy activists, or that the two would be hanged the next morning. Their families only found out about the deaths on July 25 when the junta announced through its state-run newspapers that the executions had been carried out. Family members rushed to Insein Prison, but were not allowed to see the bodies, nor were they told when their husbands and sons were hanged. On July 27, pro-junta thugs including members of the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party and the ultranationalist Association for Protection of Race and Religion (known by its Burmese acronym Ma Ba Tha) stoned the houses of Ko Jimmy and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw. Rallies in support of the executions were held in Yangon and Mandalay in the following days, with junta soldiers and police providing security for protesters. Prior to the executions, Captain Ohn Kyaw Myint, who plotted to assassinate the generals of the Myanmar Socialist Programme Party, and ethnic Chin student leader Salai Tin Maung Oo were the best-known cases of political dissidents being hanged in Myanmar. Ko Jimmy was 53 and Ko Phyo Zeya Thaw was 41 when the two made the ultimate sacrifice for the democracy struggle in Myanmar. According to the Assistance Association for Political prisoners, as of June 2023 more than 150 people including politicians, students and women had been sentenced to death since the putsch..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2023-07-23
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-23
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Villagers say 14 killed as Myanmar violence flares
Sub-title: Fighting increases in border states while junta continues to delay elections
Description: "Fighting between the Myanmar army and anti-junta rebels has flared up in recent days, with local people in one village saying on Saturday that 14 people were killed in a single raid. Deadly violence has engulfed Myanmar since the military deposed Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government in February 2021 and unleashed a bloody crackdown on dissent that has left thousands dead. The junta has been battling anti-coup “people’s defence force” (PDF) militias and long-established ethnic rebel armies that control large areas of territory near the country’s borders. A senior military source, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP that fighting had been going on in recent days in the states of Kachin, Karen and Kayah, as well as Sagaing and Magway regions. Two people from Sone Chaung village in Sagaing – a hotbed of opposition to junta rule – told AFP the army had killed 14 people in a raid in the early hours of Friday morning. The villagers, who both spoke on condition of anonymity, said the army came looking for PDF leaders. One said that six of the dead were PDF fighters, but the rest were civilians, and the bodies were found scattered over a wide area, apparently shot or cut down as they tried to flee. “Fighting and raids of PDF places in Sagaing and Magway regions are ongoing these days,” another military source said without giving further details. Access to the areas affected is extremely difficult for journalists, making it hard to independently verify local accounts. Earlier this month, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, told south-east Asian ministers that Washington and regional states must pressure the junta to put an end to violence and return to democracy. But diplomatic and economic pressure on the generals has so far had no effect. The junta, which justified its coup by alleging fraud in elections won by Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, has promised to hold fresh polls. But it has delayed them once, and earlier this month hinted it would extend the state of emergency and postpone polls again..."
Source/publisher: "The Guardian" (UK)
Date of publication: 2023-07-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-22
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Has China Invited Myanmar Junta Boss Min Aung Hlaing to Beijing?
Description: "Ties between China and the Myanmar junta are getting warmer, and diplomats and observers following the issue recently received a message that suggests the relations between Beijing and Naypyitaw could reach a new milestone soon with a visit to China by regime boss Min Aung Hlaing in September. Every China-Myanmar relations watcher knows that—if the news is true—it would be really mind-blowing for the junta leader, who has mostly been ostracized by Western democracies for his 2021 coup, and has even been banned from ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) capitals and excluded from their summits. Since then, Russia and China have turned out to be his allies, and Moscow has invited him for several official visits, but Beijing hasn’t. Following the coup, Min Aung Hlaing desperately tried to visit China to seek Beijing’s blessings for his regime. But his attempts were turned down by Chinese officials. What’s significant about the September trip—the message says—is he would be there at Beijing’s official invitation! But can China handle this hot potato? The Irrawaddy has not been able to independently verify the message that emerged in June, one month after Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s visit to Naypyitaw. Qin is so far the most senior Chinese official to see Min Aung Hlaing in more than two years since the takeover. Following Qin’s visit, regime spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun briefly visited China. Neither side made any announcement. Early this month, Min Aung Hlaing disappeared from public for a few days after a July 2 meeting in Yangon with officials from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and associates to discuss national economic promotion. Asian intelligence sources and others in Naypyitaw said he flew to Guangzhou, southern China. The reason behind the visit was unknown. Obviously, Min Aung Hlaing is desperate to visit China to be received by high-ranking officials, and there is evidence to suggest that he will do whatever it takes to get invited. In May, Major General Yang Yang, acting director-general of the Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, met the junta’s No. 2 official, Soe Win, for talks on “cooperation between the two armies.” During the meeting, Soe Win reportedly proposed a resumption of the controversial Myitsone Dam project in Kachin State. In September 2011, then President Thein Sein suspended work on the Chinese-funded Myitsone Dam in response to a mounting public outcry over the project, which critics say threatens the source of the Irrawaddy River. The Chinese were upset with the decision. The surprise suspension was also interpreted as a cue to Western governments, including the US, to ease sanctions. In any case, if Soe Win raised this controversial proposal with visiting Chinese officials, analysts believe it indicates Min Aung Hlaing is desperate for further endorsement from Beijing, including an official visit. It will be a quid pro quo. But will Beijing buy it? For China, welcoming Min Aung Hlaing officially will be seen as an endorsement and the lending of full legitimacy to the brutal and totally condemned regime in Myanmar. China should think twice before inviting Min Aung Hlaing. Deep anti-China feeling Following the February 2021 coup, the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar faced daily demonstrations in which thousands of protesters demanded that their neighbor stop supporting the military. Despite widespread international condemnation of the coup, China called it merely a “major cabinet reshuffle” and said the takeover was an internal affair, provoking huge protests. At the time there were calls for a boycott of Chinese products and threats to China-backed projects and pipelines. There were also attacks on Chinese-owned factories in Yangon. Then there were attacks on China’s pipelines in Mandalay Region. At the time, Chen Hai, Chinese ambassador to Myanmar, came out to say that the current situation in the country was “absolutely not what China wants to see,” adding that China hoped all parties in Myanmar “could handle the current problem through dialogue and consultation properly and lead the country back on track as soon as possible.” Despite such anti-China sentiment among Myanmar people, Beijing hasn’t been totally alienated from the regime over the past two-and-a-half years. In 2023, China stepped up its most high-profile engagement with the Myanmar regime since the 2021 coup by sending Qin. Prior to his visit, there came the Chinese special envoy, Peng Xiubin, who is the director of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China, as well as visits by senior officials of Yunnan Province. However, there have been no regime ministers separately invited by their Chinese counterparts to Beijing for direct engagements since the coup. Engagement between the two militaries has also been at a low level since the takeover, even though China is a major ally and arms supplier to Myanmar. Once Min Aung Hlaing sets foot in Beijing on an official visit, it will only fuel anti-Chinese feeling in Myanmar. There will be consequences. Myanmar opposition forces may attack Chinese projects in Myanmar and protests will likely take place in and outside of the country. Last time, after Foreign Minister Qin’s visit, anti-China protests broke out across Myanmar. Activists, student union members and general strike committees across the country launched an online campaign, sharing the message, “Hey China: stop killing Myanmar’s people by supporting fascist criminals,” in Chinese and English..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2023-07-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Righting wrongs in Myanmar requires justice – not retribution
Sub-title: Degrees of culpability must be carefully weighed to stop justice turning into vindictiveness, while those claiming authority need to come clean about their own past deeds.
Description: "More than two years into Myanmar’s post-coup conflict, the question of justice looms large. Certainly, it cannot be expected from the military regime, the main perpetrator of the almost daily atrocities across Myanmar and the instigator of the crisis itself. Instead, hope lies with the resistance. However, the questions of what crimes to punish and who to hold accountable need to be carefully considered if justice is not to turn into vindictiveness. The military’s crimes are so outrageous that they demand accountability, but the resistance may be casting its net too widely in the search for culprits. In January the National Unity Consultative Council, the body coordinating resistance policy, issued a policy paper advocating that civil servants who went on strike to join the Civil Disobedience Movement should be rewarded when the revolution succeeds. More controversially, the paper states that government workers who have stayed in their jobs should be punished. Civil servants in the CDM have made enormous sacrifices and are rightly regarded as heroes, so it is fair to honour them. But nobody should be punished for not being a hero. The policy seemingly ignores that many people are in an impossible situation; family commitments and economic hardship often leave them with little alternative to keeping their jobs and following regime orders. Tarring these people as villains could drive them into the arms of the junta, if only to seek protection, and will make reconciliation harder after the conflict. It is also necessary to acknowledge that some members of the resistance are committing crimes, too. These certainly pale in comparison to those of the Tatmadaw and most of them would not have happened if the military had not thrown the country into chaos. But this doesn’t make them any less responsible for their actions. The most notorious of these crimes is probably the gruesome killings of seven young people in Sagaing Region by a local armed group affiliated with the National Unity Government, the parallel administration set up by lawmakers ousted in the coup. There are conflicting accounts of the incident, but all agree that members of the armed group based in Chaung-U Township apprehended the victims in August last year when they were scavenging in a village recently raided by the military, allegedly raping some females in the group before the massacre. The fighters were detained shortly after by the NUG-backed township administration body but released after one month. The NUG itself appears to have only heard about the case months later, in January this year, and it did not release a statement about it until May after some media reported on it. In the statement it called the killings unlawful and said it was “working to reveal the truth and to take legal actions”. But it is unclear what action, if any, has been taken against the perpetrators. The slowness and inadequacy of this response is troubling because it undermines the NUG’s claim to offer a more humane alternative to military rule. Despite publishing a military code of conduct that states that “captives shall not be tortured and murdered”, the parallel government seemingly fails to enforce this code even when the most egregious breaches occur. However, this may be less due to unwillingness than a straightforward lack of control over the troops it nominally commands. Although a highly mitigating factor, it is difficult for the NUG to admit to because it contradicts its claims of “effective control” over large swathes of Myanmar, which is key to its strategy of being recognised as the country’s legitimate government. But while it lacks the military’s hard power, the NUG has the clear moral high ground among the Myanmar public and much of the international community. Its words carry huge weight and are keenly listened to by millions. It must therefore choose them carefully. The Chaung-U killings were the actions of a rogue resistance group, but they took place amid a conflict where the military, and to some extent the resistance, have blurred the lines between combatants and civilians. The junta’s raising of local militias has muddied the situation, but many of the civil servants, military veterans and political party members assassinated by resistance groups would be considered civilians under international humanitarian law. Resistance groups often claim their victims have directly contributed to the arrest, torture and killing of their members, but there is little due process to establish the facts. Although the NUG’s military code of conduct forbids attacks on civilians without qualification, its leaders have given tacit approval for these assassinations or simply dodged the issue. Asked about this by The Diplomat, Acting President Duwa Lashi La offered a vague excuse, saying most of the victims “are like spies of the military” who are “destroying our policy”. The lack of clear red lines gives resistance groups licence to settle scores on the vaguest of pretexts and is particularly dangerous in such a decentralised movement. Some might argue that, while brutal, targeting the regime’s local minions will expedite its demise. But although the assassination campaign has led to some mass resignations of local officials, the practice also fuels a cycle of retributive violence that would be difficult to stop even after regime change. Frontier interviews with members of military families and veterans indicate that the assassinations have in fact tethered some people more closely to the military. But for the NUG to exert more moral authority, it also needs to look inwards. Several of its members are from the National League for Democracy, whose time in government coincided with the military’s brutal “clearance operations” against the Rohingya in Rakhine State, in 2016 and 2017. While the constitution denied it any control over the armed forces, the NLD participated in the cover-up of the atrocities in Rakhine through an international campaign of denials. In what appeared as a momentous break from these policies, the NUG announced in June 2021 that it would restore citizenship to the Rohingya, welcome back the refugees in Bangladesh and seek justice for them. Meanwhile, some members of the parallel government, which recently appointed a deputy minister from the minority group, have declared a change of heart. However, they have stopped short of acknowledging their complicity in what happened in Rakhine. “In 2017, few of our people raised their voices against the military’s genocide of the Rohingya people. Past military regimes’ narratives about the Rohingya were deeply entrenched in society. The junta still rejects the very name Rohingya, but we have learned,” wrote the NUG Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Dr Win Myat Aye. From Win Myat Aye, these words are a deflection. As minister of social development, relief and resettlement in the NLD government, he accused the Rohingya of torching their own houses, despite overwhelming evidence that the military had done so, and oversaw the expropriation of the lands of those who fled to Bangladesh. In addition, it is disingenuous to claim that the military deceived the NLD and wider public about the Rohingya. Successive military regimes have indeed tried to scapegoat the Muslim minority, but the results of the 2015 and 2020 elections and the reaction to the 2021 coup show Myanmar society is hardly in thrall to military propaganda. If people believed the military’s lies about the Rohingya, it was because they were more than ready to do so. In any case, being hoodwinked by propaganda is not a valid excuse for complicity in crimes against humanity. If it were, those currently collaborating with the military regime could make the same argument. Although a standout example, the events in Rakhine are one chapter in a more than seven-decade history of conflict across Myanmar, and justice is key to any attempt to break the cycle of violence. Overthrowing the military alone will not achieve this aim. There are no easy formulas, but for real justice to be made, no victims can be forgotten and careful distinctions must be made between degrees of culpability. Direct involvement in atrocities should be punished, but political affiliation by itself should not be. And perhaps above all, a full reckoning over past crimes is required to build a new Myanmar..."
Source/publisher: "Frontier Myanmar"
Date of publication: 2023-07-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-20
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Title: Aung San Suu Kyi's son calls on governments to impose 'tougher sanctions' on Myanmar
Sub-title: Kim Aris has spoken to Sky News as a civil war rages in the country two years after his mother was removed as leader in a military coup.
Description: "International governments should impose "tougher sanctions" on Myanmar and restrict its military from accessing aviation fuel, the son of the country's ousted leader has said. Kim Aris' mother Aung San Suu Kyi was the head of Myanmar's government before she was arrested during a military coup in the country in 2021. He has spoken to Sky News after chief correspondent Stuart Ramsay and his team went undercover deep in the jungle in Myanmar to report on the civil war which has been raging in the country since the coup. They spent a month in Myanmar with resistance fighters, medics and volunteers who are fighting a war the military regime claims isn't happening. Asked why international governments are not speaking about the war in Myanmar as much as people in the country would hope, Mr Aris said: "Unfortunately, I think it's kind of an indication of the disinterest of people in what's going on on the other side of the world... Until people themselves start to get involved, the governments aren't likely to do anything." He added that governments have "condemned what's happening" but now need to take more meaningful steps. Asked what measures those might be, Mr Aris said: "Tougher sanctions would help, and making sure the military are restricted or completely cut off from aviation fuel and those kinds of things. "This would help immensely. "And just being able to get aid to the people who need it. At the moment, the military are cutting off all aid to everybody." Advertisement Mr Aris's call to restrict Myanmar's access to aviation fuel comes as the military is using fighter jets to bomb targets during the civil war. He cited a report from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights which says China and Russia are the main suppliers of advanced weapons to Myanmar's military. 'No concrete news of Suu Kyi's whereabouts' Mr Aris grew up in the UK with his mother in the early years of his life and remained in Britain when she returned to Myanmar as a political figure who promoted democracy and human rights. He told Sky News the last time he spoke to his mother was before her government was overthrown more than two years ago. Mr Aris continued: "Yes. I haven't really received any concrete news about her whereabouts and I haven't had any communication with her since before the coup. "So despite my requests for official channels, I haven't received any response. "It is hard, but I'm kind of used to it, having lived with this most of my life." Myanmar's military rulers repeatedly imprisoned Suu Kyi under house arrest between 1989 and 2010 as they viewed her as someone undermining the peace and stability of the country. However, following her release from house arrest for the final time she became state counsellor, the title for the de facto leader equivalent to a prime minister, in 2016. Suu Kyi and other democratically elected leaders led a democratic experiment in the country before it was crushed by the military coup in 2021. Their government was overthrown and she was arrested alongside others..."
Source/publisher: "Sky News" (London)
Date of publication: 2023-07-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: British government cuts aid to Burma by 70% since coup
Description: "British aid to Burma has been cut by 51% this financial year, and by 70% since the financial year 2020-2021, according to newly published Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office accounts. This comes during a time when Burma is suffering its worst human rights and humanitarian crisis ever, after the attempted military coup on 1 February 2021. “Foreign Secretary James Cleverly is cutting aid to Burma at a time when more people than ever are in desperate need of assistance,” said Anna Roberts, Executive Director at Burma Campaign UK. “Aid to Burma should be increased, not cut, and more aid needs to go to local civil society so British aid reaches people in areas not under Burmese military control.” British aid to Burma has been cut from £61.9 million last year, to £30.1 million in this financial year. Previous government records show that the aid to Burma in 2020 was just over £103 million. This means that aid has been cut by 70% from 2020 to 2023-2024. These cuts in aid to Burma come after the government’s 82% cuts in aid to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, who fled genocide in Burma. The British government has previously tried to disguise the overall cuts in aid to Burma by highlighting statistics for humanitarian aid, rather than overall aid to Burma. Funding for any development aid programmes discontinued after the attempted coup began should have been reallocated towards the dramatic increase in humanitarian needs but was not. Even before the coup Burma Campaign UK had been campaigning for a higher proportion of UK aid to be spent on the humanitarian emergencies in the country. In 2018 DFID was spending three times as much on economic development and governance as on humanitarian aid. The humanitarian crisis in Burma has been created as the Burmese military desperately tries to consolidate an attempted coup in February 2021. It has met unprecedented resistance and is losing control of parts of the country. In response, it has launched indiscriminate attacks using airstrikes and long-range artillery. The British government has so far failed to sanction supplies of aviation fuel to Burma, despite five British companies, UK P&I, Steamship Mutual, Britannia P&I, North Standard and Shipowners’ Club, being involved in the supply chain of aviation fuel deliveries. Without aviation fuel, the jets can’t fly and if they can’t fly, they can’t bomb. The British government had previously led the implementation of sanctions on sources of revenue and arms but there have been no new sanctions in almost four months and major sources of revenue, such as gas, state-owned banks and rare earth minerals have yet to be sanctioned. The slow plodding pace of sanctions has meant the military has been able to generate revenue to fund arms purchases. The EU has sanctioned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise and the US has sanctioned state-owned banks. It is not just the cuts in aid to Burma which are alarming, but also the way in which aid is given. Most of the people forced to flee attacks by the Burmese military are in areas not under the control of the military and where UN and other agencies don’t operate. For most, the only way to reach them is through local civil society organisations, but the British government and other donors provide relatively little aid to them, and apply so many conditions and so much bureaucracy and red tape that local organisations can’t access funds. “James Cleverly is moving too slowly to cut off sources of revenue and weapons to the Burmese military and is now cutting aid to the people attacked by those weapons,” said Anna Roberts. “Arguing that the British government has also cut life-saving aid to other countries is not a defence justifying these cuts, it’s a disgrace.”..."
Source/publisher: "Burma Campaign UK" (London)
Date of publication: 2023-07-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-19
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Resistance and the Cost of the Coup in Chin State, Myanmar (March 2023)
Description: "Lead researcher: June Nilian Sang Contributors: Victor Biak Lian, Dan Seng Lawn, Adam Burke, Tabea Campbell Pauli, Nathan Shea, Rebecca Crisp Design: Deddeaw Laosinchai Executive Summary The violent crackdowns that followed the Myanmar military’s coup d’état in February 2021 led many civilians in Chin State, a region in the west which borders India and Bangladesh, to take up weapons and defend themselves. Suffering high numbers of arbitrary attacks on civilians, Chin State has seen hundreds of deaths and tens of thousands of individuals displaced in the past two years. Conflict continues as local groups resist the Myanmar military in the absence of any political solution or decisive military victory. Airstrikes and arson attacks by Myanmar forces have led to the destruction of thousands of civilian homes, religious and community buildings, and crops and livestock. The United Nations estimates that up to 54,000 people have been displaced within Chin State since 1 February 2021, and over 50,000 people have fled across the Indian border. Civilians in Chin State, both in military-controlled areas and territory ‘liberated’ by ethnic armed or resistance groups, lack proper access to food, education, health, and livelihoods services, further increasing the number of fatalities. Women, children, elderly people, and people with disabilities are particularly vulnerable. Political and geographic challenges have stymied a coordinated humanitarian response. Displacement of civilians is likely to continue in the medium term, including across the Indian border into Mizoram and Manipur. Direct access for international humanitarian actors has been severely limited. Local authorities and communities on the Indian side of the border, which share historical and kinship ties with Chin people, have played a significant role in providing support on the ground. Nevertheless, long-term solutions for aid, livelihoods, and future security of Chin populations are absent, leaving many uncertain around their strategies for survival. This report provides an update on the situation facing many communities along the Myanmar/India border. The data and insights, collected in December 2022, reveal the evolving landscape of armed and political actors and the shifting balance of power within Chin State. It also spotlights the situation faced by thousands of Chin civilians displaced by violence, seeking refuge along the India-Myanmar border. Its key findings, underpinned by detailed contextual analysis, provide evidence for humanitarians and development policymakers seeking to improve support to conflict-affected populations..."
Source/publisher: The Asia Foundation
Date of publication: 2023-06-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-18
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Buddhist Kingship as a Source of Political Legitimacy in Times of Crisis in Myanmar
Description: "Despite the unerringly military nature of state control in Myanmar for decades, the junta has on several occasions — and especially in times of crisis — used ancient traditions and rituals of Buddhist kingship to legitimise its control, even endowing military officers with special religio-ritual characteristics. Niklas Foxeus tracks this phenomenon in its various contexts. In post-Independence Burma, starting from 4 January 1948, the model of Buddhist kingship to promote and defend Buddhism has repeatedly been employed as a source of political legitimacy, especially in times of uncertainty, contestation and instability. Although the circumstances have changed from one period to another, the ideology of Buddhist kingship has been a common denominator of political leaders of most governments: during the U Nu period (1948–62, with some hiatuses); the late Ne Win period (1962–88); the military dictatorship of SLORC–SPDC (1988–2011); and after the military coup of 1 February 2021, led by General Min Aung Hlaing. The model draws on the karmic path of Buddhism: improving karma through merit-making by giving alms and other donations to the sangha (monastic community); building or renovating pagodas, monasteries and the like, thereby enabling a rebirth in the heavenly world of the gods (nat-pyi) or as a wealthy human being in the next life (while those who commit misdeeds can be reborn in hell (nga-ye)), and so forth. In a more traditional understanding of society as mainly determined by karma from previous lives, everyone deserves his or her social position. The kings or — in a modern context, political leaders — have, similarly, earned the highest position in society due to their superior accumulation of karmic merit acquired in previous lives. Hpoun (‘power’ or ‘glory’) is obtained as a result of having a large store of karmic merit. As noted by Min Zin, hpoun is taken for granted and naturalised at most levels of Burmese society, from the family to the government; further, there are also certain signs of superior hpoun such as the ability to collect huge amounts of donations to host merit-making ceremonies on a grand scale; giving lavishly to monks; building imposing pagodas and monasteries, etc. Such acts will not only generate more favourable karmic merit but will also serve as a source of social prestige. A politically significant sign of such karmic power is being able to seize political power and maintaining it, or the appearance of white elephants as its embodiment (see below). This hpoun is therefore (as Min Zin points out) self-legitimating by its mere fact (certain signs or possession of power). What is needed is a public that will recognise its significance. As we will see, that may have changed in the contemporary period. Having committed misdeeds (especially military leaders), acts of merit-making are also performed to create a balance between the accumulation of merit and demerit. Many of the features above can be traced back to the so-called Asokan model of the Buddhist Indian King Asoka (r. 273–32 BC). There are thus three dimensions involved in, for instance, public performances by Buddhist leaders: display of karmic power (hpoun); generating karmic merit through Buddhist merit-making; social prestige. The performative spectacles of the military leaders have covered these three dimensions, with an emphasis on the first: to persuade the people of their possession of superior store of karmic merits from previous lives providing them with hpoun and a cosmic sanction to rule as a kind of Buddhist kings defending and promoting Burmese Buddhism and nation. * Shortly after independence, Burma was plunged into civil war with Karen and Communist insurgencies. At the same time, there were rumours, prophecies and expectations — from around the 1940s — that a righteous king would arrive who would protect and promote Buddhism. Moreover, there were also expectations that a Buddhist ‘world emperor’ (Burmese sekyā-watay-min; Pali cakkavattin) would appear, both figures, at times, seemingly fused in the popular imagination. The future king would inaugurate a prosperous era for Burma and Burmese Buddhism that would make it last for its prophesied remainder of about 2,500 years during the second half of the sasana era. In this unstable and tumultuous period, U Nu became prime minister and came to embody the expectations of a righteous Buddhist king who would promote Buddhism after a long hiatus of British colonial rule. Some regarded U Nu as a bodhisatta (a Buddha-to-be), like the Burmese kings, while others believed that he was the prophesised Buddhist world emperor. U Nu, however, combined this Buddhist imaginary with an essentially secular socialist ideology. Like a king in the Asokan model, he convened the so-called Sixth Buddhist Synod in 1954–56. He built pagodas, monasteries and even temples for the spirit-cults of the 37 Lords. As his Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) party won three elections (1952, 1956, and 1960), it was clear that his persistent appeal to traditional Buddhist sensibilities resonated with most of the Buddhist population. In the 1960 elections, he even promised to make Buddhism the state religion. In contrast to earlier periods, the military leaders of the SLORC–SPDC government, which seized power in a coup in 1988 following a popular uprising, portrayed themselves as inheritors of the Burmese Buddhist warrior kings that had united the country, of whom there were grand statues in the new capital Naypyidaw, the ‘Abode of Kings’ (in 2005): King Anawrahta (1044–77), King Bayinnaung (1551–81), and King Alaungpaya (1752–60). To appease popular opinion, the military junta promised to hold multi-party elections in May 1990. The National League for Democracy (NLD) and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide victory, but the military government refused to hand power to them. Later the same year, in August, monks organised a monastic boycott of the military. As it had annulled the Constitution of 1974, the military junta had no formal source of political legitimacy; it was essentially a military council ruling by decree. Without popular consent to rule, they began to focus more on Buddhist sources of legitimacy. They employed Buddhism as a kind of populist political legitimation strategy, and performed a ritual theatre in a performative manner to persuade the public about the notion that they are the rightful rulers of Burma/Myanmar, not merely defending the country and preventing its disintegration but also — like the historical Burmese kings — foremost in promoting and defending the Buddha’s dispensation (sasana), as well as Burman Buddhist cultural traditions and customs. In 1994, as noted by Juliane Schober, the military government borrowed a tooth relic from China and led a procession in royal style (with other rituals) in order to unify the divided public in their common interest of Buddhist merit-making. It was a performative spectacle in the emulation of pre-colonial royal Buddhist ceremonies that portrayed the generals as righteous rulers (dhammaraja) over the Buddhist realm. At this time, the military government repeatedly declared (in state-controlled media) that it had found white elephants. In traditional Buddhism, white elephants are seen as a cosmic confirmation of the hpoun of the ruler that confirms his political legitimacy and promises an era of abundant prosperity. It is one of the seven jewels of a Buddhist world emperor and thought to be able to bring rain and prosperity. There were also other cosmic signs that were meant to confer legitimacy on them. What people could not see on the ground in the economically mismanaged country at the time, they were thus assumed to see in such cosmological signs promising a prosperous future. Reportedly, it was General Than Shwe who first used white elephants as a source of political legitimacy since the monarchical period; nine white elephants were found during his rule. In one elephant stall, there is an inscription attributed to General Than Shwe saying: ‘White elephants are only found during the reign of a glorious king. It is an omen that augurs the country’s prosperity.’ * On 1 February 2021, General Min Aung Hlaing carried out a miliary coup in which the army seized power from the NLD, which had won a landslide victory in the general elections of November 2020. Although the military junta (titled the State Administration Council (SAC)) led by General Min Aung Hlaing claimed to seize power in accordance with the Constitution of 2008, it was, according to analysts, unconstitutional and illegal. Once again, Burma/Myanmar had a government ruling without popular consent. As during the former military junta rule, military leaders turned to Buddhism for political legitimacy. During the demonstrations that broke out following the coup throughout major parts of the country, initially led by a popular movement called the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), General Min Aung Hlaing seemed to focus on Buddhist matters, namely finishing what he claimed to be the largest seated Buddha statue in the world, a project he began before the coup. In the months following the coup, while the streets were filled by demonstrators and clashes occurred between them and the police and the military, Min Aung Hlaing held several ceremonies and organised events to which monks were invited where they discussed the project devoted to his seated Buddha statue. Like his predecessors, Min Aung Hlaing made lavish donations to the monks and the Sangha; he performed — like military rulers of SLORC-SPDC — various magical rituals (yadaya-khye) intended to ward off dangers and mishaps predicted by astrologers and to help to maintain his power; and a white elephant was found that would confirm his hpoun. According to Ingrid Jordt, some/many Burmese people during the SLORC–SPDC period (1988–2011) were persuaded by some of the Buddhist cosmological implications of the performances and events during military governments confirming their hpoun and right to rule. However, the younger Generation Z seems to be more secular, or have at least adopted more secular attitudes demanding religion be separated from politics, including monks supporting their own cause. Moreover, they have mocked and ridiculed the generals and military rule by using humour, thereby rejecting their pretentions of legitimate claims to power. After the coup, the monk Sitagu Hsayadaw, formerly held in great respect by the people, became a kind of chief monastic advisor to Min Aung Hlaing, thereby providing him with legitimacy. As a result, his reputation has been tarnished and he has come to be despised by people belonging to the Opposition. He is criticised and ridiculed on social media. This public criticism of a famous monk is a significant change in comparison to earlier times. An important difference between U Nu and the military dictatorships is that he won elections and enjoyed popular support among the people. He did not portray himself as a warrior king but mainly as a pious Buddhist layman who sought to implement Buddhist principles in society as a kind of panacea for social, political, and economic problems — like disseminating loving-kindness to all living beings; avoiding killing living beings by the prohibition of using pesticides by farmers; and trying to refrain from using violence against insurgents. By contrast, the military seized power, and most people were/are opposed to their rule. In the absence of popular consent, they turned to Buddhism as a kind of populist political legitimation strategy and performed a ritual theatre in a performative manner to persuade the public about the notion that they are the rightful rulers of Burma/Myanmar. Their sincerity has — among Western observers and some Burmese people — therefore often been doubted, that is, that they are using religion instrumentally in a cynical manner. However, it is likely that they are more convinced than anyone else of the efficacy of their own rituals and the significance of various perceived signs of their greatness. Military leaders have turned to astrologers and cult leaders for various forms of divination and power-strengthening rituals (yadaya-khye). Min Aung Hlaing even claimed that his white elephant is superior to those of the generals of the former military junta; and maintained that his ruby — a symbol of royalty — is larger and of better quality than theirs, etc. The seated Buddha statue he is currently sponsoring will, he has claimed, be the largest one in the world. In this way, he seems to say that he is even more fit to be a righteous Buddhist ruler than the previous generals, because the cosmic signs are more persuasive. Yet, Min Aung Hlaing seems to enjoy less respect among the public than his predecessors. The public mockery of him reached unforeseen levels in the months following the coup in February 2021. Demonstrators carried portraits of him hanging from the gallows; photographs of him were strewn on the streets so that not only would the demonstrators trample on them but also soldiers and police, a very disrespectful act; slippers were seemingly sold with his portrait underneath them; and even toilet paper with his portrait was sold. On cartoons, he has been sometimes depicted as a short man wearing women’s high-heeled shoes that would make him taller. All these actions were a kind of popular mocking counter-discourse to any claim he could make to legitimate political power. Generation Z may be less likely to be persuaded by the public performances of Buddhist kingship and related cosmic sanctions than previous generations, probably a sign of the social and ideological transformations the country has undergone, especially in urban areas during the 10-year (2011–2021) experiment in democracy. * The views expressed here are those of the author and not of the ‘South Asia at LSE’ blog, the LSE South Asia Centre or the London School of Economics and Political Science. Please click here for our Comments Policy. This blogpost may not be reposted by anyone without prior written consent of LSE South Asia Centre; please e-mail [email protected] for permission. Banner image © Katsuma Tanaka, Bagan, Myanmar, 2021, Unsplash. The ‘Myanmar @ 75’ logo is copyrighted by the LSE South Asia Centre, and may not be used by anyone for any purpose. It shows the national flower of Myanmar, Padauk (Pterocarpus macrocarpus), framed in a design adapted from Burmese ikat textile weaves. The logo has been designed by Oroon Das..."
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Source/publisher: London School of Economics and Political Science
Date of publication: 2023-07-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-17
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The Myanmar Crisis continues to raise questions on ASEAN unity and centrality
Sub-title: The Thailand caretaker government’s decision to engage with the military junta in Myanmar has threatened ASEAN unity
Description: "The outgoing caretaker government of Thailand hailed the Thailand-led informal meetings to engage Myanmar—joined by representatives of a few members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and neighbouring countries, namely Laos, Cambodia, India, China, Brunei, and Vietnam, as well as Myanmar—on 19 June as successful, amidst growing criticisms from several quarters. Only Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar had sent their Foreign Ministers for this meeting. The invitation sent from Thailand read, “ASEAN should fully reengage with Myanmar at the leaders’ level.” The Thai Foreign Ministry statement read, “informal dialogue would not amount to a formal ASEAN meeting, the ministry said, but would help support ASEAN’s efforts to end the violence in Myanmar.” The talks held in Pattaya were boycotted by significant regional countries such as Indonesia (the current ASEAN chair), Singapore, and Malaysia, leading to seeming divisions within the bloc. Indonesia cited the lack of consensus among ASEAN members to engage with the regime leaders, while Singapore deemed it premature to engage with the junta at the summit level. The meeting received condemnation from Myanmar’s parallel civilian government, the National Unity Government, and over 300 civil society organisations and regional lawmakers. They viewed it as a clear violation of ASEAN’s consensus agreement to exclude junta representatives from high-level meetings. The meeting received condemnation from Myanmar’s parallel civilian government, the National Unity Government, and over 300 civil society organisations and regional lawmakers. Thailand’s decision to take the lead in organising these meetings signifies the caretaker government’s intent not to rely solely on the incoming government (that may change the current military policy towards Myanmar and align it with countries that support democracy) and ASEAN to address Myanmar-related issues. Thailand’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Don Pramudwinai, justified this choice by emphasising the belief that efforts to tackle the crisis within Myanmar should be smooth, given they share one of the longest borders of around 2,416 km. The organisation of these talks aims to prioritise Thailand’s best interests, particularly considering the direct impact of the issue on the borders, trade, refugee conditions, and overall business activities. Thailand’s bilateral approach towards Myanmar diverges from the position adopted by ASEAN. In November 2021, Thailand’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister publicly announced his visit to Myanmar, where he met with Min Aung Hlaing, the coup’s leader. On 22 December 2022, Thailand took the initiative to arrange a meeting with representatives from mainland Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Another meeting involving stakeholders from Thailand and Myanmar occurred in April 2023. Notably, both of these later meetings included the participation of ministers from Myanmar’s military government, the State Administration Council (SAC). These engagements contradict the ASEAN Five Point Consensus (5PC), which ASEAN member states agreed upon in April 2021. These actions by Thailand reflect its interests, concerns, and historical approach to its mainland neighbours to sort its bilateral position. Thailand’s rationale for engaging with Myanmar Thailand considers itself the most impacted ASEAN member state regarding the situation in Myanmar. According to reports, Thailand hosts more than 20,000 displaced people and illegal migrants from Myanmar. Similar to other Southeast Asian nations, Thailand has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, which means it does not have provisions to recognise or protect refugees according to international standards legally. Furthermore, Thailand heavily depends on importing oil and primarily gas from the Yadana field located in the Andaman Sea off the coast of Myanmar. Following the 2021 coup, Thailand’s state-owned oil and gas company, PTT Exploration and Production, actively acquired the investments Chevron and Total divested from Myanmar. The caretaker government of Thailand’s decision to host the foreign minister of the Myanmarese ruling junta for an ‘informal regional peace talk’ not only drew criticism but is said to again bring to the fore the internal divisions within the ASEAN bloc. Thailand’s reliance on Myanmar extends to the labour sector, with a significant dependence on both formal and informal workers from Myanmar in various industries, including agriculture and fisheries, construction and manufacturing, and the service sector. In 2021, Thailand stood as Myanmar’s largest trading partner, and Thai businesses have a substantial presence in Myanmar, particularly in the food and beverage and pharmaceutical sectors. However, since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, border trade between Myanmar and Thailand has significantly declined due to the junta’s restrictions to prevent weapons from reaching resistance forces. According to Myanmar’s Ministry of Commerce, under the military generals, border trade has decreased from over US$4 billion in the 2019-2020 financial year to US$3.6 billion in the 2022-2023 financial year. Ongoing border conflicts frequently delay trade, while high taxes burden traders. For nearly two years, Myanmar’s military generals have been barred from senior-level meetings of the ASEAN for not living up to the agreement to start talks with the ousted civilian government led by now-jailed Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Therefore, the caretaker government of Thailand’s decision to host the foreign minister of the Myanmarese ruling junta for an ‘informal regional peace talk’ not only drew criticism but is said to again bring to the fore the internal divisions within the ASEAN bloc. Critics have pointed out “it risks legitimising Myanmar’s military government and is inappropriate because it is outside the official ASEAN peace initiative, known as the five-point consensus.” But the question is, does it really present ASEAN as a fractured and divided organisation in this scenario? Even though most countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore did not agree to participate in this gathering, the reason cited for not doing so was the same. All these countries wanted to stick to the decision taken at the ASEAN meetings of not engaging with the top leaders of the junta until the conditions laid down by the ASEAN are met, like the junta open to engaging with the civilian opposition government, scaling down the ongoing violence, among others. Problems with the 5PC The lack of progress of the five-point consensus (5PC) signed in an emergency meeting held in Jakarta in April 2021, two months after the coup, has led many to say that there is a need for the ASEAN to now look beyond the 5PC, but does that give Thailand (a fellow ASEAN member country) the pass for hosting these informal meetings and inviting the top officials like the Foreign Minister of the junta regime? This brings into question the unity and credibility of the ASEAN. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, professor of political science at Chulalongkorn University, has pointed out, “By riding roughshod over Indonesia’s leadership, Thailand is also undermining the ways that ASEAN works and the role of its chair.” Regardless of the fact (stated in the previous section) that Thailand appears to be the most affected country by the ongoing crises in Myanmar, given that Thailand itself is on the cusp of undergoing a change in government, with the new government (if it comes to power) having stated that they will be committed to the ASEAN’s 5PC, this move to engage with the military junta in Myanmar seems like a desperate attempt by the caretaker government to try and earn one last feather in its cap. Scholars like Zachary Abuza at the National War College in Washington, D.C., have stated, “Thailand’s caretaker government seems determined to continue advancing the political and economic interests of the Thai military and royalist elites.” Countries like Indonesia and Singapore will hardly ever endorse such meetings because ASEAN forms the main nucleus of their foreign policy outlooks. This year’s ASEAN chair, Indonesia, already has a lot on its plate, like the ASEAN community-building project, tensions in the South China Sea, the impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war, the growing United States-China rivalry, promoting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and the planned accession of Timor Leste as ASEAN’s 11th member this year. But according to statements from the Indonesia Foreign Ministry, it is still “undertaking efforts with the office of the ASEAN special envoy to Myanmar to achieve an inclusive dialogue with all parties in the conflict.” While it cannot be denied that the ASEAN mechanisms like the 5PC and the various summits and meetings about the Myanmar crisis have not come out with any substantive progress, it also does not seem plausible for individual member countries to organise such informal meetings by completely side-tracking the ASEAN platform. Countries like Indonesia and Singapore will hardly ever endorse such meetings because ASEAN forms the main nucleus of their foreign policy outlooks. If not all ASEAN countries are on board with such arrangements, that again raises a finger on the whole notion of unity within the ASEAN. At a time when ASEAN centrality is being championed in the debates centring on the evolving dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, and there are constant efforts by countries like Indonesia and Singapore to ensure that the ASEAN remains relevant amidst the mushrooming of the many mini-laterals and plurilaterals in the region, these ‘informal secretive meetings’ will only feed into the ongoing narrative of the ‘fading of the ASEAN unity’. Critics of the ASEAN 5PC have said that alternate plans and drastic measures should be taken, like suspending Myanmar’s membership in the ASEAN or letting the United Nations deal with this issue. These measures seem overly severe, but if the ASEAN wants to implement any of these, the decision needs to be taken following the ASEAN way and the platform of the ASEAN itself to ensure the credibility of the ‘ASEAN centrality’ principle..."
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Source/publisher: Observer Research Foundation
Date of publication: 2023-07-15
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-15
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Human Rights Situation weekly update (January to July, 2023) [EN/MY]
Description: "Human Rights Violations Committed by Military Junta from January to June, 2023. Military Junta troops Committed 1222 times of Human Right Violations in 15 Regions and States within 6 months from January to June 2023. According to Social Media and News Media, they committed 30 types of Human Right Violations. Among those Human Right Violations, the Military Junta attacked with heavy artillery 292 times to the Civilians and their places the most. As a second, the Military troops burnt and destroyed the civilians’ houses and properties 281 times. Third, they arrested the Anti- Military activists who protested in various ways 259 times. The Military Junta Troop is targeting and attacking Civilians entire country and also destroying the Civilians’ houses and buildings by launching airstrikes 128 times. As the worst Human Right Violations, the Military committed massacres by launching airstrikes and dropping bombs on over 100 civilians including children, and all died at Bazigyi Village in Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region on April 11th in 2023. Military Junta committed rape and kill over 8 women and a total of 12 women died within 6 months. 2 civilians from Yangon Region and 6 from Mandalay Region, a total of 8 were arrested and killed by the Thwaythout Force that works under Military Junta. They committed arresting the civilians, burning the people, raping the women, and using the locals as human shields along their matching area. Civilians fled to the safety of the Military 180 times within 6 months. The Military Junta troop has been still committing Human Right Violations in various ways since the coup on 1st February 2021..."
Source/publisher: Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of publication: 2023-07-14
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar’s Pro-Democracy Camp Faults Secret Meeting With Aung San Suu Kyi
Description: "The National Unity Government of Myanmar, led by opponents of the ruling junta, has criticized a recent meeting between Thailand's top diplomat and Aung San Suu Kyi, saying that it may complicate ASEAN's efforts to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. Thailand's foreign minister, Don Pramudwinai, has revealed that he met with the ousted Myanmar leader on July 9, and that she expressed her willingness to discuss with him further the issues in her war-torn country. Zin Mar Aung, the foreign minister of the NUG, expressed her disapproval, saying the Thai minister's actions were an attempt to parallel ASEAN's role in resolving the crisis. She said the Thai official's move calls into question the existing arrangement in which Western powers and the U.N. Security Council have pushed for ASEAN to play a central role in resolving the conflict, which has escalated since a military coup in February 2021. Five-point proposal Indonesia’s foreign minister, whose country is the current chair of ASEAN, stated at an annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers this week in Jakarta that ASEAN would continue to prioritize its five-point peace proposal. The proposal, developed in 2021, calls for a cessation of violence and brokered dialogue between the parties. The junta has faced widespread criticism for failing to implement its terms. Thailand's foreign minister is the only international official who has been granted access to Suu Kyi since the coup. He assured ASEAN officials at the meeting in Jakarta that Suu Kyi was in good health. In a statement released Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on Myanmar’s military regime to “implement ASEAN’S five-point consensus” and to “support a return to democratic governance.” For more perspectives and insights, VOA conducted an interview with the NUG's Zin Mar Aung, via Zoom, on Thursday. This interview has been edited for length and clarity. VOA: Did Thailand's foreign minister discuss his secret trip to Myanmar with the NUG? According to multiple media outlets, he briefed his ASEAN colleagues about his meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi on Sunday in Myanmar during the bloc's foreign ministers' meeting in Jakarta. Has the NUG approached him directly about these matters? Zin Mar Aung, NUG foreign minister: No. We didn’t receive any direct communication from the Thai foreign minister regarding his meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi. The NUG has attempted to contact both the foreign minister and the Thai special envoy on Myanmar, but have received absolutely no response. We have often attempted diplomatic communication with Thailand's foreign minister on issues such as Myanmar's refugee crisis and the arrest and detention of migrant workers. The Thai foreign ministry has yet to respond to the NUG officially on any of these issues but continues to communicate with the junta regularly. VOA: According to Japan’s Kyodo News, Aung San Suu Kyi told the minister that she supports "dialogue without any preconditions" to address her country's ongoing issues. What is NUG's opinion on this? Zin Mar Aung: The first thing I'd want to point out is that the Thai foreign minister's comments about conveying Aung San Suu Kyi's views are inherently one-sided. She is a political prisoner with no freedom to communicate with the outside world. There were only two people at the meeting, so we have to take only his word for what was said. That is why we are skeptical that the Thai foreign minister or the junta would accurately convey messages from her that don’t fit their agenda. VOA: How does this meeting affect the NUG? Zin Mar Aung: The main issue is, due to the Thai foreign minister's visit, both ASEAN and the international community have become more confused when dealing with the Myanmar issue. Thailand stated that because it is Myanmar's ASEAN neighbor, it bears greater responsibility for the Myanmar issue. However, they actually try to go around the five-point consensus, rather than helping to implement it. Thailand's parallel track, outside of official channels, violates the ASEAN common agreement. Western countries and Myanmar's neighbors, such as India and China, have pushed for ASEAN centrality in resolving Myanmar's problems. NUG also have criticisms of the ASEAN, and we feel that ASEAN alone is no longer enough; however, the Thai foreign minister’s actions only serve to weaken it further. VOA: Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, while attending the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, stated that he would focus on attempting to end the crisis in Myanmar. However, there is also focus on the South China Sea dispute between China and ASEAN countries. So, do you think the U.S. is effectively putting pressure on ASEAN on the Myanmar issue? Zin Mar Aung: I must respond that it is ineffective. In the case of Myanmar, there is an ASEAN centrality policy that states that only ASEAN should take the lead in addressing the issue. It arose because powerful countries do not want to conflict with one another on the Myanmar issue. They went to ASEAN to avoid their conflicts. The Myanmar issue is simply one of several for world powers and ASEAN members. There are also regional issues, such as the South China Sea problem. There are also Indo-Pacific concerns to consider. For the U.S., Myanmar is simply a small component of their overall strategy; similarly, exerting pressure on ASEAN is only a small element of their overall strategy. As a result, the United States cannot exert significant pressure on ASEAN..."
Source/publisher: "Voice of America" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication: 2023-07-14
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-14
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict 2022
Description: "OVERVIEW: The Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC) identified 271 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Myanmar in 2022, a decrease from 474 in 2021. In these incidents, 112 health workers were arrested and 27 were killed, undermining health care providers’ ability to maintain safe staffing levels to effectively meet patient needs. In addition, health facilities were damaged or destroyed on at least 46 occasions and raided 32 times, impacting the population’s access to health care. A total of 103 incidents were related to the ongoing political protests following the February 2021 military coup. The remaining 168 occurred in the context of armed conflicts that erupted before and after the coup. This factsheet is based on the dataset 2022 SHCC Health Care Myanmar Data, which is available for download on the Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX)..."
Source/publisher: Insecurity Insight, Safeguarding Health in Conflict
Date of publication: 2023-07-12
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-12
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ETC Singapore’s Myanmar divestment raises more questions for Singapore
Description: "The Singapore Exchange-listed company Emerging Towns & Cities Singapore (ETC) has announced an agreement to sell its controlling stake in the Golden City real estate development, built on land leased from the Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Army), Office of the Quartermaster General. The deal involves the sale of the ETC Singapore subsidiary DAS, which owns 70% of the Singapore company Uni Global Power. Uni Global Power own 70% of the Myanmar company Golden Land Real Estate Development, which is the developer of the Golden City project. The buyer is Grand Ally Pte Ltd, a private Singapore company set up in February 2023 and owned by key members of ETC who manage the Golden City project. Grand Ally is controlled by Li Bo, a Chinese citizen who is the Vice President of Sales and Marketing for ETC, and the company’s regional sales and marketing director for Myanmar. The other shareholder/directors are Lai Xuejun and Zhang Xiaoping, who are also Chinese citizens. ETC sold its stake in Golden City for S$4 million, which involved a loss of S$80.2 million, according to the company’s announcement. The fact that ETC’s sale involves related parties creates risks that the company may still maintain links to the Myanmar military through its personnel and shareholders. Justice For Myanmar asked ETC if Li Bo, Lai Xuejun and Zhang Xiaoping will continue to have a role and hold shares in ETC after completion of the sale but did not receive a response. As Grand Ally is registered in Singapore, Singapore will continue to be exposed to Golden City’s business with the Myanmar military, which is committing ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity with total impunity. Through its campaign of terror against the people, the Myanmar military junta has so far murdered over 3,700, arbitrarily arrested more than 23,700, committed indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, torture, sexual violence and displaced at least 1.5 million since the coup attempt in 2021. Justice For Myanmar urges Singapore Exchange Regulation to scrutinise ETC’s divestment to ensure that SGX has no further direct or indirect exposure to business with the Myanmar military. We urge Singapore to deregister Grand Ally Pte Ltd and to impose sanctions on the junta and its business interests. Singapore banks should ensure that they do not hold accounts for Grand Ally or support the Golden City project in any way. Governments should impose sanctions on Grand Ally Investments, its Myanmar partner, Jewellery Luck Group of Companies, and their owners and directors. Jewellery Luck Group of Companies owns 30% of Golden Land Real Estate Development through its subsidiary, Nature Link Company Limited. Under the sale, ETC will discharge itself from a loan facility between Golden Land Real Estate and the international banks ICBC, E.SUN, and the Myanmar crony bank, Kanbawza, which will continue to be exposed to the financing of the Myanmar military through the Golden City project. All banks should end their business with the Myanmar military and its associates. ETC’s road to divestment The sale comes after a February 25, 2021, Justice For Myanmar report into ETC’s payments to the Myanmar army and the implications for Singapore Exchange, which found that payments to the army included a US$6.8 million “land use premium” and annual payments of US$2.8 million. The deal is under a build-operate-transfer contract, where the army receives the building as an asset at the end of the maximum 70-year term. Total payments to the army over the full 70 years would amount to US$191.1 million. In response to Justice For Myanmar’s report, Singapore Exchange Regulation took regulatory actions against ETC on February 26 2021 and the company suspended trading. To address questions from the SGX regulator, ETC commissioned independent reviews into payments to the Myanmar military and its legal compliance. The independent review of transactions, carried out by Nexia TS for the period from October 2016 to February 2021, identified two payments to the Office of the Quartermaster General in 2018 and one in 2020, totalling US$5.035 million. According to the summary of findings, payments to the army were communicated “verbally and there were no formal written invoices”. The review also found that annual payments to the army were made in MMK using a below market exchange rate of 830 MMK to the USD agreed to with the quartermaster general’s office, although the reviewers noted that there is “no formal written agreement or notification”. ETC had kept the balance as an accrued land lease premium. In October 2021, Justice For Myanmar and the Australian Centre for International Justice published a legal memo from international law experts Felicity Gerry KC, International Criminal Court counsel, and Daye Gang of the Victorian Bar in Australia, which found that international law and guidance places due diligence obligations on the Singapore Exchange and possible liability on the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Singapore Government for companies doing business with the Myanmar military. The legal memo found that Singapore has an international legal obligation “to investigate, prevent and cease transactions that amount to wrongful acts”, which are applicable to business transactions with the Myanmar military and its business interests, and that legal remedies would be “easily pursued and enforced” against SGX if the Myanmar military’s financial organs are found to be in breach of international laws and/or compliance regulations including international human rights and humanitarian law. In December 2022, ETC released an executive summary of its legal compliance review, after a follow-on engagement was commissioned to respond to the October 2021 legal memo following questions from Singapore Exchange Regulation. The review, conducted by Kelvin Chia Partnership, outlined steps for ETC to avoid being caught by unilateral sanctions, such as by avoiding company personnel who are US, UK or EU citizens; to pay the Myanmar military in kyat; to avoid business in the US, UK or EU; and to use third-party contractors in Golden City for the installation of any machinery from the US, UK or EU. ETC’s latest annual report shows a “partial payment” of 2.33 billion kyat (S$1.68 million) to the Myanmar army in 2022, which deepened ETC’s complicity in the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “ETC is a longstanding business partner of the Myanmar military that is complicit in the junta’s genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. “ETC’s divestment was necessary but raises further questions that we urge Singapore authorities to address, including whether SGX will remain exposed to the Golden City project, and the fact that a private Singapore company will continue to bankroll the murderous junta. “We are heartened that Singapore Exchange Regulation has taken swift action against ETC over its business with the Myanmar military, and to issue sanctions guidance that strengthens the impact of Myanmar sanctions for SGX-listed companies. “It is a positive sign that Singapore authorities are investigating companies for possible links to the supply of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military, but Singapore needs to do far more to respond to the crisis in Myanmar and to prevent the Singapore companies from providing funds to the junta, including through imposing sanctions as it has done on Russia. “Governments must now sanction Grand Ally and its owners, who, together with Jewellery Luck Group of Companies, have chosen to continue to pursue business with the Myanmar army and finance its atrocities.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-07-11
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-11
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Press Statement on the Official Visit of Foreign Minister H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
Description: "The delegation led by H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung, Foreign Minister of the National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar paid an official visit to Timor-Leste (East Timor) at the official invitation of the President of Timor-Leste from 1st to 5th July 2023. The purpose of the visit was to enhance relationships with countries in the region, build stronger and closer ties with neighboring countries and promote the role of Myanmar in regional organizations. During the official visit, the delegation led by Union Minister engaged in meetings with relevant officials including the President, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The Delegation led by Union Minister attended the inauguration ceremony of the new government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste which was held on 1st July 2023. During the ceremony, Union Minister and the delegation had the opportunity to meet with Timor-Leste’s government leaders, regional leaders and other relevant officials. In his speech, the President of Timor-Leste acknowledged and conveyed his greetings to Foreign Minister H.E. Daw Zin Mar Aung and U Linn Thant, the Representative to the Czech Republic of the National Unity Government. On 3rd July, Union Minister and the delegation had a cordial meeting and engaged in a discussion with H.E. Mr Jose Ramos Horta at his office for an hour. During the meeting, Union Minister presented the President of Timor-Leste with a portrait of State Counsellor H.E. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as a token of remembrance. Following this, Union Minister and the delegation met with H.E. Ms Maria Fernanda Lay, the President of the National Parliament of Timor-Leste at her office. During the official visit to Timor-Leste, Union Minister and the delegation had a meeting with Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Bendito dos Santos Freitas at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Timor-Leste and held discussions with other relevant officials on 4th July. Union Minister and the delegation also met with H.E. Mr. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, Prime Minister of Timor-Leste at the Prime Minister’s Office in the morning of 5th July. As Timor-Leste is a country that emerged from the people’s revolution and its national leaders are also representatives of the people, during the meeting with Union Minister, they warmly welcomed the delegation, wholeheartedly supported the Myanmar people’s revolution and shared their own experiences. On 5th July, Union Minister and the delegation were bid farewell by the relevant officials of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Lester. The official visit of the delegation led by the Union Minister concluded successfully, encompassing discussions on political agreements, including bilateral cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the National Unity Government has consistently prioritized fostering cordial relations with neighboring countries and regional countries since its establishment. The Ministry remains committed to further strengthening relationships and promoting cooperation as its foremost objective..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication: 2023-07-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Urgent Statement: Extrajudicial Murders of Political Prisoners
Description: "On June 27, under the pretense of transferring them, the military removed political prisoners from Daik-U (Kyaiksakaw) Prison. 37 political prisoners have since gone missing. However, when concerned families of the political prisoners inquired at Daik-U Prison, the prison authorities repeatedly denied the whereabouts of these prisoners. On July 7, 2023, the Staff Officer of Daik-U Prison, Kyaw Zeya (A-3702) sent a signed letter to the family of Khant Linn Naing (aka Ko Khant, aka Let Wel), Prison Registration No. PaKha/22/00436, the son of Than Soe Naing, to inform them of his death. On July 8, Kyaw Zeya sent another signed letter to the family of Pyae Phyo Hein (aka Ko Pyae), Prison Registration No. DaU/22/00176, the son of Kyaw Oo, to inform them of his death. The letters stated that while transferring prisoners from Daik-U Prison to Insein Prison, a transport vehicle suffered an accident. Seizing the opportunity, the two of them (Khant Linn Naing and Pyae Phyo Hein) were alleged to have attempted escape. As a result, they were killed by the security forces who fired “warning shots” at them in an attempt to recapture. Despite the letters being dated as “June 29”, they arrived to the 2 families on only July 7 and July 8 respectively. However, in envelope provided to the wife of Pyae Phyo Hein, the letter inside the envelope was in fact addressed to Khin Moe Moe, the wife of the still missing Aung Myo Thu. According to this, there are clear grounds to believe the life of Aung Myo Thu is in danger. Prison transfers are but one of the excuses used, and according to events in recent months there are consistent reports of people being removed from prisons, being interrogated, and killed. On July 2, the family of political prisoner Sein Win was informed about his passing in Myingyan Prison that same day from gastrointestinal tract bleeding. However, prisoners inside the prison revealed that Sein Win had been removed from prison and interrogated. His family members also stated that bruises were found on his body from the time of his death. On June 7, Pyu Saw Htee militiamen went to the house of political prisoner Kaung Zarni Hein’s (aka La Pyae) mother and sister, and murdered them. Thereafter, on July 6, the junta forces killed political prisoners Kaung Zarni Hein and Kyaw Thura, according to reports from within the junta’s community. It is clear, these brazen murders of political prisoners in prisons violates not only domestic laws, but also international laws. Such killings mirror the unlawful and sadistic murders of the Jewish community by the fascist Nazi Germany during the World War II. Moreover, political prisoners removed from Daik-U Prison remain missing without a trace. It is currently unknown whether they are dead or alive. These actions overstep the procedures of prison, along with committing the heinous crime of unjust torture and illegal killings. This is also a blatant violation of the ASEAN Human Rights Convention. In Burma, the rule of law has been rendered void since the military junta coup by the supporting pillars of junta rule: the judges; soldiers; police; prison staff, who have intentionally perpetrated wrongful arrests, unlawful sentencings, illegal killings, torture and persecution of political prisoners in prisons, at the command of the junta. We, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, strongly condemn such unlawful killings and torture, we will do our best to ensure justice for all political prisoners who have been wrongfully imprisoned. All perpetrating parties must be held accountable for these acts. In addition to the above-mentioned crimes, the human rights violations, unlawful killings, and arbitrary torture that Burma experiences day after day are violations of international human rights law. These violations cannot be dealt with within the country’s judiciary at this time. Therefore, we strongly urge the international community to make a collective effort to take action through international judicial mechanisms. Since the unjust seizure of state power by the terrorist junta led by Min Aung Hlaing on February 1, 2021, there have been at least a total 3,757 people killed. 150 of them lost their lives in prison due to poor healthcare and ill-treatment, or tortured to death during interrogation. The numbers shown here were based on the data AAPP collected, the real number of fatalities could be higher..."
Source/publisher: Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Date of publication: 2023-07-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Widening Split Overshadows ASEAN’s Latest Push for Peace in Myanmar
Description: "The Myanmar crisis and implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ peace plan for the country’s post-coup conflict is set to dominate the ASEAN foreign ministers’ retreat on Wednesday (July 12). One notable absentee will be junta foreign minister Than Swe, who has not been invited despite Myanmar’s membership in the regional bloc. The junta leadership has been excluded from ASEAN meetings since late 2021 after they failed to honor the peace plan, known as the five-point consensus. ASEAN ministers joining the meeting are expected to express their frustration and concern over the conflict, with many showing signs of ‘Myanmar fatigue.’ But Myanmar’s neighbor Thailand will likely maintain its policy of appeasing the junta. Thai foreign minister Don Pramudwinai flew into Naypyitaw on Sunday to meet with the regime’s senior leadership. Details of the meeting are unknown. Don plans to attend this week’s foreign ministers’ retreat in Jakarta, where he will be able to update other ASEAN members on his talks in Myanmar. Patience is wearing thin with a peace process that has failed to gain traction, and ASEAN is under pressure to find a solution for Myanmar. Stubborn generals have been unable to control vast swaths of the country despite waging a brutal military campaign against both armed and peaceful opposition to their rule. The majority of Myanmar citizens continue to oppose the regime following the military takeover in February 2021. Current ASEAN chair Indonesia is taking a hardline stance against Myanmar’s military rulers for failing to implement the five-point consensus, especially the points related to ending violence, humanitarian assistance and jump-starting political dialogue. ASEAN leaders reached the consensus for Myanmar during an emergency summit in April 2021, two months after the military staged a coup against the democratically elected National League for Democracy government. But the Southeast Asian bloc has since been heavily criticized for its inaction in pressing ahead with the five-point plan. As chair, Jakarta has also held several meetings with Myanmar stakeholders including the country’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), its People’s Defense Force (PDF) armed wing and allied ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). “We have conducted 110 engagements, in the form of in-person meetings, virtual meetings, and phone calls, including my own face-to-face meetings with both the NUG and SAC [junta] foreign ministers on several occasions,” Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said. But observers say the peace process has made little if any progress, citing the junta’s ongoing atrocities including deadly airstrikes against civilians. At the same time, ASEAN has been under pressure from its dialogue partners, especially the US, which wants to see the cessation of all violence against the Myanmar people. Washington has also imposed sanctions on junta leaders and two state-owned banks that the regime uses for international transactions, including for buying arms. The purpose is to cripple the military regime’s ability to wage war against civilians and the resistance. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken will meet with his ASEAN colleagues at the Post Ministerial Conference on Friday (July 14). He will then join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), due on the same day, to discuss regional and international issues. Thailand’s concern with Myanmar crisis Thailand’s outgoing military-backed government stepped into the limelight on Myanmar again on Sunday when acting foreign minister Don Pramudwinai paid a secret visit to Naypyitaw prior to the retreat. In June, Thailand hosted highly criticized informal talks with Myanmar, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines, India and China to reengage with Myanmar’s military leaders. Outgoing Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha argued that direct talks were necessary to protect his country, as the crisis has a direct impact on Thailand which shares a 2,416-kilometer border with Myanmar. The meeting was, however, shunned by ASEAN chair Indonesia as well as Singapore and Malaysia, driving a rift between the regional bloc’s member states. Of ASEAN’s 10 members, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are not democracies while Thailand’s outgoing government first came to power in the same way as the current Myanmar junta, via a military coup. There is deep frustration among ASEAN members as the conflict in Myanmar drags on into its third year with no end in sight. The regime has rejected a peaceful settlement in favor of brutal suppression of opposition forces. Jakarta is frustrated but has so far maintained a fairly balanced policy of engaging with stakeholders on both sides in Myanmar. However, this could change when Laos takes over the chair next year. There is concern among ASEAN democracies that Laos may lift the ban on Myanmar junta leaders and allow them to rejoin regional meetings. This move would likely cause an even deeper split in ASEAN. So far, ASEAN has come up with no effective ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ for Myanmar. In May, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo somberly acknowledged to fellow Southeast Asian leaders that no progress had been made to end the civil strife gripping Myanmar and renewed his call for an end to violence. He spoke after yet another deadly regime airstrike on the civilian population. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim also voiced his frustrations, noting that about 200,000 people had fled to Malaysia to escape the tumult in Myanmar. Anwar called into question ASEAN’s rigid principle of non-intervention in its members’ internal affairs. “Yes, there is non-interference, but we will have to then have a new vision that could give us some flexibility in order to navigate and maneuver the way forward,” he said. So far, Myanmar’s military regime has successfully managed to hold two groups hostage – the people of Myanmar and ASEAN..."
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2023-07-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Title: နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး‌ ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်၏ တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံသို့ တရားဝင်ခရီးစဥ်သွားရောက်ခဲ့ခြင်းနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ သတင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description: "ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်ဦးဆောင်သည့် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့သည် တီမောလက်စတေး (အရှေ့တီမော) နိုင်ငံသမ္မတ၏ တရားဝင် ဖိတ်ကြားချက်အရ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှ ၅ ရက်နေ့အထိ တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံသို့ တရားဝင်ခရီးစဥ် သွားရောက်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဒေသတွင်း နိုင်ငံများနှင့် ဆက်ဆံရေး တိုးမြှင့်ရေး၊ အိမ်နီးချင်း နိုင်ငံများနှင့် ပိုမိုတိုးတက်ခိုင်မာသော ဆက်ဆံရေး တည်ဆောက်နိုင်ရေး၊ ဒေသတွင်း အဖွဲ့အစည်းများတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အခန်းကဏ္ဍ တိုးမြှင့်ဆောင်ရွက် နိုင်ရေးတို့အတွက် ရည်ရွယ်ကာ သွားရောက်ခဲ့ခြင်း ဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ခရီးစဥ်အတွင်း ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဦးဆောင်သည့် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့သည် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ၏ သမ္မတ၊ ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေး ဝန်ကြီးများ အပါအဝင် တာဝန်ရှိသူများနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးဦးဆောင်သည့် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့သည် ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျင်းပ ပြုလုပ်သည့် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ အစိုးရသစ် ကျမ်းသစ္စာကျိန်ဆိုပွဲသို့ တက်ရောက်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါ အခမ်းအနားတွင် ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးနှင့် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့သည် တီမောလက်စတေး အစိုးရ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ ဒေသတွင်းနိုင်ငံ ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ တာဝန်ရှိသူများနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံသမ္မတမှလည်း မိန့်ခွန်းပြောကြားရာ၌ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဒေါ်ဇင်မာအောင်၊ ချက်သမ္မတနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ ကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဦးလင်းသန့်တို့အား ၎င်း၏ မိန့်ခွန်းတွင် ထည့်သွင်းနှုတ်ဆက်သွားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးနှင့် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့သည် ဇူလိုင်လ ၃ ရက်နေ့တွင် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ သမ္မတ H.E. Mr José Ramos Horta နှင့် ၎င်း၏ ရုံးခန်း၌ တစ်နာရီကျော်ကြာ ရင်းရင်းနှီးနှီး တွေ့ဆုံ ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးက နိုင်ငံတော်အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်၏ ပုံတူပန်းချီကားကို တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ၊ သမ္မတထံသို့ အမှတ်တရလက်ဆောင် အဖြစ် ပေးအပ် ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့နောက် ဆက်လက်၍ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးနှင့် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့သည် တီမော လက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ၊ လွှတ်တော်ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ H.E. Ms Maria Fernanda Lay နှင့် လွတ်တော် ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ရုံးခန်းတွင် တွေ့ဆုံ ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ကြပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးနှင့် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့သည် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ တရားဝင်ခရီးစဥ် အတွင်းတွင် အစိုးရတာဝန်ရှိသူများနှင့် ဆက်လက် တွေ့ဆုံခဲ့ရာ ဇူလိုင်လ ၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီး H.E. Mr. Bendito dos Santos Freitas နှင့် တီမောလက်စတေး နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၌ လည်းကောင်း ၊ဇူလိုင်လ (၅) ရက် နံနက်ပိုင်းတွင် တီမော လက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ ဝန်ကြီးချုပ် H.E. Mr. Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão နှင့် ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်ရုံးခန်း၌ လည်းကောင်း၊ တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ပြီး အခြားသော သက်ဆိုင်ရာ တာဝန်ရှိသူများနှင့်လည်း တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံသည် လူထုတော်လှန်ရေးမှ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာသည့် နိုင်ငံတခုဖြစ်သကဲ့သို့၊ နိုင်ငံ့ ခေါင်းဆောင် များသည် လူထုတော်လှန်ရေးခေါင်းဆောင်များ ဖြစ်သည့် အားလျော်စွာ ပြည်ထောင်စု ဝန်ကြီးနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံရာတွင် မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ တော်လှန်ရေးကို လွန်စွာမှ အားပေးထောက်ခံကာ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့ကိုလည်း လှိုက်လှိုက် လှဲလှဲ ရင်းရင်းနှီးနှီး ကြိုဆိုဆက်ဆံခဲ့ ကြပြီး ၎င်းတို့၏ အတွေ့အကြုံများ ကိုလည်း မျှဝေခဲ့ပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးနှင့် အဖွဲ့သည် ဇူလိုင်လ ၅ ရက်နေ့တွင် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံမှ ပြန်လည် ထွက်ခွာလာခဲ့ရာ တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ တာဝန်ရှိသူများမှ ပြန်လည် ပို့ဆောင်နှုတ်ဆက်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး ဦးဆောင်သည့် တီမောလက်စတေးနိုင်ငံ တရားဝင်ခရီးစဥ်သည် အောင်မြင်စွာ ပြီးမြောက်ခဲ့ပြီး နှစ်နိုင်ငံဆက်လက်ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ရေးအပါအဝင်၊ နိုင်ငံရေးဆိုင်ရာ သဘော တူညီချက်များကို အောင်မြင်စွာ ဆွေးနွေး နိုင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနသည် ဒေသတွင်းနိုင်ငံများ၊ အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ချစ်ကြည်ရင်းနှီးရေးအတွက် ဝန်ကြီးဌာန စတင် ဖွဲ့စည်းတာဝန်ယူစဥ် ကာလကတည်းက အစဥ်အမြဲ ဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိနေပြီး ဆက်ဆံရေး ပိုမိုတိုးမြှင့် ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ရေးတို့ အတွက်လည်း ပထမဦးစားပေး အနေနှင့် ဆက်လက် ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication: 2023-07-10
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-10
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: New report names five French banks and a pension fund supporting Myanmar military junta
Description: "More than two years after the attempted military coup in Myanmar, and two years after financial institutions’ investments in Myanmar’s military cartel were first exposed in a Justice For Myanmar and BankTrack briefing, five major French banks and a pension fund continue to invest in twenty-two companies linked to the Myanmar military junta, a report published today by Info Birmanie, BankTrack and Justice for Myanmar found. The junta is accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. The report, which is endorsed by ALTSEAN-Burma, FIDH and Reporters without Borders, reveals that these investments by Crédit Agricole, La Banque Postale, the BPCE group, BNP Paribas, Société Générale and the Fonds de Réserve pour les Retraites (FRR) amount to over US$6 billion, 75% of which is in the fossil fuel sector. Investments were also made in companies that sell arms to the junta and in companies operating in the telecommunications sector that enables the junta’s surveillance. With US$4 billion, Crédit Agricole accounts for most of the investments. The companies in which these six financial institutions are shareholders have been divided into two categories: those with a direct and long-standing relationship with the Myanmar military or with companies controlled by the Myanmar military before the coup (category 1), and those with a direct business relationship with state-owned companies under military control following the coup of February 1, 2021 (category 2). The report highlights the connection of these investments to fueling widespread and systematic human rights violations in Myanmar, including the imprisonment of 70 journalists and other severe restrictions on press freedom. It reveals that Crédit Agricole is investing in India’s state-owned company Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) that has been implicated in the sale of military equipment to the Myanmar junta since the 2021 coup attempt. BEL is also a leading partner of the Thalès Group. The findings are published while France is preparing to welcome Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a guest of honour at the July 14th Bastille Day parade in Paris, as part of the celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the France-India partnership. French investments and the partnership between India and France in the field of defence should be rigorously scrutinised in the light of these findings, to prevent French institutions from helping to finance the flow of arms and technology to the junta. Crédit Agricole also invests in Sinotruk Hong Kong Ltd, a company scrutinised in a recent report from Tom Andrews, UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, for transferring equipment to the Military junta since the coup attempt. Crédit Agricole, Groupe BPCE, BNP Paribas, Banque Postale and Fonds de Réserve pour les retraites also hold shares in the Japanese company KDDI and its partner Sumitomo Corporation. These companies in the telecommunications sector continue to do business with the military junta through their joint operations with Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), supporting the junta’s surveillance capabilities. The report calls on the five banks and the pension fund to comply with their obligations under France’s 2017 Duty of Care Law and international standards on business and human rights. The report authors urge the financial institutions to divest immediately and responsibly from companies listed in category 1 and to sell their shares in category 2 companies if they do not cease their support for the junta. France must ensure that the Pension Reserve Fund does not invest in companies linked to the Myanmar military. The data published in the report highlights the need for France to give the Duty of Care Law its full practical scope with regard to companies in the financial sector and the importance of the negotiations underway at European level to adopt a directive on corporate due diligence. Several countries, including France, have been reported to lobby for a restricted scope of application for the text under negotiation, excluding the financial sector. Continued vigilance and scrutiny of the ongoing negotiations is needed until the final text includes the financial sector. Info Birmanie's coordinator highlights that "it is urgent to see Crédit Agricole divest from Indian arms manufacturer Bharat Electronics Limited, which Norges Bank Investment Management, a Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, in particular, divested from because of its arms sales to the Myanmar junta." Yadanar Maung, Justice For Myanmar spokesperson says: “It is unacceptable that French banks and a pension fund continue to invest in companies with known ties to the Myanmar military junta that is committing atrocity crimes against the people of Myanmar with impunity. These banks must act now to ensure they are in no way supporting the junta. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, we urge France to take a firm stance against the flow of arms to the junta, including from India, and push for a global arms embargo.” Henrieke Butijn, Climate campaigner & researcher at BankTrack adds : “It is outrageous that these banks have still not taken adequate action to assess and cut ties with companies linked to the Myanmar junta, even after their investments were exposed two years ago. That is two years in which the junta has been able to use the revenues from fossil fuels and the products from companies like Bharat Electronics to terrorise the population. By failing to act on their investments, these five French financiers are not only in breach of the OECD Guidelines and UNGPs, they are also betraying the people of Myanmar."..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-07-06
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-06
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Title: North Kalay Police Chief Han Thar Oo on Policing Under Myanmar’s National Unity Government
Description: "North Kalay Police Station at Kalay in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region was among the first police stations to be established by the anti-junta resistance forces and recognized by the National Unity Government (NUG) after the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar. Pa Ka Pha, the local defense force in the region, began work on setting up a police station following a decision by the NUG early in October 2021 to set up a People’s Police under the Civil Disobedience Movement. The police station that existed at north Kalay near Letpanchaung, which functioned under the government before the coup, had been abandoned by police personnel after Kalay erupted in massive protests against the junta. With the arrival of Han Thar Oo in early December 2021, the efforts of the Pa Ka Pha gathered momentum. Han Thar Oo, who hails from north Kalay, was a one-star police officer at Yangon when he decided to join the resistance movement after the coup. He is among the 2,937-odd police officers attached to the NUG — all of whom had joined the CDM after the coup. Resistance groups appointed him as head of the police in North Kalay and tasked him with establishing a system to check crime in the region. In May of last year, police forces and stations under the NUG received a boost after the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament), the legislative body of the NUG, enacted the People’s Police Force Law to regulate law enforcement in areas controlled by resistance forces. On January 24, I visited the North Kalay Police Station near Letpanchaung. Similar to other stations, it is rudimentarily equipped and has a lock-up for criminals. But it is also different in that it is prepared for an attack from the regime forces. There are trenches around the police station and landmines have been manufactured for planting where necessary. Locations have been identified for police personnel to take positions as a defensive measure against junta attacks. Here are excerpts from an interview with North Kalay Police Station chief Han Thar Oo. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Tell us about yourself. I was born in Kalay. I joined the police service in 2013 as a one-star officer. I received training in Shan State at the Police Training Center for six months. I was posted there for two years and then transferred to Yangon, where I served for around a year. Our duty was mainly to patrol some parts of the city. This was stopped after the coup on February 1, 2021. Subsequently, we were tasked with apprehending anti-coup protesters. We were instructed to shoot at them. I shot some protesters with rubber bullets. Then I realized that as a policeman my duty is to protect the people and not to shoot them. On March 5, I escaped from Yangon. Two of my friends from the police helped me escape. They took me to the taxi stand. I reached Mandalay and then Sagaing Region. How many have left the police service like you? Around 20,000 probably all over the country, but not everybody has registered with the CDM. This is almost double the number of army personnel who have left their jobs after the coup. How did you get associated with this police station? After arriving from Yangon, I was in hiding for almost two months at different locations in Sagaing Region. I realized I could not rest content with the CDM but wanted to engage against the military regime at a deeper level. At Chang-U in Sagaing Region, another policeman and I provided training to a batch of wannabe rebels, who were equipped with their own guns. But after the training ended, some members of this group were apprehended by the army. We then shifted the camp to another location very high on a hill. Then the group broke up. Around May-June 2021, the Kalay PDF was formed. Meanwhile, some people who were trained by the Chin National Army at Camp Victoria in Chin State also returned to Sagaing Division. Then as the PDFs took shape and began to operate, I realized that a police service would be of huge importance if we were to set up our own government. I returned to Kalay. There was a high demand for the police in this region mainly because of drug trafficking and addiction. PDF and resistance leaders and a Member of Parliament from Kalay had also requested me to begin the police service. On December 6, 2021, the Kalay Police Service was formed. It was a big challenge given the scant resources at our disposal. There is a constant danger of attacks from regime troops. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Prior to the coup, police here were not following the law. People had lost faith in the police because it was lax against criminals. Police were active mainly against the functionaries and sympathizers of the resistance movement. Many stations were attacked and burned in this region. There was lawlessness. The police service had collapsed. This police station was already abandoned before we occupied it. Some personnel had also joined the CDM. How has the police service been organized in North Kalay? Before the coup, there were five police stations in Kalay, including the one in North Kalay. We moved here on March 3, 2022. The military has no presence here. I began with a team of 10 people, including myself; all of us had joined the CDM. Thirty-five more people were engaged with the station after training. Currently, our strength is 45 personnel. We remain in touch with the chief of the police service of the country, who is based at a secret location in Sagaing Region. We have established two lock-ups – one in this police station and another in the jungle, where 17 and 21 people respectively are locked up. The NUG has recognized this police station. You can see the letter pasted on the wall of the station. What is the area and population covered by this police station? This station is responsible for the northern region of Kalay. There is a separate police station for the southern region. We cover about 50 villages, comprising around 50,000 people. What are the challenging crimes that you deal with in Kalay? The most challenging for us is checking drug trafficking. Drug trafficking has increased after the coup and the junta is involved in this illicit activity. A section of the military is compelled to get engaged because they do not receive regular salaries. The military’s objective is also to destroy the young generation through drugs. Consignments come mostly from Shan State. I have not heard of any place near Kalay where either Heroin No 4 or synthetic drugs are produced. After the coup, 2,000 acres of poppy were planted at Tonzang in Chin State by farmers owing to poverty and lack of livelihood alternatives. There were some other places in and around Tedim where this phenomenon is discernible. Traffickers and consumers are from all income groups and include men and women. Small packets are packed in soap boxes and then ferried across huge distances. Before the coup, the NLD government had made optimum efforts to curb the menace. Three sophisticated X-ray scanners were installed at three highways believed to be the main arteries of the drug trade to detect the consignments. On one occasion, drug barons attacked one of the X-ray scanners because it impeded the illicit trade. After the coup, the efforts have become lax. The scanners’ primary objective now is to detect weapons and not drugs. Assassinations and killings have also emerged as a big challenge for us. Many dalans (informers of the military) have been killed on mere suspicion, on false information and without evidence. There were five cases of killings last year. In total, there were 96 cases of crime in the first year. This includes all types of cases. Drug trafficking accounted for most of the cases, followed by killings, theft, and rape. Almost every week there are seizures of drug consignments in India’s northeastern states. Are there cartels that have been specifically pushing drugs to India? The export of drugs to India has certainly increased after the coup, which is very apparent from the quantity that has been confiscated in the last two years. It is the junta that is actively involved in drug trafficking, and there are people to ferry the consignments through numerous routes in the country. There is a wrong notion among some people that PDFs and refugees in India are involved in drug trafficking. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. What happens to the criminals after they are arrested? After they are arrested, a chargesheet is submitted to the court based on the investigation of the offense. Then, the accused is produced before the court. Currently, there are five courts with four judges. The verdict is binding on the police. The laws that are followed are mostly those that were in place under the earlier system before the coup, and some have been amended to suit the local conditions and situation. How do you meet the expenses of the police station? All personnel in the police station are volunteers. We do not take salaries. Expenses are met through local contributions and from the Pa Ka Pha. How can the police administration be made more efficient? Are any plans being implemented? We need more unity, support, a stable situation and effective expansion of our operations to more areas. Now we cannot go to the Pyu Hsaw Htee (allies of the military) villages, even if a serious offense or crime is committed there. If the junta decides to launch operations in this locality, then we would have to pack up and relocate to safer places. And in all probability, the station would be burned, and we will have to start all over again. Of course, we need more funds and manpower. Now very often we have to spend money from our pockets. What kind of assistance have you received from the NUG? Our police station is under the NUG’s Ministry of Home Affairs. Under the NUG, police services have been formed in only four districts so far, including Tamu and Wetlet. Kalay is among the first police stations recognized by the NUG. Guidelines and laws have been formulated by NUG. Police stations also function as per the norms laid down by the NUG. It is a process that has to grow and evolve. There are so many guns everywhere with civilians in Myanmar. Imagine a situation when the military regime is toppled and democracy is restored in the country. Will so many weapons not trigger a serious law and order situation in the future? In my personal opinion, it will be a very big challenge. But now, all the resistance groups have the same goals and are not much of a problem at the moment. Could you deliver a message to the world from us? I will, certainly. This is an appeal to the world and especially to democratic nations. Myanmar is suffering. We appeal to the world not to forget us. Please assist us in our struggle against the atrocious junta. This must end once and for all..."
Source/publisher: "The Diplomat" (Japan)
Date of publication: 2023-07-06
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-06
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar Junta Achieves Nothing Without Shelling and Airstrikes: Army Defector
Description: "As Myanmar’s junta continues to lose ground to resistance forces, former army captain Lin Htet Aung, who joined the nationwide civil disobedience movement in March 2021, is helping others to defect. He recently talked to The Irrawaddy about the revolution, how the junta’s tactics might change and the effect of the regime’s scorched earth attacks. Why is the junta conducting so many airstrikes and shelling attacks on resistance and civilian targets? The ground troops cannot meet the regime’s goals. Without shelling and airstrikes, the troops achieve nothing. There is a slogan, “The military will fight with heavy explosives”. They think they can win with explosives and they are prepared to use them plentifully whenever they are attacked. Can the junta use any more extreme tactics? The next step might be to use chemical weapons. The junta expected to have toppled the resistance by now. It is now also using politics and religion to break public support and stop supplies from reaching the resistance. It is suffering badly militarily, which is why we see more shelling. Junta forces burn people’s homes while arbitrarily arresting and killing civilians. These acts are among their high efforts. Chemical weapons and cluster bombs are the next steps. Does the junta have chemical weapons and cluster bombs? The junta will not admit it but we have learned that its factories are producing those weapons. Personnel who have defected from those factories said the military is designing and producing cluster bombs with 120mm explosives. We hear the junta has produced chemical bombs but we have no documents. Defectors from the factories say the regime has been collecting these weapons for several years. How is the junta trying to reduce public support for the revolution? The junta’s airstrike on Pazi Gyi village was a message that anyone who supported the revolution would be killed. Troops burn villages based on accusations they are sheltering resistance fighters. In Magwe Region, the regime banned oil drilling to stop supplies to the resistance. This is nothing new. We used to use these tactics in conflict areas. They follow stages: block off the whole conflict area, conduct violence to divide the revolutionary organizations from the people and, if that fails, kill civilians to increase fear. This is a familiar strategy. Is it easy to conduct airstrikes? In the past, the military used its air force sparingly. Helicopters were sometimes used in clashes with the Arakan Army in Rakhine State. Now fighter jets and helicopters are used in every situation. Helicopters are deployed at many bases and fighter jets are always on standby. The junta uses its aircraft for almost every incident, no matter how small because the routes for reinforcements are controlled by revolutionary forces. In the past, the use of helicopters was restricted due to the costs. Does the junta consider any code of conduct to avoid harming civilians? The regime does not follow any code of conduct. There are also rules about taking up positions near civilian areas but the regime ignores them. They use civilians as human shields during operations. There is no distinction between civilians and military targets. Anyone who opposes military rule is an enemy. Does the regime worry about violating the Geneva Conventions? There are war crimes and crimes against humanity committed but to the junta there is no such thing. It only respects its own rules. From the bottom to junta boss Min Aung Hlaing, they all have the same attitude. Could the revolution succeed if the regime lost its airpower? The resistance groups are much stronger now in tactics and capabilities. They have really improved while junta troops have weakened. The regime is losing ground, despite using 120mm rounds or heavy machine guns that cause great damage. Helicopters and fighter jets have become the main strike force. Everything would change if we could stop the airstrikes. But the revolutionary forces need weapons to match the junta troops. With their current weapons, revolutionary groups can still not counter and protect themselves from junta offensives..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2023-07-04
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-04
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Biggest Buddha cries for Myanmar’s little dictator
Description: "The world’s largest marble Buddha, now under construction in Myanmar’s military capital of Naypyidaw, will reportedly be able to withstand 193 kilometer-per-hour winds and earthquakes measuring as high as 8.8 on the Richter scale. The gargantuan 25-meter Buddha, weighing over 5,000 tons and etched from over 20,000 tons of marble, is nearly complete after three-plus years of building, according to state media reports. And State Administration Council (SAC) junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is clearly excited judging by reports of his June 29 visit to the construction site. The project has employed over 150 laborers, including from the Myanmar Engineering Society and Military Engineering Corps, and will be built entirely “without foreign experts,” Min Aung Hlaing proudly proclaimed during his site visit. The image, carved in the Maravijaya style, is a very common Buddha pose “with 32 great characteristics and 80 small characteristics of the Lord Buddha”, according to state media reports. In a report covering the first section of the image’s installation in October 2021, just as multiple conflicts were raging in Myanmar following the February coup that year that installed the SAC, the purpose of the statue was touted as peaceful. “(T)he Buddha image is being built with the aim of showing the flourishing of the Theravada Buddhism in Myanmar to the world, ensuring the peace and tranquility of the country, contributing to development of the region through the visits of local and foreign travelers and improving the State development.” Min Aung Hlaing had taken a close interest in the gigantic statue’s construction even before his disastrous and bloody coup. He has reportedly visited frequently at important stages of the statue’s assembly. In May, for instance, he witnessed the “Unnalon Holy Hair installation.” At the auspicious time and date of 2:43 am on February 13, the fourth section of the image was conveyed and installed. The military ruler has seemingly staked his karmic fortunes on the statue’s successful completion. Gigantic Buddha statues are not new to Myanmar or Theravada Buddhist countries across Southeast Asia. Some of the biggest Buddhas in Myanmar are at the Maha Bodhi Tahtaung in Monywa, home to a 116-meter standing Buddha reportedly opened in 2008, the third tallest Buddha statue in the world, and a 90-meter-long reclining Buddha replete with 31 floors inside. (The tallest Buddha statue in the world is the Statue of Unity in India, towering at 182 meters.) There are also gigantic reclining Buddhas in the Mon State capitol of Mawlamyaing, in Bago city and the famous Chaukhtatgyi in Bahan township in Yangon – all of which underscore Myanmar’s long tradition of religious construction and support of the Buddhist clergy, or sangha. The Maravijaya Buddha will overshadow the previous largest marble Buddha, the Lawka Chantha Abhaya Labha Muni, or Kyauk Taw Gyi Pagoda, on the outskirts of Yangon, carved in 2013 to 11.3 meters from 700 tons of marble winnowed down to 400 tons upon completion. The statue was so heavy it required specially-built barges and railways to transport. While gigantic religious statues in Myanmar are commonplace, so too is the pursuit of celestial absolution for mass crimes by military rulers. Min Aung Hlaing is merely the latest dictator to support religious construction projects in karmic hope that building giant Buddhas will give them positive reincarnation rather than rebirth in the “hungry ghost realm” where they belong to be endlessly tormented by their many victims. There are growing reports of SAC leaders engaging in not just the building of gigantic religious structures but also flourishes of yedaya, or Myanmar black magic, also common practiced by generations of superstitious generals. In the mid-1990s, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the current junta regime’s obvious inspiration, toured a Buddha Tooth Relic borrowed from China around Myanmar. That abusive regime built lavish temples, reportedly with forced prison labor, to display the artifact in a bid to boost their spiritual fortunes and appease the Buddhist priesthood. The sangha and military haven’t always seen eye to eye. There have been sometimes supportive, almost symbiotic, relations, especially with conservative or ultranationalist monks in the official Buddhist synod, the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee. At other times, including in 1990 and 2007, the two power centers have been antagonistically opposed as activist monks staged public marches to agitate against declining living standards and the then-military regimes’ disastrous socio-economic policies. The relationship between the military-controlled central state and Buddhist clergy was also tested during General Thein Sein’s 2011-16 administration by the rise of the Buddhist monk-led Patriotic Association of Myanmar, or Ma Ba Tha, which contributed to a rise in anti-Muslim persecution and at times open violence. The most notorious pro-military monk is Sitagu Hsayadaw, who was widely revered in the country until his support for the Ma Ba Tha caused certain unease. But as Myanmar Now’s editor Swe Win wrote early in 2023, Sitagu expressed support for the coup soon after it was staged and continues to sidle up to Min Aung Hlaing, to the opprobrium of many in Myanmar. In recent weeks, the influential Ottama Thara from the Thabarwa Monastery in Thanlyin township, close to the commercial capital of Yangon, reportedly urged senior National League for Democracy (NLD) officials to compel Aung San Suu Kyi to retire from politics and seek to promote peace in the country. Many monks formerly connected to Ma Ba Tha are now reported to support SAC-raised death squads such as the Thwe Thouq (blood drinkers) and brutal militias such as the Phyu Saw Thee in the deeply religious but horrifically violent conflict areas of Sagaing and Magwe. State media routinely claims many monks have been targeted for assassination by the anti-coup resistance despite their supposed innocence but likely due to their perceived support for the SAC. At the same time, many monks are known to be involved in the clandestine support for resistance activities while also conducting their traditional roles in health, education and humanitarianism. The lavish funeral arrangements for the former chairperson of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, Bhamo Hsayadaw, who died at age 94 on May 25, were another indication of the regime’s karmic compulsions, even if the respected monk dissolved the Ma Ba Tha in 2017 and reportedly called on the military not to stage a coup in January 2021. Min Aung Hlaing, Vice Senior General Soe Win and other senior SAC officials were pallbearers at the June 6 funeral in another apparent attempt to stockpile good deeds to outweigh their widespread war crimes. As if to deepen the macabre aspects of these religious performances, the silicon sculpture of Bhamo Hsayadaw will have state-of-the-art artificial teeth to represent his unique smile, the work of famed sculptor Aung Kyaw Tun. But as Myanmar endures a grinding multi-sided war, extreme military violence, natural disasters and a devastated economy, Min Aung Hlaing’s gigantic Buddha statue in Naypyidaw will not be smiling down kindly upon him or his junta. Indeed, in March, the Maravijaya image seemingly cried as stripes appeared around the marble statue’s eyes, stains that prompted officials to unceremoniously cover its face. It was hardly a propitious sign for a superstitious dictator seeking spiritual absolution for his many well-documented karmic crimes..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Asia Times" (Hong Kong)
Date of publication: 2023-07-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: A closer look into the urban resistance in Myanmar
Sub-title: Flash mobs, longyi campaign, and voices from the protest frontlines
Description: "The pro-democracy movement in Myanmar continues to challenge the junta which grabbed power in a coup in February 2021. The opposition government, ethnic armed groups, urban activists, and exiled media are all demanding the end of the military dictatorship, restoring civilian leadership, and reviving the nation’s transition to democratic rule. Massive rallies opposed the junta and a civil disobedience movement emerged against the military dictatorship immediately after the coup. The junta responded by violently suppressing protest actions, revoking the licenses of independent media outlets, and designating the opposition government as a terrorist group. A systematic crackdown on dissent targeted youth activists, opposition leaders, journalists, and ordinary citizens suspected of supporting the pro-democracy movement. Despite the mass arrests and violence, opposition against the junta continues to garner public support as seen in the coordinated “silent strike” across the country. Activists either joined the armed resistance in rural communities or sustained the opposition in urban centers. READ MORE: Myanmar's Spring Revolution Through the help of a solidarity network, Global Voices interviewed the Yangon Revolution Force (YRF) and the Artists Collective about the status and prospect of the urban struggle against the junta. After the violent dispersal of rallies, activists organized flash mobs to evade security forces while spreading the message of the resistance. Oakkar, a spokesperson of YRF, explained how flash mobs are organized. Our flash mobs initially included 30–40 people, but when crackdowns became lethal, we downsized to groups of 10–20. Eventually, most of us were apprehended, and we had to operate in even smaller units. The Artists Collective, a group of rebel artists, affirmed the value of flash mobs in the overall resistance. Soft strikes and flash mobs are highly effective. We must always show the fascists that they're not in control. We believe these campaigns are gaining significance over time. Images and videos of flash mobs often go viral reflecting the online support of Myanmar internet users. Oakkar shared how activists are maximizing multiple platforms to reach more people: When the junta began brutally cracking down on peaceful protests and restricting internet access, we started organizing flash mobs. We didn't expect our campaigns to go viral or receive applause; we simply acted as necessary and relayed information to the media. The public's support has given us the strength to continue. We've also leveraged platforms like Telegram and Instagram. It's risky for people to engage with our Facebook posts due to potential repercussions, but we continue innovating ways to demonstrate that the junta cannot govern. Another innovative protest is the Longyi campaign which involves the posting of protest messages in Myanmar’s traditional attire. The Longyi campaign is a source of pride for us. Longyi is our traditional attire, a wrap-around skirt worn by both men and women. We wrote revolutionary messages on the fabric that would become visible when adjusting the Longyi in the crowd. The campaign received significant praise and global support, marking a proud moment for us. Another risky form of protest is talking to strangers in the streets about the anti-junta campaign. Another risky campaign involved our members approaching random people on the street to discuss the junta's upcoming sham election. This task was dangerous; if the people we approached were spies or junta supporters, we risked imprisonment. But we managed to execute it successfully. Oakkar narrated the difficulties they face in waging guerilla tactics in urban centers: It's extremely risky for our comrades to operate in Yangon. Increased patrolling, more spies, and advanced surveillance make it difficult and resource-intensive to operate in the city. Despite the ruined economy, locals are willing to rent safe houses to our members for a higher price. Operations cost is high due to the necessity of employing several scouts for safety. The Artists Collective underscored the role of collaboration among different members of the pro-democracy movement: As long as our comrades, who are in riskier situations, are willing to revolt, we're ready to help in any way to ensure the success of this spring revolution. For instance, during Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's birthday, we stayed up all night on a video call to guide our comrades in Yangon on how to draw the banner. Oakkar highlighted the sacrifices of those who decided to join the anti-junta resistance: Our members have had to make tremendous sacrifices. Our security is a constant worry, day and night. Many of us are unable to sleep peacefully, as the threat of midnight raids looms large. One of the most heart-wrenching realities is being cut off from our families. Additionally, unlike most young adults in their 20s, we don't have the luxury of enjoying regular pastimes and leisure activities. Our commitment to this cause, however, makes these sacrifices bearable. He also shared an appeal to the international community: We understand that everyone has their own responsibilities and tasks. However, we would greatly appreciate it if they could provide donations to support war victims fleeing to the borders, assist immigrants, or offer free online education to students supporting the Civil Disobedience Movement The Artists Collective cited the contribution of artists in the pro-democracy movement: As artists, we knew we could contribute by creating artworks to support the revolution. The fact that people are printing our artwork or using the digital versions online brings us immense satisfaction. We support the revolution through our art. Working together, we create banners, convey important messages, and assist with designs. Seeing our art pieces printed, displayed in marches, and online during flash events fills us with pride. The group is confident that the revolution against the junta will lead to success: We've seen a significant number of women and people of diverse sexual orientations and identities in deadly combat. This unique situation has brought people of different ages together to fight against the regime that has systematically oppressed our nation for 70 years. We believe the world will witness the establishment of a new federal democratic order in our country..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Global Voices"
Date of publication: 2023-07-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: India sells arms to junta while claiming concern over crisis in Myanmar
Sub-title: Observers say such sales abet junta war crimes and suppliers should be held accountable.
Description: "Companies in India are supplying weapons to Myanmar’s junta while Prime Minister Narendra Modi expresses concern about the political crisis in Myanmar on the international stage, observers said Monday, highlighting the two-faced nature of the strategy. Indian arms manufacturer Bharat Electronics Limited, or BEL, transferred military equipment worth more than US$5.1 million to Myanmar’s army or known Myanmar arms brokers Alliance Engineering Consultancy and Mega Hill General Trading over a period of six months from November 2022 to April 2023, the rights group Justice for Myanmar reported in June. The military equipment included metallic sonar domes; transducers and gaskets for the domes to be used on frigates, warships or submarines; directing gear systems; technical documents; various items for radio transmission or radar equipment; and manpack radios for battlefield communication. Justice for Myanmar called the shipments “part of a pattern of Indian support for the Myanmar military and its domestic arms industry” and called on India’s allies to use their leverage to “pressure India to stop the supply of arms and dual use goods and technology” to the regime, including during Modi’s state visits to the U.S. and France this year. The weapons sales come even as Modi and U.S. President Joe Biden issued a joint statement following their meeting at the White House on June 22 expressing concern about the worsening rights situation in Myanmar and calling for the release of the country’s political prisoners. Than Soe Naing, a political analyst, pointed out the hypocrisy of India selling weapons to the junta with one hand while saying it is concerned with the situation in Myanmar on the other. He noted that India has stayed neutral amid the ongoing conflict in Myanmar and neglected or even arrested refugees who have fled fighting across its border. “But on the international arena, when making a statement as a democratic country, it uses the terms ‘democracy and human rights,’” he told RFA. “It doesn’t make any sense. It is a government that is indirectly supporting the crimes committed by the Myanmar military by willfully ignoring them.” Justice for Myanmar’s report came on the heels of one released in May by U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews, who said the junta had imported at least US$1 billion in arms and raw materials to manufacture weapons between the Feb. 1, 2021, military coup d’etat and December 2022. Rights groups say the junta is using such weapons against the people of Myanmar, including to attack the armed resistance and civilians who oppose its rule. While Russia, China and Singapore were the major sources by far, the U.N. report found that Indian entities, including state-owned entities, had transferred US$51 million in arms and related materials to the junta over the same period. That followed Russia’s US$406 million, China’s US$267 million, and Singapore’s US$254 million. Selling weapons for war crimes Ko Mike, a spokesman for the Blood Money Campaign, a collective of Myanmar activists campaigning to stop revenues reaching the junta, said that Indian companies selling weapons to Myanmar are abetting war crimes. “They are supporting killings by a terrorist group [the junta] that is committing the worst crimes in the world,” he said. “Sometime in the future, it will be necessary to do something internationally about accountability [for such entities].” Ye Tun, a political analyst, said that Modi appears to believe the junta is responsible for maintaining stability in Myanmar. “So if you [maintain stability] by using weapons, India will sell weapons to Myanmar’s military [to support such alleged efforts].” Prior to the sales detailed in Justice for Myanmar’s latest report, the group noted that Indian state-owned arms producer Yantra India Limited shipped multiple 122mm howitzer barrels to the junta in October 2022 in an apparent breach of international law. The Indian government has so far ignored calls by civil society organizations and the people of Myanmar, including the shadow National Unity Government, or NUG, and failed to comply with U.N. resolutions and its responsibilities under international law, said Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadana Maung. Radio Free Asia attempted to contact the Indian Embassy in Myanmar by email for comment but received no response. Calls to junta Deputy Information Minister Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun, seeking comment on the claims, went unanswered Monday. Regional stability at risk Thein Tun Oo, the executive director of the Thayninga Institute for Strategic Studies, which is made up of former military officers, called it “normal” for India to assist its neighbor. “India can stand on its own two feet and cooperate with anyone it wants to,” he said. “India has taken Myanmar as a partner ... [because] Myanmar is the best country for India to cooperate with on the security of the Indian Ocean. So, it is normal for India to cooperate with Myanmar.” But NUG spokesman Kyaw Zaw said that as the world’s largest democracy, India is expected to embrace democratic values and not prop up regimes that oppress their own people. “We hope that India will try to understand the will of the people of Myanmar and help them to fulfill that will,” he said. If India instead continues to support the junta, he said, there will be no resolution to the conflict in Myanmar and the stability of the region will be at risk..."
Source/publisher: "Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of publication: 2023-07-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: India’s Massive Armaments Sales
Description: "It does not surprise one any longer when news relating to the persecution of minorities surfaces in India. In yet another development, the BJP’s Hindutva-backed regime has been found to be expanding its network of terror beyond India’s borders by colluding with Myanmar’s outlawed junta. The military govt that staged a coup in February 2021 overthrew the civilian government of Noble laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, putting her and her party behind bars. The military junta in charge faces a grave legitimacy crisis from the global community at large with India being an exception. When the 2021 issue was debated in the UN General Assembly, India abstained from voting against it evincing its tacit support for the military setup in Naypyidaw. UN’s recent report titled Billion Dollar Death Trade exposed India’s massive arms shipments to the ports of Myanmar which the military junta is potentially using against its civilian population committing gross atrocities to suppress democratic voices in the country. The volume of arms exports from India increased significantly when an organised genocide began in the country against the Rohingya community in 2017. International bodies such as Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and New Global Report on Arms Expenditure have claimed that half of India’s arms exports between the years 2017-21 have gone to Myanmar. The supplies included surveillance equipment, artillery, and missiles manufactured by Indian state-owned enterprises like Bharat Dynamics Limited. Not only has India become an abettor of crimes against humanity in Myanmar but also a violator of the Wassenaar Arrangement which makes it incumbent on the signatories to increase transparency in their arms exports. The arrangement also prohibits its members from supplying and acquiring ‘dual use items’ meaning those that can be used for civilian as well as military purposes to and from a state that is a cause of concern for the region in which Myanmar is. There is overwhelming evidence available that the junta is involved in heinous war crimes yet the Indian state continues to aid and arm them knowing well to what ends they are being used. The UN’s Special Rapporteur has reported that $51 million worth of arms has been supplied directly to Myanmar’s military and arms dealers by Indian firms. Another state-owned enterprise named Bharat Electronics Limited is reported to have despatched Remote Controlled Weapons Station (RCWS) according to export data. A further six HJT-16 Kiran-1 light attack aircrafts were flown to former Burma with which India shares over a thousand-mile border. The Indian representative claimed that any defence exports made to Myanmar over the period in question were part of the deal signed with the civilian government before the coup for the security interests of both nations. India could have suspended these supplies till democracy was restored in the country, yet it continues to empower the junta through this enormous flow of arms. The impact of this arms influx has been grievous for the civilians who are subjected to mass slaughter and destruction of their homes and villages. For instance, the fuses in the recoilless rifles used by the military to fire on people of the Kayin state where more than 10,000 were forced to flee from their homes were produced by Maharashtra-based Sandeep Metalcraft. Another firm called Yantra India supplied 122 mm gun barrels for Howitzers manufactured by Ka Pa Sa defence industries that were used by the artillery to shell villages. The rapid militarization of the junta is only resulting in instability and civil war in the ASEAN member state. Not only is it wreaking havoc on innocent minorities but also this bellicose group surfeiting on Indian supplies is posing a glaring threat to other countries in the region as well as those part of the Wassenaar Arrangement which prohibits this sort of unchecked outflow of weapons and military technology. If the rogue regime in Myanmar gets hold of strategic weapons it could be a recipe for disaster and a compromise on global security. As a result of the crisis in Myanmar, India has refused to host the Rohingya refugees and those already in their custody are discriminately denied even the basic safeguards listed under International Refugee Law. If the Indian state has any regard for the dignity of human life, it must halt this multi-layered siphoning of military hardware until a stable, popular and legitimate government is established in Myanmar..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Daily Times
Date of publication: 2023-07-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Spring Diary
Description: "I used to be a university teacher. As a teacher, I was proud of my work as a mentor to students, our young gems for the future. I highly valued my job, and I’d devoted myself to teaching as I had few skills for another profession. As my husband was an employee at a private bank, we had to manage living on a fixed income since we were both salary earners. We’ve brought up our children to be content with life, doing our best to make a happy family, although it was not fully provided. But my dreams were shattered one morning in spring. That day was 1st February 2021. My life, steady until that point, was struck by an immense change. On that day, the military announced a state of emergency and staged an illogical coup. I felt like a motherless child, like someone who had lost her future. It felt like I had travelled back in time. I had no motivation to work, and I felt even more lonely when the internet connections were cut off. Nobody could tell what would happen next or what had happened. People would voice their random ideas, and the department, the school, the town, and the entire country became silent with people deeply immersed in their own thoughts. The movement started in Mandalay. Two days after the military coup, motorbike riders expressed their distress by honking on the streets. The whole street and residential quarters were noisy with honking sounds. Later, a silent strike was staged with a three-finger salute. Posters bearing the images of the three-finger salute spread throughout the country—it was not long before we heard the frustrated voices of people protesting the dictatorship. Educators and staff from universities across the country also took part in protests by holding up posters of three-finger salutes. The once silent university came alive without the orchestrated but simultaneous chanting of slogans. At the same time, universities were closed, but staff continued to rotate teaching work due to the high rates of COVID-19 infections. The presence of teaching staff that day was a clear sign of how much civil servants loathed the dictatorship. Multiple ethnic groups, students, and civil servants participated in various anti-dictatorship activities. People resented the unjust acts committed by the authoritarian government, especially since the time for a newly elected government was just an arms-length away. Despite these challenges, our university’s strike column marched daily. I could not participate in these marches as I had to take care of my daughter’s security, but my inability to join the marches gave me a guilty conscience. I felt like I was being unfaithful to the movement. I tried to counteract my guilty conscience by banging pots and pans harder at 8pm, a symbolic act to drive out the evil dictators. Continuing work as an educator became a big challenge. It took time for me to decide about what to do, since I’ve always been a responsible person who highly valued my work. I discussed it with my colleagues, friends, family, and parents. My supervisor explained the pros and cons of standing bravely for the truth. As they did, the State Counsellor’s quote, “people matter,” echoed in my mind. My husband supported me in resisting the dictatorship within my own capacity. It was with such support that I was able to make a strong decision. From the 8th of February, I decided to join the CDM movement and withhold my labour—proudly contributing to the revolution alongside my colleagues at the university. Three weeks after the coup, the CDMers’ personal security was threatened when the military forces and police entered our university under the pretext of security. On 6th March, a month after we commenced our refusal to work with the slogan “don’t go to the office but struggle for freedom”, I went to my parents’ place with my daughter. My son and his father stayed behind in Yangon because of their respective responsibilities. About 10 days after I reached my parents’ village, a close friend and colleague informed me that she was going back to the office and asked me if I wished to recommence my duties. If so, she would submit my name. Soon after, my supervisor whom I so revered informed me that they would be resuming their duties out of fear for their security and arrest. We discussed with our colleagues how we could support them. We will not surrender, and we will fight till the end. At the end of April 2021, I received news that my nephew, a young university student had been shot dead by military forces the night before. The sad news broke me. On that day, Tedim was completely silent. The soldiers, whose duty was to protect the life and property of the people, were brutally killing innocent people for no reason. I prayed that such incidents would not take place again for anyone—but my prayers were not answered. Many people’s lives were sacrificed. If we did not resist this horrible system, then who would? In May 2021, I was expelled from my post for standing for the truth. It was a profession that I invested my heart and soul in for several decades, and I felt as though my arms and legs had been amputated. Moreover, the income source to support my family was now cut off. Life became very lonely. It was difficult to detach myself from work, but I had no reason to defend it any longer. I believed that Eternal God would prepare the best for me. I was satisfied that I had been able to take refuge with my parents and care for my 80-year-old father. I found strength in the understanding and support from my parents and siblings. Whenever I had a chance, I went to my father’s farm and nurtured the plants, ploughed the ground with an iron hoe, or cut the trees with a knife. I learned how to make use of the same hands I once used only to hold pencils and pens. Perhaps this was a blessing in disguise—I now had a chance to experience my community’s traditions and customs. Many people from my village did not share my ideas. Few civil servants became CDMers. They believed they had to mind their own business regardless of the government. They continued to show up for the civil servants’ recruiting exams held by the military council and were proud of their achievements when appointed. They thought they were doing great, but it was very uncomfortable for me to live in such an environment. My daughter would always encourage me—unhappy from trying to adapt to a new place—with positive motivation like “Mom…don’t be depressed. Our revolution will win.” Compared to my daughter’s moral support, I felt sorry about the lack of understanding in society. However, I was proud of my daughter because she knew what was right and what was wrong. Her sacrifice and willingness to accept a meagre way of living was much greater than mine. My husband’s support also gave me power. He would repeatedly tell my daughter, “Your mother is a revolutionary heroine. We should always be proud of Mom.” Maybe it was the emotional dejection that lowered our immunity. At the end of May 2021, my entire family was infected by COVID-19. We had to pull ourselves together to prevent us from falling to pieces. I was grateful for the fellow nurse CDMer who came to our house and treated us. Her words of consolation at that time of sickness and depression energized us. A year after returning to my native village, the community criticized me in different ways. The most annoying question I got was, “Are you divorced from your husband?” Because I was a CDMer, I did not receive any salary. They would heartlessly tell me that the success of our revolution would not be achieved in any way, and that I should go back to work. Even my close relatives blamed me. On the one hand, the arrest of CDMers increased every day. Though imprecisely, security became a concern. Over time, some schools in the village reopened, but my daughter had no desire to attend the school run by the military council. It was impossible to pursue online education either since the internet remained cut off. Meanwhile, I was able to meet and accompany a Catholic priest who came back to visit the village from Mizoram, India. In this way, I reached Buarpui village in Mizoram state in early April 2022. My daughter came with me and was able to continue her schooling, but she faced various challenges due to the language barrier, an unfamiliar school syllabus in Hindi, Mizo, and Lai languages, and culture shock. I felt guilty. For work, I worked in the kitchen of a hostel as an assistant to the chef. My days were spent peeling potatoes, picking rice grains, and washing dishes. I was exhausted both mentally and physically. I missed Myanmar and the life I enjoyed in the past—but I had to control my homesickness. I reminded myself not to forget that my life was where it was supposed to be, not where I wanted to be. The challenges as a CDMer refugee were hard. I prayed to God all the time, wishing to go back to where I deserved and wished to be. Through a friend, I learned about a call for 5 Research Fellowships from the Institute of Chin Affairs (ICA). I was interested, and I started to prepare for the application without any prior experience and with much difficulty. As I worked, I jotted down my thoughts and sought advice from my experienced friends. I sent my application before the deadline on the 31st of August. When the decision letter came on 15th September, I was happy to know that I was among the short-listed candidates. It reminded me of the same feeling I had when I first applied for my job. I wanted to be selected because I was interested in the field. On 27th September, I was informed that I had been selected as one of the Research Fellows. I was overjoyed. It was evident that God is good. I was pleased and proud of myself for being a Research Fellow of the Myanmar Fellowship Program. Then again, I grew wary when I thought of leaving my daughter behind. Departing from Buarpui, my daughter told me constantly not to worry about her but to take care of myself. From there, I started my second lonely journey to the capital city, Aizawl. In October 2022, myself and four other research fellows met the Deputy Director and the learning facilitator at the ICA office in Aizawl. The Chin Research Centre was formally opened in the compounds of Mizoram University. It is possible that the Spring Revolution created a historical milestone between the ICA and Mizoram University. We had the opportunity to learn from the professors and associate professors of MZU and to write research papers. I’m grateful to the responsible persons of ICA, our group leader who paid attention to every detail, and the learning facilitator, for not only providing knowledge but for supporting the livelihood of someone living with uncertainty in a foreign land. My ambition is to prepare a thesis paper that will enable us to implement a credit transfer, in addition to finding a way to have dialogue and collaborate on how to overcome the challenges of educational opportunities for refugee children. I aim to continue my tasks of the Spring Revolution as a researcher preparing research papers for the interest of the community and our people. Starting from Spring, how far do I have to walk on this journey? It is grueling to predict when this journey will end. I hope it will not take long. Another spring will come along with the sweet, lamenting, cooing sound of cuckoos. I have to nurture the victory plant embedded in my heart to welcome the triumphant spring. There will also be light after darkness. If the opportunity avails in peaceful times after the Spring Revolution prevails, I will create a good educational environment while sharing the knowledge earned through this program with my colleagues and students..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of publication: 2023-07-03
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-03
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ကြိုဆိုဝမ်းမြောက်ကြောင်းထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
Description: "၁။ ကရင်နီပြည်လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်ဦး (ကလလတ) သည် တောင်ပေါ်မြေပြန့် တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများအားလုံးနှင့်အတူ အကြမ်းဖက်(စကစ) စစ်အုပ်စု အား ပြန်လည်ခုခံတိုက်ခိုက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့ ရက်စွဲပါ သဘောထားကြေညာချက်(၁/၂၀၂၃) ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့မှုသည် ပြည်သူလူထုနှင့်အတူ ရပ်တည်လျက် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ပြတ်သားစွာ လက်တွဲပါဝင် ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ကို ဖော်ညွှန်းသော သမိုင်းတွင်မည့် လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်ဖြစ်သဖြင့် ဂုဏ်ယူအားတက်ရပါသည်။ ၂။ ယခုကဲ့သို့ ကရင်နီပြည်လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်ဦးအနေဖြင့် နွေဦး တော်လှန်ရေးတွင် တက်ကြွစွာဖြင့် ကျရာအခန်းကဏ္ဍမှ ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင် ဆင်နွှဲနေကြသော တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ပြည်သူလူထုကြီးနှင့်အတူ ရပ်တည်ချက် ခိုင်မာစွာ မိမိတို့အားလုံး၏ ဘုံရန်သူ စစ်မိစ္ဆာအား အတူတကွ ပြန်လည် တော်လှန်ခုခံသွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း တရားဝင်ထုတ် ပြန်ကြေညာသည့်အတွက် လှိုက်လှဲစွာ ကြိုဆို ဝမ်းမြောက်သည်ကို ဖော်ပြလိုပါသည်။ ၃။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အား အပြီးတိုင် အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းရာတွင် ကရင်နီပြည်လူမျိုး ပေါင်းစုံပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်ဦး အနေဖြင့် တိကျသော ရည်မှန်းချက်များ ချမှတ်ကာ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အပါအဝင် မိမိတို့ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ၊ အခြားတိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစု အသီးသီးတို့နှင့် လက်တွေ့ကျကျ တော်လှန်ရေး လုပ်ငန်းများကို ပူးတွဲလုပ်ဆောင်သွားမည်ကို သိရှိရသည့်အတွက် ပြည်သူလူထု အားလုံး၏ ကိုယ်စား အားအင်သစ်များ ရရှိပါကြောင်းနှင့် မှန်ကန်သော ရပ်တည်ချက်နှင့် သဘောထားများ အတွက် ကဏ္ဍအလိုက် ချိတ်ဆက်ရပ်တည်ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication: 2023-07-02
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-02
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: China Looms Large Over Thailand's Move to Reengage With Myanmar Junta
Description: "WASHINGTON - A recent attempt by Thailand to reengage with Myanmar's junta appears to be aimed at creating an alignment with China, a close ally of the military regime in Myanmar, analysts said. On June 19, the outgoing Thai government of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, a former general who seized power in a 2014 military coup, hosted informal talks for foreign ministers from member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Myanmar's foreign minister, Than Swe, appointed by the military junta that seized power in February 2021, was among those who attended. Top diplomats from some other countries in the 10-member regional bloc, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, did not. In August 2022, foreign ministers from ASEAN member states had agreed to bar Myanmar's ruling generals from the group's meetings until they made progress on the so-called Five-Point Consensus reached in April 2021 to end the violence that engulfed Myanmar after the coup. Protests, a civil disobedience movement and fighting continue in Myanmar. As China is currently the second-largest aid provider to the Myanmar junta after Russia, Beijing may want the junta to restore order to stabilize the China-Myanmar border and the pipelines running through Myanmar into China, according to Paul Chambers, lecturer and special adviser on international affairs at Naresuan University in Thailand. Thailand, which is close to China diplomatically and geographically, has sought to take a similar stance, said Chambers. "[The] Prayut government would want to include China in any ASEAN negotiations concerning Myanmar," he said. Sek Sophal, a researcher at the Center for Democracy Promotion at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan, said Thailand's military-backed government sees China as a key player in the Myanmar issue. The Thai government has continued to engage with Myanmar on a "business as usual" basis and has done "very little" to put pressure on the junta, Sophal said. When asked by VOA about the informal talks hosted by Thailand, the Chinese Embassy in Washington said they were not aware of the matter and referred the question to the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar or Thailand instead and received no reply. The United States called on Myanmar to comply with the Five-Point Consensus. "As the secretary noted, Burma's military regime has repeatedly carried out horrific, and extensive violence against the people of Burma since the February 2021 military coup," a State Department spokesperson said last week in an email to VOA. "We recognize and continue to welcome ASEAN's efforts to address the crisis in Burma. Given the regime's lack of progress on the Five-Point Consensus, we call on ASEAN members to hold Burma accountable for its actions," the spokesperson said. The U.S. Treasury Department last week imposed sanctions on Myanmar's Defense Ministry and two state-owned banks, the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and the Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank. The measure freezes any assets of the sanctioned entities that are in the U.S. or controlled by a U.S. person. It also prohibits all transactions by U.S. persons or entities carried out within or transiting the U.S. that the targeted entities would benefit from. Chambers said that the U.S. could use its sanctions against Myanmar's junta and work with its ASEAN opponents, such as Indonesia, to slow down Bangkok's current cooperation with the junta. "The U.S. is aware that Thailand has, since at least 2013, followed a realist policy of hedging or 'creating balance' between Beijing and Washington," he said. After more than nine years of China-leaning rule under Prayuth, a surprise win by the Move Forward Party in the May 14 elections means Thailand is slated to have a new government installed in July, according to parliamentary procedure. Pita Limjaroenrat, who leads the left-leaning, progressive Move Forward Party, is the front-runner to become Thailand's next premier. He has been vocal about how he would shift Thailand's foreign policy direction, including its stance on Myanmar. "A stable Myanmar is a boon to the entire region, but if Myanmar sneezes, Thailand gets sick as well," Pita told VOA's Thai Service during an interview in April. Educated at Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Pita is known to have a natural affinity for the U.S. Analysts, however, say the Thai politician has to walk a fine line to engage constructively with China, given its economic clout and growing influence in Thailand's foreign policy. "Thailand might have to continue to bandwagon with China for its economic interests," although Thailand has reset its foreign policy to work with the U.S.-led Western countries, said Sophal. Chambers said a Pita-led Thailand would distance itself from China, work closely with Washington, and cease cooperating with the Myanmar junta..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "VOA" (Washington, D.C)
Date of publication: 2023-07-01
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ကြိုဆိုဝမ်းမြောက်ကြောင်းသဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "၁။ အကြမ်းဖက် (စကစ) စစ်အုပ်စုကို ပြန်လည်တိုက်ခိုက်နေပြီဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကရင်နီပြည် လူမျိုးပေါင်းစုံ ပြည်သူ့လွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်ဦး (ကလလတ) ၏ ဇူလိုင် ၁ ရက်နေ့ရက်စွဲဖြင့် သဘောထားကြေညာချက်ကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊​ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်စွာဖြင့် လှိုက်လှဲစွာ ကြိုဆိုပါသည်။ ၂။ ကလလတ ဗဟိုကော်မတီ၏ သမိုင်းစာမျက်နှာသစ် ဖွင့်လှစ်လိုက်သည့် ယခု ကြေညာချက်သည် လွယ်ကူစွာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ပြီး ထွက်ပေါ်လာသော ကြေညာချက်တခု မဟုတ်ကြောင်း မိမိတို့ အထူး သတိပြုမိသည်နှင့် တပြိုင်တည်းတွင် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး အမြန်ဆုံး အောင်မြင်ရန် အရေးပါသည့် ဖြစ်ထွန်းတိုးတက်မှုတခုကို သမိုင်း၏တောင်းဆိုချက် အရ ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်ဟုလည်း လေးနက်စွာ ခံယူပါသည်။ ၃။ ကရင်နီပြည်(ကယားပြည်နယ်) အတွင်း သံလွင်အရှေ့ဘက်ခြမ်းရှိ စစ်ရေးအချက်အခြာ နေရာများကို ကလလတနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းမဟာမိတ်အဖွဲ့များ အောင်မြင်စွာ တိုက်ခိုက် သိမ်းပိုက်နိုင်ခဲ့သည့်အပေါ်လည်း မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် အထူးပင် ဂုဏ်ယူပါသည်။ ၄။ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ (CRPH)၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ (NUG) တို့နှင့် နီးနီးကပ်ကပ် လက်တွဲပြီး တော်လှန်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများကို ပူးတွဲလုပ်ဆောင် သွားရန် အဆင်သင့်ဖြစ်နေကြောင်း ကလလတ၏ ကြေညာချက်ပါ သဘောထားကြောင့် မိမိတို့ အထူးပင် အားတက်ရပါသည်။ ၅။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့်လည်း စစ်အာဏာရှင် စနစ်အမြစ်ဖြတ် ချေမှုန်းရေးအတွက် ကလလတ အပါအဝင် မဟာမိတ်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အားလုံးနှင့် ဆက်လက်၍ အခိုင်အမာ လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း တည်ကြည် လေးနက်စွာ သန္နိဌာန်ပြုပါသည်။ ၆။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်ကို အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရန် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူမျိုးစု လက်နက်ကိုင် အဖွဲ့ အစည်းများအားလုံး ပူးပေါင်းပါဝင်ကြပါရန်လည်း အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ကာကွယ်ရေး ဝန်ကြီးဌာနက တိုက်တွန်းပန်ကြားပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of publication: 2023-07-01
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့်ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန ကြေညာချက် ( ၂/၂၀၂၃)
Sub-title: တစ်နှစ်စာကင်းလွတ်ခွင့်ပြုကြောင်း အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခြင်း
Description: "၁။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ ထိန်းချုပ်မှုအောက်ရှိ ငွေကြေးစနစ်များအပေါ် မှီခိုနေရမှုကို အဆုံးသတ်နိုင်ရန်၊ ပြည်သူများကြုံတွေ့နေရသည့် လုံခြုံရေးစိန်ခေါ်မှုများဖြေရှင်းနိုင်ရန်၊ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အမြစ်ဖြတ် ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရေးအတွက် လွတ်လပ်ပြီး လုံခြုံစိတ်ချရ၍ လက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်သော ငွေကြေးလည်ပတ်မှု ယန္တရားတစ်ခုကို ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၂။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုအစိုးရအဖွဲ့၏ သဘောတူညီချက်ဖြင့် ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်မြန်မာ ကျပ် (Digital Myanmar Kyat - DMMK) ကို နိုင်ငံတော်၏ တရားဝင်ဒစ်ဂျစ်တယ်ငွေကြေးအဖြစ် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဇွန်လ ၂၆ ရက်နေ့တွင် သတ်မှတ် ဖြန့်ဝေခဲ့ပါသည်။ ၃။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် NUGPay တစ်နှစ်ပြည့်မြောက်မည်ဖြစ်ပြီး ပြည်သူလူထုကြား ပိုမို ကျယ်ပြန့်စေရန် တော်လှန်ရေး၏ ထောက်ပို့ကဏ္ဍတွင် အကျိုးဖြစ်စေရန် ရည်ရွယ်၍ ၂၀၂၂ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက် နေ့မှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဇွန်လ ၃၀ ရက်နေ့အတွင်း တစ်နှစ်တာ Activation Code (၅၀၀၀ ကျပ်) ပေးချေ၍ အကောင့်ဖွင့်လှစ်ခဲ့သော NUGPay သုံးစွဲသူများသည် ပထမတစ်နှစ်ပြည့်သည့်နေ့မှစ၍ နောက်ထပ် တစ်နှစ် စာ Activation Code ဖိုး ပေးချေစရာမလိုပဲ တစ်နှစ်စာ ကင်းလွတ်ခွင့်ရရှိပါမည်။ ၄။ တစ်နှစ်စာ ကင်းလွတ်ခွင့်ရရှိသူများအနေဖြင့် Activation Code ဖိုး ပေးချေလိုပါက CDM ဝန်ထမ်းများ အတွက် Activation Code ပေးအပ်မည့် အစီအစဉ်တွင် လှူဒါန်းနိုင်ပါသည်။ ၅။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ ၂၀၂၂ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် ဇွန်လ ၃၀ ရက်နေ့အတွင်း အကောင့်ဖွင့်လှစ်ခဲ့သော NUGPay သုံးစွဲသူများအားလုံးကို ၂၀၂၃ ဇူလိုင်လ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် ဇွန်လ ၃၀ ရက်နေ့အထိ Activation Fees တစ်နှစ်စာကင်းလွတ်ခွင့်ပြုကြောင်း ကြေညာအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of publication: 2023-07-01
Date of entry/update: 2023-07-01
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Appointment of Deputy Minister (Announcement No.1/2023)
Description: "The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), as exercising the democratic mandate from the people through the general election held in 2020, and in accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter published by Announcement No. (19/2021) on the 31st March 2021, Mr. Aung Kyaw Moe has been appointed as Deputy Minister for the Ministry of Human Right of National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication: 2023-06-30
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Myanmar: Military’s obstruction of humanitarian aid could be international crime
Description: "The chief of OHCHROpens in new window’s Myanmar team, James Rodehaver, explained that since their February 2021 coup, the country’s military rulers have been instilling a “climate of fear” to subjugate the civilian population, restricting aid access and using “all means” at their disposal to clamp down on civil society. Brutal tactics He said the military’s tactics had included the use of heavy weaponry on civilian areas and airstrikes, the burning of villages, and the use of landmines to prevent those forced to flee from returning home. “Another thing that they have done regularly has been to burn food stores, crops and seed stores, to destroy medical facilities and to target medical workers.” The military imposed further restrictions on humanitarian assistanceOpens in new window in the aftermath of deadly Cyclone Mocha in May, Mr. Rodehaver said. Over 17.6 million people, or a third of the overall population of Myanmar need aid. OHCHR Spokesperson Ravina Shamdasani briefing in Geneva on the comprehensive human rights update for Myanmar, stressed that intentional obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance may amount to serious violations of international law. Aid workers treated as opponents “The military has operated as if those providing aid are helping those opposed to their rule, rather than respecting their need for protection and facilitating their access and assistance to the civilian population in a time of crisis”, she said. She cited the military’s “four cuts” strategy outlined in the report “to kill and injure thousands of civilians while destroying goods and infrastructure necessary for survival, including food, shelter, and medical centres”. An estimated 1.5 million people have been internally displaced, and approximately 60,000 civilian structures have reportedly been burnt or destroyed, she said. Between the overthrow of the civilian Government and April 2023, credible sources have verified that at least 3,452 people had died at the hands of the military and its affiliates, and 21,807 individuals had been arrested. Dramatically worse “Notably, our report says the security situation has dramatically worsened for humanitarian workers since the coup. Aid providers are consistently exposed to risks of arrest, harassment or other mistreatment, or even death”, Ms. Shamdasani added. “In the context of armed conflicts, intentional obstruction or denial of humanitarian assistance may further constitute war crimes such as wilful killing, torture and other degrading treatment, starvation, and collective punishment”, she warned. Intentional denial can also constitute crimes against humanity, she continued, such as murder, “extermination, torture and other inhumane acts, or persecution, when committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.”..."
Source/publisher: UN Geneva
Date of publication: 2023-06-30
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီ ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁/၂၀၂၃)
Sub-title: ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီး ခန့်အပ်တာဝန်ပေးခြင်း
Description: "ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားပြုကော်မတီသည် ၂၀၂၀ ခုနှစ်၊ ပါတီစုံဒီမိုကရေစီ အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲတွင် ပြည်သူလူထုက ဒီမိုကရေစီနည်းကျ အပ်နှင်းလိုက်သည့်အာဏာကို ကျင့်သုံးလျက် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပဋိညာဉ်အရ ဦးအောင်ကျော်မိုးအား အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ဒုတိယဝန်ကြီးအဖြစ် ခန့်အပ်တာဝန်ပေးလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw
Date of publication: 2023-06-30
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-30
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများက စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ပုလဲမြို့နယ်တွင် ပြည်သူလူထုအား အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းအပေါ် ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန်ပြစ်တင်ရှုတ်ချခြင်း။
Description: "၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ ၂၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီများမှ တိုက်လေယာဉ်ဖြင့် ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ပုလဲမြို့နယ်တွင် ရဟန်းတစ်ပါးအပါအဝင် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူ (၁၀) ဦးကျော် အသက်ဆုံးရှုံးခဲ့ရပြီး ပြည်သူအများအပြား ဒဏ်ရာရရှိခဲ့သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်လုပ်ရပ်ကို ပြင်းပြင်းထန်ထန် ပြစ်တင်ရှုတ်ချပါသည်။ ထိုအကြမ်းဖက်တိုက်ခိုက်မှုကြောင့် အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူများအသက်ဆုံးရှုံးသည်သာမက ဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်း၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများနှင့် အရေးပါသော လူထုအဆောက်အဦးများလည်း ပျက်စီးသွားခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့သော ဖြစ်စဉ်သည် ယခုတစ်ကြိမ်သာ သီးခြားဖြစ်ပွားခြင်းမဟုတ်ဘဲ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၇) လ တစ်လျှောက်လုံး လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီမှ ပြည်သူများအပေါ် အကြိမ်ပေါင်း (၇၀) ကျော် အစုလိုက်၊ အပြုံလိုက် သတ်ဖြတ်ခြင်းများထဲမှ တစ်ခုသာဖြစ်ပါသည်။ မျက်မြင်သက်သေများက ၎င်းတို့ကြုံတွေ့ခဲ့ရသည့် ကြောက်မက်ဖွယ်ဖြစ်ရပ်ကို ကွင်းကွက်ကွင်းကွင်း ထင်ထင်ရှားရှား သက်သေထွက်ဆိုထားပါသည်။ ရုရှားတိုက်လေယာဉ်အမျိုးအစားများ ဖြစ်သည့် YAK-130 ၏ မြေပြင်ပေါ်တွင်ရှိသမျှကို ပစ်ခတ်မှုနှင့်အတူ အင်အားပြင်းဗုံးများဖြင့် ညောင်ကုန်းရွာ၊ ချင်းပြစ်ရွာနှင့် ပိတောက်ကုန်းရွာတို့ကို ပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်ခံရပြီး သေကြေပျက်စီးမှု ကြီးကြီးမားမားဖြစ်ပွားစေခဲ့ပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အာဏာရှင်များမှ ဆေးရုံများ၊ စာသင်ကျောင်းများ၊ ဘုန်းကြီးကျောင်းများနှင့် ခရစ်ယာန်ဘုရားကျောင်းများကို တမင်တကာပစ်မှတ်ထား အကြမ်းဖက်သည့်လုပ်ရပ်သည် လူ့အသက်ကို တန်ဖိုးမထားပဲ အပြစ်မဲ့အရပ်သားပြည်သူများကို ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ တိုက်ခိုက်ဖျက်ဆီး သတ်ဖြတ်နေပြီး လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ ၎င်းအကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်မှ ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်းကျူးလွန်နေသည်ကို ဖော်ပြနေပါသည်။ အသက်လုထွက်ပြေးနေသော ရွာသားများကို ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ တိုက်ခိုက်ရေး လေယာဉ်များပေါ်မှ ကျည်ဆန်များဖြင့် ပစ်ခတ်ခဲ့ပြီး နောက်ထပ် သေဆုံးမှုများဖြစ်ပွားခဲ့ကြောင်း မျက်မြင်သက်သေများက ထွက်ဆိုထားပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီတပ်သားများ၏ ကိုယ်ထိလက်ရောက် ကျူးလွန်မှုကြောင့် ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အသက်ပေါင်းများစွာဆုံးရှုံးသည်သာမကပဲ ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းနှင့် မီးရှို့ခြင်းများကြောင့် အိုးအိမ်များစွာ ဆုံးရှုံးပျက်စီးနေသည်။ အပြစ်မဲ့ပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အကြမ်းဖက်ခြင်းများကြောင့် ပြည်သူများ၏အသက်အိုးအိမ် ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးမှုများသည် အလွန်ဆိုးရွားသဖြင့် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ၏ အာရုံစိုက်မှုနှင့် ထိရောက်သည့် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ ချက်ချင်းလိုအပ်နေပါသည်။ မဖော်ပြနိုင်လောက်အောင် နာကျင်မှုနှင့် ဝမ်းနည်းပူဆွေးမှုများခံစားရသည့် ကျန်ရစ်သူမိသားစုဝင်များနှင့်အတူ ထပ်တူထပ်မျှ ဝမ်းနည်းပူဆွေးရပါသည်။ ဒဏ်ရာရရှိသည့် ပြည်သူများလည်း အမြန်ဆုံးပြန်လည်သက်သာ ကျန်းမာလာစေရန် ဆုတောင်းပေးနေပါသည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် အများပြည်သူကို တရားဓမ္မလမ်းပြပေးနေသော ရဟန်းသံဃာတစ်ပါး၏ အသက်ကိုပါ ဆုံးရှုံးစေခဲ့သဖြင့် ထိုလုပ်ရပ်အတွက်လည်း တာဝန်အပြည့်အဝယူရပါလိမ့်မည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီများက ယခုကဲ့သို့ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်းပေါ်တင် ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်ခြင်းသည် ၎င်းတို့ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သမျှသော ဆိုးရွားသည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှူများအတွက် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းက ထိရောက်သည့် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ မတွေ့ရသောကြောင့်ဖြစ်သည်။ အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ ရာဇဝတ်သားများဖြစ်သည့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်းတို့၏အပေါင်းအပါများ၊ မြန်မာပြည်သူအပေါ် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများပိုမိုကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် စစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းထောက်ပံ့သူများကို အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတရားဥပဒေများအရ ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူရန်လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ဤလုပ်ရပ်များ ချက်ချင်းရပ်တန့်ရမည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် ထောက်ခံအားပေးသည့် နိုင်ငံများရှိနေသေးသည်မှာ လွန်စွာရက်စက်ပြီး လက်နိုင်ခံစရာအကြောင်းမရှိပေ။ UN၏ နောက်ဆုံးထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်အရ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၇) လအတွင်းတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် အနည်းဆုံး အမေရိကန်ဒေါ်လာ (၁) ဘီလီယံ တန်ဖိုးရှိ စစ်လက်နက်များနှင့် နှစ်မျိုးသုံးလက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများကို အထူးသဖြင့် ရုရှားနိုင်ငံမှ ဝယ်ယူခဲ့ကြောင်းတွေ့ရသည်။ ဆိုလိုရင်းမှာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ယူကရိန်းပြည်သူအပေါ် ရုရှားနိုင်ငံကစစ်တိုက်ခြင်းကို ငွေကြေးအားဖြင့် တိုက်ရိုက်ကူညီနေခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဤအာဏာသိမ်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ဗိုလ်ချုပ်များသည် ရိုဟင်ဂျာလူမျိုးများကို လူမျိုးသတ်ဖြတ်ခဲ့ခြင်းအတွက် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတရားရုံး (ICJ) တွင် တရားစွဲဆိုခြင်းခံနေရသည်။ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သည့် စစ်အာဏာရှင်များနှင့် အပေါင်းအပါများသည် သူတို့ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သမျှသော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများအားလုံးအတွက် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာတရားဥပဒေအောက်တွင် မုချအရေးယူခံရမည်။ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီက စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း ပုလဲမြို့တွင် ကျူးလွန်သည့် အစုလိုက်အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုသည် အာဆီယံ ဘုံသဘောတူညီချက်(၅)ချက်နှင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပေါ်ချမှတ်သည့် UN လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များကို တိုက်ရိုက်ချိုးဖြတ်နေခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏လုပ်ရပ်ကို အာဆီယံနှင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီက လစ်လျူရှုခြင်းကြောင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ်ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများကို ပိုမိုတိုးပွားစေသည်။ ယင်းအစား ဗီတိုအာဏာပိုင်အချို့နှင့် UN လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ၏ အမြဲတမ်းအဖွဲ့ဝင်အချို့တို့သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏တရားဝင်အစိုးရဖြစ်သည့် NUG ကိုအသိအမှတ်ပြုပြီး အတူတကွလုပ်ဆောင်မည့်အစား မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထုအပေါ် လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှုများ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီကိုထောက်ပံ့နေကြပြီး ဤလုပ်ရပ်များသည် ဒေသတွင်း ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကိုသာမက ကမ္ဘာ့ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်သော လူသားမျိုးနွယ်ကို ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ အမြောက်အမြားပါဝင်သည်။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား တိုက်ရိုက်သော်လည်းကောင်း၊ သွယ်ဝှိုက်သော်လည်းကောင်း ထောက်ပံ့ခြင်းများအားလုံး ချက်ချင်းရပ်တန့်ရမည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ဆန့်ကျင်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုအား ပုံမှန်ဖြစ်အောင် မည်သည့်အခါမှ ခွင့်ပြုမှာမဟုတ်ပါ။ ဤကဲ့သို့သော လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ချက်ချင်းရပ်တန့်ရန်အတွက် သက်ဆိုင်ရာအပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများက လျင်မြန်ပြတ်သားစွာ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်ရန် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ လူမဆန်သော အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား လေယာဉ်ဆီများ ထောက်ပံ့ပေးသည့်လမ်းကြောင်းများကို ပစ်မှတ်ထား အရေးယူဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့ရန် တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း၊ ပုလဲမြို့နယ်တွင် စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အစုလိုက်၊ အပြုံလိုက်သတ်ဖြတ်မှုပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအား တရားစီရင်ပြီး ပြည်သူများအားလိုအပ်သည့် ထောက်ပံ့မှုများပေးနိုင်ရန် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ သက်ဆိုင်ရာအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား တောင်းဆိုအပ်ပါသည်။ မျက်မြင်များ၏ သက်သေထွက်ဆိုချက်များသည် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်ကို ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်ရန် နိုင်ငံတကာမှ ကြားဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်မှု အရေးတကြီးလိုအပ်ကြောင်း သတိပေးနေပါသည်။ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ရေရှည်တည်တံ့သော ဖြေရှင်းမှုများပြုလုပ်နိုင်ရန် အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့် အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်သင့်သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီရရှိပြီး အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများပပျောက်ကာ လူတိုင်း တန်းတူအခွင့်အရေး၊ ဂုဏ်သိက္ခာနှင့် လေးစားမှုရရှိသော အနာဂတ်ဆီသို့သွားနိုင်ရန် လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်နေသော စစ်ကောင်စီကို အမြစ်ဖြတ်ချေမှုန်းရမည်။ မည်သည့်လူသားမဆို ယခုကဲ့သို့ ဖော်ပြရန်ပင်မစွမ်းသာတဲ့ ကြောက်စရာအတွေ့အကြုံများနှင့် ဆုံးရှုံးမှုများကို ဘယ်တော့မှ မခံစားသင့်ပေ။ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုနှင့် ဖိနှိပ်မှုများ ကင်းရှင်းပြီး ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ နေထိုင်နိုင်ရန် ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အားလုံး စုပေါင်းလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-06-29
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-30
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Title: Condemnation of the Massacre in Pale Township, Sagaing Division, Myanmar, by the Brutal Genocidal Military Junta - SAC and Their Partners in Crimes
Description: "We strongly condemn the heinous massacre that occurred in Pale Township, Sagaing Division, Myanmar, on June 27th, orchestrated by the brutal genocidal military junta. This merciless act resulted in the deaths of at least 10 innocent villagers, including a revered monk and a student, and the wanton destruction of monasteries, schools, and other vital community structures. It is crucial to recognize that this is not an isolated incident but rather one among a series of over 70 massacres committed by the brutal genocidal military junta in the past 27 months alone. The witness testimonies vividly recount the horrifying events that unfolded. The indiscriminate firing of Russian fighter jets YAK-130, along with the deployment of large bombs, deliberately targeted innocent villagers and villages such as Nyaung Kone, Chin Pyit, and Pi Tauk Kone villages, causing widespread devastation and claiming the lives of men, women, students, and monks. The deliberate targeting of civilians, homes, hospitals, schools, monasteries, and churches demonstrates a flagrant disregard for human life, openly committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, and a calculated effort to inflict suffering on innocent civilians. According to witnesses, fleeing villagers were subjected to relentless attacks, with bullets fired from the fighter jets, resulting in additional casualties. The destruction caused by the military junta's assault extended beyond the immediate loss of life, with houses being consumed by fires sparked by the bombardment. The scale of violence and destruction inflicted upon the affected communities is deeply distressing and requires immediate international attention and action. We offer our deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of the victims, who are enduring unimaginable pain and grief. Our thoughts and prayers are also with those who have been injured, and we fervently hope for their swift recovery. The loss of innocent lives, including a young student and a monk dedicated to spiritual guidance, is an irreparable tragedy that demands justice and accountability. The brutal genocidal military junta has been openly and freely committing these heinous crimes against humanity because they see no real actions taken against them by ASEAN and the international community for the crimes they have been committing everyday, therefore they perceived no action against them as license to commit more crimes against humanity against the population of Myanmar. This has to stop!. It is totally unacceptable that some countries are still supporting the genocidal military junta to commit more crimes against humanity against the population of Myanmar. According to the recent UN report, the genocidal military have received more than $ 1billion worth weapons and dual use from these countries knowing that this same genocidal military generals in Myanmar are facing the case of genocide against Rohingya population.The genocidal military junta and their partners in crimes must be hold accountable for their mass atrocities under the international laws. This Pale Massacre is another textbook of the brutal genocidal military junta directly violating ASEAN's five points on Myanmar and the UN Security Council Resolution on Myanmar. The inaction from the ASEAN and the UN Security Council have led to more crimes against humanity . Instead of taking decisive actions against genocidal military junta and recognising and fully engaging with the true democratic representative of the people of Myanmar, the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), some veto power holders and permanent members of the UN Security Council and some members of ASEAN countries are directly supporting the genocidal military junta, and their support is massively contributing to these crimes against humanity, which threaten not only peace and security in the region but the world. The people of Myanmar will never allow the normalisation of crimes against humanity. To put an end to these grave human rights abuses, we implore the international community to take swift and decisive action. One effective measure would be to impose sanctions on the jet fuels used by the military junta, which would hinder their ability to carry out such ruthless attacks. We call upon international agencies and organisations to launch a thorough investigation into the Pale Township massacre, ensuring that the perpetrators are brought to justice and that the affected community is provided with adequate support and protection. The witness testimonies stand as a stark reminder of the urgent need for international intervention to safeguard the lives and dignity of the people of Myanmar. The international community must unite to address these ongoing human rights abuses and work towards a sustainable solution. It is imperative to establish a federal democracy in Myanmar and remove the genocidal military junta to prevent further atrocities and uphold the principles of human dignity, justice, and respect for human rights. No human being should ever have to endure such unspeakable terror and loss. Together, we must take collective action to ensure that the people of Myanmar can live in peace, free from the grip of violence and oppression..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of International Cooperation Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-06-29
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-29
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Can China help bring peace to Myanmar?
Description: "The ASEAN Summit in Indonesia in May 2023 saw, once again, the problem for Southeast Asian leaders seeking better outcomes to Myanmar’s political and humanitarian crises. Pleas for giving greater attention to the fading Five-Point Consensus from 2021 jostled with growing disdain for the self-destructive tendencies of Myanmar’s military leadership. Part of the deal for respectability in ASEAN is to focus on practical and reasonable steps to achieve agreed outcomes. Myanmar now fails every time. Such failure means Myanmar is a problem for China’s leaders too, who have been watching closely since the 2021 military coup. China’s foreign policy establishment and analysts think deeply about the opportunities and risks of future scenarios across Southeast Asia. It should not be forgotten that former leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s deposed government in Myanmar was in key respects a useful partner for China’s regional ambitions. The coup was probably judged an unhelpful complication. For Chinese strategists, a primary consideration is access to the Indian Ocean. That access made it possible for China to import around US$1.5 billion of natural gas in 2022 from the Rakhine State coast, across central Myanmar, up through Myanmar’s mountainous Shan State and to Yunnan province in China. In a future regional security crisis, where maritime access was in doubt, Myanmar might also allow valuable ‘back door’ access for China to friendly ports on the Bay of Bengal. With such scenarios in mind, the economic relativities of the Myanmar–China relationship are worth considering. According to 2021 World Bank data, Myanmar’s nominal GDP was US$65 billion (US$1200 per capita), while China’s was US$17.73 trillion (US$12,200 per capita). To put Myanmar’s poverty in perspective, if it were a Chinese province, its economy would be the third smallest. It would only best two of China’s remote landlocked regions, Tibet and Qinghai — which are both still at least five times richer per capita. Yunnan — the Chinese province neighbouring Myanmar, and with many geographical and cultural commonalities — has a GDP of around $430 billion a year. This is over six times larger than Myanmar’s, and around nine times more on a per capita basis. With such incredible disparity in wealth, anti-Chinese politics in Myanmar, while usually only a fringe issue, can ignite quickly given local resentment against Myanmar’s commercially successful ethnic Chinese minority. This old story, replayed around Southeast Asia over centuries, is a fact of life for Chinese diplomats seeking to build relationships that offer mutual benefit. With China a significant supplier of weapons and training to Myanmar government forces, and also to some ethnic armies, it is entangled in the country’s politics in ways that are both profitable and problematic. Exactly how much of this involvement is centrally planned in Beijing is an open question. Yunnanese authorities have a habit of seeking local solutions through the often unruly borderlands. Under President Xi Jinping, Chinese diplomacy has yet to get much momentum for its ‘peacemaking’ activities in such a contested environment. More than two years after the coup, China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang recently met with Myanmar Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, becoming the highest-ranking Chinese official to meet with the coup leader. With more high-level engagement likely soon, the question of how China can encourage positive outcomes for Myanmar requires a focus on its core interests. While Myanmar’s economic growth until the coup was advantageous, the fact that the coup leaders are almost friendless — and despised even in ASEAN — offers different upside. For now, China can harness the Myanmar military’s appetite for attack aircraft, heavy weapons and constant resupply of ammunition and technical equipment to bolster its role as the patron-in-chief. Russia has traditionally taken a similar approach. For Beijing and Moscow, Myanmar is part of a convenient global constellation of countries pushed to the outer edge of the international system. Whatever its short-term strategy, it would help China’s standing in ASEAN, and even in countries like Australia, if it showed a creative instinct to use its wealth and influence to broker better outcomes for the people of Myanmar. The fear is that China will instead continue to manipulate Myanmar’s impoverished and downtrodden status while fuelling, through its lucrative weapons exports, some of the most atrocious violence seen in Southeast Asia for generations. When the dust finally settles in Myanmar, its people will rightly ask who sustained the reviled military regime. Right now, the answer is that Beijing offered ‘friendship’ to the coup-makers, an irony for a Communist Party so committed to regime and institutional stability. Yet with the right attention to China’s role and self-interests, it is still possible to imagine shifting positions, where Chinese institutions eventually work out how to negotiate a more peaceful settlement. At a time when China talks regularly about peace in European, Middle Eastern and African conflict zones, a positive contribution in Myanmar would be welcomed by all..."
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Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication: 2023-06-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: National Unity Government: Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - Announcement 1/2023
Sub-title: Announcement regarding illegal issuance, sale and distribution of government securities
Description: "1. It has come to the attention of the Ministry that the illegal military council, a designated terrorist organisation, through its subordinate institutions, have been raising desperately needed funds in the form of public debt through quarterly sale of government securities in the domestic market in order to perpetuate their illegal and tenuous hold on power and to prosecute their murderous reign of terror against the people; and that the auction calendar for the second quarter of the fiscal year 2023/2024 is as follows: 2. Pursuant to the Law Amending the Public Debt Management Law (Third Amendment), the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No 4, 2021), all activities pertaining to the issuance, sale and distribution of government securities shall be conducted only with the express approval of the National Unity of Government. Any auctions of debt conducted without the approval of the National Unity Government shall result in no lawful liability on the State or the Government, and shall give rise to no valid claim against the State or the Government, as delineated under the following sections of the Law: Section 46: Any borrowing, debt or liability incurred by, or on behalf of, a Restricted Entity on or after 1 February 2021 shall not constitute a Government Debt, or Public Debt or Publicly Guaranteed Debt. All agreements, instruments or guarantees entered into by, or on behalf of, a Restricted Entity in connection with such borrowing, debt or liability shall have no binding legal effect on the State of the Government. Section 47: No claims shall be made against the State of the Government or any successor body in connection with any borrowing, debt, liabilities or debt servicing of a Restricted Entity. 3. It is hereby further reiterated that no legal claim shall be levied against the State or the Government in association with the debts accrued through government securities, raised by the illegal military council and its subordinate institutions, from or after 1 February 2021..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of publication: 2023-06-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ စီမံကိန်း၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှင့် ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှုံမှုဝန်ကြီးဌာန ကြေညာချက် ( ၁ /၂၀၂၃)
Sub-title: အစိုးရငွေချေးသက်သေခံလက်မှတ်များ တရားမဝင်ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချ၍ ငွေချေးယူနေခြင်းနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသည့်ကြေညာချက်
Description: "၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ကြေညာထားပြီးဖြစ်သည့် တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ယင်း၏ လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် ၎င်းတို့သက်ဆိုးရှည် စေရန်နှင့်ပြည်သူလူထုအား အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်နိုင်ရန် အရေးပေါ်လိုအပ်နေသော ဘတ်ဂျက်လိုငွေ ဖြည့်ဆည်းနိုင်ရေးအတွက် အစိုးရငွေချေးသက်သေခံလက်မှတ်များကို ၃ လပတ်အလိုက် အချိန် ဇယား ရေးဆွဲပြီး ပြည်တွင်း၌ ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချ၍ ငွေချေးယူလျက်ရှိကြောင်းနှင့် ၂၀၂၃-၂၀၂၄ ခု၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရေးနှစ် ဒုတိယသုံးလပတ်အတွက် အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချ၍ ငွေချေးယူရန် စီစဉ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်- ၂။ ပြည်သူ့ကြွေးမြီ စီမံခန့်ခွဲမှုဥပဒေကို တတိယအကြိမ်ပြင်ဆင်သည့်ဥပဒေ (၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုလွှတ်တော် ဥပဒေအမှတ် ၄) အရ အစိုးရငွေချေးသက်သေခံလက်မှတ်များ ထုတ်ဝေ ရောင်းချ၍ ငွေချေးယူခြင်းကို အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ သဘောတူခွင့်ပြုချက်ဖြင့်သာ ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၏ ခွင့်ပြုချက်မရှိဘဲ ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းသည် နိုင်ငံတော် (သို့မဟုတ်) အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အပေါ် ဥပဒေအရ သက်ရောက်မှုရှိမည် မဟုတ်ကြောင်းနှင့် နိုင်ငံတော် (သို့မဟုတ်) အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အပေါ် တောင်းဆိုပိုင်ခွင့်ရှိမည် မဟုတ်ကြောင်းကို အောက်ပါ အတိုင်း အတိအလင်း ပြဋ္ဌာန်းပြီးဖြစ်သည်- ပုဒ်မ ၄၆။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ ကန့်သတ်ထားသော အဖွဲ့အစည်း တစ်ရပ်ရပ်၏ ငွေချေးယူခြင်း၊ ကြွေးမြီတင်ရှိခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် ပေးရန်တာဝန်ရှိခြင်းသည် အစိုးရကြွေးမြီ သို့မဟုတ် ပြည်သူ့ကြွေးမြီ သို့မဟုတ် နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အာမခံချက်ရှိသည့် ကြွေးမြီဟု မှတ်ယူခြင်းမပြုရ။ ထိုကဲ့သို့သော ငွေချေးခြင်း၊ ကြွေးမြီ သို့မဟုတ် ပေးရန်တာဝန် ရှိမှုတို့နှင့် စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ကန့်သတ်ထားသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းတစ်ရပ်ရပ်မှ ချုပ်ဆိုထားသော သဘောတူညီချက်များ၊ စာချုပ်စာတမ်းများ သို့မဟုတ် အာမခံချက်များအားလုံးသည် နိုင်ငံတော် သို့မဟုတ် အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အပေါ်တွင် ဥပဒေအရသက်ရောက်မှုမရှိစေရ။ ပုဒ်မ ၄၇။ ကန့်သတ်ထားသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းတစ်ခု၏ ချေးငွေ၊ ကြွေးမြီ၊ တာဝန်ဝတ္တရား များ သို့မဟုတ် ကြွေးမြီဝန်ဆောင်မှုနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ နိုင်ငံတော် သို့မဟုတ် အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အပေါ် တွင် တောင်းဆိုပိုင်ခွင့်မရှိစေရ။ ၃။ သို့ဖြစ်ပါ၍ တရားမဝင် အာဏာသိမ်းစစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်း၏လက်အောက်ခံအဖွဲ့အစည်း များက ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ ထုတ်ဝေရောင်းချပြီး ငွေချေးယူနေသည့် အစိုးရ ငွေချေးသက်သေခံလက်မှတ်များအားလုံးသည် အစိုးရကြွေးမြီ (သို့မဟုတ်) ပြည်သူ့ကြွေးမြီ (သို့မဟုတ်)နိုင်ငံတော်၏အာမခံချက်ရှိသည့်ကြွေးမြီများ မဟုတ်သည့်အတွက် နိုင်ငံတော် (သို့မဟုတ်) အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အပေါ် တောင်းဆိုပိုင်ခွင့်မရှိကြောင်း အသိပေးကြေညာလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment - NUG
Date of publication: 2023-06-28
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-28
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: National Unity Government Weekly Press Update (25/2023)
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-06-26
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Will the first Myanmar border guard defection have a contagion effect?
Sub-title: It is imperative that the NUG successfully integrate the defecting Karenni forces and accommodate their leadership.
Description: "The slowing of Myanmar military defections to the National Unity Government (NUG) since 2022 challenges the opposition theory of victory based on hollowing out the junta army as an effective fighting force, spread too thinly across too many fronts. The Myanmar military’s most important victory to date may not have been on the battlefield, but in the barracks, having staved off mass defections. Cracks have recently emerged, however, as the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) announced that its two battalions had defected to the NUG. The border guard forces on the country’s eastern frontier with Thailand had been integrated into the Myanmar military for more than a decade. Though small with only a few hundred men, it is the first Border Guard Force (BGF) to defect en masse. And while it is one of dozens of BGFs, which are in no way a monolithic force, the reasons for their defection may be shared more widely across the multi-ethnic country of 55 million people. The Border Guard Forces Border Guard Forces emerged as the Myanmar military reached ceasefires with various ethnic resistance organizations that had been fighting the central government for decades. This accelerated during the National Ceasefire Agreement process, during which 10 ethnic armies signed a pact with the military in 2015. The military sought to divide the different ethnic armies and buy off individual commanders with promises of local autonomy, control over lucrative cross-border trade and more control over special economic zones. The most notorious example of these zones is the gambling hub of Shwe Kokko in eastern Kayin state. In 1994, a group broke away from the Karen National Union/Liberation Army (KNLA), establishing themselves as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. In 2009-2010, they became the Kayin State Border Guard Force, under the leadership of Colonel Saw Chit Thu, and formally integrated into Myanmar's military. Under the agreement, Saw Chit Thu was allowed to develop the area. Enter a Chinese national, with Cambodian citizenship, She Zhijiang, whose Yatai International Holdings pledged to invest $15 billion in Shwe Kokko, starting in 2017. Yatai New City is nothing but a hub of gambling, human and drug trafficking, and on-line scam centers. An ex-BGF colonel, Saw Min Min Oo, is one of directors of Myanmar Yatai, the local partner. Another key player is Chit Lin Myaing Co., ostensibly the corporate holding company of Saw Chit Thu’s Border Guard Force. In December 2020, the military raided Shwe Kokko, but when the government tried to oust Saw Chit Thu in January 2021 some 7,000 border guards threatened to resign in protest, forcing a government rethink. The government quickly reappointed him and Saw Chit Thu became an important military ally following their seizure of power on Feb. 1, 2021. Since then, Shwe Kokko has grown, with rents paid to the State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta formally calls itself. Thailand arrested She Zhijiang in August 2022 at China’s request and will soon extradite him, but business continues. Under pressure from China, Thai authorities briefly turned off the power to Shwe Kokko and other SEZs in June 2023. Border Guard Forces have done much of the front-line duty against the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the cost of doing business with the junta. In April 2023, there was intense fighting near Shwe Kokko, which caused a large refugee exodus into Thailand. Though the junta’s border guards suffered heavy casualties, they were supported by the Myanmar Air Force, which eventually pushed the KNLA back; the KNLA and allied People's Defence Force militias suffered their own heavy losses. Since the coup, casinos and scam centers, funded by Chinese transnational criminal enterprises, have proliferated along the border, under the protection of Naypyidaw-backed BGFs. They are an important financial lifeline for the economically beleaguered junta, whose sources of revenue have dwindled due to their economic mismanagement. The Karenni patchwork Like elsewhere in Myanmar’s border regions, the political tapestries are complex and there are a multiplicity of actors in Kayah state. The Karenni National Progressive Party immediately joined with the NUG following the February 2021 coup and has actively fought against junta forces. They have worked with the Karen Nationalities Defense Force that was established following the coup as an umbrella for local people’s defense forces in Kayah State and southern Shan State. The KNPLF was one of the 2015 National Ceasefire Agreement parties, formally integrated into the military as the Karenni Border Guards Force. Despite being on the junta’s side, the KNPLF has been attacked by the Myanmar military. On 24 December 2021, over 100 members of the 66th Light Infantry Division massacred and incinerated the bodies of some 40 civilians, including two aid workers from Save the Children, in Hpruso. When the KNPLF tried to intervene and secure the release of detained civilians, the military killed four of their members. In early 2023, the KNPLF refused to attend a ceasefire meeting in the capital Naypyitaw. Unlike other BGFs, the KNPLF control no special economic zone. As such their defection is not a financial loss for the junta. With fewer financial incentives than the border guards in Shwe Kokko and other areas, the KNPLF has been less willing to fight on behalf of the junta or be used as cannon fodder. Fighting in the Karenni region has subsided in relative terms, according to the think tanks IISS and ACLED. And there may be a reason for the decline in violence: The various Karenni forces have routed the military in recent engagements. In reply, the military has increased air attacks; some 108 in Kayah state in April, alone. There’s been at least at least two since the defection, with more expected. And yet, it is a loss and one more piece of the border that the junta no longer controls, between the Karen region and Shan State, adjacent to Thailand’s Mae Hong Son and close to Naypyitaw. While numerically small, the KNPLF immediately joined in military operations against the junta, which had tried to seize their headquarters in Mese township. Several military outposts near Mese fell over this past weekend, and there are reports that Light Infantry Battalion 430 surrendered, with up to 100 troops. If so, it would be the largest surrender to date. Finally, on June 12, a group of ethnic armies and opposition militias established the Karenni State Interim Executive Council, the first revolutionary state government established. The KNPLF’s defection helps to maintain political solidarity. Contagion unlikely Every Border Guard Force is their own organization, with their own political and economic motivations to maintain their alliance with the junta. The BGFs who control the special economic zones in Shwe Kokko, KK Park, and Kokang still have a financial incentive to stay loyal to the junta. Many fear the more puritanical ethnic armies, which are vehemently against the gambling and human trafficking that goes on within the economic zones and might not countenance being under the NUG umbrella. And given the fighting that has transpired between some BGFs and ethnic armies, the latter may not be too willing to embrace their formal rivals. Spread thin, the junta needs the border guards now more than ever, which gives them additional leverage over Naypyitaw. A contagion is unlikely, but the first BGF to defect represents a crack. As the junta fails to provide other BGFs with materiel or air support, while milking them for funds and using them as fodder, some groups may take note. To that end, it’s imperative that the NUG handle this well, integrating the defecting Karenni forces and accommodating their leadership. After all, the theory of victory is based on the man-by-man, unit-by-unit hollowing out the junta’s forces..."
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Source/publisher: "RFA" (USA)
Date of publication: 2023-06-27
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၃/၂၀၂၃)
Sub-title: အခြေခံအလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်နေမှုများ၊ အလုပ်သမားခေါင်းဆောင်များအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးနှိပ်စက်နေမှုများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်
Description: "၁။ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လအတွင်း ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းဒေသကြီးရှိ စက်မှုဇုန်များမှ လုပ်ငန်းရှင်အချို့သည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း၍ အခြေခံအလုပ်သမား အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများအပြင် အလုပ်သမားခေါင်းဆောင်များအား မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း၊ အလုပ်မှထုတ်ပစ်ခြင်း တို့ကို အောက်ပါ အတိုင်း ပြောင်ပြောင်တင်းတင်း ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်- (က) ၃-၆-၂၀၂၃ ရက်နေ့တွင် ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ လှိုင်သာယာမြို့နယ်၊ စက်မှုဇုန် (၅)၊ မလိခလမ်းရှိ ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံသားပိုင် JAKO ကုန်အမှတ်တံဆိပ်ချုပ်လုပ်သည့် Sun Apparel Myanmar အထည်ချုပ်စက်ရုံမှ အလုပ်သမား ၄၀၀ ဦးတို့သည် လုပ်ခ လစာတိုးမြှင့်ပေးရေး၊ အလုပ်ပိတ်ရက် အကျိုးခံစားခွင့်များ ရရှိရေး၊ သန့်ရှင်းသော သောက်ရေနှင့် ထမင်းစာဆောင် သီးသန့်စီစဉ်ပေးရေး စသည်တို့ကို ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ စုဝေးတောင်းဆိုခဲ့ရာ လုပ်သမားခေါင်းဆောင် (၂)ဦး ကို စစ်ကောင်စီမှ လုပ်ငန်းခွင် တွင်း ဝင်ရောက်ဖမ်းဆီး၍ စစ်ကြောရေးသို့ ပို့ဆောင်ခြင်း၊ ( ခ) ၁၀-၆-၂၀၂၃ ရက်နေ့တွင် ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ ရွှေပြည်သာမြို့နယ်၊ သာဓုကန် စက်မှုဇုန်ရှိ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသားပိုင် ZARA နှင့် Inditex ကုန်အမှတ်တံဆိပ်များ ထုတ်လုပ်လျက် ရှိသည့် Hosheng Myanmar စက်ရုံ၌ စားဝတ်နေရေး ကျပ်တည်းမှုနှင့် ကုန်ဈေးနှုန်း ကြီးမြင့်မှုကြောင့် တစ်နေ့လုပ်အားခ (၅၆၀၀)ကျပ် တိုးမြှင့်သတ်မှတ်ပေးရန် တောင်းဆိုခဲ့သည့် အလုပ်သမားခေါင်းဆောင်(၇)ဦးအား အလုပ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ်ခြင်း၊ အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေးများရရှိရေး ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ စုဝေး တောင်းဆိုခဲ့သည့် စက်ရုံမှ အလုပ်သမား ၆၀၀ ကျော်အား စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း ၍ စက်ရုံသို့ လာရောက်ပြီး ခြိမ်းခြောက်ပြောဆိုခြင်း၊ ညှိနှိုင်းဖြေရှင်းရန် မြို့နယ် အထွေထွေအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူးရုံးသို့ လာရောက်ခဲ့သည့် အလုပ်ထုတ်ခံထားရသော အလုပ်သမားသမဂ္ဂ အတွင်းရေးမှူးနှင့် အခြားခေါင်းဆောင်တစ်ဦးအား စစ်ကောင်စီ မှ မတရားဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း၊ ( ဂ) ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ လှိုင်သာယာမြို့နယ်၊ စက်မှုဇုန် (၃)၊ ကျန်စစ်သားလမ်းရှိ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသားပိုင် ZARA, Only, DIVIDED (H & M) ကုန်အမှတ်တံဆိတ်များ ထုတ်လုပ်နေသည့် Myanmar York အထည်ချုပ်စက်ရုံတွင် သတ်မှတ်အလုပ်ချိန် ထက် ကျော်လွန်ခိုင်းစေခြင်း၊ အလုပ်သမားများ၏ ဆန္ဒမပါဘဲ အချိန်ပို လုပ်ကိုင်ရ ခြင်း၊ အချိန်ပိုလုပ်ကိုင်သူများအတွက် လိုအပ်သည့် သက်သာချောင်ချိရေး အစီအမံ များ စီစဉ်မပေးခြင်း၊ ခွင့်ရက်များ အပြည့်အဝ ခံစားခွင့် မရခြင်း၊ အလုပ်သမားများ လုပ်နိုင်စွမ်းရှိသည့် ကုန်ထုတ်စံနှုန်းထက် ပိုမိုထွက်ရှိရေး ဖိအားပေးခိုင်းစေခြင်း၊ တစ်ခါတရံ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်သူများက ကိုယ်ထိလက်ရောက် ကျူးလွန်ခြင်း စသည့် အခွင့်အရေးများ ချိုးဖောက်ခံနေရခြင်း။ ၂။ စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ၎င်း၏ သြဇာခံ အလုပ်ရှင်များသည် ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ်၊ ဖေဖော်ဝါရီလ ၁ ရက်နေ့မှ စ၍ အလုပ်သမားသမဂ္ဂ ခေါင်းဆောင်များနှင့် အဖွဲ့ဝင်များကို အလုပ်မှ ထုတ်ပစ်ခြင်း၊ ဖမ်းဆီးခြင်း၊ ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခြင်း၊ လွတ်လပ်စွာသင်းပင်းဖွဲ့စည်းခွင့်၊ စုပေါင်းအရေးဆိုခွင့်နှင့် စည်းရုံးခွင့်ကို ပိတ်ပင် တားမြစ်ခြင်း၊ လခစားအလုပ်သမားများကို နေ့စားအလုပ်သမားအဖြစ် ပြောင်းပစ်ခြင်းနှင့် ဖိအားပေး ခိုင်းစေခြင်း၊ လုပ်အားခေါင်းပုံဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အလုပ်သမားများ ရသင့်ရထိုက်သည့် လုပ်ငန်းခွင်ဆိုင်ရာ အခြေခံအခွင့်အရေးများကို အပြည့်အဝ မပေးခြင်းစသည့် အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှု များကို ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။ ၃။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာနက ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ ဩဂုတ်လ ၂၇ ရက် နေ့တွင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော အလုပ်သမားများနှင့် အလုပ်ခန့်ထားမှုအပေါ် ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှုများ၊ အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်နေမှုများနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် ကြေညာချက်အမှတ် (၁၁/၂၀၂၂) နှင့် ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ်၊ နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၂၁ ရက်နေ့တွင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့သော အလုပ်သမားသမဂ္ဂများ လွတ်လပ် စွာ ဖွဲ့စည်းခွင့်နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် မည်သို့သော ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုကိုမျှ လုံးဝမပြု လုပ်ရေးနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် ကြေငြာချက်အမှတ် (၁၃/၂၀၂၂)တို့ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခဲ့ပြီးဖြစ်ရာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများတွင် အားပေးကူညီသူများ မဖြစ်စေရေး အလုပ်သမားအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ သမဂ္ဂများ၊ အလုပ်သမားအဖွဲ့ချုပ်များအနေဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်အတိုင်း လိုက်နာရန် အထူးလိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ၄။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း အခြေခံအလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်နေသည့် အလုပ်ရှင်များ၊ Brand/ buyers များအား နိုင်ငံတကာပြဋ္ဌာန်းချက်များနှင့်အညီ ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ရန်အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန အနေဖြင့် ILO နှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပြီး အလုပ်သမားအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအနေဖြင့်လည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေးနှင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုများကို အမြန်ဆုံးရပ်တန့်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် ကျူးလွန်သူများအား ထိရောက်စွာ အရေးယူ နိုင်ရေး တက်ကြွစွာ ဝိုင်းဝန်းပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ပေးကြပါရန် တိုက်တွန်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ၅။ ပြည်တွင်းတွင် ရပ်တည်လုပ်ကိုင်နေသည့် လုပ်ငန်းရှင်များအနေဖြင့်လည်း အလုပ်သမား အခွင့်အရေးများ၊ စံတန်ဖိုးများအား လေးစားလိုက်နာကြရန် အထူးလိုအပ်ပါသည်။ လူမျိုးတုန်း သတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာတွင် တရားစွဲခံ ထားရသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းပြီး အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခြင်း များသည် သာမန် အလုပ်သမားအခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုမျှသာမဟုတ်ဘဲ ရာဇဝတ်မှုမြောက်သော ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများဖြစ်သောကြောင့် လုပ်ငန်းရှင်များအနေဖြင့်လည်း အထူးရှောင်ရှားရန် နှင့် ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နေပါက ထိရောက်သော ဟန့်တားအရေးယူမှုများ ဆောင်ရွက်မည် ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာလိုက်သည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Labour - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-06-27
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-27
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Format : pdf
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Title: A Criminal Cancer Spreads in Southeast Asia
Sub-title: In post-coup Myanmar, crime syndicates, working with the military, are moving into more complex fraud schemes from a growing number of autonomous enclaves.
Description: "In the fractured authority surrounding crime-group controlled enclaves on the Moei River separating Thailand and Myanmar, this is what a crackdown on armed gangsters looks like: China presses Myanmar’s military junta — a sometimes client of Beijing — to make Thailand cut electric power to a large gambling and fraud hub run by Chinese crime syndicates across the river in Myanmar. The military-supervised Border Guard Force in the area, a partner of the syndicates, responds with threats to shut down cross-border trade. Then, giant generators appear in the enclave, deployed by the border guards and the gangs. The army, without explanation, does nothing. Individual commanders, if not the army itself, are believed to profit from the criminal activity. Business as usual continues. That is roughly how it goes along Myanmar’s lawless border, with variations for geography and the local cast of characters. Late last year, awareness began to rise in the region that Myanmar’s criminal enclaves were metastasizing, and the call do something about it grew louder from the media, civil society and governments. While the zones themselves were not a new phenomenon, a nefarious development amplified international alarm: After Beijing’s anti-COVID measures sent Chinese workers scurrying home from the enclaves, their criminal operators began luring jobseekers from around the world with offers of lucrative high-tech jobs, then trafficking them across borders into cyber slavery to work in financial scams. Despite the growing perception of the enclaves as a global security threat, nothing of consequence has changed. Every angle of attack is blunted by the tangle of interests in these zones — powerful organized criminal groups, local armed actors, fragmented sovereignty, and corruption, with the gambling and fraud city of Shwe Kokko at the heart of it all. Myanmar’s military has neither the will nor the capacity to manage its own Border Guard Forces (BGF), much less curb the reach of transnational crime from enclaves under BGF control. Much of the country, embroiled in full scale revolution against the junta, is beyond the reach of the overstretched army. It will be up to key neighboring countries, in cooperation with international law enforcement, to cut off access to critical cross-border connections and resources. For the United States, which has already been victimized, this crime wave represents a growing non-traditional security threat that requires a robust response. BGF and Its Criminal Syndicates Grow Deeper Roots in Myanmar At least 17 distinct crime zones now provide an estimated 5 million square meters of criminal office space along a 31-mile stretch of the Moei River on the Myanmar border with Thailand alone. Despite strict border controls and lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic, these zones expanded dramatically in size following the 2021 military coup. For example, the notorious KK Park Zone — sensationalized on Tik-Tok for harvesting and selling the organs of trafficking victims who refused to work on scams — grew from 26 to over 75 structures between 2021 and May 2023. By early last year, the criminal activity had victimized nationals of more than 46 countries, with the majority trafficked into Myanmar through Thailand. Despite increased awareness of the problems by the media and international law enforcement, the gangs continued expanding their ability to infiltrate online hiring platforms, set up fraudulent recruitment firms and networks, establish links with traffickers, and set up shop in new jurisdictions across Myanmar. By March 2023, growing organized crime activity in Karen State began to generate tremendous pressure for action even on resistance figures. Karen civil society groups raised concerns that the BGF’s illicit pursuits threatened to undermine governance and prospects for democracy and autonomy in Karen State, as suspicion deepened that a growing number of Karen resistance leaders had ties to the BGF schemes. In April, tensions spilled into armed conflict when a coalition of pro-democracy armed forces attacked the BGF criminal empire in Shwe Kokko and other illicit BGF businesses in Myawaddy township. “Shwe Kokko is a hub of drugs and sex-trafficking that funds the military regime with dirty money,” they charged. The junta responded with a joint force of BGF and army troops, intercepting the advancing resistance fighters, crushing a key People’s Defense Force group, and taking dozens of hostages. Thus, the junta proudly demonstrated its determination to keep Shwe Kokko a safe zone for crime. An Online Confidence Scheme — ‘Pig Butchering’ — Goes Global Initially focused on illegal online gambling, the crime zone operators now concentrate on a new form of fraud known as “pig butchering” or in Chinese, “shazupan.” The scheme originated in China around 2018, and as COVID depressed profits from gambling, Chinese-affiliated crime groups ramped it up. Here’s how it works: Scammers lure potential victims into trusting online relationships over a long period. Eventually, the scammer proposes a small investment idea and often transfers to the victim purported returns over what appear to be legitimate online trading platforms. This process, known as “fatting the pig,” continues until the victim feels secure enough to hand over substantial funds. The scammer then “butchers the pig” and disappears with the money. Some syndicates are developing new forms of artificial intelligence to identify potential victims on Western social media sites and WhatsApp, or to enhance the efficiency of the scams. This includes the use of generative AI to create images and video content for fraud schemes, as well ChatGPT to generate scripts and content. The Military and BGFs Provide Protection for Myanmar’s Crime Enclaves The overarching obstacle to staunching the spread of organized crime in Myanmar is the chaos in governance and the lawlessness triggered by the February 2021 military coup. While the elected government tried to stem the influx of Chinese gangsters, the junta reversed those efforts after the coup, and the illegal operations quickly resumed their rapid expansion. At the center of that story is the Karen Border Guard Force, which maintains its headquarters in the very heart of the Shwe Kokko crime city. The rise of the Karen BGF, operating at least nominally under Myanmar Army control, was accelerated by the coup and its ties with the Chinese crime bosses. The Karen BGF emerged in the late 2000’s from an ethnic armed group called the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army. From 2017-2019, it forged alliances with two key Chinese criminals, She Zhijiang, head of Yatai International Holding, and Wan Kuok-Kui (aka Broken Tooth), a triad leader who heads a transnational criminal organization known as the Hongmen World Historical and Cultural Association. The BGF provided land and support for these first two large illegal gambling cities to spring up near the Thai border — Shwe Kokko and Saixigang (now known as Dongmei Zone), respectively. When Thai police arrested She Zhijiang in August 2022, his absence left the BGF in control of a massive criminal empire, vastly increasing its wealth and power. Meanwhile, Wan Kuok-kui, who was sanctioned by the United States in December 2020, relocated to China, where his focus seems to be laundering hundreds of millions of dollars into the Chinese economy. His move apparently gave the BGF even wider control over the enclave’s criminal activity. From the beginning of their emergence in Myanmar, the autonomous crime zones have relied on Karen BGF leaders to offer secure space. By providing security, controlling border trade, and handling relations with rival armed groups and the Myanmar army, the BGF and its leaders are among the greatest beneficiaries of the illicit activity. Profits from the partnership have been plowed into high-tech upgrades of weapons and other military equipment for the BGF, commanded by Col. Chit Thu and his colleague, Major Mote Thon. Indeed, Chit Thu’s forces’ weapons are qualitatively superior to the Myanmar Army’s, making his BGF one of the most lethal units under the military’s “command.” Thailand Sees the Threat, But Makes Little Headway Against It Seeking influence and material support, the BGF and the Chinese crime groups have invested heavily in Thailand. They use the country to traffic people into the criminal zones and to access the internet and electricity essential to their operations. Thailand is also a source and transit route for the BGF’s sophisticated arms and equipment — made easy by BGF control of crossing points for bilateral trade. By mid-2022, Thai authorities were increasingly concerned about what they call “grey Chinese business” and an explosion of trafficking Thai nationals and tens of thousands of foreigners into Myanmar. A string of murders, gunfights and rumors of Chinese kidnapping, assaulting or torturing victims on Thai soil produced a serious public outcry. Consequently, Thailand has begun to clamp down. Yatai crime boss She Zhijiang is on the verge of extradition to China. A Thai working committee was set up to crack down on trafficking, and Thai law enforcement has mobilized to investigate Chinese “grey business.” In June 2023, the Thai police raided the Hongmen office in Thailand, arrested a second notorious criminal associated with Shwe Kokko named Yu Xinqi, and scooped up the owners of several exclusive nightclubs catering to Chinese crime bosses. So far, however, these measures have failed to dent the Thai base for criminal operations in Myanmar. Construction continues around Mae Sot and new players are emerging along the Thai border to the north in Myanmar territory controlled by the United Wa State Army. Meanwhile, the Karen BGF has brazenly flouted Thailand’s enforcement efforts. When Thai police arrested She Zhijiang, a BGF spokesman stated publicly that the arrest would not “harm normal operations” in Shwe Kokko. When Thailand moved to curtail electricity to the border compounds in early June 2023, the BGF threatened to close the largest frontier crossing to bilateral trade. After Thailand squeezed the power supply, the BGF ramped up diesel imports for generators, turning a crackdown into a money-making opportunity. Even China’s Moves to Curb Criminal Groups Has Had Only Mixed Effects As a key target for scam operations, China has significant steps to rein them in to protect its own citizens and its relations with the Southeast Asia neighborhood. Beijing has enhanced anti-money laundering requirements for banks, cut off criminals’ access to Chinese telecoms by policing WeChat, raised public awareness on trafficking and banned travel for many Chinese to Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, none of this has stopped the networks from regional spread. Instead, gangsters have adapted, focusing more on markets outside of China and recalibrating efforts to traffic young Chinese job seekers. Last month, Chinese authorities insisted the junta crush criminal activities directed at Chinese nationals from Myanmar. As yet, Chit Thu and his BGF are still operating with impunity, making it clear that not even a military operation — like the one launched by the pro-democracy forces in April — will dislodge the criminals. Taking the cue, other armed militias are building their own enclaves at an alarming rate. Only a Concerted, Transnational Approach Will Halt the Spread of Myanmar-Based Crime To stem the rise of these criminal networks will require a coordinated international effort. The United States could potentially take a leading role, partnering with others to sanction the BGF and cut off telecommunications services to all criminal militias in Myanmar. This would call for careful coordination with neighboring countries and other international law enforcement. Repatriating the sheer number of globally trafficked victims inside Myanmar will require a major cross-border operation..."
Source/publisher: United States Institute of Peace
Date of publication: 2023-06-26
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-26
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Title: This Civilian Resistance Needs the West’s Help, Not Its Silence
Description: "Winning the hearts and minds of fellow citizens is a key pillar of any armed resistance. The 95,000 civilians thought to have joined Myanmar’s grassroots insurgency since the 2021 coup have done that, harnessing people’s fury at the military for overthrowing the democratically elected government, imprisoning leader Aung San Suu Kyi and bringing to an end a period of relative freedom. Waging a surprisingly effective and enduring guerrilla war, the People’s Defense Forces have taken on an experienced army that has shown no limits to its brutality. To the surprise of seasoned analysts, this network of opposition groups has inflicted sustained casualties via ambushes, skirmishes, bombings, the sabotage of military-related facilities and businesses and targeted assassinations from the hinterlands to the former capital, Yangon. Many of the armed ethnic groups that have fought insurgencies along Myanmar’s borders for decades have been lending vital assistance to this new resistance, including weapons, resources and training. But without access to heavy weaponry or counter-measures to withstand the military’s deadly airpower, these anti-junta forces and the people they’re fighting for are stuck in a grinding civil war. And they are no closer to achieving the goal of the National Unity Government, under whose umbrella they loosely operate. Made up of representatives of those elected in a landslide in 2020, the NUG, operating in exile with an office in Washington, wants to remove the junta from power and restore democracy to a country that’s been in an almost constant state of conflict since its independence from British rule in 1948. To do that, Myanmar’s citizens need more from the West, and from allies in Asia, including financial, diplomatic, strategic and political assistance. New sanctions announced by the US last week on the Ministry of Defense, as well as two state-owned banks, are a welcome step forward. However, the junta’s most valuable asset — the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise — remains untouched, despite the European Union imposing sanctions on the lucrative firm in February 2022. We know that the military has been able to import at least $1 billion in arms, dual-use goods, equipment and materials to manufacture weapons since the coup — a clear failure of the current sanctions regime and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ five-point plan adopted in the wake of the coup that called for an immediate end to violence and dialogue among parties. Using these weapons and equipment, the regime has killed at least 3,500 civilians, detained as many as 22,000 political prisoners and forcibly displaced over 1.5 million people since February 2021. The violence has continued unabated: Airstrikes, land attacks, murder, torture and rape. Villages aligned with opposition groups have been burned to the ground; suspected collaborators have been beheaded. An investigation by the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur, Tom Andrews, revealed that it’s not just private and state-owned entities in China, Russia and India profiting off the misery of Myanmar’s people, but also networks and companies in Singapore and Thailand, two members of Asean supposedly backing the five-point plan. His inquiry identified the transfer of fighter jets, attack helicopters, reconnaissance and attack drones, advanced missile systems, tank upgrades, radio and communication equipment, radar complexes, and components for naval ships. One of the worst air attacks since the coup occurred on April 11, when a Yak-130 fighter jet armed with two 250-kilogram bombs struck a National Unity Government ceremony attended by around 300 people. As Andrews details in his May 17 report to the UN, the attack caused widespread carnage, compounded when two Mi-35 attack helicopters arrived soon afterward to strafe survivors and first responders. At least 160 people died, including nearly 40 children. Russia supplied the fighter jet and the choppers, while the Myanmar military’s Directorate of Defense Industries domestically manufactured the bombs and the machine guns, relying in part on raw materials supplied by private entities from Singapore, China and Thailand, the report said. Separately, it documented that Indian state-owned arms manufacturers have shipped a coastal surveillance system, a remote-controlled weapons system, components from an ammunition and missile manufacturer, and 122-mm howitzer barrels, while private sector entities exported explosive fuses likely for artillery shells. This weaponry, along with a vast array of other military hardware, has been used in countless operations across Myanmar that have caused atrocities amounting to probable war crimes and crimes against humanity, Andrews noted. With lengthy borders along both China and India, Myanmar is strategically important — and its stability matters well beyond Southeast Asia. The junta has been struggling to stabilize an already-backward economy that contracted 18% last year and is facing soaring inflation, a weakening currency and shrinking foreign-currency reserves. The NUG says the regime now controls only half the country, and transnational crime including fraud scams, slavery and drug production is rife. There are still protests, including strikes and non-violent demonstrations, almost daily, from Yangon to smaller cities and towns. Significantly different from past periods of military rule, even the formerly stable ethnic majority Bamar and Buddhist heartland is engaged to an unprecedented degree in resistance. The military is facing a high attrition rate from casualties and desertions, and correspondingly low morale, Richard Horsey, senior Myanmar adviser with the International Crisis Group, told me. But it is difficult for anti-junta groups to take advantage of this weakness, despite their tenacity and effectiveness in some areas. Beijing has already made its move. Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with the head of the military government, General Min Aung Hlaing, last month in the capital, Naypyidaw, with a statement released afterward noting China “supports all parties in Myanmar to properly handle differences and achieve reconciliation under the constitutional and legal framework.” Thailand’s recent plan to re-engage with junta officials — rightly shunned by key Asean partners Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam and Cambodia — is counterproductive at best, while the UN Security Council has yet to find a way to hold the junta accountable for its abuses. Now is the time for Washington to better coordinate a more effective sanctions regime and take a more active role to support pro-democracy forces — as it is empowered to do by the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act that President Joe Biden signed into law in December. It authorizes the provision of “non-lethal assistance” to both the ethnic armed organizations and People’s Defense Forces. In Syria and Ukraine, non-lethal assistance has included uniforms, protective armor, armored military vehicles, radar and medical equipment. It begs the question: Why not for Myanmar?..."
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Source/publisher: Washington Post
Date of publication: 2023-06-25
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-25
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Title: ASEAN’s planned military exercises led by Myanmar junta and Russian regime will deepen its complicity in the junta’s international crimes
Description: "Justice For Myanmar calls on the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) to immediately cancel Myanmar junta and Russia led counter terrorism military exercises to be held in the coming months. The drills are being organised by the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counter Terrorism, co-chaired by the Myanmar military junta and the Russian regime, and will involve a tabletop exercise in Myanmar in August and a field training exercise in Russia in September. The working group held its final planning conference for the exercises in June in Khabarovsk, Russia, attended by all members of ASEAN and dialogue partners China and India. The USA, Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand boycotted the meeting. The exercises will involve military training that coordinates a response to a simulated terrorist attack and will help the Myanmar military build the capabilities of elite troops engaged in a campaign of terror against the people. ASEAN’s practical assistance and support for the training of Myanmar junta troops makes the bloc further complicit in ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Since the military’s illegal coup attempt on February 1, 2021, the junta has murdered more than 3,600 people, arbitrarily arrested more than 23,000, committed indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling, torture, and sexual violence, and displaced at least 1.5 million people. Since 2021, ADMM’s counter terrorism working group has been led by Major General Aung Myo Thant, Deputy Chief of the Myanmar military’s Armed Forces Training, and Major General Grigorii Tiurin of the Operational and Strategic Command of Russia’s Eastern Military District. Their co-chairpersonship ends this year. The working group is also used by the junta for propaganda purposes and to seek regional support for its attacks against the legitimate National Unity Government (NUG), People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations. For instance, a junta propaganda article on the December 2021 ASEAN counter terrorism meeting, hosted by the junta, reported on Aung Myo Thant’s speech, “highlighting… the terrorist activities of NUG and PDF, electoral fraud which led to the state of emergency declared by Tatmadaw to maintain the State affairs, efforts of Tatmadaw in various ways to peacefully find a solution on vote-rigging, the NLD government’s multiple rejections on the discussion and its intent to form a new government with controversial election results.” ASEAN has not only failed to take action in support of human rights and democracy in Myanmar but is actively aiding the junta’s criminal conduct through direct military support like the planned military exercises. This makes ASEAN complicit in the junta’s atrocity crimes. ASEAN is also impeding effective international action to resolve the crisis in Myanmar by acting as an institutional barrier that supports the junta by providing cover for its members and dialogue partners to enhance military cooperation and avoid taking action to protect the human rights of the Myanmar people and end the military’s impunity. Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “If the world needs anymore evidence that the Five Point Consensus has failed, ASEAN’s training of junta troops in “counter terrorism” should be the nail in the coffin. “ASEAN’s planned training of junta troops will make the bloc further complicit in the junta’s violent attacks against the Myanmar people. “Rather than helping to resolve the Myanmar crisis, ASEAN’s actions are worsening it and causing real harm. “The fact these military exercises are planned is testament to the shocking failure of Indonesia as ASEAN chair to uphold basic principles of democracy and human rights. “ASEAN must immediately cancel the exercises, ban the junta from all meetings and recognise and support the National Unity Government as the legitimate government of Myanmar. “If, under Indonesia’s leadership, the exercises do go ahead, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and the incoming Thai government should boycott the exercises and stand with the people of Myanmar in support of human rights and democracy.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-06-22
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-22
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Title: Myanmar Authorities Must Ensure Full Legal Recognition of the Right to Citizenship of All Rohingya People, Deputy High Commissioner tells Human Rights Council - Council Concludes Interactive Dialogue with the High Commissioner on his Annual Report
Description: "The Human Rights Council this morning held a panel discussion on human rights violations against Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar, hearing the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights say that the Myanmar authorities must ensure full legal recognition of the right to citizenship of all Rohingya people and issuance to them of appropriate civil documentation. Nada Al-Nashif, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, said Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar had endured decades of persecution and systematic discrimination. Today, more than one million were languishing in refugee camps in Bangladesh. An estimated 600,000 remained in Myanmar, where they continued to be deprived of their basic rights. The military coup of February 2021 and violent repression in many parts of Myanmar had inflicted more suffering on minority communities, including Rohingya Muslims. Ms. Al-Nashif said that to achieve an inclusive future, the authorities in Myanmar needed to ensure a fully democratic, representative and accountable political system, repeal all discriminatory legislation, undertake dialogue aimed at national reconciliation, and implement measures that ensured the respect and protection of the human rights and dignity of each person without discrimination. A fundamental step was the full legal recognition of the right to citizenship of all Rohingya people and issuance to them of appropriate civil documentation. Yasmin Ullah, Chair of the Board at Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, said there were currently over 1.3 million Rohingya refugees worldwide lacking protection, legal status, and a way out of this plight. There needed to be recognition of Rohingya ethnic status. Citizenship alone granted Rohingya no protection. A truth commission would be a guide to how structural and institutional reform could take place to ensure no repetition of atrocities, violations of rights or discriminatory policy and practices could take place without accountability in Myanmar again. There should not be any repatriation without such a framework in place. Chris Lewa, Founder of the Arakan Project, said a permanent solution for the Rohingya to live peacefully in Myanmar would guarantee a sustainable return to their homeland. Despite numerous United Nations resolutions, no progress had been made. Following the coup in February 2021, the generals responsible for mass atrocities against the Rohingya were now de facto authorities. In this context, insistence on expediting Rohingya repatriation was disturbing, as conditions for a safe, voluntary return were not in place. Repatriation to Myanmar needed to be voluntary and should not be promoted until root causes were addressed and conditions for a safe return were in place. Kyaw Win, Executive Director of Burma Human Rights Network, said since August 2017, the Myanmar military had held a campaign of killings, mass rape and arson against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State, killing thousands and forcing over 730,000 to flee to Bangladesh. The citizenship system was another clear violation of the human rights of Muslims in Burma. The Network called on the United Nations Security Council to end its inaction and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court or establish a separate criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute the full spectrum of atrocity crimes in Burma. Mohshin Habib, Adjunct Professor at Laurentian University and Policy and Strategy Adviser at ASA Philippines Foundation, said Rohingya people had faced recurring military crackdowns and fled Myanmar in significant numbers in 1978, 1981, 1992, 2012, 2015, 2016 and 2017. These recurring crackdowns had devastated Rohingya lives and made them the world's most persecuted minority. During the August 2017 crackdown, Tatmadaw burned 300 Rohingya villages, vandalised 36,000 businesses and snatched valuables from 26,000 families. As a result, at least 800,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar and took refuge in Bangladesh, joining those who fled earlier. The three practical measures to repatriation were security, economic and education, and social capital theses. In the ensuing discussion, many speakers deplored discrimination, marginalisation and persecution of the Rohingya community, which had caused the forced exodus of the community. Speakers expressed deep concern about the human rights situation of the Rohingya. Thousands had been raped or killed and forced to flee their homes. The appalling, widespread violations of human rights, which could equate to crimes against humanity and war crimes, needed to cease, and perpetrators needed to be held accountable. There needed to be reform of the 1982 Citizenship Law in line with international standards. Other speakers said dialogue needed to be held between the Rohingya and the militia. The principle of non-interference in domestic affairs needed to be upheld. It was counterproductive to politicise the issue of internally displaced persons and to interfere in the domestic issues of Myanmar, including through International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice actions. Speaking in the discussion on Myanmar were Norway on behalf of a group of countries, Pakistan on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Luxembourg on behalf of a group of countries, European Union, Kuwait, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Türkiye, Bangladesh, Gambia, Costa Rica, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Senegal, Iran, South Africa, Russian Federation, Mauritania and Egypt. Also speaking were the Islamic Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Watch, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, International Bar Association, Lidskoprávní organizace Práva a svobody obcanučů Turkmenistánu z.s., iuventum e.V., INHR, and Association Ma'onah for Human Rights and Immigration. At the beginning of the meeting, the Council concluded the interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner for Human Rights on his annual report which began yesterday. A summary can be found here. Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in concluding remarks, thanked all delegations and non-governmental organizations for contributing to the debate, which had been constructive. There were two anniversaries this year, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration, which were opportunities to reflect on universality and indivisibility. Mr. Türk took note with appreciation all States that had reported cooperation with components of the human rights ecosystem and his Office. To achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, there could not be exclusion or stigmatisation of minority groups, including the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. The world needed to take a clear stance against racism, xenophobia and all other forms of discrimination. In the discussion, some speakers said the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights presented a valuable opportunity to take stock of opportunities and challenges and commit to improving and enhancing national frameworks in line with international human rights obligations. Some speakers were deeply concerned by the regression of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex rights in many countries. A number of speakers noted that climate change would continue to pose great threats to the human rights of both present and future generations. During the debate, speakers denounced human rights violations committed in many countries, regions and territories. Speaking in the interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner were Ghana, Cambodia, Burundi, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Nicaragua, Ireland, New Zealand, Tunisia, Namibia, Honduras, Uganda, Hungary and Eritrea. Also speaking were Right Livelihood Award Foundation, World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Every Casualty Worldwide, International Commission of Jurists, East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, and Il Cenacolo. The webcast of the Human Rights Council meetings can be found here. All meeting summaries can be found here. Documents and reports related to the Human Rights Council’s fifty-third regular session can be found here. The Council will next meet this afternoon at 3 p.m. to hear the presentation of the report of the Secretary-General on the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the oral updates of the High Commissioner and his Office on Nicaragua and on Sri Lanka, followed by an interactive dialogue with the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Interactive Dialogue on the Annual Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights presented his global update on his annual report on Monday, 19 June, and the interactive dialogue started on Tuesday, 20 June. Discussion In the discussion, some speakers, among other things, said the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights presented a valuable opportunity to take stock of opportunities and challenges and commit to improving and enhancing national frameworks in line with international human rights obligations. This was the time to collectively re-commit to respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of all. States needed to work to ensure that the vision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was realised for all persons, everywhere, in all their diversity. Cooperation between Member States and international human rights bodies played a crucial role in technical assistance and capacity building. Cooperation was a two-way process; it was imperative that human rights bodies worked together and engaged in constructive and genuine dialogue. Some speakers said that the Council had a crucial role in addressing shortcomings in the protection and promotion of human rights, which could only be achieved by engaging in open dialogue, working together constructively while respecting each other, and avoiding overpoliticisation. One speaker said there was a need to respond in diverse cultural contexts and called for the respect for the sovereign rights of countries as there should be no foreign interference in domestic affairs. Some speakers expressed deep concern at human rights violations around the world, despite the efforts of the Council and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to address them. A number of speakers were deeply concerned by the regression of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex rights in many countries, expressing concern at legislation which restricted the rights of these people. States needed to promote and protect the rights of all people, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. All States should take steps to address sexual and gender-based violence and remove barriers to sexual and reproductive health and rights. A number of speakers noted that climate change would continue to pose great threats to the human rights of both present and future generations. The Office was commended for providing technical assistance, including by helping countries with the development of policies on climate change mobility. The High Commissioner and his team were encouraged to pursue further efforts aimed at ensuring that States incorporated a human rights-based approach to frameworks which sought to address the negative impacts of climate change. Some speakers said the Council needed to take all possible measures to protect the rights of women, girls, and persons of diverse gender identities and sexual orientations, especially those from marginalised communities, in the face of increasing pushback against agreed language on gender and sexual and reproductive rights. Such roll-back was putting hard-won gains at risk, and along with it, the protection of the lives and rights of millions of people around the world. During the discussion, many speakers denounced human rights violations committed in many countries, regions and territories, noting situations of armed conflict; overpoliticisation; restrictions on the rights of linguistic and indigenous minorities; anti-homosexuality legislation; impediment of civil and political rights; the removal of indigenous populations; the shrinking of civic space; torture; violations against women and girls; and attacks on human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and activists. Speakers urged the Office of the High Commissioner to promote universal respect for both individual and collective rights. The High Commissioner should ensure that all current and future Office field presences consistently recorded and periodically reported publicly on all casualties of armed conflict and violence occurring within their remit. The human rights pillar remained chronically underfunded, while the need for a well-resourced and effective international human rights framework continued to increase. Concluding Remarks VOLKER TÜRK, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, thanked all delegations and non-governmental organizations for contributing to the debate, which had been constructive. There were two anniversaries this year, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration, which were opportunities to reflect on universality and indivisibility. All States needed to treat human rights on an equal footing. It was the duty of States to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, there were certain statements that cast doubt on that consensus. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights promoted all human rights stemming from the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter dealt with sovereignty issues. Human rights started at home. Issues needed to be examined from global, regional and national dimensions. Dialogue could not be empty formulas. There was a need for uncomfortable conversations for the sake of human rights. Cooperation and collaboration were imperative. Mr. Türk noted with appreciation all States that had reported cooperation with components of the human rights ecosystem and his Office. The High Commissioner had a duty to remove obstacles and promote the implementation of all human rights in all parts of the world. He expressed hope that all States would accept this role and cooperate with the mandate. He noted that the voluntary fund that dealt with Universal Periodic Review follow-up was in urgent need of support. Mr. Türk said his Office was in discussion with authorities of both countries to re-establish a presence in the Western Sahara territory. His Office continued to encourage the relaxation of unilateral coercive measures to support the most vulnerable segments of populations. Mr. Türk expressed his strong commitment to supporting small island States. Extra funding resources were required to provide sufficient support. Further, he said, the Office aimed to support and facilitate dialogue on the rights of indigenous communities. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights aimed to strengthen its mandate. There were key issues that it would focus on in future, including accountability, transitional justice, and rights in the digital sphere. The Office would soon hold an event to assess its own functions. In closing, Mr. Türk said that to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, there could not be exclusion or stigmatisation of minority groups, including the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. The world needed to take a clear stance against racism, xenophobia and all other forms of discrimination. Panel Discussion on the Measures Necessary to Find Durable Solutions to the Rohingya Crisis and to End All Forms of Human Rights Violations and Abuses against Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar Opening Statement by the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights NADA AL-NASHIF, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, said Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar had endured decades of persecution and systematic discrimination. Today, more than one million were languishing in refugee camps in Bangladesh. An estimated 600,000 remained in Myanmar, where they continued to be deprived of their basic rights. The military coup of February 2021 and violent repression in many parts of Myanmar had inflicted more suffering on minority communities, including Rohingya Muslims. In addition, last month Cyclone Mocha – the most powerful storm to hit the region in a decade – raged through the country. The military had put in place a system of physical and administrative restrictions on the conduct of humanitarian operations. People were reportedly living in forests and improvised shelters without any access to life-saving food, medicine and services. At the end of last year, the Security Council adopted its first resolution on Myanmar, in which it underscored the need to create conditions necessary for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons. Sadly, those conditions did not currently exist on the ground. To achieve an inclusive future, the authorities in Myanmar needed to ensure a fully democratic, representative and accountable political system, repeal all discriminatory legislation, undertake dialogue aimed at national reconciliation, and implement measures that ensured the respect and protection of the human rights and dignity of each person without discrimination. A fundamental step was the full legal recognition of the right to citizenship of all Rohingya people and issuance to them of appropriate civil documentation. Many Rohingya continued to flee to safer countries, often taking immense risks, including dangerous sea crossings. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 3,500 Rohingya attempted deadly sea crossings in 2022, a 360 per cent increase compared to 2021. At least 348 Rohingya died while making these sea crossings in 2022. Ms. Al-Nashif expressed solidarity with and support to Bangladesh for providing refuge to more than one million Rohingya refugees, and commended countries in the region, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, for providing protection and humanitarian assistance to Rohingya who arrived by boat. Since March this year, due to shortfalls in funding, the World Food Programme had had to sharply reduce food rations in the camps twice, which had further compounded the refugees’ hardship. In the face of the impunity enjoyed by the Myanmar military for past and present violations and abuses against the Rohingya, Ms. Al-Nashif expressed full support for the ongoing accountability efforts at the international level. The complaint brought by the Gambia against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice was but one step in this direction. She expressed hope that the Human Rights Council would redouble its support in the direction of accountability initiatives. Statements by the Panellists YASMIN ULLAH, Chair of the Board at Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, said she was a member of the Rohingya community who had to flee from violence and systemic oppression in Myanmar as a young child along with her family in 1995. Rohingyas had been driven out for decades under oppressive arbitrary policy and practices by Burmese authorities. There were currently over 1.3 million Rohingya refugees worldwide lacking protection, legal status, and a way out of this plight. Only a domestic change in Myanmar would lead to long term peace and success. However, the international community’s support in breaking through the barriers of silence on the atrocities committed against the Rohingya and ensuring that the community were never forgotten was vital. Ms. Ullah said she was working on solutions that would enable people from her community to have food to eat, education, medical treatment and tangible protections. There needed to be recognition of Rohingya ethnic status. Citizenship alone granted Rohingya no protection. Rohingya had been systematically erased and excluded from social, economic, and political participation as a collective ethnic group. Rohingya were being traded from refugee camps to concentration camps in their homeland. Rohingya needed to be acknowledged as an indigenous ethnic nationality of Myanmar throughout history and now. Myanmar needed a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as part of the transitional justice process. Since democratic transition in Myanmar occurred under circumstances of compromise and impunity, what had happened to Rohingya had recurred all over the country. Myanmar needed to be reformed at every level in all institutions. The 2017 genocidal campaign and the 2021 attempted coup were glaring evidence of what happened when there was no transitional justice plan during a transition period. Denial of truths and refusal to create institutional reforms had led Myanmar into further violations of fundamental rights. A truth commission would be a guide to how structural and institutional reform could take place to ensure that no repetition of atrocities, violations of rights or discriminatory policy and practices could take place without accountability in Myanmar again. There should not be any repatriation without such a framework in place. CHRIS LEWA, Founder of the Arakan Project, said a permanent solution for the Rohingya to live peacefully in Myanmar would guarantee a sustainable return to their homeland. Despite numerous United Nations resolutions, no progress had been made. Following the coup in February 2021, the generals responsible for mass atrocities against the Rohingya were now de facto authorities. In this context, insistence on expediting Rohingya repatriation was disturbing, as conditions for a safe, voluntary return were not in place. Citizenship and other root causes had not been addressed, and since the coup, the junta had arrested and sentenced more than 3,500 Rohingya for unauthorised travel. Durable solutions for internally displaced persons in Myanmar needed be a precondition before any repatriation started from Bangladesh. The bilateral pilot repatriation plan for about 1,100 Rohingya involved resettlement to 15 relocation sites, however, some families cleared for return were left without option to go back to their village of origin. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had said that conditions were not conducive for a return in safety and dignity. There had been some positive developments in Myanmar. In 2021, the National Unity Government recognised the Rohingya’s entitlement to Myanmar’s citizenship, and appointed a Rohingya adviser, which was a breakthrough. The Arakan Army altered their rhetoric and formed Rohingya Village Committees, with mixed results. In August, Bangladesh granted permission for skills development activities. However, it was worrying that funding shortfalls had forced the World Food Programme to reduce monthly food rations in June. Even before these food cuts, 12 per cent of children were severely malnourished. It was recommended that the international community prioritise the Rohingya amid global challenges, and support international accountability. Repatriation to Myanmar needed to be voluntary and should not be promoted until root causes were addressed and conditions for a safe return were in place. Returnees should not be confined to ‘relocation’ sites. Efforts should also focus on improving conditions for Rohingya refugees in host countries. Alternative durable solutions such as resettlement to third countries and complementary pathways should be vigorously pursued. KYAW WIN, Executive Director of Burma Human Rights Network , said the Network had been documenting human rights violations in Burma. Since August 2017, the Myanmar military had held a campaign of killings, mass rape and arson against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine state, killing thousands and forcing over 730,000 to flee to Bangladesh. The situation had been neglected internationally and was getting worse and worse every day. The junta’s restrictions of movement of the Rohingya were clear violations of International Court of Justice provisional measures aimed at preventing genocidal acts against the Rohingya. The citizenship system was another clear violation of the human rights of Muslims in Burma. It limited Muslims’ ability to obtain citizenship and access basic State services. Hate speech was currently a dangerous phenomenon in Burma. The Network had documented over 600 incidents of hate speech against Muslims over the past year. Mosques and other religious sites had been destroyed. The 1982 citizenship law made every Muslim in Burma a foreigner. This law breached human rights more than any other law in the State. The international community had failed to acknowledge the illegality of this law. As long as the military enjoyed complete impunity for their actions, unyielding oppression of the Rohingya and other minorities would continue unabated. The time to close this impunity gap was now. The Network called on the United Nations Security Council to end its inaction and refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court or establish a separate criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute the full spectrum of atrocity crimes in Burma. States needed to impose targeted economic sanctions against the Myanmar military, and pursue international legal action against the junta. States and international companies needed to stop the supply and transfer of arms to the Myanmar military. Finally, Myanmar’s neighbouring States, including India, Thailand, Indonesia and Bangladesh, needed to devise a comprehensive regional response to the refugee crisis; provide protection, support, and humanitarian and legal aid to all refugees fleeing Myanmar; and authorise emergency cross-border aid to internally displaced people in Myanmar. MOHSHIN HABIB, Adjunct Professor at Laurentian University and Policy and Strategy Adviser at ASA Philippines Foundation, said Rohingya people had faced recurring military crackdowns and fled Myanmar in significant numbers in 1978, 1981, 1992, 2012, 2015, 2016 and 2017. These recurring crackdowns had devastated Rohingya lives and made them the world's most persecuted minority. During the August 2017 crackdown, Tatmadaw burned 300 Rohingya villages, vandalised 36,000 businesses and snatched valuables from 26,000 families. Research estimated that 25,000 people were murdered, 18,000 raped, 43,000 received gunshot wounds, and 116,000 were beaten, all inflicted by security forces under the control of the Myanmar authorities. As a result, at least 800,000 Rohingya fled Myanmar and took refuge in Bangladesh, joining those who fled earlier. The International State Crime Initiatives claimed that a leaked document adopted by the Myanmar regime in 1988 revealed the State Peace and Development Council adopted an 11-point “Rohingya extermination plan”, of which the first eight elements had been effectively instituted. The recent coup had made it impossible for a successful repatriation attempt. Meanwhile, the Bangladesh campsites had become the most densely populated area globally, causing environmental degradation and posing significant economic, health and reputational consequences for Bangladesh. There was also evidence of human and drug trafficking syndicates operating on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, posing significant security risks and a broader regional geopolitical crisis risk. Although mindful of the United Nations Special Rapporteur’s 8 June 2023 recommendation to “immediately suspend” pilot repatriation of Rohingyas due to “serious risk” for their life and freedom, the durable solution still appeared to be eventually repatriating Rohingyas to Myanmar. The three practical measures to repatriation were security, economic and education, and social capital theses. Financial reparation would provide a primary financial means for Rohingyas required to repatriate, resettle and rehabilitate to restore their original state of economic life in Myanmar; 9.5 billion United States dollars were assessed as fair compensation as of June 2023. Discussion In the ensuing discussion, many speakers, among other things, deplored discrimination, marginalisation and persecution of the Rohingya community, which had caused the forced exodus of the community. Speakers expressed deep concern about the human rights situation of the Rohingya. Thousands had been raped or killed and forced to flee their homes. The appalling, widespread violations of human rights, which could equate to crimes against humanity and war crimes, needed to cease, and perpetrators needed to be held accountable. The rule of law needed to be upheld. Discriminatory ideologies, denial of citizenship and restrictions on movement were part of the root causes of the crisis. Diplomatic pressure needed to be asserted on the militia to cease the violence and persecution that they were committing in Myanmar. Genocide needed to never occur again. There needed to be reform of the 1982 citizenship law in line with international standards. Some speakers called for the implementation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Five Point Consensus solution to the crisis. Member States and civil society needed to unite in their response to the dire situation of the Rohingya. Some speakers said that the junta was violating international decisions regarding Myanmar every day with impunity. Accountability and transitional justice measures needed to be introduced to prevent impunity and ensure accountability for abuses. The military regime had cracked down on the civil space in Myanmar, persecuting journalists and human rights defenders critical of the regime. The rights of journalists and human rights defenders needed to be protected. There were increasing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing Myanmar. Some speakers said that many Rohingya refugees were turned back by neighbouring countries, including Bangladesh. Those speakers called on all States to respect the principles of non-refoulement. Some speakers said there needed to be an immediate return of Rohingya from neighbouring countries under conditions ensuring the rights of returning Rohingya. Other speakers said that returns needed to be carried out on a safe, voluntary basis. Cuts to food rations for refugees provided by the World Food Programme were alarming. Such cuts had had a devasting effect. Speakers encouraged the international community to provide increased humanitarian support to reduce the burden on Bangladesh and to support it to provide shelter for the Rohingya. Some speakers expressed serious concern that the junta continued to block humanitarian access to Rohingya communities. Speakers called on the Myanmar militia to ensure full, unimpeded humanitarian access to Rohingya refugee camps. Movement restrictions also hindered the Rohingya’s ability to obtain such basic needs. Concrete steps were needed to aid Rohingya to obtain basic food, services and employment. Some speakers recalled that Cyclone Mocha had devastated the Rohingya refugee population, and called for increased support in response to the disaster. A number of speakers said the pilot repatriation project agreed between Bangladesh and Myanmar would help to address the crisis and ensure the voluntary return of the Rohingya to Myanmar. Other speakers said that the project would only deepen the crisis by allowing the military to commit further violations of the rights of the repatriated Rohingya. Some speakers said dialogue needed to be held between the Rohingya and the militia. Imposing outside solutions would not solve the crisis. Dialogue needed to be carried out based on existing bilateral agreements. The principle of non-interference in domestic affairs needed to be upheld. It was counterproductive to politicise the issue of internally displaced persons and to interfere in the domestic issues of Myanmar, including through International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice actions. Questions were asked on actions needed to ensure that this moment did not become a missed opportunity; on measures to improve the situation of Rohingya in Myanmar and in Bangladesh, especially in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons; on steps that developed countries could take to provide additional support to the Rohingya; on steps to support the safe repatriation of the Rohingya and other Muslims; on measures to ensure accountability for human rights violations and address their root causes, and to put an end to impunity; and on how the international community could ensure the participation and amplify the voices of the Rohingya in developing measures to address the crisis. Concluding Remarks NADA AL-NASHIF, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, said there needed to be a focus on immediate support to Rohingya still in Myanmar, and any transition from the camps in Rakhine needed to be done in coordination with the camps themselves. They also needed to ensure that more humanitarian funds were invested in Bangladesh. There was a need to change the citizenship law and create durable conditions for the return of Rohingya, as well as increase resettlement pathways for the most vulnerable groups. Accountability options needed to be pursued. YASMIN ULLAH, Chair of the Board at Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, said it was important to ensure that displaced Rohingya be cared for in a dignified fashion, understanding they were also humans. It was important that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Five Point Consensus was expanded. Multiple conversations had been held with Indonesian institutions, and there was a commitment to ensure the Five Point Consensus expanded to include cross-border aid, and improve upon the existing women, peace and security framework. There were multiple ways to ensure Rohingya were centred in all these discussions. The Council needed to centre Rohingya in all conversations on Myanmar, and they should not be excluded. There could not just be lip service, there needed to be concrete plans and actions. The dictatorship and living under the junta regime for decades was a political and ideological issue. Transitional justice needed to be at the centre of all future plannings. Civil society groups were the foundation of Myanmar society. There should not be repatriation of Rohingya to go right back to the hands of the perpetrators. CHRIS LEWA, Founder of the Arakan Project, said building trust was necessary. The Rohingya advisor had no official position within the Cabinet of Myanmar; this was something which could be changed. There was significant follow-up which could be done to push the National Unity Government to take action on their words, including dialogue on how to amend the citizenship law. The Arakan army had a nationalist agenda and they needed to be open to undertaking reforms. There had been progress; the army had provided assistance to villages in the wake of Cyclone Mocha. It was still concerning to hear governments in the room discussing the repatriation project, as this should not happen. If Rohingya wanted to return, with informed consent, they should be able to do so. It was important that Rohingya were involved in meaningful dialogue, and that they were heard. There needed to be a focus on providing better conditions for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Malaysia, and other countries. KYAW WIN, Executive Director of Burma Human Rights Network, said that since 1962, the military had been leading anti-Muslim policies that had led to the atrocities of today. After the 2021 revolution, people started to realise how the military had implemented those ideologies. In southern Burma, 70 per cent of the Muslim community did not have citizenship. This population could influx to neighbouring countries again, and there could be more mass atrocities. The international community needed to impose an immediate arms embargo against the military. The military was killing civilians in clear breach of international law. Impunity needed to end. Millions of refugees were struggling to survive. To end impunity, cases in the **International Court of Justice **and the International Criminal Court were important, and there were several other measures that could be taken in international fora. Members of the Rohingya community needed support to stand on their own two feet. Repatriations should not occur while conditions were unsafe for the Rohingya. The Rohingya had great potential but needed help. There were several villages in central Burma that had been burned to the ground. The people of Burma could not stop the military regime without the help of the international community. MOHSHIN HABIB, Adjunct Professor at Laurentian University and Policy and Strategy Adviser at ASA Philippines Foundation, said despite increasing polarisation in world politics, the international community continued to impose trade sanctions and embargos on Myanmar. However, these were not universal, and there were members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that were not imposing such sanctions. These States needed to do more to put pressure on the military regime and support the Rohingya. International Court of Justice actions and other external measures could also add more pressure on the militia and lead to positive outcomes. Domestically, the Myanmar military regime needed to improve its human rights record by acknowledging past abuses and genocide against the Rohingya. They needed to recognise the Rohingya as an ethnic minority. Domestic and international recognition of the Rohingya and their rights, including their right to citizenship, was needed..."
Source/publisher: UN Human Rights Council (Geneva)
Date of publication: 2023-06-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-21
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Title: အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက (၁၄၈)နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့အခမ်းအနားသို့ ပေးပို့သည့်သဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "၁။ ၂၀၂၃ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ(၂၁)ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သည့် (၁၄၈)နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့ အချိန်အခါသမယတွင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာ၌ ရောက်ရှိနေထိုင်နေကြသော ကရင်နီလူ မျိုးများ အားလုံး ကိုယ်စိတ်နှစ်ဖြာ ကျန်းမာလုံခြုံ၍ ဘေးရန်အပေါင်းမှ ကင်းကွာကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ကရင်နီပြည်သည် သီးခြားလွတ်လပ်သည့် တိုင်းပြည်ဖြစ်သောကြောင့် ကရင်နီပြည်ကို မည် သည့် နည်းနှင့်မျှ အုပ်ချုပ်စိုးမိုးခြင်း ပြုလုပ်ကြမည်မဟုတ်ကြောင်း ဗမာဘုရင်ကိုယ်စား ကင်းဝန်မင်းကြီး ဦးကောင်းနှင့် အင်္ဂလိပ်ဘုရင်ခံချုပ်ကိုယ်စား ဆာဒေါ့ကလပ်ဖောဆစ်(သ်)တို့မှ ၁၈၇၅ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၂၁)ရက်နေ့တွင် လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုး၍ နှစ်နိုင်ငံအကြား သဘောတူစာချုပ်ချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့ပြီး ယင်းနေ့ထူးနေ့ မြတ်ကို ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့အဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်၍ နှစ်စဉ်ကျင်းပခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၃။ ယခုအချိန်သည် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ မတရားအာဏာသိမ်းအုပ်ချုပ်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမှုကို မြန်မာတစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူများနည်းတူ ကရင်နီတစ်မျိုးသားလုံးနှင့် ကရင်နီတော် လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများက လုံးဝလက်မခံနိုင်ကြဘဲ ဆန့်ကျင်တော်လှန်နေကြသည့်ကာလဖြစ်သလို အကြပ်အတည်းအခက်အခဲများကို ရင်ဆိုင်နေကြရသည့် အချိန်လည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ၄။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့ကို တိုင်တည်၍ ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများအားလုံး စည်းလုံးညီညွတ်ပြီး ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားများ လွတ်မြောက်ရေးနှင့် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးအတွက် ဆထက်တိုးကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်ကြပါစေကြောင်း ဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ၅။ စစ်အာဏာရှင်စနစ်အမြစ်ပြတ်ပြီး နိုင်ငံရေးတန်းတူညီမှုနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့် အပြည့်အဝရှိ သော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းမှုများလည်း ပြီးမြောက်အောင်မြင်နိုင်ကြ ပါစေကြောင်းနှင့် မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအဖွဲ့အနေဖြင့် ကရင်နီပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံးနှင့်အတူ ခိုင်မာစွာရပ်တည်၍ ယခုဆင်နွှဲနေသည့် နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေး ပြီးမြောက်အောင်မြင် သည်အထိ လက်တွဲဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-06-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: (၁၄၈) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့သို့ ပေးပို့သော ဂုဏ်ပြုသဝဏ်လွှာ
Description: "၁။ ယနေ့သည် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားတရပ်လုံး တန်ဖိုးထားဂုဏ်ယူရသည့် နေ့ထူးနေ့မြတ် တစ်ရက်ဖြစ်သည်။ ယနေ့ကျရောက်သော (၁၄၈) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့ကို ကရင်နီ ပြည်သူတရပ်လုံးနှင့်အတူ ဝမ်းမြောက်ဂုဏ်ယူစွာ ကြိုဆိုပါကြောင်းနှင့် ယနေ့ကြုံကြိုက် နေရသော အခက်အခဲ အတားအဆီးများအားလုံးကို အောင်မြင်စွာ ဖြတ်ကျော်နိုင်ပါစေကြောင်း ဦးစွာဆုမွန်ကောင်း တောင်းအပ်ပါသည်။ ၂။ ခရစ်နှစ် ၁၈၇၅ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၂၁) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကရင်နီပြည်၏ သီးခြားတည်ရှိမှုကို အသိအမှတ်ပြုကြောင်း ဗမာဘုရင်ကိုယ်စားလှယ် ကင်းဝန်မင်းကြီး ဦးကောင်းနှင့် ဗြိတိသျှ ဘုရင်ခံချုပ် ကိုယ်စားလှယ် ဆာဒေါ့ကလပ်ဖော့ဆက်တို့က လက်မှတ်ရေးထိုး အတည်ပြု ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၃။ ထို့နေ့ကို ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့ဟု သတ်မှတ်ကာ နှစ်စဉ်အမျိုးသားနေ့ အခမ်းအနား များကို ကျင်းပခဲ့ပြီး ကိုယ်ပိုင်စာပေ၊ ယဉ်ကျေးမှုနှင့် ဓလေ့ထုံးတမ်းစဉ်လာများကိုထိန်းသိမ်း စောင့်ရှောက်လာခဲ့သည်မှာ ယနေ့တွင် (၁၄၈) နှစ်တိုင်တိုင် ပြည့်မြောက်ခဲ့ပြီး ဖြစ်သည်။ ၄။ ကရင်နီပြည်သူများသည် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုရရှိရေးအတွက် အာဏာရှင်အဆက်ဆက်ကို အစဉ်တစိုက်တွန်းလှန်ခဲ့ကြသည်နှင့် အားလျော်စွာ သမိုင်းအစဉ်အလာအားဖြင့် ကြီးမားလှသည်။ ၅။ ယနေ့ ဆင်နွှဲလျက်ရှိသော ပြည်သူ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးတွင် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသား ခေါင်းဆောင်ကြီးများ၊ မဟာမိတ် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသား တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ကရင်နီ ပြည်သူများ၏ ကြီးမားလှသော ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှု၊ အရင်းအနှီးများနှင့် အသက်၊ အိုးအိမ်၊ စည်းစိမ် ပေးဆပ်စွန့်လွှတ်မှုများကို အစဉ် အောက်မေ့ဦးညွှတ် ဂုဏ်ပြုရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ၆။ ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားတော်လှန်ရေး ခေါင်းဆောင်များ၊ တော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုနှင့်အတူ ကရင်နီပြည်၏ စစ်ရေး၊နိုင်ငံရေး ဖြစ်ပေါ်တိုးတက်မှုများကို အသိအမှတ်ပြု ဂုဏ်ယူဝမ်းမြောက်ကြောင်းကိုလည်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ ၇။ နိုင်ငံရေး၊ စစ်ရေး၊ စိတ်ဓာတ်ရေးရာ စစ်မျက်နှာစာ အဘက်ဘက်တွင် မြန်ဆန်စွာ အင်အားပြုန်းတီး ချိနဲ့လာလျက်ရှိသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား အမြစ်ပြတ်ချေမှုန်းနိုင်ရန် ယခင်ထက်ပိုမို စုစည်းညီညွတ်စွာြဖင့် ကြိုးစားအားထုတ် ရုန်းကန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်သွားကြရန်နှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်ပြဌာန်းခွင့်၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်၊ တန်းတူရေးနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုတို့ ပြည့်ဝထုံမွှမ်းသော ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စုသစ်ကို အားလုံးအတူတကွ လက်တွဲထူထောင်ကြပါစို့ဟု တိုက်တွန်းလျက် ယနေ့ ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၂၃) ရက်နေ့တွင် ကျရောက်သော (၁၄၈) နှစ်မြောက် ကရင်နီအမျိုးသားနေ့သို့ ဤသဝဏ်လွှာအား ဂုဏ်ယူစွာဖြင့် ပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Defence - National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-06-21
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-21
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: The Heyzer Maneuver in Myanmar
Description: "Myanmar has seen the back of the sixth Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations since 1995. Noeleen Heyzer resigned her position in recent weeks, earlier than planned from her appointment in October 2021 and assuming her role in December of that year. What will be her legacy? Not much. A kind assessment could conclude she gave it the good old college try, but was reasoning with caged beasts. A realpolitik regard would argue she was doomed from the starting line, because those caged beasts cannot be reasoned with. What can we learn from Heyzer’s 20 months in the position? There isn’t much to labor over. The military State Administration Council (SAC) wasn’t interested in any form of international engagement let alone mediation, and absolutely nothing to do with conflict resolution. The efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been stuck since the signing of the Five-Point Consensus in early 2021, yet remain the lodestar of international efforts regardless of how adrift, capsized or sunk they are. Heyzer didn’t have much to work with. The entire “good offices” position of the envoy is mired in the past, with its mandate in the UN General Assembly, not completely with the Secretary General. There hasn’t been any serious reform of the role in close to 30 years, a point acknowledged by an in-depth study of the good offices mandate released by the International Peace Academy (IPI) over 10 years ago. One of the concluding points of that study from 2012 could have been written today: “There is no doubt that the UN carries a legacy of resentment or disappointment among many sides within Myanmar who have felt, for different reasons, that the good offices in the past did not sufficiently consider their interests. In the international donor community, while some acknowledge the potentially important role the UN can play in Myanmar, few seem to want the world organization to actually take the lead in coordinating international assistance to the country.” The failure of the UN to gain access to Cyclone Mocha-affected communities in Rakhine State, or conflict-affected displaced in Sagaing Region, poses crucially important questions on the efficacy of the UN to remain in Myanmar. With a weak and distracted Secretary General in António Guterres, a dysfunctional Permanent Five members of a divided Security Council (China, Russia, the United States, Britain and France), it’s a wonder Heyzer got any attention let alone the level of support she needed from her first day. Early on, she was roundly criticized for suggesting a form of “power sharing” in a Channel News Asia interview. Whether she misspoke or considered it a serious proposal and was compelled to walk it back following the furor, the damage of an unforced error was already inflicted. Her one trip to call on Min Aung Hlaing in August 2022 was an unmitigated disaster, with the SAC releasing details of their conversation that were not completely congruent with what her post-visit statement said. Following this envoy equivalent of road-kill, she was compelled to broaden her consultations to members of the resistance including the National Unity Government (NUG) and some ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), although this was an uncommon development. From the August visit until her resignation, she was dogged by criticism from all sides, much of it perhaps unfair yet reflecting frustration at ongoing violence and the trap of diplomatic language that compelled her to express “deep concern” at incessant SAC mass atrocities. Heyzer met with Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang on May 1, where he “stressed the need to act prudently and pragmatically to prevent the escalation of the conflict and spillover of the crisis, and expressed his hope that Madame Special Envoy will uphold an objective and fair position and play a role as a bridge.” Trips were also made to India, and all around Southeast Asia. Soon after the announcement of her stepping down, she visited with NUG Foreign Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung: a photo of them hugging was both touching and, one hopes, cardiac arrest-inducing in Naypyitaw. The Global New Light of Myanmar made its position on the UN clear in its June 16 opinion piece from Kyaw Myint Tun-Paris called “The Picture of Irrelevance.” It was vintage vitriol. While it may have been designed to condemn the UN system and international mediation efforts, it must also be seen as a good riddance to Heyzer and a glove slap to any replacement. “What breakthrough do they have to prove in recent memory? Where have they brought lasting peace? Name one! Under their watch record number of people have been forcibly displaced or stateless. So, what have they done? Is the world becoming more peaceful? These people should be given no role in finding solutions for the problems Myanmar is facing. Solutions for Myanmar will come from within and with the help, cooperation and understanding of the neighbours (sic) and friendly countries.” As if to pour salt on the wound, the paper also carried a report on a meeting with acting UN Resident Coordinator Ramanathan Balakrishnan and colleagues with three SAC ministers in Sittwe, still struggling for official access to assist over a month after Cyclone Mocha. What have we learned from the near three decades of special envoys? Precious little. The first, the polished Peruvian diplomat Álvaro de Soto served from 1995 to 1999, which started optimistically with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release before dissolving into repressive military rule deadlock. He may have visited the country six times during his tenure, but he achieved little of note apart from the “concession” of meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on every visit. De Soto’s contribution to Myanmar may be slight, but his legacy as a UNSG special envoy is instructive for Myanmar. Resigning from his envoy role in the Middle East peace process, his frustration at being hogtied to conditions that limited engagement with key actors was reflected in his leaked End of Mission memo in May 2007 following his resignation: “the UN should resist the natural temptation of almost every government and intergovernmental institution to throw a committee or a czar, or in this case, an envoy, at a problem…(w)e are not in the lead, and the role we play is subsidiary at best, dangerous at worst.” A similar end of mission memo from Heyzer should be encouraged. Then the reptilian Razali Ismael from Malaysia (2000-2005) served at a relatively optimistic time following the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 2002, but any optimism was dashed with the mass killing of her supporters at Depayin in May 2003, and then the purge of his erstwhile partner, Military Intelligence chief and Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt in October 2004. He refused to renew his position in early 2006 because he had been not permitted to visit the country in two years. In a creepy two-step criticism of the then regime with pretension over his own performance, Razali said in an interview; “Progress has not been made towards any reconciliation. If there used to be any, that has now snapped with [Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s] continued house arrest… What possibility is there of further progress?… Still, there is no frustration as this was, after all, a noble effort… good at dodging things and stonewalling… We have been dealing with these [Myanmar military] people for a very long time now. We are familiar with their ways.” This wasn’t exactly an advertisement for institutional memory and adaptive engagement. Next came the former Nigerian ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Gambari. The then ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) should have recognized a kindred spirit in Gambari, after all he rebuffed the General Assembly when they condemned the execution of prominent environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogani people in late 1995. Gambari faced a genuine domestic political deadlock in 2006, then the popular protests and the brutal crackdown of September 2007, Cyclone Nargis and the desperate days of the UN seeking access to affected areas and the timely visit of Ban Ki-moon (who visited again in April, with great fanfare and no progress). The Indian diplomat Vijay Nambiar enjoyed greater success, but he operated between 2010 and 2016 when the opening afforded him access, and even some EAOs welcomed his role in the peace process. Nambiar wasn’t completely astute: he asked Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to contribute Sit-Tat troops for UN peacekeeping operations in 2014 (a small number served in Liberia and South Sudan). Christine Schraner Burgener was appointed in April 2018 following the carnage of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya in Rakhine State, was told by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to stay out of the peace process and stick to Rakhine, where she could do little. Her post-2021 performance was strident in condemning the SAC, her calls with Vice Senior General Soe Win unresponsive, and her plaintive calls to visit Myanmar rebuffed by the SAC, but also over-stating her importance: “Clearly, I can imagine that he [Min Aung Hlaing] would not like to see me now in Myanmar because the people know me… and they would probably be very encouraged by my presence.” Despite pushing a much stiffer and determined UN response for an envoy, she was also criticized in Myanmar for perceived moral equivalency in condemning violence by all sides (the trap of neutrality in vocalizing opposition to violence, even grossly asymmetric state violence and atrocity). Kyaw Myint Tun-Paris summed up the past envoys in colorful fashion. “There have been appointments of those who were no longer wanted anymore close to the Ivory Tower in New York. Dump them all on Myanmar! There was one who was appointed so that frequent trips can be made to see family and relatives in a nearby country [likely Gambari]. Then, there was a lightweight who had no clues whatsoever about Myanmar [this could be any of them]. One promptly turned up at Davos soon after the appointment… Whether there is a need or not, they visit the country frequently and put out press statements just to show they are working hard and justify their employment. Attempts would be made to visit the country especially when their contract is up for extension.” Like carrion birds, potential replacements are circling. But any future appointment will face not just the same blend of SAC stonewalling or UN dysfunction Heyzer endured, but a witches brew of competitive engagement initiatives from predatory actors from China, India, Thailand and Japan through the Nippon Foundation, along with the frozen efforts of ASEAN, and the rumors of attempts from Switzerland, Norway, Finland and other deluded European states looking to forge a breakthrough. The competing “Track 1.5” efforts of Thailand has annoyed Indonesia, received no support from the rest of ASEAN, and is but the latest data point of dysfunction. Many of these efforts have some bit-part Myanmar players who have highly questionable legitimacy and political cachet. All of this incoherence benefits the SAC, who chortle at foreigners competing for pole position to appease them. For many in the international community have adopted a stance of mee-sa-ta-phet yay-mote-ta phet (holding the flame/torch in one hand and the firehouse in the other): effectively hedging their bets on who is going to “win” the conflict and be the side to ingratiate. There has been a plethora of post-coup shapeshifting amongst foreign actors, who prior to February 2021 sought to engage the Myanmar deep state and its many war criminals, and who—regardless of their affected ardor for the resistance now—will casually betray the revolution when the winds of opportunism shift. If another envoy is going to be offloaded on Myanmar, it will likely be another seasoned diplomat with similar skills sets to Heyzer. The candidates will resemble archetypes of international servants, but to the SAC a bevy of min-laung (pretender kings, or more accurately “imminent kings”) and their cohorts of pontificating min-sayar (king’s teacher, or advisor). There will be no “innovation”, “off-ramping”, “nuance”, or that absolute pearl of statecraft thinking, “fresh approach.” It’s almost certainly going to be some soiled version of what came before. But does it need to be? Is there a possibility of obviously needed reform? Ralph Waldo Emmerson wrote that “foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds, adored by little statesmen”, which could aptly describe the current cohort of Western diplomats and donors working on Myanmar all conjoined by a dearth of clear thinking. There are four potential courses of action: in theory. In all likelihood the UN and P5 countries will shuffle on with an utter disregard for impact, progress or the interests of the people of Myanmar. But what if we entertain the potential for the self-straitjacketed global order to react differently, even with expectations on progress being as low as possible? First, consider a completely different candidate. Heyzer was deemed suitable in late 2021 because she was a consummate UN insider, who had sidled up to the generals before, and being Singaporean could “read their minds” more acutely. Many observers thought then as now, these qualities worked against her. The same calculation holds true. If you find merely a “new Noeleen” then we’ll all be concluding similar bleak assessments of dashed expectations in three years as we are today. Six very different envoys from Africa, Southeast Asia, Switzerland and Latin America have confounded calculations on whether outsiders or Asians are most effective. No one who actually wants the job should be considered, especially if it’s former US ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson or disgraced British politician Boris Johnson, should they put their hands up. A UN lifer obviously has little comparative advantage other than a more acute understanding of the UN’s internal defects, as Heyzer demonstrated (as did previous envoys). Former military officers elicit little respect either, as retired US general Wesley Clark found in 2010 when he co-chaired an Asia Society task force on engaging Myanmar, or most recently the lack of any discernable progress in engaging with the SAC from former Indonesian army general Agus Widjojo. Second, rewire an entirely new approach, with a new mandate directly from the Secretary General and a closer rapport with the SG’s office. The need for reform has been apparent for many years, but even tinkering with structures in the UN is seen as disruptive. If Heyzer’s failure should spur anything, it is the necessity for a genuine reimagining of the role, and what its long-term utility could be for the UN’s assistance to Myanmar. One dimension could be the total restructuring of the UN’s presence in Myanmar, discarding half of the operational agencies and paring down presence and operations to address immediate humanitarian and development needs related to livelihoods, health, education and emergency relief. This would alleviate the funding gap for donors who have already invested in multi-donor funds. The current leadership under Ramanathan Balakrishan needs to be radically reconstituted, and a balance sought between operational realities and high-level mediation efforts. Third, consider a collective effort of a contact group of multiple officials, expanding the team from a bare bones operation (although one I’m certain well remunerates the players regardless of their 1-0 scorecard) to multiple high-level actors. Nothing limply ineffectual like the “Group of Friends of Myanmar” that the UN tried before, following the 2007 demonstrations and crackdown, involving some 14 countries. However, this shouldn’t be a consortium of existing envoys or point people such as the Norwegian envoy, or Igor Driesmans, the European Union envoy, but a group of higher level officials who can interact with multiple actors. These consultations must be broad and inclusive, especially the resistance actors in EAOs, the NUG and emerging political forces such as the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC) and new configurations such as the Sagaing Forum. However, just the convening of such a forum within the constraints of the UN is devilishly difficult with protocol, egos and above all competing state interests. Look at one collection of “Group of Friends” meeting memos from 2009, which echoes the impasse of 2023, and face up to the hard facts that change in Myanmar didn’t come about from outside pressure or support. Or, fourth, do nothing. Just inform the SAC that they’re not worth the trouble. Alleviate the diplomatic corps from having to expend energy on supporting labored interventions that have no chance of even minimal success. Clear the space for ASEAN to continue to fail. Stop investing in false hope in Myanmar; it might do the standing of the UN some good, but likely not. The Heyzer maneuver of early departure should be a call for reform and reengagement, to clear a clogged diplomatic passage. But it won’t be. David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights on Myanmar..."
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Source/publisher: "The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication: 2023-06-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
Grouping: Individual Documents
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Title: Sweden must act to stop Indian arms sales to Myanmar military
Description: "Sweden must act on recent Indian arms sales to the Myanmar military and investigate how components of Swedish arms are once again being exported from India to Myanmar, despite the EU arms embargo. Justice For Myanmar calls on the Swedish government and its arms control authority, the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP), to take necessary measures to ensure that Swedish arms do not end up in the hands of the illegal Myanmar military junta that is committing atrocities throughout the country with total impunity. On 29 March 2023, Sweden’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Tobias Billström responded to an inquiry by Member of Parliament, Håkan Svenneling, on measures taken by the Swedish government to prevent the re-export of weapons produced under Swedish licence in India. The inquiry follows an investigation by Justice For Myanmar that found that some of the arms and associated components sold from India to the Myanmar military have been Swedish designed, including fuses for Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles, developed and produced by Saab Group. As an EU member state, it is prohibited for Sweden to transfer arms and dual use items and technologies to the Myanmar military. In responding to MP Håkan Svenneling’s question, Billström confirmed that Swedish Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles have been manufactured in India under licence since the 1970s. He also confirmed that Sweden has transferred Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles to India and that some of these transferred arms have been diverted from India to Myanmar. In 2012, this diversion was subject to an official investigation by the ISP. According to Billström, the ISP concluded that India was respecting its commitments to not re-export weapons manufactured under Swedish licence and that the Indian government had taken sufficient measures to reduce the risk of diversion. However, since the 2012 investigation concluded, Indian firm Sandeep Metalcraft Private Limited has supplied the Myanmar military with time mechanical fuse 447 designed for 84 mm Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles, despite the Myanmar military’s genocide against the Rohingya and ongoing international crimes. One shipment of fuse 447 was sent to Myanmar in 2019 and a second shipment likely of fuse 447 was shipped after the Myanmar military’s attempted coup, directly supporting its campaign of terror. Sandeep Metalcraft still advertises Carl Gustaf fuses on its website. The information exposed by Justice For Myanmar therefore suggests that key components for ammunition for Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles once again have been diverted from India to Myanmar. This casts doubt on the Indian government’s willingness to comply with end-user commitments and take appropriate measures to reduce the risk of diversion. Billström’s response did not address the questions raised about the recent transfer of fuses for Carl Gustaf rifles from India to Myanmar. In response to Justice For Myanmar’s earlier investigation, Saab declined to respond to questions on whether the transferred fuses would require a Saab licence to be produced, and whether Saab’s licence production agreements with Indian companies prohibit or restrict onward exports from India to other countries. It is unclear whether Sandeep Metalcraft is in a position to manufacture the fuses in India without licensable parts and assistance from the Saab Group. India has continued to export military hardware, including 122 mm barrels for howitzers, to the Myanmar military as late as October 2022. The manufacturer of these barrels is Yantra India Limited, a state-owned public sector undertaking associated with the Indian Ministry of Defence. Yantra India Limited’s ordnance factory in Ambajhari currently produces 84 mm mark-III FFV 551 Carl Gustaf ammunition. The FFV551 is the primary high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round and is a rocket-assisted projectile. Billström, in his response, also noted a new system, in place as of March 1, 2022, that implies supervisory controls in foreign countries that have received transfers of light weapons made in Sweden, such as Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles and ammunition for this category of weapon. This system may include post-transfer verification visits in recipient countries to reduce risks of diversion, including the risk of re-export to other countries without prior and explicit permission from Sweden. The new system also implies that countries that have not acted in accordance with commitments to not re-export Swedish light arms without prior consent from Sweden should not be considered eligible as recipients of new transfers of arms made in Sweden or of transfers foreseen as part of prior deals made with Sweden, as long as the commitments continue to be contravened or where a recipient country refuses to accept a post-transfer verification visit. It is not clear whether ISP has undertaken, or intends to undertake, an official investigation into the transfer by Sandeep Metalcraft fuses for Carl Gustaf rifles to Myanmar. ISP should urgently investigate if any of the Sandeep Metalcraft shipments to Myanmar contain Swedish technology and make public any past or future investigation carried out to this end. Justice For Myanmar supports the proposal made by members of Parliament Håkan Svenneling et al of April 28, 2023, asking the Swedish government to adopt a strategy to prevent the re-export of Swedish arms to Myanmar. Justice For Myanmar notes with concern that in September 2022, Saab announced its decision to set up a production facility in India for its Carl-Gustaf M4 shoulder-fired weapon system. For this venture, Saab FFV India is being established as a new company to make the rocket launchers for the Indian military, as well as parts of other weapons platforms for foreign states. This move is particularly alarming in light of India’s increasing military co-operation with the Myanmar military after its campaign of genocide against the Rohingya in 2017. In July 2019, India and Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding to increase defence co-operation and has continued to support the Myanmar military after its coup attempt. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India was the third largest supplier of weapons to Myanmar for the years 2017-2021, accounting for 17% of Myanmar’s arms imports after China (36%) and Russia (27%). Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “We are deeply concerned about Sweden’s apparent ties to the supply of weapons to the Myanmar military, which is intensifying its indiscriminate attacks against the people. “The ISP must fully investigate how components of Swedish light arms and their ammunition are still being exported from India to Myanmar, including from Sandeep Metalcraft, and ensure that Sweden abides by the EU arms embargo, which prohibits Sweden from transferring arms and dual use goods to the Myanmar military. “The Swedish government needs to take urgent action to prevent further diversion, including a suspension of export and production agreements with Indian arms manufacturers in light of India’s blatant disregard for he norms of conduct contained in the Wassenaar Arrangement and in international humanitarian law, as seen in the continued business Indian arms manufacturers have with the illegal Myanmar military junta. “We demand that the ISP evaluation leading to a decision to grant Saab the right to establish an M4 manufacturing plant in India be made public in light of India’s well-known track record of exporting conventional arms, ammunition, parts and components to Myanmar, including from Swedish designed weapons.”..."
Source/publisher: Justice For Myanmar
Date of publication: 2023-06-20
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-20
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Title: Is Myanmar the Frontline of a New Cold War?
Sub-title: How America and China Are Reshaping the Burmese Civil War
Description: "ver since the Burmese military seized power in a coup in early 2021, the country has been caught in a deadly tailspin. What began as peaceful mass protest against the junta flared into armed resistance, with much of the country descending into renewed civil war. The conflict has since turned into a protracted insurgency, with newer pro-democracy forces fighting alongside ethnic armed groups that have battled central authorities for decades. Amid growing signs of a strategic stalemate, both the junta and the resistance appear determined to fight on. Neighboring states have tried to mediate, but a negotiated peace is not in sight. For much of the last two years, the Burmese crisis received minimal attention from the United States and China, despite unfolding at a time of intensifying great-power tensions. Washington and its partners have voiced support for Myanmar’s pro-democracy faction, yet geopolitical considerations have limited their willingness to take forceful action against the junta. Although Beijing favors the military dictatorship in some respects, it initially opted to wait and see, too. But this great-power restraint is now breaking down. Misperceiving several developments as indications that the antiregime forces are American proxies, Beijing is moving with increasing determination to shore up the junta. The result is what one might call Cold War–ization: the civil war is attracting outside meddling by great-power rivals, each fearing that inaction would benefit the other side. Stay informed. In-depth analysis delivered weekly. This puts other countries in the region, particularly those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in a bind. One of ASEAN’s core tenets has been that it should not be forced to choose between the United States and China. Instead, the group values maintaining good relations with both great powers. But as Myanmar’s civil war takes on aspects of a Cold War proxy conflict—a situation brought on in part by the unwillingness of governments in the region to unite against the junta early on—the country’s neighbors may soon face that exact choice: not just between a junta and a pro-democracy resistance but between China and the United States. For Washington and its allies, meanwhile, the entrenchment of a military junta beholden to China would portend diminished influence and greater instability throughout Southeast Asia. A RENEWED CIVIL WAR The February 2021 coup set Myanmar on a path to conflict and devastation. The putschists enjoyed scarce support among the population, which rallied behind deposed leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in peaceful protest. Members of the ousted government banded together with several other political and ethnic groups to proclaim a civilian National Unity Government to restore democracy. The military’s answer was to unleash relentless and often indiscriminate violence on its opponents. By the spring of 2021, Myanmar was careening toward a renewed civil war, with opponents of the military dictatorship taking up arms and vowing to fight back rather than retreat. The resistance found allies among the country’s almost two dozen ethnic armed groups—organizations located along Myanmar’s periphery, some with close economic and political ties to neighboring China, that have fought for increased autonomy or outright independence ever since Myanmar’s founding in 1948. Although facing a ruthless and better-equipped adversary, the pro-democracy and ethnic armed groups quickly gained a foothold in many rural areas, especially along the country’s borders with India, China, and Thailand. As early as mid-2021, the junta’s leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, conceded that his forces did not control the entire country. They have since held their ground in the countryside but have struggled to take cities and towns, in part because they are outgunned by the regime’s heavy artillery and at the mercy of its air force. As of late spring 2023, the two parties appear to have reached a strategic stalemate. DOUBLE GAMES The United States’ approach to post-coup Myanmar has consisted of a cautious and pragmatic balancing act between values and interests. Washington opposes the junta, yet it is also wary of alienating its allies and partners in the region, some of whom have maintained engagement with the Burmese military since the coup. High-level U.S. officials have met with Burmese opposition resistance leaders, and the U.S. government has issued targeted sanctions against high-ranking military officials. But the sanctions have left untouched the junta’s most prized asset: Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, a military-owned firm that generates some $1.5 billion in annual revenues and offers the regime much-needed access to foreign currency. Washington has also refrained from imposing secondary sanctions on those who do business with the junta, such as Thai energy companies and Singaporean financial firms. This restraint on the part of the United States is likely meant to placate other countries in the region, particularly Thailand, whose government—itself brought to power in a coup in 2014—remains supportive of the Burmese junta and maintains close economic ties to the regime. Important U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as Australia, India, and Japan, have voiced their “concern” about the Burmese crisis but fear that excessive pressure would open the regime to greater Chinese influence. As a result, they have maintained or, in the case of India, expanded their economic and diplomatic ties to the junta and are unlikely to provide support to the Burmese resistance. Not unlike the United States, China has viewed the chaos in Myanmar with ambivalence. Beijing enjoyed good relations with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government before its overthrow. From the Chinese perspective, the outbreak of a civil war next door—China and Myanmar share a 1,300-mile border—was bad news for regional stability and for China’s multibillion-dollar investments in Myanmar under the Belt and Road Initiative. China was and remains one of the Burmese military’s leading arms suppliers, but it has never quite trusted the military’s leadership, which it views as too unpredictable. Beijing also supports some of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, including by acquiescing to an underground cross-border arms trade. For this and other reasons, leaders in Beijing opted to hedge their bets in the aftermath of the coup. Although they never denounced the junta or explicitly called for a return to civilian rule, they opened a backchannel to the National Unity Government and pressured the regime not to dissolve Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy. When fighting between the junta and an ethnic armed group led to the accidental shelling of a Chinese border town, Beijing reportedly warned the junta that another such incident would draw “the necessary response.” Chinese leaders also kept the ruling generals at arm’s length. When Wang Yi, then the Chinese foreign minister, visited Myanmar in the summer of 2022, he declined to meet with Min Aung Hlaing, the junta’s leader, a move that was seen at the time as a major diplomatic snub. CHINA GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE The complex array of American and Chinese interests at play in Myanmar allowed the country to mostly avoid the gravity well of U.S.-Chinese competition, at least for a while. The warring parties on the ground may view their fight as part of a global struggle between democracy and autocracy, a fact most evident in the resistance’s vocal support for Ukraine and the junta’s Russian sympathies. But the same has not been true of Washington and Beijing, for whom the civil war has been an exercise in balancing and hedging, not in proxy warfare. In September 2021, the United States and China even collaborated to block the junta from taking over Myanmar’s seat at the United Nations. Things have taken a turn for the worse over the past year, however, as Beijing has abandoned its initial caution and embraced the junta. Driving this shift is China’s perception that the United States has itself changed course and that Washington now fully supports—and is solidifying its influence over—the pro-democracy resistance. Two developments in particular have triggered Beijing: new U.S. legislation on Myanmar and last year’s decision by the National Unity Government to open an office in Washington. In truth, neither step signals a meaningful shift in U.S. policy. The law in question, the 2023 BURMA Act, reiterates Washington’s goal of reversing the coup and calls for the provision of nonlethal military aid (mostly communications equipment) to antiregime forces. Yet the law mandates neither lethal military support nor sanctions on the junta’s oil and gas business, and even the disbursement of nonlethal aid has lagged. U.S. efforts on behalf of Myanmar’s rebels are negligible—practically nonexistent—in comparison with the support the United States is providing to Ukraine, for instance, in its war against Russia. As for the National Unity Government’s new office in the U.S. capital, its goal is to coordinate and amplify the resistance’s advocacy, but whether it succeeds in this task is another question. These caveats notwithstanding, Beijing’s reaction has been to throw its weight more forcefully behind the junta, ending two years of relative disengagement. In May, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang met with Min Aung Hlaing, declaring that China would help Myanmar “achieve reconciliation under the constitutional and legal framework”—diplomatic code for supporting the military regime. Earlier this year, the junta banned Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, which it would likely not have done without feeling that it had Beijing’s assent. According to insiders, Chinese interlocutors have also urged the pro-democracy resistance not to grow too close with the West. Beijing’s new special envoy to Myanmar, Deng Xijun, has gone on the offensive, too. In recent months, Deng has held a flurry of meetings with junta leaders and representatives of several ethnic armed groups and is reportedly pushing for cease-fires between these parties. That outcome would benefit the regime and hobble the resistance: a truce with Chinese-aligned ethnic armed groups would drive a wedge between them and their pro-democracy allies, whose fighters rely on the ethnic armed groups for training, manpower, and equipment (a large portion of which is of Chinese origin or is built using Chinese-made parts. The regime, on the other hand, would be fighting on fewer fronts at once and could redeploy its soldiers to the most important hot spots. The result would be an emboldened junta, confident of its chances for survival and willing to fight on. GET OFF THE FENCE China’s newfound interest and engagement in Myanmar brings to mind Cold War–era conflicts in Southeast Asia, such as wars in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Then as now, rival domestic factions curried favor with and sought support from rivaling superpowers—which were often receptive to these efforts, driven by a fear that the other side would otherwise gain a leg up. Myanmar today is no exception. Competition between China and its rivals—above all, the United States and India—is reshaping domestic politics in many countries in the Indo-Pacific as local actors feel compelled to pick sides. The Maldives and Sri Lanka have for years been caught in a geopolitical push and pull between India and China. The question of Chinese influence, and of embracing or rejecting China’s growing regional ambitions, has become a political lightning rod elsewhere in South Asia, parts of Southeast Asia, and Oceania. But the stakes are particularly high in an armed conflict such as Myanmar’s, where China’s growing involvement risks prolonged suffering and additional great-power tensions. Given the state of U.S.-Chinese relations and the ideological dimension of Myanmar’s civil war, it was perhaps inevitable that the warring parties would become entangled in broader geopolitical rivalries. But substantial culpability lies with regional actors who have long since abdicated responsibility and thereby ceded the playing field to Beijing. ASEAN has performed especially poorly. Owing to the bloc’s focus on consensus building and noninterference, it has proven incapable of exerting any serious pressure on the junta. Its flagship diplomatic initiative in the conflict, an unworkable 2021 agreement known as the Five-Point Consensus, quickly lost steam because it lacked enforcement mechanisms. Meek attempts at backdoor diplomacy by the Indonesian government, which currently chairs ASEAN, have failed to make progress, too. Meanwhile, several autocratic ASEAN member states appear eager to rehabilitate the junta within the organization, including Thailand and Laos, which is set to assume the role of chair for 2024. Instead of endless dithering and talk of engaging “all stakeholders,” ASEAN members and other countries in the region should face the facts. First, the Burmese military is the structural and proximate cause for the violence that has repeatedly engulfed Myanmar for three-quarters of a century. Second, the military is incapable of achieving battlefield victory, as evidenced by its failure to consolidate control over rural areas, defeat the ethnic armed groups, and suppress popular resistance despite its overwhelmingly superior firepower. Its removal from power is the only realistic option for achieving long-term peace in the country. The diplomatic efforts of ASEAN and other states should reflect that reality. ASEAN could learn from the African Union, which in 2019 suspended Sudan for its military’s failure to hand over power to civilians. Washington should try to coordinate its Myanmar policy with Beijing. Finally, ASEAN will risk obsolescence if it sticks to seeking cooperation and striving to accommodate both great powers. This approach is already proving ineffective in the South China Sea in the face of aggressive Chinese territorial expansion. In Myanmar, ASEAN needs to make some hard choices and get off the fence. China’s diplomatic efforts to shore up the junta, if successful, will only drag out the conflict and consolidate a regime beholden to China’s revisionist geopolitical goals. That outcome, in turn, would likely portend greater pressure on other states in the region to align with either Washington or Beijing—an outcome that no one within ASEAN wants. The United States, for its part, should understand that it can no longer dismiss Myanmar as strategically unimportant. Given the country’s location at the meeting point of South Asia and Southeast Asia, a stable Myanmar is essential for stability in the region at large. As a first step, the United States should turn more attention to Myanmar, as it pledged to do in the BURMA Act, and persuade its allies and partners to align their policies. Yet the U.S. government should not view the civil war as a zero-sum competition with China, whose geographic proximity to and major interests in Myanmar make it a necessary part of any settlement. On the contrary, Washington should try to coordinate its Myanmar policy with Beijing, if only to build the necessary guardrails to preclude escalation. U.S. officials should make their case by appealing to the pragmatism of Chinese leaders: The United States and China’s shared interest in regional stability means the junta must go. And since the junta will consider a peaceful negotiated settlement only if it sees no path to military victory, U.S. assistance to the resistance forces under the BURMA Act is not a threat to China but is instead in line with Beijing’s own goals. Moreover, Beijing should be well aware that the junta’s complete lack of popular support makes it a risky long-term partner. For Southeast Asian states, keeping Cold War dynamics from fracturing the region should be a paramount concern, one that takes precedence over increasingly unworkable norms around noninterference and consensus. Recent moves by Thailand to rehabilitate the junta are the exact wrong approach, giving the regime a false sense that it can hold on to power. Instead, ASEAN’s interest in regional stability points to one solution only: removing Myanmar’s main destabilizing agent, the junta, from power..."
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Source/publisher: Foreign Affairs
Date of publication: 2023-06-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Title: The sound of gunshots across the Salween met with silence elsewhere
Sub-title: On the Myanmar-Thai border, there are airstrikes, gunshots and explosions that no one in the outside world notices.
Description: "MAE HONG SON, THAILAND – In winter, international tourists flowed into Thailand’s northern towns when the country fully opened its borders after the Covid-19 pandemic. The sleepy town of Mae Sariang in Mae Hong Son province near the Thai-Myanmar border was full of visitors. Hotels and guesthouses were fully booked, highlighting the end of a pandemic that killed more than 30,000 people in the country. However, a one-hour drive from the town is Mae Sam Laep village, where silence and fear chill the air. While the whole country celebrated a return to normal life, residents in this small Thai village – many of whom fled from war-torn Myanmar – are haunted by the decades of civil war happening right on their doorsteps. Mae Sam Laep is next to the Salween River, the last free-flowing river in the Mekong region. Less than half a kilometer of this more than 3,000-km-long river is the border that divides the two countries. The sound of gunshots and explosions has become part of the villagers’ daily lives, along with the occasional sound of military aircraft from the Myanmar side of the river. Facing Myanmar’s Karen state, the villagers in Mae Sam Laep have seen the fighting between Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), escalate after the military coup in February 2021 – which overthrew the elected civilian government and left the country into turmoil. The KNLA is the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), a political organization that has fought Myanmar’s central government since 1949 and called for a federal state in which ethnic Karen can determine their own political direction. The coup resulted in a rapidly growing resistance to the Tatmadaw by armed groups across the country, and the KNU was no exception. The military’s response was to deploy more forces and launch a series of airstrikes and raids aimed at cracking down on the resistant groups. At least 23 airstrikes were reported in Dooplaya district in southern Karen state from December 2021 to May 2022, according to the Karen Human Rights Group’s report. This resulted in several thousand Karen people fleeing across the Salween River to Mae Sam Laep in Thailand – creating a humanitarian crisis that halted the local economy and the tourism industry. Bunkering down As clashes between the military and armed groups increased, villagers along the Thai border were forced to build safety bunkers to avoid stray bullets from the Myanmar side. Students in Thai schools had to undergo evacuation training to prepare for unexpected fighting nearby. The escalating violence also disrupted the transportation of food and necessities on the Salween River. When I visited Mae Sam Laep early this year, the ports were empty and lifeless despite the lifting of Covid travel restrictions. Only a few boats were seen carrying goods from the Thai to the Myanmar side. Thai authorities had set up areas to temporarily host displaced people from Karen State. The border was officially closed due to security concerns, while visitors were not allowed to get near the border. This ghostly atmosphere contrasted with the pre-coup period when boats would queue up at the ports, waiting for passengers and goods to be carried over to the Myanmar side. Local villagers would organize boat trips for tourists, who came to explore the lush and then peaceful scenery along the Salween. Restaurants were crowded with customers looking to try local food. After the coup, many villagers reported seeing the Myanmar military’s fighter jets flying over their towns. However, this was denied by Thai security officers, who said the jets had not entered Thai air space. “We are mostly afraid of airstrikes,” one villager told me. “Many of us used our mobile phone cameras to capture photos of Myanmar aircraft flying near our houses. But we were asked by [Thai] soldiers to not upload the videos on social media or send them to journalists because it would affect diplomatic relations between Thailand and Myanmar.” With the villagers urged to stay silent, their stories have not been heard by outsiders, making the ongoing war invisible to the outside world. But this silence is louder than any sound. It resonates with the difficulties of villagers whose lives will not be at peace anytime soon. Rebuilding the economy However, living in the shadow of war, some villagers feel they cannot let themselves and their people be forgotten by outsiders. Recently, a group of villagers joined hands with local politicians in an effort to restore eco-tourism, with an attempt to bring in tourists despite the ongoing war on the other side of the border. Led by Phongphiphat Mibenchamat, the head of the Mae Sam Laep Administrative Organization who is known locally by his nickname Chai, the villagers hosted a media boat trip to show the natural beauty of the Salween River and the forest surrounding it. They hope the media will spread the word about their village and its attractions. Tourism can play a crucial role in boosting the local economy in the post-pandemic era as cross-border trade and farming have been disrupted by the war. “Tourist safety is still a challenge. But we must start rebuilding our profile in the industry now,” said Phongphiphat. Meanwhile, both the war and the pandemic have created a political vacuum that halted the development of seven proposed dams on the Salween River. One of those is the Hatgyi Dam, which is only 47 kilometers north of Mae Sam Laep. It was first proposed by the Myanmar government in 1998 and made a leap forward in 2005 when Myanmar and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding to develop the dam. About 90% of the 1,360-megawatts of electricity generated from the dam will likely be imported to Thailand. But progress has been marred by bloody conflicts and the project is unlikely to move on under the current military government. This political vacuum may leave civil society groups protesting against the dam in limbo for a while. But they believe the project will be revived once Myanmar’s political situation stabilizes. Their main concerns are the impact of the dam on the river’s rich biodiversity and people’s livelihoods. Thousands of villagers will be displaced by the dam’s construction. For local people, the dam seems to be a small concern in the face of never-ending war. Seeking new sources of income, like tourism, while ensuring safety and food on their plates, are now their urgent issues. However, the gunshots are still ringing loud in their ears.
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: Mekong Eye
Date of publication: 2023-06-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Title: Thailand’s ‘re-engagement’ of illegal Myanmar junta is a betrayal of the Myanmar people, Southeast Asian MPs say
Description: "JAKARTA – Thailand Deputy Prime Minister Don Pramudwinai’s decision to push through with “informal” meetings with the illegal Myanmar military junta despite widespread criticism and condemnation is a betrayal of the Myanmar people and an affront to ASEAN unity, Southeast Asian lawmakers said today. “The Thai government’s determination to hold these meetings, despite receiving rejections from the ASEAN chair, Indonesia, as well as Singapore and Malaysia, demonstrates its arrogant disregard for the unity of ASEAN, the human rights of the people of Myanmar, and even the will of its own citizens,” ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) Co-chair Charles Santiago said today. “The current Thai government was overwhelmingly defeated in the recent general election and no longer has a mandate from the people; initiating such talks in spite of this is a slap in the face of the Thai voters.” According to leaked documents, Pramudwinai sent a letter on 14 June inviting other ASEAN foreign ministers to an “informal discussion” on 18-19 June, with the aim of “fully [re-engaging] with Myanmar at the leaders’ level”. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi replied to the letter rejecting the invitation on 15 June, while the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement to the same effect on 18 June. Singapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan said in a press conference during his visit to the United States on 17 June that it was “premature to re-engage with the junta at a summit level or even at a foreign minister level.” The Philippines has yet to release an official statement but reportedly will not attend. Despite this, Pramudiwinai has insisted that the talks will go ahead on 19 June and the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said that high-level representatives from Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, India, China, Brunei and Vietnam have confirmed their attendance. This meeting follows a previous “track 1.5 meeting” that was held in Thailand in March and was attended by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam along with China, India, Bangladesh and Japan. “We are dismayed that Thailand and other countries are still willing to engage with the murderous Myanmar junta without any attempt to hold it accountable, despite the military’s continued atrocities that have already resulted in the deaths of thousands of its own people. The ‘Track 1.5’ meetings also weaken ASEAN’s credibility on their ability to resolve the many crises unfolding in Myanmar,” said Santiago. “Indonesia as ASEAN chair, as well as the other ASEAN member states, must not let this meeting go unanswered: there must be an inquiry into Thailand’s blatant disregard and disrespect of the current Chair. While we appreciate their rejection of this ill-conceived meeting, it cannot stop there. ASEAN must work together to hold the military junta accountable, including by reforming the failed Five-Point Consensus which has yet to yield any results since its adoption in April 2021,” said Santiago..."
Source/publisher: ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of publication: 2023-06-19
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-19
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Title: China’s support in Myanmar driven by self-interest
Description: "In 2022, China’s former foreign minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar, but he did not meet with the regime’s leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. On May 2 2023, the general warmly welcomed Wang’s successor Qin Gang. The minister expressed China’s support for the regime regardless of the situation and promised deeper economic cooperation. He further promised to support Myanmar’s efforts ‘to maintain stability’. In March 2021, China condemned the violence against civilians, halted investments and engaged with the exiled National League for Democracy (NLD)’s members. This support changed dramatically in 2023 as China began a new diplomatic approach. On 4 April 2023, the secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Yunnan Provincial Committee Wang Ning arrived in Naypyidaw. Later that month, an envoy from the CCP came and met former junta leader Than Shwe — now 90 years old — who had nurtured closer relations with China than Min Aung Hlaing. The envoy also met former president Thein Sein. These meetings were intended to ask the former leaders to advise Min Aung Hlaing, who is known to be anti-Chinese, to forge closer ties. China’s strategy intertwines economic, political and military dimensions. Since the military coup, China has invested US$113 million in Myanmar. The China–Myanmar Economic Corridor provides an important economic link between the two countries. The plan for a high-speed railway between Yunnan and Rakhine — which was shelved in 2014 — is now back on the table, as is a windmill project in Rakhine, a hydroelectric power station in Kachin state and a gas power plant. For Myanmar, supplies of food, fertiliser and stable electricity are urgent, and China is addressing this through infrastructure. Since February 2023, the 770 kilometre-long Chinese-operated oil pipeline from Rakhine to Yunnan has been used to transport Russian oil to China. The pipeline begins at the deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu on Ramree Island and is very important to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. On the political and military front, China worries about the border regions, where fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) often land both bombs and refugees on the Chinese side. Qin visited the United Wa State Army, Kachin Independent Army, Arakan Army and other China-friendly northeast EAOs before he saw Min Aung Hlaing. Qin has urged Yunnan to strengthen its border defence. China worries that the People’s Defense Force (PDF) will attack its investments in Myanmar. PDF attacked one of the stations on the pipeline in February 2022. In May 2023 a series of anti-Chinese protests arose — reflecting mounting resentment towards Chinese investments for neglecting the locals and the environment. The resistance has called for a boycott of Chinese products. There has also been speculation that China is helping to construct a base on the 11 km-long Great Coco Island, which is located 300 kilometres away from Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. The island has a radar station and an airfield. Another sign of China’s offensive strategy in the region was a visit by Chinese diplomats to Bangladesh to accelerate the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, despite poor conditions in the Rakhine settlement camps. The strategy in Myanmar is also part of China’s attempts to counter US influence in the region. The United States’ 2021 Burma Act will provide support to the National Unity Government and the resistance. This may have convinced China to support Min Aung Hlaing. Chinese envoys have not been allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and China is not happy with the NLD ban. Despite these concerns, a strategic triad alliance between China, Russia and Myanmar is emerging. Perhaps this is a convenient relationship for the three partners, but it is viewed cynically by Myanmar’s civilians. Demonstrations have intensified and the pipeline has been attacked three times since Qin’s visit. The parallel National Unity Government has declared Chinese investments illegal. For Min Aung Hlaing, the alliance is a question of survival. He badly needs economic, political and military support and so has chosen to ignore resentment against increased Chinese influence. Meanwhile, China’s Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai met with Myanmar’s Home Affairs Minister and urged him to crack down on the internet fraud and gambling hub Shwe Kokko run by Chinese criminals on the border with Thailand. The Ambassador urged Myanmar to rescue the people trafficked and trapped by Shwe Kokko. But their headquarters are guarded by the Border Guard Forces of the military, which have stakes in the business. China clearly wants Min Aung Hlaing to get control over matters affecting Chinese interests before it sends an invitation for an official visit to Beijing. The military uses its Russian fighter aircraft and helicopters to bomb civilians, while troops have been burning villages and murdering civilians. The resistance is without a firm coherent command, needs more international help and depends on EAOs opposing the regime. But the resistance will not give up until there is substantial change. Any mediation seems impossible and the generals are used to cope with international sanctions. China’s support of Min Aung Hlaing is bad for the resistance and the humanitarian crisis. If China’s support for Myanmar continues to be guided by a desire to serve its own interests, prospects for changing the situation will remain dim..."
Creator/author:
Source/publisher: "East Asia Forum" (Australia)
Date of publication: 2023-06-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-17
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Title: Transcript of Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan's and United States Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s Joint Press Availability, 16 June 2023
Description: "United States Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken: Vivian, Foreign Minister, it is wonderful to have you here at the State Department. We have actually worked closely together since the last time I was in government, and I value the conversations we have had over many years. One of the things that I can say very clearly is that every time I have an opportunity to spend time with (the) Foreign Minister, I learn something, and I am grateful for that. Singapore is for the United States, a true partner. Having the opportunity today to discuss so many issues that bring us together, regionally, bilaterally in the first instance, regionally but also globally, was very, very beneficial. If I could, let me just begin with a few words about my upcoming visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC), since we are leaving tonight on that trip. We look forward to having a series of meetings with senior officials in Beijing, building on the engagements that we have had with the PRC since President Biden and President Xi met in Bali late last year. To summarise it, the trip has three objectives. First, to establish open and empowered communications so that our two countries responsibly manage our relationship, including by discussing challenges, by addressing misperceptions and avoiding miscalculations. Second, to advance US interests and values, and those we share with allies and partners around the world, including speaking directly and candidly about our very real concerns on a range of issues. Third, to explore the potential for cooperation on transnational challenges, global economic stability, illicit synthetic drugs, climate, global health, where our countries’ interests intersect and the rest of the world expects us to cooperate. Intense competition requires sustained diplomacy to ensure that competition does not veer into confrontation or conflict. Again, that is what the world expects of both the United States and China. Now, our friends in Singapore and Southeast Asia more broadly, are essential to realising what is a shared vision for a free and open, a prosperous, a secure, a connected, a resilient Indo-Pacific where people or goods or ideas can travel freely, where rules are applied fairly and transparently. Indeed, for six decades now, the strategic partnership between the United States and Singapore, rooted in respect for the rules based international order, has helped strengthen peace and stability in the region and around the world. I reaffirmed to the Foreign Minister that ASEAN is at the heart of our Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States supports ASEAN centrality, and we see a considerable convergence between our own Indo-Pacific strategy and ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, epitomised by a shared belief in inclusive economic growth, transparency and the rule of law. Vivian and I discussed Russia and the ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. Singapore has consistently stood up for Ukraine sovereignty, its territorial integrity, its independence, as well as the United Nations Charter in which those principles are embedded, and joined the United States and our allies and partners in enacting sanctions that are taking a toll on Russia's war machine. We will continue to support Ukraine as we work toward a just and lasting peace, one based on the principles that I laid out recently in Helsinki. Respect for human rights and self-determination are also being challenged in Burma, where the military’s coup and the brutal crackdown continues to harm civilians, to deprive them of their right to choose their own path and threatens regional stability. We appreciate Singapore and ASEAN’s critical role in seeking a peaceful solution. United States will continue to impose strong sanctions against those perpetrating atrocities. We welcome Singapore's partnership in maintaining the necessary economic pressure. Our two countries are also seizing new opportunities to work together – from space and cyber, to supply chain resiliency, to clean energy. We spent some time talking about that. As part of the green shipping challenge launched at COP 27 last year, Singapore recently announced an MOU with the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to upgrade digital infrastructure and to reduce emissions. We are partnering to advance our clean energy across ASEAN, including the ASEAN power grid, which will facilitate renewable energy development, deployment throughout the region, and help Singapore transition to net zero emissions by 2050. And as part of our expanded US-Singapore Climate Change Partnership, we are announcing today, new and enhanced areas of cooperation from reducing deforestation to encouraging energy efficient buildings. All this collaboration is rooted in one of our strongest bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific. American companies, we talked about this as well, are the largest source of foreign direct investment in Singapore. We are working to grow our economies even faster, and even fairer through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), of which Singapore was an early and enthusiastic supporter. Singapore is also a critical security partner, hosting American ships and aircraft, sending pilots to train in the skies above Arizona and Idaho. For evidence of our robust people-to-people ties, one need look only for example at Singapore's Cabinet, where over half the ministers including Prime Minister Lee has studied in the United States. President (Halimah) Yacob is also a distinguished alum of the State Department's International Visitors Leadership Program, proving that we have a pretty good eye for talent. Recently, the Prime Minister urged the people of Singapore “to think boldly, to aim high, to seek far”. Those are wise and powerful words, and I look forward to that spirit continuing to guide the close partnership between Singapore and the United States. Minister Vivian Balakrishnan: Thank you, Tony. It is always special to meet you here. I think we have been meeting regularly for about seven years, including in different incarnations. So, I will confess to being biased, but I think the United States is very blessed to have the ultimate consummate diplomat in you, and more so at this very testing, trying and challenging times. It is an honour to be here and thank you for the opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues just now. We first reaffirmed the excellent, long-standing, close, stable relationship between the United States and Singapore, and I should add, our shared commitment to a rules-based international order, and the fact that it was the United States seven, eight decades ago, which envisioned, underwrote and supported this rules-based international order. Even now as we go through challenging times, I think we need to reaffirm the importance of such a system. We also covered a range of bilateral, regional and global issues. On the bilateral front, everyone knows that we have got a very robust economic relationship. We are in that special category which is defined as a Major Security Cooperation Partner of the United States. But we have not stood still. We are also expanding into new frontiers. You have just mentioned the updated United States-Singapore Climate Partnership, and this will focus on collaboration in five areas, including regional energy transition in Southeast Asia, and low and zero emission solutions. Watch this space, there is a lot happening. We are also working in other areas like cybersecurity, all the more pertinent now with the challenges that we are facing. We also signed the Artemis Accords last year – that is another whole new frontier for collaboration. I mentioned just now that in fact for 33 years, we have had a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the United States use of our facilities, both naval and aviation. Again, that has been a symbol of our belief that the United States’ strategic presence and contribution to our part of the world has provided stability, has provided opportunity and helped to underwrite the peace which we should never take for granted. Singapore is home today to over 5,700 United States companies. I also made the point that the United States investments in Singapore exceed what the United States has invested in Japan, China and ROK (Republic of Korea) combined. If you consider how small Singapore is, that statistic becomes all the more remarkable. On the other side of that same equation, Singapore's investments into the United States and US exports to Singapore support more than 250,000 jobs in America itself. I know it is not just about trade for its own sake, but also in terms of jobs and opportunities for people on both sides. I also wanted to commend the very active regional engagement by President Biden’s Administration, with your shepherding of the efforts in our part of the world. The fact that President Biden attended the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh last year, and the President also hosted the ASEAN-US Special Summit in Washington in May last year – that sent a very strong signal of engagement. We also elevated the ASEAN-US relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership last year, and it is not just a form of words but the real substance, the real deal. We also look forward to working with you to align the US Indo-Pacific strategy with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and we hope that there will be further discussions hopefully, when the President and you can visit our part of the world for the ASEAN meetings, the East Asia Summit, (and) the ASEAN-US Summit as well either here or in our part of the world in the near future. I think the point is, we do want to reaffirm the critical importance of the US anchoring your strategic engagement in our part of the world. I made the point that there is in fact a deep reservoir of goodwill and trust, and you have many partners in the Asia Pacific. Maybe others may not be as explicit as we are in saying how welcome you are, but I gave you the assurance that everyone wants to see you engage in our part of the world. The IPEF, which we also discussed, is another strong reaffirmation of the US commitment to the economic agenda in Asia Pacific. We welcome the substantial conclusion of the negotiations on the second pillar of the IPEF, which focuses on supply chains. We hope that the remaining pillars of the IPEF will include meaningful provisions that will lead to concrete benefits, and even greater regional integration. Finally, I know you have got a big visit coming up. I believe you are leaving tonight. I wanted to say that we commend your efforts. This is a very important and critical moment, not just for the United States and China. The rest of the world will be watching. So, we hope and believe that you will be able to manage the differences, but more importantly, establish open channels of communication, build mutual trust and understanding. I wish you a smooth-sailing and successful visit. Thank you, again, for hosting me. Thank you for this chance to, as always, have very open and sincere discussions, and I wish you all the best. Simon Lewis (Reuters): First to the Foreign Minister, Dr Balakrishnan. The Secretary mentioned that Myanmar came up in your discussions. I wondered if I could ask you for Singapore's position on an initiative by the caretaker government in Thailand to re-engage with Myanmar's military junta and reportedly inviting the junta back into ASEAN meetings. Is that something that Singapore would support? I would also be interested in your response to the recent report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, on human rights in Myanmar, who identified $254 million worth of goods that have come through Singaporean entities to the Myanmar military, so I am interested in your response to that. And for the Secretary, I am also interested in your view on whether ASEAN nations including Singapore, also Thailand, should be doing more to stop the violence in Myanmar. And specifically on Thailand, I wonder if we could get your view on efforts to form a new government there. Are you concerned about the Thai military trying to cling onto power despite the pretty clear results of the election? And just an additional one because it is breaking news. President Putin has said that tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed to Belarus. Secretary, what is the US response to that, and are there consequences for Russia and Belarus? Thank you. Minister: Well, thank you. I think I counted at least three questions. Let me get back to first principles. We condemn the coup in Myanmar, and the ongoing violence against civilians, the instability in the country, the setback to national reconciliation and the enormous impact on the economy. Unfortunately, it is now more than two years. We have not seen any signs of improvement. From an ASEAN perspective, we have the Five-Point Consensus and we haven’t seen any significant progress in fulfilling the Five-Point Consensus. So we believe it would be premature to re-engage with the junta at the Summit level or even at the Foreign Minister level and in fact, our leaders at the recent ASEAN Summit reaffirmed this position. Having said that, the ASEAN Chair Indonesia is engaging across a wide spectrum of stakeholders and the key point is this – you do need everyone, ultimately, to sit down and negotiate. I do not know how long it will take. The last time, it took 25 years for some form of democratic transition to occur in Myanmar. I hope it will not take that long. But it is very important for the rest of us. Whilst we are in favour of reconciliation and more dialogue, we obviously want to make sure that the level of violence goes down. And certainly, from Singapore's perspective, our policy is that we should all do our best to make sure arms, or even dual-use items which can be used to inflict harm and injury on civilians, should be proscribed. I noted Tom Andrews’ report, and one line in it is worth quoting. He said that “there are no indications that the government of Singapore has approved or is involved in the shipment of arms and associate materials to the Myanmar military”. But more importantly, we are also engaging Tom Andrews because any specific information which he has access to and which we can use for investigations or, if need be, to prosecute companies or entities which are breaching our laws and our policies on arms and dual-use – rest assured, we will get to the bottom of it. But the bigger question is, when will peace come back? Tony, I am afraid I remain pessimistic. Secretary Blinken: You can sign my name onto every word of what Foreign Minister just said, including unfortunately, the pessimism that he expressed at the end, which we share. But everything that Minister said, I ascribe to as well. We are very focused on supporting ASEAN efforts to move forward towards a resolution that ends the violence, that frees people in jail, that puts Burma back on a democratic path. The Five-Point Consensus that the junta signed onto, has not been, to state the obvious, advanced, much less met. And it is very important that we continue, all of us, to sustain the appropriate pressure on the junta and look for ways to engage the opposition in Burma and find every possible avenue to advance Burma’s return to the democratic path, to an end of the violence, to the freedom of people who have been unjustly imprisoned. And in all of these efforts, we are working, the United States and Singapore, very closely together both through ASEAN and on a bilateral basis. With regard to Thailand. I simply say that our full expectation is that the government will be formed pursuant to the laws of Thailand. That is our expectation. That is the expectation of people in Thailand as well. With regard to the reports about Belarus, we have seen comments that were made in the last few hours. We will continue to monitor the situation very closely and very carefully. We have no reason to adjust our own nuclear posture. We do not see any indications that Russia is preparing to use their nuclear weapon. President (Biden) said again this week that we remain committed to the defence of NATO - every inch of its territory. That is our north star. We are very focused on that. I would just note that one of President Putin’s claims for starting his brutal invasion of Ukraine, one of the many rationales he gave at various points, was ostensibly to prevent the threat of Ukraine reacquiring the nuclear weapons that it gave up when the Soviet Union dissolved, and Ukraine voluntarily gave up the weapons they inherited, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan. It would be rather ironic, among many other things for President Putin to now be talking about putting nuclear weapons on the territory of a neighbouring state again, including a state that gave up the nuclear weapons that it inherited when the Soviet Union dissolved. As for Belarus itself, this is just another example of Lukashenko making irresponsible, provocative choices to cede control of Belarus’ sovereignty against the will of the Belarusian people. Nirmal Ghosh (Straits Times): Minister, you have spoken about new frontiers in relationship with the United States. Could you elaborate a bit on that? You have mentioned the Climate Partnership, cybersecurity and so forth - a few more specifics if you could share. Secondly, as have been mentioned, a lot of the world is watching the Secretary's forthcoming visit to China. I wonder if you could give us a Singapore and/or a Southeast Asian view of US-China relations. Mr Secretary, could you also speak to that latter part about ASEAN centrality and how it all fits into the Indo Pacific strategy? Minister: Thank you Nirmal. I used to be the Minister of Environment before this incarnation. So, I was heavily involved with the final negotiations for the Paris Agreement. One observation which I will make is that we would not have arrived at the agreement in Paris if it had not been for the confluence of strategic and environmental interests of the United States and China. I can tell you that from direct experience. That is why tonight's trip is so important, because there are many global planetary issues - climate pandemics, even cybersecurity, which require the United States and China to work off the same page and be key pillars for a global system which will help increase resilience to threats to welfare, health, and prosperity for people all over the world. So you (Blinken) go with our full support. But having said that, speaking now as a diplomat, I want to make this plea. Please do not put too much weight on poor Tony's shoulders. The fact is diplomats need time and space and sometimes just some quiet time to engage in some honest-to-goodness conversations without having to put out a tweet every hour or two. The trip is essential, but not sufficient. There are fundamental differences in outlook, in values, and it takes time for mutual respect and strategic trust to be built. So, it is important, but I am also making the plea. I hope people do not have excessive expectations on that front. On your question about the new frontiers, I already mentioned the Climate Partnership, and there are five focal areas under that partnership which include the regional energy transition. Second, low- and zero-emission technologies and solutions. Third, nature-based solutions and carbon markets. And lastly, urban decarbonisation resilience and capacity building. And even in all these areas, you can see that there are obvious opportunities for synergy and cooperation between the United States and Singapore not just for our own sake, but in our region as well. I mentioned the Artemis Accords, so outer space is certainly another frontier. And of course, we have been working very closely, especially in last couple of years on cybersecurity, because that is a clear and present frontier where there is both risk and opportunity. So, watch this space. Secretary Blinken: I think the Foreign Minister has captured it very, very well on all fronts. With regard to ASEAN, I simply want to note and emphasise something I noted before. If you look at our own Indo-Pacific Strategy, and you then look at the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, the coincidence of these approaches, these strategies, these visions are very, very strong, and very, very high. And that speaks to why we do put a premium on ASEAN Centrality, and why as Vivian pointed out, starting with President Biden, we have had significant re-engagement with ASEAN over the last two and a half years. Economic growth, inclusive economic growth, transparency, the rule of law. We also work on discrete issues in areas that have a real impact on the lives of people in the region, as well as in the United States, whether it is climate, whether it is energy, whether it is global health. All of these are front and centre in what we are doing and one of the things that we talked about today is Burma. And of course, in ASEAN meetings and US-ASEAN engagement maybe that tends to get the headlines, and it is usually important. But if you look at the agenda that we are actually pursuing, both at the meetings that we have in the day in, day out, it is a very broad universe of issues of subjects, all of which go to the needs, the aspirations, the hopes of people in the ASEAN region and in the United States. Minister: So, watch what we do, not just what we say, and you will see that there is a full range of activities for the United States and its engagement with ASEAN. Jennifer Hansler (Cable News Network): Thank you. Mr Secretary, on Iran, how would you characterise the ongoing inter-talks with Tehran? Would you say that you are optimistic that an understanding can be reached between the two sides on constraining Iran's growing nuclear program? And the Omani Foreign Minister said earlier this week that he believes the two sides are close on a deal for the detainees? Do you agree with that characterisation? Moving on to the China detainee issue are you committed to raising the case of Kai Li, Mark Swidan, and David Lin in your meetings in Beijing? More broadly, to both you Mr Secretary and Mr Foreign Minister, given what you said about this not being sufficient, are you optimistic that this will lead the way to continued meetings, continued dialogues between the US and China, including on the military-to-military front? Thank you. Secretary Blinken: With regard to Iran, some of the reports that we have seen about an agreement on nuclear matters or for that matter on detainees are simply not accurate and not true. On the nuclear side of the equation, we are determined to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. We remain convinced that the best way to do that is through diplomacy. We have not taken any option off the table – you have heard that clearly from the President. But we continue to believe that diplomacy would be the most effective path forward but there is no agreement, and reports to the contrary, are simply inaccurate. When it comes to our detained citizens in Iran, nothing would please me more than to be able to say that we have an agreement that secures their release, but that too, would not be accurate. It is something we continue to work on, intensely on a regular basis. And that is separate and apart from the conversations we have on nuclear matters, but I am not in a position to say that we have an agreement. With regard to the visit - two things. One, yes, I will be raising the detainees. This has been an ongoing conversation with the PRC, and something that for me is always at the top of my list - that is, looking out for the security and wellbeing of Americans around the world, including those who are being detained in one way or another, including arbitrarily. More broadly, what we are working to do on this trip is to really carry forward what President Biden and President Xi agreed to in Bali at the end of last year, which was to establish sustained, regular lines of communication at senior levels across our governments, precisely so that we can make sure that we are communicating as clearly as possible to avoid as best possible misunderstandings and miscommunications. Because if we want to make sure, as we do, that the competition that we have with China does not veer into conflict, the place you start is with communicating. So, we will see what comes from this visit but this is directly in response to what the two Presidents agreed in Bali last November. As to what comes next, let us see how the visit goes. I think Vivian said it very well. This is an important, but insufficient step because there is a lot of work to be done. I note as well, that even as we are trying to make sure, through better communications, that the competition does not veer into conflict, we are also looking at areas where we might cooperate in the interests of the American people, in the interests of China and its people but also in the interests of people around the world. One of the clear demand signals that that we get, including from our close friends and partners, is that both the United States and the PRC will responsibly manage this relationship and look for areas where our cooperation might produce results that benefit not only our own people, but people around the world, including in the region, so we will be looking at that as well. Minister: Well, the only thing I can add there is perhaps a perspective from Southeast Asia. First, if you look a hundred years down the road, we see both China and the United States being a clear presence for the century and beyond. Second, we see the United States remaining a Pacific partner and power and stakeholder. We do not want you to go away. Secretary Blinken: And we are not. Minister: Third, if you look at the challenges confronting the world right now, and we have enumerated - climate, pandemics, cyber, opportunities in outer space - we will need, even as the world transits into a multipolar world, now more than ever, a rules-based multilateral system with institutions and processes fit for purpose and updated where necessary. This requires the United States and China to achieve a modus vivendi. So, this trip is important, it is essential, but it does not stop there. I think Tony knows the views for all of us in Southeast Asia. The more you travel and engage, the better. As I said, I am biased because he is a friend, and I can think of no better diplomat at this point in time. His cool, rational, emollient way to deal with some very fundamental differences, because China and the US are not going to converge and become one identical entity. The challenge for all of us, both mentally, emotionally, and diplomatically, is to hold sometimes contrarian thoughts in one mind. And this is the challenge of the century. Fifty years ago, when Henry Kissinger went to Beijing, it completely reordered the strategic furniture in the globe. We are coming close to a point when this will be necessary again. So, we all watch with interest and concern and some optimism, because we all have to be optimistic, otherwise you will not keep trying. So, let us support these efforts. And let us see where you will take it. Benji Hyer (Channel News Asia): We have heard Washington and Singapore's position on US-China relations. I wanted to ask your perspective on ties between Russia and China. How much is what they call the “friendship with no limits” between Moscow and Beijing a concern for the US Secretary of State and Foreign Minister for the Indo-Pacific and ASEAN? Secretary Blinken: You have heard us speak to this on a number of occasions in recent months, and it entirely depends on the practical manifestations of that partnership, with that friendship. I will let China and Russia address how they view their partnership. But we have been very clear, for example, about the importance of countries not providing Russia with the kind of assistance that it can use to advance its aggression in Ukraine. Equally, we have been open and welcoming of efforts and initiatives of countries including, for example, China, to try to play a positive role in diplomacy that can advance a just and durable peace in Ukraine. As it happens right now, there are, I think, representatives from six or seven African countries who are in Ukraine also trying to advance that proposition. I would note the terrible irony of the fact that while they were in Kyiv, more missiles from Russia rained down on the Ukrainian capital, but I will leave that to others to underscore that particular irony. But as with many countries, we want to ensure that no one is adding fuel to this fire Russia is making and if countries by the same token can play a positive, productive role, including China, in trying to find a path to a just and durable peace, that is something we welcome as well. Minister: Well, Singapore is a tiny city state. We have only been independent for almost 58 years. So, I hope you understand, from our perspective, the UN Charter, international law and the precepts of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity are sacrosanct for us. We have no other alternative. And therefore, for us, this invasion is something which we have to take a stand on and we have. That is expressed in our votes at the General Assembly and in some specific sanctions that we have taken against Russia. It is something which we do not do routinely or lightly, but it is an expression of how strongly we feel on this matter. I cannot speak for China, but I would say that, at least in their interactions with us and in their public statements, China has affirmed the importance of territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty. Like Tony, I hope that their efforts will bear fruit. You really have to pray for peace, because we know that at the end of the day, you will end up at the negotiating table. But right now, blood is being shed and lives are being lost for perhaps, marginal leverage on the negotiating table, and as humanitarians, all of us must feel the pain and the tragedy of this situation. I think we all want peace. When it will be achieved, I do not know, but we all want peace..."
Source/publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore
Date of publication: 2023-06-17
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-17
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Title: Burma: Human Rights in the Aftermath of the Coup
Description: "Announcement: Please join the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission for a hearing on human rights in Burma in the aftermath of the February 2021 coup d’état. On February 1, 2021, in response to the November 2020 election in which Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy, won a parliamentary majority, the Burmese military undertook a coup d’état, installed a junta and arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders. Burma’s multiethnic population reacted with protests and general strikes that were violently suppressed, generating widespread political and armed resistance that has drawn on the decades-long fight for greater autonomy in ethnic regions. The military has repeatedly used lethal force against peaceful protestors, waged offensives, including with airstrikes, against ethnic minority militias, and allegedly committed a wide range of other human rights violations and infractions of international humanitarian law, including targeted killings, burning of villages, and sexual violence. According to the State Department, since the coup nearly 3,000 people have been killed, nearly 17,000 detained, and more than 1.5 million displaced. Steps taken by the United States, the UN, ASEAN and other international actors with the goal of restoring democracy in Burma, including imposing sanctions, have not succeeded to date. The junta has announced that it intends to hold nationwide elections at some point in 2023, but the State Department has said the elections “cannot be free and fair” under current conditions. Meanwhile, 900,000 forcibly displaced Rohingya, victims and survivors of crimes against humanity and genocide, remain in Bangladesh with no solution to their crisis on the horizon. Witnesses will review the human rights situation in Burma in the aftermath of the coup; discuss the response of the United States and the international community, including implementation of Executive Order 14014 and BURMA Act provisions as well as accountability initiatives; and offer recommendations for policymakers. This hearing will be open to Members of Congress, congressional staff, the interested public, and the media. The hearing will be livestreamed via the Commission website and will also be available for viewing on the House Digital Channel service. For any questions, please contact Kimberly Stanton (for Co-Chair McGovern) or Mark Milosch (for Co-Chair Smith)..."
Source/publisher: Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
Date of publication: 2023-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-16
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Title: “Why would they target us?”: Exploring patterns of the Burma Army's retaliatory abuses against villagers across Southeast Burma
Description: "Introduction Since the 2021 military coup, the Burma military junta, calling itself the State Administration Council (SAC), has carried out violent attacks against civilians throughout the country in an effort to crush all dissent and opposition to its rule. These attacks include assaults against villages and abuses against villagers in Southeast Burma. Since the coup, KHRG has received reports of increased human rights violations committed in Karen State, in particular where the Burma Army has targeted civilians instead of armed groups. While the United Nations’ Security Council has acknowledged the SAC’s targeting of civilians, little analysis has focused on the underlying logic that informs these attacks, particularly in ethnic states. Without an in-depth investigation into these patterns of abuse, the struggles of villagers and the conflict dynamics in Karen State cannot be fully understood. A careful investigation into these matters can also inform national, regional and international measures to protect civilians in Burma and to advance meaningful peace and justice in the country. For these reasons, this report provides an analysis of the Burma Army’s practices of deliberately targeting civilians in Karen State, looking specifically at how villagers in Southeast Burma understand and articulate human rights violations committed by the Burma Army. The report examines patterns of retaliatory abuses, as recounted by villagers, as well as other incidents of violence against villagers in the region documented by KHRG since the 2021 coup. The report clarifies the illegal and inhumane consequences of the SAC’s activities and identifies several factors underlying the SAC’s violence against civilians: the SAC targets villagers, considering them as “enemies”, averse to the regime due to their support of anti-coup protests or because of their perceived link with ethnic armed groups. SAC military also commits abuses against villagers to spread terror in the region and impose their rule, as well as to deter attacks by local armed forces against them. Under-supplied SAC soldiers also loot villagers’ properties. On numerous occasions, the targeting of nearby villages occurs after skirmishes between SAC and local resistance forces in the area. Lastly, villagers who refuse to comply with SAC orders are often targeted in overt retaliation. Military attacks against civilians are not accidental, nor are they the result of the Burma Army’s inability to distinguish civilian targets from military ones. Instead, these attacks are deeply rooted in an established practice of scapegoating in Southeast Burma, wherein villagers are blamed as a group for their perceived opposition to the military. Villagers are subjected to collective punishment, as the SAC launches punitive attacks against them for acts committed by other individuals considered to belong to the same group. By targeting civilians this way, the SAC violates international law, including by committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Key Findings The military junta regularly targets civilians in Southeast Burma, in a deliberate manner, instead of directing their attacks to armed resistance groups, which has devastating and outspread consequences for local communities. These abuses take the form of air strikes and indiscriminate shelling towards villages, shooting villagers on sight and arbitrarily arresting them, and destroying and looting their properties, among others. Several distinct, yet often overlapping patterns can be identified in villagers’ testimonies explaining the mechanisms behind the SAC’s targeting of civilians. These patterns share a notion of scapegoating and collective punishment linked to the Burma military’s perception of villagers in Karen State as opponents and thereby prompting any retaliatory action against them, leading to grave abuses against civilians. Conventional understandings of the conflict in Southeast Burma fail to grasp key conflict dynamics on the ground. The reality is not a two-party conflict between the SAC troops and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), with neutral civilians collaterally impacted. Rather, civilians are targeted intentionally and systematically by the military junta, thus showing its disregard for human life and its illegitimacy. The SAC attacks launched against civilians are in breach of international human rights, humanitarian and criminal law, particularly the interdiction of discrimination against any person on arbitrary grounds, as well as the prohibition of targeting civilians based on the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets. Military leaders must be prosecuted as such. Armed conflict is only one end of the spectrum of resistance against military control within society in Karen State, and villagers’ agency strategies are key to the civilian opposition against the military. Such efforts should be creatively supported, and conflict-sensitive understandings of the situation should be included in regional and international discourses and responses in Burma aiming for the protection of civilians and meaningful peace. Villagers’ voices and demands for decisive measures against and protection from SAC’s abuses are met with inaction by the international community, enabling the human rights and humanitarian crisis to worsen. Moreover, the lack of a meaningful response may push villagers towards taking up arms, and increase militarisation in the country. Recommendations To the international community, ASEAN, NGOs, funding agencies, and individual governments: Acknowledge that the military junta is the root cause of the current human rights and humanitarian crisis, and refrain from giving any legitimacy to the junta, including by signing agreements with them and presenting credentials to them. Call on ASEAN to suspend Burma’s ASEAN membership until a democratically-elected civilian government is restored; abandon the current Five-Point Consensus and develop a new plan that addresses the critiques outlined by numerous stakeholders; and cooperate with international and local actors to end the junta’s violence against the people of Burma. Support current investigations and proceedings to prosecute junta leaders, and seek out all additional opportunities (through ad hoc tribunals, universal jurisdiction and other mechanisms) to hold the Burma military accountable for its vast array of crimes. Broaden the scope of accountability in future proceedings to include SAC crimes committed against Karen peoples, not yet covered by current investigations, as well as to investigate the war crime of collective punishment and the crime against humanity of persecution. Increase financial support for and collaboration with local human rights organisations and actors operating on the ground to ensure that the widest representation of voices and experiences of oppressed peoples in Burma are considered. Acknowledging the SAC practice of purposely targeting civilians in Southeast Burma, ensure increased and adequate humanitarian assistance and protection, including support for victims of air strikes, displacement, property destruction, torture, arbitrary arrest, and other abuses. Ensure that the SAC is unable to hold decision-making power over the distribution of aid, and that funds are not indirectly being rerouted through the SAC. Consult and include local actors and communities in decision-making regarding humanitarian response and the resolution of the crisis, and prioritise and strengthen methods of service delivery and communication that rely on local CSO/CBOs and ethnic service providers. Urge neighbouring countries to ensure that their authorities do not deny entry to people crossing the border seeking refuge, as well as to allow the passage of aid into Burma through cross-border aid organisations and local CSOs already operating in the area. Suspend exports of aviation fuel and all arms transfers to Burma, including weapons, munitions, surveillance technologies, and other military and security equipment, and take action to avoid contributing to these supply chains, whether directly or indirectly. Support coordinated and targeted sanctions against junta officials suspected of responsibility for international crimes and other serious violations of international law, as well as against their affiliated companies..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication: 2023-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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Size: 7.7 MB (Original version) - 43 pages
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Title: “Why would they target us?”: Exploring patterns of the Burma Army's retaliatory abuses against villagers across Southeast Burma
Description: "The Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) is pleased to announce the release of its latest commentary report, titled: “Why would they target us?” Exploring patterns of the Burma Army's retaliatory abuses against villagers across Southeast Burma. Since the 2021 military coup, the State Administration Council (SAC) has carried out violent assaults in rural villages throughout Southeast Burma/Myanmar, targeting civilians instead of armed groups. These deliberate attacks, including killings, air strikes, indiscriminate shelling, shootings, arbitrary arrests, and property destruction, have devastating consequences for local communities. Drawing from interviews with local villagers and numerous field reports, this report presents several distinct patterns of retaliatory abuses against civilians by the Burma Army in the region. It sheds light on the SAC’s practice of scapegoating and collectively punishing civilians in ethnic areas, and provides a deeper understanding of the illegal and inhumane actions committed by the SAC in the country. This report places a particular focus on villagers' perspectives and their own understanding of the human rights violations they face. It highlights how local civilian efforts and initiatives are essential in resisting, evading, and protecting villagers from SAC abuses, as well as the concrete protection measures and actions villagers demand from the international community. The report aims to inform national, regional, and international policies, and challenge simplistic understandings of the situation in Karen State as a two-party conflict between the SAC military and ethnic armed organisations, with civilians collaterally impacted. The report highlights the urgent need for decisive action against the SAC's systematic targeting of civilians, ensuring accountability for perpetrators and supporting villagers’ agency. Such measures are essential if meaningful peace and justice in Southeast Burma is to be accomplished. KHRG calls on the international community, NGOs, and regional and foreign governments to: Acknowledge that the military junta is the root cause of the current human rights and humanitarian crisis, and refrain from giving any legitimacy to the junta, including by signing agreements with it and presenting credentials to it. Call on ASEAN to suspend Burma’s ASEAN membership until a democratically-elected civilian government is restored; abandon the current Five-Point Consensus and develop a new plan that addresses the critiques outlined by numerous stakeholders; and cooperate with international and local actors to end the junta’s violence against the people of Burma. Broaden the scope of accountability in future proceedings to include SAC crimes committed against Karen peoples, not yet covered by current investigations, as well as to investigate the war crime of collective punishment and the crime against humanity of persecution. Increase financial support for and collaboration with local human rights organisations and actors operating on the ground to ensure that the widest representation of voices and experiences of oppressed peoples in Burma are considered. Acknowledging the SAC practice of purposely targeting civilians in Southeast Burma, ensure increased and adequate humanitarian assistance and protection, including support for victims of air strikes, displacement, property destruction, torture, arbitrary arrest, and other abuses. Suspend all arms transfers to Burma including all weapons, munitions, surveillance technologies, and other military and security equipment. Suspend exports of aviation fuel, and take action to avoid contributing to these supply chains, whether directly or indirectly..."
Source/publisher: Karen Human Rights Group
Date of publication: 2023-06-16
Date of entry/update: 2023-06-16
Grouping: Individual Documents
Language:
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