Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Websites/Multiple Documents
Description:
Talks, interviews, conversations etc.
Source/publisher:
Youtube
Date of entry/update:
2018-02-11
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
more
Description:
"Daily independent news program, hosted by Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez, airing on over 800 stations."...Topics in the News...
Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez
Source/publisher:
Democracy Now!
Date of entry/update:
2016-01-17
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
"...Here are some of the things I try to fight: environmental destruction, undemocratic power, corruption, deception of the public, injustice, inequality and the misallocation of resources, waste, denial, the libertarianism which grants freedom to the powerful at the expense of the powerless, undisclosed interests, complacency..."
George Monbiot
Source/publisher:
George Monbiot
Date of entry/update:
2017-09-27
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Climate Change - networks, campaigns, guides, resources, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
English
more
Description:
Advancing the politics of small deeds....
"In this beautifully animated clip from Dirt! The Movie, Wangari Maathai tells an inspiring tale of doing the best you can under seemingly interminable odds. Join us at www.DirtTheMovie.org"
Wangari Maathai
Source/publisher:
www.DirtTheMovie.org
Date of entry/update:
2016-01-22
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Climate Change policy - global ( statements, studies, conferences etc.), Economy and social justice (global)
Language:
English
more
Description:
"About 11,100,000 results, February 2018, of a Google search for Noam Chomsky
Source/publisher:
Google
Date of entry/update:
2015-10-20
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Avram Noam Chomsky (/ˈnoʊm ˈtʃɒmski/; born December 7, 1928) is an American linguist, philosopher, cognitive scientist, logician, political commentator, social justice activist, and anarcho-syndicalist advocate. Sometimes described as the "father of modern linguistics", Chomsky is also a major figure in analytic philosophy. He has spent most of his career at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he is currently Professor Emeritus, and has authored over 100 books. He has been described as a prominent cultural figure, and was voted the "world?s top public intellectual" in a 2005 poll..."
Source/publisher:
Wikipedia
Date of entry/update:
2015-10-20
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
Wide-ranging collection of videos
Noam Chomsky
Source/publisher:
Youtube
Date of entry/update:
2016-02-29
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Noam Chomsky was born on December 7, 1928, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He has written and lectured widely on linguistics, philosophy, intellectual history, contemporary issues, and particularly international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. Chomsky has been a writer for Z projects since their earliest inception, and a tireless supporter of our operations."
Source/publisher:
Z Communications
Date of entry/update:
2015-10-20
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
347 videos, November 2016; 111,000, February 2018 - of Noam Chomsky - interviews, debates, lectures etc. on politics, education, philosophy, activism.... from 2 minutes to more than 2 hours -
Source/publisher:
Youtube
Date of entry/update:
2016-11-13
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
more
Description:
"Tom Engelhardt launched Tomdispatch in November 2001 as an e-mail publication offering commentary and collected articles from the world press. In December 2002, it gained its name, became a project of The Nation Institute, and went online as "a regular antidote to the mainstream media." The site now features Tom Engelhardt?s regular commentaries and the original work of authors ranging from Rebecca Solnit, Bill McKibben, and Mike Davis to Chalmers Johnson, Michael Klare, Adam Hochschild, Robert Lipsyte, and Elizabeth de la Vega. Nick Turse, who also writes for the site, is associate editor and research director.
Tomdispatch is intended to introduce readers to voices and perspectives from elsewhere (even when the elsewhere is here). Its mission is to connect some of the global dots regularly left unconnected by the mainstream media and to offer a clearer sense of how this imperial globe of ours actually works..."
Source/publisher:
tomdispatch.com
Date of entry/update:
2018-02-11
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
more
Individual Documents
Description:
"ASEAN must shift away from its military-centric engagement with Myanmar. In doing so, it must embrace a process and posture that addresses underlying structural inequities.
The 2021 Myanmar coup differs markedly from those in 1988 and 1962, facing strong domestic resistance and international condemnation. The National Unity Government (NUG), seen as legitimate, counters the military’s authority, underscoring the coup’s failure to secure control or legitimacy, rendering it more an “attempted” than a successful takeover. To maintain and enhance peace, security, and stability, and to further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region is one of the purposes of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). Presently, a pivotal concern for ASEAN leadership pertains to discerning strategies to mitigate protracted armed conflict and engender sustainable peace within Myanmar. Concurrently, they must grapple with elucidating the underlying reasons for the ineffective implementation of the 5 Points Consensus (5PC) in resolving the Myanmar issue.
The deficiency in realising the 5PC can be attributed to a myopic focus solely on the immediate conflict spurred by the attempted coup, as orchestrated by Myanmar’s military. This focus has hindered solutions addressing the key requisites for enduring peace in Myanmar. In order to adhere to a coherent course of action, ASEAN leaders are compelled to address three fundamental inquiries: Can the Myanmar military engender genuine peace within the nation? Does the Myanmar military singularly possess the requisite capacity to stabilise and uphold the integrity of Myanmar? What are the underlying catalysts precipitating Myanmar’s protracted conflicts?
Can the Myanmar military engender genuine peace within the nation?
The basic premise that the Myanmar military has the capacity to establish sustainable peace within the nation is questionable. The longstanding pattern of armed conflict in Myanmar, exacerbated by military coups and subsequent insurgencies, underscores the ineffectiveness of military rule in being genuine partners in fostering lasting peace. Since assuming power in 1958, and subsequently in 1962 and 1988, successive military regimes have failed to engage, let alone quell, armed resistance movements, leading to the proliferation of ethnic armed groups and protracted conflict over the past six decades.
Despite sporadic attempts at peacemaking initiatives, such as ceasefires and negotiations, these efforts have largely been superficial and have failed to address the root causes of the conflicts. According to Bertil Litner, a prominent expert on the Myanmar Civil War, these peacemaking endeavours have primarily served to provide armed groups with temporary respite and economic opportunities for military leaders, rather than addressing underlying political grievances.
A few weeks ago, renowned conflict scholar Johan Galtung passed away. Galtung long advocated for approaches that deepen understanding and generate creative, integrative solutions to the most complex of conflicts. For example, Galtung’s conflict triangle theory outlines the limitations of ceasefire agreements in achieving sustainable peace. Merely halting hostilities without addressing structural and cultural conflicts, this theory suggests, can only yield negative peace at best. The point here is that the Myanmar military’s historical approach to peacemaking has not fostered enduring stability and does not include peacebuilding approaches for longer-term transformative change to address the drivers of conflicts.
To attain sustainable peace and justice in Myanmar, ASEAN leaders must listen to and engage with a range of Myanmar’s leaders, and work to adopt a comprehensive approach addressing direct, structural, and cultural aspects of the conflict. By acknowledging and addressing the multifaceted nature of the crisis, ASEAN can support and foster a conducive environment for lasting peace and stability in Myanmar.
Is the Myanmar military one entity with enough strength to stabilise and preserve Myanmar?
The assertion that the Myanmar military is the sole entity possessing sufficient capability to stabilise and safeguard the nation is unfounded. That the people of Myanmar have shown their rejection and resistance to military rule is well documented. Since 1 February 2021, during attempted military seizures of power, the nation witnessed annual widespread participation in silent strikes, underscoring public aversion towards military rule and its political entrenchment. Observable trends, such as dwindling enrolment rates at military academies and reports of coerced conscription among Myanmar’s youth further affirm the peoples’ disapproval of military involvement in governance.
Recent events, notably the coordinated offensive launched in Northern Shan State on 27 October, 2024, have unveiled the true limitations of the Myanmar military’s capabilities and morale. Contrary to prior perceptions of invincibility, these events have exposed vulnerabilities within the military apparatus. Assertions propagated by the Myanmar military regarding its indispensable role in maintaining stability within the nation are now recognised as baseless bravado.
The causes of Myanmar’s armed conflicts started from the era of the Burmese kings.
The genesis of armed conflict in Myanmar can be traced back to several historical antecedents, beginning with the era of the Burmese monarchs. The entrenched autocratic system, characterised by its phenotypical brutality, instigated protracted wars between the Burmese kingdom and various ethnic groups such as the Mon, Shan, and Rakhine. These conflicts have endured across generations, perpetuating a cycle of violence and discord. The colonial period and the upheavals of the Second World War exacerbated pre-existing cultural tensions, further exacerbating interethnic hostilities, and entrenching exclusionary governance systems for inequitable recognition and power sharing.
The journey towards Independence, marred by distrust between the dominant Burman ethnic group and minority ethnic communities, laid the groundwork for post-independence conflict. Today, Myanmar’s armed revolution is rooted in entrenched social conflicts, exacerbated by structural disparities. These encompass issues such as perceptions of federalism, resource allocation, territorial delineation, and the protection of ethnic and minority rights. The protracted armed conflicts spanning over 70 years, coupled with the oppressive, divisive tactics employed by the Myanmar military, perpetuate deep cultural and structural fault lines within the nation.
Achieving sustainable peace in Myanmar necessitates addressing not only ceasefires but also the underlying structural and social conflicts. As this line of analysis suggests, giving primacy for peace leadership to the military is not going to be effectual for lasting peace. Engaging with Myanmar entails a multifaceted approach aimed at resolving chronic social tensions and fostering social cohesion across diverse ethnic and cultural divides.
ASEAN leaders and the international community can look to the notable shifts in the dynamics of the situation in Myanmar led by a range of civil society, elected leaders, and EROs (ethnic revolutionary organisations) to help end the conflict. Contemporary Myanmar society exhibits distinct signs of transformation, such as a diminished reliance on the military apparatus, and a profound aversion to the divisive tactics of Burmanisation employed by the Myanmar military. This heightened awareness among the majority Burman populace, coupled with an increasing recognition of the suffering endured by ethnic minority communities residing in border regions, has catalysed a burgeoning sense of mutual understanding and empathy among Myanmar’s diverse ethnic groups.
Notably, the ongoing Myanmar Spring Revolution underscores a positive trajectory towards social cohesion, characterised by widespread sympathy and solidarity among the populace. Leaders of armed resistance factions, including the National Unity Government, evince a nuanced understanding of Myanmar’s structural conflicts and espouse a steadfast commitment to pursuing peaceful resolutions through dialogue.
Myanmar’s protracted peace process stands firmly rooted, with concerted efforts directed towards addressing underlying structural inequities. At the forefront of the revolution’s objectives lies the imperative to dismantle the entrenched authoritarian grip of the Myanmar military, thereby paving the way for the establishment of a new federal democratic state. In this context, the responsibility falls upon ASEAN leaders and the international community to re-assess its military-centric engagement, where no durable solutions can be found, and engage meaningfully in the transformative processes for peace and justice in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Australia-Burma relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"About three years ago, Asean leaders gathered in Jakarta for an emergency summit on Myanmar at which the FivePoint Consensus (5PC) – entailing the cessation of violence in the country, constructive dialogue among parties to the conflict.....About three years ago, Asean leaders gathered in Jakarta for an emergency summit on Myanmar at which the FivePoint Consensus (5PC) – entailing the cessation of violence in the country, constructive dialogue among parties to the conflict, the appointment of a special Myanmar envoy and the provision of humanitarian assistance – was agreed upon with the State Administration Council’s (SAC) senior general Min Aung Hlaing. The 5PC has since seen very limited progress. Airstrikes by the Myanmar military and fighting among various armed actors continue, leading to the displacement of more than 2.5 million people since the 2021 coup. Inclusive platforms for political dialogue have not materialized.
While Indonesia created a new precedent of meeting with various stakeholders across Myanmar, the Asean chair’s one-year tenure remains too short for significant breakthroughs. Hitherto, observers have described Asean’s 5PC as “failed”, “toothless”, “not appropriate”, and a “dead pact” and have said Asean centrality is “in tatters”. Nonetheless, there are three useful features of the 5PC. It is deliberately capacious: its points (except naming the AHA Centre) remain broad with room for interpretation. It is not a peace plan and was crafted to avoid binding the actions of any successive chair.
Second, the 5PC is what Asean member states believe gives Asean the standing to be involved in the Myanmar crisis. Many may disagree that any agreement from Min Aung Hlaing is required for Asean engagement, but it is nonetheless significant to Asean, committed to its principle of nonintervention. Without the 5PC, there would be no basis for Asean involvement. Third, the 5PC is a measure aimed at preventing major power rivalries around the Myanmar crisis by establishing a test case for Asean centrality. Consequently, the 5PC carries high stakes for Asean’s credibility in responding to the crisis through regional initiatives. Making progress on the 5PC is crucial.
Successive Asean chairs face at least three main challenges. The first is discerning a mediumterm strategy for Asean’s engagement with Myanmar. The 5PC was designed to address the immediate aftermath of post-coup violence. But the desired “cessation of hostilities” will never come without a minimum acceptable medium-term strategy, accommodating the Myanmar people’s visions for the future. Here, half measures aimed solely at cease-fires will make no progress. Second are the limits of time and operating within the one-year Asean chair timeframe. Sensemaking and trust-building are massive undertakings, as Indonesia discovered through its painstaking efforts.
The chair needs to understand facts, histories, and perspectives on the ground, then analyse the interests of domestic and regional actors, before finally devising its policies for the year. The first two stages might already take up the best part of five months, leaving a mere two to three months to craft its approach on Myanmar for the Asean summit. The third challenge is supplementing efforts at internal convening with external rallying. It must create space to bring together Myanmar stakeholders and simultaneously muster meaningful support from the international community.
Between Myanmar, Asean and regional actors, there remains a wide gap of understanding. Many Myanmar stakeholders do not understand Asean’s processes and limitations, and many Asean member states do not fathom the complex relations and perspectives among the Myanmar groups. Asean must continue to create the space to learn from the various relevant Myanmar stakeholders and seek the support of the major frontline states, namely China and India, for its efforts. It is time to rethink the terms of the chair’s special envoy to enable Asean to deal with the aforementioned challenges. After three years, it is clear that no chair has the capacity to deal with the issue alone.
In fact, it is unfair to leave the responsibility to the chair alone. Indonesia’s proposal of a troika mechanism is a nod towards the need for a sustainable, more permanent mechanism. In this respect, the creation of an Asean office on Myanmar follows sensibly. The office should focus on three main areas of the 5PC mandate – cessation of violence, delivery of humanitarian assistance and facilitation of stakeholder dialogues – to create the spaces and conditions for a nationbuilding process.
A troika-plus mechanism (one that includes key Asean countries that have the competence, leverage and persistence to engage) could see its members share a rotating coordinator role of the office, dividing up labour by issue, stakeholders or time periods. Importantly, the office must continue engagement with all stakeholders in Myanmar, not only with the Myanmar military, as its main modus operandi. Finally, domestic engagement will have to be balanced with efforts on the external front, where the office could coordinate international envoys and rally support for Asean’s approach. A new United Nations special envoy has been appointed, and fresh coordination of envoys is needed.
While the international community has given verbal support to Asean centrality, it must also be rallied to provide support through policy options, technical assistance, resources and political leverage. With a more permanent Asean office on Myanmar, a medium-term 5PC strategy can be built. This helps to avoid short-term, individual actions, such as elections organized by the junta or through the existing Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, that might derail medium-term objectives. The Asean strategy would ideally turn into a framework that coherently guides and shapes the chair’s efforts for the year and allows each chair to make piecemeal, sustainable progress on the crisis.
This framework should outline how Asean, with the full support of the UN Security Council, can help to achieve three key objectives: (1) a humanitarian cease-fire, (2) a negotiated transition and (3) the establishment of an inclusive federal democracy in Myanmar. These objectives cover short, medium and long-term goals. New procedures for implementation and milestones to measure progress toward the objectives must be developed.
As recently as December 2023, the 17th Asean Defense Ministers’ Meeting acknowledged the “need to develop concrete, practical and measurable indicators in support of the implementation of the FivePoint Consensus”. Thankfully, the 5PC is sufficiently broadly worded to allow flexibility in activities and implementation. The establishment of a permanent office in Myanmar, initiated by the current chair Laos, could be formalized by Malaysia and effected by the Philippines. The time to start is now.
(The writers are, respectively, director of research at the Surin Pitsuwan Foundation, Thailand; head of the Department of International Relations and coordinator for the Myanmar Initiative Program at the Jakartabased Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and executive director of the Institute for Strategy and Policy, Myanmar.)..."
Source/publisher:
The Statesman
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, ASEAN-Burma relations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"1. Introduction
Since the 2021 military coup[1], human rights violations are being committed against villagers by armed actors in Southeast Burma[2] with increasing intensity. Among these violations, incidents of torture of civilians have seen an alarming increase: in 2023 alone, 33 incidents involving at least 37 victims were reported to KHRG, mainly perpetrated by the Burma Army.[3] This physical and mental violence is used by the State Administration Council (SAC)[4] as a weapon of war. Villagers in locally-defined Karen State[5] are particularly vulnerable to abuse, when continuously arbitrarily arrested and detained, as the SAC punishes and intimidates them in retaliatory violence, failing to adhere to international legal norms and the rules of war. This systematic abuse is impacting the security, livelihoods and freedom of movement of villagers, and causing severe injuries, fear and trauma.
This briefing paper presents incidents of torture against villagers in Southeast Burma by the SAC and affiliated armed groups in the period between January to December 2023.[6] The paper begins with a brief overview of the context in which torture has been occurring across Southeast Burma since the 2021 coup. It then presents a factual summary of the incidents of torture in 2023, and discusses the trends identified in the reports received by KHRG, including the torture of civilians arbitrarily arrested on accusations of affiliation with armed resistance groups or to extract information about their activities; to intimidate and terrorise the population; and/or when forcing villagers to act as human shields or porters. The impact of torture on the communities is also presented. Finally, a security and legal analysis of the situation of these severe human rights violations is conducted, and policy recommendations are provided for stakeholders.
2. Contextual Overview: torture as a weapon of war in Burma
For decades, villagers have been mistreated by the Burma Army who have sought to impose their political and military will over civilian populations across Burma. Civilians have long been targeted as part of the “four cuts” strategy, which aims to destroy links between insurgents, their families, and local villagers by severing supplies of food, funds, intelligence and recruits to armed resistance groups.[7] Amid the civil war, which has been intensifying in Karen State in the past three years, human rights abuses against civilians abound, including killings, air strikes on civilian areas, indiscriminate shelling, landmine usage, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, widespread displacement, severe livelihood challenges, and barriers to education and healthcare.
The practice of arbitrary detention of civilians by the SAC is widespread in Burma, with approximately 20,240 political prisoners under detention across the country.[8] Under detention, civilians are highly vulnerable to abuse, mistreatment, or dire detention conditions, as the SAC fails to adhere to international law regarding the protection of prisoners and disallow the monitoring of conditions by lawyers or outside observers.[9] In rural Southeast Burma, villagers are frequently arrested and detained by SAC authorities in army camps, police stations, prisons, and checkpoints. In addition, villagers are often detained by soldiers in villages, on their plantations, or even their homes. Amid the ongoing conflict and the continued impunity enjoyed by armed actors, villagers are immensely vulnerable to extrajudicial killing, torture and mistreatment when detained in any of these circumstances and places.
The Burma Army has used torture for many decades, defined as the act of inflicting severe pain or suffering on someone to force them to do something or in punishment. Throughout the years, villagers have reported extreme torture including waterboarding, burning, cutting of body parts, hangings and burying underground, and torture has occurred both in detention facilities, in villages and forests, and sometimes publicly in charades of terror.[10] Some of these extreme methods are evident in the incidents documented in this briefing paper. Accusations of villagers being connected with armed resistance groups have been a common feature of torture in interrogation and punishment by the Burma Army throughout the many years of conflict. Ignoring international norms and regulations for the proper treatment of detainees, SAC soldiers inflict suffering on civilians under their captivity without recourse, to a degree which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity under customary international criminal law.
3. Factual summary: patterns of torture against villagers by the SAC and its impacts
This section presents evidence of the torture of villagers in Southeast Burma involving the SAC and SAC-affiliated groups. Since the 2021 coup, KHRG has received reports documenting 52 incidents of torture against villagers by the SAC military across our operational area.[11] In 2023 alone, KHRG received 36 reports detailing 33 of those incidents, and involving 37 victims of torture. Incidents of torture mostly occurred during arbitrary arrests; villagers were tortured as part of interrogation to extract information related to military objectives. Torture was also used against villagers in punishment for their alleged affiliation with opposition groups, either for being relatives, informants, or supporters of those groups, including suspicion of supplying them with food and materials. On other occasions, the SAC military tortured villagers in an abuse of power, to intimidate, terrorise and instil fear. Finally, villagers were also subjected to torture whilst being forced to act as human shields or porters by armed actors. Some instances of armed resistance groups operating in Southeast Burma torturing villagers have also been reported to KHRG, usually against those accused of being spies for the SAC, excluded from this analysis.[12]
a) Torture in interrogation to extract information
During the reporting period, the SAC military frequently arbitrarily arrested or detained villagers to obtain knowledge of local armed resistance groups’ activities. These arrests often occurred in the aftermath of attacks by resistance groups, as SAC soldiers sought to collect information on those involved. Torture was used to extract information or force confessions, and detention conditions were often dire. These interrogations also frequently happened publicly in villages, at checkpoints, on roads, or even in villagers’ houses. Many villagers who were arrested by the SAC were also forcibly disappeared, removed from protective measures or observation of their health or welfare by relatives or lawyers.[13] Villagers are at risk of being detained and subjected to intimidation and torture as they go about their daily lives, as the following incidents attest to.
On February 21st 2023, in search of People’s Defence Force (PDF)[14] members in the aftermath of fighting in the area, SAC soldiers from Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)[15] #603, led by Battalion Commander Hein San Htun, entered T’Hsee Theh Mee Lar Town, Than Tuang Way Thaw area, in Taw T’Htoo Township, Taw Oo District. The SAC soldiers arrested eight villagers who were taken to Than Taung police station, in Than Taung Town, where they were interrogated, beaten and punched. The SAC soldiers burned villagers’ houses and confiscated villagers’ belongings, including clothes and five motorcycles, which they burned altogether.
Later that day, five more villagers, three men and two women, from the same village were arrested by the SAC soldiers and questioned at the police station. All but one of the villagers were released shortly afterwards. As explained by a local person from T’Hsee Theh Mee Lar Town, a young villager was taken to an SAC army camp where he was interrogated and tortured before eventually being released a few days later. Villagers assumed that the SAC had found incriminating evidence related to other youngsters, possibly PDF members, on his phone.[16]
Villagers are arbitrarily arrested, and subsequently mistreated or tortured, in the aftermath of attacks against the SAC when soldiers search the area for those involved or who could have information on the attack. Travelling in the aftermath of attacks is therefore particularly dangerous for villagers. As explained by a victim of torture, that had taken place on January 6th 2023, in Dooplaya District: “They [the SAC] suspected me of being a spy. The fighting was happening when I returned to the village to feed my pigs. They suspected me of being a spy and arrested me. They asked many questions. They tortured me. I told them I was nothing [a civilian]. I told them I was a normal villager”. He added:
“I was afraid but could not do anything. I did not know how to be afraid. I considered myself dead.”
When the SAC interrogated him, he was kicked and stabbed by a knife several times.[17]
On another instance on March 26th 2023, at about 3 pm, Saw[18] A---, an 18-year-old villager, from Aa--- village, Aaw P’Lah village tract[19], Hsaw Htee Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, was arrested by SAC Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #20, who are based in Nyaunglebin Town, on suspicion of participating in a recent bomb attack along with six other villagers. Saw A--- was travelling by motorcycle to buy a duck to eat when he was arrested in Ba--- village. Saw A---’s mother, B---, was informed of her son’s arrest by other villagers living in Ba--- village. After hearing of the arrest, B--- and her husband went to find him: on March 27th at LIB #20 army camp and on March 28th, at Baw Bi police station. Saw A---’s parents had to provide the SAC soldiers with food and 20,000 kyat [9.50 USD[20]] for the cost of tea to be permitted to ask for information about their son. The SAC soldiers at Baw Bi police station told the victim’s parents not to worry about their son because he would be released soon after interrogation, if found not guilty. After he was released, Saw A--- explained to his mother about the brutal torture he had to endure: he was beaten in public relentlessly by the soldiers soon after his arrest before being taken to the police station, where he was again tortured during interrogation. Others from Ba--- village, who were also arrested along with Saw A---, reported that several villagers were also subjected to torture by the SAC.[21]
On another instance on September 18th 2023, after fighting and air strikes in T’Ko Teh village tract, Waw Ray Township, Dooplaya District, a 50-year-old villager named U[22] C---, from Ca--- village, K’Leh T’Khon Teh village tract, was arrested by the SAC soldiers when he returned from a displacement site to his village to feed his livestock. After the arrest, the SAC soldiers beat and punched him. Due to the severe injuries caused, he had to undergo medical treatment.[23]
Incidents of arrest and torture are also common at checkpoints. On November 16th 2023, a villager named Ko[24] D---, from Da--- village, Sa Htain village tract, Ler K’Saw Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, was apprehended by SAC soldiers from Infantry Battalion (IB)[25] #559 and #560 at a checkpoint on the road near Ea--- village. Ko D--- had visited Ea--- village to purchase items for himself, and was detained on the road while returning home. The soldiers stopped and searched him and his motorbike, and interrogated him. During the search of his motorcycle, the SAC soldiers discovered 20 tablets of yaba[26] hidden inside the seat. When questioned about these tablets, Ko D--- informed the SAC soldiers that they were for his personal use while working. However, one of the SAC soldiers said: “You are lying. I know you bought these drugs for the PDF”. During the interrogation, the SAC soldiers beat the villager. After, one of the SAC commanders threatened Ko D--- by saying: “You can’t tell anyone about this. If you do and we see this news on social media, we will kill you”. Since this incident, Ko D--- has been afraid to travel, and cannot eat well. Ko D---’s wife informed KHRG that villagers were living with fear and concern about their security.[27]
Many local villagers who have been impacted by the arrest and torture have been left with emotional distress and trauma. The escalation of arrests and torture in Southeast Burma has heightened villagers’ worry about being apprehended which is leading to fear of commuting to work or ensuring their livelihoods.
b) Torture and physical abuse as punishment
Villagers are arbitrarily arrested and detained often with no evidence provided for suspicion of affiliation with, or support to, local armed resistance groups; villagers are simply going about their daily lives. When detained on such accusations, SAC soldiers use intimidation, physical violence and other forms of mistreatment in punishment.
Saw E---, a young villager from Fa--- village, T’Nay village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District, was detained three times in November 2023 by the SAC, and at the end tortured to death. First, he was apprehended and detained at his farm, asked for his name and any military affiliation, and then forced along with some friends to guide SAC soldiers to Wa Wee Lay Road. The second time, he was arrested while travelling on a road with two friends, Maung[28] F--- and G---, and accused of having ties with Karen armed resistance groups after they were found carrying a battery with them, which villagers insisted was for personal use to charge their phones. The SAC soldiers gave these three young villagers 240,000 kyat [114 USD] and instructed them to purchase food for the soldiers in Ga--- village, T’Nay village tract. G--- was kept behind with the soldiers. Shortly afterwards, the soldiers were attacked by Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[29] soldiers. Maung F--- and Saw E--- were too afraid to return because of the fighting. The SAC soldiers thought the three young villagers were implicated in the attack, even accusing Maung F--- of being a KNLA officer. As punishment, G---, still detained by the SAC military, was severely tortured. The SAC soldiers burned his face with fire, stabbed a knife at his back, and beat his head. The soldiers told him: “You guys are Kaw Thoo Lei[30] soldiers [KNLA]. You see! When your friends were just released, they [KNLA] tried to attack us. […] If your friends do not come back and [KNLA] attack us [again], I will bury your body in a standing position.” The village head from Fa--- village negotiated with the SAC, who asked for the money they gave Maung F--- and Saw E--- in order to release G---. G--- was released the same day and needed treatment and medicine for his injuries.
On November 24th 2023, at around 3 pm, Saw E--- was arrested one more time by this same SAC troop beside a plantation while he was going to meet his friends. He was detained alongside Saw H---, a villager from Ga--- village, T’Nay village tract, who had been arrested earlier; the two men were tied up together. Soon after he was detained, the SAC sergeant in charge gave soldiers knives and took Saw E--- to be tortured. They beat and kicked him and then cut out his eyes and cut his ears with knives. The soldier told him: “Last time [that Saw E--- was arrested], you took the money and after you left, you attacked us. And now, you come and sneak up on us again.” As they took out his eyes and cut his ears, they told him: “The eyes that snuck up on us and the ears that were eavesdropping.” During the torture of Saw E---, H--- was able to slip away and escape. He informed villagers in T’Nay area about what happened to Saw E--- and Fa--- villagers went to look for him nearby Meh Pray Hkee army camp. The SAC soldiers there told villagers that Saw E--- might had been killed during an attack by the KNLA and gave no more information.[31]
Saw H--- had been arrested on November 22nd 2023 while he was herding his cows in Ga--- area. The SAC asked him questions and also accused him of having connections with the KNLA soldiers. Saw H--- recalled:
“They [SAC soldiers] hit me with a machete and I was bleeding. They slapped me in the face. After that, they went to take a rope and tied me from the back. My hands were swelling, as the blood was not running [through]. It was so tight. I could not stand it anymore, so I asked the SAC sergeant to loosen the rope. I was a bit more comfortable when the rope was loosened.”
He was tied up together with Saw E--- on that night, after two days of arrest. When SAC soldiers questioned and tortured Saw E---, Saw H--- untied the rope by scrubbing it and escaped into the forest. After his escape, he was not able to sleep for several days due to fear. Since then, villagers are afraid of being arrested by the SAC soldiers so they dare not going to their farmlands or hill fields to secure their livelihood.[32]
On another instance, on the morning of July 9th 2023, villagers residing near the eastern part of the Pa Ra Lo river in Ler Doh Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District, went to Kyauk Ta Ga Town to purchase food. SAC soldiers from LIB #264 detained them when they entered the town and apprehended 16 of the villagers, accusing them of transporting rice and other items to the PDF. Among the arrested villagers, three individuals were severely beaten by SAC soldiers, as reported by their family members. Despite being able to provide food for the detainees, the families were denied access to see them. During a subsequent meeting with village leaders on July 14th 2023, the family members expressed their desire to secure the release of the villagers but were too afraid to directly confront the SAC soldiers. In August 2023, these arrested villagers were released and many fled their villages, facing security concerns.[33]
On September 11th 2023 from 5 to 6 am, there was a fighting between PDF troops and SAC, involving over 30 soldiers from the Infantry Battalion (IB) #285 marching to Ja--- village, Pu Law area, Ler Muh Lah Township, Mergui-Tavoy District. After the fighting, the SAC indiscriminately conducted constant shelling into nearby villages and vicinities, up until 12:30 pm. This shelling resulted in the displacement of villagers. While fleeing, a 26-year-old villager named Maung K---from Ja--- village, Pu Law area, Ler Muh Lah Township, was arrested by the SAC. The soldiers tortured Maung K--- to death. They also arrested other villagers and brought them to Pu Law Town’s police station. Some villagers were released after a while.[34]
If a villager is arrested on suspicion of affiliation with an armed resistance group, it is common that their family members and close associates will also be targeted, in punishment. This creates much fear among villagers if a friend or family member is detained, regardless of any truth to the claims. In one incident in which a human rights defender was arrested, falsely accused of being PDF, and forcibly disappeared, his daughter feared being targeted herself: “After they arrested my father, I heard that SAC tried to look for the family members. They showed our pictures to people, and they asked people where we were. They also asked people about how many children my father has. They asked people whether we came back to Rb--- [the family’s hometown] or not. […] I think they wanted to arrest all my father’s family members because they wanted to make sure they could arrest every family member of my father. […] We have security concerns. We have to flee from place to place.”[35]
c) Torture as intimidation or as an abuse of power
Torture of villagers is also committed by the SAC and other affiliated armed groups with no clear military objectives discernible. These incidents can be seen as efforts to demonstrate that SAC soldiers have the power to act without fear of punishment from any legal mechanism. They can act with impunity, terrorise and intimidate villagers, and inflict pain on the civilian population, in a grave abuse of power.
For instance, in April 2023, Saw L---, a 30-year-old resident of Ka--- village in the K’Moh Thway area, Ler Doh Soh Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, was apprehended by SAC LIB #409, stationed at the Nga Pyaw Daw Wa checkpoint in Da Wei Town. Saw L--- was returning home by motorbike from escorting students to school in Da Wei Town. The SAC soldiers stationed at the checkpoint were intoxicated and called out to him, but he could not hear them due to the noise of a car engine and hence did not stop. Then, the SAC soldiers followed him by car and apprehended him in La--- village, located in the Htee Ler Klay area. Following his arrest, the SAC soldiers physically assaulted him using sticks. Saw L--- is an ordinary villager who earns a living by working on his hill field.[36]
In another incident, on August 17th 2023, Saw Ta Dah Win, an officer of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)[37] -affiliated with the SAC- tortured three villagers on a road located in Mee Kyain village tract, Hpa-an Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. The villagers were Saw M--- (49 years old), Saw N--- (23 years old) and Saw O--- (40 years old), from Na--- village, Mee Kyain village tract. These villagers work as daily labourers, selling gravel to support their livelihood. When the DKBA officer noticed a gravel pile obstructing the road during his travel to Ma--- place in Hpa-an Township, he confronted the villagers. Despite the villagers’ apologies and willingness to remove the gravel, the DKBA officer violently assaulted them. Saw M--- suffered a split lip from a wooden stick blow, and Saw N--- and Saw O--- were also repeatedly struck. This incident has left local villagers living in fear of similar mistreatment. The perpetrator, Saw Ta Dah Win, serves as an operation commander in a DKBA battalion led by Saw Bo Bee.[38]
SAC soldiers also apprehended villagers whilst they were undertaking their livelihood activities in fields and plantations. For example, on October 7th 2023 at 4:30 pm, SAC soldiers arrested and assaulted Naw[39] P---, from Oa--- village, Ma Htaw village tract, Dwe Lo Township, Mu Traw District. She was arrested by the SAC soldiers at her farmland located in Thwah Hkoh Law area, while she was herding buffaloes. Naw P--- was taking care of her three buffaloes because she thought it was a higher risk for her sons and son-in-law to do the herding work during this time of intensified conflict. When apprehended by SAC soldiers, they asked her random questions trying to obtain information about any armed resistance activities in the area, pointing a gun at her chest. Naw P--- was then taken to see the SAC commander at the SAC base in a forest at Wa May Kyoh place. Naw P--- does not speak Burmese, so it was challenging to communicate with the SAC soldiers, but she managed to convey that she was alone and had simply been herding buffaloes. Despite this explanation, however, she was still mistreated, tied up the entire night in the forest, leaving her wet, cold, and deprived of food. Later, the SAC soldiers offered snacks, which she hesitantly accepted, fearing potential harm. On the next day, at dawn, she was released.[40]
As has been demonstrated, villagers in Southeast Burma often face arrest and torture alongside other human rights violations by the SAC and affiliated armed groups whilst they are travelling, purchasing goods, or working. For villagers who must travel for their livelihoods, or to carry out other daily tasks, avoiding interactions with armed actors is impossible, especially since some events occur unexpectedly and there are many checkpoints on roads. Saw Q---, a 26-year-old villager from Pa--- village, A’Lu village tract, Kyeh Htoh Township, Doo Tha Htoo District, whose father was arrested whilst travelling for his livelihood as a day labourer, expressed his fears:
“Before the coup, we could travel freely. We did not hear about arbitrary arrests. After the coup, we are afraid to go to A’Lu Lay. We are afraid when we are travelling. We are concerned about the fighting that is going to happen. Before the coup, our livelihood activities were fine. Yet, after the coup, our livelihood is restricted”.[41]
d) Torture of villagers forced to act as human shields and porters
The SAC arbitrarily arrests villagers to force them to act as human shields or forced porters, accompanying troops as they travel on foot through contested territory. These acts may indeed be seen as torture in themselves, such as the hard physical labour of being forced to carry heavy loads whilst at risk of being attacked by armed groups whilst travelling. Moreover, villagers being forced to act as human shields are often mistreated and physically abused whilst under detention. They are also forcibly disappeared, isolated and cut off from communication with others. In 2023 alone, KHRG documented 13 incidents of use of human shields and forced portering, involving at least 97 villagers.[42]
In one reported incident, on March 20th 2023, 50 to 70 soldiers from SAC Light Infantry Division (LID)[43] #77 and other combined troops, entered Qa--- village and Ra--- village, Nah Tha Kway village tract, Moo Township, Kler Lwee Htoo District. The soldiers arrested 22 villagers in total, including four children aged between 6 to 17. The SAC released six villagers (including two people with disabilities) and took the rest with them as human shields. These arrested villagers were tied up and were forced to walk in front of the SAC soldiers and threatened that they would be killed if KNLA soldiers were to attack on the way. The next day, two elderly villagers were released but 14 villagers remained detained including the three children. One villager taken as a human shield in this incident, Saw R---, explained:
“After arresting us, they tied up our hands; 7-8 people in a set. They did not tell us where they were going to take us. They were so aggressive communicating with us so we dare not refuse to follow them once they arrested us. The soldiers said: ‘Don’t you dare to escape! If you do so, we will shoot you dead.’ How would we dare to escape when they are that aggressive? We dared not even move”.
The SAC soldiers confined these arrested villagers in a classroom of Ra--- village school, locking the door. For five days, these villagers endured living, eating, sleeping, and using a trash bin as a makeshift toilet in the cramped room. Once a day, the SAC soldiers would open the door, allowing the detainees to clean their hands and legs, and bathe. The SAC soldiers hung their clothes in front of the classroom where the villagers were detained so it would be targeted if attacked by KNLA soldiers. On March 24th 2023, the SAC released all of the villagers by tying them up in the forest.[44]
On July 9th 2023, SAC LIB #559 and #560, led by Commander Min Min Htun and based in the army camp in Ea--- village, Sa Htain village tract, Ler K’Saw Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, travelled to Da--- village. On their way, at around 9 am, they arrested Ko S---, a villager from Da--- village, and forced him to carry their ammunition. Ko S--- explained that he suffered from lower back pain and could not carry the bullets. Then, one of the SAC soldiers named Ko San Naing, told him: “Don’t talk nonsense. You have to carry bullets as we ask you to do so”, and continued to force him to carry their bullets. As they travelled, the SAC soldiers arrested whoever they saw on their way and took them as porters and human shields. Ko S--- reported to KHRG that the SAC arrested ten villagers in total, forcing them to carry their ammunition and walk in front of the soldiers. Among the arrested villagers were a three-year-old child and his mother. When they arrived at a plantation, owned by Ko T--- (a villager from Da--- village), they encountered Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA)[45] soldiers and fighting happened. The KTLA soldiers realised that there were also villagers with the SAC soldiers and so stopped firing guns and retreated. During the fighting, the SAC soldiers told the arrested villagers to crouch down but did not let them put down the ammunition they carried. None of the villagers were injured or hit by bullets during the fighting, nor were any of the soldiers. After the fighting, the SAC told the villagers: “You did a good job”, and released them all, leaving them to walk two hours home. Ko S--- stated: “They [SAC] would not have released us if any of their soldiers had died or had been injured.” Ko S--- and the other arrested villagers still feel afraid and panicked after being released: they worry and fear that they will be arrested again and killed.[46]
Villagers who were released or who managed to escape captivity suffer afterwards from the trauma and face recovery from injuries sustained during the torture. After being taken as human shields by the SAC in March 2023, Qa--- and Ra--- villagers, Nah Tha Kway village tract, Moo Township, expressed they were experiencing significant emotional distress. One of the victims from Ra--- village explained:
“Because of this arrest, we were afraid, and one of the children got sick [with shock]; it seems that this child was very afraid. Some elders also had to take medicine after returning to the village.”
The experience of being forced to act as a human shield is traumatic and this is compounded by the high frequency of these crimes: villagers know they may be targeted again. Some villagers who have been tortured and released need continued treatment due to their injuries. With the intensification of armed conflicts and difficulty working to get income, families are struggling to support the injured victims.
4. Analysis: Legal implications of the torture of villagers by the SAC
Villagers in Southeast Burma are individually targeted, assaulted and tortured by SAC soldiers in order to extract information about armed resistance groups, punished for alleged affiliation with such groups, intimidated and terrorised, or dehumanised when captured as human shields or forced porters. Following attacks by armed resistance groups, villagers have been common targets of retaliatory violence, as the SAC violently seeks to extract information and locate resistance soldiers in and around villages. Civilians face constant insecurity, frequently attacked while in their villages, on their plantations or farms, or on roads when travelling for essential livelihood activities. Any potential contact with SAC soldiers puts villagers at risk of ill-treatment. SAC soldiers fail to respect the basic rights, dignity and integrity of civilians, treating them as enemies and legitimate targets.
Endemic across the whole of Burma and escalating with increasing fervour, the incidents presented in this report are an aspect of the widespread and systematic arbitrary detention of civilians by the SAC, who often entangle the lines between civilians, political enemies and military targets. Under detention, whether held temporarily at checkpoints or confined in prisons, villagers are at grave risk of ill-treatment and torture. Even detention in one’s home can involve beatings, intimidation, and other torturous violence. The scale of the abuse of power by the SAC against civilians demonstrates their confidence in their own impunity.
Torture is defined under international law as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person to obtain information from them or a third party, to punish for an act committed, or suspected of having committed, to intimidate, coerce, or for any reason based on discrimination.[47] The protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is an absolute human right which upholds the individual’s right to the protection of his or her dignity and integrity, enshrined in Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).[48] In the incidents detailed in this briefing paper, the SAC tortured villagers to extract information about local armed resistance attacks or activities, and punish villagers accused of being affiliated with or supporting local PDFs. Other incidents also included in this briefing paper as evidence encompass violence and ill-treatment at the hands of the Burma Army.
Under international human rights law, these incidents evidence many violations of the 1948 UDHR,[49] including violations of villagers’ right to life, liberty and security, freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, and freedom of movement.[50] The prohibition is further recalled by other universal and regional conventions.[51]
Even though Burma is not a signatory to the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as one of the most universally recognised human rights, the prohibition of torture has acquired status of customary international law, thus creating an obligation erga omnes, owed to and by all states, to act against those who torture, even if a state has not ratified the relevant treaty.[52] Moreover, under international humanitarian law (IHL), the targeting of civilians violates the fundamental principle of distinction between civilian and military targets in the conduct of hostilities, as enshrined in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Articles 27 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians, and reaffirmed in Rule 1 of the ICRC Commentary of Customary IHL.[53] Any violation of these rights is qualified as a grave breach, allowing universal jurisdiction to bring the perpetrators to justice.[54] As further stated by Rule 90 of the ICRC Commentary, torture is prohibited in non-international armed conflicts, such as that occurring in Southeast Burma.[55] Moreover, Rule 156 of the ICRC Commentary qualifies torture as conduct that endangers protected persons and violates important values, such as by subjecting persons to humiliating treatment or forcing persons to undertake work that directly helps military operations of the enemy, as constituting war crimes.[56]
Under international criminal law, exemplified by Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,[57] torture as a war crime in a non-international armed conflict needs to meet the requirement of the 1984 Convention Against Torture: i) the instrumental purpose of the criminal act, and ii) the act of torture must be committed by, or with the involvement, of a person in a position of authority (public official, de facto organ of a state, or other non-private capacity).[58] The SAC’s acts of torture against civilians for their alleged participation in or support of armed resistance groups meet the requirements to be qualified as war crimes. Torture may also constitute a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f) and, residually, (k) of the Rome Statute, when is committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population.[59] Notably, torture as a crime against humanity does not require an instrumental purpose, as the degree of aggression upon personal dignity and integrity is sufficient to make it a matter of international concern. Some of the incidents which occurred in the context of detention by the SAC may not have involved this purposive intent, but given their frequency and systematic nature, they may nevertheless amount to crimes against humanity.
5. Recommendations
For international stakeholders, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and regional and foreign governments:
Acknowledge the serious crimes committed by the Burma Army leaders and avoid endorsing or legitimising the State Administration Council (SAC). This includes refraining from entering into agreements with them, granting them official recognition, and inviting them to participate in international forums and functions. Support local civil society and community-based organisations (CSO/CBOs) and ethnic service providers that prioritise human rights, and work with them to strengthen support systems for victims. Support local CSOs/CBOs to expand psychological support programmes -in all ethnic regions and languages- for survivors, their families, and the communities to help them cope with trauma, uncertainty and fear. Listen to and support local and civil society organisations in their efforts to document arbitrary detention and torture in Southeast Burma, advocate for victims’ rights, and provide comprehensive support to ensure the safety and protection of witnesses who come forward to testify about arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. This support should include relocation, psychosocial support, legal aid, and financial assistance. Support efforts to hold the Burma Army leaders accountable for their vast array of crimes in impartial and independent courts, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Court of Justice (ICJ), and foreign national courts with universal jurisdiction. Broaden the scope of international investigations to include torture and arbitrary detention faced by civilians residing in Southeast Burma. Raise international awareness of the crimes of torture and arbitrary detention in rural Southeast Burma and explore actionable measures to deter and address the occurrence of these crimes.
Footnotes:
[1] On February 1st 2021, the Burma (Myanmar) military deposed the democratically elected government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD). The military transferred power to Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of Burma’s Armed Forces. Based on unproven fraud allegations, the Burma military invalidated the landslide victory of the NLD in the November 2020 General Election and stated it would hold new elections at the end of the state of emergency. Elected President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi were detained, along with ministers, their deputies and members of Parliament.
[2] In 1989, the then-ruling military regime changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar without consultation from the people. KHRG prefers the use of Burma because it is more typically used by villagers, and since the name change to Myanmar is reflective of the military regime’s longstanding abuse of power.
[3] The terms Burma military, Burma Army, and SAC are used interchangeably throughout this report to describe Burma’s armed forces. Villagers themselves commonly use Burma Army, Burmese soldiers, or alternatively the name adopted by the Burma military regime at the time -since the 2021 coup, the State Administration Council (SAC).
[4] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma (Myanmar) and leads the Military Cabinet of Burma, the executive branch of the government.
[5] Karen State, defined locally, includes the following areas: Kayin State, Tanintharyi Region and parts of Mon State and Bago Region. Karen State, located in Southeastern Burma, is primarily inhabited by ethnic Karen people. Most of the Karen population resides in the largely rural areas of Southeast Burma, living alongside other ethnic groups, including Bamar, Shan, Mon and Pa’Oh.
[6] The present document is based on information received from February 2023 to February 2024. It was provided by community members in six out of seven districts of Karen State who have been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The code names do not correspond to the actual names or to coding used by KHRG in previous reports.
[7] KHRG, Undeniable: War crimes, crimes against humanity and 30 years of villagers’ testimonies in rural Southeast Burma, December 2022.
[8] Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP Burma), ‘Political Prisoners Post-Coup’ monitoring as of 15th March 2024, available at: aappb.org/
[9] AAPP (Burma), Political Prisoners Experience in Interrogation, Judiciary, and Incarceration Since Burma’s Illegitimate Military Coup, March 2022, pp. 6-11 available at: aappb.org/?p=20734
[10] KHRG, Undeniable, above, December 2022.
[11] KHRG operates in seven areas in Southeast Burma: Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton), Taw Oo (Toungoo), Kler Lwee Htoo (Nyaunglebin), Mergui-Tavoy, Mu Traw (Hpapun) and Dooplaya and Hpa-an. When KHRG receives information from the field, it organises data according to these seven areas. These are commonly referred to as ‘districts’ and are used by the Karen National Union (KNU), as well as many local Karen organisations, both those affiliated and unaffiliated with the KNU. KHRG’s use of the district designations in reference to our research areas does not imply political affiliation; rather, it is rooted in the fact that many rural communities commonly use these designations. For clarity, the Burmese terms for these districts are provided in brackets but do not correspond with the Burma (Myanmar) government administrative divisions.
[12] For torture incidents committed by the People’s Defence Force (PDF) and Kawthoolei Army (KTLA), for instance, see: KHRG, In the Dark: The crime of enforced disappearance and its impact on the rural communities of Southeast Burma since the 2021 coup, November 2023, pp.32-33.
[13] KHRG, In the Dark, above, November 2023.
[14] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma/Myanmar, which then formalised the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army.
[15] A Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) comprises 500 soldiers. Most Light Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw (or Burma Army) are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers, yet up-to-date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). LIBs are primarily used for offensive operations, but they are sometimes used for garrison duties.
[16] Unpublished report from Taw Oo District, received in March 2023.
[17] KHRG, In the Dark, above, p. 20
[18] ‘Saw’ is a male honorific title in S’Gaw Karen language used before a person’s name.
[19] A village tract is an administrative unit of between five and 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village.
[20] All conversion estimates for the kyat are based on the 18th March 2024 mid-market exchange rate of 1,000 kyat to USD 0.48 (taken from https://wise.com/gb/currency-converter/mmk-to-usd-rate).
[21] Unpublished report from Kler Lwee Htoo District, received in August 2023.
[22] ‘U is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[23] Unpublished report from Dooplaya District, received in September 2023.
[24] ‘Ko’ is a Burmese title meaning older brother. It can be used for relatives as well as non-relatives.
[25] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations.
[26] Yaba, which means ‘crazy medicine’ in Thai, is a tablet form of methamphetamine. Introduced to East Asia during World War II to enhance soldiers’ performance, methamphetamine has become increasingly popular in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia Vietnam, and in Burma where it is typically manufactured; see “Yaba, the ‘crazy medicine’ of East Asia” UNODC, May 2008 and KHRG, “Chapter: Drug production, use and the social impacts in Southeast Myanmar since the January 2012 ceasefire,” in Truce or Transition: Trends in human rights abuse and local response in Southeast Myanmar since the 2012 ceasefire, June 2014.
[27] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in November 2023.
[28] ‘Maung’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[29] The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).
[30] The term Kawthoolei (or Kaw Thoo Lei) refers to Karen State as demarcated by the Karen National Union (KNU), but the exact meaning and etymology is disputed; see: Jonathan Falla, True Love and Bartholomew: Rebels on the Burmese Border, Cambridge University Press: 1991.
[31] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in January 2024.
[32] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in January 2024.
[33] KHRG, In the Dark, above, p. 29.
[34] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in September 2023.
[35] Unpublished report from Taw Oo District, received in April 2023.
[36] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in June 2023
[37] In 1994, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) split from the KNLA over religious considerations. In 2010, the majority of DKBA troops transformed into BGFs, but one faction refused and changed its name to Democratic Karen Benevolent Army in 2012. In 2015, the DKBA Splinter Group split from this faction and reclaimed their original name, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. It is active in Mu Traw (Hpapun) and Hpa-an districts, and it has not signed the NCA.
[38] KHRG, “Doo Tha Htoo District Incident Report: A DKBA operation commander tortured three villagers in Hpa-an Township (August 2023)”, December 2023.
[39] ‘Naw’ is a female honorific title in S’Gaw Karen language used before a person’s name.
[40] Unpublished report from Mu Traw District, received in November 2023.
[41] Unpublished report from Doo Tha Htoo District, received in July 2023.
[42] Since February 2021, KHRG has received at least 22 reports containing evidence of SAC soldiers using human shields, involving more than 564 villagers. See: KHRG, Shadow of Death: Use of civilians as human shields by the State Administration Council (SAC) in Southeast Burma since the coup, July 2023.
[43] A Light Infantry Division (LID) of the Tatmadaw is commanded by a brigadier general, and consists of ten light infantry battalions specially trained in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, search and destroy operations against ethnic insurgents . They were first incorporated into the Tatmadaw in 1966. LIDs are organised under three Tactical Operations Commands, commanded by a colonel, three battalions each and one reserve, one field artillery battalion, one armoured squadron and other support units. Each division is directly under the command of the Chief of Staff (Army).
[44] KHRG, “Kler Lwee Htoo District Incident Report: Villagers arrested as human shields, and shelling and looting by the SAC in Moo Township, March 2023, October 2023”.
[45] The Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA) was founded on July 17th 2022 by Brigadier-General Nerdah Bo Mya. Nerdah Bo Mya, former Commander-In-Chief of the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), was dismissed by the KNU in 2022. KTLA operates in two districts in Southeast Burma, in KNU-controlled areas, namely Mergui-Tavoy and Dooplaya districts. In Dooplaya District, they operate in alliance with resistance armed groups. KTLA battalions in Mergui-Tavoy District are in conflict with both SAC and KNLA troops.
[46] Unpublished report from Mergui-Tavoy District, received in July 2023.
[47] 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Article 1
[48] 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 5.
[49] 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
[50] 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 3, Article 5, Article 9, Article 13.
[51] 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 7; and 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Art 14
[52] 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘Convention Against Torture’).
[53] The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, Common Article 3: ‘Conflicts not of an international character’; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 27 and Article 32; ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 1: The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants,
[54] 1949 Geneva Convention (IV), Article 146 and Article 147
[55] ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 90: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment.
[56] ICRC, Customary IHL Database Rule 156: Definition of War Crimes.
[57] 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7(2)(i).
[58] 1984 Convention Against Torture, Article 1
[59] 1998 Rome Statute, Article 7(1)(f) and (k)..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Reporting torture: resources, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.76 MB
more
Sub-title:
Increased violence would be costly for all parties
Description:
"Recent battlefield gains by Myanmar's resistance forces indicate that the military regime which seized power in February 2021 is on the defensive.
Earlier this month, the junta lost control of Myawaddy, a trading center along the Thai border. Resistance groups also carried out drone strikes against targets in Naypyidaw, the capital, as well as the Defense Services Academy, near Mandalay.
It is an appropriate time then to assess Western support for Myanmar's resistance.
The conflict has strengthened ethnic armed groups, many of which were formed decades ago and are more ethnonationalist than democratic. How to handle these groups is a key issue for Washington, which is on the verge of implementing aid policies that risk exacerbating lethal divisions rather than promoting democracy.
The U.S. cannot bet on the collapse of the military regime, which continues to control major population centers. Yet it has held back from offering military assistance to the resistance, especially after Washington's unproductive experience in Syria's civil war. But the terms on which Washngton is offering nonlethal aid in Myanmar risk creating the outcome it has been seeking to avoid.
A $1.2 trillion funding package passed by the U.S. Congress last month raised this fiscal year's appropriation for Myanmar by 23% to $167 million. The expanded sum includes $75 million for cross-border aid and $25 million for nonlethal support to ethnic armed organizations and People's Defense Forces fighting the regime.
Washington has been here before. The language used in the appropriation was taken from a previous funding authorization relating to Syria, where nonlethal aid included body armor and intelligence about enemy troop positions. That appropriation led eventually to the covert deployment of lethal equipment.
The immediate impact of the U.S. move will be to irritate Myanmar's neighbors, who will see it as an intensification of American involvement in the conflict.
China has been hedging its bets by supporting both the military regime and several armed groups along the border. India and Thailand have also accepted military rule while allowing weapons and fighters to flow over their borders. None of them wishes to see greater U.S. entanglement.
Implementing the nonlethal aid program will cause headaches for U.S. bureaucrats too. While the U.S. is ideologically driven to support democracies overseas, it is understood now in Washington that Myanmar is more complicated than it appeared when democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi drove the international narrative.
The most powerful armed groups are organized along ethnic lines, entrenching long-standing differences about how to carve up Myanmar's territory.
Alongside them are People's Defense Force groups, formed by urban youth in response to the regime's brutal crackdown on street protests and strikes. They started with no arms or military training and have been able to wage conventional warfare only with the aid of the ethnic armies.
In the northwestern Sagaing region, where government forces recently have lost ground, every major assault on urban areas has been led by or involved significant participation by the Kachin Independence Army, the Chin National Defense Force or the All Burma Students' Democratic Front, which was formed after a 1988 uprising.
The U.S. has taken note, and in an unprecedented public acknowledgement of engagement with the resistance, State Department Counselor Derek Chollet announced on social media platform X last month that he had met with the leaders of a coalition of armed Karen, Kachin, Karenni and Chin groups and had offered congratulations on their "extraordinary efforts to pursue a federal democracy in Burma."
It is tempting for Washington to anoint the ethnic armed organizations as the new heroes of Myanmar. But the blood and soil nationalism that motivates them bears little resemblance to the Enlightenment values that are the pillars of the American republic.
Even in aiming to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar, such U.S. support is unlikely to make much difference given that Beijing is providing arms to both sides.
The armed ethnic groups vary in their allegiance to democratic norms and the level of internal democracy within their ranks. But the harsh reality is that Myanmar is moving toward ethnic cantonization.
The National Unity Government, a pro-democratic front largely operating from exile, has played a role in diplomacy and coalition building, but within Myanmar has had to rely mostly on the might of ethnic armies. Any peace settlement will have to reflect this balance of forces, which is likely to lead to the creation of ethnically based local administrations.
It is not in the interest of the U.S. or of Myanmar for Washington to increase the level of violence by bolstering armed groups engaged in combat. Nor would the U.S. benefit from trying to goad China deeper into the fighting.
While most of Southeast Asia gains from playing off China against the U.S., the most likely outcome in Myanmar would be more violence and death, creating the conditions for perpetual war. Some argue that splitting the country into many parts offers the best hope of a lasting peace, but recent violence between rival local councils in Chin state shows that division along ethnic lines is likely to lead to fresh complications.
The hard fact is that this is not a conflict susceptible to quick and easy solutions, and any U.S. attempt to determine outcomes is likely to fail. Washington should spend its increased appropriation for Myanmar on humanitarian assistance and strengthening civil society, not supporting more fighting..."
Source/publisher:
Nikkei Asian Review
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-29
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Mizzima Editorial
Nobody envies the current predicament of Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing.
Military positions are falling and soldiers are deserting. Generals within the ranks are grumbling. Even some of his supporters are upset at his performance and speaking out.
If that wasn’t bad enough, the potential horror of a public-relations nightmare of Myanmar’s democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi possibly dying of heatstroke in a non-airconditioned “prison box” has prompted a scramble to rehouse her and the former president Win Myint, possibly in cooler and more salubrious living quarters, though their whereabouts have not been confirmed.
There is the tut-tutting of the dragon to the north. It has not gone without notice that China’s ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, recently met with former military regime strongman Than Shwe in Naypyidaw and members of the current junta with, no doubt, messages to “cool it” and seek solutions to the worsening Myanmar crisis that is threatening Chinese investments, infrastructure, trade and friendly relations. China is no fan of democracy but is certainly pragmatic.
Min Aung Hlaing hangs out in his ivory tower in Naypyidaw, a city purportedly built with astrologers’ advice to protect the “men in green” from foreign invaders but in reality to protect them from their own irate people – Bamar and ethnic – living in the Golden Land.
It is impossible to know what Min Aung Hlaing is thinking but it may be dawning on him that he made a grave mistake in the early hours of 1 February 2021 when he pulled the rug from under the duly-elected civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party and incarcerated its leaders. Now rumours are swirling that the junta may release some jailed members of the NLD, a party removed from registration ahead of what Min Aung Hlaing claims will be a “free and fair” – though “limited” – election in the not-too-distant future.
Min Aung Hlaing – by ripping the reins from Suu Kyi’s hands – misjudged the Myanmar people, particularly Generation Z, who had got used to expanding freedoms brought in under the Thein Sein regime, and picked up by the democrats in the NLD, in the wake of the 2015 election.
There is little doubt that he expected protests and then eventually a return to teeth-grinding normality as happened during previous challenges to military regime rule – particularly in 1988 and the early 1990s, and in the wake of the 2007 Safron Revolution. But Generation Z hit back under the banner of the Spring Revolution.
Now, one by one, the military junta’s pawns are being removed from the chessboard, army positions falling, military colleagues growing doubtful, the failures adding up, leaving the power-hungry general with shrinking options, and an opposition of Spring Revolutionaries growing increasingly bold, knocking at the gates.
But Min Aung Hlaing is wily. He will no doubt be hoping that he can play a game in which when “peace” is sought by Myanmar players and the international community, he and his generals will be at the negotiating table, with a clear intent to include his military in a future federal Myanmar.
But such a stance is anathema to the Spring Revolutionaries who are seeking to tear down revered General Aung San’s hard-won creation and build a new “federal union” with the military slate swept clean..."
Source/publisher:
"Mizzima"
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The Myanmar Ambassador to United Nations Kyaw Moe Tun has called on the international community during the General Debate of the 2024 ECOSOC Financing for Development Forum in New York on 25 April to provide political and economic support for his country steeped in crisis.
The following is his statement:
Madam President,
Myanmar aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the ASEAN, the LDCs the G77, and China respectively.
Successful implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) and its seven action areas remains key to achieving the SDGs. The 2024 Financing for Sustainable Development Report highlighted fiscal constraints, debt distress and acute financing needs of many developing countries. The 4th International Conference on FFD should, therefore, strengthen international cooperation on addressing financing gaps, accelerate urgent actions to implement the 2030 Agenda and reform the international financial architecture.
As embodied by the AAAA, individual member states bear the primary responsibility of paving their own path toward realizing sustainable development while the international community provides an enabling environment and complementary support.
Unfortunately, in my country, Myanmar, the illegal military coup in February 2021 has dismantled our prospects of realizing the SDGs, even the future of our youth. The people of Myanmar are experiencing various grave sufferings due to the military junta’s atrocities. In this regard, I wish to highlight the following action areas of the AAAA in the country.
Domestic Public Resources: The deteriorating economic situation, inflation, rising food prices, worsening humanitarian situation, and mass displacement have forced the population to focus more on survival over investment and growth. UNDP reported that almost half of the population was living below the national poverty line in 2023. The middle class is disappearing, indicating growing polarization in society. Moreover, the crowding out of human capital investment threatens to undermine the future re-emergence of the middle class.
At the same time, the total breakdown of the rule of law and rampant corruption has exacerbated the illicit economy including online scams. UNODC reported that Myanmar became the world’s largest opium producer by the end of 2023. According to UNCTAD, up to $1,347 million in inward illicit financial flows have been generated from the potential exports of opiates.
Domestic and international private business and finance: The World Bank reported that financial sector reforms have also stagnated and are in danger of being reversed after the illegal military coup. Microfinance institutions were impacted by the subsequent domestic banking crisis, affecting 5 million customers including many MSMEs.
Besides, the recent unlawful forced conscription of the military junta has pushed many youth, including those working in the private sector, into hiding and fleeing the country.
In conclusion, Madam President, Myanmar is currently at the intersection of political, economic, and developmental crises. Cooperation and effective assistance from the international community should be conflict-sensitive and tailored to the aspirations of our people. It is crystal clear that ending the military dictatorship and building a federal democratic union is the only way forward to create a conducive environment to the successful implementation of the AAAA and the 2030 Agenda, above all to the peace and stability in Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
"Mizzima"
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, UN System humanitarian assistance
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar urge the French government to swiftly investigate and freeze any assets of Theint Win Htet in France and revoke her visa.
On April 3, 2024, the French lawyers William Bourdon and Lily Ravon, acting as counsel for Justice For Myanmar, reported Theint Win Htet to French authorities requesting that they freeze any of her assets in French territory and consider her removal from France. They also wrote to HEC Paris urging the school to notify French authorities of Theint Win Htet’s sources of funds and to consider revoking her admission.
HEC benefits from its status as a Consular Higher Education Institution (Etablissement d'Enseignement Supérieur Consulaire-EESC), and as such the CCI Paris Ile-de-France is one of its main shareholders. On April 5, 2024, Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar wrote to CCI Paris Ile-de-France to raise concerns about Theint Win Htet’s access to the HEC, HEC Investment Club and International Consulting Club, the implicit support that her admission may imply from the many business leaders and their institutions who sit on the board of directors, and risks related to the use of the knowledge and network in the Myanmar context.
Theint Win Htet is a member of the founding family of Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, a Myanmar military linked crony conglomerate and, according to her LinkedIn profile, has been admitted to HEC Paris, an elite French business school.
Shwe Byain Phyu Group is a major crony conglomerate with significant links to the Myanmar military, including a partnership to import petroleum with EU-sanctioned Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and interests in the mining and timber industries, which are now dominated by EU-sanctioned state-owned enterprises that are under junta control.
As a result of the family’s business with the Myanmar military junta and its conglomerates, the USA sanctioned Theint Win Htet, her brother Win Paing Kyaw, her parents Thein Win Zaw and Tin Latt Min, and Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies on January 31, 2024. In its sanctions announcement, the USA noted the role of Theint Win Htet, her brother and mother in “various companies that are closely related to the regime.”
In 2022, Shwe Byain Phyu Group took control of Telenor Myanmar, renamed ATOM Myanmar, putting the personal data of millions of users at risk amid the junta’s attempts to ramp up surveillance as part of its campaign of terror against the people of Myanmar.
Since the military’s illegal coup attempt, Theint Win Htet has acted as a shareholder and director of One Telecom Company Limited, a company established during Shwe Byain Phyu’s acquisition of Telenor Myanmar. In 2023, Theint Win Htet did an internship at ATOM Myanmar as a financial analyst.
Theint Win Htet has also held shares in Min Shwe Myine Enterprise Limited, a Myanmar petroleum company that formed a consortium in 2022 to “to find reliable suppliers from Russia to tighten Myanmar Russia partnership.”
Theint Win Htet’s expenses are supported by her family, according to Justice For Myanmar sources.
Info Birmanie and Justice For Myanmar call on the EU to urgently impose sanctions on Shwe Byain Phyu Group and its owners and directors, including Theint Win Htet, and to increase its targeted sanctions to block the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment and jet fuel, in coordination with its allies.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says:
“The fact that Theint Win Htet is able to study in France is a further sign of the serious lack of coordination in sanctions imposed after the military’s illegal attempted coup.”
“Theint Win Htet’s presence in France undermines EU sanctions on Shwe Byain Phyu Group’s business partners and undermines US sanctions on Theint Win Htet and her family members.
“France should swiftly investigate and freeze any assets in France belonging to Theint Win Htet or her family members and bar her from France.”
“For more than three years, the people of Myanmar have courageously resisted the military’s failing attempted coup. France should stand on the side of the people and send a clear message that Myanmar cronies are not welcome in its territory.”
Info Birmanie coordinator Johanna Chardonnieras says:
"The integration of a student at HEC under American sanctions for her links with the Myanmar military junta, which is responsible for serious human rights violations, shows the laissez-faire approach to Myanmar.”
"By sharing its knowledge and network with Theint Win Htet, HEC, its management, board of directors and shareholders are showing, at best, a flagrant lack of diligence in the admissions process, and at worst, a disregard for the Myanmar people's struggle for freedom.
"It is from France that Theint Win Htet continues to exercise her ownership in the Shwe Byain Phyu Group - generating revenue for the junta and contributing to the bloody repression of her fellow citizens. It is therefore up to the French government to take appropriate measures, as a corollary of its repeated condemnations of the military junta’s international crimes and exactions, and its repeated expressions of support towards the people of Myanmar.".....Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar demandent urgemment au gouvernement français d’enquêter sans délai sur les avoirs de Theint Win Htet en France, de les geler et d’évaluer s’il y a lieu de remettre en question son droit de séjour en France.
Le 3 avril 2024, les avocats français William Bourdon et Lily Ravon, agissant en tant que conseils pour Justice For Myanmar, ont signalé Theint Win Htet aux autorités françaises en leur demandant de geler tous ses avoirs sur le territoire français et d’envisager le retrait de son droit de séjour en France. Ils ont également écrit à HEC Paris pour demander à l’école d’informer les autorités françaises sur les sources de financement de Theint Win Htet et d’envisager de révoquer son admission.
HEC bénéficie du statut d’Etablissement d’Enseignement Supérieur Consulaire (EESC) et, à ce titre, la CCI Paris Ile-de-France est l’un de ses principaux actionnaires. Le 5 avril 2024, Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar ont écrit à la CCI Paris Ile-de-France pour faire part de leurs préoccupations concernant la présence de Theint Win Htet à HEC, HEC Investment Club et International Consulting Club, du soutien implicite des nombreux chefs d’entreprise et institutions qui siègent au conseil d’administration que cette admission à HEC pourrait impliquer, et des risques liés à l’utilisation des connaissances et du réseau mis à disposition de Theint Win Htet dans le contexte birman.
Theint Win Htet est membre de la famille fondatrice du Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, un conglomérat en relation avec l’armée birmane. D’après son profil LinkedIn, elle a été admise à HEC Paris, une école de commerce française réputée.
Le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu est un important conglomérat qui entretient des liens étroits avec l’armée birmane, notamment un partenariat pour l’importation de pétrole avec Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), une société sanctionnée par l’Union Européenne (UE), et des intérêts dans les secteurs de l’exploitation minière et du bois, qui sont désormais dominés par des entreprises d’État sous le contrôle de la junte, sanctionnées également par l’UE.
En raison des affaires de sa famille avec la junte militaire birmane et de ces consortiums, les États-Unis ont sanctionné le 31 janvier 2024 Theint Win Htet, son frère Win Paing Kyaw, ses parents Thein Win Zaw et Tin Latt Min, ainsi que le Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies. Dans l’annonce de ces sanctions, les États-Unis ont noté le rôle de Theint Win Htet, de son frère et de sa mère dans « diverses entreprises étroitement liées au régime ».
En 2022, le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu a pris le contrôle de Telenor Myanmar, rebaptisé ATOM Myanmar, mettant en péril les données personnelles de millions d’utilisateurs, alors que la junte tente de renforcer la surveillance dans le cadre de sa campagne de terreur contre le peuple de Birmanie.
Depuis le coup d’État de l’armée, Theint Win Htet est actionnaire et gérante de One Telecom Company Limited, une société créée lors de l’acquisition de Telenor Myanmar par Shwe Byain Phyu. En 2023, Theint Win Htet a effectué un stage chez ATOM Myanmar en tant qu’analyste financière.
Theint Win Htet a également détenu des parts dans Min Shwe Myine Enterprise Limited, une société pétrolière du Myanmar qui a formé un consortium en 2022 pour « trouver des fournisseurs fiables en Russie afin de renforcer le partenariat Myanmar-Russie ».
Selon les sources de Justice For Myanmar, les dépenses de Theint Win Htet pour financer son mode de vie et ses études en France sont prises en charge par sa famille.
Info Birmanie et Justice For Myanmar appellent l’UE à imposer d’urgence des sanctions au groupe Shwe Byain Phyu et à ses propriétaires et directeurs, dont Theint Win Htet, et à renforcer ses sanctions ciblées pour bloquer l’accès de la junte aux fonds, aux armes, aux équipements et au carburant d’aviation, en coordination avec ses alliés.
Yadanar Maung, porte-parole de Justice For Myanmar, déclare :
« Le fait que Theint Win Htet puisse étudier en France est un nouveau signe du grave manque de coordination des sanctions imposées après la tentative illégale de coup d’État de l’armée. »
« La présence de Theint Win Htet en France compromet les sanctions de l’UE à l’encontre des partenaires commerciaux du groupe Shwe Byain Phyu et les sanctions des États-Unis à l’encontre de Theint Win Htet et des membres de sa famille. »
« La France devrait rapidement enquêter et geler tous les avoirs en France appartenant à Theint Win Htet ou aux membres de sa famille et lui interdire l’accès au territoire français. »
« Depuis plus de trois ans, le peuple du Myanmar résiste courageusement à la tentative de coup d’État manqué de l’armée. La France devrait se ranger du côté du peuple et envoyer un message clair selon lequel les complices de la junte birmane ne sont pas les bienvenus sur son territoire. »
Johanna Chardonnieras, coordinatrice d’Info Birmanie, déclare :
« L’intégration à HEC d’une étudiante sous sanctions américaines pour ses liens avec la junte militaire birmane, responsable de graves violations des droits humains, est symptomatique du laisser-faire en place sur le dossier birman. »
« En partageant ses connaissances et son réseau avec Theint Win Htet, HEC, sa direction, son conseil d’administration et ses actionnaires font preuve, au mieux, d’un manque flagrant de diligence dans la procédure d’admission, au pire, d’un mépris pour la lutte du peuple birman pour la liberté. »
« C’est depuis la France que Theint Win Htet continue d’exercer son actionnariat dans le groupe Shwe Byain Phyu, générant des revenus pour la junte et contribuant à la répression sanglante de ses concitoyens. Il appartient donc au gouvernement français de prendre les mesures qui s’imposent, en corollaire de ses condamnations répétées des crimes et exactions commis par la junte militaire et ses déclarations répétées de soutien au peuple birman....."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Business and the Military, Sanctions
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
122.79 KB 219.39 KB 154.32 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
In the Arakha region, ongoing clashes persist between the terrorist fascist military council and the Arakha Army, notably escalating in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Ann, and Thandwe cities. The intensification of hostilities in Buthidaung Township is particularly concerning, attributed to the continued efforts to secure control over the Military Operation Command Center (MOC - 15).....
Amidst the fierce fighting and the imminent defeat of the terrorist fascist military council, they are resorting to inciting communal conflict among various communities in the Arakha region, exploiting differences in religion and nationality. Additionally, there is obvious manipulation by the terrorist fascist’s military council, evident in their deliberate training of Muslim extremists to stoke communal tensions and arming terrorist groups within the Muslim community, all aimed at furthering their agenda during the ongoing conflict......
Conversely, Muslim terrorist factions, whether acting independently or in collaboration with the military council, have initiated a series of attacks against the Arakha Army. Additionally, these groups have engaged in criminal activities such as theft and vandalism of non-Muslim public property, posing a grave threat to the lives and security of residents in the Arakha region. Incidents, including house burnings and direct threats to civilians, have become increasingly prevalent, particularly in the Buthidaung and Maungdaw areas. In response to these escalating threats, a curfew was imposed from 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM starting April 26, 2024.....
Residents of the Buthidaung and Maungdaw areas are urged to strictly adhere to the curfew from its initiation until further notice. Non-compliance will result in appropriate disciplinary measures. Residents must notify the nearest ULA administrative authorities for necessary travel and secure permission..."
Source/publisher:
United League of Arakan
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Rakhine (Arakanese) - cultural, political
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
124.34 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The MAU tracks market prices in southern Sagaing Region. Data are collected from three vendors per product per market at the end of each month. The data include prices from Monywa (main market), Myaung (village), Shwebo (main market), Ye-U (village), and Yinmarbin (village). Data and product specs are available at www.themimu.info/market-analysis-unit.
KEY FINDINGS
Prices were very stable across the region in March with fewer price changes than in past months;
Rice prices were stable or rising just 2-3%, and cooking oil prices stabilized after last month's increases;
Vegetable prices drifted slightly lower, but vegetable price trends differed somewhat by market;
Meat and fish prices fell slightly in Monywa, but meat/ fish prices were stable elsewhere;
Prices for hygiene NFIs were very stable, continuing a multi-month trend for these products;
NFI prices were generally very stable, although Monywa and Shwebo saw some price movement;
Prices were most stable in Yinmarbin, locking in February's price increases there..."
Source/publisher:
Myanmar Information Management Unit (Myanmar) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Food Security and nutrition in Burma/Myanmar, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1023.6 KB
more
Description:
"Acting President Duwa Lashi La Advocates Pragmatism and Unity in Addressing Public Issues.....Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing
Thann Reflects on Spring Revolution Victories and International Support.....National Unity Government Extends Congratulations and Solidarity to Wa State on 35th Anniversary.....Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann Emphasizes Accountability and Care in Governance.....PDF Strikes Military Council’s Defense Factory.....National Unity Government Forces Intercept
and Neutralize 20 Military Council Officers.....Myanmar’s UN Ambassador Advocates for Youth Amid Military Council’s Forced
Recruitment.....Anti-Coup Committee Donates 50
Million Kyats to Aid Displaced People through National Unity Government.....People’s Defensive War Claims Lives of Nearly 30 Military Council Members.....Military Affairs Summary of Third Week of April, 2024..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-25
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.11 MB
more
Description:
"IN BRIEF.....In Myanmar, despite the government's efforts to block Facebook, continued access to the platform has been integral to maintaining freedom of speech among the population. Nonetheless, Facebook is criticised for facilitating the spread of harmful content and misinformation. There is an urgent need for an improved, responsible design on Facebook, including more proactive verification of political accounts, revisions to content management and compensation for harm resulting from its past policies.
In Myanmar, Facebook is the window to reality. In the early days of the 2021 coup, the Ministry of Transport and Communications imposed blocking orders on Facebook and WhatsApp. Most independent media have been extinguished amid financial and physical threats. Any disruption to Facebook access, relied upon by over half of Myanmar’s population as the country’s Internet, could be fatal to their freedom of speech.
But Facebook has also attracted criticism for facilitating the spread of information that violates human rights in the country. Despite their attempts to ban Facebook, the junta weaponizes it by propagating divisive rhetoric to attract military recruits and funding. In the wake of the February 2024 forced conscription law, a user reported that ‘all the information on Facebook right now is about how to escape [the] country’. In times of crisis, people may be especially susceptible to misinformation disseminated by military supporters.
The need for reliable news is as urgent as ever. This could be achieved if Facebook was more willing to embrace the principles of responsible platform design and remediation.
In 2021, a video of the detained former Yangon region chief minister, Phyo Min Thein, accusing opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi of corruption went viral. The video has been accused of being a deepfake or being filmed under duress. In an under-resourced nation with a limited public understanding of technological manipulation, algorithms should not be optimised only for engagement. In cases where timely fact-checking may be challenging, Facebook should ensure the availability of counter-narratives to combat bias and misinformation.
Information diversity requires an understanding of how algorithms prioritise and de-prioritise content. Notwithstanding internal misinformation policies and a promise to remove ‘advocacy of violence by Myanmar security forces’, Facebook’s page-recommendation algorithm has been accused of promoting pro-military content. As articulated in the Christchurch Call, algorithms should redirect users away from extremist content or promote credible counter-narratives.
To better recognise and encourage credible content, Facebook could develop a more specific version of its universal Community Standards in the form of ethical guidelines for political content in Myanmar. This requires actively engaging the myriad stakeholders — ethnic communities, experts, youth and diaspora — to develop a nuanced understanding of what is newsworthy, credible or harmful.
With a more tailored framework to bump up desirable — albeit less engaging — news, algorithms might be able to better prioritise diverse content and provenance over pure sensationalism. This goes a long way in helping people see the platform as a mere provider of information, rather than the peddler of truth.
Facebook should step up efforts to proactively verify the accounts of political parties and affiliated entities. Despite Facebook’s takedown policy against recidivists who post harmful content, detection may not be effective because the junta has thousands of soldiers spreading misinformation via fake accounts. Facebook should invest more resources in working at a grassroots level, such as with defectors already privy to the military’s information warfare tactics, to improve its detection mechanisms.
Due process mechanisms also contribute to transparency. Content takedowns are a double-edged sword that can chill extremist speech as well as lead to the over-removal of non-harmful posts.
All users deserve the right to appeal restricted content and access mechanisms that reverse erroneous decisions. In light of the limited digital literacy rate of certain user populations and over a hundred spoken languages in Myanmar, Facebook should devote more resources to training both human and automated moderators that are sensitive to linguistic and cultural nuances.
Platforms should be held accountable when improper content management leads to grave consequences. The Rohingya conflict exposed this need in 2021 when Facebook rejected a proposal for victim remediation on the basis that ‘Facebook does not directly engage in “philanthropic activities”’. In response, Ireland’s National Contact Point for Responsible Business Conduct called for Facebook to amend its human rights policy and an Oversight Board mandate to provide rehabilitation or compensation when Facebook is found to have contributed to human rights violations.
Given the gravity of misinformation amidst an ongoing civil war, social media platforms have no reason to shirk from providing rehabilitation after the fact or even resources to educate and empower its users.
One suggestion is for Facebook to divest some profits, particularly those obtained from military-affiliated extremist content over the years, to fund urgent humanitarian efforts that provide digital services and education. Additionally, in response to complaints from victims of doxing, especially women under threat of violence, Facebook could offer heightened account security and monitor disclosures of victims’ personal information across the platform for a period of time. Beyond philanthropy, these gestures could represent Facebook taking accountability for entrenching strife and recognising its power to mitigate harms.
Despite Facebook’s missteps in Myanmar, it is an essential tool in keeping the people in touch with one another and the outside world. This only serves to underline its responsibility to protect the safety of its users..."
Source/publisher:
East Asia Forum
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
‘I think at least the UN agencies should sit down and listen to what it is.’
Description:
"On 16 March 2023, Noeleen Heyzer, then-special envoy of the UN secretary-general on Myanmar addressed the UN General Assembly. She gave a grim but routine update on the country’s civil war, outlining rising humanitarian needs and calling for international action to prevent further bloodshed. Then Heyzer said something more unusual.
“At the request of Myanmar actors, including key ethnic armed organisations, the [exiled government] NUG and humanitarian civil society organisations, I have supported their efforts to establish and convene an Inclusive Humanitarian Forum (IHF), which aims to open up operational space to deliver humanitarian aid through all available channels,” she told the Assembly.
But over a year on from that speech, Heyzer is no longer in the job and the IHF project has ground to a halt, even as the resistance groups that invented it gain more territory – providing more aid delivery possibilities for the UN and others.
In a frank and wide-ranging interview, her first since leaving the special envoy role in June 2023, Heyzer describes how she was first approached for help with the IHF by resistance groups after they were rejected by the UN’s emergency aid coordination body, OCHA; how she tried to drive it forward; and how the project eventually fell foul of UN territorialism.
The UN Myanmar country team is “orphaned… a structure that is left without overall direction and political cover”
After being vacant for 10 months, her special envoy position was finally filled a few weeks ago, on 5 April, by Julie Bishop, a former Australian foreign minister. But according to former UN assistant secretary general for Myanmar Charles Petrie, she joins a UN Myanmar team that has been “orphaned… a structure that is left without overall direction and political cover”. There is no in-country UN resident coordinator to lead the 20 UN organisations in Myanmar with various mandates. That role is shared among other staff.
Big ideas for aid delivery to Myanmar are needed now more than ever. An estimated 2.8 million people displaced and 18.6 million overall are in need of help this year, according to UN estimates.
Existing conflicts were deepened by a February 2021 military coup that has pitted the junta – known as the State Administration Council (SAC) – against an alliance of resistance groups that have been winning substantial territory in recent months. While resistance supporters are pleased to see the junta losing ground, some experts fear an increasingly desperate regime could become even more violent, worsening the humanitarian crisis.
Helping the people caught up in the war has been riddled with complexity, as many of its victims are in areas controlled by the resistance. The big humanitarian actors – particularly the UN – work with the permission of the junta, mainly delivering aid only within the territory it controls.
Critics of this policy told The New Humanitarian the best way to help those worst affected is through the sprawling network of civil society groups and administrative wings of the ethnic armed groups controlling much of the country, across international borders – efforts the IHF aimed to support. The approach of the UN, meanwhile, has been heavily criticised by Myanmar-watchers as, at best ineffective, and at worst supine and exacerbating the suffering of those caught up in the conflict.
Championing the IHF was Heyzer’s attempt to solve that riddle.
So in an era of UN promises to put affected communities at the centre of humanitarian responses – how did the IHF go from an outsider idea, to being championed by the UN’s most senior official in Myanmar, and back again? What does its failure to be accepted say about the shortcomings of the UN in addressing one of the world’s biggest humanitarian crises? And more pressingly, given the changing dynamics of the conflict, is it time to look again at the IHF, or at least at making aid more available to all parts of Myanmar?
A controversial proposal
The IHF was proposed by the Karenni National Progressive Party, the Karen National Union, and the Chin National Front – all longstanding ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) – and by the NUG’s Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. Other EAOs and civil society groups also supported the plan in a less official capacity and did not sign associated documentation, according to Heyzer.
Read more: What was in the IHF plan?
Born out of a frustration these groups had with the approach taken by the big humanitarian actors, particularly OCHA and ASEAN – the regional bloc tasked with leading diplomatic efforts – the IHF planned to put aid directly in the hands of the EAOs, and simultaneously heighten their political clout against the junta.
Many Myanmar observers saw the IHF as an imperfect but pragmatic step towards improving the humanitarian response. “It was basically the only game in town even trying to push a new direction on access or create a forum where [the] NUG had any real role,” said a well-placed source who requested anonymity to protect their career and contacts.
“I think at least the UN agencies should sit down and listen to what it is, and to understand what the… [resistance] groups are wanting to say,” said Dr Thinn Thinn Hlaing, Myanmar country director at the Tropical Health and Education Trust, an NGO. “I don't think it has even gone on to that listening mode because they think that it's an obstructive attempt to counter AHA Centre (ASEAN’s humanitarian arm) proposals. In fact, it's not like that at all…. It is meant to be complementing.”
Some ASEAN officials felt the IHF was being positioned as a competitor to their own process under the bloc's plan for Myanmar, known as the Five Point Consensus, according to a former adviser to the IHF, who was not authorised to speak to the media. This meant the bloc did not provide the “game-changing” support it could have, they added. The fourth point of the Consensus says ASEAN “shall provide humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre”, which works with the junta.
“It was basically the only game in town even trying to push a new direction on access or create a forum where [the] NUG had any real role.”
Despite Heyzer’s high-level advocacy and claims to include civil society, the IHF could not find universal support among campaigners.
For instance, Khin Ohmar, founder of the Progressive Voice civil society group, was critical of Heyzer and called the IHF a “misguided proposal”. In written responses to The New Humanitarian in February, Ohmar said the IHF did not recognise the junta as the root cause of violence, that the junta was included in the project's set-up, and that it “left out and neglected the participation and role of Myanmar's frontline humanitarian responders” in its development.
The former adviser, however, said the perception that the IHF collaborated with the SAC was a misunderstanding stemming from clauses in some of the proposals that envisioned two tracks of aid for Myanmar: the IHF and, separately, the junta-approved UN operations.
Ohmar also said the IHF aimed “to use humanitarian assistance to induce political results”, putting lives at risk “for the sake of a potential dialogue” by calling for humanitarian pauses that could be exploited militarily by the junta. This ignored “do no harm” principles of humanitarian aid, she added.
But the former adviser said the IHF suffered from not being widely understood, and that most observers didn’t realise it was a “genuinely localised initiative, developed and proposed by EROs (ethnic resistance organisations), NUG, and CSOs (civil society organisations)”.
“Some audiences misinterpreted it as a pet project of Heyzer and assumed that local actors were being organised to cooperate from the top down,” the former adviser added, defending it as a “rare example of a local request being taken by the special envoy to the UNSC, UNGA, secretariat and powerful states in the region” – actions “really valued by local actors as no other senior diplomats have been willing to do so”.
UN opposition
But even as the communications and coordination of the IHF was said by the former adviser to have been improving, Heyzer’s perceived ownership of it was causing tension with other arms of the UN.
OCHA – an agency that has made grand promises around prioritising the wishes of affected communities – is viewed as having been particularly hostile to the plan, and four sources flagged the suspicion that the agency had pushed for her dismissal.
“No one was going to run with [the IHF] once she was gone, which was the intention of her going,” said the well-placed source above who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The UN secretary-general’s office has denied any interference from OCHA. “The appointment of the special envoy is handled by the Office of the Secretary-General. It is not an issue in which OCHA is involved,” Guterres’ spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told The New Humanitarian in response to written questions. “Furthermore, in no way did OCHA work against or try to undermine Ms. Heyzer.”
Heyzer refused to name a specific agency but did say: “People were very turf conscious – [saying], ‘if she’s not doing her mediation on the national scale and then she takes on these things… does it mean she is moving into our territory?’”
Pressed further, Heyzer said: “There was fear I was moving into an operational space. I will stop there.” But she insisted this fear was not justified. “We were so small – there was no way in which I could be operational,” she told The New Humanitarian.
‘The bigger picture’
Whatever the cause of Heyzer leaving her position, it points, for some, to larger problems surrounding the UN’s Myanmar operations.
“There’s a broader picture of an invidious position that she was in, that the mandate itself wasn’t working, and clearly it was an indication she didn't have support from the Secretary-General’s office – that's the bigger picture,” said David Mathieson, a Myanmar analyst based in Chiang Mai, northern Thailand.
That Heyzer was not allowed “a certain latitude to try to figure some things out” as special envoy was indicative of “systemic dysfunction at a high level” in Guterres’s office, Mathieson said, adding: “It’s the natural product of empire-building within the UN, which should come absolutely no surprise to anyone who’s been involved in international humanitarian and development issues over the years.”
Heyzer said she “needed the UN to be behind me”. Asked if the institution was not supporting her, she replied: “It's hard, because the UN has so many conflicts… the secretary-general’s attention, the UN’s attention, is not focused on Myanmar, especially since ASEAN is asked to take the main role. That’s why... when I was doing… other initiatives, I found was that the UN couldn’t think out of the box.”
The UN disputes this narrative. “The secretary-general did provide full support to the former special envoy. He is grateful to Ms. Heyzer for her dedicated service to the United Nations and her tireless efforts to advance a peaceful and sustainable solution for the people of Myanmar,” said Dujarric.
Looking more broadly, The New Humanitarian’s interviews with over a dozen Myanmar analysts and aid workers suggest the UN has undergone a major crisis of confidence in Myanmar. Many sources blamed a lack of attention from Guterres, who, prior to Bishop’s appointment as the new envoy, was said to have outsourced diplomacy to ASEAN.
The perception of Myanmar as a low priority for Gutterres has been heightened by the absence of a resident coordinator. “The secretary-general doesn’t want an incoming resident coordinator to present credentials to [junta capital] Naypyidaw because the optics wouldn't be good,” said one aid worker at an NGO working near the Myanmar border.
Dujarric said an official was appointed as resident coordinator in 2023 but had not been deployed to Myanmar, and country team officials were doing the job “on a rotating basis”.
But without leadership, the country team is “lost on how to engage on what is an intrinsically complicated political environment”, said Petrie. Fixing the UN’s structures in Myanmar, starting with the “essential” appointment of the resident coordinator, is critical, he added.
Dujarric said Guterres “continues to focus on the situation in Myanmar” and “draws attention to the severe humanitarian, socio-economic, and human rights crisis”. The UN has “undertaken initiatives focused on improving visibility and fundraising efforts to relieve suffering in Myanmar”, including responding to civilian protection concerns and facilitating the safe delivery of humanitarian aid, he said.
“The UN response in Myanmar is well coordinated and guided by senior level leadership,” added Dujarric. “Furthermore, the close cooperation between the UN Country Team in Myanmar and the Office of the Special Envoy helps to contextualise operational considerations in line with ground realities, geopolitical sensitivities, and regional dynamics.”
Time for another look at the IHF idea?
If the IHF itself is dead, the idea that gave it life still has much support.
As the war is turning against the junta and the NUG and EAOs control more territory, Myanmar campaigners say the UN has less reason not to engage with the resistance groups for humanitarian purposes – the reason the IHF was launched in the first place.
Aid to Myanmar requires a “completely different approach” from the international community, said Petrie. “The UN can do it under a humanitarian mandate, [which] provides the cover to engage with all groups,” he said, adding that an asserted campaign to gain more understanding of “how civil society and different actors are dealing with the challenges in SAC and non-SAC areas, and [finding] modalities to provide support to the most vulnerable in all of these areas” could go a long way to restoring the UN’s relevance in the country.
To counter the “military’s manipulation” of the relief efforts, “we have been working for the establishment of a supplementary parallel mechanism to ensure the effective delivery of humanitarian aid through safe passages”, the NUG’s top humanitarian official, Dr Win Myat Aye, told The New Humanitarian. “The approach and ideas and the concept is the same” as the IHF, he added.
In public at least, the UN doesn’t appear to disagree.
“A mixture of response approaches by humanitarian organisations is required to expand reach,” said Dujarric. “No single entity can reach every part of the country due to the different areas of control and varying access constraints, and so there is a complex mosaic of different approaches by different actors in different areas of control and access.”
The IHF is not the only controversial aid initiative being proposed for Myanmar.
In late March, Thailand began deliveries under its own ASEAN-supported humanitarian corridor scheme, sending aid from Thailand to the Myanmar Red Cross.
Critics, including Tom Andrews, the UN’s special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, say these efforts are being controlled and manipulated by the junta.
“We know that the junta takes these resources, including humanitarian, and weaponises them – uses them for their own military strategic advantage,” Andrews told AP.
Thailand’s project “smacks of desperation”, and because of its alleged associations with the junta will likely struggle to attract funding beyond ASEAN, making it “hard to sustain”, Phil Robertson, deputy director of the Asia division at Human Rights Watch, told The New Humanitarian.
If the IHF is used to rebrand these efforts, “then it’s not worth the paper it's written on,” Robertson added. “However, on the other hand, if the Forum becomes a way to support humanitarian assistance cross-border from Thailand and India via local communities and organisations who have been active on the borders for years, then the whole concept becomes more interesting and important.”
It remains to be seen what changes, if any, the newly installed Bishop intends to pursue, but observers say a major push will be needed if Heyser’s vision of broadening aid access in Myanmar to rebel held areas is to become a reality.
As Robertson put it: “Without a UN special envoy to work on this, and help sort out the differing visions, players, and plans, the Forum will remain a moribund concept.”..."
Source/publisher:
"The New Humanitarian" (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Weekly Update Of National Unity Government ( 17 / 2024 )..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-24
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
5.97 MB
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from April 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Kayin State, Kayah State, and Shan State from April 15th to 21st. Military Junta Troop used chemical toxic bombs in Kayin State. Military Junta and police were shot in Myitkyina Prison in Kachin State and 4 people including 2 political prisoners died. Military Junta Troop also opened cases for the youths who did not want to attend the Military Service and also arrested the mother as a hostage in Paungde, Bago Region.
Almost 20 civilians died, and over 10 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 underaged children died, and 2 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses. 5 civilians from Sittwe died in the land mines of the Military Junta Troop in Rakhine State..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
303.18 KB 307.5 KB 122.2 KB
more
Description:
"1. We have noted that military junta has forcibly recruited Rohingyas living inside Rakhine State as soldiers, provided them with military training, and equipped them with weapons with the intention of provoking communal conflict.
2. Similarly, we have found that the military junta has carried out malicious and cunning acts by making Rohingyas organize fake demonstrations, along with forcing them to act as if they oppose the Arakan Army, who are fighting against the terrorist military to escalate ethnic conflict.
3. In addition, the terrorist military has been blatantly burning and destroying homes of civilians and office buildings of international humanitarian aid organizations, as well as perpetrating other acts of violence in Buthidaung.
4. The National Unity Government strongly condemns the subversive acts that are destroying the peaceful coexistence of the people in Rakhine State. We make a special plea to the population to be cautious and mindful of the political tricks employed by the terrorist military to create ethnic conflict. We urge the exercise of inter-ethnic trust, mutual respect, understanding and tolerance..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
730.7 KB
more
Sub-title:
Appeal to the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand
Description:
"1. During the intense armed clashes between resistance forces and the junta forces at Myawaddy and its surrounding area, the junta forces have been committing various forms of targeted attacks, including artillery attacks and airstrikes, on the public buildings and properties of civilians. As a consequence of these indiscriminatory targeted attacks, thousands of civilians have been fleeing to Mae Sot, Tak Province and its surrounding area.
2. We, the National Unity Government of Myanmar, would like to express our sincere appreciation to the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, the Royal Thai Army, border guard officers, and authorities of the Tak Province for providing every necessary assistance, shelter, and other support to the people fleeing from the Myanmar border. This action portrays the Royal Thai Government as being a good neighbor for the people of Myanmar and the people of Myanmar will always remember this support and assistance.
3. As the junta has been escalating the indiscriminatory targeted attacks on civilians, we expect that the number of people fleeing from those areas might rise in the coming days.
4. Therefore, we would like to request any respective organizations and authorities to provide assistance and support the people who urgently need humanitarian assistance and shelter. We, the National Unity Government of Myanmar, together with our ethnic alliances and other affiliated groups would like to express that we are ready to cooperate with the Government of Thailand and other related organizations in every aspect to provide assistance for the people of Myanmar.....၁။ ထိုင်း-မြန်မာနယ်စပ် မြဝတီမြို့နှင့်အနီးတဝိုက်ဒေသအတွင်း တော်လှန်ရေးအင်အားစုများ နှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုတို့အကြား ဖြစ်ပွားနေသော တိုက်ပွဲများတွင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက အရပ်သားပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ်အဆောက်အအုံ၊ အသက်အိုးအိမ်စည်းစိမ်တို့အား ပစ်မှတ်ထား တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သဖြင့် လွန်ခဲ့သည့်ရက်အနည်းငယ်အတွင်းမှာပင် ဒေသခံပြည်သူ ထောင်နှင့် ချီ၍ တက်ခ်ခရိုင်၊ မဲဆောက်မြို့နှင့် အခြားဒေသများသို့ ထွက်ပြေးတိမ်းရှောင်ခဲ့ရပါသည်။
၂။ ထိုသို့တိမ်းရှောင်ထွက်ပြေးလာသည့် စစ်ဘေးရှောင်ပြည်သူများအတွက် နေရာထိုင်ခင်း စီစဉ်ကာ လိုအပ်သည့်ကယ်ဆယ်ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများ ပေးအပ်ခဲ့ပါသော ထိုင်းအစိုးရ၊ ထိုင်းတော်ဝင် တပ်မတော်၊ နယ်စပ်လုံခြုံရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် တက်ခ်ခရိုင်တာဝန်ရှိသူများအားလုံးကို မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက မြန်မာပြည်သူများကိုယ်စား အထူးပင်လှိုက်လှိုက်လှဲလှဲကျေးဇူးတင် ရှိပါသည်။ အိမ်နီးချင်းကောင်း ပီသသည့် အဆိုပါဆောင်ရွက်ချက်ကို မိမိတို့ မြန်မာပြည်သူများ အနေဖြင့် အမြဲ အမှတ်ရနေမည် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၃။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုအနေဖြင့် အရပ်သားပြည်သူလူထုနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဆောက်အအုံ များကို ပစ်မှတ်ထားသည့် တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ ဆက်တိုက်ပြုလုပ်နေလျက်ရှိရာ စစ်ဘေးရှောင် ပြည်သူ ဦးရေ ဆက်လက်များပြားလာနိုင်ကြောင်း မိမိတို့အနေဖြင့် မှန်းဆထားပါသည်။
၄။ ထို့ကြောင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာတာဝန်ရှိသူများအနေဖြင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှု ဆိုင်ရာ ကူညီထောက်ပံ့မှုများ၊ နေရာထိုင်ခင်းများအား အရေးပေါ်လိုအပ်နေသည့် ပြည်သူများအတွက် ကူညီထောက်ပံ့ပေးပါရန် မေတ္တာရပ်ခံအပ်ပါသည်။ မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရနှင့် မဟာမိတ်တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ အနေဖြင့်လည်း ထိုင်းအစိုးရ၊ သက်ဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့်အတူ မြန်မာပြည်သူများကို အကူအညီပေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ကဏ္ဍပေါင်းစုံ၌ ပူးပေါင်း ဆောင်ရွက်သွားရန် အသင့်ရှိနေပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
124.38 KB 236.58 KB
more
Description:
"၁။ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်အုပ်စုက လူမျိုးရေးပဋိပက္ခဖြစ်စေရန် ရည်ရွယ်၍ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ် အတွင်း နေထိုင်ကြသည့် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများအား (တရားမဝင်အဓမ္မ) စစ်သားအဖြစ် စုဆောင်းခဲ့ပြီး စစ်သင်တန်းများ ပို့ချကာ လက်နက်များ တပ်ဆင်ပေးလျက် ရှိနေကြောင်း လေ့လာသိရှိရသည်။
၂။ အလားတူ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်အား တော်လှန်တိုက်ပွဲဝင်နေသည့် အာရက္ခတပ်တော်အား ရိုဟင်ဂျာများက ဆန့်ကျင်နေကြောင်း ထင်မှတ်မှားစေသည့် ဖိအားပေးစေခိုင်းမှုများနှင့် အတူ အတုအယောင် ဆန္ဒပြပွဲများ ကျင်းပစေကာ လူမျိုးရေး ပဋိပက္ခ အရှိန်မြင့်တက်လာအောင် ယုတ်မာကောက်ကျစ်သည့် အကြံဆိုးဖြင့် ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်ကို တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၃။ ထို့အပြင် ဘူးသီးတောင်မြို့အတွင်း အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်က ဦးဆောင်ကာ အရပ်သား ပြည်သူများ၏ နေအိမ်အဆောက်အအုံများ၊ နိုင်ငံတကာ လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှု အကူအညီပေးရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ ရုံးအဆောက်အအုံများကို မီးရှို့ခြင်း၊ ဖြိုချခြင်းနှင့် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများကို ပေါ်ပေါ်ထင်ထင် လုပ်ဆောင်နေကြောင်း သိရှိရသည်။
၄။ ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်းမှ ပြည်သူများ၏ ငြိမ်းချမ်းစွာ အတူယှဉ်တွဲ နေထိုင်နေမှုကို ဖျက်လိုဖျက်ဆီး ပြုလုပ်နေကြသည့် အဖျက်အမှောင့်လုပ်ရပ်များကို ပြင်းထန်စွာ ရှုတ်ချ ကြောင်းနှင့် ရခိုင်ပြည်နယ်အတွင်းနေ ပြည်သူများအနေဖြင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ လူမျိုး ရေး၊ ဘာသာရေး ပဋိပက္ခဖြစ်စေရန် ပြုလုပ်နေသည့် နိုင်ငံရေးလှည့်ကွက်များအား လူမျိုးစု အချင်းချင်းကြား ယုံကြည်မှု၊ အပြန်အလှန် လေးစားမှု၊ နားလည်သည်းခံမှုတို့ဖြင့် သတိထား ကျော်ဖြတ်ကြရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အထူးအလေးအနက်ထား မေတ္တာရပ်ခံ ပန်ကြားလိုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Arakan (Rakhine) State - reports etc. by date (latest first)
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
228.31 KB
more
Description:
"The text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the international community faces multiple crises we, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, renew our commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.
We reiterate the need to take collective action to preserve peace and stability and to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, global health, education, gender inequality, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, violent extremism and terrorism, information integrity and a digital transition that respects, protects, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We affirm our commitment to free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms. Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.
We reaffirm our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and to re-energize efforts towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as multidimensional crises, and particularly the pandemic and ongoing major conflicts, have set back progress towards their achievement.
We will continue to work in close cooperation with our partners and with relevant multilateral fora such as the G20. Global challenges require solidarity and a cohesive international response, looking for shared solutions for peace, stability, and development, leaving no one behind.
II. FOSTERING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICA
We will continue to deepen the partnership with African countries and regional organizations, including the African union (AU). We welcome the AU participation in the G20 as a permanent member and reiterate our support for the G20 Compact with Africa. The G7-Africa partnership is guided by the objectives of the AU Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.
The consequences of the Russian aggression and its weaponization of food supplies and energy resources have affected notably many vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa. In this perspective, Russia’s war is proving not just a war against Ukraine but against the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.
We reiterate our strong partnership for just, green transitions to net zero emissions as core to sustainable development, and we are ready to inject new momentum into the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Together with the entire international community and stakeholders beyond government, we need to urgently work in partnership to accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, consistent with the unanimous commitment reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly last September.
Debt vulnerabilities are a significant challenge. We fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the “Common Framework” in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We recognize the importance of effective and long-term solutions, promoting coordination between official bilateral and private creditors. We call upon Multilateral Development Banks and development finance institutions to continue to play a key role to foster sustainable development through increased financing, policy advice and technical assistance for the benefit of developing countries, particularly the poorer and more fragile countries across the continent. In particular central to economic development is ensuring access to sustainable and resilient food systems, health care and health security, and clean, affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.
We reiterate our commitment to supporting African governments as they address conditions leading to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. Development and democracy are mutually reinforcing, and we underscore the importance of free and fair elections to meet the citizens’ needs and expectations.
We are concerned about the activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other emerging Russia-backed forces, which are producing a destabilizing impact, notably in North Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel. We call for accountability of all those responsible for human rights abuses.
1. Libya
We will continue to help Libya put an end to its protracted internecine conflict, also fueled by foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries, in order to build a more peaceful and prosperous future and support its stability, independence, territorial integrity and national unity. The political stalemate leaves Libya extremely vulnerable to third state actors pursuing control over Libya’s security, politics and economy, sowing instability throughout the country and wider region.
We therefore call on all Libyan political actors to engage in meaningful dialogue in order to break the current impasse and move towards a credible roadmap to free, fair and inclusive national presidential and parliamentary elections without delay. The international community must also be united in the pursuit of these goals.
We take note with regret of the recent announcement by UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Abdoulaye Bathily, regarding his decision to resign. We thank him for his dedicated service and renew our full support to the United Nations and the key role it continues to play in Libya. We call on the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint his successor without delay.
2. Sahel
We express our grave concern for the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, compounded by the backsliding of the principles of constitutional rule of law, democracy and good governance and regression in the regional cooperation frameworks.
Such an increasingly precarious and unpredictable political scenario requires renewed efforts by all relevant actors and stakeholders in reconfiguring international and regional responses to the challenge of growing political tension, confrontation, and instability in the Sahel.
We are also deeply concerned by the spread of terrorist threats and activities, leading to conflict and causing widespread misery and displacement of the civilian population. We are appalled by the grave human rights violations committed by multiple parties, including Russian proxies in the region.
We look forward to strengthening further our cooperation with the African Union, regional organizations and the UN in fostering stability, security, good governance and development in the Sahel, preventing a “spill-over” of insecurity towards the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, as well as irregular migration flows towards North Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere.
We congratulate Mauritania on its taking over the rotating Presidency of the African Union and we commend its commitment to the rule of law, good governance, refugee inclusion and constitutional values. We stand ready to assist States of the Sahel in accelerating the pace of the transition towards the return of the constitutional order.
3. Horn of Africa
We reaffirm our strong commitment to promoting peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. We continue to provide humanitarian support to those most affected by food insecurity, widespread poverty, armed violence, the impact of extreme weather events and displacement.
We express our concern regarding the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region of Somalia announced in January 2024. We encourage both the Ethiopian and the Federal Government of Somalia to keep all channels of dialogue open to prevent further escalation, working with regional partners, in the framework of the African Union and through bilateral contacts, in accordance with international law and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.
4. Somalia
We commend the important progress in the institutional, macroeconomic and security sector in Somalia. We encourage the Somali Authorities to continue to make meaningful progress in the fight against Al Shabaab and in the consolidation of the institutional framework, including completion of a transparent and inclusive constitutional reform process.
The process of transitioning security responsibilities to the Somali security forces needs to be closely followed, especially in view of the termination of the mandate of the African Union Transitional Mission (ATMIS) in Somalia at the end of 2024. We welcome planning underway by Somalia and the African Union for a multinational mission to follow ATMIS to help maintain stability while Somalia continues to develop its security capabilities.
5. Ethiopia
While we welcome developments in the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, we express concern for the persistent and violent tensions in many areas of the country, as well as reports of human rights violations and abuses, the severe economic crisis and widening food insecurity
We encourage further and lasting developments in the protection of human rights, protection of civilians, political dialogue to resolve tensions, reconciliation and national dialogue, transitional justice and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict.
We call for a similar commitment by those involved in conflicts in other regions of Ethiopia to pursue peace through dialogue.
We underscore the importance of delivering peace dividend quickly for conflict-affected populations through recovery and reconstruction support, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, and implementation of durable solutions for Internally Displaced People (IDPs).
6. Sudan
We strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, where the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate more than one year into the war. We especially note the impact of the crisis on women and girls, and condemn the ongoing atrocities being committed by both sides of the conflict, including using rape and other forms of gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence. We are concerned by the increasing numbers of displaced people.
Obstruction of humanitarian access by the Sudanese Armed Forces and rapid Support Forces is resulting in the starvation of the Sudanese people. We urge both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to agree and implement a lasting ceasefire without pre-conditions and to establish safe and stable humanitarian cross border and cross line access channels, including from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas of Sudan. We urge all actors to return to negotiations and to engage in a national dialogue inclusive of women and the composite Sudanese civil society and aimed at re-establishing civilian and representative institutions. An active African role and the continued support of the international community remain essential to help Sudan to restore the democratic transition process.
We commend the outcomes of the Paris Conference for Sudan and the Neighbouring countries during which over 2 billion Euros have been pledged to support civilian population in Sudan and those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries in 2024.
7. Democratic Republic of the Congo
We strongly condemn the resumption of attacks by the March 23 Movement (M23) in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We are very concerned by the worsening of the humanitarian situation, and the increasing serious human rights violations and abuses the population is being subjected to. We also condemn all armed groups operating in the country. We demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and of any further advances by the M23 and its withdrawal from all occupied areas as agreed through the African Union-endorsed Luanda process. We demand all armed groups to cease hostilities, withdraw from the areas they are controlling and disarm.
We expressed deep concern at the reports of the Group of Experts on the DRC on foreign military support for M23 and direct military interventions on DRC territory. We condemn any such support provided to M23 and any other armed group operating in the DRC and demand its cessation and the immediate withdrawal of any unauthorized foreign military presence from the DRC. We also condemn support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), and demand the cessation of such support.
We stress that any violations of the UN arms embargo is unacceptable and urge all States to stop any support to these armed groups.
We remain committed to the Luanda and Nairobi processes to reach a negotiated diplomatic solution to the conflict. We encourage an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization programme and the meaningful participation of women and youth in all their diversity. We also stand ready to work with the nations of the Great Lakes region to address the root causes of the cycles of violence in eastern DRC in a manner that takes into account the concerns and interests of the whole region, including by promoting accountability for all actors responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.
III. ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOSTERING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY
We recognize that forced displacement and irregular migration have to be addressed in an integrated, comprehensive, and balanced manner, in a spirit of joint responsibility and commitment, and in accordance with international law and in full respect of human rights.
We will support our partners in addressing the root causes of instability in Africa and other regions and countries of origin, while promoting a cycle of growth grounded in the huge potential of the Continent, particularly in view of the just and clean transition and growth in access to electricity, offering alternative solutions to irregular migration. Collectively, we will address migration drivers including through: better leveraging and coordinating our development and climate finance; supporting fragile and conflict afflicted states; and strengthening international capacity to address climate change, conflict, learning poverty and other drivers of migration. We are ready to build synergies among initiatives from all partners and institutions. We will also continue to support African countries hosting large number of displaced populations.
We acknowledge that climate change is a risk multiplier already having a strong impact on human mobility. We see the need to further strengthen disaster risk reduction, adaptation, and resilience measures to counteract the drivers of involuntary displacement in the context of climate change.
Human traffickers and people smugglers must be stopped from continuing their nefarious activities and we need to disrupt their business models. We recognize that women and girls are especially impacted by human trafficking, particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation. The UN and its Agencies have a role to play in this respect. Countries of origin, transit and destination must work together to stop migrant smuggling and human trafficking and uphold the dignity and worth of the human person – in line with the UN Charter.
We will work towards reducing irregular migration and envisioning regular, safe and orderly migration on the basis of relevant national sovereign regulations. We are committed to find ways to better address challenges posed by irregular migration, within the framework of our international obligations. We will enhance cooperation against migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In this respect, we acknowledge the “Rome Process” started in July 2023 with an International Conference on Migration and Development” with the dual objective of fighting human traffickers and smugglers and supporting economic development. We also acknowledge the “Mattei Plan for Africa” launched by Italy. We also recall the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and protection and the multilateral legal framework on migration and refugee protection. Legal migration pathways can contribute to economic growth and decent work in line with international standards in countries of origin and destination.
We need to inject consistency and coherence in our investment in areas of shared priority for Africa, including food security, nutrition, sustainable rural development, energy transition, sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and quality infrastructure development, bridging digital divides, education, training and skilling, gender equality and good governance. Based on a mutually beneficial exchange, approaching issues on an equal footing, and ensuring alignment with Africa’s needs and priorities as identified by the African Union, African Governments and their peoples, we must step up efforts to achieve concrete sustainable development outcomes, contribute to the stabilization of areas of crisis, fight fundamentalism and address the root causes of irregular migration flows.
IV. PROMOTING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC, MANAGING ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA
The Indo-Pacific region is a key engine for global growth, with more than half of the world’s population. We reiterate commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, grounded on respect for international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms, and human rights. We underscore that peace and stability of the region also contributes to prosperity and development of the entire international community. Developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.
We reaffirm individual initiatives of the G7 members and welcome those of our partners, such as ASEAN, IORA, Australia, Republic of Korea, India and other South Asian as well as Pacific Island countries, to enhance their engagement in the region. We underscore our commitment to further strengthening our coordination among the G7. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of working together with all regional partners.
We reaffirm our thorough support to ASEAN centrality and unity, as well as to initiatives aimed at fostering regional cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
We underscore our commitment to further strengthen our partnership with the Pacific Island countries, by supporting their needs and efforts in the implementation of the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We look forward to the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States under the theme “Charting the course towards resilient prosperity” (St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda 27th-30th May 2024). We will broaden our support to civil society, private sector, and academia’s plans for the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
8. China
We recognize the importance of constructive and stable relations with China. We reaffirm the need to engage candidly with and express our concerns directly to China. China is a key interlocutor in addressing global challenges, and we stand ready to cooperate with China on areas of common interest.
We reaffirm our interest in a balanced and reciprocal collaboration with China aimed at promoting global economic growth, with a view to enabling sustainable and fair economic relations and strengthening the international trading system. Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China, nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. However, we are concerned that China’s non-market policies and practices are leading to harmful overcapacity that undermines our workers, industries, and economic resilience. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards.
We reiterate the importance of ensuring a level playing field and a transparent, predictable, and fair business environment. Respect for the rules-based multilateral trading system based on market principles needs to be the hallmark of our relations, to protect our workers and companies from unfair and non-market policies and practices, including forced technology transfer or illegitimate data disclosure, which distort the global economy and undermine fair competition. We will protect our workers and business communities from unfair practices, including those that lead to overcapacity, create supply chain vulnerabilities and increase exposure to economic coercion, as we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversification where necessary.
We reaffirm the need to uphold the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety. In this respect, we call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression. We express our strong concern about transfers to Russia from business in China of dual-use materials and components for weapons and equipment for military production.
We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to oppose China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation and we express serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines vessels in this regard. There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization, coercive and intimidation activities in the South China Sea. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.
We restate the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity for the whole international community and we call for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings, as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is. There is no change in the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies.
We remain concerned about the human rights situation in China, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. We express our concerns about the deterioration of pluralism and civil and political rights in Hong Kong since the 2020 National Security Law. We reemphasize these concerns following the recent passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which will further erode autonomy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The new law will make it harder to live, work and do business in Hong Kong and undermine the ability of Hong Kong people to maintain free and open exchanges with the wider world. We reiterate our call on China to uphold its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights and freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. Furthermore, we urge China and the Hong Kong authorities to act in accordance with their international commitments and applicable legal obligations.
We call on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. We encourage China to uphold its commitments to act responsibly in cyber space.
9. North Korea
We reiterate our strong condemnation of North Korea’s escalatory development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge North Korea to return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We reiterate that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT. We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests. We urge all UN member states to implement all relevant UNSCRs fully and effectively and demand Security Council members to follow through on their commitments. We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programmes, including malicious cyber activities.
In this context, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the UN sanctions that Russia had previously voted for. We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts.
We strongly condemn North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and abuses and its choice to prioritize its unlawful weapons development programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call upon North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately and to meaningfully engage with the UN human rights system. We take note of the progressive re-opening of North Korea’s borders and call upon North Korea to take this opportunity to re-engage with the international community including through the return of all diplomatic and humanitarian personnel to North Korea.
We are disappointed by North Korea’s continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security.
10. Myanmar
We reiterate our strong condemnation of the military coup in Myanmar and reaffirm our support and solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their quest for peace, freedom, and democracy. The continuing attacks by the military destroying civilian infrastructure (including homes, schools, places of worship and hospitals), the repeated and serious violations of human rights and the alarming humanitarian situation – which particularly affect those in most vulnerable situations, including children, women and members of minority religious and ethnic groups – are unacceptable. We also condemn the recent implementation of the 2010 conscription law by the military regime. The forced recruitment of young people can only lead to further violence and trigger a massive exodus to neighboring countries.
We urge the Myanmar military to immediately cease any violence, release all prisoners arbitrarily detained – starting from the democratically elected leaders- and establish an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, in view of restoring the path towards a meaningful and durable democratic process. We also reiterate our call on the Myanmar military to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, to desist from any form of forced labour and to allow prompt, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all displaced persons and people in need.
We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to promote a credible and inclusive process to achieve the swift implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We highlight the importance of a comprehensive implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and support the UN’s further engagement in the crisis, including through the leadership of the newly appointed UN Special Envoy on Myanmar and through the designation of a Resident Coordinator in country. Accountability for serious crimes committed in Myanmar remains essential.
We reiterate our call on all States to prevent or to cease the flow of arms and other dual-use materiel, including jet fuel, into Myanmar. We stress the need to create conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of all Rohingya refugees and displaced persons and justice and accountability for atrocities committed against Rohingya and other ethnic communities.
V. ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES
11. Development Finance and Infrastructure
We reaffirm our commitment to promoting sustainable, resilient, inclusive, and quality infrastructure as a key element for achieving sustainable development by addressing the infrastructure investment gap in low- and middle-income countries. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway offer a framework we will use to promote our vision of sustainable and economically viable infrastructure, underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement and finance.
We reaffirm our commitment to advancing high standards for quality infrastructure as a means to spur sustainable and inclusive economic development.
We intend to work together to accelerate progress towards the commitment to mobilize up to 600 billion USD by 2027 by enhancing the strategic dimension of the Partnership for the Global Infrastructure and Investment We propose to act in close cooperation with partner countries, multilateral development banks and development finance institutions, including through de-risking, co-financing initiatives and enhanced coordination mechanisms, including at country/regional level, to further promote the development of a pipeline of bankable projects in close cooperation with the private sector, as well as to reinforce project preparation.
Infrastructure development should also encompass a wide range of initiatives (i.e. on regulatory frameworks, jobs market, energy access, training and research and health systems) to support partners in order to offer opportunities to the most marginalized and vulnerable and with a view to strengthening social cohesion and inclusion.
We will promote a transformative shift towards quality investment, in key areas that drive inclusive and sustainable development and resilience, including food security, climate and clean energy, biodiversity and reducing pollution, connectivity including ICT and transport networks, global supply chain resilience, health and education, and mainstreaming gender equality. We will prioritize efforts to deepen partnerships with Africa and based on the continent’s investment needs, consistent with the goal of accelerating progress towards the SDGs, through concrete deliverables, such as ongoing work along the Lobito Corridor. Given its global mandate, G7 countries will also continue to deploy investment while bringing forward the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment global strategy in other strategic regions, such as work on the Luzon Economic Corridor.
Recognizing the insufficient progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the urgency to address the financing gaps in the context of a growing number of low-income countries and middle-income countries facing higher risk of debt distress and constrained fiscal space to invest in their own development and futures, we will work together with our partners and with international finance institutions to create the conditions to scale up long-term financing for the countries in need. In that regard, we welcome the launch of infrastructure certification schemes, such as the Blue Dot Network and the Finance to Accelerate the Sustainable Transition Infrastructure initiatives, which aim to mobilize increased private investment in emerging markets. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit, to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty and protect the planet.
12. Food Security and Nutrition Security
We express concern about rising food insecurity and malnutrition stemming from the combined impact of climate change, loss and degradation of ecosystems, the growing number of conflicts, inflationary pressures, and the reduced fiscal space in many developing economies. We are committed to addressing, with partners, the worsening hunger crisis affecting parts of Africa. Strengthening the resilience of agri-food systems is necessary to effectively address food insecurity and malnutrition. That makes internationally coordinated action more urgent than ever. Ensuring food and nutrition security remains a challenge for the international community and affected countries, especially in known hunger hotspots in Africa and beyond, that are vulnerable to climate and conflict-related shocks.
We reaffirm our intention to increase investments to build more resilient and sustainable food systems, to help mitigate against future food shocks and diversify food supply chains. To that end, we reaffirm our commitment to contributing to sustainable and resilient food systems transformation, in the spirit of the Roadmap for Global Food Security-Call to Action and the UN Secretary General’s Call to Action for Accelerated Food Systems Transformation, issued at the UN Food Systems Summit +2 held in July 2023 in Rome. We recall the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, issued by G7 Leaders and invited countries. We also reaffirm our support for the G20 Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems and the G7 Global Alliance for Food Security. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer use efficiency and value chains, including local fertilizer production. The G7 is committed to the success of the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2025.
We also reaffirm our commitment to work with the Rome-based agencies FAO, IFAD and WFP. We recognize the role of the Committee on World Food Security as an inclusive and multi-stakeholder platform to work together on food security and nutrition.
In continuity with the UAE Leaders Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, endorsed at the COP28 by 159 Countries, including all the G7, we will enhance our efforts to address the food security-climate change nexus in a coherent and pragmatic manner, including through initiatives like the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS).
We stress the need for better coordination of international initiatives and projects aimed at countering food insecurity and malnutrition in order to maximize the delivery and impact of already existing resources. We continue to need innovative financial solutions for food systems, especially involving responsible private investment.
13. Economic Resilience and Economic Security
Economic resilience and economic security are critical for the proper functioning of the G7 and wider global economies. We will foster cooperation in accordance with the G7 Leaders’ Statement on economic Security issued at Hiroshima last year. To this end, we remain committed to making global supply chains more resilient and reliable especially for critical products and technologies.
We will continue to co-ordinate work on de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, actively engaging the private sector.
We emphasize the importance of honoring international norms and obligations to safeguard global economic security and resilience and reaffirm our commitment to building global economic resilience and responding to harmful practices that undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We will continue working within the G7 and with trusted partners towards resilient supply chains, built in a transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable manner.
We reiterate our concern about increasing threats to economic security for all global economies, notably economic coercion, and comprehensive strategies that use non-market policies and practices, as well as other practices in the pursuit of market dominance that lead to harmful overcapacity and supply chain concentration, thereby creating vulnerabilities and dependencies. We remain committed to enhancing our coordination and cooperation within the G7, while at the same time engaging other interested international partners about joining our efforts. We will continue work, principally through the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to improve our assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, in accordance with our respective legal systems and in conformity with international law.
We acknowledge the key role of semiconductors as a critical part of supply chain resilience and economic security. To that end, we welcome the establishment by the G7 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministers of a semiconductors Point of Contact (PoC) Group dedicated to facilitating information exchange and sharing best practices among G7 members.
14. Climate, Energy Security and Environment
We are facing the unprecedented triple global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution that are mutually reinforcing and intrinsically linked, as well as an ongoing global energy crisis, health threats, and environmental damage, including those caused or exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
The international community needs to come together and act decisively, irrespective of geographic or political divides, taking concrete steps collectively to achieve the global target to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and achieve global net zero (CHG) emissions by 2050.
To this end, we reaffirm our commitment, and we reiterate the call on all countries to contribute to global efforts to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, sustainable and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science and to accelerate low and zero-emission technologies.
We recognize the primary need to accelerate the transition to net-zero emissions by 2050, while ensuring policies to diversify energy sources and supplies to address potential security risks to energy systems, in a manner consistent with our climate and sustainability goals.
We are determined to promote energy efficiency as the “first fuel”, and fast-track clean, safe, and sustainable energy development and deployment, while reducing our dependency on fossil fuels. Moreover, actions must be taken to increase access to electricity and clean cooking as well as to accelerate sustainable, just and inclusive clean energy transitions in emerging and developing countries and to continue efforts to swiftly implement the Just Energy Transition Partnerships.
We are determined to promote affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy in Africa. With this objective, under the Italian Presidency we look forward to continuing discussions on how the G7 can concretely advance and contribute to Africa’s industrial advancement and to its sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth.
The connection between climate, environment and energy is critical to making progress towards our climate change and environmental goals while implementing economically sustainable, just, and rapid transitions. Seizing the opportunities presented by innovative technological solutions and the alignment of global financial flows to support the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework will be critical to ensuring prosperity and environmental sustainability, while simultaneously fostering development and poverty alleviation, especially in developing countries.
We underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, globally by 2030, considering national circumstances, and welcome the consensus reached at CMA5 calling on all Parties to contribute to its achievement.
We need to play a key role in defining secure, sustainable, and affordable energy systems, ensuring just and inclusive clean energy transitions. We therefore commit to achieving concrete steps forward in strategic areas. Among these, we recognize the key role of renewables, including from sustainable biological origin, nuclear energy for those who opt to use it, including advanced and small modular reactors, energy efficiency, methane emissions reduction in line with the Global Methane Pledge, industrial de-carbonization, most innovative technologies such as renewable and zero-emission hydrogen, and carbon management technologies. We will pursue secure, resilient, affordable and sustainable supply chains for critical minerals and raw materials, including through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and MSP Forum, and pursue implementation of the Five Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security adopted by G7 Climate Energy and Environment Ministers. We also underline the opportunities offered by circular economy, including recycling and resource efficiency, as well as innovative technologies. Investing in innovation should also help us in addressing the key topic of reducing GHG emissions in heavy-emitting sectors and promoting the development of a circular economy.
Leveraging private sector financing as well as innovative financing mechanisms are important steps to support energy transitions in developing countries, increase resources for adaptation and resilience and enable actions for responding to loss and damage to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially SIDS and LDCs.
The transition to a net zero-emissions, sustainable, climate resilient and nature positive, pollution free and circular economy will necessarily need to involve all the members of society, to ensure just and inclusive transitions, leaving no one behind. Women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples s tend to bear the brunt of climate change-related disasters. In this context, we place particular emphasis on need to empower these societal sectors and include them in efforts to address climate change and environmental degradation. We highlight the importance of nature-based solutions in this context. Plastic pollution is a global problem that requires urgent attention. We look forward to an ambitious and effective global agreement to end plastic pollution.
Biodiversity loss is an equally serious threat. Climate, biodiversity, and human health are interrelated and interdependent. We recall our commitment to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework fully and swiftly and to achieve each of its goals and targets, which is the landmark plan to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. We also underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.
We will work to mobilise nature finance from all relevant sources and to align financial and fiscal flows, as appropriate, including international development assistance, with the GBF. We also call on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to increase and report nature finance by CBD COP16. We welcome the Global Stocktake Decision’s recognition of the importance of nature for achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through halting, and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.
Given the risk of a global water crisis and continued lack of universal access to water and sanitation, we call for stronger collaboration at multilateral level in line with the UNEA-6 Resolution on Water. We welcome the UN System-wide Strategy on Water and Sanitation and are committed to the implementation of the Water Action Agenda as a key outcome of the UN Water Conference 2023. We also call for prompt appointment of a UN Special Envoy on Water.
15. Global Health
Global health is a pre-requisite for sustainable development. Building on the lessons learned during the COVID -19 pandemic, we will continue to promote global health, knowing that health emergencies are a global challenge that need a global response.
We support a reform of the Global Health Architecture fostering a more coordinated approach, strengthening Pandemic Prevention Preparedness and Response (PPR) including sustainable financing for capacity strengthening and for health emergency response, especially through the Pandemic Fund. We recognize the importance and reiterate our commitment to reaching a successful, equitable outcome of the ongoing negotiations for a new WHO convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic PPR and targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) by May 2024. Completing the negotiations in time is critical to leverage political attention, strengthen future pandemic responses and improve equity.
We commit to redouble our efforts to advance universal health coverage, including by supporting countries to restore access to essential health services and reduce mortality rates to be better than pre-pandemic levels by 2025. We also reaffirm our commitment to invest in resilient health systems, primary health care service delivery, and a skilled health workforce – including through the WHO Academy – as essential to reclaiming lost ground due to COVID-19 and promoting Universal Health Coverage as essential elements of pandemic preparedness.
We acknowledge that climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are having a dramatic impact on global health and both noncommunicable and infectious disease threats. We are therefore addressing these challenges in a coherent and strategic manner, through the “One Health” approach that recognizes that the health of people is linked to the health of animals, plants and our shared environment.
In this framework, we reaffirm that antimicrobial resistance is a key priority, and we will work closely for a successful upcoming UN High Level Meeting on AMR in September 2024.
16. Gender Equality
We reiterate our commitment to give a new impetus to gender equality. We recall the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome documents of its review conferences and confirm our determination to deliver on the 2030 Agenda relevant Sustainable Development Goals.
We reaffirm the G7’s continued global leadership on gender equality and the promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons. We express our strong concern over the global rollback of all women’s and girls’ rights, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the disproportionate impact of conflict and crisis on them.
Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a fundamental pre-requisite to eradicate poverty, to stimulate prosperity and sustainable and inclusive growth, and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. We recognize that unpaid care and domestic work are major obstacles to the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and negatively impact women’s economic empowerment by impairing their ability to work full-time or in leadership positions. We reaffirm the significant value of the World Bank Invest in Childcare initiative and aim by 2035 to support 200 million more women to join the workforce by investing in efforts to close the global childcare gap.
We must pursue gender equality as a cross cutting priority to promote and protect the rights of women and girls and members of minority groups, including their ability to exercise their human rights, by ensuring freedom from all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence. We need to strengthen their economic security and empowerment by increasing and addressing barriers to their participation and building their resilience against the impacts of climate change, including by advancing their access to jobs in green and blue industries critical to our future and the future of our planet. We will promote comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR, including at the UN General Assembly and Summit of the Future.
Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflicts and crises which can exacerbate existing gender inequalities and expose women and girls, to heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and discrimination. The involvement of women and girls in all areas related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as well as disaster risk reduction is crucial to creating and ensuring sustainable and inclusive peace and address the root causes of conflicts. In line with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Resolutions on Women Peace and Security (WPS), we underscore the importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in all areas of policy decision-making spaces and tangible implementation, and through women’s civil society organizations, non-government partners, and throughout the political, security and development spheres. We remain committed to protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence before, during, and after conflicts, ensuring accountability for perpetrators, and providing support and services to survivors.
17. Disaster and Risk Reduction
We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the “Early Warning for All” Initiative by scaling up international cooperation.
We acknowledge the interrelated causes and effects of disasters, particularly climate change-induced disasters, on different aspects, including peace and stability, local, regional, and international security, health, education, gender equality, and vulnerability. We renew our commitment to act ahead of disasters by working across the Humanitarian, Development Peace Nexus. Our aim is to reduce risks, anticipate and prepare for disasters, minimize the impacts of disasters on communities and infrastructure in order not to hamper development progress.
We stress the importance of the outcome of COP28 in terms of operationalizing new funding arrangements to respond to loss and damage, including the fund. We welcome the pledges to the fund that have already been made and we encourage further support, to be provided on a voluntary basis and from a wide variety of funding sources. This is part of our wider commitment to assist those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
19. Global Governance
We reiterate the significance of maintaining and strengthening the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter, and the paramount importance of international and multilateral cooperation in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. We share the UN Secretary General’s ambition for inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism, as outlined in the “Our Common Agenda” Report. We look forward to the UN Summit of the Future as an opportunity to accelerate these efforts, to tackle global challenges and accelerate progress on the SDGs.
To restore a sense of common purpose among UN Members States and to make international and multilateral cooperation stronger, more effective, more inclusive, more democratic, more efficient and more transparent, we commit to actively contribute to the Summit of the Future as an opportunity to foster dialogue and to find shared solutions to common problems. Human rights as one of the founding pillars of the UN system will be our common compass throughout the Pact for the Future. We welcome the latest report of the UN Secretary General on human security. We are committed to working with all UN Member States to strengthen the roles of the UNSG as well as the UNGA. We also recommit to the reform of the UNSC.
We reaffirm the need for strengthened international financial institutions and underscore the role of multilateral developments banks (MDBs) in the SDGs achievement, including in crisis affected contexts. We support the ongoing efforts for MDBs reform, including the World Bank Group (WBG) evolution roadmap, to better address global challenges. In this respect, we look forward to the WBG and International Monetary Fund annual meetings.
We stress the key role of MDBs in addressing global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict, which are critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development that is inclusive and resilient.
19. Conflict Prevention and Management, Support to UN Peace Operations
We renew our commitment to strengthening peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to address increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges. We need to build resilient societies, uphold human rights, support good governance, and invest in people to achieve sustainable peace. We condemn sexual and gender-based violence, especially when related to armed conflict situations.
We highly value the role of the UN and support an integrated approach to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. We support the Peacebuilding Commission in its role as a convener of relevant stakeholders and an advisory body to other UN organs and we support the Peacebuilding Fund as a critical tool to help to ensure adequate financing for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
We reaffirm that the UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions are valuable tools to prevent escalation and the recurrence of conflicts and to protect civilians where mandated to do so.
We further reaffirm our general support for the UN Secretary General’s ‘’New Agenda for Peace’’, “Action for Peacekeeping” and “Action for Peacekeeping Plus” to reform and strengthen such operations, based on a conflict prevention approach to crises. We will enhance capabilities and work to ensure the safety and security of those deployed, for example through the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.
We underscore the importance of strengthening the global implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agendas.
20. A Global Resilient Cyberspace, Artificial Intelligence
We reiterate our commitment to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure cyberspace. We highly value the role of the Ise-Shima Cyber Group to define common ground.
While relying on the leadership of governments and international organizations, we recognize the importance of the multistakeholder model, with the invaluable contribution of the private sector in promoting technological development and of civil society in advancing a common understanding of threats and providing solutions to improve cybersecurity.
As the international community is increasingly confronted with disruptive activities carried out through Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, we reiterate that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace. We call for the full implementation of existing norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, and we encourage States to deepen their understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace.
We condemn malicious cyber activity, and we will continue to work together at the national level and in multilateral fora to increase accountability in cyberspace. We will increase our cooperation against malicious cyber activities, including state-sponsored ones. We are determined to protect our democratic systems and critical infrastructures from malicious cyber threats. We express our concern for the increasing number of ransomware attacks , particularly targeting hospitals and healthcare facilities, and in this regard we recall relevant norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which emphasize states’ commitment to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT and to respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory aimed at the critical infrastructure of another state. We welcome significant international initiatives, such as the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the Pall Mall Process, which contribute to increase awareness and improve oversight coordination.
We urge countries to enact legislation in line with the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention) and engage in accession to the treaty. We also urge countries to fully utilize the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a tool to combat cybercrime.
We call on the international community to be guided by the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace to reduce risks to international peace and stability and make cyberspace a less contested domain. We underline the importance of confidence building measures, international cooperation, and capacity building. We affirm our support for the “Programme of action to advance responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs in the context of international security”, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onward.
We reaffirm the G7 support to Ukraine’s cyber resilience, and we welcome multilateral initiatives aimed at providing assistance, such as the Tallinn Mechanism.
We will continue to coordinate and, where possible, unite our efforts to assist countries to improve their capacity to address the multiple challenges of cybersecurity and resilience. Exchanging information on respective national projects may help identify best practices. We will be inspired by a demand driven approach and aim to fully integrate cybersecurity into digital development, as highlighted by the Accra Call for Cyber Resilient Development. To this end, we will continue to cooperate where it is relevant with International Financial Institutions, for instance the World Bank, and the private sector.
Malicious cyber activities are disrupting critical services in G7 countries – including hospitals, energy companies and water companies – and costing our economies billions of dollars in disruptions. We commit to taking concrete steps to improve our collective cyber resilience.
Considering the key and complementary role played by high-level policy makers and the National Agencies for Cybersecurity in ensuring a safe cyberspace and in fostering international collaboration at a policy and technical level, we also welcome the first meeting at G7 level, scheduled in Rome on 16-17 May, and we look forward to the outcome of their discussions. We resolve to keep analyzing the multifaceted applications of artificial intelligence and other new and emerging technologies, in such a way as to strike an effective balance between the advantageous uses for people and the need to mitigate the potential negative impacts in certain domains, including cyberspace. With this regard, we acknowledge the importance of advancing our efforts to ensure safe, secure and trustworthy AI, which is human-centric and human rights-based, including through advancing the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process, and foster interoperability between AI governance frameworks to support our common vision.
As new technologies are defining the future of our societies, we endorse the UN General Assembly resolution “Seizing the Opportunities for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems for Sustainable Development” that was adopted by consensus and co-sponsored by 123 countries. We will also endeavor to provide contributions to the Global Digital Compact and WSIS+20 Review and the UN Pact for the Future, in order to protect an open, free, secure and inclusive Internet for future generations, governed through multi-stakeholder processes, and by protecting the ability for all to share information and communicate freely and securely, making sure the voices of younger generations, emerging economies and developing countries are properly heard.
We recognize the nexus between AI and cybersecurity, and we commit to countering the risks posed to cybersecurity by AI. We also underscore the importance of ensuring the cybersecurity of AI systems and note the publication of the Guidelines for secure AI system development.
21. Countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference
Malign foreign influence operations, including malicious cyber activities, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), are a growing challenge to democratic societies around the world, threatening to undermine democratic values, human rights, governmental processes, political stability, and international partnerships. These operations aim at misleading and deceiving our citizens, interfering in our democratic processes, destabilizing our governments and democratic institutions, and undermining our shared values, creating, and exploiting cultural and societal frictions, as well as negatively affecting our ability to conduct foreign and security policy. FIMI threatens to destabilize the very fabric of our rules-based international system and is exacerbated by the exploitation of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).
We are committed to addressing the potential risk of the misuse of new technologies for purposes of disinformation, and the role of AI in FIMI, especially in the context of forthcoming elections.
AI has the potential to strengthen democracy by advancing resilience, openness, civic engagement and participation, and access to government services and information. But AI can also be used as a tool to undermine democracy, including through voter suppression, information manipulation and curtailment of civic engagement. We are concerned with the potential for authoritarian states and non-state actors to misuse current and emerging technologies to undermine democracy and confidence in elections and to erode the information environment.
FIMI negatively affects the ability of citizens to take rational, informed decisions, which lies at the very heart of our democratic institutions and aims at undermining confidence in democratic governments and societies. Disinformation can be used to polarize society; it often supports violent extremist activities and is fuelled by malicious foreign players. Online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of malign actors to create or exacerbate tensions.
State and non-state actors are increasingly adopting hybrid tactics, also through their proxies. In particular, Russia, since beginning its war of aggression against Ukraine, has been augmenting military efforts on the ground with hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference. We condemn the widespread use of FIMI and AI by the Russian Government and its proxies to support its war of aggression against Ukraine and fuel further tensions globally. Building our resolve to promote information resilience, we will enhance coordination to establish a common operating picture and develop coordinated responses to information manipulation. A whole-of-society and whole-of-government effort is required to combat FIMI and foster information integrity.
We are committed to protecting our information environment and democratic values against any attempt of foreign manipulation. We commit to championing free and independent media at home and around the world and promote pluralism and freedom of expression. Together we seek to strengthen public resilience to and awareness about FIMI, through education, including digital, media and information literacy initiatives and awareness-raising campaigns, also addressing gendered disinformation.
We plan to strengthen our coordinated effort to better prevent, detect, respond to, and mitigate FIMI threats, addressing the impact of hybrid threats at the earliest stage possible. As billions of citizens will cast their ballots globally in 2024, the protection of free and fair elections from foreign interference is a central focus of the G7 Agenda.
We also call on tech companies, in particular social media platforms, to intensify their efforts to prevent and counter FIMI campaigns and to reduce the potential abuse of AI technology for this purpose, also by increasing their transparency.
Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) we are strengthening our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies. We are determined to intensify our efforts, to protect our democratic systems and open societies from foreign information manipulation and interference, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response.
22. Digital and Transnational Repression
Advances in surveillance technology, including AI and commercial spyware, can enable foreign governments and their proxies to monitor, track, and target individuals more effectively and invasively. We are committed to countering the misuse of technology to target human rights defenders, journalists, perceived political opponents, and other civil society members.
Transnational repression (TNR), which involves reaching across state borders to intimidate, silence, attack, and/or murder dissidents, human rights activists, and others for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms, has a detrimental impact to free speech, freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. It is one of the most harmful manifestations of authoritarian governments that aims to export repressive forms of governance extraterritorially. We strongly condemn the targeting of activists, critics and journalists in this respect.
23. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Outer Space
We remain firmly committed to uphold the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We intend to maintain and strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for a more secure, stable, and safer world and endorse the statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group.
We are greatly concerned by Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and actions, North Korea’s and Iran’s continued advancement of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These developments pose serious challenges for international peace and security and require our united resolve in defense of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.
Recalling the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach.
In this spirit, we remain resolved to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and advance the NPT’s implementation across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars. We reaffirm the centrality of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operation and the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification system. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states that have not yet done so to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We deeply regret Russia’s withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty and we are gravely concerned by Russian statements with respect to nuclear explosive testing. We urge Moscow to continue to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests.
We call for the immediate commencement of long-overdue negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) while urging all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of such material.
We adhere to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We underscore the IAEA’s crucial role in upholding the international non-proliferation architecture, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and safeguards, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the benefit of all Member States. We recall the G7 Leaders’ commitment to evaluate measures to reduce reliance on civil nuclear-related goods from Russia and to assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies. We support Japan’s safe, transparent and science-based process to responsibly manage the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System treated water and in proactively coordinating with scientists and partners as well as the IAEA.
The G7 is committed to working with all States to further identify and implement measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use and to strengthen arms control. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued on January 3, 2022, on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement. We welcome the transparency of G7 nuclear-weapon States in providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenals. We call on others that have not yet done so to follow suit.
We reiterate our deep regret over Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty and we call on Russia to return to its full implementation and to engage with the U.S. on reducing nuclear risks. We are also concerned about China’s ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without transparency – including providing data and objective size of its nuclear arsenal – or good faith arms control and risk reductions measures. The G7 urges China to engage in concrete strategic risk reduction discussions with the U.S. to promote stability through greater transparency of China’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities.
We underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, while encouraging other leaders, youth and others to also visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We recognize the important role that f conventional arms control, confidence-building measures and regional risk reduction have in reducing the risk of armed escalation or miscalculation, improving trust and transparency, and promoting strategic stability between states.
Conventional weapons continue to be used for regional coercion, raising international tensions, and in acts of military aggression that have resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties. This highlights the urgency of implementation agreements and commitments relating to conventional arms control and disarmament that take into account humanitarian factors.
Reaffirming our strong commitment to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we underline the need for the universalization and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
We will actively seek to advance efforts in the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC to examine and develop concrete measures to enhance the implementation of the Convention.
We recognize the high priority of addressing biological threats worldwide as an utmost priority. With rapidly advancing technology and more acute biological risks, it is crucial to ensure that biological research, development, and innovation are conducted in a safe, secure, responsible, transparent, and sustainable manner. Strengthening domestic measures, engaging international organizations, academia, and the private sector remains paramount to promote and establish effective regulatory biosafety and biosecurity measures for the life sciences and global health.
We reaffirm the key importance of addressing biosecurity challenges in the African continent, strengthening preparedness, and empowering the African scientific community, involving women and youth. We recognize the important progress made through the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA), a flagship effort pf the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, national frameworks, surveillance and epidemic intelligence and non-proliferation capacities in Africa.
In this overall effort, we will work together across the G7, the G7-led 31-member Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the BTWC, the WHO and other appropriate international fora to raise the bar globally on biosafety and biosecurity.
We commit to maintaining and updating export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including through multilateral export control regimes and in cooperation with all responsible international actors.
We reaffirm the key role of the G7 Global Partnership in addressing threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and CBRN materials and supporting vulnerable countries around the world in to build security capacity to better mitigate all manner of CBRN threats. We welcome the launch of the Global Partnership’s new initiative to counter WMD disinformation.
Working with partners, we e will continue to assess the risks posed by exports of rapidly advancing dual-use technologies. Where necessary and according to our respective legal frameworks, we will cooperate and promote efforts to implement export controls to address risks to international security.
We celebrate in 2024 the tenth anniversary of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which all G7 members participate. The development of realistic processes and technologies by IPNDV will help ensure future agreements contain robust verification provisions.
Space-related services, data and activities are increasingly key for the functioning of our economies and the implementation of public policies for the welfare of our citizens. However, we see globally an intensification of threats and the development of capabilities directed at disrupting the peaceful use of space.
We reiterate the importance of upholding the existing legal framework for activities in outer space, notably the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”). We remain committed to fostering international cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building measures to promote responsible behavior with the goal of improving space security for all states. In parallel, we will also remain vigilant and invest in the resilience of space-related services against potentially hostile activities.
We affirm the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.
24. Countering terrorism and transnational crime
We condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we reiterate our determination to protect freedom and security in our societies, upholding democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights – including the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy – freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.
Terrorist networks know no borders and countering terrorism requires a strong collective and internationally aligned approach that includes combating the financing of terrorism and terrorist propaganda. We need to recognize and tackle new threats emanating from malign actors’ use of emerging technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence, while the risk of chemical, biological, and radiological attacks remain a serious threat. The potential use of technologies to counter terrorism and violent extremism must be recognized as well.
Countering terrorism needs a holistic approach, aimed also at preventing violent extremism. It is imperative that we prevent radicalization to violence online and offline, in prison as well as in societies, through work with civil society, women-led organizations, local leaders and communities. We should work to promote rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for former terrorists in order to reintegrate them back into society with a reduced risk of recidivism. We intend to step up information sharing and international cooperation, promoting capacity building domestically and with partners, including in border management. All our efforts are based on respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law.
Organized crime is also a major threat to our societies and citizens and also knows no borders. Organized crime can take advantage of the insecurity, instability and conflicts caused by terrorism and it can also be a way that terrorist groups support their activities. Terrorism can leverage organized crime, too. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, crimes that affect the environment, trafficking of cultural property, money laundering and corruption can find a fertile ground when exploiting war and conflicts. Capacity building in justice and security measures to counter the illicit economy can help to foster inclusive and peaceful societies.
We reaffirm our commitment to fight organized crime and its illegal profits, focusing on new risks such as cybercrime. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants have become major sources of income for organized crime, together with drug trafficking. We are firmly committed to stop the criminal exploitation of vulnerable peoples, breaking the business model of organized criminal groups.
We also reaffirm our commitment to fight against the illicit production and distribution of synthetic drugs including fentanyl. Trafficking of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs props up large, adaptable, and resilient transnational criminal organizations that operate across the globe – with the financial means and capacity to corrupt society, undermine governance, and weaken government institutions around the world. Together, we reaffirm our commitment to countering the production, distribution, and sale of illicit narcotics; to sharing threat information and engaging in joint investigations and enforcement efforts; to scheduling precursor chemicals and other drugs, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and other international entities; to collectively coordinating efforts with key international partners, especially with countries where synthetic drugs are produced; to participating in multilateral fora, such as the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, that unite countries and key institutions in fighting the scourge of deadly drugs; and to advancing public health interventions and services to those who need it. Individually and collectively, we will crack down on the global criminal networks that fuel overdose deaths, disrupt the illicit financial mechanisms that support these networks; seize deadly drugs before they enter our communities; and deliver life-saving medication and care. We are ready to work with other governments to tackle these transnational challenges and to support the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.
We welcome the valuable input of the G7 Roma-Lyon Group’s work on preventing and combating terrorism and transnational organized crime.
25. Fight against Corruption
We recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime and undermine democratic governance. Corruption and illicit finance also undermine progress across all the Sustainable Development Goals.
We reaffirm the fundamental role that the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and its supporting bodies play in the global fight against corruption. We will strive to further support and enhance the effectiveness of its Implementation Review Mechanism, especially with a view to its next review phase.
We also reaffirm our commitment to timely and effective implementation of the FATF standards on transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements, underscoring the importance of accountability tools that will deny corrupt actors access to our territories and our financial systems.
We also recognize the challenges faced by some developing countries in meeting international standards designed to combat corruption and illicit finance, and we encourage the international financial institutions to coordinate and increase their efforts to support countries in their efforts across their operations, particularly in fragile and conflict affected countries.
26. Threats to maritime security
We reiterate our commitment to promoting a cooperative system of international governance for the ocean and seas and to maintaining the rules-based maritime order based on international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights. In this context, we recognize the importance of the role of international courts and tribunals including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
We firmly reiterate our condemnation for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorism and transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and narcotics, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal maritime activities. We reaffirm the importance of national and regional ownership in pursuing the fight against illegal activities at sea.
V1. TACKLING REGIONAL ISSUES
27. Western Balkans
We reaffirm our shared commitment to the security, economic prosperity, and European perspective of the six Western Balkans countries as a crucial investment for peace and stability. We emphasize the importance of advancing the necessary internal reforms, particularly on rule of law, including tackling organized crime, illicit finance, and corruption.
We fully support further progress on regional cooperation and integration, including by implementing the Common Regional Market, and we encourage local political elites to make decisive progress on regional reconciliation. To this aim, we call on Kosovo and Serbia to implement without further delay the Agreement on the Path to Normalization and its Implementation Annex adopted in 2023. We urge both sides to engage constructively in the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, refraining from provocations, inflammatory rhetoric, and uncoordinated actions.
We firmly reject any attempt from internal or external actors to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and multiethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the executive mandate of the EUFOR ALTHEA operation to support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining a safe and secure environment in the country.
We urge all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to put aside divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, to avoid any act that could destabilize the country and to focus on internal reforms that would move the country closer to realizing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
We welcome the European Council’s decision in March 2024 to open negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union. We support the mandate of High Representative Christian Schmidt.
28. South Caucasus
We urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain fully committed to the peace process to achieve a dignified and durable peace based on the principles of non-use of force, respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. We recall the Joint Statement issued by the sides on December 7th, 2023, and encourage them to uphold that spirit of cooperation in their future interactions. Further escalation would be unacceptable.
We call on Azerbaijan to fully comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law and encourage appropriate steps to ensure the safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons wishing to come back to their homes.
The G7 and its members are ready to facilitate further constructive contacts at all levels, notably within the established negotiating frameworks provided by the EU and the USA, whose enduring efforts we commend.
We reiterate the importance of the commitment to the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We encourage greater regional cooperation and the re-opening of all borders, including the border between Armenia and Türkiye.
29. Central Asian countries
We remain resolved to support the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of the Central Asian countries.
We are committed to enhancing our cooperation with the Central Asian countries to tackle regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the enduring impact of the situation in Afghanistan, the regional terrorist threat, as well as managing water resources and climate change and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We encourage the further strengthening of regional cooperation, especially in the field of connectivity and infrastructure, including the Middle Corridor, to improve ease of trade between the Central Asian countries, bolster global supply chains, foster trade, forge investment and energy links, provide economic diversification and enhance resilience, while upholding labor rights and environmental protection.
We will continue to support the implementation of the socio-economic and political reforms announced in the Central Asian countries. Throughout the region, we support the expansion of civic and political participation, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights.
30. Afghanistan
We remain committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. We condemn the continued and systemic abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Taliban, notably of the political, economic and social rights of women and girls, as well as the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities. We deeply regret that the Taliban has taken no serious step to initiate an inclusive political process with fellow Afghans regarding the future of the country. Peace and stability in Afghanistan will require the establishment of an inclusive and representative political process which allows Afghanistan to fulfill its international obligations and includes full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation of Afghan women, upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We intend to remain vigilant against the risk of Afghanistan serving as a base for hosting or exporting terrorism to other countries.
The safe and secure departure of all Afghans wishing to leave the country must be guaranteed, as well as humanitarian access and the possibility to effectively provide humanitarian aid.
We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.
We are committed to the swift appointment of a UN Special Envoy in line with the recommendations of the UN’s Independent Assessment and as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2721.
VII. COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Stronger cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is of paramount importance as we have common values and shared interests. We commit to further partner with the Region to address global challenges, including by protecting the international system based on international cooperation and international law, tackling natural disasters and climate change, countering transnational organized crime, and promoting trade and investments aimed at improving socio-economic resilience.
31. Haiti
We express our solidarity to the Haitian population, which is suffering from unprecedented levels of gang violence. We reiterate our support to the ongoing international efforts aimed at strengthening public institutions and law enforcement, as well as combating criminal gangs, whose illegal activities have led to a marked deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation of the country.
We encourage the international community to scale up its humanitarian support to the Haitian population. We note the urgent need to protect women and children in Haiti, who are suffering disproportionately from the recent and rapid escalation in violence.
We welcome UNSCR 2699, authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti, to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. We commend the Government of Kenya for its readiness to lead the mission. Every effort should be made to expeditiously provide robust financial support to the mission so that it may deploy as soon as possible. The people of Haiti cannot wait.
We also welcome UNSCR 2700, which renews the sanctions regime for Haiti for an additional year. The sanctions regime promotes accountability by extending the territorial arms embargo and ability to sanction individuals and entities who are responsible for, or complicit in, actions that threaten the peace and security in Haiti.
We commend the outcome of the CARICOM Summit held in Kingston, Jamaica, on March 11 and the commitment taken by Haitian stakeholders to implement an inclusive transitional governance arrangement.
We support the ongoing efforts of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti and call on the political actors to bridge their differences and commit in a forward-looking, transparent, and fair national dialogue, which is essential to stabilize the Country.
We reiterate the importance that the process to find lasting solutions to the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis be Haitian-led and owned.
32. Nicaragua
We call on the Nicaraguan government to end its human rights violations as well as widespread repression and related violations and abuses against civil society, Indigenous Peoples, academics, students, the independent press, and political and religious actors.
We urge authorities to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and abide by their international obligations. We condemn the closure of CSOs and the systematic attacks on religious institutions and organizations, including the Catholic Church and its ministers, many of whom have been arrested and then sent into exile, along with hundreds of political actors and civil society members – and moved to strip them of their citizenship. We call on the Government to restore their citizenship under international conventions.
We further call on the Nicaraguan Government to hold free and fair elections, allowing the members of the opposition to exercise their rights to the freedom of assembly, and to free speech.
33. Venezuela
We are deeply concerned about the ongoing political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. We call on Venezuela to swiftly implement the Barbados Agreements of October 2023, with particular regard to electoral guarantees, and the deployment of international electoral observations missions in order to ensure free and fair elections.
We are deeply worried by the recent decisions to prevent members of the opposition from exercising their core political rights and the continued detention and harassment of opposition members. We call for the immediate release of political prisoners still detained.
We follow closely developments between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region and we demand Venezuela to refrain from destabilizing initiatives. The matter must be resolved in line with international law..."
Source/publisher:
G7 Foreign Ministers
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, International Relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"GENEVA (19 April 2024) – UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk today warned that intensified fighting in Rakhine State between the military and the Arakan Army, alongside tensions being fuelled between the Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine communities, pose a grave threat to the civilian population. He warned of a grave risk that past atrocities will be repeated.
Since the year-long informal ceasefire between the two sides broke down last November, 15 of Rakhine’s 17 townships have been affected by fighting, resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries, and taking the number of displaced to well over 300,000.
“Rakhine State has once again become a battleground involving multiple actors, and civilians are paying a heavy price, with Rohingya at particular risk,” the High Commissioner said. “What is particularly disturbing is that whereas in 2017, the Rohingya were targeted by one group, they are now trapped between two armed factions who have a track record of killing them. We must not allow the Rohingya to be targeted again.”
The military has been fast losing ground to the Arakan Army (AA) throughout northern and central Rakhine. This has led to intensified fighting in the townships of Buthidaung and Maungdaw, ahead of an expected battle for the Rakhine State capital, Sittwe. The two townships are home to large Rohingya populations, putting them at grave risk.
“Facing defeat, the military has outrageously started to forcibly conscript, bribe and coerce Rohingya into joining their ranks. It is unconscionable that they should be targeted in this way, given the appalling events of six years ago, and the ongoing extreme discrimination against the Rohingya including the denial of citizenship,” Türk said.
Some reports say the military is forcing the Rohingya recruits or villagers to burn ethnic Rakhine homes, buildings or villages. Ethnic Rakhine villagers have allegedly responded in kind by burning Rohingya villages. The UN Human Rights Office is trying to verify all reports received, a task complicated by a communications blackout throughout the State.
Türk said disinformation and propaganda are also rife, pointing to claims that “Islamic terrorists” have taken Hindus and Buddhists hostage. “This was the same kind of hateful narrative that fuelled communal violence in 2012 and the horrendous attacks against the Rohingya in 2017,” he said.
Since the start of the year, the AA has positioned itself in and around Rohingya villages effectively inviting military attacks on Rohingya civilians.
On 15 April, the Médecins Sans Frontières office and pharmacy were torched in Buthidaung, along with some 200 homes. Hundreds have fled and are reported to be taking refuge in a high school, the grounds of the former hospital, and along roads in Buthidaung town. With both the Maungdaw and Buthidaung hospitals having been shut by the military in March and with the conflict intensifying, there is effectively no medical treatment in northern Rakhine.
“The alarm bells are ringing, and we must not allow there to be a repeat of the past,” Türk said. “Countries with influence on the Myanmar military and armed groups involved must act now to protect all civilians in Rakhine State and prevent another episode of horrendous persecution of the Rohingya.”..."
Source/publisher:
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, UN human rights documents on Myanmar, The UN and Burma - news and commentary, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"We, the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are deeply concerned over the recent escalation of conflicts, including in the area of Myawaddy, Kayin State, along the border area between Myanmar and Thailand and in Rakhine State of Myanmar, which have caused displacement of civilians.
To avoid further humanitarian impacts of such escalation of all forms of conflicts, we urge all parties for an immediate cessation of violence and to exercise utmost restraint, to uphold international humanitarian law, and to take all the necessary measures to defuse tensions and to ensure the protection and safety of all civilians, including foreign nationals and citizens of ASEAN Member States..."
Source/publisher:
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
133.94 KB
more
Description:
"Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN), wholeheartedly appreciate the decision made by the People’s Assembly organised by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) to abolish the 1982 Myanmar citizenship law, commonly known as the Rohingya Genocide law. This landmark decision represents a significant milestone in the ongoing spring revolution journey toward fostering unity, inclusivity, and respect for all individuals within Burma.
The 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law was formulated based on dictator Ne Win’s ideology of Burmanization, xenophobia, and racial discrimination. It has systematically discriminated against the Rohingya community, ultimately contributing to the Rohingya genocide.
Similarly, thousands of Muslims from Southern Burma have become stateless along the Thai-Burma border. Additionally, other Muslim minority groups such as Pathi, Pashu, Kaman, Myaydu, and Panthay, as well as other religious minority groups such as Hindus, Gurkha, Sikhs, Bahais, and Christians, have faced similar discriminatory experiences in expressing their identities while seeking citizenship. BHRN hopes these issues can be similarly resolved.
BHRN’s Executive Director Kyaw Win said, “Burma’s discriminatory Citizenship Law is a blight on the country’s history. By reversing this law, the People’s Assembly and the NUCC are strongly signaling they intend to separate themselves from the bigotry of the Tatmadaw. As the junta loses ground in the civil war, it is vital that planning takes place now to ensure that Burma’s next phase is one of equality and harmony for all its people. We welcome this first step and encourage further action to protect the citizenship and status of all Burma’s people.”
The 1982 citizenship law established three types of citizenship: citizen, associate citizen, and naturalized citizen. However, no clear articles or administrative processes exist for individuals to attain citizenship after holding associate or naturalized citizenship identities. Implementation of the law is rife with corruption, leading to instances where even siblings from the same household hold different identity documents.
As a result of this law and its implementation, minority communities face the risk of statelessness and limited access to education, property rights, healthcare, higher employment, and other essential services. Therefore, by undergoing the legal process to abolish this discriminatory law, the revolution in Burma reaffirms its commitment to upholding the principles of equality, justice, and human rights for all citizens.
We commend the efforts of all those involved in this decision and urge for the swift abolition of the law is crucial to continue progress towards building a more harmonious and inclusive society. Finally, a new citizenship law must be based on human rights norms and should be only one type of citizenship for everyone equally.
Organisation’s Background
BHRN is based in London and operates across Burma/Myanmar working for human rights, minority rights and religious freedom in the country. BHRN has played a crucial role in advocating for human rights and religious freedom with politicians and world leaders..."
Source/publisher:
Burma Human Rights Network
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Burma's citizenship laws and other relevant legislation (texts and commentary)
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Karen National Union (KNU) led resistance forces, including the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karen National Defense Organisation (KNDO) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), captured Thingannyinaung Tactical Command Base under Burma/Myanmar military’s Southeastern Command on the 4th of April 2024. On the 10th of April 2024, they captured 275th Infantry Battalion stationed in Myawaddy Township. However, some troops from the 275th Infantry Battalion have retreated to the 2nd Thailand-Myanmar Friendship Bridge where they have stationed themselves and taken sheltered near the bridge.
Since capturing the bases, our allied forces are conducting military operations to intercept, block, and deter reinforcement troops sent by SAC in order not to lose Myawaddy. Some tasks still need to be carried out in order to reach a secure position in the Myawaddy area. People are urged to live and travel while taking security precautions.
Once the Myawaddy area has reached a secure position, the KNU, with the participation of the local people, will establish administrative matters, prevent illicit businesses, contraband trades and human trafficking, and implement stability, law enforcement, necessary public services, and facilitate commodity flow in the Myawaddy area from a possible position despite the challenges. We release our positions as follows:
The KNU is deeply concerned about the security of the people living on both sides of the Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border, border stability, and access to humanitarian aid, and we will do our best concerning those issues.
The KNU is committed to establishing and maintaining cross-border security and stability. We are making the necessary preparations and arrangements for the continuity of rules-based cross-border activities in line with regional best practices.
In order to establish peace and security for the people living on both sides of the Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border, the KNU is working to achieve meaningful cooperation with the Royal Thai Government, local and international partner organizations, including border-based Karen organizations and connecting with all concerned parties.
We respect and honor all our comrades who have sacrificed their lives, blood, and sweat to remove any kind of dictatorship, including the military dictatorship, and establish a new civilian-led federal democratic union that respects diversity and inclusion. The KNU will continue to fight to achieve our goal together with the Ethnic Resistance Organizations and democratic alliances, and we urge the entire people of Kawthoolei and Burma/Myanmar to keep participating and fighting persistently..."
Source/publisher:
Karen National Union
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-12
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Armed conflict in Karen State - general articles and reports
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
511.01 KB 810.84 KB
more
Description:
"Today, April 11th, marks the one-year anniversary of the Pazigyi Village aircraft bombing massacre. On April 11th, 2023, at approximately 7:30 A.M. in the Sagaing Division, Kantbalu Township, junta forces bombarded the opening ceremony of the Pazigyi village administration office – a donation event – with a jet plane. Those who survived were also chased and shot at by military planes, resulting in the deaths of nearly 40 children and over 170 civilians.
Despite international condemnation of this terrorist junta’s action, no meaningful action has been taken thus far, and there is still an irresponsibility in addressing the situation.
The main reason the junta can carry out daily airstrikes targeting civilians, as in the Pazigyi case, is due to the unhindered purchase of aviation fuel from the international community. Between February 2021 and December 2023, more than 1,650 airstrikes were carried out, resulting in the deaths of nearly 950 civilians, including many children.
On April 4th, 2024, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution concerning Myanmar, urging member states to abstain from exporting, selling, or transferring jet fuel to the country. This marks the first time the UN has made such a call. The decision, which was delayed for more than three years, has resulted in an increase in the number of deaths and underscores the urgent need for truly effective measures and decisive action.
Singapore and Vietnam allow the use of their ports, while UN member states such as the USA, the UK, and the EU have the leverage to halt jet fuel access to the terrorist junta in Myanmar. However, they have not yet taken any effective measures, demonstrating irresponsibility. They continue to support and permit the junta to commit war crimes.
The USA, the UK, and the EU must sanction aviation fuel sales and shipment insurance. UN member states and their companies must immediately cease all exports, sales, or transfers of aviation fuel to the Myanmar junta.
As long as international governments do not take effective action to stop the junta’s access to aviation fuel, we, the Blood Money Campaign, will continue to campaign for the ban on jet fuel movement alongside local and international revolutionary organizations in solidarity..."
Source/publisher:
Blood Money Campaign
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
348.97 KB
more
Sub-title:
Decision Not to Deport 19 Children Should be Expanded to All Refugees
Description:
"(Bangkok) – The Thai government’s decision not to forcibly return 19 children to Myanmar should be expanded to include all refugees from Myanmar, Human Rights Watch said today.
On March 12, 2024, officials from Thai immigration and the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security took 19 Myanmar children, ages 5 to 17, from Wat Sawang Arom School in Lopburi province in central Thailand and brought them without their parents to the border in Chiang Rai province prior to repatriating them to Myanmar. Thai members of parliament, human rights groups, and the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand strongly criticized the planned return. On March 26, Social Development and Human Security Minister Varawut Silpa-archa said in a media interview that his agency would not return the 19 children to Myanmar, and that they could remain in Thailand.
“Thai authorities showed sympathy and support by allowing 19 children from Myanmar to remain in Thailand,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The government’s next step should be to assure all those fleeing Myanmar that they can seek protection in Thailand.”
Prior to Varawut’s announcement, Thai officials had said that the 19 children were “undocumented” and were irregularly living in Thailand. The previous government in July 2023 had used a similar argument to justify sending back 126 “undocumented” Myanmar children from a school in Ang Thong province, despite concerns raised by the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand and human rights groups.
Varawut’s assurances that these 19 children could remain in Thailand should become Thai government policy for all Myanmar refugees, as long as the human rights situation in Myanmar remains dire, Human Rights Watch said. Fighting since early April around the Myanmar border town of Myawaddy, opposite Mae Sot in Thailand’s Tak province, has raised concerns about future influxes of refugees.
Thai Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha-Nukara said on April 9 that the government has prepared to receive up to 100,000 refugees temporarily.
Not everyone fleeing conflict and rights abuses in Myanmar has been able to seek protection in Thailand. In late October, the Thai military forcibly returned thousands of refugees who had been sheltering in border areas next to Myanmar’s Karenni State.
Any forced returns to Myanmar may violate Thailand’s obligations as a party to the Convention Against Torture and the customary international law principle prohibiting refoulement, the forcible return of anyone to a place where they would face a genuine risk of persecution, torture or other ill-treatment, or a threat to their life.
Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military junta has carried out a nationwide campaign of mass killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate attacks that amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. More than two million people have been internally displaced and more than 109,000 refugees have fled to neighboring countries.
The Thai government should promptly fulfill its pledge at the Global Refugee Forum in December 2023 to withdraw its reservation to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 22 guarantees the rights of refugee children, but Thailand’s reservation calls for refugee children to be treated “subject to the national laws, regulations and prevailing practices in Thailand.” The convention also contains protections for children from being forcibly separated from their parents.
Thailand should also provide protection and support to all refugees, including by permitting the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, to undertake refugee status determinations.
“The deteriorating human rights situation in Myanmar could mean that Thailand receives many more refugees in the near future,” Pearson said. “While the Thai government should be assuring refugees that they will not be returned into harm’s way, concerned governments should be prepared to support Thailand to provide protection.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Chevron has finally divested from the Yadana project after two years of making empty promises to the public, following years of continuous financial support for the atrocities, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed by the military in Myanmar. The decision was prompted by pressure from civil society to halt all transactions with the brutal and illegal junta. Despite their prolonged assurances, Chevron’s actions, along with their empty promises, have contributed to the deaths of more than 4852 civilians and the destruction of over 76,923 homes in Myanmar.
After TotalEnergies’ departure from the project, Chevron’s stake in the Yadana project rose to 41.1%, and after its exit, the remaining shares have been redistributed among Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and PTTEP, a Thai majority state-owned enterprise. Although once the largest gas project in terms of production volume, the Yadana project’s output is steadily declining and is expected to conclude within a few years as per the contractual agreement. Plans to minimise negative environmental impacts in the project’s deommissioning imperative.
The Yadana project has been a significant source of revenue for the Myanmar junta and has made the investors complicit in indiscriminate airstrikes and other attacks against civilians. However, Chevron’s exit does not absolve it of its human rights responsibilities outlined in the OECD Guidelines and UN Guiding Principles. The transfer of Chevron’s shares to PTTEP and MOGE perpetuates the junta’s commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, as the funds and resources remain in the hands of the terrorist junta.
Therefore, Chevron breached international laws, business and human rights principles over three years in Myanmar without taking immediate action seriously. Again, the recent divestment of Chevron must act responsibly as per all guidelines and principles. There are various actions and remedies for Myanmar people to be accountable for their support of the terrorist Min Aung Hlaing group’s atrocity crimes in Myanmar for over three years.
Meanwhile, PTTEP, as the primary investor and operator of the Yadana and Zawtika gas projects, holding a significant participating interest of 62.9630% in the Yadana project, continues to support the illegal junta. PTTEP must stop payments to the junta by withholding all funds in an escrow account. Shareholders of PTTEP also have a responsibility to engage with the company and ensure it stops its contributions to atrocities in Myanmar. Lastly, Thailand’s government also needs to take accountability to their majority state-owned enterprise, PTT and its subsidiary, PTTEP to follow all requirements of the UNGP and OECD guidelines in action as they promised in public. It will maintain their dignity, image and ethically responsible enterprise as the role model among the business entities.
The Blood Money Campaign urge the US, UK, Canada, and Australia to impose full sanctions on MOGE for directly funding the junta’s violence against Myanmar people. These governments must stop protecting MOGE and by extension, the terrorist junta..."
Source/publisher:
Blood Money Campaign
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
200.08 KB
more
Description:
"The recent events unfolding in Myanmar, particularly in the town of Myawaddy, adjacent to the Mae Sot District in Tak Province, Thailand, have raised significant concerns. Reports indicate that on April 7, 2024, the Karen National Union (KNU) and the People’s Defense Force (PDF) seized control of Myawaddy, including the capture of the Burmese Army’s tactical headquarters and the invasion of the area occupied by the 275th Battalion, the largest military base of the Burmese Army in Myawaddy town.
Furthermore, on the same day, reports emerged regarding the landing of a plane from the Burmese junta at Mae Sot International Airport. There has been speculation regarding the purpose of this flight, with some reports suggesting it may involve the transfer of weapons and military personnel from the Burmese army or the transfer of junta property from occupied territories.
In response to these developments, the Thai government held a press conference on April 8, 2024. Mr Thanawat Sirikul, Deputy Director-General of the Department of Information and Deputy Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the flight in question was for civilians, and subsequent flights have been cancelled.
Considering recent events concerning the situation in Myanmar and its implications for Thailand, Milk Tea Alliance Thailand issues the following demands to the Thai government:
Withhold the assistance provided to the Burmese Army: We call upon the Thai government to withhold all forms of assistance provided to the Burmese Army. Burmese Army is the active armed organisation in Myanmar that is conducting indiscriminate attacks on civilians and its infrastructure. Supporting the Junta in Myanmar will make Thailand complicit in their war crimes. Regarding the agreed military aid or humanitarian support, the nature and extent of such aid must be disclosed to the public.
Support for International Humanitarian Law: The Thai government must actively advocate for the Burmese military’s adherence to international humanitarian law, as outlined in the four Geneva Conventions. All parties involved in the conflict must uphold principles of humanitarian law, particularly in protecting civilians and respecting their rights.
Inclusive Peace Negotiations: We urge the Thai government to refrain from exclusively supporting peace negotiations that cater to the demands of the Burmese military. Instead, we advocate for inclusive dialogue that involves all stakeholders, including ethnic armed forces and the People’s Defense Force (PDF). These negotiations should be guided by principles of justice, accountability, and human rights, ensuring a sustainable and equitable resolution to the conflict.
Protection of Civilian Refugees: The Thai government has a moral obligation to assist civilian refugees fleeing conflict in Myanmar, according to human rights principles. Refugees must not be subjected to danger, refoulement, and exploitation, and adequate measures must be implemented to prevent any such occurrences. The Thai government must uphold its responsibility to protect vulnerable populations and provide them with the necessary support and care.
Milk Tea Alliance Thailand hopes that the Thai government will heed these demands to ensure that all civilians are treated with human rights and that the military, which is responsible for coups, genocides, and other crimes, must be held accountable and punished according to the law..."
Source/publisher:
Milk Tea Alliance Friends of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
255.59 KB 176.37 KB
more
Sub-title:
Statement on the Appointment of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations on Myanmar
Description:
"1. The National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar welcomes the appointment of Ms. Julie Bishop as the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations on Myanmar.
2. We have full confidence that Ms. Bishop’s extensive experience and expertise in diplomatic acumen make her a great fit for this new position, and we would like to express our sincere hope that she will discharge her responsibilities with the utmost dedication and commitment and serve the best interests of the people of Myanmar in alignment with their desires and aspirations.
3. The National Unity Government stands to closely collaborate with the Special Envoy in our endeavor to establish a federal democratic union founded upon democratic principles and values, which is the shared goal of the Myanmar people.
4. Therefore, the National Unity Government urges the international community to provide assistance and support to the Special Envoy, enabling her to effectively fulfill her responsibilities for the betterment of the people of Myanmar.....ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်ခန့်အပ်မှုနှင့် စပ်လျဉ်းသည့် ထုတ်ပြန်ချက်
၁။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် Ms. Julie Bishop အား ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူး ချုပ်၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖြစ် ခန့်အပ်လိုက်မှုအပေါ် ဝမ်းမြောက်စွာ ကြိုဆိုပါ သည်။
၂။ Ms. Bishop သည် ၎င်း၏ သံတမန်ရေးရာ အတွေ့အကြုံနှင့် ကျွမ်းကျင်မှုများအရ ဤရာထူး နေရာအတွက် အသင့်လျော်ဆုံး ဖြစ်မည်ဟု ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အနေဖြင့် အပြည့်အဝ ယုံကြည်ပြီး၊ မြန်မာ ပြည်သူလူထု၏ အကျိုးစီးပွားအတွက် ၎င်းတို့၏ဆန္ဒနှင့်အညီ လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို ထမ်းဆောင် သွားမည်ဟု မျှော်လင့်ပါသည်။
၃။ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့်လည်း မြန်မာပြည်သူလူထု၏ တူညီသည့် ရည်မှန်း ချက်ပန်းတိုင်ဖြစ်သည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီစံနှုန်းများနှင့် တန်ဘိုးများကိုအပေါ် အခြေခံသည့် ဖက်ဒရယ် ဒီမိုကရေစီပြည်ထောင်စု တည်ဆောက်ရေးကို ဦးတည်ကာ အထူးကိုယ်စားလှယ်နှင့် နီးကပ်စွာ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
၄။ ထို့ကြောင့် နိုင်ငံတကာအနေဖြင့်လည်း ကုလသမဂ္ဂအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်၏ အထူးကိုယ်စား လှယ်အား ၎င်း၏လုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်များကို ထိရောက်အောင်မြင်စွာ ထမ်းဆောင်နိုင်ရေးအတွက် အဘက်ဘက်မှ ဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီပေးကြပါရန် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက တိုက်တွန်း တောင်းဆို အပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, National Unity Government (NUG), Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
51.2 KB 60.46 KB
more
Description:
"Strengthen the political leadership to align with the evolutions of the revolution. To achieve policy balance, the National Unity Government (NUG) and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) will be reviewed and reformed, and a progress report will be submitted to the Third People’s Assembly.
The National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC should engage with all revolutionary stakeholders as soon as possible to achieve a political pact.
In obtaining the common political pact, NUCC should initiate discussions with other political and revolutionary forces who are not yet part of NUCC.
To clearly discuss the Form of State.
To set fundamental policies for the emergance of new states including that of Bamar.
To develop directives and/or regulations to enhance communication and collaboration, check and balance between NUCC and NUG in accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC).
To strengthen accountability and improve engagement between the public and political leading institutions, such as NUCC and NUG, Town Hall Meetings, press conferences, and other public relations channels.
To avoid repeat of occurances such as violations provisions of the Federal Demoracy Charter (FDC) by the National Unity Government (NUG) by issuing the China Policy Statement, Joint Political Position Statement, and establishing the FSCC without consulting NUCC.
To ensure the National Unity Government (NUG) the political guidance and check and balance mechanism of the National Unity Consultative Council
(NUCC) by implementing the provisions stated in the Federal Democracy
Charter (FDC).
To continue the development of Rohingya Policy as soon as possible.
To lead the process of the National Apology by the National Unity Government (NUG) and the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC towards the ethnic people regarding the suppressions including the Rohingya Genocide committed by past government
With the direct leadership of the President, to form a special commission on minority affairs, which will advocate for oppressed ethnic people, including Rohingya.
To take actions with a policy of zero-tolerance against sexual harassment, violence, rapes, child rape cases, and killings faced by women and LGBTIQ+ during the revolutionary period.
To bring justice for arbitrary arrests, torture, and killings against civilians during the revolutionary period.
To establish the federal human rights commission as soon as possible to seek accountability for human rights violations during the revolutionary period.
To take effective action on unlawful tax collection processes and set up a systematic process of tax collection in revolutionary force-controlled areas.
To identify the monitoring mechanism and financial supervision process on the fundraising and expenditures of the National Unity Government (NUG)
through audit and submitting the report to the people’s assembly.
To assure and protect access to education for all children and everyone during the revolutionary period without discrimination.
To protect and ensure equal access to healthcare services for all during the revolution.
To eliminate all discrimination against ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and disability with a zero-tolerance policy.
To amend or repeal laws that violate the values of human rights and women’s rights..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
551.45 KB
more
Description:
"In accordance with the provisions stated in the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC), the Second People’s Assembly was convened by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), lasting five days from April 4-9.
A total of (204) delegates, (104) special invitees, and (128) observers participated by representing the spring revilution forces, such as (a) elected parlimentarians including the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), (b) political parties, (c) spring reovlution forces, (d) ethnic resistance organizations, and (e) interim state/federal unit/ethnic councils. Among the participants, 64.9 percent were male, 34.3 percent were female, and the remaining 0.8 percent were others.
During the people assembly, participants and special invitees reviewed and offered recommendations on reports submitted by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), Joint Coordination Committees (JCCs), and ministries of National Unity Government (NUG).
The following three decisions were passed by the Second People’s Assembly among the recommendations and feedback provided by the representatives:-
(a) Local Governance and Rule of Law
To review and establish harmonize mechanisms among revolution forces, including the National Unity Government (NUG), to assure the responsibility and accountability of ground administration, defense, and security mechanisms (PaAhPha, PaKaPha, and PaLaPha) according to the Federal Democracy Charter.
(b) Illegitimate Conscription Law of Military Junta
To combat the illegal conscription law of military terrorist and its consequences by an effective strategic response through collaboration with people and revolutionary forces.
(c ) The issue of Myanmar Citizenship Law (1982)
The Second People’s Assembly determined that the Myanmar Citizenship Law (1982) would be abolished. It shall be implemented in accordancw tih Chapter (5) “Interim Legislature” provisions of the Federal Democracy Charter.
The remaining proposals are put on record for further discussion by respective political leading forces in accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter.
All the discussion points, feedback and recommendations of attended representatives were being documented in the Assembly, and respective political leading organizations will continue coordination in accordance with the Federal Democracy Charter.
The assembly agreed to hold the People’s Assembly every six months..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Consultative Council
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, National Unity Government (NUG)
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
608.83 KB 841.27 KB
more
Description:
"The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), Athan, RW Welfare Society, and Progressive Voice welcome the UN Human Rights Council’s resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar. While the adoption of the resolution by consensus represents an important step in further cementing the Myanmar military’s lack of legitimacy, the resolution falls short in key areas in addressing the ongoing atrocities and ensuring justice and accountability in Myanmar.
The resolution, adopted by consensus at the end of the 55th regular session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 4 April 2024, unequivocally condemns the military junta’s escalating violence against civilians and its increasing violations of international law, committed with blanket impunity. The HRC’s adoption of a new resolution on Myanmar deals a resounding blow to the illegal Myanmar military junta, putting on full display the world’s condemnation of its terror campaign against the people of Myanmar.
It leaves no doubt that the military junta has absolutely no international legitimacy and is the root cause of Myanmar’s intensifying human rights and humanitarian crisis.
The resolution maintains the ongoing crisis in Myanmar high on the Council’s agenda. It ensures that the Council is regularly informed of the developments in the country by the High Commissioner and the Special Rapporteur. In particular, its request that the High Commissioner report on “pathways to fulfil the people of Myanmar’s aspirations for human rights protection, accountability, democracy and a civilian government” is a welcome step. This presents a crucial opportunity for the UN system as a whole to truly demonstrate its respect for the wishes and efforts of Myanmar people to establish federal democracy, and ensure the protection of human rights, and justice and accountability.
Shortcomings in the Resolution
The resolution, however, falls dangerously short yet again in several key areas.
Transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment: While the resolution rightly recognizes the serious human rights and humanitarian implications of the junta’s atrocity crimes, in particular the increasing airstrikes facilitated by “sale, diversion and unregulated or illicit transfers of arms and jet fuel,” it fails to recognize the need for a comprehensive global arms embargo or sanctions on aviation fuel.
It merely calls on states to “cease the illicit transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment […] as well as to refrain from […] the export, sale or transfer of jet fuel, surveillance goods and technologies and less-lethal weapons.”
The failure to explicitly call for a comprehensive embargo on arms and sanctions on aviation fuel to Myanmar represents a failure by the Council to fully respect the overwhelming demands of Myanmar’s peoples to the international community, which is to neutralize the junta by ending its capacity to bomb civilian communities across the country.
The reality is that any transfer, sale, or diversion of arms, munitions, and other military equipment to the military junta likely amounts to aiding and abetting its commission of war crimes and other crimes under international law. This means that all sales, transfers, and diversions of arms, munitions and other military equipment to the Myanmar military are illicit, and therefore must stop immediately.
ASEAN: Of additional concern is the resolution’s expression of “full support for the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations” (ASEAN). ASEAN’s efforts over the past three years—including its so-called Five-Point Consensus (5PC) and attempts at “inclusive dialogue”—have been consistently ineffective and misguided. It has continually failed to recognize and address the Myanmar military as the root cause of the crisis, while neglecting the will, aspirations, efforts, and sacrifices of the Myanmar people to establish an inclusive, peaceful federal democratic Myanmar. Still today, ASEAN’s approach to addressing the crisis lacks the Myanmar people’s consent.
The people of Myanmar cannot afford to wait indefinitely for ASEAN to implement the 5PC. As primary stakeholders in the future of their own country, the people of Myanmar have a right to know about ASEAN’s plans. ASEAN and the UN are accountable to the people of Myanmar regarding matters of their own country.
Continuing to rely exclusively on ASEAN, despite the indisputable failure of its efforts over the past three years, will only prolong the junta’s escalating atrocities. This obliges the UN and the international community as a whole to end its ineffective reliance on ASEAN and to assume collective responsibility and leadership in addressing Myanmar’s crisis.
Calls to Action
Three years since the military’s attempted coup, the will of the Myanmar people remains strong, as their steadfast democratic resistance movement continues its tireless efforts to dismantle the military junta and build an inclusive federal democracy and sustainable peace from the ground up.
The Council must mobilize Member States to heed the unwavering calls of the people of Myanmar to fully ban the military junta’s access to arms and aviation fuel once and for all, and actualize justice and accountability through all possible avenues. There cannot be a true end to the human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar unless and until the military is held accountable under international law. We call on the Council to urge UN Member States—particularly those of the Security Council—to refer the situation in Myanmar as a whole to the International Criminal Court under Article 14 of the Rome Statute..."
Source/publisher:
FORUM-ASIA, Athan, RW Welfare Society and Progressive Voice
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
129.32 KB
more
Sub-title:
ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ ၅၅ ကြိမ်မြောက် ညီလာခံ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက ချမှတ်လိုက်သည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေအနေဆိုင်ရာ သဘောတူဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အပေါ် တုန့်ပြန်ချက်
Description:
"The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, as represented by the National Unity Government, welcomes the Human Rights Council’s adoption by consensus of the resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar on 4 April 2024. Myanmar extends its deep appreciation to the European Union as penholder and to all cosponsors.
Myanmar also welcomes the resolution’s extension of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, and its call for a more active UN role in Myanmar including greater coherence and efficiency on the ground and continued action to hold the military accountable for its crimes.
Myanmar looks forward to contributing to the OHCHR report mandated by the Council. The High Commissioner has been asked to prepare a comprehensive report on ‘pathways to fulfil the aspirations of the people of Myanmar for human rights protection, accountability, democracy and a civilian government’. Myanmar remains firmly committed to securing accountability through international courts and national jurisdictions and to exploring fresh ways to deliver justice and reparations, including through the creation of a special tribunal.
Ministry of Human Rights
National Unity Government
ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ
၅၅ ကြိမ်မြောက် ညီလာခံ
လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက ချမှတ်လိုက်သည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေအနေဆိုင်ရာ သဘောတူဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အပေါ် တုန့်ပြန်ချက်
===============================
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ
(၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၈ ရက်)
အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရက ကိုယ်စားပြုထားသည့် ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတ မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံတော်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး အခြေအနေနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ လူ့အခွင့် အရေးကောင်စီက ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလ ၄ ရက်နေ့တွင် တညီတညွတ်တည်း အတည်ပြု လိုက်သည့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အား ကြိုဆိုဂုဏ်ပြုပါသည်။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတ မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံသည် ယခုဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို ဦးဆောင်ရေးဆွဲခဲ့သည့် ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂနှင့် ထောက်ခံ တင်သွင်းခဲ့ကြသောနိုင်ငံများကို လေးလေးနက်နက် ကျေးဇူးတင်ကြောင်း ပြောကြားလို ပါသည်။
ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တွင် ယခင်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များထက် ပိုမိုခိုင်မာသည့် အချက်သစ်များ ပါဝင်ကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်။ ၎င်းဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် အသစ်များထဲတွင် အရပ်သား ပြည်သူများ အပေါ် လေကြောင်း တိုက်ခိုက်မှုများ ပိုမိုပြင်းထန်စွာ လုပ်ဆောင်နေသည့် အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်အုပ်စုထံ လေယာဉ်ဆီ တင်ပို့ခြင်း၊ ရောင်းချခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် လွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းတို့ကို ရှောင်ကြဉ်ရန် နိုင်ငံများအား တောင်းဆိုမှုပါဝင်ပါသည်။
ဤဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သစ်တွင် ရိုဟင်ဂျာများ အပါအဝင် လူမျိုးစုနှင့် ဘာသာရေးလူနည်းစုများ အပေါ် ဆိုးရွားစွာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်နေခြင်း၊ မိုခါဆိုင်ကလုန်းမုန်တိုင်းအပြီး ရခိုင် ပြည်နယ်သို့ ပေးပို့ရမည့် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများအား ရည်ရွယ်ချက်ရှိရှိ တားမြစ်ခြင်း၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ အမျိုးသားအမျိုးသမီး၊ လူငယ်များကို အတင်အဓမ္မ စစ်မှု ထမ်းရန် အပြင်းအထန် စီစဥ်ဆောင်ရွက်နေခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားများ အပေါ် ပစ်မှတ်ထား နှောင့်ယှက်နေခြင်း များကိုလည်း ရှုတ်ချထားပါသည်။
လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာမဟာမင်းကြီးအား “မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ပြည်သူများ၏ ရည်မှန်းချက်များ ဖြစ်သည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကို ကာကွယ်ပေးခြင်း၊ တာဝန်ခံမှု ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်း၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် အရပ်သားအစိုးရတရပ် ပေါ်ထွန်းရေး အတွက် လုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်း စသည့်နည်းလမ်းများကို ပြည်ပြည့်စုံစုံ အစီရင်ခံစာရေးဆွဲ တင်သွင်းရန်” တာဝန်အပ်နှင်းခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ မဟာမင်းကြီးရုံးအား ကောင်စီက တာဝန်ပေးအပ်ခဲ့သည့် ထိုအစီရင်ခံစာအတွက် ပူးပေါင်း လက်တွဲလုပ်ဆောင်ရန် အဆင်သင့်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံတကာ တရားရုံးများနှင့် နိုင်ငံတော်အဆင့် တရားစီရင်ပိုင်ခွင့်များ မှတစ်ဆင့် တာဝန်ခံမှု ဖော်ဆောင်နိုင်ရေးနှင့် အထူးခုံရုံးများ ဖွဲ့စည်းခြင်းအပါအဝင် တရားမျှတမှုနှင့် နစ်နာမှုများအားကုစားပေးခြင်းဆိုင်ရာ နည်းလမ်းသစ်များကို ရှာဖွေ ဖော်ထုတ်လုပ်ဆောင်သွားရန် ခိုင်မာစွာ ကတိပြုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Myanmar - NUG
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
166.96 KB 1007.23 KB
more
Description:
"ခိုင်မာစေလိုက်သည့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို အဖွဲ့၀င်နိုင်ငံများအနေနှင့် တိကျခိုင်မာသော ဆောင်ရွက်ချက်ဖြင့် မလွဲမသွေ ဆက်လက်ဆောင်ရွက်ရမည်။
မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်အား အောက်တွင်ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ပါသည်။
5 April 2024: The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) welcomes the adoption of a strengthened United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. It is imperative that UN member States now respond to the gravity of the escalating crisis in Myanmar by taking concrete steps to end Myanmar military violence and hold military leaders accountable for their crimes.
The resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, which was adopted by consensus in Geneva on Thursday, 4 April 2024, calls for steps to be taken towards advancing accountability and cutting the Myanmar military’s supply of arms and jet fuel that enable it to perpetrate atrocities against civilians.
The resolution calls on all States to “to cease the illicit sale, transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment to Myanmar” and to “refrain […] from the export, sale or transfer of jet fuel.” The inclusion of jet fuel, as called for by Myanmar civil society and international non-governmental organisations, is a critical step towards cutting the military’s capacity to commit human rights atrocities through its use of devastating airstrikes.
Ending the supply of jet fuel is urgent, as the military escalates its indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilian targets in response to mounting losses on the ground to allied resistance forces. According to data compiled by Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica, the military carried out 750 airstrikes between 1 September and 31 December 2023, an average of at least six per day.
Furthermore, SAC-M emphasises that any transfer of arms, munitions and military equipment to the Myanmar military likely constitutes an act of aiding and abetting war crimes, which is a crime under international law. Therefore, all sale, transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment to the Myanmar military is illicit and, under the resolution, should cease.
The Myanmar military has ignored previous Human Rights Council resolutions on Myanmar by continuing to block the population’s access to vital humanitarian assistance. According to UN figures, 2.8 million people are internally displaced and 18.6 million people are in need of aid.
SAC-M calls on the international community to not fall into the ‘humanitarian trap’ of trying to secure a path forward towards a political solution through a notional humanitarian corridor, reducing the response to the whole Myanmar crisis into a purely humanitarian format. Instead, member States, donors and UN agencies must expand delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need through direct coordination with resistance authorities, including the National Unity Government and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations, and broader civil society.
The new resolution also requests the UN Secretary-General to “call the continued attention of the Security Council to the situation in Myanmar”, which has failed to enforce its resolution 2669 on Myanmar since it was adopted in December 2022. The Secretary-General should advise the UN Security Council to impose a total embargo on the sale, transfer and diversion of arms, munitions and other military equipment to the Myanmar military and to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.
The Security Council held an open briefing on the situation in Myanmar in New York on Thursday, hours after the Human Rights Council resolution was adopted. However, Myanmar’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, was prevented from speaking at the briefing. SAC-M considers this to set a dangerous precedent for the denial of speaking rights to a permanent representative of a concerned country.
Additionally, the Human Rights Council resolution calls on the High Commissioner for Human Rights to report to the Council “on pathways to fulfil the aspirations of the people of Myanmar for human rights protection, accountability, democracy and a civilian government.”
SAC-M urges the High Commissioner to use the report to consider ways in which the extensive evidence collected by the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar can be put to use and the process of prosecuting the leaders of the military for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes can finally commence.
၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၅ ရက်။
ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးအခြေအနေဆိုင်ရာနှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့်ပိုမိုခိုင်မာစေသော ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် တစ်ရပ် ချမှတ်ခြင်းအား SAC-M မှ လက်ခံကြိုဆိုလိုက်သည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ရဲ့ အကြမ်းဖက်မှုများအား ရပ်တန့်ရန် တိကျခိုင်မာသော ဆောင်ရွက်မှုများလုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းနှင့်စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင်များသည် ၎င်းတို့၏ ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများအတွက် တာဝန်ရှိကြောင်း သေချာစေခြင်းအားဖြင့်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် ပြင်းထန်နေသော အကျပ်အတည်း၏ ပမာဏထုထည်မှုကို ကုလအဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများမှ ယခုချက်ချင်း ကိုင်တွယ်ဖြေရှင်းတုံ့ပြန်ရန် မဖြစ်မနေအရေးကြီးသည်။
၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၄ ရက် ကြာသပတေးနေ့က ဂျီနီဗာတွင် အားလုံးသဘောတူညီမှုဖြင့် ချမှတ်ခဲ့သော မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေး အခြေအနေနှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်သည် တာဝန်ခံမှု မြှင့်တင်ရန် နှင့် အရပ်သားများအပေါ် ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများ ကျူးလွန်ရန် အထောက်အကူပြုသည့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်၏ လက်နက်နှင့် လေယာဉ်လောင်စာများအား ဖြတ်တောက်ရန် လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များအား တောင်းဆိုထားသည်။
ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တွင် “မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသို့ လက်နက်၊ ခဲယမ်းမီးကျောက်များနှင့် စစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ တရားမ၀င် ရောင်းချခြင်း၊ လွှဲပြောင်းခြင်းနှင့် လွှဲအပ်ခြင်းတို့ကို ရပ်တန့်ရန်” အပြင် “လေယာဉ်ဆီ တင်ပို့ခြင်း၊ ရောင်းချခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် လွှဲအပ်ခြင်းမှ […] ရှောင်ကြဉ်ရန်” ဟူ၍ အဖွဲ့၀င်နိုင်ငံအားလုံးကို တောင်းဆိုထားသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အရပ်ဘက်လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အစိုးရမဟုတ်သော နိုင်ငံတကာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများက တောင်းဆိုထားသည့် လေယာဉ်ဆီ လောင်စာကိစ္စရပ်အား ထည့်သွင်းခြင်းသည် အပျက်အစီးပြင်းထန်သော လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှုများမှတဆင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ရက်စက်ကြမ်းကြုတ်မှုများကို ကျူးလွန်လျက်ရှိသည့် စစ်တပ်၏ အစွမ်းအစကို ဖြတ်တောက်စေရန်အတွက် အဓိကကျသော ခြေလှမ်းတစ်ခု ဖြစ်သည်။
မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် အရပ်သားပစ်မှတ်များကို ခွဲခြားခြင်းမရှိ ဝေဟင်မှ ဗုံးကြဲတိုက်ခိုက်မှုကို တိုးမြှင့်လုပ်ဆောင်နေပြီး ယင်းသည် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်မှ မဟာမိတ်တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဖွဲ့များထံ မြေပြင်တွင် တိုးပွားလာသော ရှုံးနိမ့်မှုများအတွက် ပြန်လည်တုံ့ပြန်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် လေယာဉ်ဆီ ထောက်ပံ့မှု ရပ်ဆိုင်းရေးသည် အရေးပေါ် ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဉာဏ်လင်းသစ် Analytica (Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica) မှ ပြုစုသော အချက်အလက်များအရ စစ်တပ်သည် ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ် စက်တင်ဘာ ၁ ရက်မှ ဒီဇင်ဘာ ၃၁ ရက်အတွင်း လေကြောင်းတိုက်ခိုက်မှု ၇၅၀ ကြိမ် ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး တစ်ရက်လျှင် ပျမ်းမျှ အနည်းဆုံး ခြောက်ကြိမ်တိုက်ခိုက်သည်။
ထို့အပြင် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်အား လက်နက်၊ ခဲယမ်းမီးကျောက်များနှင့် စစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ လွှဲပြောင်းမှုမှန်သမျှသည် စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများကို အားပေးကူညီခြင်းဟူသော ကျူးလွန်မှုတစ်ခုဖြစ်ပြီး ယင်းသည်နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေအရ ရာဇ၀တ်မှုဟု သတ်မှတ်ထားသည်ဟု SAC-M မှ အလေးပေးထောက်ပြလိုသည်။ ထို့ကြောင့် မြန်မာစစ်တပ် ထံ လက်နက်၊ ခဲယမ်းနှင့် အခြားစစ်လက်နက်ပစ္စည်းများ ရောင်းချခြင်း၊ လွှဲပြောင်းခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် လွှဲအပ်ခြင်း မှန်သမျှသည် တရားမ၀င်ဖြစ်ပြီး ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်နှင့်အညီ ရပ်တန့်ရမည်။
မြန်မာစစ်တပ်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ ယခင်ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များကို လျစ်လျူရှုထားပြီး မြန်မာလူထုအတွက် အရေးပါသော လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများ ရရှိခွင့်ကို ဆက်လက်ပိတ်ဆို့ထားသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၏ ကိန်းဂဏန်းများ အရ ၂.၈ သန်းသော ပြည်သူများသည် ပြည်တွင်းနေရပ်စွန့်ခွာတိမ်းရှောင်သူများ ဖြစ်ကြရ ပြီး ၁၈.၆ သန်းမှာ အကူအညီများ လိုအပ်လျက်ရှိသည်။
SAC-M မှ နိုင်ငံတကာအသိုင်းအဝိုင်းကို တောင်းဆိုလိုသည်မှာ စိတ်ကူးဆန်သော လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုစင်္ကြံမှတဆင့် နိုင်ငံရေးအဖြေတစ်ခုဆီသို့ ဦးတည်သွားမည့်လမ်းကြောင်းတစ်ခုကို အရယူရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမည် ဟူသည့် ‘လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုထောင်ချောက်’ ထဲသို့မကျရောက်ရန် ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ယင်းထောင်ချောက်သည် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ ပုံစံအဆင့်သို့သာ ဖြစ်သွားစေပြီး မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံအကျပ်အတည်းတစ်ခုလုံးအပေါ် နိုင်ငံတကာ၏တုံ့ပြန်မှု လျော့ကျသွားစေမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ သို့ပါ၍ အဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများ၊ အလှူရှင်များနှင့် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအေဂျင်စီများသည် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရ NUG နှင့် တိုင်းရင်းသား တော်လှန်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ စသည့် တော်လှန်ရေး အာဏာပိုင်များ အပြင် အရပ်ဘက် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများစွာတို့နှင့် တိုက်ရိုက် ညှိနှိုင်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းအားဖြင့် လိုအပ်သူများထံ လူသားချင်းစာနာ ထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီများ ပေးအပ်ခြင်းကို တိုးချဲ့လုပ်ဆောင်ရန် လိုအပ်သည်။
ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အသစ်အရ “မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ အခြေအနေအပေါ် လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ၏ ဆက်လက်အာရုံစိုက်စေရန် တောင်းဆိုခြင်း”ဟူသည့်အချက်အား ကုလသမဂ္ဂ အထွေထွေအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်ထံ ထပ်လောင်းတောင်းဆိုထားပြီး လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီသည် ယင်း၏မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက် ၂၆၆၉ ကို ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ဒီဇင်ဘာလတွင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့ပြီးကတည်းက ယင်းအား လက်တွေ့သက်ရောက်မှုရှိစေရန် ပျက်ကွက်ခဲ့သည်။ အထွေထွေအတွင်းရေးမှူးချုပ်သည် မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ထံ လက်နက်ရောင်းချမှု၊ လွှဲပြောင်းမှု၊ လမ်းကြောင်းလွှဲမှုအပေါ် လုံးဝပိတ်ဆို့အရေးယူမှုချမှတ်ရန် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီကို အကြံပြုသင့်ပြီး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအခြေအနေကို နိုင်ငံတကာ ရာဇ၀တ်မှုတရားရုံး (ICC) သို့ လွှဲပြောင်းပေးရန်လည်း ၎င်းက အကြံပြုသင့်သည်။
လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ကို အတည်ပြုပြီးနောက် နာရီပိုင်းအကြာတွင် လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအခြေအနေနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ ကြာသပတေးနေ့တွင် နယူးယောက်၌ အဖွင့်ရှင်းလင်းပွဲ ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ သို့သော်လည်း အစည်းအ၀ေးတွင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂဆိုင်ရာ မြန်မာအမြဲတမ်းကိုယ်စားလှယ် သံအမတ်ကြီးဦးကျော်မိုးထွန်း အား မပြောဆိုရန် တားမြစ်ခဲ့သည်။ သက်ဆိုင်ရာနိုင်ငံတစ်ခု၏ အမြဲတမ်းနေကိုယ်စားလှယ်တစ်ဦးမှ ပြောဆိုပိုင်ခွင့် ကို ပိတ်ပင်ခြင်းသည် အန္တရာယ်ရှိသော သာဓကတစ်ခုအဖြစ် SAC-M မှယူဆသည်။
ထို့အပြင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်အရ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ မဟာမင်းကြီးရုံးအား ကောင်စီသို့ “လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကာကွယ်မှု၊ တာဝန်ခံမှု၊ ဒီမိုကရေစီနှင့် အရပ်သားအစိုးရတစ်ရပ် နှင့်စပ်လျဥ်းသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိ ပြည်သူများ၏ ဆန္ဒများကို ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးရေး လမ်းစဥ်”အပေါ် အစီရင်ခံရန် တောင်းဆိုထားသည်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လွတ်လပ်သော စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှု ယန္တရား (IIMM) မှ စုဆောင်းရရှိထားသည့် ကျယ်ပြောများပြားလှသော သက်သေ အထောက်အထားများကိုအသုံးပြု၍ လူမျိုးတုံးသတ်ဖြတ်မှု၊ လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများနှင့် စစ်ရာဇ၀တ်မှုများအတွက် စစ်ဘက်ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို တရားစွဲဆိုသည့် လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်ကို စတင်ရန် နည်းလမ်းများထည့်သွင်းစဥ်းစားရေးအလို့ငှာ အစီရင်ခံစာကို အသုံးချရန် SAC-M မှ မဟာမင်းကြီးအား တိုက်တွန်းလိုပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-04-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Mar 15 to 21, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Shan State, Kayin State, Kachin State, Rakhine State, and Chin State from March 15th to 21st. The head of the Prison who works under the Military threatened and tortured the political prisoners at Daik-U Prison from the Bago Region, Insein Prison from Yangon Region, Gangaw Police Station from Magway Region, and Magway Prison. Military Junta and village administrators are forcing civilians of the full age to get Military Service, blackmailing, and arresting by using various ways.
Over 60 civilians died, and over 60 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 underaged children died, and 6 were injured when the Military Junta committed abuses. The military Junta forced Rohingyas to protest the Arakan Army-AA..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
377.42 KB 365.75 KB 2.58 MB
more
Description:
"This Incident Report describes events that occurred in K’Ser Doh Township, Mergui-Tavoy District, in October 2023. On October 25th, State Administration Council (SAC) Infantry Battalion (IB) #403 arbitrarily arrested a 31-year-old male villager named Ko J--- whilst they were patrolling through his village in K’Ser Hkler area, K’Ser Doh Township. The reason for Ko J---’s arrest is unknown. Local villagers later found his dead body buried in a shallow grave in a nearby village. This incident caused insecurity and fear among villagers, causing many villagers to seek safety by fleeing to nearby villages or towns to evade potential harm.[1]..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Discrimination against the Karen - Mergui-Tavoy Human Rights Situation Reports
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
814.48 KB 579.62 KB 520.57 KB
more
Description:
"SG/SM/22167
The following statement was issued today by the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres:
The Secretary-General remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation and escalation of conflict in Myanmar. He condemns all forms of violence and reiterates his call for the protection of civilians including aid workers in accordance with international humanitarian law, for the cessation of hostilities, and humanitarian access.
The expansion of conflict in Rakhine State is driving displacement and exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities and discrimination. The Secretary-General calls on all parties to prevent further incitement of communal tensions. He is alarmed by reports of ongoing airstrikes by the military, including today in Minbya township that reportedly killed and injured many civilians. He is concerned by reports of forcible detention and recruitment of youths, including Rohingya, and the potential impact of forced conscription on human rights and on the social fabric of communities in Myanmar.
The Secretary-General calls for sustained international and regional attention to the crisis in Myanmar, including through strengthening regional refugee protection efforts and responsibility sharing with countries hosting those fleeing persecution and violence. Addressing the root causes of systemic discrimination in Myanmar and seeking accountability for serious violations of international law will be central to any lasting solution to the crisis.
The United Nations is committed to staying and delivering in Myanmar and to working with all stakeholders, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional actors, to attain sustainable peace.
For information media. Not an official record..."
Source/publisher:
UN Secretary-General
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ အနေဖြင့် တာဝန်ခံမှုအရှိန်မြှင့်ပြီး၊ ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ထူထောင်ရေးအတွက် မြန်မာလူထု၏
ကြိုးပမ်းမှုများကို ထောက်ခံအားပေးပါ။
မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက်အား အောက်တွင်ဖတ်ရှုနိုင်ပါသည်။
15 March 2024: The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council must respond to the gravity of the escalating crisis in Myanmar. It must urgently provide effective support for the Myanmar people’s efforts to establish federal democracy, including by holding the military accountable, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M team members Isabel Todd and Connor Macdonald travelled to Geneva this month to meet with UN officials, diplomats and members of Myanmar’s National Unity Government during the 55th Regular Session of the UN Human Rights Council. The Council is due to adopt a resolution on Myanmar at the end of the Session.
More than three years ago, in response to the military’s attempted coup, the Myanmar people launched a nationwide grassroots revolution to transition the country into a federal democracy. They are strengthening local revolutionary administrations and interim governance structures across the country. But the military continues to obstruct the Myanmar people’s democratic aspirations through the commission of gross human rights atrocities that amount to the most serious crimes under international law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Independent on-the-ground verification of reports of conflict-related fatalities is extremely challenging in the current Myanmar context. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), which aggregates conflict data from open-source material, at least 50,000 people have been killed in Myanmar since the launch of the military’s attempted coup in 2021, including at least 8,000 civilians. ACLED says these figures are conservative estimates. According to the UN, there are at least 2.7 million people displaced inside the country and 18.6 million people in need of aid, due to the military’s blockades on humanitarian assistance.
The military has escalated its use of violence against the population in recent weeks and months, signalling its determination to continue committing atrocities so long as it has the means to do so. The UN Human Rights Council has so far failed to respond in a manner proportionate to the gravity of the crisis. It has not acted to end the impunity that makes the atrocities possible, as many UN human rights mechanisms have stated.
SAC-M is calling on the members of the Human Rights Council to protect human rights in Myanmar far more effectively through the upcoming resolution. The Council should address accountability by identifying ways to utilise the extensive evidence collected by the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, including through the establishment of a special tribunal for Myanmar. It must call on UN member States to cease all transfers of arms and aviation fuel to the Myanmar military. It must demand that the Security Council impose compulsory arms and fuel embargoes and refer the entire Myanmar situation to the International Criminal Court for prosecutions.
Furthermore, the Human Rights Council should support the Myanmar people’s clearly expressed democratic will and aspirations by calling for strengthened international recognition of, and engagement with, the National Unity Government, National Unity Consultative Council, Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations and civil society, including on urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance.
The UN has failed the people of Myanmar to date. The Human Rights Council must lead the way in remedying that failure by taking concrete steps to end the military’s human rights violations and contribute to laying the foundations for a peaceful and just future for Myanmar.
၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ မတ်လ ၁၅ ရက်။
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် တစ်နေ့တစ်ခြား ဆိုးရွားပြင်းထန်လာနေသော ပဋိပက္ခ၏ အခြေအနေကို ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက တုံ့ပြန်အရေးယူရမည်ဖြ်ပါသည်။ စစ်တပ်အား ၎င်းတို့ကျူးလွန်ခဲ့သော ပြစ်မှု များကို တာဝန်ခံစေမှုအပါအဝင် ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီစနစ် ထူထောင်ရန် မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ကြိုးပမ်းအားထုတ်မှုများကို ထိရောက်သော ပံ့ပိုးကူညီမှုများ စောလျင်စွာ ပေးအပ်ရမည်ဟု မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူး အကြံပေးကောင်စီ (SAC-M) မှ ပြောကြားလိုက်ပါသည်။
SAC-M အဖွဲ့မှ အဖွဲ့ဝင် Isabel Todd နှင့် Connor Macdonald တို့က လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ၏၅၅ ကြိမ်မြောက်၊ ပုံမှန်အစည်းအဝေးတွင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂမှ တာဝန်ရှိသူများ၊ သံတမန်များ၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အစိုးရအဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံရန် ယခုလအတွင်း ဂျီနီဗာသို့ သွားရောက်ခဲ့သည်။ ကောင်စီသည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်တစ်ရပ်ကို အစည်းအဝေးအပြီးတွင် ချမှတ်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။
လွန်ခဲ့သည့် သုံးနှစ်ကျော်ကာလအတွင်း စစ်တပ်၏ အာဏာသိမ်းရန် ကြိုးပမ်းမှုကို တုံ့ပြန်သည့်အနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူ များက တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံးအနှံ့ အောက်ခြေလူထုတော်လှန်ရေးမှသည် ဖက်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီနိုင်ငံသို့ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းလိုသည့် တော်လှန်ရေးကို ဆင်နွှဲခဲ့ကြသည်။ ၎င်းတို့သည် နိုင်ငံတဝှမ်းရှိ ခုံတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များ၏ ဒေသန္တရအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးနှင့် ကြားဖြတ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဖွဲ့စည်းပုံများကို အားကောင်းလာအောင် လုပ်ဆောင်နေကြသည်။ သို့ရာတွင် စစ်ရာဇဝတ်မှုများနှင့် လူသားမျိုးနွယ်အပေါ် ကျူးလွန်သည့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုများ အပါအဝင် နိုင်ငံတကာဥပဒေအရ အဆိုးရွားဆုံးသော ရာဇဝတ်မှုများဖြစ်သည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာ ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာမှု အဖုံဖုံကို စစ်တပ်က ကျူးလွန်နေပြီး မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ဒီမိုကရေစီ မျှော်မှန်းချက်များကို ဆက်လက်တားဆီး ပိတ်ပင်နေဆဲပင်ဖြစ်သည်။
ပဋိပက္ခနှင့်ဆက်နွယ်သော ထိခိုက်သေဆုံးမှုအစီရင်ခံစာများကို ပကတိ အခြေအနေမှန်အတိုင်း စိစစ်အတည်ပြုခြင်းသည် လက်ရှိမြန်မာနိုင်ငံအခင်းအကျင်းတွင် လွန်စွာခက်ခဲသော စိန်ခေါ်မှုဖြစ်နေဆဲပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ အများပြည်သူလက်လှမ်းမီနိုင်သော သတင်းအချက်အလက်များမှ ပဋိပက္ခဆိုင်ရာ သတင်းအချက်အလက်များကို စုစည်းနေသော ACLED အဖွဲ့ ၏ မှတ်တမ်းများအရ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် စစ်တပ်မှ အာဏာသိမ်းမှု ကြိုးစားချိန်မှ စတင်၍ အရပ်သား ၈၀၀၀ အပါအဝင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် အနည်းဆုံး လူ ၅၀,၀၀၀ ထက်မနည်း သေဆုံးခဲ့သည်။ ACLED က ယင်းအချက်အလက်များက အနိမ့်ဆုံး ခန့်မှန်းထားသော
အချက်အလက်များဖြစ်သည်ဟု ပြောဆိုထားပါသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၏ အချက်အလက်အရ နိုင်ငံအတွင်း အနည်းဆုံး လူဦးရေ ၂.၇ သန်းခန့်သည် အိုးမဲ့အိမ်မဲ့ဖြစ်နေပြီး လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုဆိုင်ရာ အကူအညီပေးရေးတွင် စစ်တပ်၏ ပိတ်ဆို့ကန့်သတ်ချက်များကြောင့် အကူအညီလိုအပ်နေသူ ၁၈.၆ သန်းခန့်ရှိနေသည်။
စစ်တပ်သည် မကြာသေးမီ ရက်သတ္တပတ်များနှင့် လများအတွင်း လူထုအပေါ် အကြမ်းဖက်မှုကို ပိုမိုကျူးလွန်လာခဲ့ပြီး ၎င်းတို့အခွင့်အရေးရသမျှကာလပတ်လုံး ရက်စက်ယုတ်မာမှုများကို ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်ရန် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ချထားကြောင်း သိသာထင်ရှားနေပါသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီသည် ပဋိပက္ခ၏ အခြေအနေကို သင့်လျော်သလို တုံ့ပြန်ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် ပျက်ကွက် နေဆဲပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီသည် ကုလသမဂ္ဂလူ့အခွင့်အရေးယန္တရားအများအပြားက ဖော်ပြထားပြီးသည့်အတိုင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်း ဆိုးရွားစွာအကြမ်းဖတ်မှုများကို ဖြစ်ပေါ်စေသည့်အချက်ဖြစ်သည့် စစ်တပ်အပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူခံရခြင်းမှ ကင်းလွတ်နေမှုကို ရပ်တန့်စေရန်လည်း မဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသေးချေ။
ယခုချမှတ်မည့် ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်ဖြင့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးများကို ပိုမိုထိရောက်စွာကာကွယ် ပေးနိုင်ရန်အတွက် SAC-M က လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များအား တောင်းဆိုသည်။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ အထူးခုံရုံးတည်ထောင်ခြင်း အပါအဝင် ကုလသမဂ္ဂ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဆိုင်ရာ လွတ်လပ်သော စုံစမ်းစစ်ဆေးမှုယန္တရားမှ စုဆောင်းရရှိထားသော အထောက်အထားများအားလုံးကို အသုံးချမည့် နည်းလမ်းများကို သတ်မှတ်ဖော်ထုတ်ခြင်းဖြင့် တာဝန်ခံစေမှုရှိစေရန် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက ကိုင်တွယ်ဖြေရှင်းရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ မြန်မာစစ်တပ်ထံသို့ လက်နက်နှင့် လေယာဉ်ဆီတင်ပို့မှုများအားလုံးကို ရပ်ဆိုင်းရန် ကုလသမဂ္ဂအဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများအား တောင်းဆိုရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ လက်နက်များနှင့် လောင်စာဆီတင်သွင်းမှုကို မဖြစ်မနေ တရားဝင် ပိတ်ပင်တားဆီးကန့်သတ်ရန်နှင့် တရားစွဲဆိုရန်အတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီသည် လုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီအား နိုင်ငံတကာရာဇဝတ်ခုံရုံးသို့ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အခြေအနေအရပ်ရပ်အား လွှဲပြောင်းပေးအပ်ရန် တောင်းဆိုရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။
ထို့အပြင် လူသားချင်းစာနာထောက်ထားမှုအကူအညီအား အရေးပေါ်ပေးအပ်ခြင်းအပါအဝင် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေး အတိုင်ပင်ခံကောင်စီ၊ တိုင်းရင်းသားတော်လှန်ရေးအဖွဲ့များနှင့် အရပ်ဘက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအား နိုင်ငံတကာမှ အသိအမှတ်ပြုမှုနှင့် စေ့စပ်ညှိနှိုင်းဆွေးနွေးမှုများ ခိုင်မာအားကောင်းစေရန် တောင်းဆိုခြင်းဖြင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီက မြန်မာပြည်သူများ၏ ရှင်းလင်းပြတ်သားနေသည့် ဒီမိုကရေစီလိုလားတောင့်တမှုနှင့် ပြင်းပြသော ဆန္ဒသဘောထား တို့အား ပံ့ပိုးကူညီသင့်ပါသည်။
ကုလသမဂ္ဂအနေဖြင့် မြန်မာပြည်သူများအတွက် ကူညီပံ့ပိုးရန် ယနေ့အထိ တိုင်အောင် ပျက်ကွက်နေဆဲပင် ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အဆိုပါ ပျက်ကွက်မှုများကို ကုစားပေးဖို့ အတွက် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကောင်စီအနေဖြင့် စစ်တပ်၏ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို အဆုံးသတ်ကာ၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းပြီး တရားမျှတသော အနာဂတ် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံဖြစ်လာစေရန် အခြေခံအုတ်မြစ်ကောင်းများချမှတ်ရာတွင် အားပေးကူညီသည့်အနေဖြင့် တိကျသောခြေလှမ်းများကို လျှောက်လှမ်းပြခြင်းဖြင့် ဦးဆောင်ဦးရွက်ပြုပေးသင့်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"This Situation Update describes events occurring in Tha Htoo (Thaton) Township, Doo Tha Htoo (Thaton) District, during the period between September 2022 and January 2023, including constant indiscriminate shelling committed by the State Administration Council (SAC) resulting in property destruction, casualties and fear. On November 10th 2022, SAC Military Training Number #9 arrested Kaw Kya Ther villagers by accusing them of being informants for the People’s Defence Force (PDF) and detained them in the camp. As a result, fighting broke out between SAC and PDF, and SAC conducted indiscriminate shelling in the area. On January 11th 2023, the SAC indiscriminately shelled mortars into Maw Lay village tract in three different instances, injuring three villagers, after a drone attack by the local PDF and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). On February 9th 2023, SAC Artillery Unit #314 fired mortars into plantations in Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, injuring another civilian. Villagers are facing livelihood insecurities as a result.[1]
Arbitrary arrest of villagers, fighting and shelling
On November 10th 2022, State Administration Council (SAC)[2] Military Training Number #9, under Light Infantry Division (LID)[3] #44, based in Ah Lan Ta Ya camp arrested Kaw Kya Ther (Htoe Bo Lin) villagers [unknown number], from Way Raw (Win Yaw) village tract[4], Tha Htoo Township, accusing them of being spies for the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[5]. The next day, on November 11th at about 8:42 pm, fighting broke out between PDF forces, combined with the local Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[6], and SAC Military Training #9 at Ah Lan Ta Ya camp, which is led by the Deputy Battalion Commander [unknown name] and Major Chit Win Thu. During the fighting, SAC shelled eight rounds of mortar into Kaw Kya Ther village, Way Raw village tract, Tha Htoo Township. Therefore, six houses owned by Kaw Kyaw Ther villagers were damaged by the mortar shells’ explosion. During the fighting, three SAC soldiers including Major Chit Win Thu were killed, PDF soldiers confiscated some ammunition from the SAC, and rescued the detained Kaw Kya Ther villagers.
Constant shelling conducted by SAC soldiers into villages
Since the 2021 coup in Burma, indiscriminate and deliberate shelling conducted by the SAC has been one of the most common attacks [against civilians] happening in Tha Htoo Township, Doo Tha Htoo District. For instance, the SAC K--- army camp, under the command of LID #44, is located in the centre of K--- village, Maw Lay village tract, Tha Htoo Township, beside the village’s main road. SAC troops usually conduct shelling in K--- village [since their camp is located in the centre, and so they shell the surroundings]. One villager from K--- village, Naw[7] H---, reported to KHRG: “I can’t even count [the number of shelling incidents]. Sometimes, they [SAC] shelled every day. […] Three months ago [around September 2022], a mortar landed on my house. And the shrapnel hit my aunt’s house too. […] They [SAC] shelled [mortars] regularly.”
Since the [2021] coup, SAC soldiers in Tha Htoo Township have conducted shelling into the villages surrounding their army camps as retaliation after being attacked by local KNLA or PDF soldiers. Other times, they [SAC soldiers] have done it [conduct shelling] when receiving information from their informants about an imminent attack by KNLA and PDF. However, sometimes the SAC has conducted shelling for unknown reasons. Some of the mortars landed on farms and plantations owned by villagers and nearby villages, such as Y--- village, P--- village, L--- village, or K--- village. Some mortars landed in the villages, beside houses, schools and monasteries. Therefore, local villagers, especially villagers who live close to the army camps, have been facing high [security] risks to their lives and fear. They have also suffered injuries and property damage and destruction. According to Naw H---, the witness from K--- village: “Sometimes [mortar shells landed] in our village, near the school, near the monastery, ... Children who attended school know best [have experienced it]. Children [in school] were scared and cried loudly. […] During a shelling [incident in 2022], young children like my nieces were only seven and nine years old. They told me: ‘Moegi [term of affection for women]! [Hearing] mortar shells’ [explosion] sound makes me feel scared. We dare not to walk on the first floor [of the school]; we stay on the ground floor under the bed. Moegi! When the school closes, pick me up, okay?’. I feel pity for the children. […] My niece is only nine years old. She is very intelligent. She said: ‘Moegi, once the shells landed nearby, and I was scared, so I cried and the teacher hugged me. [All children in] the whole school were crying.’ When I heard that, my heart Ummm [felt worried; anxious]!”
In January 2023, the army camp in K--- village was operated by SAC battalions under LID #44 and some of their soldiers were based in the monastery. On the morning of January 11th 2023, local PDF and KNLA attacked K--- army camp with a drone. As retaliation, the SAC indiscriminately shelled about five mortar rounds around K--- village area. Two of the mortar shells landed in K--- village, in the Muslim community area. The mortar shells injured two villagers, and killed two of their bulls -which cost about five million kyat [2,378 USD[8]]. It also destroyed one motorcycle, and several parts of their house. Another house was also damaged. The two victims are married and have children. Their children were safe because they were at school. The damages caused major impacts on the family’s livelihood and well-being. After the incident, their neighbours immediately took them to the local W--- clinic, under the Karen National Union (KNU)[9]-controlled territory, for medical treatment.
On the same day, from 7 pm to 11 pm, SAC battalions under LID #44 based in K--- army camp shelled three more mortar rounds in K--- village. Two mortar shells landed on a villager’s rubber plantation and one mortar shell landed beside a villager’s house. Before this shelling incident [in the evening], no armed group, either PDF or KNLA, had attacked them [the SAC] and villagers did not receive any prior warning about the shelling. Villagers do not know why the SAC indiscriminately conducted the shelling [in the evening]. The two mortar shells that landed on a rubber plantation also damaged one farm hut, including the roofing. Fortunately, the hut owner was not in the hut [during the incident] so nobody got injured or killed. At about 11 pm, another mortar shell landed beside a villager’s house in K--- village and the shrapnel injured a 52-year-old villager, named Saw[10] O---, on his thigh. The incident happened when he was visiting his friend; the house owner. He was outside of the house chatting with the house owner who was inside the house. The victim explained [to KHRG]: “When I was going [to the friend’s house], [I heard] the sound of [mortars] exploding coming from K--- [army camp] two times. […] When there were no more sounds, I went to the villager’s [his friend’s] house in the village. Soon after I spoke one or two words [with the house owner], mortar shells landed [beside me]. And the shrapnel hit me. […] As soon as I got hit, I fell down. […] My blood flowed down [he sustained heavy blood loss], so it got dark [he fainted].”
After, villagers surrounding the incident place went to help Saw O--- by providing first aid, bandaging the wound with a longyi [piece of clothing]. Villagers brought him to a monastery by motorcycle to get medical treatment from an SAC medic who is based in the monastery. The SAC medic injected some [unknown] medication and bandaged the wound. During that night, villagers could not bring him immediately to the Thaton Town hospital [run by the SAC] because of the curfew (enforced by the SAC between 6 pm to 6 am) and the risk of stepping on landmines on the way planted by armed groups. Therefore, he had to wait the whole night and then villagers took him to Thaton hospital the next morning by car. The cost was 50,000 kyat [23.78 USD] for transportation and he had to be in the hospital for eight days. The total cost was about one million kyat [475.51 USD] for medical treatment. According to the victim, Saw O---: “When we went [to the hospital] and I got the X-ray, shrapnel was visible [in the test result]. The doctor took out everything [all shrapnel]. The shrapnel was very big and very long.” When KHRG conducted the interview on January 26th 2023, Saw O--- had already been discharged from the hospital. He could not walk properly yet, so he was not able to work on his farm for his family livelihood. He still had to go to the hospital for further treatment and checks. Therefore, he struggled financially to pay the medical fees for the whole medical treatment.
On February 9th 2023, at 10:06 am, SAC Artillery Unit #314 fired 80mm mortars into the rubber plantations near I--- village, Shwe Yaung Pya village tract, Tha Htoo Township, in KNU-controlled territory. Two mortar shells landed in a rubber plantation, damaging 13 rubber trees owned by a villager named Naw A---. A 52-year-old villager named Saw B---, from I---, was minorly injured by the shrapnel on his face, near the eyebrow.
Further background reading on the situation of indiscriminate shelling in Southeast Burma can be found in the following KHRG reports:
“Taw Oo District Short Update: House burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes by the SAC in Htaw Ta Htoo Township (September to November 2023)”, March 2024 “Dooplaya District Situation Update: SAC indiscriminate shelling and healthcare and livelihood challenges (February to April 2023).”, February 2024. “Mu Traw District Situation Update: SAC air strikes, arrest of villagers, and indiscriminate shelling causing casualties, and landmine explosion, March 2022 to February 2023”, January 2024. Striking Fear: Impacts of State Administration Council (SAC) shelling on villagers' lives in Southeast Burma (January to October 2023), December 2023.
Footnotes:
[1] The present document is based on information received in December 2022 and January 2023. It was provided by a community member in Doo Tha Htoo District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG.
[2] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma/Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup.
[3] A Light Infantry Division (LID) of the Burma Army is commanded by a brigadier general and consists of ten light infantry battalions specially trained in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, search and destroy operations against ethnic insurgents. They were first incorporated into the Tatmadaw in 1966. LIDs are organised under three Tactical Operations Commands, commanded by a colonel, three battalions each and one reserve, one field artillery battalion, one armoured squadron and other support units. Each division is directly under the command of the Chief of Staff (Army).
[4] A village tract is an administrative unit of between five and 20 villages in a local area, often centred on a large village.
[5] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma/Myanmar, which then formalized the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army.
[6] The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).
[7] Naw is a S’gaw Karen female honorific title used before a person’s name.
[8] All conversion estimates for the kyat are based on the February 7th 2024 mid-market exchange rate of 1,000 kyats to USD 0.48 (taken from https://wise.com/gb/currency-converter/mmk-to-usd-rate).
[9] The Karen National Union (KNU) is the main Karen political organisation. It was established in 1947 and has been in conflict with the Burma government since 1949. The KNU wields power across large areas of Southeast Burma and has been calling for the creation of a democratic federal system since 1976. Although it signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015, relations with the government remain tense.
[10] Saw is a S’gaw Karen male honorific title used before a person’s name..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) reports, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
576.01 KB
more
Description:
"Even three years after the coup d'état on February 1, 2021, the humanitarian situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate as airstrikes and fighting continue throughout the country, killing and injuring many innocent people on a daily basis. According to the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for Myanmar announced by OCHA last December, 18.6 million people, including 6 million children, are still in need of humanitarian assistance.
Under these circumstances, the Government of Japan has continuously provided humanitarian assistance totaling more than US$109.5 million through international organizations and NGOs since immediately after the coup d'état, directly benefiting the people of Myanmar.
In response to the further increase in humanitarian assistance needs for the people of Myanmar, the Government of Japan has now decided to provide additional humanitarian assistance totaling approximately US$37 million. Specifically, through international organizations such as UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, ICRC, UN Women, and AHA Center as well as NGOs. The assistance will include medical services, improved nutrition for pregnant women and infants, water and sanitation infrastructure, access to education, food and medicine distribution, support for women victims of trafficking in persons, and support for anti-drug measures and rehabilitation. This assistance will be provided not only in Myanmar but also in neighboring Thailand.
The Government of Japan will continue to strongly urge Myanmar military to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access and will continue to provide diverse assistance so that as many people as possible can receive the support in need..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Japan
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"This Short Update describes events that occurred in Htaw Ta Htoo (Htantabin) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District during the period between September and November 2023, including house burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes. In September 2023, tensions were heightened between the State Administration Council (SAC) and local armed resistance groups in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo Township, after People’s Defence Force (PDF) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) extrajudicially killed an SAC soldier who had been sent to the area as a spy. After this killing, the SAC burned down at least 27 villagers’ houses in five different villages, shelled mortars into villages, and conducted air strikes in the area, causing three casualties. The shelling injured one villager, damaged five villagers’ houses and one shop, as well as plantations, and killed one cow. The air strikes injured two villagers and damaged a villager’s house.[1]
House burning in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract
From the second week of August 2023, combined forces of the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[2] and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)[3] increased their military activities in every village in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo (Htantabin) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District.
As reported by local villagers, Maung[4] Kyaw Htun, a soldier from State Administration Council (SAC)[5] Infantry Battalion (IB)[6] #39, was ordered by his leader to return to his parents’ village, A--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, to investigate the military activities of the KNLA and PDF there while posing as a civilian. Soldiers from the KNLA and PDF knew about this situation. On September 12th 2023, the KNLA and PDF arrested Maung Kyaw Htun whilst he was at his father’s house, took him to a place outside the village, and killed him. Maung Kyaw Htun’s family members went to SAC IB #39 army camp immediately after finding out he was killed and informed the SAC about what had happened. On September 13th 2023, at 6 am, SAC combined forces, including IB #39 which is based in Lay Maing village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, went with five military trucks and two artillery trucks to A--- village, B--- village, and C--- village, in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract.
At around 10 am on September 14th 2023, these SAC combined forces burned down four houses in B--- village. The owners of those houses are Saw[7] D---, Saw E---, Saw F--- and Saw G---. Also on this day, these SAC combined forces burned down seven houses in C--- village. The owners of those houses are Ko[8] H---, Ko I---, Ko J---, Ko K---, a daughter of Ko K---, Daw[9] L---, and Daw M---. After the SAC troops burned down villagers’ houses in these two villages, they stayed in B--- village for three days. On the third day, September 16th, at 6 am, the SAC troops retreated from the village and returned to their army camp. On the afternoon of September 16th 2023, KNLA and PDF soldiers burned down Maung Kyaw Htun’s father’s house. This contributed to increasingly heightened tensions between local armed resistance groups and SAC troops in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract.
On October 20th 2023, SAC combined forces, including IB #39, went to N--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, where they burned down three villagers’ houses. The owners of those houses are Saw O---, Saw P--- and Saw Q---.
On November 12th 2023 at 1:30 pm, the combined forces of the KNLA and PDF attacked these SAC troops using tripwire bombs in a place between A--- village and N--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, after which fighting broke out. On the evening of November 12th 2023, the SAC troops burned down nine houses in B--- village, as well as four houses in A--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. Villagers whose houses were burned down in B--- village are Saw R---, Saw S---, Saw T---, Saw U---, Maung V---, Naw[10] W---, Naw X---, Saw Y--- and Saw Z---. Villagers whose houses were burned down in A--- village are Aa---, Ko Ab---, Ko Ac--- and Ko Ad---.
The SAC combined forces that are based in Lay Maing village, including IB #39, often fired mortar shells into villages and surrounding areas where they thought the KNLA and PDF soldiers might stay, regardless of whether fighting had occurred or not. During the reporting period, the SAC also conducted air strikes in this area.
Indiscriminate shelling into Day Loh Mu Nu village tract
On October 19th 2023, at around 1 pm, the SAC combined forces, including IB #39 that is based in Lay Maing village, indiscriminately fired rounds of mortars into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract, Htaw Ta Htoo Township, Taw Oo District. These villages include A---, B---, C---, N---, Ae---, Af---, Ag---, and Ah--- villages. One of the mortar shells landed in a shop owned by U[11] Ai--- in C--- village. The mortar shell exploded, damaging the shop.
On November 17th 2023, the SAC troops indiscriminately fired mortar shells into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. One of the mortar shells landed in a farm near Ae--- village. It exploded and its shrapnel killed a cow owned by Saw Aj---. On November 19th 2023, the SAC troops again indiscriminately fired rounds of mortar into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu area. One of the mortar shells landed in a villager’s house in N--- village. It exploded and damaged the roof of the house owned by Ak---. Shrapnel from the mortar shells also hit other three houses nearby, damaging them.
On November 27th 2023, the SAC troops indiscriminately fired rounds of mortar into villages in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. One of the mortar shells landed in a rubber plantation owned by a villager near Af--- village. It exploded and damaged the rubber plantation. There were no casualties [caused by the shelling] in this village.
Also on November 27th 2023, at 9:04 pm, the SAC combined forces based in Lay Maing army camp and Kon Nit Maing (Seven Miles) army camp, indiscriminately fired rounds of mortars into Ag--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. The mortar shells exploded in a rubber plantation owned by a villager, damaging it. Shrapnel from the mortar explosion hit a house owned by a 34-year-old female villager, Naw Al---. She was also hit by the mortar shrapnel, sustaining injuries to her elbow.
Air strikes in Day Loh Mu Nu village tract
On November 27th 2023, at 3:17 pm, the SAC conducted an air strike in Ah--- village, Day Loh Mu Nu village tract. The air strike injured two villagers, one of whom was seriously injured. A villager’s house was also damaged by the air strike.
Further background reading on the situation on house burning, indiscriminate shelling and air strikes in Taw Oo District, Southeast Burma, be found in the following KHRG reports:
“Taw Oo District Situation Update: Fighting, shelling, and house burning in Thandaung Town, and air strikes in Htaw Ta Htoo Township (January to July 2023)”, January 2024
Striking Fear: Impacts of State Administration Council (SAC) shelling on villagers’ lives in Southeast Burma (January to October 2023), December 2023.
“Taw Oo District Incident Report: Killings, property destruction, and indiscriminate shelling by the SAC in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township (July 2023)”, November 2023.
“Taw Oo District Short Update: Air strikes, displacement and property damage in Daw Hpa Hkoh Township, July 2023”, August 2023.
Burning Karen State: Retaliatory burning of houses and property against rural civilian communities of Southeast Burma (2021 and 2022), March 2023.
Footnotes:
[1] The present document is based on information received in November and December 2023. It was provided by a community member in Taw Oo District who has been trained by KHRG to monitor human rights conditions on the ground. The names of the victims, their photos and the exact locations are censored for security reasons. The parts in square brackets are explanations added by KHRG.
[2] The People’s Defence Force (PDF) is an armed resistance established independently as local civilian militias operating across the country. Following the February 1st 2021 military coup and the ongoing brutal violence enacted by the junta, the majority of these groups began working with the National Unity Government (NUG), a body claiming to be the legitimate government of Burma (Myanmar), which then formalised the PDF on May 5th 2021 as a precursor to a federal army.
[3] The Karen National Liberation Army is the armed (KNLA) wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).
[4] ‘Maung’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[5] The State Administration Council (SAC) is the executive governing body created in the aftermath of the February 1st 2021 military coup. It was established by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 2nd 2021, and is composed of eight military officers and eight civilians. The chairperson serves as the de facto head of government of Burma/Myanmar and leads the Military Cabinet of Myanmar, the executive branch of the government. Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of SAC chairperson following the coup.
[6] An Infantry Battalion (IB) comprises 500 soldiers. However, most Infantry Battalions in the Tatmadaw are under-strength with less than 200 soldiers. Yet up to date information regarding the size of battalions is hard to come by, particularly following the signing of the NCA. They are primarily used for garrison duty but are sometimes used in offensive operations.
[7] ‘Saw’ is a S’gaw Karen male honorific title used before a person’s name.
[8] ‘Ko’ is a Burmese title meaning older brother. It can be used for relatives as well as non-relatives.
[9] ‘Daw’ is a Burmese female honorific title used before a person’s name.
[10] ‘Naw’ is a S’gaw Karen female honorific title used before a person’s name.
[11] ‘U’ is a Burmese male honorific title used before a person’s name..."
Source/publisher:
Karen Human Rights Group
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Discrimination against the Karen
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.9 MB
more
Description:
"This week, in Melbourne, the Australian government for the second time is hosting leaders for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Australia Special Summit.
It's been six years since the last summit on Australian soil.
While many countries in the region have seen economic growth during that time, repression and democratic backsliding has also been growing. The rights of people across the region are being trampled or ignored. The summit is an opportunity to put those issues, and the rights of south-east Asian people, front and center.
In 2018, Aung San Suu Kyi represented the government of Myanmar at the summit. Since then, the military has ousted the civilian-led government and has drawn the country into a spiraling human rights and humanitarian crisis.
The military has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity - Aung San Suu Kyi is among the tens of thousands arbitrarily detained. She is serving 27 years in prison under a slew of fabricated charges.
Six years ago, Hun Sen was Cambodia's leader posing for selfies at Sydney Harbor and brazenly threatening Cambodians who dared to protest that he would "beat them." Now his son Hun Manet is leader.
As Human Rights Watch has documented, physical assaults of opposition members have continued. The opposition leader Kem Sokha is serving a 27-year sentence confined to his home, and the main opposition party was banned from contesting the sham 2023 elections.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited last time and will attend the summit again, but his term is ending. Indonesia's democratic institutions meant to provide a check on power such as the Constitutional Court and Anti-Corruption Commission have been eroded, with a return to dynastic patronage politics.
His likely successor is currently the defence minister, Prabowo Subianto - implicated in massacres in East Timor in 1983, and the 1997-1998 kidnappings of activists in Java that led to his dismissal from the army.
The lesson is that when there is no proper accountability following a truth commission as in Timor-Leste, even notorious human rights abusers can go on to hold political power. Prabowo has the support of Widodo, who paired his son Gibran Raka to be Prabowo's vice-president.
Then-Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte skipped the last summit. Now it's Ferdinand Marcos jnr son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos. His son is desperate to rehabilitate the family name and is being feted by Western leaders from Washington to Canberra.
While the Australian government may be relieved to have a non-volatile pro-West partner in Malacaang Palace, the summary killings of drug suspects still occur regularly because of the lack of accountability for police violence.
The government refuses to co-operate with the International Criminal Court's investigation into the "drug war" killings, and killings of leftist activists and trade unionists continue, fueled by the authorities' practice of "red-tagging" them as "communists."
Thailand's then-Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha, who seized power in a 2014 military coup, attended the last summit. As in Myanmar, Thai generals had the foresight to shore up their continued domination of the political process through a constitutional and legal framework that enabled the military to determine who became prime minister.
So when the reformist Move Forward Party resoundingly won the most votes in the May 2023 election, entrenched interests had ways to prevent them from assuming power. Now Thailand is ruled by Srettha Thaivisin, a former businessman from the Pheu Thai party, while the former exiled prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra is back home, on parole and holding court for ruling party politicians.
Malaysia's leader in attendance is Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who doggedly won the last election after years of trumped-up charges against him. As Anwar struggles to hold together a fragile coalition of parties, many of his promises for reform have gone unmet.
Vietnam and Laos both remain Communist Party states that don't even pretend to hold independent elections. Laos is chairing ASEAN this year. Vietnam is enjoying attention from Western capitals and companies looking to "de-risk" from China. Meanwhile, its crackdowns have intensified against activists, including environmental defenders.
This regional backsliding on democracy and human rights should be of immense concern to the Australian government and Australians. The government is rightly worried about the Chinese government's growing influence in the region. Across south-east Asia, Chinese companies as part of China's mass surveillance infrastructure are building "smart" city systems that collect massive amount of personal and other data without oversight.
Beijing is actively seeking to shore up support for votes from governments in the region to evade accountability at the United Nations and in the global arena.
And it is pressing south-east Asian governments to return dissidents and ethnic Uyghurs, sending a stark reminder to Chinese nationals that even if they have left the mainland, they are not truly safe.
Instead of taking bold steps to defend democracy and human rights, Australia and other democratic governments have shown less willingness to hold human rights abusers responsible if those abusers are strategic allies, trade partners in "de-risking," or otherwise considered helpful in containing China.
The approach is deemed "pragmatic" but involves passively monitoring the decline of human rights and democracy across the region or raising matters privately, where there is little chance of impact.
Meanwhile, civil society activists, government critics and journalists are facing intimidation, threats, harassment, and in some cases physical attacks.
ASEAN has proven woefully inadequate in addressing regional human rights crises - most starkly evident with its impotent and ineffectual response to atrocities in Myanmar.
This is hardly likely to improve now that Laos is the chair. Australia should use this summit to press for meaningful co-ordinated action on Myanmar.
Australia is right to forge greater trade and security ties and strengthen its relationships in the region.
But those ties alone will not be enough to stop the authoritarian slide. In its capacity as summit host, the Australian government can direct conversations with a human rights focus.
It can encourage openness by acknowledging the deficiencies in its domestic rights record.
This forthright approach will send the message that strong diplomatic relations still thrive without condoning or covering up each other's human rights concerns..."
Source/publisher:
The Canberra Times via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Crimes Against Humanity, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"On 1 March 2024, H.E. Mr. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, participated in the Interactive Dialogue on High Commissioner’s Oral Update on Myanmar during the 55th Session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva, Switzerland.
On this occasion, Ms. Usana Berananda, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations Office at Geneva, delivered a statement by Thailand, stating that as an immediate neighbour, Thailand is deeply concerned about the current situation in Myanmar, especially the plight of people in the country. For this reason, Thailand has undertaken the initiative to upscale humanitarian assistance along the Thai - Myanmar border to support the implementation of the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus.
In addition, Thailand hoped that ASEAN, neighbouring countries, and external partners would seek to build on this initiative by encouraging all parties to work towards dialogue, reconciliation, and a return to democracy, with a goal to achieve a peaceful, stable, and unified Myanmar where human rights of the Myanmar people are fully respected.
On the same day, VFM also met with H.E. Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations in Geneva to share Thailand’s visions in enhancing the effectiveness of HRC, especially in emergency situations. VFM reaffirmed Thailand’s readiness to work with all countries and stakeholders to advance the work of the HRC..."
Source/publisher:
Government of Thailand
Date of entry/update:
2024-03-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Albanese, Southeast Asian Leaders Should Address Myanmar, Other Regional Crises
Description:
"Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should focus on human rights concerns and democratic backsliding at the upcoming summit with Southeast Asian leaders.
Human rights conditions have worsened in ASEAN countries in recent years, and ASEAN as an organization has done little to address key crises among its members.
Key concerns include the need for stronger sanctions against Myanmar and ending attacks on dissidents in Cambodia and Vietnam, and security forces’ targeting of activists in the Philippines.
(Sydney) – Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese should focus on human rights concerns and democratic backsliding at the upcoming summit with Southeast Asian leaders, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Albanese will host leaders from nine of the countries making up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit on March 4 to 6, 2024, in Melbourne.
The 60-page report, “Human Rights in Southeast Asia,” summarizes critical human rights issues that Albanese should raise at the summit. Human Rights Watch urged the Australian government to put its values as a rights-respecting democracy at the core of its relations with ASEAN countries. As the Australian government approaches the summit with the goal of removing blockages to regional economic cooperation, it should not bypass human rights concerns in the hopes that they will resolve themselves, because they will not.
“This high-level meeting would be a lost opportunity for Australia and the people of ASEAN countries if the Australian government were to gloss over human rights issues,” said Daniela Gavshon, Australia director at Human Rights Watch. “The Australian government should send the message that human rights violations are a key foreign policy concern.”
It will be especially important for Australia to guide discussion toward human rights since the subject has been left off the summit agenda.
The summit marks 50 years of ASEAN-Australia dialogue relations. Over the past five decades, successive Australian governments have pursued closer economic, security, and political partnerships with ASEAN countries. Australia continues to strengthen its ties with Southeast Asian countries to offset the shift in global power dynamics.
United States influence in the region is being challenged by the growing political, economic, and military clout of a more assertive China. To counter China’s threat to human rights and the rules-based international order, Australia should center its dialogue with ASEAN leaders on the rights of Southeast Asian people rather than just on strengthening friendly relations.
The anniversary presents a unique opportunity to reflect on human rights in the region and to reframe the next 50 years of Australia-ASEAN cooperation. Albanese has already projected the next half-century to be “even more successful than the last” for ASEAN-Australia relations, and pledged A$95.4 million (US$63.9 million) to kick-start Australia’s Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040.
In a February letter, Human Rights Watch urged Prime Minister Albanese to press for commitments from individual countries at the summit, and raise specific human rights issues with individual governments.
“Human rights conditions have worsened in ASEAN countries in recent years and ASEAN as an organization has done little to address key crises among its members,” Gavshon said. “Australia’s failure to directly address human rights concerns at the summit would be a propaganda coup for abusive leaders, and it will embolden new ASEAN leaders to continue the human rights abusing legacies of their predecessors.”
In its most serious human rights lapse, ASEAN has not dealt with the spiralling humanitarian and human rights crisis in Myanmar. The consequences have spilled over the borders of Thailand, India, and China, and contributed to the continued suffering of ethnic Rohingya who have fled to Bangladesh. Tens of thousands have sought safety in neighboring countries since the 2021 coup by the Myanmar military. In addition, Rohingya who fled crimes against humanity and acts of genocide in 2017 cannot return. Given increasing insecurity and deteriorating conditions in the camps housing one million Rohingya in Bangladesh, 4,500 made the high-risk sea voyage to Indonesia or Malaysia in 2023, according to the United Nations refugee agency.
ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus – which Myanmar’s junta repudiated days after agreeing to it in April 2021 – is not a viable framework for dealing with a military that continues to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes. Australian and ASEAN governments should agree to enforce sanctions against Myanmar, including those newly imposed by Australia on banks and jet fuel suppliers, in their own jurisdictions. Together, Albanese and Southeast Asian leaders should commit to strengthening multilateral action at the UN Security Council.
Among other key rights issues to be addressed is the Thai and Cambodian governments’ cooperation to uncover, intimidate, and arrest Cambodian civil society activists in Thailand. In Vietnam, the government systematically suppresses freedom of expression and other basic liberties. In the Philippines, the security forces target activists, rights defenders, and journalists, often with deadly results.
State-sponsored discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia remains pervasive. On an institutional level, ASEAN purports to respect the human rights of its 685 million citizens. However, its Human Rights Declaration and ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) have no real impact.
In its capacity as summit host, the Australian government can direct conversations with a human rights focus. It can encourage openness by acknowledging the deficiencies in its own domestic rights record. This forthright approach will send the message that strong diplomatic relations still thrive without condoning or covering up allies’ human rights concerns, Human Rights Watch said.
“The 50th anniversary of ASEAN-Australia dialogue relations marked at this summit could be a turning point,” Gavshon said. “Looking forward to 2040, the region will face environmental challenges, economic uncertainty, and strategic competition, but these challenges can be lessened if governments show respect for human rights and democracy.”..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-28
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, ASEAN-Burma relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"A deadly stampede outside a passport office that took two lives and unending lines outside embassies - these are just some examples of what has been happening in Myanmar since the announcement of mandatory conscription into the military.
Myanmar's military government is facing increasingly effective opposition to its rule and has lost large areas of the country to armed resistance groups.
On 1 February 2021, the military seized power in a coup, jailing elected leaders and plunging much of the country into a bloody civil war that continues today.
Thousands have been killed and the UN estimates that around 2.6 million people been displaced.
Young Burmese, many of whom have played a leading role protesting and resisting the junta, are now told they will have to fight for the regime.
Many believe that this is a result of the setbacks suffered by the military in recent months, with anti-government groups uniting to defeat them in some key areas.
"It is nonsense to have to serve in the military at this time, because we are not fighting foreign invaders. We are fighting each other. If we serve in the military, we will be contributing to their atrocities," Robert, a 24-year-old activist, told the BBC.
Many of them are seeking to leave the country instead.
"I arrived at 03:30 [20:30 GMT] and there were already about 40 people queuing for the tokens to apply for their visa," recalled a teenage girl who was part of a massive crowd outside the Thai embassy in Yangon earlier in February. Within an hour, the crowd in front of the embassy expanded to more than 300 people, she claims.
"I was scared that if I waited any longer, the embassy would suspend the processing of visas amid the chaos," she told the BBC, adding that some people had to wait for three days before even getting a queue number.
In Mandalay, where the two deaths occurred outside the passport office, the BBC was told that there were also serious injuries - one person broke their leg after falling into a drain while another broke their teeth. Six others reported breathing difficulties.
Justine Chambers, a Myanmar researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies, says mandatory conscription is a way of removing young civilians leading the revolution.
"We can analyse how the conscription law is a sign of the Myanmar military's weakness, but it is ultimately aimed at destroying lives... Some will manage to escape, but many will become human shields against their compatriots," she said.
Myanmar's conscription law was first introduced in 2010 but had not been enforced until on 10 February the junta said it would mandate at least two years of military service for all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27.
Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun, the spokesperson for the military government, said in a statement that about a quarter of the country's 56 million population were eligible for military service under the law.
The regime later said it did not plan to include women in the conscript pool "at present" but did not specify what that meant.
The government spokesperson told BBC Burmese that call-ups would start after the Thingyan festival marking the Burmese New Year in mid-April, with an initial batch of 5,000 recruits.
The regime's announcement has dealt yet another blow to Myanmar's young people.
Many had their education disrupted by the coup, which came on top of school closures at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic.
In 2021, the junta suspended 145,000 teachers and university staff over their support for the opposition, according to the Myanmar Teachers' Federation, and some schools in opposition-held areas have been destroyed by the fighting or by air strikes.
Then there are those who have fled across borders seeking refuge, among them young people looking for jobs to support their families.
Young Burmese confront dashed dreams in exile
Why India wants to fence its troubled Myanmar border
In response to the conscription law, some have said on social media that they would enter the monkhood or get married early to dodge military service.
The junta says permanent exemptions will be given to members of religious orders, married women, people with disabilities, those assessed to be unfit for military service and "those who are exempted by the conscription board". For everyone else, evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine.
But Robert doubts the regime will honour these exemptions. "The junta can arrest and abduct anyone they want. There is no rule of law and they do not have to be accountable to anyone," he said.
Wealthier families are considering moving their families abroad - Thailand and Singapore being popular options, but some are even looking as far afield as Iceland - with the hope that their children would get permanent residency or citizenship there by the time they are of conscription age.
Others have instead joined the resistance forces, said Aung Sett, from the All Burma Federation of Student Unions, which has a long history of fighting military rule.
"When I heard the news that I would have to serve in the military, I felt really disappointed and at the same time devastated for the people, especially for those who are young like me. Many young people have now registered themselves to fight against the junta," the 23-year-old told the BBC from exile.
Some observers say the enforcement of the law now reveals the junta's diminishing grip on the country.
Last October, the regime suffered its most serious setback since the coup. An alliance of ethnic insurgents overran dozens of military outposts along the border with India and China. It has also lost large areas of territory to insurgents along the Bangladesh and Indian borders.
According to the National Unity Government, which calls itself Myanmar's government in exile, more than 60% of Myanmar's territory is now under the control of resistance forces.
"By initiating forced conscription following a series of devastating and humiliating defeats to ethnic armed organisations, the military is publicly demonstrating just how desperate it has become," said Jason Tower, country director for the Burma programme at the United States' Institute of Peace.
A turning point in Myanmar as army suffers big losses
Who are the rulers who executed Myanmar activists?
Mr Tower expects the move to fail because of growing resentment against the junta.
"Many youth dodging conscription will have no choice but to escape into neighbouring countries, intensifying regional humanitarian and refugee crises. This could result in frustration growing in Thailand, India, China and Bangladesh, all of which could tilt away from what remains of their support for the junta," he said.
Even if the military does manage to increase troop numbers by force, this will do little to address collapsing morale in the ranks. It will also take months to train up the new troops, he said.
The junta had a long history of "forced recruitment" even before the law was enacted, said Ye Myo Hein, a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
"So the law may merely serve as a facade for forcibly conscripting new recruits into the military. With a severe shortage of manpower, there is no time to wait for the lengthy and gradual process of recruiting new soldiers, prompting [officials] to exploit the law to swiftly coerce people into service," he said.
Even for those who will manage to escape, many will carry injuries and emotional pain for the rest of their lives.
"It has been really difficult for young people in Myanmar, both physically and mentally. We've lost our dreams, our hopes and our youth. It just can't be the same like before," said Aung Sett, the student leader.
"These three years have gone away like nothing. We've lost our friends and colleagues during the fight against the junta and many families have lost their loved ones. It has been a nightmare for this country. We are witnessing the atrocities committed by the junta on a daily basis. I just can't express it in words."..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-27
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
In Part 2 of a 2-part series, Bobby Anderson considers the strengths and weaknesses of Myanmar’s military and its chances of collapse.
Description:
"The Resistance
Let’s start with the difference between an Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) and a People’s Defense Force (PDF). Put simply and broadly, a PDF does not seek autonomy within the State, while autonomy within a federal state (but no longer succession) is a key demand of most EAOs.[1] PDFs were created in response to the 2021 coup, while EAOs uniformly pre-dated it. Some but not all PDFs are connected to the NUG, although the term PDF also includes Local Defense Forces (LDFs), which are autonomous.
Taking PDFs and EAOs as a whole, Andrew Selth estimates ‘up to 250 loosely organised local defence groups, urban resistance cells and EAOs… there could be about 25,000 active members of the various militias and resistance groups, and a further 30,000-35,000 in the relevant EAOs.’ This and other claims arrive with the caveat that no one has an accurate macro-level tally: local organizations are the only ones likely to have accurate estimates, but those too would be limited and area-specific data, which is constantly shifting. Therefore, any tally is out-of-date soon after it occurs.
Ethnic Armed Organizations
Regarding EAOs, in 2018, I wrote about the failure of the deposed civilian government’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, and that relates to Selth’s key use of the word relevant. His count of 30,000-35,000 EAO troops discounts EAOs not currently at war with the junta, most through ceasefires – a situation that predates the current junta’s seizure of power. Let’s briefly consider EAO numbers as a whole, because those with ceasefires still represent potential combatants. The sit-tat’s aforementioned manner of signing and breaking ceasefires is a deadly game, and EAO’s with current ceasefires know that they are not durable. Estimates of pre- and post-coup EAO numbers (i.e. not PDFs) are represented in the table below:
* includes reserves.
** indicates no known or significant change from pre-coup numbers
Since the coup, we can only note that EAO numbers have increased. If Ye Myo Hein’s estimates are correct, there is at least a parity between EAO numbers overall and the sit-tat’s human resource capacity. Prior to the October 27 offensive, the disorganization of the resistance was what in part held back faster territorial acquisition and greater sit-tat attrition. The sit-tat, in many ways inept, at least acknowledges the stark fact that it can’t fight the strongest EAOs, and so it continued to play the aforementioned game of musical chair ceasefires. The momentum building against the sit-tat makes this option less attractive for EAOs.
Back to Selth’s ‘relevant,’ select EAOs falling under the China-backed Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC), deserve particular mention. The FPNCC is a negotiating block created and led by the United Wa State Party (UWSP), which formed out of the remnants of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989. The UWSP for its part has been built by China into the largest, best armed, and most cohesive EAO in the country, and perhaps after the now-defunct Wagner Group and the thoroughly desiccated Islamic State, is now the largest non-state armed group on the Asian continent.
The Three Brotherhood’s AA, MNDAA, and TNLA are under the FPNCC umbrella, as are the National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla), and the Shan State Army North (linked to the Shan State Progress Party). Unlike many an EAO alliance, the FPNCC proved more durable, and at present it contains the absolute majority of EAO fighters countrywide.
The Chin National Front’s (CNF) armed forces are allied with several newly formed Chinland Defense Forces – which are PDF groups based in Chin State. Their exponential post-coup growth is noteworthy and harken back to the CNF’s bloody and unexpected arrival on the resistance scene in the mid-1990s after they were trained and armed by the KIA.
An outlier in the EAO continuum is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Other Rohingya groups, such as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, and other EAOs, regard it as a terrorist organization, with links to other Jihadist groups worldwide, although ARSA denies this. ARSA have also been implicated in massacres in Rakhine. They are mostly involved in intra-Rohingya political struggles in the refugee camps in Bangladesh and are more actively engaged in killing Rohingya alternates to their authority there, and occasional Bangladeshi security officials, than killing sit-tat in Rakhine. Rohingya people, as far as the author is aware, have no representation in PDFs, nor are they part of any resistance not wholly concerned with their own specific ethno-religious-territorial concerns. This is despite some outreach on the part of NUG to build bridges with Rohingya, firstly by actually using the word ‘Rohingya’, in contrast to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, who only referred to them as Bengalis in order to cement the claim that they were recent migrants from Bangladesh. NUG has since acknowledged the violence they were subjected to by the sit-tat, but has hardly acknowledged the structural violence adhered to by the NLD against them. And so NUG’s claims – that it would provide justice, repatriation, and reparation for Rohingya – are yet to be tested.
People’s Defense Forces
The most recent PDFs in Myanmar began forming and arming immediately after the 2021 Military coup. However, they have a long and potted history in Myanmar, explained by Jasnea Sarma at the University of Zurich as follows:
In the past too there used to be such groups. They went by different names like Swan Ar Shin စွမ်းအားရှင်, ပြည်သူ့တဝန် or civilian task force, ရွာတာဝန်ပြည်သူ့စွမ်းအားရှင် or village task force etc) . These groups were driven by self-defence and formed often as a response to circumstance, namely local protection from threats. The post-coup PDFs, often referred to as ပြည်သူ့ကာကွယ်ရေးတပ်မတော် or ပြည်သူ့တပ်မတော်, are a direct response to the coup, all fighting the sit tat, but they do mimic the workings of these older groups. This explains in-part why it’s difficult to clearly understand which PDF is aligned with which group. They are not necessarily always linked to previously elected representatives, although many are. Not all PDFs are tied to NUG. Many are now allied with EAOs, some are standalone, with occasional alliances of convenience. There are many composed mainly of armed university students assisted by EAOs. Some also have church affiliations. What’s important is that they have arms and can maintain a defensive posture and have been extremely important and effective after the 2021 coup. History tells us that if anything, they will keep forming in (and around) Burma, adapting to the needs.
Jasnea Sarma
PDFs have been able to mount effective resistance across Bamar areas and have been able to recruit a significant number of fighters, including former soldiers and police officers; as mentioned, many Bamar youth in Sagaing and Magwe who might have joined the sit-tat are in PDFs instead. They have also received weapons from abroad, although most of their firearms originate from actions against the sit-tat or from select EAOs. Local manufacture of firearms also occurs, but the artisanal nature of these operations not only limits their impact, but poses danger to both manufacturer and shooter. Civilian drone conversion is another factor. Regarding numbers, NUG claims 50-100,000 fighters in 259 trained PDF battalions and 401 LDFs. The formal size of a PDF battalion is 200 personnel, but some are up to 500. Hein estimates that PDF personnel numbered 40,000 as of February 2022, with no less than 30,000 LDF personnel. These PDFs are concentrated in the Anyar theatre of Sagaing, Magwe, and Mandalay, where there are at least 15,000 PDF and 20,000 LDF combatants.
As of November 2022, independent observers speaking with Ye Myo Hein estimated that 30 percent of PDFs/LDFs fell under the command of NUG, 40 percent had some links to NUG, while 30 percent were wholly independent. At the local level, it’s likely that all PDFs have more authority than local NUG representation. They’re armed, after all. However, some PDFs are under the control of NUG (which raised $44 million for its defense ministry alone in its first 14 months), with a clearer integration between the two, rather than the diffuse and grassroots nature of many other PDFs which resemble the franchise nature of many an insurgency.
However, the PDFs face deep challenges, including a lack of coordinated leadership, limited support from the international community, and even the populations of some areas they control, due to the predatory behavior of select groups. Limited resources are worth highlighting: Min Zaw Oo from the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security estimated to Deutsche Welle that at the beginning of 2022, only 10 percent of PDFs had automatic weapons, although they are now generally better armed. Despite this, we have evidence of local support, of retention in numbers, of the capacity of fighters, all found in the sit-tat body count the PDFs are responsible for.
Overall, the balance of personnel favors the armed resistance.
Credibility Issues
The support EAOs might give to PDFs in particular and the NUG in general is constrained by the lack of credibility the deposed civilian government had with some EAOs. AA chief General Twan Mrat Naing summarized it well: “the NLD government after 1988 promised federalism and they pledged this to the ethnic people, but after they came to power, they didn’t keep the promise. So we have learned the lesson and we are not naive anymore.” The past relationships of many EAOs with the deposed civilian government surely shapes EAO relations with the NUG and PDFs and this issue will come to the forefront in any NUG-EAO victory. Promises of federalism will not be taken at face value.
International Support for the Sit-tat
Since the coup, elements of the “international community” have imposed sanctions on the sit-tat and affiliated individuals. The countries and institutions most in support of NUG are peripheral in comparison to the countries which maintain pragmatic relations with the sit-tat. Who cares about Switzerland when you’ve got China? While, as mentioned, sanctions may bite because of the predominance of the US dollar, this is not an insurmountable issue for either the junta or allies who seek alternates to said dollar.
China and Russia protect the sit-tat from United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) resolutions, and both can offer the veil of legitimacy to any staged elections. India and other Myanmar neighbors must keep their options open with a state they must trade with and absorb refugees from.
China
In 2004 the sit-tat began reaching out to “the west”, which was seen as a hedge against China’s hegemony in the region. The situation is now an inverse of the one which led to the removal of Khin Nyunt and his China clique two decades ago. China’s support is crucial to the sit-tat’s survival. However, China’s nuanced approach to the Three Brotherhood Alliance reflects both a loss of patience and a hedging of bets.
Since the February 2021 coup, China has justified engagement with the sit-tat to both support stability and ensure bilateral relations, although a recent USIP report showed how, with regard to stability, the opposite is occurring, with negative implications for China. China also cites principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Implicitly, Myanmar is firmly within China’s sphere of influence. The notion of a ‘sphere of influence’ was once imagined to be terminally ill by liberal internationalists, but it is both healthy and real, and extends to China’s drug control policy as well as its vaunted Belt and Road Initiative, which binds Myanmar and her eastern neighbors to China, economically and infrastructurally. The bond already exists culturally, in Yunnan in particular.
China is Myanmar’s predominant economic partner, much to India’s consternation (see below), and has invested heavily in Myanmar’s energy sector, infrastructure development, and natural resource extraction, providing a much-needed source of economic support for the country, both under the civilian government and the latest junta. Myanmar, however, has a considerable amount of authority in the relationship. Key Chinese investments include the Kyaukphyu deep sea port, power plant, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which will connect Kyaukphyu and Yunnan via pipeline and reduce China’s reliance on fuel shipments through the Straits of Malacca; the Mee Lin Gyaing natural gas power plant in Ayeyarwady; and numerous others. This is imperial thinking of a scale not comprehensible to many a government, especially ones who only see foreign relations through the prism of their own domestic elections, and still others who automatically discount the effectiveness of state-controlled enterprises in favor of the sacraments of a ‘free market’.
This relationship has not always been so smooth. Myanmar and China cooperated in the subjugation of Chinese Nationalist Guomindang (GMD) forces which had fled Yunnan and established themselves in Shan in the late 1940s, with a delusion that they would one day re-invade with the support of the CIA. Those wash-outs were a theoretical threat to the China’s ruling communists, entirely overblown. The dregs of the GMD in Shan, unlike the sit-tat, was an institution entirely hollowed out by corruption, and was generally only interested in making money. China-Myanmar cooperation was, at the time, an aberration. During the Cold War, Myanmar considered China both rival and threat. After the dictator Ne Win’s expulsion of large numbers of ethnic Chinese in the late 1960s, China increased support to Communist Party of Buma (CPB) forces in Bago Yoma, just north of Yangon, while Red Guard ‘volunteers’ supporting the CPB invaded Northern Shan in 1968. Reconciliation began after the death of Mao and Deng Xiaoping’s emergence as China’s paramount leader in the late 1970s. The CPB’s vocal support for the ’Gang of Four’, a faction of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials whom Deng had purged, led Deng’s support to the CPB to decline. The removal of the sit-tat’s ‘China clique’ in 2004 did not end Chinese overtures and investments, although the derailing of the Myitsone dam project in 2011 was a further hiccup in the relationship. Since the coup, China has not only blocked efforts to impose sanctions on Myanmar but has increased its own investments.
Even before the recent offensive, China hedged its bets vis a vis the sit-tat, and the civilian government they deposed, with EAOs, though the FPNCC; a coalition of EAOs that were by and large excluded from peace process before the coup. China’s facilitation with these EAOs led to ceasefires which allowed the overextended sit-tat to reallocate overextended forces elsewhere. China also froze out the western powers that sought to engage FPNCC, leaving those westerners – “conflict” and “peacebuilding” experts and the like – to content themselves with NCA signatories, the KNU and NMSP especially. China’s relations with FPNCC members continued after the latest offensive; indeed, it is likely that the Three Brotherhood Alliance alerted China of its intentions in advance. China’s continued subtle approach toward both the sit-tat and the alliance reflects their stated policy of non-interference, but it also likely reflects a loss of patience in the sit-tat’s sheltering of the operations of ethnic Chinese criminal gangs in Shan and elsewhere. The October 27 Offensive has resulted in the capture and extradition of numerous of these criminals to China, and China has also mediated temporary ceasefires between the warring parties which will likely peter out soon due to the sit-tat’s incorrigible belief in its own battlefield genius, despite all evidence to the contrary.
China also extends the occasional fig leaf to NUG, while explicitly stating their displeasure at the NUG’s continued relations with Western powers. This seems mostly for show. NUG, for its part, has issued a policy paper on China which includes support for the ‘One China’ policy. If NUG were to emerge victorious in the struggle against the sit-tat, China would find itself temporarily sidelined, because despite its insistence on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, its dealings with the current sit-tat is implicitly a bet on its success. However, this sidelining would be temporary. China simply has too much authority—economic, political, and otherwise.
Russia
The sit-tat hedges its China bets with Russia. During the Cold War, Myanmar was closely aligned with the Soviet Union—the USSR even built the Inya Lake Hotel following Nikita Khrushchev’s 1958 visit—and Russia retains much of that goodwill. This remains, however, a relationship of convenience: the sit-tat needs arms, and Russia needs cash. Russia is currently the sit-tat’s largest arms supplier, and this includes artillery and fighter jets. This cooperation extends to tourism, trade, and nuclear energy. Russia also blocks UNSC attempts to sanction the sit-tat. Russia’s support to development of nuclear energy in Myanmar is of particular note: the sit-tat claims that such development is peaceful. However, surely Min Aung Hlaing is following the example of Kim Jong Un and the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK), just as Kim learned from what happened to Moammar Qaddafi in Libya. Weapons of mass destruction are protective amulets westerners also believe in.
India
India’s position toward the sit-tat and the February 2021 coup has been aptly described as ‘fractured between words and deeds’ – sweet diplomatic words about upkeeping democracy, and deeds reflecting an extremely short-sighted military, political, and economic support for the junta, as well as a reluctance to understand the important role of other resistance actors. India tries to maintain a positive relationship with whoever happens to be running Myanmar, and the reason is a) China, and b) security in Northeastern India, including counterinsurgency along the long and porous border with Myanmar. This border security also involves China, which regards Northeastern India’s Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet. India’s current policy dates back to at least 1988. Like China, India justifies this engagement with the principle of non-interference and the need for stability. During the brief democratic transition, it maintained a balance in its relations with the sit-tat and the civilian government, with the aim of promoting its strategic interests in the region, including security, energy, and connectivity. India has reverted to its pre-democratic stance, maintaining positive relations with the current junta to the extent that the Modi government has downplayed junta bombs erroneously falling into Indian territory and return soldiers safely back to Myanmar who escape to safe Indian army/paramilitary controlled areas. Myanmar is an important partner for India’s ‘Act East’ policy, which aims to deepen India’s ties with Southeast Asia and strengthen its position as a regional power. It is seen as key to India’s energy security, with several major projects underway, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project which connects Sittwe and NE India, and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway; India’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The sit-tat’s attitude toward India is more transactional. They look the other way while Indian Naga, Meitei, Mizo and other insurgents to use Myanmar as a base. The sit-tat likely see the presence of these foreign insurgents as useful bargaining chips in any negotations with Indian authorities. The insurgents pay for the privilege in the form of protection fees, and they purchase weapons and supplies from local sit-tat as well.[15]
Other neighbors are less, but still, important: Thailand has maintained a pragmatic relationship with the powers that be in Myanmar since the departure of the Raj. Bangladesh, despite the burden of the expelled Rohingya, and delays to their repatriation, does likewise. Near neighbors have had to be more serious than the utopian foreign policies of distant states.
Short-term predictions
Who’d have known? That three years on this fight would continue. That the Bamars would lead it. That some EAOs would finally, meaningfully, join forces, not only with one another, but with PDFs. That the sit-tat would shrink in the face of it.
What we’ve learned firstly is that the sit-tat is an ineffective and inefficient war-making enterprise. They draw from the same limited toolbox across juntas and acronyms; they don’t seem to have any new ideas, other than conscription. And so, while they won’t likely collapse anytime soon, they will continue to weaken and bleed. We will see more defections, more forced conscription, and ever less enthusiasm for the fight. We may even see foreign support for the sit-tat in the form of foreign fighters, namely Russian military, although the parameters of this limit the extent of it: firstly, sit-tat ego needs to be overcome; second, China needs to approve. Such foreigners would be labelled ‘advisors’, and the resistance would have no small fun in killing them.
The sit-tat’s brutality will increase within an ever-shrinking space. We can anticipate a further revamping of the sit-tat’s ‘Four Cuts’ (လေးဖြတ် ဗျူဟာမှာ/ ဖြတ်လေးဖြတ်) counterinsurgency strategy, first used in the 1960s in the Bago Yoma – an area that remains depopulated to the present day. Four Cuts aims to deny food, funds, intelligence and recruits to enemies of the state, and involves large-scale detentions, population transfers, and the inevitable killings. This is already happening, especially in order to secure transport routes, and we can anticipate more systematic actions in the Bamar heartlands of Sagaing and Magwe in particular, where the sit-tat will attempt to depopulate inconvenient areas whose populations they cannot adequately control.
Given attrition rates and growing emphasis on less reliable militias, in addition to growing financial shortfalls, we can anticipate the sit-tat’s further loss of territory, with the junta essentially surrendering remaining tracts of Chin, Kayah, Northern Shan, and Rakhine in particular. The same will happen in Bamar areas in which Four Cuts cannot be effectively implemented; they will fall back to flatlands distinguished by all-weather roads, and EAO and to a lesser extent PDF territories will expand in response. Personnel attrition will lead to a further reliance on air power, which in turn leads to more reliance on Russia for planes, parts, and training. Areas of the country controlled by the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other members of the FPNCC which have ceasefires with the junta will continue to expand and assert sovereignty. So will independent-minded BGFs and criminal gangs. The oft-claimed fiction that Myanmar is a state will become ever more untenable.
Ultimately, we will witness a desiccated sit-tat ruling a desiccated Bamar space, surrounded by enemies. This will also prove untenable: the international community has no stomach for any new states, and this includes China and Russia. The future Myanmar will be federal by fiat.
It’s worth returning to the dream of impending collapse: a remote possibility that still cannot be discounted. The degrading of such an institution as the sit-tat occurs at what looks to be a slow pace which suddenly accelerates. If enough officers believe it is going to happen, their own individual decisions will combine to make it happen. What happened to Romania in December of 1989 illustrates such a process. Political wits once said of Romanians that they were like corn mush in that they could be boil forever yet never explode, but they had the strength to boo the dictator in Timisoara, on live television. The regime, at that moment, ended, because it ended in the minds of its enforcers, who shot Ceausescu and his wife and then turned on one another in a brief killing frenzy while re-labelling themselves a democratic opposition. The sit-tat’s implosion would be far bloodier, and that sour-faced major general I ran into in Paletwa in 2019 will be either in front of the firing squad or behind the rifle stock.
The one thing we can bank on is that the people of Myanmar will continue to suffer..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Louise Taylor
1 February 2024 marked the third anniversary of the coup in Myanmar. Although there is much geopolitical tension and conflict at the moment occupying people’s minds, with developments in the Middle East and Ukraine particularly dominating the news, the situation in Myanmar been delicately avoided by donors and international partners for some time.
However, as the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index shows, organized crime in Myanmar has significantly worsened, to the point that the country currently has the highest levels of organized criminality in the world.
Furthermore, Myanmar’s resilience to organized crime has weakened significantly since its low ranking in 2021. The gap between its criminality and resilience scores is so large that it has no meaningful global comparator. This calls for urgent intervention in Myanmar and could be a cautionary tale for countries such as Ecuador and Haiti, whose emerging crime–resilience gap scores may not be at this critical juncture yet but are steadily approaching Myanmar’s dire, unenviable situation.
In 2021, Myanmar’s criminality score of 7.59 (out of 10, where 10 is the worst ranking), placed it third among all countries in the world. By 2023, a score of 8.15 propelled Myanmar to the top of the global ranking, i.e. it has the highest levels of criminality globally. The most significant increases in its criminal market scores (one component of the criminality ranking) were in non-renewable resource crimes (following a surge in illegal rare earth mining after the 2021 coup) and human trafficking, where cases of forced labour and of trafficking for forced criminality and marriage, as well as the plight of the Rohingya people, were exacerbated by the conflict and subsequent sanctions imposed by the international community.
Myanmar’s score for criminal actors (the other component of the criminality ranking) also jumped between 2021 and 2023 – with a particular upward trend for foreign (namely Chinese) actors operating in the country – to a record 9 out of 10. This now matches the score also reached by state-embedded actors, who are active in most, if not all, criminal markets. In particular, state-embedded actors are facilitators in Myanmar’s drug markets (where the country scores 10 for synthetic drugs). Overall, Myanmar has the highest combined score for criminal actors in the world.
But the biggest shifts are seen in Myanmar’s ability to resist and withstand organized crime. The Index shows that the more a country is affected by conflict or instability, the more likely it is to have reduced resilience to organized crime. Myanmar is no exception. The country’s resilience score, already low at 3.42 (out of 10) in the 2021 edition of the Index, slid to a paltry 1.63 in 2023. This is not the lowest score in the world – Libya and Afghanistan rank lower – but two key findings are nonetheless striking. First, the country has seen a drop of between 1 and 3 points in every single resilience indicator. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the gap between criminality and resilience is so large that it puts Myanmar eons away from any other country. In 2021, the gap between criminality and resilience was 4.17 points, but by 2023 it had widened to an alarming 6.52 points (the gap ‘growth’ between 2021 and 2023 is shown in the figure below, alongside other countries that also experienced growth gaps).
The biggest resilience score drop was seen in the international cooperation indicator, which fell from 5.0 to 2.0. Much of this can be explained by the decisions of many international partners not to engage directly with the military government, and Myanmar’s exclusion from international forums, and information and exchange mechanisms until the coup is resolved. Donors suspended their government-to-government aid agreements, partnerships and projects after the coup, and promised to support more civil society and humanitarian projects. However, these promises may not have been realized.
Aid delivery and programming in Myanmar is challenging. Civil society and communities are literally under fire; there are difficulties in getting funding into Myanmar (possibly complicated by the unintended consequences of the Financial Action Task Force blacklisting); and there are concerns about the safety of project staff. Data from the OECD shows a considerable 85% drop in overall aid contributions since 2021 – arguably at a time when intervention and support are most urgently and desperately needed. There were other demands on donors during this period, such as Ukraine, which saw a surge in aid in 2022. However, in December 2023, the UN reported ‘gross underfunding’ for the estimated 1.9 million people who had been prioritized for aid.
The drop in donor activity and aid, and the knock-on effect of limited programming and interventions, has also affected the ability to monitor the situation in Myanmar. This has been exacerbated by a significant decline in the resilience capacity of non-state actors. This is not surprising, given the well-documented targeting of civilians and the repressive tactics of the military government.
The conflict in Myanmar has not only increased vulnerability, but the resulting lawlessness has fuelled crime and enabled new illicit markets to consolidate. Myanmar scores 7.5 for the cyber-dependent crimes market. Cyberscam centres have sprung up across the country, particularly in border towns and special economic zones, facilitated by state-embedded and Chinese actors.
The cyberscam phenomenon is also an example of how domestic criminality, if left unchecked and unregulated, can affect the stability and security of neighbouring countries – such as Thailand –, the wider region and the world. The scale of cyberscam activity has become so significant that it appears to have even affected China’s delicate geopolitical balance in the region, eventually forcing Beijing to issue arrest warrants for key figures linked to cyber fraud in Myanmar’s Shan State. The absence of scrutiny in Myanmar has therefore not only contributed to the widening and deepening of the country’s crime–resilience gap, but has also been instrumental in allowing rising criminality to have reach and impact far beyond its borders.
While cyber fraud in Myanmar has attracted much international scrutiny and attention, it is primarily a manifestation of an internal, complex picture of intertwined criminality, vulnerability and risk. The ‘gap’ that exists for Myanmar is a canary in the coal mine for us all – it needs to be top of the agenda in 2024 for governments and civil society practitioners alike. Prescribing a tonic of acute diplomatic attention, rapid redirection of aid and programming efforts that navigate complexity to create innovative solutions to address state-embedded criminality while supporting and building community resilience is an urgent imperative for the country.
This analysis is part of the GI-TOC’s series of articles delving into the results of the Global Organized Crime Index. The series explores the Index’s findings and their effects on policymaking, anti-organized crime measures and analyses from a thematic or regional perspective..."
Source/publisher:
The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (Geneva)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Racial or ethnic discrimination in Burma: reports of violations against several groups, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
150.36 KB
more
Sub-title:
They were returning home after the junta enacted a military conscription law.
Description:
"More than 100 ethnic Rakhine youths detained by Myanmar’s junta as they returned by bus to Rakhine state from the commercial capital Yangon last week remained incommunicado on Monday, with relatives expressing concern that they were forcibly recruited to join the military amid a rollout of the country’s conscription law.
Junta troops arrested the youths on Feb. 20 at a checkpoint in Shwe Pyi Thar township, according to a monk who was a fellow passenger on one of the buses and who lobbied to authorities on their behalf.
“Of the three buses that were stopped, the two that I tried to intercede for carried between 90 and 100 passengers [in total],” said the monk who, like others interviewed for this report, spoke to RFA Burmese on condition of anonymity due to security concerns.
“The last thing I knew, they were arrested,” he said. “The reason I know this is because they entered the military checkpoint and never came out.”
The youths, aged between 18 and 30, had been working in garment, shoe and other factories in Yangon, the monk said. They were returning to their homes in the Rakhine townships of Myepon, Minbya, Mrauk-U, and Kyauktaw because their wards in Yangon would no longer register them as guests and they feared arrest after the junta enacted the military conscription law earlier this month.
They departed the Aung Mingalar Bus Yard in two buses operated by the Aung Si Khaing bus service and a third operated by the Pwint Phyu bus service, the monk said. The buses typically carry up to 50 passengers.
The youths are currently being held at the junta troop unit in Yangon region’s Hlaing Tharyar township, he said, adding that he had been unable to contact them as of Monday.
No contact since arrest
The military has suffered heavy losses on the battlefield in recent months – most notably in western Rakhine state, where the ethnic Arakan Army, or AA, ended a ceasefire in November and has since gone on to capture six townships.
On Feb. 10, the junta enacted the People’s Military Service Law, sending draft-eligible civilians fleeing from Myanmar’s cities. They say they would rather leave the country or join anti-junta forces in remote border areas than fight for the military, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat.
RFA Burmese has since received reports of recruitment roundups and arrests of young people, despite pledges from authorities that the law will not be enforced until April.
A relative of one of the detained youths told RFA that 14 of them are from his home village of Ywa Thar Yar, in Myebon township’s Yaw Chaung district.
“Four are male and 10 are female,” he said. “We haven’t had any contact with them since their arrest. They were working in factories in Yangon.”
The relative urged the junta to “release them as soon as possible,” as they had committed no crimes and were supporting their families with their income.
Aid workers confirmed to RFA that more than 100 Rakhine youths were arrested at the checkpoint on Feb. 20, but were unable to provide the details of those in custody, such as their names, ages or hometowns.
Nowhere is safe
Residents said that in the past two weeks, authorities in Yangon and Mandalay have been strictly enforcing the Guest List Law, which mandates either seven days’ imprisonment or a fine of 10,000 kyats (about US$5) for those who fail to register.
And last week, junta troops arrested around 600 civilians after their flights from Yangon landed at two airports in Rakhine state, according to family members and sources with knowledge of the situation, who said the military is holding them on suspicion of attempting to join the armed resistance.
A young Rakhine man working in Yangon told RFA that the junta is arresting people from his state who are living in the city “even if they are registered on guest lists,” but said returning home isn’t safe either.
“Now, if you go back to Rakhine, you will be arrested at Sittwe Airport … [or] at Kyaukpyu Airport. But if you stay [in Yangon], there are difficulties with the military service law,” he said. “I fled here to avoid the fighting in Rakhine, but it’s not safe here either. That’s just the current situation."
Rakhine military commentators told RFA they believe that the junta is likely targeting youths returning to Rakhine state because they “fear they will join the AA.”
Attempts by RFA to contact junta spokesperson Maj. General Zaw Min Tun for comment on the detention of young people in Shwe Pyi Thar township went unanswered Monday.
On Feb. 20, the AA said in a statement that the junta is “unlawfully arresting Rakhine people” in cities such as Yangon and Mandalay to use as soldiers, in addition to subjecting them to daily discrimination, torture, extortion, and execution. The group called on Rakhines fleeing fighting in the state to move to territory under its control, instead of relocating to the cities..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-26
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
In Part 1 of a 2-part series, Bobby Anderson considers the strengths and weaknesses of Myanmar’s military and its chances of collapse.
Description:
"Starting in 2017, the insurgent Arakan Army (AA) waged war against the Union of Myanmar across the complex topography of Paletwa township in southern Chin State. In January 2024, Paletwa fell to them.
I had worked in Paletwa with the deposed civilian government’s Department of Rural Development (DRD) before the February 2021 coup. From 2017 onward, in response to the AA’s guerilla actions, the civilian government had constricted my movement across the township; by 2019 I was limited to Paletwa town and the expanse of the Kaladan River stretching south. I still heard small arms fire at night. Back then the river was my only way in or out of town, and it wasn’t safe either: boats transporting soldiers were strafed.
In what is now a memory steeped in irony, back in 2019 the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw, of late referred to as စစ်တပ် / sit-tat, hosted a ceremony in Paletwa town to commemorate their “re-taking” of the township from AA. They hadn’t re-taken any territory at all, but no matter: the sit-tat has never let reality get in the way of self-adulation. That afternoon I sat obliviously on the side of the road which ran down to the jetty, eating ဝက်သားဟင်း tamin hin (pork curry). I paid and I happened to step outside just as a major general and his entourage passed on foot. He stopped and looked at me, open mouthed, and I did the same to him. My first thought was that he looked like a cut rate scoutmaster: U Baden-Powell. Then I wished I’d paid more attention before I stepped out. None of the soldiers lining the street were there when I’d entered the mess an hour before. I smiled dumbly, hoping for reciprocity. Instead, I got a look of hatred that felt white-hot; an expression that spread across the soldiery. Civilian officials later told me that the major general was vexed that I was in Paletwa. And he was especially vexed because I had permission to be there from the civilian government. I’d passed security checkpoints on the Kaladan with the requisite paperwork and had checked in with the town’s police and immigration officials—in the Union, immigration officials control the internal movement of both foreigners and Myanmar citizens.
That sour look stayed with me. For a commander, who would have had total control over the township prior to the quasi-democratization that began a decade earlier, back in Paletwa for a victory lap, it must have been a rude shock to be blindsided by a useless, grinning, pale guy. I flatter myself in hindsight by imagining that in some miniscule way I was, to that commander, representative of everything abhorrent about civilian rule.
This essay considers the possibility for a return to civilian rule in the face of both sit-tat intransigence and stunning recent losses at the hands of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance – comprised of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – launched a coordinated offensive against the sit-tat on October 27, 2023, and have since seized much of northern Shan state, while People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and other Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) launch new operations countrywide. This has all served to put down the myth of the sit-tat’s dominance. I consider alternating claims of sit-tat resiliency and fragility, with particular attention to the demographics of both the sit-tat and the resistance; as well as sit-tat coherence, mindset, funding, territorial control, and international relations. I conclude with a few predictions.
Myanmar’s military
Myanmar’s military has dominated the country’s political and social landscape since independence. It ruled Myanmar as a dictatorship from 1958 to 1960, then from 1962 until 2011, when a series of political and economic reforms initiated by the sit-tat through their affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) under Thein Sein led to a transition to a semi-democratic system which ultimately saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) win elections in 2015.
However, prior to this ‘loss’, the sit-tat, learning from the Indonesian military’s post-1998 mis-steps in that country’s abrupt and disorganized transition to civilian rule, had enshrined their dominance through a constitution they drafted. The 2008 Constitution gave the sit-tat undisputed control of key ministries including Home Affairs and Defense, and allocated them 25 percent of seats in the parliament or Hluttaw, making reforms of the aforementioned constitution impossible. The sit-tat’s constitution also provided a legal basis for any future coup d’état. The NLD’s expert on constitutional law, U Ko Ni, believed in a democratic future and noted that what could not be amended could be replaced. In 2017, he received a bullet to the head by way of reply. The sit-tat would remain in control, and any future civilian government would be, for all intents and purposes, window dressing.
On February 1, 2021, the sit-tat deposed the civilians anyway. Sit-tat head, Min Aung Hlaing, justified his coup by alleging widespread ballot fraud in the November 2020 elections which had seen the NLD accrue a majority of votes. The coup was widely condemned by the international community, bar the sit-tat’s most powerful friends: the People’s Republic of China, which referred to the coup as a ‘cabinet reshuffle,’[1] and Russia.
The civilian government reconstituted itself as best it could in non-sit-tat-controlled territories and abroad, forming the National Unity Government (NUG) together with its allies from EAOs, activist groups, and political parties in April 2021. While the coup was historically predictable, as was resistance in non-Bamar, ethnic minority areas, the violent ferocity of the resistance in Bamar areas that came perhaps as a shock to the military. Some civilians began to band together in People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). Some PDFs sheltered in territories controlled by the country’s myriad EAOs, receiving training from them. Some PDFs also aligned themselves with the NUG. And soon, PDFs began killing soldiers in droves. The sit-tat, for their part, responded to resistance predictably, and with increasing sadism, moving from the first days of jailing NLD figures and dispersing protesters to levelling entire communities from the air, recently with the deadliest airstrike thus far in the conflict. The 168 civilians dead in Pa Zi Gyi in April 2023 join untold thousands in graves, while many survivors join two million displaced.
Many Myanmar-focused academics and journalists have staked positions on the sit-tat’s resiliency or fragility. In 2021, the Center for Strategic and International Studies claimed hopefully that the sit-tat was on their last legs, while in 2023, The Irrawaddy more subtly and intelligently noted that the sit-tat’s implosion is not impossible.
Numbers
Before the coup, general estimates of sit-tat personnel ranged from 300,000 to 400,000. These were overblown.
In the past three years, more sober estimates have emerged. On the low end, in May 2023 Ye Myo Hein estimated 150,000 personnel, of which 70,000 are in combat roles. However, the line between combatant and non-combatant in that structure has essentially been erased due to understaffing and losses, and this attrition in numbers was obvious even before the October offensives. As for police, who serve as auxiliaries to the sit-tat, Andrew Selth suggests 80,000, while Ye Myo Hein estimates 70,000. Police would be less reliable regime enforcers: they are not indoctrinated in the manner of soldiers (see below) and they reside in civilian communities. Border Guard Forces (BGF) and Pyu Saw Htee – newly-created and armed militias[2] – may also be counted, but they are peripheral. BGF loyalties are local and diffuse; as a rule they once fought the state but then switched sides, generally betraying previous ideologies, and so their loyalties can be fluid. They are essentially rural gangs running small fiefdoms with state protection. As for militias in general, their numbers are growing due to an inability for the sit-tat to recruit fast enough to replace their own losses. Such militias- staffed with retirees, criminals and EAO turncoats- are a cheap and collateral interim.
Losses
Even before the October 2023 offensive in northern Shan State, Ye Myo Hein estimated 13,000 sit-tat casualties since the start of the coup, along with 8,000 defections and desertions. He estimated 7,000 police losses, although this police figure is not disaggregated by casualty, or desertion/defection. Nikkei noted that unnamed Yangon diplomats believed that the sit-tat was losing an average of 15 soldiers per day, or roughly 5,500 per year. The NUG claimed nearly 5,000 dead soldiers in the first 10 months following the coup, and prior to the October 27, the 2023 Offensive claimed that the sit-tat had lost half of its combat forces in the last two years, or 30,000 troops. These claims, however, cannot be confirmed, nor can the vast number of changing estimates following the recent offensives, and so sticking with conservative estimates is prudent.
If we accept Ye Myo Hein’s estimates as accurate – and this author does – then losses estimated by Nikkei of 5,500 per year constituted 3.7 percent of the overall. That is a considerable bleed. To this we need to add desertions and defections: Hein estimated an additional 8,000, while the NUG claimed that roughly 14,000 sit-tat and police left the ranks as part of the civil disobedience movement (CDM) as of March 2023. The NUG claims to offer financial incentives for deserters, but this is unlikely to be a deciding factor in a soldier’s choice. There simply aren’t funds available to create a durable financial incentive to leave; a decision which is complicated by many other factors.
These numbers have increased since the October 27 offensive, and although the totals are unknown, they are stark. In early January 2024, at the capture of Laukkai alone, 2,389 military personnel, including six brigadier generals, surrendered: “the largest surrender in the history of Myanmar’s military”, according to Ye Myo Hein.
Which begs the question: even before the October offensive, were sit-tat recruitments keeping pace with losses?
Not by a long shot. The recent activation of the Conscription law starkly bears this out, but even before the recent offensive, the sit-tat faced ever-growing issues in both recruitment and retention. Their traditional recruiting grounds, such as Sagaing and Chin, are now charnel houses, and many of the young who may have sought sit-tat careers are now rebels instead. The Irrawaddy indicates that applications to the sit-tat’s officer academies are significantly down. While this might constrain talent, talent itself is relative. This sit-tat is hardly a group of innovative tacticians. They throw bodies at problems, including medically unfit ones.
Ye Myo Hein reasonably asserts that the sit-tat is “barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force, much less a government”: they were understaffed even before the coup. However, the sit-tat is used to bleeding, and managing multiple rebellions across both broad topographies and decades. The potential for a sudden collapse has been bandied about, but there is no historical precedent the author is aware of that looks anything like the current situation in Myanmar. However, conscription can be seen to reflect desperation. Other comparable militaries have ‘collapsed’ because they were either miniscule or corrupt or faced overwhelming force, or a combination of the three. The sit-tat maintains a disciplined, hierarchical corruption variant which functions because civilians are the prey, and so this corruption has not yet served to hollow out the institution.
The culture of the sit-tat supports its longevity. A 2021 Deutsch Welle article claimed that soldiers were being “brainwashed” into buying the army’s worldview”. But they already knew that worldview. The sit-tat always has been a Bamar-supremacist, totalitarian organization.[3] While Theravada Buddhism is a part of this identity, it exists more as a marker to distinguish the sit-tat from non-Buddhists, Muslims especially. The sit-tat’s willingness to kill Buddhist monks when the sangha diverges from the sit-tat shows how disposable this marker can be: indeed, to its officer class, the sit-tat may be a religion that supersedes Buddhism, or at least embodies a ‘purer’ form of Buddhism than the monks who have dedicated their lives to its practice.[4] And while the sit-tat’s lower ranks may contain Rawang, Chin, and other non-Bamar and Christian foot-soldiers, the officer class is entirely Bamar. This doesn’t mean that the lower ranks joined because they prescribe to the worldview: escaping poverty is a more plausible rationale.
This culture is supported by insularity.[5] Recruitment is multi-generational. Soldiers and their families live apart from civilians and tend to intermarry. They have their own schools and universities, their own health care, their own insurance and pensions, and their own courts. Civilians, to this group, are entirely untrustworthy, occasionally traitorous. The sit-tat has always ‘safeguarded’ the nation and so they believe they own it. The sit-tat’s sadism is also part and parcel of its culture: gore is bonding materiel. The massacres carried out by soldiers and militias forge a palpable hatred of the sit-tat among civilians, and surely give soldiers the feeling that reprisals await, and there is nowhere else to shelter but in the bloody organization that stains them. In the face of this, the security the Tatmadaw offers, financial and otherwise, is a powerful motivation to stay.[6] This motivation may be seen in the sit-tat personnel who recently fled into Mizoram, India; all opted to return.
With the mitigating circumstance of desperate poverty for many of the rank-and-file, to join this group is to knowingly join a criminal, sadistic, totalitarian endeavor.
Funds
Bodies are one count; cash is another. The sit-tat’s FY 2023-4 budget is US$2.7 billion equivalent – 25 percent of the national budget. The source of their on-budget funding is largely from Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise and revenues linked to extractive industries. The sit-tat has a much larger business structure than the state budget; they directly run two business conglomerates, Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). MEC and MEHL holdings are vast, expanding across mining, industry, banking, food, and tobacco. Contributions to MEC, MEHL, and associated insurance and pension schemes operated by conglomerate subsidiaries are automatically deducted from soldier’s pay, with select contributions converted to MEC or MEHL shares, further bonding soldiers to the sit-tat.
Loot for the rank-and-file is also an aspect of economic embeddedness. By way of illustration, much livestock was stolen by soldiers and proxies from fleeing Rohingya during the 2017 expulsions that the price of meat temporarily collapsed in Sittwe.[7] Other illicit local economic opportunities for officers in particular abound, which the aforementioned BGFs and allied militias play an important role in, especially regarding the sit-tat’s need for plausible deniability in such illicit businesses. Indeed, the system of promotion in the sit-tat is based in part on the funds which junior officers can amass and funnel upwards. These opportunities remain a fundraising and control mechanism for regional sit-tat commands and BGFs in particular. Narcotics have been a form of conflict resolution utilized by the sit-tat at least since the 1960s, and this became especially evident after collapse of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1989, when the sit-tat made immediate ceasefires with the CPB’s successor organizations and turned a blind eye to their manufacture and trafficking of heroin, and later, methamphetamine. Bertil Linter, Ko Lin Chin, Tom Kramer and others have described these dynamics extensively. Myanmar recently became, again, the world’s biggest opium producer. In exchange for policing territories as state proxies, the sit-tat has turned a blind eye to such illicit economies at least, and more likely, is engaged in the trade.
The application of outside theories upon the sit-tat leadership is a type of anthropomorphism. This includes economics. Myanmar’s GDP growth fell to a negative 18% in the year following the coup, although it did eventually recover to 1%. Before the coup, it averaged a positive 6% per annum. In discarding or being ignorant of economic theories, the sit-tat has demonstrated that it is not as subject to them as N. Gregory Mankiw and other Economics 101 textbook authors would imagine. This also applies benefit to us outsiders in that it demonstrates that economics, for all the ambition of its proselytizers, is a social science, not a hard one. How many times, according to economic predictions, should the country have collapsed under Ne Win or Than Shwe?
Although Myanmar is not experiencing hyperinflation, it is worth comparing it to an extreme example: the hyperinflation in rump Yugoslavia in 1993. In August 1993, inflation climbed to 1,880 percent; at an annualised rate, this totaled 363 quadrillion percent. By December of 1993, 500 billion Dinar notes were printed. At the time, I was a teen blissfully unaware of economics. But I did note while I was there that, in bars, the prices of drinks would change between rounds. And yet Yugoslavia kept going – with no friends save a weak Russia, no natural resources worth mention, no China. The country’s institutions continued under a much more effective sanctions regime than is currently imposed on Myanmar, under what were effectively new “rules of the game” only seen clearly in the rear-view mirror. And so the sit-tat also stumbles onward, economics be damned.
The sit-tat often displays a rawer understanding of how money works than many an economist who would have bet on collapse. The trend of cronyism displays this understanding all too well: the mutuality of oligarchy and junta is a support mechanism that proves durable for all parties, and I hope someday Joe Studwell, former editor of the Far East Economic Review and author of Asian Godfathers and How Asia Works, chooses to write about this interrelation in Myanmar.
That said, Min Aung Hlaing’s recent complaints about finances indicate that even he senses something is economically amiss. But the leadership’s short-sightedness limits their response to inflation to targeting cooking oil producers, threatening local banks that Min Aung Hlaing labels traitorous, and most revolting of all, attempting to rob Myanmar’s migrant workers by demanding they remit 25 percent of their wages home at the regime’s ‘official’ (i.e. fake) exchange rate, in addition to imposing a ten percent tax rate on earnings abroad. Meanwhile the price of rice has doubled, and the military’s answer in the form of price caps will hurt farmers immensely.
Sean Turnell uses the word ‘catastrophe’ in his review of Myanmar’s current economy, but it is only that if one cares about people. It is not a catastrophe if it is seen through the prism of organized crime. Surely demonetization, a tool used by the much-hated Ne Win, and which wiped out the kyat savings of civilians countrywide in 1964, 1985 and 1987, is around the corner, even though it is expressly forbidden in the 2008 constitution.
Factionalism
Sit-tat culture and economic interconnectedness restrict the possibilities of factionalism. The coup and the subsequent crackdown, it is alleged, have led to tensions and divisions within the sit-tat. Terence Lee and Gerard McCarthy evaluate this in the forthcoming “Fracturing the Monolith: Could Military Defections End the Dictatorship in Myanmar?”, while Anders Kirstein Moeller did so in “Peering under the hood: Coup narratives and Tatmadaw Factionalism”. Both attempt to discern the contours of factionalism within the sit-tat. However, it bears reminding that, for all our knowledge of the sit-tat, we do not know what’s happening inside the ranks. Reports of low morale among troops deployed to areas of armed resistance means that the sit-tat deals with the same issues as every other occupying force in history. Low morale in the face of the latest offensive is resulting in surrender, but it has yet to lead to revolt.
It’s fair to assert that any factionalism happening within that olive drab opacity is limited to the point where said factionalism does not threaten to change the organizational philosophy of the group, nor the core beliefs it holds. An intra-sit-tat revolt against Min Aung Hlaing will not occur because he is a Bamar supremacist fascist. Rather, it will happen because he is a Bamar supremacist fascist who is losing. Nor will the sit-tat compete against civilians in a game that they haven’t already fixed in their favor. The system remains totalitarian, supremacist, and monolithic. For those arguing that factionalism is possible, I hope for the same, but we simply don’t know. Nevertheless, these hopes of factionalism within limits have precedent. The previous junta’s ‘opening’ in 2010 dated as far back as 2004 with the arrest of Military Intelligence Commander Khin Nyunt and the deposing of his ‘pro-China’ clique.
Despite the sit-tat’s overarching ideology, there may be a minute amount of pro-NUG elements within it. Select PDF attacks, according to Ye Myo Hein, “were likely only possible with the collaboration of military insiders, and they have aroused anxiety within the military’s leadership.”
Territorial control
The sit-tat has been able to maintain control in all major cities and many of the roads connecting them, but even prior to the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s October 27 offensive, the sit-tat controlled less territory and faced more complex and violent resistance than at any time in their history. Shona Loong starkly illustrates this in Post-coup Myanmar in Six Warscapes.
Back in February 2023, Min Aung Hlaing stated that only 198 out of over 330 townships in Myanmar were ‘100 percent stable’. If we take ‘stable’ as code for ‘under control,’ Min Aung Hlaing was implying that 40 percent of the country’s townships were ‘out of control’. By July 2023, the sit-tat had imposed martial law in 37 townships, including resistance strongholds in Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Kayah. Prior to the October 27, 2023 offensive, most of Chin state was already under resistance control, as was much of Kayah. The same for Rakhine, which was largely run by the Arakan Army (see below). In Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Kayah, the sit-tat was forced to rely on air power and artillery. It also faced difficulties in maintaining supply lines and, apparently, ensuring the loyalty of troops deployed in these areas. To shore up its own defense, the sit-tat made changes to the Arms Act to arm pro-junta militias and security organizations. As of August 2023, they began conscripting civil servants into militias in southern Shan and Kayah state, including health and education staff – a telling indicator of the effect of the bleed the PDFs were subjecting the sit-tat to. Other proxies were being mobilized to guard foreign investments the sit-tat could not commit numbers to. In a repeat of the practice of previous juntas, the sit-tat also conscripted criminals. Implicitly, then, recruitment was not keeping up with losses. And territories continued to be lost.
And then came the October 27, 2023 offensive, in which the Three Brotherhood Alliance overran dozens of towns across Northern Shan State, and the garrisons which supposedly were there to defend them. Most of Northern Shan, and within it, the entirety of Kokang, was lost. Offensives began simultaneously in Rakhine, Chin, and Kayah, effecting the loss of nearly all the remaining territory in the latter two, while much of Western Rakhine is also lost to the sit-tat, and where even distant Ramree island is hosting fighting between the AA and the sit-tat. The coordination was not limited to EAOs: PDFs ramped up operations in Sagaing and elsewhere, and the Pa’O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) is now fighting the sit-tat as well. Even the criminal Karen BGF, guardians of Shwe Kokko, has apparently gone over to the resistance. This was a signature moment, and one that the sit-tat, with its decades of successful ‘musical chairs ceasefires’ in which an offensive against one EAO gives another breathing space, could not have imagined. Nor could they have imagined that, in another signature event, the United Wa State Army would assume administrative control of areas the alliance had seized from sit-tat control.
Despite this stunning set of losses, sit-tat tactics are not deviating from past practice. This includes asking China to broker ceasefires which they then speedily violate. This criminal, totalitarian endeavor holds such a supremacist belief in itself that it cannot comprehend battlefield realities..."
Source/publisher:
"Tea Circle" (Myanmar)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Many in Myanmar have condemned what they perceive as seriously flawed Western criticism of the Burmese ex-leader.
Description:
"On 18 October 2023, the Brighton and Hove City Council in the United Kingdom revoked the Freedom of the City awarded to Burmese politician Aung San Suu Kyi in 2011. Their special meeting lasted only 18 minutes, with Councillor Bella Sankey, the Labour leader of the Council, stating that it was not right to honour a person who “presided over the ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Muslim Rohingya community” and was “an enabler to racial and religious discrimination and ethnic cleansing”. Sankey was supported by all 50 or so of the Council members present.
This revocation was the latest act by Western institutions and human rights groups, at times inclined to zealotry and intolerance, to humiliate and punish Suu Kyi for her perceived failure to “speak out” against the persecution of the Rohingya Muslim ethnic minority in Myanmar. Yet not one of her critics has ever attempted to say why she supposedly did not speak out, nor offered any word of explanation other than, like Bob Geldof, to denigrate her as a “handmaiden to genocide”.
Their main concern has been to topple her from the pedestal on which they put her, and not to seek to understand her fraught and fragile relationship with the military, which has led to her detention and imprisonment for more than three years.
This year, an invaluable compendium of documents was published by the American Buddhist scholar Alan Clements and his British colleague Fergus Harlow entitled “Burma’s Voices of Freedom”, which includes interviews, articles and speeches by Suu Kyi and several of her Burmese associates. The four-volume set offers a clear and persuasive narrative of her policies from a Burmese perspective, which would come as a complete surprise to many of her Western critics.
Suu Kyi indeed acknowledged that she had not “spoken out” on the Rohingya crisis because to do so would only make matters worse.
Suu Kyi’s consistent approach over the years to the Rohingya – as on all issues – is inspired by the Buddhist virtues of loving kindness (mettā), compassion (karunā), empathetic joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekkhā). In practical terms it is based on:
Reconciliation, not condemnation. A refusal to take sides in the communal disturbances between Muslims and Buddhists in Rakhine State.
Cooperation with the military at all costs. A refusal to condemn publicly, but to search for a modus vivendi with the aim of securing their understanding and support for the country’s political transition.
Determination not to endanger the prospects for democratic change after so many years of military rule, even at the risk of being seriously misunderstood in the West.
Suu Kyi had discussions with a considerable number of Western politicians and personalities once she began to travel overseas in 2012. To some, she would undoubtedly have explained in confidence how fragile was her position, but publicly she did not dare make reference to this. Her spokesman, U Win Htein, confided to Clements on 10 April 2015 that Suu Kyi “did clearly express her position about the Rohingya, but what she expressed was that, if she spoke up for the Rohingya or advocated too heavily on their behalf, it would have unfavourable repercussions among the Burmese … It might help the international community understand the situation, but it won’t help Burma.”
Suu Kyi indeed acknowledged that she had not “spoken out” on the Rohingya crisis because to do so would only make matters worse, sully her relations with the military, and endanger her very political existence. Yet this is what human rights organisations pressed her to do. Instead, Suu Kyi put the interests of her country before her personal reputation. In an interview with NHK World (Japan) on 6 October 2018, she stated, “I don’t care about prizes and honours as such. I am sorry that friends are not as steadfast as they might be. Because I think friendship means understanding, basically, trying to understand rather than to just make your own judgement. But prizes come and prizes go.”
On her decision to represent Myanmar at the International Court of Justice on 11 December 2019, Suu Kyi’s Burmese associates are unanimous that she did not go to The Hague to defend the military, but to appear as a representative of her country in their dispute with The Gambia, and to defend Myanmar’s honour and dignity. The human rights activist and Harvard graduate Ma Thida Sanchuang said in January 2020: “But for the eyes of the general public, Aung San Suu Kyi took the lead to defend our country’s image … The general public’s stand with her on the ICJ case was the signal … to show how much they are still against the military and its party.”
This is entirely opposite to most Western interpretations. Not surprisingly, many of Suu Kyi’s closest collaborators have condemned what they see as seriously flawed Western criticism of her policies, especially on the Rohingya. U Win Htein commented: “They are false judgements. They are misperceptions. They are from the uninformed and misguided … Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is one of the most compassionate people I have ever met.” A senior Buddhist monk, the late Myawaddy Sayadaw Abbot of Mingyi Monastery, was even blunter in December 2017: “Wait and see. Only those who revoked the awards will lose their dignity in the end.” And as Myanmar’s version of Lady Gaga, Phyu Phyu Kyaw Thein, a Christian, noted in January 2020: “But one thing for sure is Daw Suu, as a devout Buddhist, forgives them for she knows that ‘they know not what they say’.”
One day soon, Suu Kyi may be free to put the record straight. Her detractors can then eat humble pie, if they have the moral courage..."
Source/publisher:
The Lowy Institute via The Interpreter
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, About Aung San Suu Kyi, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Three years after the failed military coup in Myanmar, there is genuine hope within the country for democratic resistance. By the end of 2023 and into the beginning of 2024, Myanmar reached a turning point, with significant successes achieved by the revolutionary movement, particularly on the battlefield. For the first time since the coup, there is a growing possibility that the resistance movement may prevail against the military dictatorship.
Three years after the military coup, approximately 17.6 million people in Myanmar are facing a humanitarian emergency, and 2.6 million people are homeless. The military has been responsible for the deaths of over 4,500 people, including about 500 children. In addition, more than 26,000 individuals have been detained, with 20,000 still languishing in prison.
While the struggle in Myanmar is tragic, marked by a great deal of brutality and significant loss of life, it is also deeply inspiring. The previously deeply divided nation with various ethnic groups has united against the military, which illegally seized power on February 1, 2021. Likely driven by a combination of the military’s significant electoral defeat (in the form of a pro-military party, composed of formed generals) and the personal aspirations of coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the military arrested most of the country’s civilian leadership, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and halted all democratic processes, in order to install a new government, a military junta under the name State Administration Council (SAC). At first, the people of Myanmar faced daunting odds. However, they persevered, and now, three years later, we see the balance of power beginning to shift in their favor.
The prospect of overcoming the junta seemed bleak in the aftermath of the coup, as the military seemed poised to violently suppress the initially non-violent protests that eventually escalated into armed defense. For the first two years, the resistance movement struggled to survive, clinging on despite the military’s vast advantage, eventually reaching a tipping point where the coup leaders could not quash the resistance, yet the resistance could not overcome the junta.
The year 2023 brought a change to this situation: the first half of the year saw an improvement on the side of the revolutionary forces compared to previous years but without major victories. It was only in the second half of the year that the situation changed significantly. With Operation 1027, named after the date of its start – October 27, 2023 –it seems for the first time that the revolutionary forces may eventually emerge victorious.
The duration of this process, however, remains uncertain and will depend on a number of factors, including internal, regional, and international dynamics. Key external players that can influence events in Myanmar include China, Thailand, and India, three neighboring countries. China deserves special attention because it has been extensively involved in Myanmar’s affairs for decades and is known for its ability to turn violence in Myanmar’s border regions on and off like a switch, depending on China’s needs. Moreover, the 2017 Operation has had a strong impact on Myanmar’s relations with China.
For months, China’s central government pleaded with the SAC to crack down on cross-border cyber scam syndicates run primarily by Chinese criminals from guarded compounds on the Myanmar side of the border, controlled by local warlords, but to no avail. Then came the solution for China in the form of Operation 1027, essentially greenlighted by Beijing. In the short term, cracking down on scam centers took precedence over peace on the border. Publicly, China called for a de-escalation of the conflict.
In October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, composed of three ethnic armed organizations joined by the people’s defense forces, known as PDFs (armed units formed post-coup to resist the military regime and recognized by the National Unity Government, the parallel legitimate government formed by representatives elected in the 2020 elections), launched an operation with a dual objective: to eliminate the scam syndicates operating in the region and to confront and defeat the military dictatorship. The first objective led to the liberation of numerous compounds, with the return of the enslaved, mostly Chinese, to their homes. The second objective resulted in unprecedented battlefield losses for the Myanmar military. The second outcome was unexpected by China, as the Myanmar military suffered unprecedented battlefield losses, highlighting the effectiveness and impact of the operation.
Operation 1027, which is still ongoing, has emerged as the most significant threat to the military regime since the coup. The alliance has successfully blocked the junta’s access to the northern part of Shan State, seized key cities and town in the region, and gained control of the Myanmar-China border, thereby disrupting the lucrative border trade (which had previously funneled cash into the hands of the junta). Throughout these developments, China mediated talks between the military and the alliance (with the primary goal of averting a prolonged disruption of border trade). However, the negotiated ceasefires have been tenuous, with numerous instances of breakdown.
There is an interesting dual dependency and influence at play. Operation 1027 was made possible by the broader resistance movement in Myanmar, as the junta has been under attack by a national uprising in various towns across the country over the last three years. This further stretched the junta’s already thinning forces. In turn, Operation 1027 not only capitalized on this weakening of the junta, but also served to significantly strengthen the revolutionary forces in other parts of Myanmar, such as Chin, Kachin, Karen, Sagaing, and Magway. The revolutionary forces in these areas accelerated and began to occupy military bases. As a result, the army suffered losses as several bases fell and many soldiers were detained.
While serious battles between the military and the resistance movement continue, one thing is certain: there is no turning back at this point. At present, everything in Myanmar revolves around the removal of the junta’s cruel rule and, more broadly, the removal of the military’s influence from the country’s political landscape. The entire population shares the belief that the continued existence of a military junta in society is untenable. A return to a compromise situation in the form of a hybrid regime, similar to that of the 2010s, in which the military wields significant political power alongside the civilian government, is not a realistic solution for Myanmar’s future. While the people of Myanmar believe that victory is within reach, it remains to be seen how long this process actually takes – it could be years before we see a real change. But for now, we can look at it through a lens of hope..."
Source/publisher:
Reset Dialogues on Civilizations
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
The arrests were for writing or sharing anti-junta posts on Facebook and other social networks.
Description:
"Myanmar junta authorities have arrested and jailed nearly 1,500 people they say posted anti-junta messages on Facebook, TikTok and Telegram over the last two years, research group Data for Myanmar has found.
The arrests included a woman who had been working in Thailand and was sentenced to life in prison in December after she returned to Myanmar to have her passport and work visa renewed, a family friend told Radio Free Asia.
Officers checked her phone during the renewal in Yangon and found anti-junta messages that she had sent privately, the family friend said.
“After that, she was arrested and taken to the North Dagon jail,” the friend said. “Then she was sent to Insein Prison.”
The junta has struggled to gain popular support since taking power from a civilian government in a Feb. 1, 2021, coup d’etat.
Responding to critical messages with criminal prosecution has had a chilling effect on how people express themselves online. It has also earned Myanmar a ranking as the second worst country in the world for internet freedom, according to Washington-based Freedom House.
The Data for Myanmar report said that most of the 1,480 people detained between Feb. 29, 2022, and Jan. 30, 2024, were Facebook users.
The independent NGO also found that an average of 62 people were detained every month. Almost half of the detainees – nearly 700 people – were from the Yangon and Mandalay regions.
Data for Myanmar compiled data for the Jan. 31 report by monitoring junta-affiliated daily newspapers and news media.
Jailed for sharing news
Another social media-related arrest was that of Mandalay resident Khin Maung Chin, who was detained in December 2022 for sharing news articles and critiques of the military written by other Facebook users, a friend of his told RFA.
Khin Maung Chin was also found to have written messages about Aung San Suu Kyi, the head of the deposed National League for Democracy and the country’s former de facto leader.
And last November, junta troops raided the home of Yangon resident Min Nyo, who had worked to provide clothing and medicine to war victims.
A family member told RFA.that pro-military supporters had informed authorities about his online criticism of the junta. Min Nyo is also serving a sentence at Insein Prison, where many pro-democracy activists are held.
Freedom House noted in a report released in October that the junta has reduced broadband speeds, cut internet connections and blocked some text and calling services in areas where anti-regime resistance has been strong.
‘Procedure used by dictators’
Junta authorities have also restricted Burmese citizens from accessing social media platforms while junta-controlled publications frequently warn that people can be charged under the Penal Code and Telecommunications Law, the report said.
In December, the junta announced the formation of a committee to further monitor and take action against what people write and share online.
RFA’s attempts to reach junta spokesman Major Gen. Zaw Min Tun to ask about the Data for Myanmar report were unsuccessful.
However, junta officials have previously stated that the regime will take action if posted messages are aimed at inciting people to destroy the country’s peace and stability or to abolish the junta’s governing mechanism.
A former military officer told RFA that arresting people for critical comments is an understandable part of governing.
“As a ruler, he would arrest those who spoke ill of him,” he said. “This has become an obligation. It must be done. It is his job to arrest those who raised the rebellion.”
Aung Myo Min, the human rights minister for the shadow National Unity Government, criticized the arrests as merely a “procedure used by dictators to prevent people from speaking up” – not as a way to maintain stability..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"BANGKOK – ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) strongly condemns the decision by the Myanmar military to enforce a national conscription law that would mandate all men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 to serve for at least two years in the armed forces.
“We are deeply concerned about the impact the Conscription Law will have on the young people of Myanmar. This is yet another disgraceful attempt by the military junta to rule through fear and sabotage,” APHR Board Member and former Thai foreign minister Kasit Piromya said today.
The People’s Military Service Law was enacted in 2010 but never enforced or repealed under the National League for Democracy, despite calls to do so from civil society organizations. Nearly two decades later, the law is being implemented as the Myanmar junta’s bases and territory are rapidly being lost to the armed resistance forces. It is apparent that the junta is seeking to make up for the casualties it has lost at the cost of the future of Myanmar’s youth.
“This law seeks to undermine the youth-led struggle against the dictatorship and knowingly pits them against the opposition forces so many of them have supported. Its enactment also shows the utter cowardice of the Myanmar junta; they – quite literally – cannot fight their own battles,” Kasit said.
The announcement has caused widespread uncertainty for young people and their families who have no desire to serve under the military’s corrupt and violent dictatorship, which is deeply unpopular throughout the majority of the country. Myanmar’s young people have shown exceptional bravery in the wake of the military’s increasing violence and have done so to ensure their generation does not inherit another era of authoritarian rule. In a brutal and coordinated attempt to silence those efforts, the junta is forcing them to the frontlines.
“We urge ASEAN member states and the wider international community to help provide access, including visas and educational opportunities, to Myanmar youth who seek to flee to other countries ahead of the draft. We also call on the international community to recognize that this is a desperate attempt from a failing regime to cling to power and act decisively to support Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces and bring an end to the junta’s rule,” said Kasit..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Six are critically injured after being struck by shrapnel in a monastery compound, locals said.
Description:
"A drone test by pro-junta militia injured 13 children in Myanmar, residents told Radio Free Asia.
Regime soldiers working in collaboration with the Pyu Saw Htee militia are responsible for a weapons accident that occurred on Saturday, locals said. The militia is made up of pro-junta supporters, veterans and Buddhist nationalists.
The drone, carrying several bombs, flew over Sagaing region’s Kale township, close to the Chin state border. Soldiers are permanently stationed in Kale township’s Aung Myin Thar village, leading them to believe the attack was an accident, they added.
A resident who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons told RFA on Tuesday that a drone mounted with explosives flew over a nearby monastery compound when it suddenly crashed and exploded. Thirteen children playing in the monastery’s soccer field were injured when the bombs detonated.
“The military junta gave weapons to the Pyu Saw Htee members and they were testing them to carry out bombardments with drones that evening. The bombs fell on the soccer field where the children were playing,” he said. “Six of the children were critically injured. Some of them were hit in their faces and eyes. Some had to have their limbs amputated.”
The children who are critically injured are being treated at Kale city’s military hospital, while the remaining seven are being treated at Kale General Hospital in the township’s capital, he added. All victims are between the ages of eight and 15 years old, but identifying information is not known at this time.
The junta’s Ministry of Information released a statement on Tuesday saying that the accident was fake news, reporting that the blasts in Aung Myin Thar village were due to landmines planted by terrorists.
RFA contacted Sagaing region’s junta spokesperson Sai Naing Naing Kyaw for more details, but did not receive an answer.
According to data compiled by RFA, 1,429 civilians have been killed and 2,641 were injured by junta airstrikes and heavy artillery from the Feb. 1, 2021 coup until Jan. 31, 2024..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Children, Children's rights: reports of violations in Burma against more than one ethnic group, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Fighting continues in northern Rakhine State since the Arakan Army (AA) launched an offensive against Myanmar’s junta in mid-November last year.
The AA has seized Mrauk-U, Minbya, Kyauktaw and Pauktaw towns and Paletwa in southern Chin State along with numerous junta bases and border outposts.
The AA is attacking Rathedaung town and has told the Regional Operations Command in the state capital, Sittwe, to surrender. Sittwe is the junta’s administrative seat in Rakhine.
The regime blew up a bridge on the Yangon-Sittwe road to disrupt AA troops advances on the city and senior administrative officials have allegedly left Sittwe. Many of Sittwe’s residents have left but The Irrawaddy recently talked to someone who remains in the city.
What is the situation in Sittwe?
The AA has taken most of northern Rakhine State but Buthidaung has not fallen. The AA controls Paletwa, Kyauktaw, Minbya and Mrauk-U along the Kaladan River.
Only Sittwe is left. Many residents have fled and people fear the city could be flattened, like Pauktaw and Minbya.
Those who can afford it have gone to Yangon, Mandalay or Pyay. Half of the city has already fled and many are waiting to buy air tickets. Flights are apparently booked until late April. Canceled tickets cost around 700,000 kyats (US$200), about eight times the normal price.
The regime has blockaded Sittwe, which is surrounded by the Bay of Bengal and some try to escape by sea.
Residents fear fighting could break out at anytime and junta shelling and airstrikes will follow if fighting starts. They know about the regime’s indiscriminate attacks elsewhere.
Many residents cannot afford to leave and there is no way out from Sittwe if fighting breaks out.
We heard junta administrators are leaving Sittwe.
The government neighborhood is heavily guarded and cordoned off. We heard reports that they are moving to Thandwe [200km to the south].
Is there enough food despite the regime’s blockade?
Commodities are running low since the roads were blocked. Shops are selling off their stocks as they want to leave. They are not restocking. Garlic is unavailable and an onion costs 1,000 kyats.
We still can buy peppers from the Muslim villages but the fuel prices make it difficult to get there. Some cycle. A used bike sells for around 500,000 kyats.
Fuel has dropped from 30,000 kyats to around 18,000 kyats per liter. [The Yangon price is around 2,600 kyats].
There are no children’s snacks and rice and cooking oil prices have soared.
Many people left with nothing and they need blankets at night. They also need food. Fighting started more than three months ago and people are facing serious food shortages.
How are transport, communications and health care?
They have cut off internet access. And we can only use [military-owned] Mytel sims to make phone calls but the signal is unstable.
We switched to Mytel but we can’t transfer cash online.
Many people working in Thailand and Malaysia cannot transfer remittances.
I heard Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya and Ponnagyun are deserted.
Hospitals and clinics still operate.
The regime has imposed a curfew in Sittwe. A motorbike taxi driver was shot dead last week. No one knows who did it. Some blamed junta soldiers but others said it was the Arakan Liberation Party. The city is in panic.
How are residents earning a living in Sittwe?
Businesses have not been able to operate for months. People do odd-jobs and business owners eat what they have.
Many motorbike taxi drivers now use cycle-rickshaws due to high fuel prices. Theft has increased. The police are not interested in crime as they are busy ensuring their safety.
Fishing and trade are the main sources of income in Sittwe but businesses have closed and the streets are largely deserted..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"(CNN) — Anna wakes up about four times a night from dreams in which she is being sent to the front lines of a bloody war and forced to fight.
It’s a terrifying prospect that could become a reality for Anna and millions of her peers across Myanmar after the military junta activated a mandatory conscription law for all young men and women.
“We are in panic mode and are considering a way to escape,” said Anna, an educator in her 20s from the country’s south who requested to use a pseudonym to protect her safety. “I don’t think I can keep living in Myanmar.”
Three years on from its bloody coup, Myanmar’s military junta is facing the biggest challenge to its fragile hold on power as it struggles to fight a nationwide armed resistance on multiple fronts across the Southeast Asian nation.
The junta’s surprise announcement that it’s seeking to boost its armed forces with compulsory service prompted a rush by young people to get visas out of the country.
Videos shared on social media show long queues of people clutching documents at the Thai Embassy in Myanmar’s biggest city Yangon.
Young people told CNN they’re scrambling to figure out how to avoid being sent to the barracks, with some planning hasty exit strategies – illegal if necessary – from Myanmar or weighing up leaving their homes and families to join resistance forces that have taken up arms against the military.
Under the law, all men ages 18 to 35 and women ages 18 to 27 are required to serve for up to two years under military command. Specialists such as doctors up to age 45 must serve for three years.
Evading conscription is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine.
Analysts say the law, which has been on the books since the previous military regime in 2010 but not enacted until now, will force a young generation to fight their own people and could be used to justify human rights abuses. It could also result in further regional instability by sparking a mass exodus of people fleeing conscription into neighboring countries, they said.
Some say conscription is a desperate effort by the military to boost ranks depleted by death, desertions and defections.
“While wounded and increasingly desperate, the Myanmar military junta remains extremely dangerous,” Tom Andrews, United Nations Special Rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, said in a statement. “Troop losses and recruitment challenges have become existential threats for the junta, which faces vigorous attacks on frontlines all across the country. As the junta forces young men and women into the military ranks, it has doubled down on its attacks on civilians using stockpiles of powerful weapons.”
‘We don’t have another choice’
Myanmar’s military has been weakened by unprecedented coordination between ethnic armed organizations and resistance groups known as People’s Defense Forces, analysts say.
These groups, which support the National Unity Government in exile, and ethnic rebel armies have taken control of hundreds of strategic border towns, key military positions and vital trade routes since launching an offensive last October.
Analysis from the United States Insitute of Peace suggests the military only has about 150,000 personnel, including 70,000 combat soldiers — “barely able to sustain itself as a fighting force” — and has lost at least 30,000 soldiers since the coup.
Defense Minister Adm. Tin Aung San said the military has capacity to recruit up to 50,000 people a year and conscripts “will receive salary, rations, and entitlements according to their grades and qualifications,” according to the state mouthpiece Global New Light of Myanmar.
People who have been temporarily exempted from serving in the military — those with a medical reason, civil servants, students and carers — must return to serve even if over the age of military service, Ting Aung San said, according to the paper. Veterans could also be called up, the Global New Light reported.
Junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun said about 13 million young people would be eligible for conscription, with 60,000 men the first to be recruited reportedly beginning in April.
There’s little detail about how they’d be called up – and what training they’d receive to fight.
Young people CNN spoke to are scared that conscripts will be sent to the front lines – in mountainous, jungle terrain – without proper training.
“People know for sure that no matter what is written in the conscription law, they will have to go to the front lines. That is one thing that every person in the country is sure of,” said Kyaw Naing, 28, a teacher from Yangon region who requested to use a pseudonym for his security.
Myanmar's junta chief Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who ousted the elected government in 2021, presides at an army parade on Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw on March 27, 2021. Reuters
Aung Myo Min, human rights minister for the shadow government in exile said it has received reports of mass defections to People’s Defense Forces, with some soldiers abandoning the military because “they don’t have enough food and they are forced to take up a position to fight against civilians.”
Some of those former soldiers told the National Unity Government the military’s power has weakened, and it desperately needs recruits, according to Aung Myo Min.
But both Anna and Kyaw Naing say they’ll refuse to join their ranks.
Anna said she doesn’t have the money or connections to buy a visa out of the country, and worries the junta will be monitoring the airports, stopping those of age and arresting them.
Her parents have urged her to escape as soon as possible, but that means finding a way to cross the border illegally to Thailand.
“All the information on Facebook right now is about how to escape this country,” Anna said.
“From my side, I will try and do as much as possible to escape but if not, I will join (the People’s Defense Forces),” Anna said. “It seems like we don’t have another choice.”
Neighboring Thailand would likely be the country of choice for many of those deciding to flee.
Thailand’s Foreign Ministry told CNN Monday its embassy in Yangon has experienced an “increase in the number of Myanmar citizens applying for Thai visas in recent days” and was implementing a token system to process 400 walk-in applicants per day.
While Thailand has hosted Myanmar nationals fleeing conflict for decades in displacement camps along the border, it has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and considers those fleeing persecution to be illegal immigrants, who face jail and potential deportation.
Reports of kidnappings and arrests
For Kyaw Naing, fleeing to Thailand is not an option as he is the sole breadwinner of his family and cares for his elderly parents.
“If I leave, no one is there to look after them. I just have to survive,” he said.
Kyaw Naing says he’s stopped going out at night for fear he’ll be arrested and sent to the barracks.
“My parents are afraid I might be kidnapped by police and soldiers when I’m on my way back home from work, or when I go outside to hang out with my friends, or even when I go out to throw litter into the dustbin in the street,” Kyaw Naing said.
Even before the announcement of the mandatory conscription law, local media has reported an increase in the arrests of young people in several towns and cities and military vehicles picking people up in the street. There are also reports of dozens of young people detained at airports in western Rakhine state in recent days, with no official explanation.
CNN cannot independently verify the reports and has reached out to the military for comment.
Khin Ohmar, founder and chairperson of Progressive Voices, a Myanmar human rights research and advocacy organization, said the conscription law will “provide the junta legal cover for abusive forced recruitment practices — grabbing young men and women, especially the disenfranchised and impoverished including minors, from bus stops and factories in the cities.”
Maung Nyein, 32, lives and works in Yangon, and worries how his wife and 8-year-old daughter will cope if he’s forced to serve.
“In Myanmar, young people are not safe anymore,” said Maung Nyein, who also requested to use a pseudonym for safety reasons. “If you are forced to enter the military, there are so many things to worry about.”
The prospect of being forced to fight and kill his compatriots terrifies him.
“In other countries, this law is to train you in case of another country’s invasion, but here there is civil war going on. This is to force you to kill each other.”
CNN has reached out to Myanmar’s military spokesperson for comment but has not received a response.
The junta’s ministry of Immigration and Population said in a statement that there is “no restriction on overseas leave” and international airports and the entry and exit points with neighboring countries “are operating as usual,” according to Global New Light.
The junta also denied that its “security forces and administrative organizations are conscripting youths for military training and arresting passers-by,” calling it “misinformation” spread by “malicious media networks.”
Forced labor already happening
Myanmar’s military has a long and documented history of using civilians as human shields or forcibly recruiting them to work in the army, either as porters – carrying military equipment to and from the front lines — or performing the risky task of clearing land mines from fields.
A major concern is that the law will be used by the military to legalize this practice.
A report from the International Labour Organization’s commission of inquiry from October 2023 found that since the coup, the Myanmar military junta “continues to exact different types of forced labor in the context of armed conflict … as well as forced recruitment into the army.”
Wing Ko, a farmer from Shwebo in central Sagaing region, said he was forcibly recruited to work for the military for three months in 2023.
“One day when I was in my tent, a military troop caught me and took me to carry their clothes and weapons,” Wing Ko told CNN, using a pseudonym for safety. “After that, I was forced to walk all day with their stuff,” he said. “There were days I didn’t get to eat and drink.”
He says he was one of 42 men, most over the age of 50 with the youngest just 16, who were forcibly taken by junta troops from their villages.
“If we knew the areas, we were forced to walk in front of them so that they don’t risk themselves (standing on) land mines.”
Wing Ko said those who tried to escape were shot and killed. CNN cannot independently verify his account.
“I never thought I would see my family again. When I got home, I felt like I came back from being dead,” he said.
Maung Aye, also from Sagaing region, said six people from his village were taken by the military in June last year and forced to carry clothes and weapons.
He said there’s no way his neighbors would willingly join them.
“Our villagers won’t join the military forces or leave the country, instead we will join our resistance forces. I won’t let my children be taken by the military, instead I’d rather risk them joining the (People’s Defense Forces) for the revolution’s sake,” said Maung Aye, who also used a pseudonym for safety.
Impact on millions of young people
Conscription is not just about boosting troop numbers, analysts and human rights workers say, but a means to break up the powerful democratic resistance movement that has only gained in strength since the coup.
“The junta’s decision to enforce the conscription law now is also a way to remove the young people who were spearheading the Spring Revolution from the civilian population and put them in positions where they are likely to be killed or to kill their fellow people,” said Khin Ohmar.
The law would allow corruption, extortion and crime to flourish and could exacerbate a brain drain that’s already seen many young people leave Myanmar, impacting education and the labor market, which would “cause utter devastation to the country,” she said.
Those too young to be conscripted are already feeling the weight of the law.
“Today one of my teens asked me if all the lessons she is learning right now in class are still useful for her life in the future if she has to go to the front line,” Kyaw Naing said of his student.
“I was deeply saddened by that.”
Kyaw Naing says he’d join the resistance if faced with conscription. But he would offer to teach over holding a gun.
“I don’t want to kill people,” he said. “But if the situation pushes me to do it, I will have to. I won’t have a choice.”..."
Source/publisher:
"CNN" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"As many Myanmar people flee their country to evade its regime’s mandatory military service law, neighboring Thailand has warned that Myanmar nationals entering illegally would face legal action.
The Myanmar junta recently activated the People’s Military Service Law as the army struggles to contain an anti-junta insurgency. The move was met with a public outcry as military officials announced that 14 million of the country’s young people are eligible for conscription. That amounts to 26 percent of the country’s population of 54 million.
Since the announcement of the enforcement of the law, the number of Myanmar citizens applying for visas to enter Thailand has increased sharply.
“They are welcome if they enter the country legally. But if they sneak into the country illegally, legal action will be taken against them. I already discussed the matter with security agencies,” Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin said.
The prime minister also tried to allay concerns that Myanmar immigrants would take jobs away from local people, stressing that one of the reasons Myanmar citizens are currently fleeing to Thailand is to avoid mandatory military service, the Bangkok Post reported.
He also said Thailand’s unemployment rate is currently lower than 1 percent and that it still needs many more laborers from neighboring countries, though they must follow proper procedures to work in the country.
Thailand shares a more than 2,400-km-long border with Myanmar and has a long history of sheltering people displaced by fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed groups on the border. There are also 2.1 million migrant workers from Myanmar registered to work in Thailand as of January 2024.
Since the Myanmar junta’s military coup in 2021, Bangkok has seen new arrivals: political activists evading arrest by the the regime, as well as well-to-do families who left Myanmar for greener pastures.
There have been reports of people who entered Thailand illegally via the border being arrested.
Since the announcement of the conscription law, the Thai Embassy in Yangon has been coping with an influx of visa applicants. It recently announced that it would only accept 400 applications per day, effective from last Thursday.
Meanwhile, the number of people entering Thailand via its border with Myanmar’s southern Shan State is on the rise. Local people said this was due to the junta’s national conscription law as well as mandatory military service requirements imposed by some local ethnic armed groups active in the state..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Laws, decrees, bills and regulations relating to nationality, citizenship and immigration (texts), Other laws impacting on civil and political rights, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"20 February 2024: Comments from SAC-M’s founding members in response to the Myanmar military’s decision to enforce the 2010 conscription law:
Marzuki Darusman: “Myanmar’s youth have been abandoned to wage a three-year long struggle alone against military tyranny in pursuit of a Myanmar built on peace, justice and human rights. If the UN and ASEAN allow Min Aung Hlaing to forcibly conscript millions of young people into his junta death cult, then they will be further complicit in denying Myanmar this future.”
Chris Sidoti: “The Myanmar military’s conscription implementation reflects its desperation. They are losing the war and have run out of ideas. This is an indication that the junta’s total collapse is only a matter of time.”
Yanghee Lee: “Min Aung Hlaing’s forced conscription directive won’t save him or his junta. Instead, his depraved attack on the country’s future illustrates he is willing to destroy an entire generation rather than accept the failure of his disastrous coup. He must accept that the old military playbook will not work this time.”..."
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"While the world’s attention has been focused on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the civil war in Myanmar has taken an unexpected turn back toward democracy. In the battle between the military junta — which staged a coup in 2021 to pre-empt the seating of Aung San Suu Kyi’s newly re-elected government — and the representatives of that government, the resistance now seems to be winning.
That shift in what has been at times a horrifyingly brutal war by the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, against its own citizens, has implications for democracy in the region, for China’s regional role and foreign policy, and for the future of an imprisoned leader whose status as an icon of freedom has been tarnished internationally but who remains a national cult figure at home.
This is but the latest chapter in Myanmar’s struggle for democracy, which — from its independence in 1948 through its shedding of the colonial name of Burma in 1989, through the democratic rise of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) — has swung like a pendulum between military dictatorship and elected government.
After the country’s democratic transition began in 2011, Aung San Suu Kyi finally became state counsellor. Her National League for Democracy won another landslide victory in 2020, but the military once more seized power on February 1, 2021 before the government could be sworn in. The coup triggered massive protests. Far more threatening to the military junta, or Tatmadaw, were the speed and skill of the defeated government in galvanizing the entire opposition. Within weeks, they had established an alternative power centre, the National Unity Government (NUG) — for which I, full disclosure, serve as an unofficial advisor — with multi-ethnic representation in its leadership, including the Rohingya, for the first time in the nation’s history.
Thousands of young people fled to the cities to join the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) — the NUG’s army — transformed from shop clerks and students into guerrilla fighters in training camps in the highland jungles. Today, the PDF and the ethnic armed organizations fight under joint commands, their unity a weapon against decades of tactical ethnic division sown by the military. They have now seized nearly half of the national territory.
Three things make this challenge different from any previous battle with the Tatmadaw. First, today’s resistance struggle comes after nearly a decade of partial democratization under the NLD. Many of the young soldiers fighting the army today were part of the first generation to grow up under increasing — if still fragile and partial — democracy. They want it back.
Secondly, the army badly miscalculated the skillful political leaders of the government they had deposed. The NUG quickly reached out internally to build political and military alliances with the now-powerful ethnic community governments and armies; and externally to a broad network of international allies.
Within a year, the PDF and the so-called “ethnic armed organisations” were creating new legal, medical and educational institutions on the ground in liberated territories. A year later, a series of attacks by the NUG’s military joint commands were inflicting heavy losses on the Tatmadaw.
Many of the young soldiers fighting the army today were part of the first generation to grow up under increasing — if still fragile and partial — democracy. They want it back.
Finally, the wanton cruelty and lawlessness with which the junta waged war; bombing schools, hospitals, and entire villages began to turn sentiment even in its former strongholds. The opposition took in thousands of defectors and many thousands of Myanmar people fled into neighbouring countries. This year, the army has begun forcible kidnapping of citizens to serve as its porters and human shields. It recently announced a massive conscription drive, which the NUG has vowed to resist.
The most serious turning point came last fall, when the world was watching the Middle East. On October 27, the joint rebel forces of the Three Brotherhood Alliance staged “Operation 1027”, capturing key cities, towns, and military basesalong the northern border with China. It was a shock to the junta and a deep concern to Beijing. China’s always-opportunistic foreign policy was strained by this new turn in the conflict. They had carefully balanced support for the junta, feeding it billions of dollars in resource revenues and military assistance, and the ethnic organizations, several of whom were of majority Chinese ethnicity. It seems likely that as the opposition continues to seize more territory, and morale among the junta forces sags more and more deeply, that China will in the end support the opposition. China rarely backs a loser, and the junta’s days seem numbered.
The big question facing the NUG now is what happens the day after victory. The country has no history of shared governance. In some areas, they have only decades of warfare. The institutions on the ground, for a country of 55 million people, in medicine, law and local governance are shallow or non-existent. The challenges of finding common ground among peoples who are separated by language, history, and in the case of the Rohingya and other Muslims, by religion, could not be more daunting.
Some regional pundits predict that a new opposition government will inevitably fail over internal tensions within a year or two and the army will come marching back in. That is not merely spin on behalf of the war criminals who lead the Tatmadaw. They have billions of dollars squirrelled away from decades of corruption. They have a massive military infrastructure. They have a record of success in stirring up conflict between and among the various ethnic communities who surround them.
Still, it would not be prudent to see this latest battle against the military as facing the same end as previous collisions. For the reasons cited above — new alliances, a new generation of citizen soldiers committed to democracy, and a skillful and demonstrably capable cadre of leaders already successful in creating a new government with a broad commitment to a loosely federal democracy; this time, the odds are better.
The early months, post-victory, will turn on how quickly and how firmly a new government can bring all of its internal partners to agree on some governance minimums. They have wisely set the consensus bar low, and the transition process long. They recognize that communities that have operated as nation states, with their own legal systems, taxation frameworks, and local bureaucracies are not quickly going to cede all of that to a new central government in Yangon.
Nor are they going to be willing to make detailed long-term commitments without some evidence that there is a feasible path forward that includes everyone. The tension has already emerged behind the scenes between the seize-the-moment, ‘go faster’ caucus and the careful, ‘slow and patient’ caucus.
As Canada’s constitutional wars revealed, the only successful path forward — with far fewer issues and groups — is one of slow trust-building, endless meetings that build that trust, friendships across borders, and the recognition that one may need many small steps over many years before even seeing the finish line. Our process took nearly 40 years, from Victoria to Charlottetown, and is only partially successful to this day. Canada and other nations have contributed some of our best brains in constitution-making to the most difficult and risky task there is in governing.
Another key early task will be swift investigation and then prosecution of war crimes. Not only because it is the essential moral responsibility after a conflict so targeted at killing women and children, but also because it will give early proof and confidence to a skeptical nation that this time it really will be different.
Russia and China have been aiding the junta in training and equipment on the battlefield. They have to understand that they could become the targets of greater sanctions than those already imposed —and that they are wasting their time and money on a losing battle. The ASEAN nations have been powerless in attempting to find a way to return to democracy — not entirely surprising, since fewer than half of the members can claim any democratic credentials themselves.
Canada has an international expert on Myanmar in our service in UN Ambassador (and Policy contributor) Bob Rae, who did the definitive study of the Rohingya genocide and its consequences. He remains deeply involved in bridge-building among allies of the fight for democracy. The EU and the US have both strongly condemned the junta, and granted money and political support to the NUG.
This year could be the year that these elements come together. With greater public support, and private assistance from its international allies, 2024 could be the year that Myanmar returns to the club of nations attempting to build stable and free democracies.
Veteran political strategist and Policy Contributing Writer Robin V. Sears lived and worked in Tokyo as Ontario’s senior diplomat and later as a management consultant in Hong Kong. Today he serves as a volunteer senior advisor to the leadership of the NUG..."
Source/publisher:
Policy Magazine
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"As the resistance forces gain momentum in the Spring Revolution, the Myanmar military, disparagingly known as the Sit-Tat, finds itself increasingly on the defensive. Amidst this backdrop, the State Administration Council (SAC) announced on February 10, 2024, the enforcement of the 2010 Conscription Law, a move widely perceived as another ill-judged attempt by General Min Aung Hlaing to drag the entire nation down with him.
The People’s Military Service Law, enacted by the State Peace and Development Council—the precursor to the SAC—and signed into law by General Than Shwe on November 4, 2010, mandates service in the armed forces for all men aged 18 to 35 (extending to 45 for those with professional expertise) and women aged 18 to 27 (extending to 35 for those with professional expertise) for a period of two years, which can be extended to five years during national emergencies. Failure to comply with conscription can result in imprisonment for up to five years, a fine, or both.1,2
The question arises: why resurrect this 14-year-old law now? The apprehensive coup leader highlighted the law at the Veterans Convention on November 22, 2021, and again at the SAC’s annual meeting on February 2, 2022.3,4
According to Ye Myo Hein, a visiting Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, the Sit-Tat had approximately 150,000 members, including around 70,000 combatants, as of May 2023.5 However, there has been a significant decrease in morale and numbers among the military due to a series of defeats inflicted by the coordinated democratic forces across Myanmar as well as an increase in casualties, desertions, defections, and detentions as prisoners of war since Operation 1027 in October 2023.6,7In addition to colossal losses on the battlefields, the junta has also experienced severe setbacks on the economic front due to Western sanctions.
In a desperate bid to replenish his depleted forces, General Min Aung Hlaing attempted two unsuccessful measures. On November 14, 2023, the members of the University Training Corps were ordered to report their biodata to the Directorate of People Militia and Border Guard Forces. On December 21, 2023, 645 deserters were released from prisons under a decree with the stipulation that they re-enlist.9
After these two attempts failed, the “Commander-in-Mischief” opted for what many see as a last-ditch effort: the enforcement of Conscription Law on February 10, 2024, followed by the activation of Reserved Military Force Law on February 13, 2024.10 The latter mandates veterans to serve in the reserved force for five years post-retirement.
The repercussions of the Conscription Law have far-reaching consequences, affecting not only the people and the junta but also the revolution and neighboring countries. The plan to draft 60,000 young men and women starting in mid-April has already triggered widespread panic, prompting a mass exodus of the youth. Families of the 13 million youth in Myanmar are feeling the acute impact, compounded by economic hardships, shortages of essential goods, soaring prices, and inflation. The private sector is further burdened, being compelled to continue paying salaries for drafted employees.
This law will essentially sanction a longstanding abusive practice of coerced military service, which has been both ad hoc and illegal. The generals may hope to replace experienced troops with these inexperienced recruits, using them primarily as cannon fodder. However, forced enslavement runs the risk of these reluctant conscripts turning their weapons against their own ranks or becoming informants. Morale is expected to plummet further as troops witness their relatives being forcibly conscripted, potentially driving more individuals to join the armed resistance.
In response, the National Unity Government (NUG) issued a statement on February 13, 2024, stating that “the NUG of Myanmar, in collaboration with allied organizations will take all necessary measures to prevent the junta’s attempted roll out of forced conscription and will address dangers faced by the public.”8 This reflects a strategic and thoughtful approach by the NUG and Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) to avoid the pitfalls of the junta’s scheme, which would result in the displacement of young individuals—a scenario that would pose immense challenges in terms of accommodation, basic needs, and security.
In the words of Sun Tzu, “Know thyself and know thy enemy,” and “Who wishes to fight must first count the cost. Don’t let sacrifices sneak up on you. Whatever path you take, know the consequences.” The revolutionary leaders are thus urged to remain vigilant, not allowing the junta’s actions to distract from the broader goals of the revolution.
The international community, and particularly neighboring countries, must brace for a massive humanitarian crisis due to significant influx of migrants, including a surge in unregulated and hazardous labor migration, on top of the existing refugee crisis and cross-border instability. This situation underscores the role of the Myanmar military as the primary source of chaos within country and a key contributor to regional instability.
Despite the turmoil, there lies an opportunity to dismantle the military dictatorship. The people of Myanmar are called upon to deepen their engagement in the Spring Revolution and to support the revolutionary forces with prudence, patience, and perseverance. The revolution must ensure that conscription becomes a constriction not for the people’s movement but for the military dictators themselves.
References:
http://www.asianlii.org/mm/legis/laws/pmslpadcln272010638.pdf
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/analysis/six-key-points-about-myanmars-newly-enforced-conscription-law.html
https://vk.com/@sac.council-mnof
https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/junta-leader-wants-conscription-law-2020-02042022065126.html
https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/myanmars-military-smaller-commonly-thought-and-shrinking-fast
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/charting-the-shifting-power-balance-on-myanmars-battlefields.html
https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/the-existential-threat-facing-myanmars-junta.html
https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/02/15/7181
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gH1Fu9B_TT0
https://www.myanmaritv.com/news/myanmar-reserve-forces-law-sac-enforced-reserve-military-force-law ..."
Source/publisher:
East Asia Forum
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The People’s Representatives Committee for Federalism (PRCF) published its constitution for a federal democracy on Feb. 12.
The committee comprises 12 political parties: the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Arakan League for Democracy, Karen National Party, Zomi Congress for Democracy, Democratic Party for a New Society, United Nationalities Democracy Party, Danu Nationalities Democracy Party, Daingnet National Development Party, Mro National Democracy Party, Karen National Party, Shan State Kokang Democratic Party and Mon Affairs Association.
Previously known as the PRF, the committee changed its name to PRCF in March 2021.
Sai Kyaw Nyunt, a joint secretary of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, recently spoke with The Irrawaddy about the objectives of the constitution and its most important features.
What is the intention of publishing a constitution?
It has been nearly two years since we drafted the constitution in 2022. So, we decided that it was time to publish it.
What is the PRCF?
The PRCF was formed after the 2021 coup. It comprises primarily members of the United Nationalities Alliance and their partners.
The PRCF mentioned three main tasks in its statement about publishing its constitution. Can you elaborate on them?
We can’t accept any form of dictatorship, either military dictatorship or civilian dictatorship. The conflict in our country since independence is deeply connected to the constitution. The 1974 constitution did not meet the wishes of the people and the same is true of the 2008 constitution.
In our view, federalism is the best [form of government] for this highly diverse and multi-ethnic country. But federalism alone is not enough. There must also be democracy. So, there is a need for a federal, democratic constitution. But again, a constitution alone is not enough. Peaceful co-existence is also critically important for us to come together to form and maintain a union.
How do you see the current political landscape in Myanmar?
Myanmar is at war now. We are politicians so we don’t know much about military affairs. Military solutions alone can’t solve problems in a country. Space for politics is necessary. It is more powerful than military action in terms of fulfilling the wishes of the people. We want things handled peacefully.
So, your political parties prefer non-violence?
We don’t want to say which is right and which is wrong. I am only talking about our tendency. By political means, I mean…… you don’t necessarily have to establish a party and contest the election. You may oppose the voting, and release statements about your views. These are all political means. Dialogue is also a political means. This is what we believe.
What drove the PRCF to design a constitution?
Eleven of the 12 organizations in the PRCF are political parties. We believe certain conditions must be met for our country to have greater peace and stability. So, we have designed the constitution, outlining the conditions that we think are necessary to have peace and stability. Those parties have won votes and support from people in their respective constituencies. So, we designed the constitution to convey our idea about an ideal union.
What are the salient points about your constitution?
We refer to four documents: the fundamental principles of the PRCF, the fundamental principles in a federal democracy charter, the constitution from the Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordinating Committee, and the constitution from the UNA and allies. Our constitution touches upon new topics, such as financial matters, relations between government agencies, and administration and public services.
So, is it fair to say the constitution drafted by the PRFC is one that reflects the federal democracy charter declared by anti-regime political forces?
We can’t say so. Many organizations, including ethnic armed organizations, were involved in designing the federal democracy charter. Our constitution was drafted solely by PRCF members, but it can be used as a draft for all the stakeholders to discuss in the future.
Will you accept recommendations, if there are any, to your constitution?
We are willing to accept any recommendation that does not go against our principles.
The military regime upholds the 2008 Constitution. What will you say if they say they don’t accept your constitution?
We represent people to a certain extent, and we live among the people. So, the constitution represents our view of what this country should be like. Everyone is aware that one group or organization representing all the others was not successful. We need to try to write a constitution that is acceptable to all by negotiating between all stakeholders.
How did stakeholders in the country respond to your constitution?
No one has yet strongly responded to our constitution. It was only published recently, and perhaps stakeholders are still studying it. Our constitution is largely based on documents of ethnic armed organizations, ethnic political organizations and ethnic Bamar organizations. So, there won’t be much difference between ours and theirs.
There might be differences in the way we operate, but I don’t think there will be much disagreement regarding policies. The policies of the regime and the military, however, can be markedly different from ours. In the future, we will have to accept what is best for the people.
What is the PRCF’s next step?
We established political parties to do our share for the country. So, we will continue to work in our way to restore peace and build a country that all citizens want to see..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Myanmar: Journalist tortured and killed in military custody
The body of Western News journalist Myat Thu Tan has been found after he was shot and killed by military personnel on January 31, along with seven other political prisoners in the custody of Myanmar’s ruling junta. The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and its affiliate, Myanmar Journalist Network (MJN), strongly condemn this horrific murder and call on the military junta to immediately prosecute those responsible and cease the rampant impunity for crimes against journalists in Myanmar.
The body of journalist Myat Thu Tan was found on February 5, after he was shot and killed by military personnel in Myanmar's Rakhine state. Credit: Western News
According to IFJ sources, Myat Thu Tan, also known as Phoe Thiha, was shot by two personnel from the Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 378 in a detainment ward in Mrauk-U Town, in Myanmar’s western Rakhine state. Myat Thu Tan was a contributor with online media outlet Western News as well as a reporter for Democratic Voice of Burma, one of the country’s largest independent media organisations.
The journalist’s body was discovered buried in a bomb shelter in the battalion’s headquarters near the town’s hospital, along with six other political prisoners including rapper Kyaw Zan Wai, after the ethnic armed organisation Arakan Army seized the camp on February 5 following several days of fighting. Local media reported the bodies found at the showed signs of torture.
The prisoners had been charged by the junta under its amended Section 505 (A) of the country’s Penal Code, which criminalises ‘causing fear, spreading false news, or agitating directly or indirectly criminal offences against a Government employee.’ The draconian legislation has been consistently used to target journalists in the three years since the military coup on February 1, 2021.
The junta has yet to issue a statement on the incident, with Myat Thu Tan’s family not notified of his death. The journalist was arrested on September 22, 2022 at his Mrauk-U home for social media posts critical of the junta, and had not been tried or convicted before his death.
Amidst intensifying conflict with rebel groups across the country, the junta announced a new mandatory conscription law effective from February 10 for all men aged 18 to 35, and all women aged 18-27. In the days following, thousands of young people have been documented attempting to flee the new legislation into neighbouring countries.
The MJN said: “The killing of Myat Thu Tun along with other civilians constitutes the highest threat and intimidation to journalists working in conflict areas. Despite stepping back from the media field a few years ago, the junta continues to see him as a journalist, which triggered his killing. This case stresses that journalists could be killed at any time in Myanmar by the junta forces.”
The IFJ said:“The IFJ condemns the heinous, cold-blooded killing of Myat Thu Tan as an attack on press freedom to the highest degree. Held in pre-trial detention without conviction, the journalist and six other civilians were purposefully tortured and murdered by military personnel, with their bodies subsequently discarded. The junta must put an end to the impunity running rife in Myanmar and ensure those responsible are immediately brought to justice.”..."
Source/publisher:
International Federation of Journalists
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Freedom of opinion and expression: - the situation in Burma/Myanmar - reports, analyses, recommendations, Freedom of Opinion and Expression - tools for change in Burma/Myanmar, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"For all the rhetoric surrounding Myanmar’s instability since its coup d’état in 2021, those paying close attention to Myanmar recognize an even more important fact: it may only become more unstable. The essential combination of historical precedent and political theory suggests that not only is Myanmar better off with a centralized government, but that if it maintains its crash course towards decentralization, it will result in devastating consequences for all different populations in Myanmar. If international actors advocating for the restoration of a democratic Myanmar fail to intervene or otherwise assist democratic advocates in Myanmar, the ensuing conflicts will ravage the state and destabilize an increasingly strategically important region.
The inherent nature of Myanmar as a multi-ethnic state has been a source of division since its independence in 1948. Its consistent oppression of the Rohingya people resulted in massive sources of conflict in 2012 and 2017, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Yet the recent coup has in many ways united many minority groups, creating a common enemy out of the oppressive majority government, which has forced armed rebel groups to work synchronously to effectively combat the military government. Al Jazeera reports that the unity of these armed groups has resulted in the creation of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, composed of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, which have waged combat against the military junta quite effectively, and garnered significant momentum since late 2023.
When considering the overall instability of the region, the military junta’s proven inability to establish sovereignty at home and legitimacy abroad has become flashpoints of concern. The Associated Press reports that inflation and displacement are increasing in Myanmar, whilst economic growth remains stagnant at best. Furthermore, as armed groups establish their own regions of governance, the decentralization of power will likely result in further economic decline and civilian safety. According to the United States Institute of Peace, the junta’s inability to maintain control over specific regions controlled by ethnic minority groups has also destabilized trade in the region, led to increased crime, starvation, and homelessness. It must be acknowledged that the current form of governance in Myanmar is unacceptable from a moral and political standpoint. The Guardian reports that since the military took over in 2021, 4,000 civilians have died at the hands of the military, and the possibility that crimes against humanity have been committed has been raised by multiple rights groups. Yet the success of armed groups in rebelling against the military has and will continue to only increase these issues. Decentralization has rarely worked in global politics, and although the prospect of multiple ethnicities experiencing self-determination appears a flowery and conclusive concept, the inevitable consequences are frightening. Even in scenarios where ethnic, religious, or racial groups have managed to split into their self-governing states, it is not a process that has occurred peacefully or accompanied by economic growth. Whether it is an artificial split, a practical split, or a blend of both, the potential for genocide, protracted conflict, and continued oppression persists. Examples of these are plentiful, whether it be Yugoslavia in the early 1990s or Palestine in the 1940s, these regions still maintain incredibly volatile conflicts. Myanmar appears to be set on the same path if multiple ethnic groups continue to establish power within their own regions and decentralize Myanmar as a whole.
It becomes increasingly imperative that the U.S. and other powerful actors stand by supposed liberal values and intervene. The prospect of increased instability in Myanmar is disconcerting to all actors in the region and on the international stage. Additionally, the idea that a democratic state could turn into a decentralized failed state within a decade raises serious concerns about the international community’s commitment to these ideals and capability in addressing them. Amid this crisis, China has become an increasingly relevant actor, stepping in to act as a mediator between rebel groups and the military junta, reports Reuters. Motivated by threats to trade and the potential for a refugee crisis, China has acted in its own self-interest in attempting to stabilize the conflict as much as possible. This contrasts sharply with the actions of important Western actors, who provide only lip service to the values of democratic freedom and anti-authoritarianism that they purportedly espouse. Sanctions and condemnations are insufficient in providing necessary change, and China’s proposed rules of order in international politics will only gain more traction the longer the West allows states to drift further towards authoritarian structures. Advocacy for the restoration of Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic government should become a focal point of the Biden administration’s Southeast Asian foreign policy agenda. If it does not, the U.S. becomes complicit in the demise of yet another potential democracy..."
Source/publisher:
The Diplomatic Envoy - Seton Hall University
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The United States strongly condemns the January 7 airstrike on Kanan Village in the Sagaing Region town of Khampat, Burma. Reporting indicates this latest attack killed at least 17 civilians, including nine children. This is yet another example of the horrors experienced by people in Burma since the military coup and the violence it has fueled across the country.
We reiterate our call on the Burma military regime to cease all forms of violence, free all those unjustly detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and respect the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. The regime must abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law, including with regard to the protection of civilians.
We reaffirm our continued support of the Five Point Consensus, and stress that the United Nations Security Council must fully implement Resolution 2669 and also consider further actions to stem the regime’s violence. The United States underlines its commitment to using all tools at the Security Council’s disposal to support ASEAN’s efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis, a commitment affirmed by the vast majority of the Security Council.
The United States will continue to support peace, human rights, and an inclusive dialogue to promote genuine and inclusive democracy in Burma through our work with members of the Security Council, other UN Member States, and regional partners, including ASEAN.
The people of Burma, after nearly three years since the military wrested power away from the democratically elected government, are looking to us all for support. The international community must step up and speak out..."
Source/publisher:
United States Mission to the United Nations Office of Press and Public Diplomacy
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"This decision, mandating service for men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27, comes amidst intensifying conflicts with resistance forces and widespread international condemnation of the junta’s legitimacy and actions. As a result, a significant exodus towards relative safety is underway, with Thailand becoming a primary destination for those fleeing conscription and conflict.
Thailand stands at a crossroads, presented with a humanitarian dilemma and a strategic opportunity. The flow of young, potentially skilled individuals from Myanmar poses a question of not just moral duty but also of long-term benefits to the Thai workforce and society at large. It is a moment that calls for compassion, foresight, and leadership from the Thai government and its people.
First and foremost, welcoming the young refugees from Myanmar is a humanitarian imperative. These individuals are seeking to escape serving a regime that has been widely criticized for its oppressive tactics, human rights abuses, and illegitimate claim to power..."
Source/publisher:
ASEAN Now
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-16
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese refugees in other countries, The discussion on humanitarian assistance to Burma, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The junta’s Labor Ministry has instructed overseas employment agencies to suspend recruitment drives as of Feb. 13, according to the Myanmar Overseas Employment Agencies Association (MOEAA).
The suspension comes after the regime introduced mandatory military service for the young population, which is expected to trigger a stampede for the border. Nationwide, 14 million people – 6.3 million men and 7.7 million women – are eligible for conscription, according to the 2019 census.
The ministry has not issued an official suspension notice but instead replied to agencies seeking permission to post recruitment letters that it had stopped accepting international employment offers.
“The ministry said it had suspended accepting job offers from around the world as of Feb. 13. It did not say how long the suspension would last,” said an MOEAA official.
The abrupt suspension has created problems for employment agencies, said a manager.
“We have to spend a lot of time to get a letter of job offers. We have to negotiate an agreement with the foreign employer, and there is a long process before we get the contract to hire people for him. The ministry has now suspended it abruptly, which causes problems for us,” said the manager.
The order does not affect people hired for job contracts posted before Feb. 13.
Employment agencies send 500 to 800 legal migrant workers daily to Thailand under a government-to-government memorandum of understanding. Between 200 and 300 people are sent daily to other countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Japan.
The conscription law, which was activated by the regime on Feb. 10, requires all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to serve in the Myanmar military for two to five years.
The call-up to fight in a military widely reviled for perpetrating countless war crimes on civilians is expected to accelerate young people’s plans to study or work abroad..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, International labour standards and mechanisms
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
After a recent junta announcement on mandatory service, youths look for ways to get to Thailand.
Description:
"Young people in Myanmar’s commercial capital are lining up outside the Thai embassy to apply for visas and looking for other ways to leave the country following an announcement from the junta regime that it will call up conscripts for mandatory military service.
Starting in April, about 5,000 people each month will be enrolled into the military to perform “national defense duties,” junta spokesman Maj. Gen. Zaw Min Tun said in an interview with BBC Burmese.
Zaw Min Tun told several junta-affiliated newspapers on Thursday that as many as 50,000 men will be recruited this year into the military, which has suffered numerous battlefield defeats and large-scale surrenders in recent months.
In Yangon, young people have already started heading for the Thai border, which is about 420 km (260 miles) away, several residents told Radio Free Asia.
About 50 people – most of them young – had already formed a queue in front of the Thai embassy at 5:30 a.m. on Thursday, one Yangon resident, who didn’t want to be named for security reasons, said to RFA.
Additionally, young people riding on city buses are talking to each other about entering the Buddhist monkhood to avoid military service if they get out of the country, the Yangon resident said.
They all seemed deeply worried, he added.
Because of the recent rush of visa applicants, the Thai embassy said in a statement on Wednesday that only 400 applicants would be accepted per day.
Also, the Buddhist University in Thailand’s city of Chiang Mai, which has an affordable tuition fee, announced Wednesday that it is no longer accepting applicants from Myanmar because it had already received too many applications.
‘They have lost their way’
An poor job market and the turmoil of the ongoing civil war had already made it very difficult for young people to build a life for themselves in the country, a young man who also lives in Yangon told RFA.
Now, with the enforcement of the conscription law, young people know for certain that they don’t have a future in Myanmar, the young man said.
“All of them are preparing to leave the country because there are no jobs for them,” he said. “Now, with the implementation of this conscription law, they have lost their way.”
The young man said he had been searching for jobs in Japan, but is now focusing on finding work in neighboring Thailand.
“I heard that the junta is blocking workers from going abroad,” he said. “I also heard that [they block] new job offers by foreign countries. It’s hard to leave the country.”
Sai Kyi Zin Soe, a political commentator, said that targeting young people – who typically have the highest productivity among all age groups – will damage the country’s economy and cause widespread resentment.
“It is natural for many people who have their own goals in life to avoid armed conflicts,” he said. “They are educated young people. They can learn things. We see the targeting of this age group for use in conflict – to gain political advantage – as a very bad move.”
State-level committees
Zaw Min Tun’s comments on Thursday about conscription followed a Feb. 10 announcement from junta leader Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing that a military service law enacted in 2010 by a previous military regime would go into effect immediately.
Enforcement of the law comes as anti-junta forces and ethnic armies have scored significant victories against the military in Myanmar’s civil war, which escalated in October 2023 when the rebel groups joined together and launched new offensives, causing significant casualties.
Under Min Aung Hlaing’s directive, Burmese men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 could face up to five years in prison if they refuse to serve for two years.
Doctors, engineers and technicians – aged 18-45 for men and 18-35 for women – must also serve, but up to five years.
In the initial rounds, fewer women will be recruited, Zaw Min Tun told state media.
The junta will appoint a central committee and regional- and state-level committees to oversee the conscription, according to Zaw Min Tun. But because the junta would have to provide salaries, food and other items, the military won’t need more than 50,000 recruits, he said.
“I want to emphasize that we will not call up everyone who is eligible for military service,” he said.
The CIA World Factbook estimated that last year Myanmar’s military had somewhere between 150,000 and 400,000 personnel.
The Washington-based U.S. Institute of Peace has suggested that 21,000 service personnel have been lost through casualties, desertions and defections since the February 2021 military coup d’etat, leaving an effective force of about 150,000..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-15
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
" Three years ago today, on February 1, 2021, Myanmar’s military junta seized power in a violent and deadly coup. Since then, the junta has escalated its attacks, both online and offline, perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity, violating human rights every day.
Despite thunderous silence and dwindling support from so-called global allies, the people of Myanmar are unwavering in their determination to courageously resist the military, and take back control of their country. 2024 is a critical turning point in their fight. The international community must urgently stand with the people of Myanmar, offering not only solidarity, but also concrete resources to help topple the military junta and consign this troubled chapter to the history books.
The Myanmar people’s resistance to dictatorship needs international support to dismantle the digital “iron curtain” built by the junta to track and target the people of Myanmar. Otherwise these same people will continue to be crushed and terrorised by a surveillance state intent on destroying lives, livelihoods, and any resistance to their oppressive rule. Only when these oppressive structures fall can the people of Myanmar rebuild a new country that reflects their vision and courage.
A digital “iron curtain”
The military’s complete control of Myanmar’s telecommunications network allows it to use internet shutdowns and communications blackouts to facilitate vicious attacks and block humanitarian aid from reaching those who need it. In 2023, the military weaponised shutdowns and blackouts, especially in conflict zones where resistance is strong. Reports reveal that, before bombing towns and villages, the military frequently uses jamming devices installed on military scout aircraft to block all communication networks.
This means that people seeking safe paths to flee the conflict are unable to communicate with each other, wounded people cannot seek medical assistance, and families are cut off from critical humanitarian support.
It is difficult to document the exact number of regular internet shutdowns imposed by the junta, but they likely number in the hundreds. According to a report by the Myanmar Internet Project, 11 out of 14 states have experienced shutdowns, with prolonged shutdowns common in areas of escalating conflict, including Bago, Kachin, Karenni, Kayin, Magywa, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan.
The rise of a surveillance state
Under the guise of creating e-government projects, Myanmar’s military is raising funds and collecting resources to strengthen its massive surveillance infrastructure, pushing forward with data collection projects like the national census, e-ID system, and the establishment of a “National Database”.
In 2023, the military announced that it was developing an e-government masterplan to provide public services and sought support from international organisations, including the UNFPA, to do so. Despite no such support being provided, the military continues to seek support from other countries, including in the form of domestic and foreign technologies to run the projects.
The military needs to track and target those who oppose its reign of terror. So far, the military’s e-ID system contains the personal data of 52 million people (including six types of geographic data) and data from over 13 million households. It’s also thought that the military has collected biometric data from 2.1 million people in Myanmar — this includes fingerprints, facial features, and eye pupil scans. The military also surveils people in several other ways:
Checkpoints restrict people’s right to freedom of movement, with unlawful arrests occurring frequently.
Random security checks, including indiscriminate inspections of ID documents and phones and other devices, are conducted on the street.
Financial activities are monitored; Radio Free Asia reports that more than 700 mobile payment account were closed in the month of May 2023 alone.
The international community must stop all forms of support that allow the military to strengthen its surveillance infrastructure against the people, even as they present them as “pro-people” propaganda projects.
An ongoing campaign of terror
The military is weaponising the law to violate fundamental human rights, including the right to information and freedom of expression, as part of efforts to legitimise its abusive acts:
Failure to register a SIM can put you in prison for up to six months. The military is using section 72 of the Telecommunications Law to justify the SIM registration order.
The military has adopted extensive by-laws to the Anti-Terrorism Law, giving them the power to censor activities against the military, intercept electronic communication data, and obtain people’s location data. At the start of 2024, documentary filmmaker, Shin Daewe, was sentenced to life in prison under this law.
The military is criminalising online expression, criticism, and journalism. Data for Myanmar shows that an average of 65 individuals per month were detained for criticising the junta and supporting anti-juta activities on social media platforms, with more than 1,300 arrested for their social media content. Sixty-four journalists are in detention, making Myanmar one of the world’s biggest jailers of journalists, second only to China. In 2023, many artists, celebrities, and social influencers changed their Facebook profile pictures to black in solidarity with the victims of military atrocities. Many individuals who commented, liked, or shared posts or news reports about anti-coup movement activities were arrested. Byuhar, a hip-hop singer who criticised the military during a Facebook Live for its failure to provide a regular electricity supply was given a 20 year prison sentence. Meanwhile U Ye Htut, who served as Information Minister under the Thein Sein government in the early 2000s, was given a ten year jail sentence for his Facebook post criticising the military’s policies.
To push back against the junta’s increasing campaign of repression against the people of Myanmar, the international community must:
Establish and commit resources for a coordinated action plan to provide the people of Myanmar with alternative access to telecommunication services. Local communities in Myanmar struggle to use satellite communications or other means to resist the military’s control and authoritarian grip over communication networks. With a coordinated action plan, people in Myanmar can push back against worsening digital authoritarianism.
In areas of crisis and conflict, recognize and fund alternative access to the internet and other communication channels as critical tools for protecting lives and fundamental human rights.
Cut off or prevent financial, technical, and other forms of support that benefit the military’s massive surveillance infrastructure. In 2023, the military had difficulty securing funding from other countries or from international organisations for its e-government projects. This was a welcome step and must continue. The international community must deepen its efforts to stop the sale of dual-use surveillance technologies to Myanmar.
Push tech and telecom companies to uphold human rights and make them accountable when they fail to provide effective remedy for violations. Governments must not allow companies to profit from the suffering of Myanmar’s people.
Stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar. The international community must provide support to the people of Myanmar so they can resist the abuses of the military, while addressing the emerging challenges of building a new nation state.
Companies must:
Urgently explain how they conduct due diligence to ensure that their operations and products in Myanmar do not negatively or adversely impact human rights. Telcos must do this without delay, as their partnerships with the military significantly enable the military junta’s human rights abuses. Companies producing or selling other types of technologies, including dual-use surveillance technologies, must stop all transactions involving the military and its allies.
If leaving the market becomes the ultimate decision after a thorough human rights due diligence process, ensure that comprehensive remedies are in place to address the human rights impacts of the departure. Companies must be held accountable for irresponsible exits out of areas of crisis and conflict.
Conduct heightened due diligence to ensure that their products and services are not used in violation of human rights by the military or by military-controlled institutions, and immediately remove these products or services from the market if they are being used to facilitate rights abuses. Invest significant resources to implement human rights-based content moderation practices, data protection policies, and privacy safeguards to resist increasing attempts to extend surveillance, censorship, and rights violations.
Pursue genuine public engagement in its decision-making process and implement effective remedies when human rights violations are committed..."
Source/publisher:
Access Now
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"A military coup in Myanmar in February 2021 has led to widespread conflict and has had a severe impact on its health care system. Many health care workers have been involved in civil disobedience and protests against the coup, including boycotts. Organisations such as the WHO and Insecurity Insight have also reported on attacks on health care in the country. Since February 2021, the UK government has provided over £120mn in humanitarian and development assistance in Myanmar.
On 29 of February 2024, Lord Crisp (Crossbench) is scheduled to ask the following question for short debate:
Lord Crisp to ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the role that the United Kingdom could play in supporting health workers in Myanmar, and contributing to the reconstruction of the country’s health system.
1. The 2021 military coup
Headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s National League for Democracy (NLD) took power following elections in 2015 after decades of military rule.[1] Elections in 2020 led to further NLD gains and the military made an accusation of electoral fraud. In February 2021, Myanmar’s military commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing launched a military coup that overthrew the elected government.
A civil disobedience movement (CDM) developed following the coup. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H Andrews, stated that this led to the development of a national unity government:
Following the formation of CDM, members of parliament who had been elected in the November national elections but prevented from taking their oath of office by the junta established the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. From the Committee emerged the broader and more inclusive National Unity Government in April, to provide leadership, build international support and serve as the legitimate representatives of the people of Myanmar.[2]
Militias formed in opposition to the coup, including as part of the ‘People’s Defence Force’ (PDF) under the National Unity Government.[3]
The UK government has said that a wide range of people were involved in the protests:
In response to military rule, people from a range of backgrounds and professions took part in large scale protests across Myanmar throughout 2021. Sources differ on the scale of the protests from daily figures of 10s to 100s of thousands depending on the location and timing. However, the UN summarised that by March 2021 millions of people had protested across 100s of towns. ACLED [The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project] recorded over 6,000 anti-coup demonstration events throughout 2021. In 2022, direct action continued but evolved to include civil disobedience, flash mobs, silent strikes and smaller anti-junta protests across the country.[4]
The response of the military has included violence and arrests:
Military response to opposition includes violent oppression of peaceful protests, arbitrary arrests of protestors and family members, property raids and seizures (particularly of NLD members), and to a lesser extent enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Threats, harassment, violence, and direct attacks occur against those associated with or perceived to support pro-democratic or anti-junta groups, and on civilians in areas where there is conflict between the military and armed groups.[5]
In a written statement in February 2023 marking two years since the coup, minister of state at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Anne-Marie Trevelyan, said the coup had led to millions needing humanitarian assistance:
The consequences for domestic and regional stability are clear; over 17 million people are now in need of humanitarian assistance—a staggering increase of 16 million in just two years; over 1.5 million people are displaced within Myanmar, with a million more in neighbouring Bangladesh, Thailand and India; illicit economies are thriving; and democratic gains have been reversed. Recent figures indicated Myanmar suffered some of the most intense violence in the world in 2022, with conflict-related deaths second only to Ukraine. There is a clear trajectory of increasing violence, human rights violations and abuses, to which the UK has responded with a range of tools.[6]
Ms Trevelyan said the UK condemned the “brutal actions” of the military regime and supported “all those working peacefully to restore democracy in Myanmar”. She said that the military must engage with the National Unity Government and respect the “democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar”:
We support all those working peacefully to restore democracy in Myanmar. The military must engage in inclusive and meaningful dialogue with the full range of opposition voices, including the National Unity Government (NUG), and respect the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar. In 2022, UK ministers spoke regularly with counterparts in the NUG. We call on the military to immediately end its campaign of violence and release the thousands of people it has detained arbitrarily, including Aung San Suu Kyi. The military must engage in inclusive and meaningful dialogue with the full range of opposition voices in order to respect the federal, democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar.[7]
In a January 2024 answer to a written question asking when the UK government had last raised the treatment of pro-democracy advocates in Myanmar at the UN, the government said it had co-sponsored a resolution at the UN general assembly and supported the International Criminal Courts investigation of acts committed against the Rohingya:
On 15 November 2023 the UK co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution calling on the Myanmar military to release all those who have been arbitrarily detained on political grounds. We will continue to seek opportunities to raise our concerns at the UN and other multilateral fora. We support the International Criminal Court Prosecutor’s initiative to investigate acts committed against the Rohingya. In November, we jointly filed a declaration of intervention at the International Court of Justice in The Gambia’s case alleging Myanmar has perpetrated genocide against the Rohingya, in order to set out our interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Genocide Convention before the Court.[8]
2. Impact of the coup on Myanmar’s health system
The World Health Organization (WHO) has said “the crisis has spread in such a way” that the entire population of Myanmar, 56 million people, are now facing some level of need.[9] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has stated that a third of the population, 18.6 million people, are now estimated to be in humanitarian need.[10] The OCHA’s ‘Humanitarian needs and response plan’ (December 2023) for Myanmar estimates that 12 million people will need humanitarian health assistance in 2024.
The OCHA has stated that whilst the provision of public essential health services has “partly resumed” in large urban areas, overall access to health care, essential medicines and medical supplies continues to be “fragile, fragmented, and uneven”.[11] The OCHA says that this is exacerbated by long-term inequalities and that the health system is deeply politicised, which is affecting the return of health workers. This in turn hinders access to health care particularly for girls, women, people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups. The WHO has also reported that whilst the situation has improved in some large cities, overall health service access is still severely constrained:
The health services remain significantly impacted by the increasing conflicts and security and economic stress. While a reversal in the trend in the provision of services is observed in some large cities, such as Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon, since the pandemic and the events of February 2021, the overall access to health services remains severely constrained and fragmented, with a heavy reliance on local partners supporting their own communities.[12]
The WHO has said that prior to the current situation Myanmar had made progress in reducing the prevalence of communicable diseases, including malaria and tuberculosis.[13] The WHO said Myanmar had also shown “remarkable progress with regard to key sustainable development goals (SDG) targets of maternal mortality, newborn mortality and child mortality”.[14] However, it has stated that the established monitoring systems, such as District Health Information System 2, that allowed for an evidence-based determination of the functionality of Myanmar’s current health system “are non-functional”. The WHO’s country office therefore developed “alternative, ad hoc monitoring systems” to allow it to monitor access to health services:
The data had been collected by observation from 360 townships by WHO field-based staff and Myanmar Country Office staff since April 2021. WHO, in collaboration with the World Bank, has conducted a phone survey across Myanmar to analyse the current situation regarding access to health care and medicines, and private sector providers’ response. Increased challenges to availability and affordability of essential medicines were observed while difficulties in transporting supplies to conflict-affected areas were also noticed.[15]
The WHO reported that the Covid-19 pandemic had impacted medical training resulting in the “closure of all training institutions throughout the year 2020 with no graduation of the health workforce cadres, adding to the constraints”.[16]
The WHO has characterised health care in Myanmar as facing the following challenges:
In Myanmar, people are facing heavily restricted access to formal health services, including those run by public hospitals and de facto government clinics. Moreover, a large share of households continues to depend on health care services that are provided by private health care facilities while self-care remains a key approach adopted by them. Additionally, ethnic health organizations (EHOs) continue to fill significant gaps in health care provision. Lack of primary health care in villages, high cost of secondary health care at hospitals and movement restrictions in availing tertiary health care in capital cities continue to hinder access to health services. These restrictions are causing life-threatening suffering, notably mental and psychosocial burden, and death from medical emergencies. Minorities and other ethnically vulnerable populations continue to face severe constraints and a fragmented health care system in the wake of Covid-19 and the political changes in February 2021. Although Myanmar was hit by the deadliest wave of Covid-19 during June–September 2021, severely disrupting health sector functioning, the third and fourth waves in 2022 continued to put the health system under strain. The health system was crippled by a limited bed capacity, challenges to making oxygen and essential medicines available, and an inadequate health workforce, leading to excess death and disability. However, since then, the testing capacity and the vaccination rate have increased, which in turn have improved the level and development of seroprevalence.[17]
The WHO has said that nearly half of Myanmar’s population (46%) is reported to be facing poverty, with “serious repercussions for the cost of health care”. It has said, that particularly in conflict areas, access to health care has been put out of the reach of common people by:
significant shortages of key essential medicines
continuing supply chain disruptions
high inflation rates (about 20% in 2022–23)
The WHO also said that a “continued depletion of tax revenue” had resulted in budgets cuts to the health sector.[18]
The WHO has said the “total collapse” of the health management information system has meant that the availability of data is constrained. This has led to health programmes related to diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDs seeing a reverse in data collection and analysis used to monitor these diseases and assist with their prevention and control. The WHO has said that a new law had forced several NGOs to either shut down or reduce their operations:
Declaration of a new Registration Law, mandating civil society organizations including health facilities and associations in 2022, has forced a sizeable number of NGOs to either shut down or partially close operations. The new law has crippled their functions, restricting access to financial resources from donors, in a considerable manner.[19]
The UNHCR stated that the law made “registration compulsory for both national and international non-governmental organizations and associations”.[20]
2.1 Health workers in Myanmar
Particular concern has been raised about the impact of the current situation on health workers in Myanmar. BBC News reported that organised resistance to the February 2021 coup “started with health care workers announcing a boycott of state-run hospitals”.[21] The WHO has also said that health workers “were among the first to express dissent with regard to the military takeover through civil disobedience; this involved 50% of the health workforce in the public sector”.[22] It said this led to a “significantly reduced health workforce in the public sector”. The WHO has said that the ‘national health workforce account’ could not be updated due to “limitation in engagement with the de facto authority since 2021”.
There have also been attacks on health services following the coup. The WHO has said that there have been 385 attacks on health care reported via its surveillance system since the coup:
Since February 2021, more than 385 attacks on health care have been documented via the WHO’s Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA). These attacks have led to at least 58 deaths and 188 injuries. Each attack is deeply concerning as it affects access to and availability of essential health services–especially for women, children and other vulnerable groups.[23]
The non-governmental organisation Insecurity Insight has reported that there have been 1,087 attacks on Myanmar’s health system since the 1 February 2021 coup.[24] It has said “at least 880 health workers have been arrested, 97 killed and 117 injured undermining health care providers’ ability to maintain safe staffing levels to effectively meet patient needs”.
The OCHA has said that whilst the numbers of attacks reported differ between organisations they continue to be among the highest globally:
Attacks on health care are monitored by a number of organizations, notably World Health Organization and the non-governmental organization (NGO) Insecurity Insight. Across all tracking efforts, reported attacks on Myanmar’s health care system continue to be among the highest globally in 2023, varying between at least 66 to 330 depending on the different definitions and levels of verification used. Even considering likely underreporting, indicative records shows that at least 14 health workers were killed and 21 wounded in 2023, with local aid workers most at risk.[25]
The non-governmental organisation Physicians for Human Rights has said that attacks on health care workers “include arbitrary arrests, detentions, and violence committed against all types of health care workers, ranging from doctors and nurses to emergency medics and volunteers”.[26] In a report published in January 2022, Physicians for Human Rights reported that at first attacks were primarily targeted at health workers involved in nationwide protests:
Initially, attacks primarily involved Myanmar security forces taking action against health workers participating in nationwide protests, the Civil Disobedience Movement [CDM], and the provision of medical care to injured protesters and bystanders.[27]
However, the organisation has said that over time the attacks changed:
Over time health care workers believed to have ties to the NUG [National Unity Government] or PDFs [People’s Defence Force] were targeted, including during raids of health facilities and charity organizations accused of aiding injured PDF members or supporters. Attacks by other armed actors on health care workers have emerged, particularly against those who have continued or returned to their civil servant roles and have reportedly pressured staff participating in CDM to return to work, or are believed to be military informants.[28]
The OCHA’s humanitarian response plan has said that an estimated 372 medical teams are needed to meet humanitarian needs across Myanmar, “with a current gap of 202 teams”.[29] The OCHA has said the effective provision of health assistance is being undermined by a series of factors, including armed conflict and limited funding:
Amid the continuation and escalation of armed conflict, limited funding and legal, administrative and security barriers persist in undermining the effective provision of adequate health assistance to an increasingly vulnerable population.[30]
Number of workers in Myanmar’s health system before the coup
In a section on the status of Myanmar’s health system “pre-crisis”, the WHO expressed concern that the density of health workers in the country was one of the lowest in the South-East Asia region.
Prior to 2021, the WHO had observed a density of 17.8 health workers per 10,000 population in Myanmar. It has said an average of 22.8 health workers per 10,000 population is required to deliver a package of health services, compatible with the health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).[31] The MDGs were 8 goals that UN members agreed to try to achieve by the year 2015.[32] They have been superseded by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[33] The WHO now estimates that 44.5 health workers per 10,000 population are required to “adapt services to the standards” of the SDGs. However, the WHO has described Myanmar as having one of the lowest health worker availability levels in the region, with issues including the even deployment of staff:
Comparing health worker densities across countries in the South-East Asia Region and with the thresholds just described, Myanmar is one of the countries with the lowest health worker availability; it is only above Bangladesh. Beyond the overall limited availability of human resources in the system, deployment is also suboptimal since it is based on norms linked to facility nomenclature and size rather than on need or performance. The resulting allocation leads to insufficient personnel in some areas and exceeding capacity in others, along with inadequate skill mix, as proven by the limited number of complete critical care teams to run ICU beds during the COVID-19 crisis.[34]
3. UK government assistance to Myanmar
In March 2023, Lord Crisp (Crossbench) asked the government in an oral question what support it was providing for health workers in Myanmar “who are caring for patients outside the areas controlled by the military government of that country”.[35]
Responding for the government, then minister of state at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Lord Goldsmith, said that Myanmar’s health system had been in crisis since the coup and the UK was a leading donor on supporting health care needs in the country:
My Lords, Myanmar’s public health care system has been in crisis since the coup. We are concerned about Myanmar’s level of basic health care services and childhood immunisation rates. The UK is a leading donor on supporting health care needs in that country. This financial year, the UK has provided £13.95mn for health care in Myanmar, which is being delivered by the UN, by civil society and by ethnic health care organisations. This support is saving the lives of vulnerable women and children.[36]
Lord Goldsmith also said the UK government supported health professionals in Myanmar who were risking their lives:
We applaud the Myanmar health professionals who are risking their lives to continue treating patients. We commend the NHS volunteers who are sharing their skills and knowledge with colleagues and friends in Myanmar, taking huge risks in doing so. I absolutely pay tribute to them. Since the coup, we have provided around £100mn to support those in need of humanitarian assistance, to deliver health care and education for the most vulnerable and to protect civic space. In 2021–22, we provided nearly £50mn in aid to Myanmar, including £24mn of life-saving assistance for 600,000 people. I am not in a position to comment on future expenditure, but I think it is very clear from our recent track record that this remains a priority focus for the FCDO.[37]
As part of its approach to increase transparency in the government’s aid spending, the FCDO publishes the ‘UK–Myanmar Development Partnership Summary’ (17 July 2023). This provides an overview of the department’s development activity, development priorities, and financial information (including budgets and breakdowns of spend) in Myanmar. This sets out information on key programmes, including the ‘Myanmar-UK health partnership programme’:
[The] Myanmar-UK Health Partnership programme (MUHP)—£6mn—aims to promote equitable access to health services for people from the most disadvantaged areas in Myanmar—especially in ethnic and conflict-affected areas—and to enhance the health partnership between the UK and Myanmar. The key intended impacts of the programme are: a reduction in maternal, newborn and child illness and deaths; and a reduction in the burden of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), drug-resistant tuberculosis and malaria through supporting stronger local health responses including in partnership with UK institutions.[38]
In December 2023, the government said it had provided over £120mn in humanitarian and development assistance in Myanmar, “focussed on life-saving assistance, emergency health care, water, hygiene and sanitation services, and education”.[39] In July 2023, the government provided the following breakdown of spending on official development assistance (ODA) by year:
From 1 Feb 2021 to 31 Mar 2022: we provided £8mn
In financial year 2021/22: we provided £49.5mn
In financial year 2022/23: we provided £57.3mn
In financial year 2023/24: our allocated budget is £30.1mn (we have spent £5.13mn so far).[40]
4. Further reading
OCHA, ‘Myanmar humanitarian update No 35: 2023 year in review’, 12 January 2024
Medicins San Frontieres, ‘Health workers struggle to respond amid severe restrictions in Rakhine state’, 16 January 2024
Physicians for Human Rights, ‘“Our health workers are working in fear”: After Myanmar’s military coup, one year of targeted violence against health care’, January 2022..."
Source/publisher:
House of Lords Library - UK Parliament
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-13
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Public Health
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The government in Myanmar has announced compulsory military service for all young men and women as the country's turmoil continues.
The army seized power from the civilian government in a coup in February 2021.
But in recent months it has been defeated in a series of battles with ethnic militias and anti-coup fighters.
The move announced on Saturday will require all men aged 18-35, and women aged 18-27, to serve at least two years under military command.
No further details have been released. But in a statement, the junta said its defence ministry would "release necessary bylaws, procedures, announcements orders, notifications and instructions".
The military has faced a series of humiliating defeats in recent months.
At the end of last year, three ethnic insurgent armies in Shan State - supported by other armed groups that oppose the government - captured border crossings and roads carrying most of the overland trade with China.
Last month, the Arakan Army (AA) said it had taken control of Paletwa in Chin State and the last military post in Paletwa township, the hilltop base at Meewa.
The military-installed president of Myanmar, Myint Swe - a former general - has previously warned the country is in danger of breaking apart if the government could not bring fighting under control.
A law allowing conscription was introduced in Myanamar in 2010, but has not been not enforced until now.
Under the legislation, the terms of service can be extended up to a period of five years during a state of emergency. Those ignoring summons to serve can instead be jailed for the same period.
A state of emergency was announced by the country's junta in 2021 and was recently extended for a further six months.
Myanmar had endured almost 50 years of rule under oppressive military regimes before the move towards democracy in 2011.
On 1 February 2021, the military announced it had taken control of the country.
Disorders and fighting have affected the country ever since, with more than one million people being displaced and thousands killed.
The performance of the army in its recent battles with ethnic armed groups - some of which have ended in defeats and retreats - has sparked criticisms and doubts among its supporters..."
Source/publisher:
"BBC News" (London)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
State media report all men aged 18-35 and women 18-27 must serve for up to two years and up to five years in a state of emergency
Description:
"Myanmar’s junta has declared mandatory military service for all young men and women, state media said, as it struggles to contain armed rebel forces fighting for greater autonomy in various parts of the country.
All men aged 18-35 and women aged 18-27 must serve for up to two years, while specialists like doctors aged up to 45 must serve for three years. The service can be extended to a total of five years in the ongoing state of emergency, state media said on Saturday.
The junta “issued the notification of the effectiveness of People’s Military Service Law starting from 10 February 2024,” the junta’s information team said in a statement.
Myanmar has been gripped by chaos since the military seized power from an elected government in a 2021 coup, which sparked mass protests and a crackdown on dissent.
Three years on, the junta is struggling to crush widespread armed opposition to its rule. Since October, the Tatmadaw, as the military is known, has suffered personnel losses while battling a coordinated offensive by an alliance of three ethnic minority insurgent groups, as well as allied pro-democracy fighters who have taken up arms against the junta.
The success of this offensive and the military’s failure to mount a counterattack has dented morale among low- and mid-level officers, according to several military sources, all of whom requested anonymity.
Analysts have said the Tatmadaw is struggling to recruit soldiers and has begun forcing non-combat personnel to the frontline.
A “national military service system involving all people is essential because of the situation happening in our country,” junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun said in an audio message released by the information team.
A law mandating conscription was introduced in 2010 but has not been enforced until now. Those who fail to comply with the draft face imprisonment for up to five years, the legislation says.
Saturday’s statement did not give further details but said the junta’s defence ministry would “release necessary bylaws, procedures, announcements orders, notifications and instructions.”
It did not give details on how those called up would be expected to serve.
More than 4,500 people have been killed in the military’s crackdown on dissent and over 26,000 arrested, according to a local monitoring group..."
Source/publisher:
"The Guardian" (UK)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-11
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Other laws impacting on civil and political rights
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Feb 1 to 7, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Tanintharyi Region, and Kayin State from February 1st to 7th. 4 children died and 10 children were injured by the bomb dropping airstrike of Military Junta in Demoso Township, Kayah State on January 5th. Military Troop arrested over 300 civilians and used them as human shields from Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Mandalay Region, and Kayin State. A female political prisoner from Mandalay O Bo Prison died from a lack of medical treatment and care.
Over 8 civilians died and over 30 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 12 underaged children were injured and 9 died when the Military Junta committed abuses.7 civilians were injured and 1 died by the landmine of Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-09
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
350.67 KB 346.43 KB 469.63 KB
more
Description:
"When a country is strong and united, no one can manipulate and control it. But if, like Myanmar, it is weak and fragmented, this weakness will be exploited. China’s actions in Myanmar since the coup offer a textbook example of how superpowers take advantage of political crises in smaller countries to advance their own interests.
In recent months, China has intervened in northern Myanmar to consolidate and strengthen its geostrategic position in the region, where the two countries share a more than 2,000-km-long border.
There is no doubt that the West’s sanctions since the coup have weakened the economy in Myanmar and that China today is an important source of financial assistance and political backing for the regime. But when the junta was slow to respond to Beijing’s demands for a crackdown on transborder crime and online scam syndicates along the countries’ shared frontier, China decided to take concerted action.
Beijing gave its tacit approval to ethnic armed organizations based in northern Shan State to launch Operation 1027 to target “pig butchering”, as the online scam and other crime .
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Arakan Army and Ta’ang National Liberation Army—who together form the Brotherhood Alliance—launched coordinated attacks against the military regime in northern Shan State in late October.
To the surprise of seasoned observers the operation was highly successful. The alliance’s forces seized Laukkai, the capital of Kokang, after about two months of fighting the regime’s troops and its allied militias.
As a result, China, in collaboration with the ethnic armies in the north, was able to crack down on the online scammers and criminal activities on the Myanmar side.
After losing a large swath of territory in northern Shan to the alliance, the regime in December asked Beijing to intervene on its behalf. Junta-appointed acting President Myint Swe commented that the offensive could “break the country into pieces” if left unchecked.
China then forcefully intervened to halt the successful offensive after the MNDAA regained Laukkai City.
In December, after the fighting spread to Rakhine State, China and the regime signed an addendum to their concession agreement for the massive China-backed deep seaport project in the state’s Kyaukphyu Township. And in late January, economic attaché Quyang Daobing of the Chinese Embassy in Myanmar met with junta investment and commerce officials to discuss cooperation on China-Myanmar megaprojects, the safety of Chinese citizens employed by those projects, and matters related to improving the quality of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor—a component of Beijing’s vast Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure development scheme—among other things.
There’s only one word for it: Ingenious. China has minimized its costs and maximized its profits. Today, its protectorates are expanding in northern Myanmar along with its control and influence over ethnic armed forces in the region.
And even as this relationship deepens, the regime continues to depend on China for investment and military supplies, not to mention political backing at the UN.
Recently, the military regime handed over to Chinese authorities six alleged bosses of online scam empires in the Kokang region of Shan State along the Chinese border. It was widely suspected that the crime syndicates had been protected by the regime.
The suspects were named in an arrest warrant issued by Chinese authorities in December for alleged involvement in online scams in Laukkai.
When Operation 1027 started, China’s official position was that easing the situation in northern Myanmar would be in the interests of all parties and conducive to peace and stability in the China-Myanmar border area. Its Foreign Ministry said continually that China and Myanmar are friendly neighbors and that China has always respected Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. To Myanmar people this all just sounded like a joke—and not a particularly funny one at that.
China maintains a number of geostrategic and economic interests in Myanmar, including infrastructure projects and a gas pipeline that connects with Yunnan Province, not to mention access to the critically important Indian Ocean, with its trade and transit routes.
Beijing will invest more in northern Shan State as the “provinces” under China’s influence become more autonomous.
The Wa and Kokang, as well as the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—better known as the Mongla Group—are effectively dependent on China for internet services, currency, and supplies and logistics. They issue their political statements and conduct their administrations in the Chinese language. Since Operation 1027, the MNDAA has forged a stronger alliance with the Wa and its new generation of leadership, who bring strengthened military and administration capacities.
For its part, the Wa region is, in effect, a wholly autonomous buffer state between Myanmar and China with its own administration, schools, hospitals, courts and trading companies. It is like a small Chinese province, even if the Wa continue to fly the Myanmar national flag over it.
This is only the beginning. China’s influence has become so strong that, as far as its neighbors are concerned—and whether they like it or not—having a poor relationship with Beijing is simply not an option.
The Myanmar regime and the country’s ethnic forces know that China will always act in accordance with her own interests.
So, of course, do Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, but Myanmar, with all its complexity and now devastated by civil war, is in a far weaker position than its Southeast Asian neighbors.
Since the coup, only one “winner” has emerged so far—Myanmar’s powerful neighbor to the north..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-08
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"QUESTION
Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant: To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs in view of the ongoing situation and the progress of implementing the “Five-Point Consensus” in Myanmar, what is the Ministry’s assessment of the impact on ASEAN’s unity and image.
REPLY
Ms Sim Ann: Sir, ASEAN has taken a firm and consistent approach to the situation in Myanmar following the 1 February 2021 coup, which is reflected in the Five-Point Consensus. The ASEAN Leaders reviewed the situation at their Summits in 2022 and 2023 and agreed on a series of steps to send a clear signal to the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat last week, ASEAN reaffirmed its commitment to the Five-Point Consensus as well as the Leaders’ decisions. There has been little progress in the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus and in fact the situation in Myanmar has become more dire of late. However, the rate limiting factor for progress is not ASEAN, but the Tatmadaw. Singapore will continue to work with ASEAN Chair Laos, fellow ASEAN Member States, and our external partners to press the Tatmadaw to cease violence and implement the Five-Point Consensus swiftly and fully.
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS
Question 1
Mr Neil Parekh Nimil Rajnikant: I thank the SMS for her answer. May I ask the SMS what alternate steps does ASEAN have if Myanmar refuses to implement the consensus plan?
REPLY:
Ms Sim Ann: Sir, ASEAN Leaders have reviewed the issue twice and remain committed to upholding the Five-Point Consensus.
Question 2
Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong: Thank you, Speaker. I would like to ask the SMS, with the change of ASEAN Chair this year to Laos, does Singapore expect any change in the momentum of ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar? How does Singapore continue to expect itself to support the new ASEAN Chair in ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar regarding the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus? Thank you.
REPLY:
Dr Vivian Balakrishnan: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Let me address that supplementary question because I just returned last week from the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat. I would emphasise that the key word is “consistency”. ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Laos has expressed our clear intention to maintain that consistent position, and the paramount expression of that is the Five-Point Consensus. I would say as far as ASEAN is concerned, there is no change.
2 The unfortunate change which is happening is on the ground in Myanmar. If you would check with your contacts there, the security situation remains dire. It is almost tantamount to a civil war. Whilst the military has no intention of ceding power, their ability to maintain authority on the ground is being severely challenged by a variety of groups, both the ethnic armed organisations as well as the resistance from the Burmese majority within Myanmar itself.
3 The other point which we have all emphasised is that there is a need to continue humanitarian support. ASEAN is engaged on this, and we are also expecting that Thailand will do a bit more to enable or to facilitate the cross-border delivery of humanitarian assistance. I think our priority remains the welfare of the citizens, the people of Myanmar.
4 We should be under no illusions that ASEAN can magically resolve the problems. Ultimately, this is a political problem. This is a problem of leadership and the political leaders across the spectrum in Myanmar need to get together and reconcile their diverse positions. We still believe that there needs to be direct, face-to-face negotiations conducted in good faith amongst all the political leaders there. It is a complex situation, but we will continue to maintain our consistent position..."
. . . . .
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, ASEAN-Burma relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Will Myanmar’s instability subside anytime soon?
Description:
"This year is the third anniversary of the military coup led by Myanmar’s Senior General Min Aung Hlaing that ousted the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Over the last three years the Tatmadaw has plummeted the country into ever-increasing violence and despair.
Millions of civilians have been forced to flee from their homes because of the fighting between the Myanmar military and the opposition forces -- a collection of experienced ethnic armies, civilian militias and recently formed activist-based defence forces. Throughout the country there is a burgeoning humanitarian crisis threatening to engulf the country in serious starvation. On top of that a major economic crisis that has sent the Myanmar currency, the Kyat, tumbling -- it is now more than 3,500 kyat to the dollar: Less than half its value before the coup. Sources in the country's central bank have confirmed the lack of foreign currency has made it difficult to pay for imports.
There is an acute shortage of oil, gas, and petrol: Motorists face increasingly long waits at the pumps, and the price of fuel has sky-rocketed; electricity shortages and black-outs are worse than they have ever been -- reminiscent of the mid-1990s, when black and brown outs were endemic. Residents in Yangon and Mandalay complain that they get less than four hours of electricity a day, and even that is irregular and intermittent. In fact, some economic analysts believe the military government will run out of money by the end of February.
On the ground, only the Tatmadaw's superior air power has kept them in the game. Only concerted carpet bombing of civilian targets, which has wreaked havoc and devastation on areas deemed to be giving assistance or are sympathetic to the so-called revolutionary forces, has helped them maintain a certain degree of superiority. But even that is now under threat with the Kachin forces having downed two aircraft recently.
In the last three months, ethnic forces in the north of the country -- known as the Three brotherhood -- the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) -- have launched highly coordinated and well-planned attacks on Myanmar's Tatmadaw. During that time, the army has suffered severe losses on a scale not experienced since the days of independence. Since October 27, 2023, when the current ethnic offensive was launched, the Tatmadaw has lost nearly 40 townships, over 500 army outposts, and more than 10,000 troops have been killed, injured, or have surrendered or defected. Myanmar's military now faces an existential threat for the first time in its more than seven-decade history.
Morale and discipline within its ranks are at their lowest ebb. Changes to training schedules and military preparations in the last decade under the current commander-in-chief has left the armed forced inadequately trained and unready for armed battle. The last time the Tatmadaw was engaged in full-scale military action was in the mid-nineties against the Karen National Union -- apart from an extended skirmish against the MNDAA in 2009. The current battles in the north have left the army further demoralized. And the sentencing of the handful of commanders in charge of the recent Tatmadaw surrender to the MNDAA won't have helped morale or discipline either.
What's happened to the Tatmadaw in the last three years, especially the last three months, has been unprecedented, a former senior officer in the Tatmadaw has admitted. He blamed a lack of discipline in the lower ranks for the spate of surrenders, especially amongst the junior officers. Military families are also questioning the continued violence, fearing for their safety. The democratic forces' use of drones has been a major ingredient that has helped level the military playing field. They have proven crucial in the battle for territory, and instilled a measure of fear amongst all civilians, especially military families.
The personal safety of leading government and business figures has also become a matter of serious concern. Several prominent businessmen who fled abroad after the coup are being courted by the regime and encouraged to return. Their hesitancy to do so however was interpreted as hinging on safety concerns.
But this concern about personal safety extends right up to the very top, where it is increasingly accentuated. Sources close to top general, Min Aung Hlaing, have revealed that he has become increasingly paranoid and generally becoming more and more isolated. His concern for his personal safety has extended to having all Myanmar visitors, including the number two general, Soe Win, fully searched before they can see him. His precarious situation appears to be playing on his mind. He suffers from acute insomnia, according to sources close to the general. He cannot sleep without having an injection administered every night.
To many, Min Aung Hlaing has become the most hated and despised army commander of all time.
He is loathed throughout the ranks within the Tatmadaw. No one has a good word for him. He is universally blamed for the mess of the last three years. There is widespread ill feeling -- especially amongst nationalist Buddhist monks and the Ma Ba Tha. One of their number publicly called for Min Aung Hlaing to step down and hand power to Soe Win. He was briefly arrested after the outburst and quickly released. More crucially, Soe Win was moved from the War Office and replaced.
In the meantime, the push for Min Aung Hlaing to step down is gathering support, albeit under the surface. A group of former senior military officers, mostly associated with former president Thein Sein, are marshalling their supporters and preparing to launch a putsch. They call themselves nationalist hardliners. For the present they are biding their time to see what the early days of February bring.
Today, Min Aung Hlaing must convene the National Defense and Security Council. At that meeting he must either extend the current state of emergency for another six months or form a "civilian" provisional government to oversee the next steps towards his plans for an election, which he says will be in the first quarter of 2025. This is after a census is held this October which would pave the way for the electoral rolls to be compiled.
For the time being, all eyes are on that meeting today -- the day of the anniversary: It may help clarify the direction Myanmar's military supremo is plotting, although by the same token it may also spell the end of Min Aung Hlaing's brutal and illegal reign -- but not immediately..."
Source/publisher:
"Dhaka Tribune" (Bangladesh)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"As the conflict in Myanmar enters its third year, we see an under-reported war marked by a sharp rise in the use of explosive weapons. Reports by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) indicate a 114% increase in such attacks by the military government in 2023, highlighting escalating tensions between the military, the People’s Defense Forces, and Ethnic Armed Organisations seeking autonomy. Consequently, the conflict resulted in 2,164 reported civilian casualties from explosive weapons in 2023, including 745 fatalities, reflecting a 121% and 155% increase in casualties and deaths, respectively, over 2022. The military is linked to 85% of these civilian casualties and 88% of the fatalities.
Since 2010, AOAV has recorded 1,825 explosive weapon incidents in Myanmar, leading to 4,343 civilian casualties, including 1,450 deaths. Notably, 50% of these casualties, and 51% of those fatalities, occurred in the last year alone, emphasising the conflict’s intensity.
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) identifies Myanmar as the most violent among the 50 wars it tracks globally, with an estimated death toll of at least 50,000 since the 2021 military coup, including at least 8,000 civilians.
The conflict has displaced approximately 2.3 million people, according to the United Nations, yet it has received relatively muted international attention compared to crises in Ukraine and Gaza. This discrepancy is attributed to Myanmar’s lower strategic significance to Western powers and the complexities within its borders.
Human Rights Watch has praised the resilience and grassroots resistance of Myanmar’s people against military oppression and human rights abuses. However, the international community’s focus has shifted, with criticisms of the lack of attention to Myanmar’s plight compared to other global conflicts.
The widespread use of air strikes and shelling by the military and the junta’s political isolation, dismissing diplomatic efforts by regional entities like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, have drawn criticism. The complexity of the situation and the junta’s refusal to engage in dialogue present significant challenges to resolving the conflict.
The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has expressed deep concern over the escalating violence, appealing for the protection of non-combatants and the facilitation of humanitarian aid. The displacement crisis has grown, with two million people affected.
Recent successes of an alliance of ethnic armed groups in Shan State, along with increased operations by ethnic Karenni insurgents in Kayah State and Volunteer People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) capitalising on military setbacks, indicate a shift in the conflict’s dynamics. Despite being less experienced, PDFs have shown improved capabilities and often collaborate with seasoned ethnic soldiers.
The military’s loss of control over significant border areas and reports of low morale and recruitment challenges within its ranks suggest a strained capacity to respond effectively to the expanding resistance. The failure to counter-attack in Shan State highlights either a lack of resources or a misunderstanding of the opposition’s strength.
Overall, the conflict in Myanmar has been characterised by the military government’s tried and tested ‘Four Cuts’ strategy, targeting the civilian networks that sustain the opposition. This means, over the past three years, towns and villages, schools and hospitals, have borne the brunt of military violence.
As non-state actors continue to escalate their resistance, and the military junta escalates its own established strategies in response, civilians will inevitably continue to suffer acutely and disproportionately as a result of this devastating conflict.
Dr Iain Overton, CEO of Action on Armed Violence, warns “The conflict in Myanmar, as it enters its third year, is a tragic testament to the escalating use of explosive weaponry in warfare, marking a period of intense and under-reported violence. Our data reveals a staggering 114% increase in explosive weapon attacks by the military government in 2023 alone. This sharp escalation underscores the growing tensions between the military, the People’s Defense Forces, and Ethnic Armed Organizations. Such figures are a clear indicator of the intense suffering and instability faced by the people of Myanmar, further exacerbated by the international community’s shifting focus away from their plight. As this conflict continues to evolve, with the military facing challenges on multiple fronts, the need for a concerted and meaningful international response has never been more urgent.”..."
Source/publisher:
Action on Armed Violence (London) via "Reliefweb" (New York)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Jan 22 to 31, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Tanintharyi Region, Chin State, Rakhine State, and Shan State from January 22nd to 31st. Military Junta arrested a civilian from the Mandalay Region and 5 from the Sagaing Region and used them as human shields. 8 civilians died by the arresting and killing of Military Junta troops within a week. A female political prisoner from Magway Prison died from the lack of medical treatment and care.
Over 50 civilians died and about 50 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 3 underaged children were injured and 1 died when the Military Junta committed abuses. Civilians left their places 6 times because of the Military Junta Troop’s marching and raiding within a week. 4 civilians were injured by the landmines of the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
1.43 MB 1.59 MB 473.24 KB
more
Description:
"Justice For Myanmar welcomes the latest sanctions on the illegal Myanmar junta and its business associates, three years after the military launched a coup attempt that has failed because of the courageous mass resistance of Myanmar people.
Since the attempted coup, the junta has committed widespread atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations with total impunity, enabled by a network of domestic and international companies.
New sanctions targeted the military’s sources of funds and jet fuel.
Australia’s second round of sanctions since February 1, 2021 designated Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB), state banks illegally seized by the junta. The banks are key nodes in the military cartel’s economic networks, supporting the junta’s campaign of terror.
Australia also targeted three companies that are part of Shoon group (formerly Asia Sun), which is the junta’s main partner in the import, storage and distribution of jet fuel. The Shoon companies designated were Asia Sun Trading Company Limited, Cargo Link Petroleum Company Limited and Asia Sun Group Company Limited.
The US sanctioned Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies, a crony conglomerate founded by Thein Win Zaw, who is the group’s chairperson. Following the military’s coup attempt, Shwe Byain Phyu bought Telenor Myanmar, renamed ATOM Myanmar, providing the junta with enhanced surveillance capabilities and access to personal data. Justice For Myanmar exposed the business interests of Shwe Byain Phyu Group in 2022.
The US also sanctioned Thein Win Zaw, his wife Tin Latt Min, and their adult children, Win Paing Kyaw and Theint Win Htet.
In addition, the US sanctioned Myanma Five Star Line Company Limited, a shipping subsidiary of the US-sanctioned military conglomerate, Myanma Economic Holdings Limited.
The UK sanctioned No. 1 Mining Enterprise (ME1) and No. 2 Mining Enterprise (ME2), state-owned enterprises illegally seized by the junta that play a central role in Myanmar’s mining sector. The two mining enterprises illegally channel funds and resources to the junta through production sharing contracts with local and foreign companies. Last year, JFM exposed Greenway Mining Group, a Chinese company that is using British Overseas Territories for its continued business in Myanmar with ME1.
The UK also sanctioned Light Infantry Division 77 and Light Infantry Division 101, which are directly responsible for perpetrating international crimes.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “New Australian, UK and US sanctions are necessary to block the junta’s access to funds and jet fuel and come after sustained pressure from civil society. However, far more needs to be done to cut the junta’s access to funds, arms, equipment, technology and jet fuel.
“Sanctions continue to be too slow, lack coordination and are not covering whole networks of companies and individuals, leaving too many openings for the junta and its associates to bypass measures.
“The slow pace of Australian sanctions in particular is clearly inadequate. Australia should start imposing regular rounds of sanctions, including against the mining sector, in which Australians continue to have a significant presence.
“UK, US, EU, Canada and Australia should extend sanctions to the whole network of entities and key individuals in the junta’s natural resources ministry, join the EU in fully sanctioning MOGE, and join Canada in banning the export, sale, supply and shipment of aviation fuel to Myanmar.
“The people of Myanmar have struggled against a terrorist junta for three years and successfully blocked it from taking control of Myanmar. The fight continues and should be supported by the international community through targeted sanctions, a global arms embargo and a UN Security Council referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court.
“The Myanmar military cartel must be dismantled.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Sanctions, Business and the Military, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
112.69 KB 142.56 KB
more
Description:
"A Message from Timothy Moore, Acting Executive Director, The Border Consortium
On this solemn day, marking the third anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar on 1st February 2021, we at The Border Consortium (TBC) pause to reflect on the profound and ongoing impacts of the crimes against humanity committed by Myanmar’s armed forces. As we look back over these three years, it is with a heavy heart that we acknowledge the continued and escalating violence perpetrated by the Myanmar armed forces against civilians and their homes, schools, hospitals and places of worship. Such actions not only violate fundamental human rights but also hinder the path to peace and stability in the region.
TBC remains steadfast in its condemnation of these atrocities. Our mission is rooted in the principles of justice, human dignity, and the right of all individuals to live free from fear and persecution. We recognise that the path to healing and rebuilding for the people of Myanmar is a long and arduous one. However, we remain committed to standing in solidarity with the conflict-affected communities in Myanmar and Thailand.
Our efforts, aimed at providing humanitarian assistance and advocating for the rights and needs of these communities, are more crucial than ever. We continue to work tirelessly together towards a just and sustainable solution for the nation of Myanmar, a solution that respects the rights of all its people.
On this day of remembrance, we reaffirm our unwavering commitment to supporting the people of Myanmar. We urge the international community to join us amplifying the voices of conflict-affected Myanmar people, and working towards a future where every individual can live in dignity, security, and prosperity.
Together, we can make a difference. Together, we can help build a future that is just and peaceful for Myanmar..."
Source/publisher:
The Border Consortium (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Articles on the TB[B]C, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
206.48 KB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"1 February 2024: The international community must formally recognise Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) and establish a special tribunal to prosecute the military for the commission of international crimes, says the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M).
SAC-M hosted an online panel discussion “Emerging Realities in Myanmar: What Can the International Community Do?” to mark the third anniversary of the start of the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, which sparked the Spring Revolution.
His Excellency Duwa Lashi La, Acting President of the NUG, opened the event by addressing the historic successes of recent revolutionary offensives against the military junta.
“The Spring Revolution’s military triumphs have shattered a decades-old myth: that the Myanmar people can never topple the military,” said H.E. Duwa Lashi La. “This has now been replaced by the evident truth that the criminal military will never crush the will of our people.”
The junta has responded to its mounting territorial losses with intensified aerial bombardment and indiscriminate shelling of towns and villages under resistance control and in contested areas.
“The junta’s collapse is inevitable. The real question is when, not if, and how much devastation will occur before the end,” said Marzuki Darusman, SAC-M founding member.
The humanitarian impact of the junta’s persistent attacks is enormous and growing at an increasing rate, yet international assistance is limited.
“Every aspect of people’s basic needs – food, shelter, health care – is an emergency need right now,” said Esther Ze Naw Bamvo, a leading Kachin social justice advocate. “Almost all of the citizens from cities in conflict areas have moved to [Ethnic Revolutionary Organisation]-controlled areas. If the international community wants to provide direct support to the Myanmar people, they should find ways to contact and work with local [civil society organisations] and those organizations who are working in these areas.”
Action must be taken to apply pressure on the junta to cut its capacity to commit atrocities and other human rights violations, said SAC-M. Ending the military’s impunity was highlighted in particular.
“I believe that establishing a special criminal tribunal for Myanmar is the path forward that we all need to pursue,” said appeals prosecutor Martin Witteveen. “Accountability and criminal law will not solve every problem, but without a credible accountability, the problem will certainly not be solved.”
At the same time, action must be taken to support the democratic movement and facilitate the realisation of the Myanmar peoples’ clearly expressed democratic will and aspirations.
SAC-M founding member Yanghee Lee called on the international community to recognise the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar: “The NUG are not a shadow government and they are not a government in exile. The NUG is the de facto government and the legitimate government.”
Marzuki Darusman echoed this call: “It is clear that it is time for the international community to get off the fence and fully back the people and their representatives in the form of the NUG and the [National Unity Consultative Council]. This is the way forward to peace, stability, and democracy—no less than what Myanmar deserves.”
H.E. Duwa Lahsi La, in his closing remarks, urged the international community to join the Myanmar people as they stand firm in their resolve to deliver a truly federal Myanmar that is united, free and fair.
“There is still time for the international community – ASEAN, the UN, our neighbours and other nations – to stand with us on the right side of history.”
Source/publisher:
Special Advisory Council for Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-02-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
136.55 KB
more
Description:
"In the early morning of February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military sent armored vehicles through the capital, Naypyidaw, arresting the country’s elected civilian leaders. Three years on, the junta’s relentless efforts to consolidate power have caused a spiraling human rights and humanitarian catastrophe.
Junta security forces have killed over 4,000 people, arrested over 25,000, and deliberately blocked humanitarian aid from reaching millions of people amid countrywide economic and infrastructure collapse. The number of people needing assistance has grown from 1 million before the coup to 18.6 million in 2024, including 6 million children.
The military’s widespread and systematic abuses amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, fueled by decades of impunity and meager international efforts to stop the violations.
While atrocities spiral and slivers of refuge disappear, the United Nations Security Council remains at a standstill.
In December 2022, the Security Council passed its first resolution on Myanmar since the country’s independence in 1948, denouncing the military’s post-coup abuses. But the final text was troublingly watered down, with the calls for sanctions and arms embargoes in an initial United Kingdom-led draft removed to stave off threatened vetoes from China and Russia.
The UK, the Security Council’s designated penholder for resolutions on Myanmar, has for years taken a hyper-cautious approach to the country, a strategy that failed to promote any chance of accountability in the wake of the military’s 2017 crimes against humanity and acts of genocide against the ethnic Rohingya.
When the resolution passed—with 12 members in favor and abstentions from China, Russia, and India—the UK and others presented the compromised text as a first step, opening the door to heightened scrutiny of the atrocities taking place on the ground. “We stand ready to take further action,” the UK ambassador said. “We expect this resolution to be implemented in full.”
One year on, that further action has not materialized. Without any leverage or enforcement mechanism in the resolution, the junta has disregarded the document’s calls, such as for the release of prisoners and full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access.
Instead, since the resolution was passed, security forces have arrested more than 2,200 people, killed over 1,700, and bombed schools, hospitals, and displacement camps.
The junta has ramped up its deadly blockages of humanitarian aid as a method of collective punishment against the civilian population. After Cyclone Mocha made landfall in May, junta authorities refused to authorize travel and visas for aid workers, release urgent supplies from customs and warehouses, or relax onerous and unnecessary restrictions on lifesaving assistance for millions of people in need. The UN estimates that 10,000 children under 5 died in 2023 due to the lack of treatment for malnutrition.
Since late October, fighting between junta forces and alliances of ethnic and anti-junta armed groups has erupted across much of the country. Over 660,000 people have been forced to flee their homes in the months since, pushing the total number of internally displaced to 2.6 million.
“We’re living in constant fear of attacks, arrests, and harassment by the military,” said a villager in Rakhine State, where fighting broke out in mid-November, ending a year-long unofficial ceasefire. “Most of the men from Rakhine villages have gone into hiding to avoid arrest. The fighting left so many of our houses destroyed to the ground. All communication from other townships has been shut down.”
The latest spike in fighting has triggered further restrictions, with the military blocking urgently needed access to major roads, telecommunications services, and waterways.
“All the nongovernmental organization work has been suspended and the roads and communication to the north and south have been blocked since the attacks on November 13,” an aid worker in Rakhine State told Human Rights Watch. “There are new checkpoints set up by the Border Guard Police at the town entry points. We’re already facing a food crisis because we can’t get essential goods and food from the blocked villages. The costs of everything have gone so high.”
The authorities have prevented the humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) from operating its 25 mobile clinics in Rakhine State. “The continuation of these current blockages will have a catastrophic impact on people’s health,” MSF said.
These restrictions sustain the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, designed to exert control over an area by isolating and terrorizing civilians. They also violate Myanmar’s international obligations on the rights to life, health, and shelter.
The junta’s abuses are having an increasing impact beyond Myanmar’s borders as well, spilling over into China, India, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
Meanwhile, the 2022 Security Council resolution has not become the hoped-for on-ramp to stronger action, but the feeble peak of council activity on a country in harrowing crisis.
The coup anniversary and the junta’s unrelenting repression should mobilize the UK to lead Security Council members into taking concrete steps. Members should pass a binding resolution instituting a global arms embargo, referring the country situation to the International Criminal Court, and imposing targeted sanctions on the junta’s leadership and military-owned companies. And if Russia and China block a resolution, then individual governments should use their own national sanctions capabilities to work toward a de-facto global arms embargo—in line with the UN General Assembly’s call for states to halt arms transfers to Myanmar back in 2021.
The Security Council should hold regular public meetings to be briefed on junta atrocities and people’s efforts to assert their rights. Governments should take more concerted measures to pressure the junta and support Myanmar civil society. The voices of the Myanmar people should be guiding international efforts, their resolute struggle for democracy and freedom a clarion call that global actors need likewise to persevere. There is no other way forward..."
Source/publisher:
The Diplomat (Tokyo) via Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"THREE YEARS OF POST-COUP ATROCITIES IN MYANMAR
Tomorrow, 1 February, marks three years since the military in Myanmar (Burma) overthrew the civilian-led government. Since then, the people of Myanmar have endured war crimes and crimes against humanity as the military has imposed crackdowns on anti-coup protests and perpetrated an increasingly violent campaign in anti-junta strongholds across the country. The military has perpetrated mass detentions, indiscriminate bombardments and arson campaigns, targeted attacks on schools and religious buildings, rape and the weaponization of vital humanitarian aid. Since the coup, at least 4,400 people have been killed, including 1,600 in 2023 alone, and 2.6 million displaced while nearly 20,000 people remain detained.
In October a group of ethnic revolutionary organizations – known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance – launched Operation 1027, targeting the junta’s outposts and strongholds across the country. Operation 1027 – the most significant challenge to the junta since the coup – has galvanized other armed groups to launch attacks, with fighting now engulfing two thirds of the country. Fighting has particularly intensified in Rakhine State, where clashes on 26 January between the Arakan Army and the military in Hpon Nyo Leik village killed at least 12 Rohingya civilians. The military repeatedly shelled the village, destroying infrastructure. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Arakan Army allegedly positioned its troops in and around this Rohingya village in anticipation of the military’s attacks. Since October, at least 554 people have been killed and 800,000 newly displaced.
On 30 January the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, warned, “As the military have suffered setback after setback on the battlefield, they have lashed out, launching waves of indiscriminate aerial bombardments and artillery strikes… Military tactics have consistently focused on the punishment of civilians who they view as supporting their enemies. As a result, the military has routinely targeted civilians and protected objects under international humanitarian law, especially medical facilities and schools.” Targeted attacks on civilians and civilian objects, the use of human shields and the indiscriminate bombardments of civilian-populated areas violate international humanitarian and human rights law and may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Three years into the crisis, both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the UN Security Council are paralyzed by divisions and have made little progress on a coordinated response as civilians continue to endure atrocities. The Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Savita Pawnday, said, “In the three years since the military coup, populations across Myanmar have suffered from atrocities and daily abuses at the hands of the military who have been emboldened by impunity. The international community must collectively cut off the junta’s access to the jet fuel, funds and the legitimacy it needs to continue committing atrocities against civilians.”..."
Source/publisher:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The Myanmar military cartel must be dismantled
In February of 2021, the Myanmar military launched its illegal attempt to seize power. In the three years since, the junta has failed to gain control of the country because of the courageous resistance of Myanmar people.
The Myanmar military has a decades-long record of mass killings, torture, sexual violence and other gross human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities in particular. Since the attempted coup three years ago, the junta has committed widespread atrocity crimes and grave human rights violations with total impunity, and caused an economic and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The military's unprecedented violence and inhuman acts have been enabled by a network of domestic and international companies, illicit trade in natural resources and drugs, and ASEAN’s provision of diplomatic, military, technical, financial and intelligence.
How has the resistance movement come this far?
Spring Revolution: On the ground in Myanmar, ordinary people rose up across ethnic, religious, generational and class lines. They organised strikes against the illegitimate junta, boycotted military businesses and took up arms alongside ethnic armies to defend democracy. The Myanmar military has lost thousands of troops through defection and many others have surrendered. They continue to lose ground on all fronts to an alliance of ethnic armies and Spring Revolution resistance and defence forces.
Humanitarian Aid: People-to-people community-based emergency humanitarian aid have supported and saved lives of the most vulnerable population displaced by the Myanmar military's campaign of terror. They continue to resist the military junta as frontline humanitarians.
Sanctions: Courageous people throughout Myanmar, the diaspora and civil society organisations around the world acting in solidarity urged governments to act. Coordinated targeted sanctions are hitting the military’s global arms and financial network.
Boycotts: Mass boycotts against military products have hit the generals’ hip pockets and irreparably hurt their corrupt network of businesses. Products like Myanmar Beer, Red Ruby cigarettes and Mytel sim cards have been removed from shops and publicly destroyed. Divestment: Under pressure, companies have cut ties with the military and its businesses, and shareholders have divested from companies that continued business as usual with the junta. Multinational corporations have divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the military.
Together we can dismantle the military cartel.
In 2023, Justice for Myanmar published a report identifying 22 foreign governments, 26 intergovernmental organisations (including 14 UN entities), 8 foreign financial institutions, and 8 other international organisations that have provided the junta with political and financial support.
The report also recognises “an increasing number of governments and organisations that have taken steps to prevent or rectify their support for the military junta”.
While rounds of sanctions have been imposed by the US, UK, Canada, EU and Australia on senior junta individuals and some of the junta’s business interests, ASEAN’s approach to the Myanmar military junta has been one of enablement and complicity. ASEAN has allowed the junta to participate in and even lead regional initiatives for military cooperation and training. Notably, Singapore remains the third biggest supplier of arms and equipment to the Myanmar military since its coup attempt, in a trade valued at $254 million from at least 138 Singaporean companies, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Justice For Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung says: “For three years the people of Myanmar have successfully blocked the illegal military junta from taking control of their communities, country and future.
“The people of Myanmar have refused to accept or legitimise the junta.
“Myanmar’s federal democracy forces are rapidly expanding territorial, governance and administrative control and thousands of soldiers have defected or surrendered from the military itself.
“Targeted sanctions have hit the military cartel’s global network and multinational corporations have divested hundreds of millions of dollars from business with the illegal junta.
“It’s a three-year long losing streak caused by pressure from all sides.
“The international community needs to unite around the use sanctions and step up to finally cut off the flow of revenue and arms, equipment, technology and jet fuel to the junta to protect civilian lives.
“They must listen to the Myanmar people resisting the military and act in solidarity now.”..."
Source/publisher:
Justice For Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-31
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
141.13 KB 139.38 KB
more
Description:
"Poor decision-making and an inflexible strategy are compounding the junta’s losses and driving discontent among army commanders.
On 5 January, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) accepted the conditional surrender of the Laukkaing Regional Operations Command, giving it control of Laukkaing city, the prime objective of the joint anti-junta Operation 1027. One hundred kilometres to the west, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) has expelled junta forces from large towns and strategic roadways and gained near-total control of its primary area of operation. On the other side of the country, in Rakhine State, the Arakan Army’s (AA) campaign has accelerated in recent weeks, resulting in the rapid retreat of junta forces. And yet the impact of Operation 1027 is not confined to the battlefield, with the junta’s failure to stem its losses stirring deep dissatisfaction among its ranks according to sources close to the army and regime.
After spending three years on the sidelines, the Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the MNDAA, TNLA and AA, entered the post-coup war by launching Operation 1027 along the border with China in late October 2023. The blitz has expelled the regime from swathes of territory in the country’s north and inspired fresh attacks by opposition forces elsewhere. This month’s conflict update explores recent battlefield developments and analyses what went wrong for the regime’s forces in northern Shan State, where a new ceasefire came into effect on 11 January.....Following two rounds of talks brokered by Beijing, junta forces ceded control of Laukkaing
city to the MNDAA on 5 January. About 2,400 personnel, including six brigadier generals, were granted safe passage as a part of a negotiated withdrawal.....Junta soldiers managed to disable or destroy some of their larger weapon systems before leaving, but were required to surrender their small arms.....The Myanmar armed forces expelled the MNDAA from Laukkaing in 2009, so the city’s capture marks the end of a nearly 15-year campaign to ‘return home’. The MNDAA is now effectively in control of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (SAZ).
In December 2023, Chinese officials began pressuring the Brotherhood Alliance to de-escalate and negotiate with the junta. The MNDAA mostly complied, having already won itself a favourable bargaining position.
The TNLA’s progress had been more limited. The group responded to Chinese pressure by instead accelerating assaults on junta bases and towns. The MNDAA assisted its partner by sending units to fight in TNLA uniforms.....The TNLA is now effectively in control of the Palaung SAZ, the heartland of the Ta’ang people. It also secured a land bridge to the Myanmar–China border by capturing Namhkam Town on 18 December.
The TNLA has made inroads outside the SAZ as well. Ta’ang fighters captured Namtu Town on 28 December, and occupied the town of Kutkai after the junta withdrew on 7 January.....TNLA fighters also captured Monglon and a small base outside
Mongmit Town. The bases lie near or along a key weapons-smuggling route that links Shan to both Kachin and Myanmar’s interior.....Though the junta retains an isolated presence at Muse, the country’s largest border gate, it has lost control of the two most important roads linking Myanmar to China. Many of the units forced out by the Brotherhood Alliance have regrouped in Lashio......After a slow start, the AA’s offensive in Rakhine and southern Chin states began to accelerate in late December.....The AA has overrun more than 20 outposts across
Paletwa Township, Chin State. On 15 January, AA fighters captured Paletwa Town.....Though some regime outposts remain, the AA is now the dominant force in Paletwa. Control here opens access to the Indian and Bangladeshi borders, and an alternative supply route via Matupi, Chin State.....The fighting between the AA and the regime has implications for regional development. A key segment of India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, a US$500-million effort to link Kolkata with Mizoram, runs through Paletwa.....On 7 and 8 January, the AA fired rockets at the Dhanyawadi naval base on Ramree island, just ten kms from the terminus of the Sino-Myanmar pipeline. China plans to build a Special Economic Zone and deep-sea port on the island.....Elsewhere in the country, opposition forces continue to experience advances and setbacks.....Inspired by Operation 1027, a coalition of Karenni resistance groups began a large-scale assault on Loikaw, the Kayah State capital, on 11 November. Despite the initial capture of about half the city, the offensive has stalled.....But the operation forced the regime to pull its forces from other positions around the state, allowing the Karenni resistance to consolidate control across remote areas and several small towns.....In the southeast, an opposition coalition involving elements of the Karen National Union (KNU) and People’s Defense Forces (PDF) tied to the National Unity Government (NUG) has not recreated the territorial successes seen elsewhere.....An early December assault on the town of
Kawkareik failed, but the fighting over the past month has disrupted Asian Highway 1, the main trade route between Thailand and Myanmar.....In early November, coalition forces captured the police station and bridge at Chaung Hna Khwa, on the border of Mon and Kayin states. Regime forces retook the village on 29 December, though the bridge is now destroyed.....On 4 January, a joint KNU and PDF unit destroyed a
small bridge along the road somewhere between the towns of Kyauktaga and Phyu. That same day, opposition fighters reportedly downed powerlines near the village of Zee Kone.....In early November, PDF fighters linked to the NUG took part in the capture of Kawlin and Khampat, the first towns to fall in Sagaing Region. The NUG now claims to administer both.....To deny the NUG’s ability to govern, the junta has adopted a strategy of attacking civilians in the towns, probably with the aim of making the areas uninhabitable.....On 28 December, junta soldiers stationed in Wuntho Town fired shells at Kawlin, which lies just 12 km to the south. Four civilians, including two children, were reportedly killed. Six more civilians were killed by a second artillery attack days later.....On 7 January, a regime airstrike on the edge of Khampat reportedly killed 17 civilians, including nine children. Twenty more civilians were wounded.....Junta missteps compound losses
As early as the second week of Operation 1027, Chinese officials acting as mediators suggested to the junta that it allow the MNDAA and TNLA to administer their own areas. The junta refused to concede territories it had not yet lost, like Laukkaing, and opted to fight it out instead. But the army ultimately failed to launch a counter-offensive or utilise available resources to defend its remaining positions. Though some battalions pivoted to mobile defense, many were left to guard exposed or isolated hilltop positions and so they were overrun, partially destroyed, or forced to surrender. Sources indicated that Naypyidaw’s inflexible strategy and the avoidable losses that followed have harmed morale among ground commanders.
The army’s withdrawal from Laukkaing on 5 January forfeited its greatest bargaining chip, yet it is unclear what, if anything, the junta received in exchange. According to various reports, the second round of talks held between 22 and 24 December had not produced a concrete agreement on the fate of Laukkaing. Surprisingly, the withdrawal took place before all sides convened in Kunming, China for a third round of talks on 10 and 11 January. This suggests that the city’s commanding officers may have prematurely withdrawn, leaving the junta with little to no leverage over its opponents. Media reported that the six brigadier generals were detained upon arriving in Lashio after the withdrawal. A source confirmed that at least five of them are facing court martial. The ceasefire deal struck on 11 January appeared to freeze the conflict along the new lines of demarcation that the Brotherhood won by force, so the regime’s acceptance is indicative of a decisive defeat, rather than a compromise.
Moreover, the junta can no longer access the border area in Shan State, raising the prospect of a long-term inability to tax a significant portion of the country’s trade with China. Its losses now include large towns like Hseni and Kutkai, which were not necessarily primary objectives for the Brotherhood Alliance. By refusing to bargain, the junta has lost more territory, depleted its fighting strength, allowed the capture of large arms and munitions stockpiles, and precipitated a crisis of confidence among its officer corps. Several sources close to the regime and army have indicated widespread dissatisfaction with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and even consideration of a leadership change among at least some internal elements.
While the territorial losses inflicted by Operation 1027 do not pose an existential threat to the regime, the embarrassment of the defeat and its impact on morale could potentially generate some internal instability. Yet any effort to sideline Min Aung Hlaing will be difficult. Since the coup, the junta leader has carefully consolidated his power by removing potential rivals from important positions (the regime announced a reshuffle of several senior officials immediately after the fall of Laukkaing). Although Min Aung Hlaing has lost respect, unseating him would also equate to challenging the long-standing norms of the Tatmadaw, which most senior officers still view as sacrosanct. Moreover, it would be hard for any reform-minded faction to initiate a negotiated transition, given how deeply the regime is reviled both at home and abroad..."
Source/publisher:
International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
939.55 KB
more
Description:
"Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Jan 8 to 14, 2024
Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Mandalay Region, Rakhine State, Chin State, Shan State, and Kachin State from January 8th to 14th. Military people arrested, beat, and extorted the civilians who did not have NRC cards or Smart cards in Ayeyarwady Region. Military Junta killed 8 civilians from Sagaing Region and Mandalay Region.
About 20 civilians died and over 20 were injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. 2 underaged children were injured and 2 died when the Military Junta committed abuses. Civilians left their places 8 times because of the Military Junta Troop’s matching and riding..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-17
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
309.25 KB 280.33 KB 150.8 KB
more
Description:
"The persistent conflicts plaguing Myanmar since its independence in 1948 remain unresolved as it fails to address the root cause of the issue. The result has been an enduring struggle for ethnic rights, leading to the world’s longest-running civil war.
Despite the constitution’s proclamation in September 1947, genuine union and equality as promised have not been realized. Ethnic nationalities, notably the Shan and others, have not experienced the equality envisaged in the constitution. The military regime’s exclusion and marginalization of non-Bamar ethnicities, coupled with a policy of Burmanization, have suppressed the cultural, linguistic, historical, and ethnic expressions of other nationalities.
The military government’s inability to meet ethnic nationalities’ demands has prompted uprisings by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) seeking increased autonomy or independence. Even officially recognized ethnic nationalities face challenges in enjoying full civil and cultural rights. For example, many Shan Saophas and politicians attempted to establish a federal system in 1958-1961, however they were met with repression. This led many to take up arms against the military regime.
The military regime’s unitary system has been marred by inequalities and imbalances, perpetuated through a perceived correlation between population size, political legitimacy, and entitlements. It divides the 135 ethnic groups and restricts legislative representation to those with suitable population sizes.
In addition, the 2008 Constitution, one of the world’s lengthiest, further entrenched these disparities. These divisive tactics aimed to prolong its dictatorship. It only gives self-administered areas for some groups such as the Danu, Kokang, Naga, Palaung, Pa-O, and Wa. Consequently, the ongoing conflict in Myanmar is not merely a problem among ethnic minorities but stems from the country’s governance structure. The absence of a federal system, where every nationality enjoys equal rights, exacerbates the situation.
To achieve peace and unity in Myanmar, a shift in the system, rather than a mere regime change, is imperative. All nationalities within the country must collaboratively build and reform a system that paves the way for a genuine federal and democratic union..."
Source/publisher:
"Shan Herald Agency for News" (Chiang Mai)
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-07
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Federalism, ethnic conflict and the politics of national reconciliation - general studies and sources, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Thailand would need to implement essential refugee policies that align with international standards to deal with the ongoing humanitarian crisis
Description:
"Thailand lies at a critical intersection in Southeast Asia, where the vibrant tapestry of cultures meets the complex weave of geopolitics. As the nation grapples with the escalating number of Myanmar refugees, it's not merely facing a geopolitical conundrum but a humanitarian crisis which demands global attention.
Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin is actively advocating for Thailand to play a central role in engaging with the Myanmar military regime to address the two-year civil war. While agreeing to adhere to the peace plan proposed by the regional bloc Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he underscores the geographical proximity between Thailand and Myanmar, leading to an influx of displaced individuals seeking protection. This exodus, in turn, necessitates the provision of essential services to address their needs.
While agreeing to adhere to the peace plan proposed by the regional bloc Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he underscores the geographical proximity between Thailand and Myanmar, leading to an influx of displaced individuals seeking protection.
PM Srettha's recent statement indicates a shift in Thailand's approach from the previous government's stance, which largely supported the Junta, to a more humanitarian-focused role. However, the current government's engagement remains limited to the Junta, highlighting the need for broader connections with other groups.
Roots of displacement
The Kayin State, formerly the Karen State, has witnessed a history of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Junta, particularly against the Karen ethnic minority seeking greater autonomy. Well-documented instances of systematic violence, including rape, torture, and forced labour, explicitly targeting Karenni women and girls, showcase the severity of the situation. The military's use of both women and men as human shields violates international humanitarian law.
The coup has exacerbated the crisis and made these people easy targets of violence. There are restrictions on travel and a shortage of essential resources in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar. Humanitarian workers are adapting by seeking alternative routes to deliver aid materials and avoid harassment and detention by military forces. Consequently, a growing number of individuals, including men, women, and children, are seeking refuge along the Thai-Myanmar border to escape the worsening conditions.
Attending the displaced
Bangkok's historical role as a haven for displaced people, mainly from Myanmar, is evident. Since the mid-1980s, the nation has provided shelter to approximately 90,801 displaced people from Myanmar across nine camps. However, following the coup in Myanmar in February 2021, an additional 45,025 displaced people sought refuge. Thailand's humanitarian efforts include providing temporary shelters, a few core relief items, food, and medical assistance.
Humanitarian workers are adapting by seeking alternative routes to deliver aid materials and avoid harassment and detention by military forces.
Despite allowing these new arrivals to stay in temporary shelters near the border, the Thai government has sporadically pushed them back. Notably, these recently displaced populations are not allowed to enter established refugee camps, and Thai officials impose stringent restrictions on their movement.
In July 2023, around 9,000 hapless people sought safety in Thailand's Mae Hong Son district due to frequent airstrikes in Karenni State. Initially, Thai authorities permitted them to stay in temporary shelters, however, on 21 October, they were asked to return to Myanmar within two weeks. Consequently, the shelters were vacated as people walked back across the border into Karenni State, a journey taking four to five days. Many resettled in Doh Noh Ku, a settlement for internally displaced people at the Thai-Myanmar border.
Pushbacks persisted until 27 October, coinciding with an offensive by a coalition of armed ethnic and resistance groups against the Myanmar military in northern Shan State. Subsequently, opposition forces elsewhere in Myanmar launched attacks against the military, prompting retaliatory airstrikes, including in Karenni State. By 27 November, over 2,387 Myanmar individuals had fled again, crossing back into the Mae Hong Son district.
The Thai Foreign Minister's announcement on 3 December to construct shelters for displaced people underscores a recognition of the escalating violence and the potential for more people to seek refuge.
Pushbacks persisted until 27 October, coinciding with an offensive by a coalition of armed ethnic and resistance groups against the Myanmar military in northern Shan State.
On 8 December, Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed that Myanmar officials had reached an agreement to establish a task force to enhance humanitarian aid for those displaced within Myanmar due to the ongoing conflict. Despite good intentions, concerns arise about the effective distribution of assistance to all affected regions, considering the track record of the Junta.
Predicaments
Thailand's response to the crisis is challenging. The delicate balance between engaging with the Myanmar military regime and advocating for humanitarian provisions poses a diplomatic dilemma. The strain on resources and infrastructure due to the growing refugee population is a significant concern. The need for sustained efforts, both domestically and through international collaboration, is crucial to address the humanitarian crisis effectively.
Thailand's response is constrained by its non-ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol. However, in 2018, Thailand voted in favour of the Global Compact on Refugees, and subsequently, the National Screening Mechanism (NSM) was established in 2019. The NSM aims to grant “protected person” status to foreign nationals in Thailand who are unable or unwilling to return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution, as determined by the NSM Committee. Despite delays in application due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2023, Thailand's Cabinet approved a regulation outlining the procedure and eligibility criteria for individuals seeking NSM status, which officially came into effect on September 2023. Additionally, the rollout of the NSM will occur incrementally as the Thai government, with technical assistance and advocacy from UNHCR, continues to develop the comprehensive set of procedural standards and policies needed for its implementation.
The NSM aims to grant “protected person” status to foreign nationals in Thailand who are unable or unwilling to return to their home countries due to a well-founded fear of persecution, as determined by the NSM Committee.
However, concerns exist regarding the NSM's effectiveness and legal subordination to the Immigration Act. While Clause 15 of the NSM regulation delays the deportation of individuals asserting protected-person status, it fails to shield them from arrest, detention, or prosecution based on their immigration status. Additionally, as the NSM is legally subordinate to the Immigration Act, the predominant experience for refugees seeking protection under the NSM in Thailand would involve initial encounters with arrest, detention, and prosecution. There also remains apprehension that the NSM excludes migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos under its provision from receiving adequate protection in Thailand.
Actions required
To address the challenges, the Thai government should utilise the power granted by Section 17 of the Immigration Act to exempt NSM applicants from arrest, detention, or prosecution. Explicit provisions for determining protected status under NSM need to be established. Exempting refugees from arrest, detention, and prosecution under the Immigration Act, as emphasised in an open letter by eight organisations on 12 December, will signal Thailand's commitment to the Global Compact on Refugees.
Urgent action from Thai authorities is imperative to enhance efforts in granting appropriate status and protection to those fleeing persecution, aligning with international standards.
The escalating Myanmar refugee crisis necessitates a comprehensive and swift response from Thai authorities. While challenges persist, Thailand can set an example in the region by implementing essential refugee policies. Addressing humanitarian concerns, engaging in regional cooperation, and enacting necessary policy reforms are imperative for Thailand to effectively manage the evolving crisis and provide sustainable solutions for refugees and displaced persons..."
Source/publisher:
Observer Research Foundation
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Opinion:
“We Won’t Be Satisfied Until the end Of The World”[1]
Over the past couple of years, it has not been uncommon to come across headlines such as “Why Has the World Forgotten About Myanmar?”, “U.N. Rapporteur: Myanmar Crisis ‘Has Been Forgotten’”, “Myanmar’s ‘forgotten war’”, and “Myanmar: the Forgotten Revolution”. To be sure, while the uprisings in countries such as Sudan (2019-2022), or the Palestinians’ ongoing resistance to settler-colonial genocide in the Gaza Strip, have received international coverage from major media outlets, it seems that the world has all but forgotten about the ongoing struggle against Myanmar’s military dictatorship, which will enter its third year in 2024. This is particularly striking in light of the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) most recent report on “The top 10 crises the world can’t ignore in 2024,” which listed Myanmar as the country that is currently undergoing the fifth most urgent humanitarian crisis and projects a worsening of the situation for, what IRC classifies as, approximately three million “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPS). According to the language of the report, in terms of the total number of persons in need, the crisis in Myanmar is rivaled by only four other countries: Sudan, the Gaza Strip and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, South Sudan, and Burkina Faso. And as of December 2023, outside of “Ukraine and Syria, Myanmar recorded the highest number of conflict-related incidents (more than 8,000) for the year.”
The 1221 Coup[2]
On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s Army (Tatmadaw) staged a successful coup which saw the arrest of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and the installation of the Army as Myanmar’s new governing authority, led by Army Chief, Min Aung Hlaing. In the weeks and months that followed, the country witnessed mass demonstrations against the military junta as well as its brutal repression by the military junta, including the army’s use of live ammunition against protestors. According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), “at least 6,337 civilians were reported as killed and 2,614 as wounded for political reasons in Myanmar in the twenty months between the military coup of February 1, 2021, and September 30, 2022.” Meanwhile, the United Nations Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA) expressed concerns similar to those of IRC in their December 2023 report, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan: Myanmar, concluding that more than two years of a military junta has resulted in an all but “grim” humanitarian landscape “with a third of the population” now said “to be in humanitarian need.”
According to the report findings, the military junta’s “attempt to suppress opposition and consolidate power” has included the use of “systematic violence against the civilian population resulting in over 4,000 deaths, tens of thousands of arbitrary arrests and other human rights violations, including the use of sexual and gender-based violence.” While the State of Emergency imposed by the military in 2021 remains in place alongside restrictions on the freedom of assembly in 127 townships, Martial Law has now been imposed on 59 out of 330 townships across the country. And to make matters worse, the difficulty in satisfying basic subsistence needs for a growing number of Myanmar’s population has been compounded by “the devastating impacts of Cyclone Mocha in May…placing the people of Myanmar in increasing peril.” In total, “some 18.6 million people are estimated to require humanitarian assistance in 2024 — one million more than the same time last year — with the number of displaced people expected to continue steadily rising during the year from the record 2.6 million at the end of 2023.” By 2024, an estimated $994 million will be required to address the needs of more than 19 million people in Myanmar.
From 3D Printed Warfare to Operation 1027
A military dictatorship that the world has all but been happy to forget and the worsening effects of compounded political, social, and environmental crises: it is on all of this that the people of Myanmar, displaced in their millions, have nourished themselves and refined their struggle. What began as a popular uprising has transformed into an exodus to the countryside to take up makeshift arms — ranging from bow and arrows to refurbished wooden rifles — against Min Aung Hlaing’s military. Thus unfolded a now three-year-long protracted guerrilla war, wherein resistance fighters have reached the point of being able to 3D print drones capable of carrying explosives in various, nondescript, caves amidst an otherwise ordinary South East Asian landscape. Speaking with a Dutch journalist who spent time with one armed resistance unit, one guerrilla who goes by the name “3D” (a nom de guerre stemming from his overseeing of the manufacture of 3D printed guns and drones) said, “[the military] can’t win on the ground, so they resort to bombing us from above. We can’t defend ourselves. All we can do is hide…Drones are the only thing we have to make them feel even a fraction of the trauma we feel when they bomb us with their fighter jets.” Despite their capability to engage in warfare both on the ground and in the air, analysts have tended to view Myanmar’s armed conflict as a stalemate with no clear end in sight.
However, on 27 October, the anti-junta coalition known as ‘The Brotherhood Alliance’ — made up of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Arakan Army (AA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) — “launched a coordinated offensive taking control of several military posts and towns near the border with China,” with additional news of the MNDAA having “closed the roads from the trade hub of Lashio to Chinshwehaw and Muse on the China border in advance of a ‘major offensive.’” After a mere two weeks, “anti-junta fighters operating with ‘unprecedented coordination’ have overrun 100 military outposts and the junta stands to lose control of key border crossings that account for some 40% of cross-border trade, and a vital tax revenue source.” According to analysts, “the current offensive poses the biggest threat to the junta’s grip on power since the 2021 coup.” Speaking with DW, Anthony Davis, a Bangkok-based security analyst, said, “the offensive has denied the military regime access to key trade hubs on the Chinese border and the revenue derived from them,” while emphasizing the offensive’s “potential to bring down a regime that is already facing deep economic and political crises.”
Earlier this month, China succeeded in brokering “a ceasefire [agreement] in northern Myanmar between the junta and an alliance of rebels.” A few days into the ceasefire, however, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced that “it had taken control of the town of Namhsan in northern Shan state as well as the so-called 105-Mile Trade Zone, a key trading area on Shan state’s border with China.” Despite this shift in China’s regional policy and demonstrated willingness to assume a more active, diplomatic, and despite China’s interest in eliminating forms of illicit and illegal activity along its shared border with Myanmar, one of the main allies of the Brotherhood Alliance, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) — the military wing of the de facto ruling party, the United Wa State Party (UWSP) in Wa State, a self-administered division in the north-eastern part of the country — continues to be “entirely equipped with modern weaponry and equipment produced in China”. Hence, Davis noted, given China’s “powerful influence over the UWSA, [it] could undoubtedly affect a major reduction in munitions reaching northern groups if it wanted to.” As things currently stand, China has yet to show any interest in reducing the cross border flow of arms and munitions that make it into the hands of the UWSA.
‘Kabar Ma Kyay Bu’
Myanmar’s is a young war relative to those waged by imperial states from the global North, especially when the median age of the country’s population is 29.6 years. And the youthfulness of this armed struggle is something on full display amongst the various guerrilla camps spanning its countryside. Having previously lived as precariously employed workers, delivery drivers, university students, engineers, and the like; never having seen a day of military combat in their lives before the armed resistance against the military junta; Myanmar’s 20-somethings are now seasoned guerrilla fighters initiated into that long tradition of the struggle for liberation using armed resistance.
[1] This title is taken from the Burmese-language anthem ‘Kabar Ma Kyay Bu,’ which was sung during the 1988 People Power Uprisings (also known as the “8888 Uprising”). On 8 August 1988 (8/8/88), in what was then still known as Burma (present-day Myanmar), a major wave of protests and strikes ushered in a period of national mobilizations. This wave of protests, which has come to be known as the People Power Uprisings, culminated in a harsh crackdown and eventual military coup on 18 September 1988. This 1988 anthem of the People Power Uprisings would be sung once again by demonstrators during the 2021 protests against Myanmar’s military (Tatmadaw) coup d’etat.
[2] In a country known for auspicious dates, just as the People Power Uprisings have come to be known as the “8888 Uprisings”, the military coup of 1 February 2021 (1/2/21) was quickly dubbed the “1221 coup.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Zamaneh" (Amsterdam)
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-05
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"As Operation 1027 shifts the balance of power from the Myanmar military to revolutionary forces, we argue that the on-the-ground sociopolitical realities advocate moving past conventional nation-state models, and even the federalism debates, and demand a political will to adapt to the Mandala order, a governance style indigenous to Southeast Asia for centuries before the colonialism of the West. The future of Myanmar centers on transformative political visions that reject the reestablishment of a “national/federal army” and “central state”. It is fundamental to accept this paradigmatic change because only this will enable all parties involved to embrace and align with the emergence of various governance systems, as the material reality demands. Next, we must insist that these systems are democratic, inclusive, responsive and well-coordinated.....Beyond nation-state and federalism .....Myanmar’s economy has transitioned into a war economy. On the military junta’s side, the domestic economy has collapsed, hit by bank runs, inflation and, in rural areas, the inability to farm due to village burnings, as well as increased military spending amidst reduced public service budgets, as reflected in a recent report by the World Bank. Soaring dollar exchange rates and aviation fuel and gasoline prices, combined with international pressure and sanctions, make their fuel-dependent administration unsustainable. On the revolutionary and ethnic armed organization (EAO) side, Operation 1027 symbolizes a transition from guerrilla tactics to a coordinated alliance-led offensive with significant public support and resource flow. Despite the fact that the Myanmar public has endured unprecedented hardships, there seems to be no desire for the military to succeed, even if it would bring a return to stability. Coupled with the declining morale among the rank-and-file soldiers, as evidenced by unprecedented defections during Operation 1027, the larger picture and economic analysis points to the fact that the military will not be able to continue this fight.
Despite the military generals’ lack of interest in pursuing a political exit, the international community is reluctant to decisively support the revolution, preferring to safeguard their own interests—a stance akin to the Burmese saying of “trying to get the snake out without breaking the cane” (မြွေမသေ တုတ်မကျိုး). Having provided little substantive support, now they presumptuously debate Myanmar’s future and what the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and EAOs should do, obsessing over a “power vacuum” and “political fragmentation”. This stance stems from the assertions of certain politicians and analysts who warn that the chaos following the military’s collapse might intensify into greater violence and conflict. Such a perception is not only misguided but ironically might cause the very chaos they anticipate.
We emphasize that the chaos and violence could only happen for two reasons: externally due to attempts to reimpose central control, rather than the lack of it, and internally because of attempts to create exclusive ethnic-based systems in regions with diverse ethnic populations. In fact, it is mainly the analysts and elites who are wary of what they call “political fragmentation”, not the local populace, who have experience with Mandala-like political arrangements, with two or more than two political authorities trying to govern them, such as those seen in the long-sustaining Wa State. This may sound quixotic to the political elites but it is very practical and realistic for the local populace.
The realities on the ground demand a new imagination beyond the conventional nation-state. Now is the opportune moment to offer the people a governance system they are familiar with, rather than enforcing a federal system with extensive decentralization; even setting up a federal system will invariably require a somewhat central authority—a “federal government”. Such models, dependent on a nation-state structure, would necessitate the NUG—or whoever is charged with the task—successfully uniting all EAOs under a singular political leadership and vision, which is next to impossible and a feat that no politicians have achieved over seven decades. The current fixation on establishing a central command stems from persistent assertions by Western analysts, who argue that the lack of unity among opposition forces is the reason why the foreign governments were not providing meaningful assistance to them. If the international policy industry insists the NUG and EAOs must create a central command under a singular political leadership, it is bound to fail spectacularly.
While opposition groups share the objective of overthrowing the junta, on-the-ground political realities are almost antagonistic to a single, central command or joint command. A prime example is in Chin State, where, despite military successes, politicians face growing internal divisions, rooted in both geographical and linguistic differences. Similarly, in Shan State, local Shan groups express frustration over being marginalized and have held longstanding grievances against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). In central dry regions too, there are reported conflicts among the opposition armed groups and governing bodies. Meanwhile, groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Arakan Army (AA) have also explicitly stated their political vision of achieving a confederation, differing from other factions’ goals.
Myanmar’s present landscape makes one recall the historical period following the disintegration of the Bagan Empire in the 13th century, which saw 250 years of political interregnum, characterized by the emergence of multiple regional powers such as the territorially limited local kingdoms of Myinsaing, Pinya, Sagaing, Taungoo, Hanthawaddy, Ava and others, including the notable rise of the Tai people with the establishment of the Lanna kingdom. Currently, various groups exert control over specific territories, necessitating both domestic and international negotiations for effective governance. For instance, Chin communities now administering India-Myanmar border towns and the MNDAA initiating governance in the Kokang region, bordering China, must engage in complex discussions with multiple actors. Similarly, the NUG, now in control of the town of Kawlin, faces the challenge of implementing effective administration.
This power structure reflects the dynamics of the Mandala system, characterized by local autonomy and complex alliances, a system from the not-so-distant past and familiar to the local populace. The Mandala system, unlike a modern nation-state, features multiple political power centers (kingdoms back in those days) with diminishing political power as one moves away from the center, characterized by ill-defined, porous boundaries in contrast to the well-demarcated borders of nation-states. Within this Mandala system, these polities existed in a hierarchical order, with lesser tributaries and a possible supreme king or overlord. Allegiances were fluid and overlapping, and yet, as Thongchai Winichakul puts it, “each king had his own court, administrative and financial system, tax collection, army, and judicial system”. Thus, these polities maintain distinct autonomy and independence.
The call for a new, responsive Mandala
With our call for a new responsive Mandala, the better focus would be on ensuring democratic, inclusive and representative governances, rather than attempting to re-centralize control or establish a federal/national army. This approach involves: 1) acknowledging the emergence of multiple governance arrangements across Myanmar, no matter whether it is called “federal” or “confederal”; 2) prioritizing the establishment of democratic, inclusive and representative governance in captured territories, recognizing that international recognition is secondary to providing effective local governance for residents whose immediate concern is sustenance; and 3) avoiding the expenditure of time and resources on creating a centralized command structure, and instead fostering coordination mechanisms across different polities.
Perhaps more importantly, the new political system or systems in Myanmar must transcend narrow ethnic identities, acknowledging the diverse populations across regions, be it Shan Land (ရှမ်းပြည်), Arakan Country(ရခိုင်ပြည်) or Sagaing Nation (စစ်ကိုင်းတိုင်း). An ethnic-based political system in places like Arakan (Rakhine) or Shan will be a recipe for disaster as the current armed conflicts have already witnessed rising inter-ethnic tensions. In the same spirit, the calls to establish a Bamar state overlook the diverse ethnic populations in the central dry regions, not to mention the Chinese, Hindu or Muslim communities who have been persecuted by successive governments. Instead, efforts should focus on establishing democratic and inclusive governance systems that reflect the Mandala-like order today.
The specific form of these new polities, whether one-party systems akin to Singapore, constitutional monarchies like Thailand, Sweden or the UK, or even communist systems like China or Vietnam, is secondary to their adherence to these democratic inclusive and responsive principles of governance. This is what the internal actors starting with the NUG should aim for. At the same time, the international community must be prepared to accept this, not push for a single political authority who will represent the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
While the role of armed groups in the current stage of Myanmar’s revolution is undeniable, it’s crucial to remember that the military success of these armed groups stems from unprecedented civilian participation and public support. The revolution must center on the people, not the armed groups, ensuring these groups remain accountable and adhere to democratic principles. While the abolition of all armed forces should be a political aim for the long term, the immediate priority right now is to embrace the emerging Mandala-like political arrangements, avoiding the futile pursuit of a centralized chain of command under a singular political leadership. The focus must now shift to ensuring that these emerging political entities embody democratic, inclusive and responsive governance systems tailored to meet the immediate needs of the people, providing the essential services and support required in the here and now. This approach, grounded in current realities, paves the way for a more stable and prosperous future for the peoples of Myanmar.
Htet Min Lwin is a scholar of religion, social movements and revolution, currently writing a PhD at the York Centre for Asian Research at York University, Toronto.
Thiha Wint Aung is a political scientist who holds an MA from the Central European University (CEU) and an MPP from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo, Japan..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, International Bill of Human Rights
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
They say the junta must first ensure their labor rights, while others refuse to fund a coup regime.
Description:
"Myanmar nationals working abroad say they won’t pay income tax to their country’s junta as required by a newly passed law unless they are guaranteed protection of their labor rights, while others oppose funding what they see as an illegitimate military regime.
Myanmar’s Union Taxation Law of 2023, signed by junta chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, went into effect on Oct. 1, requiring migrant workers to pay a portion of their income to the regime. The new law ends an exemption that had been in effect since 2012.
On Dec. 13, the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok announced a tax rate of 2% on the earnings of migrant workers in Thailand.
But workers in Thailand are questioning why they should be forced to make the payments when they are afforded little assistance from the junta in protecting their rights abroad.
“We’ve witnessed many migrant workers suffering violations of their labor rights, but they don’t receive any assistance from Myanmar officials,” said Kyaw Zeya, a Myanmar national who works in Thailand. “So we won’t pay taxes without any protections.”
Migrant workers in Thailand told RFA Burmese that they are already struggling to make ends meet on low wages and that the new income tax will mean additional burdens.
Salaries for migrant workers in factories, workshops, agriculture and livestock, construction, and services is fixed at 7,500 baht (US$220) per month, meaning they will now be required to pay 150 baht (US$5) to the junta from each monthly paycheck.
In Japan, the Myanmar Embassy in Tokyo also recently announced a 2% tax on migrant worker incomes.
Under this taxation scheme, a Myanmar national in Japan who earned 200,000 yen (US$1,385) or more each month had to pay the junta 4,000 yen (US$30), while those who earned less had to pay 3,000 yen (US$20). Following resistance to the scheme, the requirements were reduced to 3,000 yen and 1,000 yen (US$5), respectively.
And while labor rights are generally better protected in Japan, Myanmar nationals working in the country told RFA that they prefer to pay their income taxes to the host nation, where the money won’t be spent on funding a military that kills and arrests those who object to its seizure of power in a Feb. 1, 2021 coup d’etat.
“Those [Myanmar nationals] who need to extend their passport cannot avoid the tax,” said Ye Zaw Htet, who lives and works in Japan. “But I refuse to pay a tax that can be used to harm people in Myanmar.”
Migrant workers who have paid the tax receive a certificate, which is needed to renew one’s passport, apply for labor ID cards and request certain official documents.
Funding a civil war
Analysts RFA spoke with said that the junta wants additional revenue to fund its purchase of aviation fuel, arms and ammunition, even while Myanmar has seen its economy contract and foreign investment vanish amidst a raging civil war.
With an estimated 5 million Myanmar nationals working in Thailand, the junta can expect to earn nearly 750 million baht (US$22 million) per month at a rate of 150 baht per worker.
From Singapore, where around 300,000 Myanmar nationals work and are required to pay a tax rate of 2%, the junta can expect to earn some 2.4 million Singapore dollars (US$1.8 million) per month.
One Myanmar citizen in Singapore who is working as a technician and spoke on condition of anonymity due to security concerns, said they will only pay taxes to a government with a legitimate mandate.
“We aren’t talking about a tax payment,” the worker said. “We will pay taxes to both our home and host countries for the development of our country under an elected government. But we aren’t willing to pay the coup regime.”
Sein Htay, an economist, said that regardless of how it is generated, government revenue “should be spent for public development programs and services, not for war expenses,” and certainly not to fund a civil war.
Attempts by RFA to contact Myanmar’s embassies in Tokyo, Bangkok and Singapore, as well as the junta’s Planning and Finance Ministry, for their response to criticism of the taxation plan went unanswered by the time of publishing.
However, Nyunt Win, the permanent secretary of the junta’s Labor Ministry, characterized the tax scheme as a way to pay for “work permits” for Myanmar nationals overseas.
“Work permits abroad have no connection to the government in the homeland,” he said. “The tax is needed to pay to the home country.”
In addition to the recent taxation plan, the junta has forced migrant workers to hand over 25% of their salaries to the regime when remitting money home through official transfer channels.
Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand staged a protest against the monthly 2% taxation plan in front of the United Nations’ office in Bangkok on Dec. 17, which received a message of support from the Ministry of Labor under the country’s shadow National Unity Government..."
Source/publisher:
"Radio Free Asia" (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Burmese migrant workers, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"The number of children killed by junta forces in Myanmar since the February 2021 coup reached 578 on Wednesday, based on statistics compiled by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG) and additional casualty reports from the past few days. The figure covers those killed who were under the age of 18.
Myanmar regime forces’ indiscriminate air strikes, shelling and raids on villages and other civilian targets across the country have killed large numbers of non-combatants including many children since the Min Aung Hlaing-led military seized power from Myanmar’s elected civilian government on Feb. 1, 2021, NUG Human Rights Minister U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy.
He said his ministry recorded at least 576 child deaths from Feb. 1, 2021 to Monday.
Since then, Nyan Min Hein, a 3-year-old child from Myauktaung Village in Rakhine State’s Kyauktaw Township was killed by junta shelling on Tuesday and Joseph Malsawmhlua, 9, from Let Pan Chaung Village in Sagaing Region’s Kale Township was killed in another junta artillery strike on Wednesday, taking the total death toll among children to 578.
Already this year, junta troops have fired artillery shells indiscriminately at residential areas as well as schools and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in several parts of the country where clashes between regime forces and resistance forces are ongoing, resulting in fresh child casualties.
The junta has been using aircraft and artillery to attack resistance forces in their stronghold areas of Karenni (Kayah), Kachin, Karen and Chin states and Sagaing and Magwe regions since the armed resistance movement started, but frequently targets civilian locations in those areas as well.
According to the NUG, the junta committed nine mass killings in 2021 causing 147 civilian deaths, followed by 44 cases in 2022 killing 515 civilians. In 2023 the number of mass killings increased dramatically to 86, leaving 1,342 civilians dead.
According to a report by the NUG’s Ministry of Human Rights, 172 children were killed last year alone, following 165 the year before.
“The regime has targeted civilians as the enemy and this continues to affect children. In 2023 alone it killed 108 boys and 64 girls, including some who were just months old, in their indiscriminate attacks,” U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy.
The Myanmar military has committed a number of crimes against humanity, the minister said. A few significant cases are the Pazi Gyi Village attack on April 11, 2023 in Sagaing Region in which 40 children were killed; the Let Yet Kone air strike, which killed 11 children on Sept. 23, 2022; the Mone Lei Khet IDP camp artillery strike in Kachin State, which killed 11 children on Oct. 11, 2023; and the A Nang Pa incident on Oct. 28, 2022, which killed dozens of people, although it is unclear exactly how many children died.
All people under the age of 18 are protected and it is the responsibility of all armed groups to shield them from conflict, according to international laws and child rights principles, U Aung Myo Min told The Irrawaddy.
“Although we can confirm the total death toll of the children, the number of wounded and those who have been left disabled is beyond our capacity” to record, U Aung Myo Min said.
In Karenni, Rakhine and northern Shan states the junta is currently facing its greatest military challenge since seizing power, having lost many bases and outposts to resistance forces including the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force and the Brotherhood Alliance of three powerful ethnic armies: the Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Amy and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-04
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état, National Unity Government (NUG)
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"On behalf of the United States of America, I reaffirm our commitment to the people of Burma as they mark the 76th Anniversary of the country’s independence on January 4.
The United States has long supported the people of Burma and their right to chart their own future toward a cohesive union. The military’s campaign of violence since the February 2021 coup has not dimmed the strong commitment of the people of Burma to regain their prosperity and advance the goals of freedom, peace, and justice. We mourn and honor the lives lost in this pursuit.
We stand in solidarity with the people of Burma in their resolve to bring democracy, self-determination, stability, and security to their country. The military regime must end its violence, release all those unjustly and arbitrarily detained, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and recognize the people’s desire to return to the path of progress and inclusive democracy..."
Source/publisher:
U.S. Department of State
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Politics, Government and Governance - Burma/Myanmar - general studies
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်အတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနှံ့အပြားတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှု အခြေအနေများကို လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနက စုဆောင်းကောက်ယူခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထိုသို့ ကောက်ယူရာတွင် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်ခံရမှုဖြစ်စဥ်များနှင့်ပတ်သက်ပြီး ခိုင်မာသည့် သတင်း မီဒီယာများကို စောင့်ကြည့်လေ့လာမှု၊ Online Monitoring တို့မှတဆင့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေးချိုးဖောက်မှု ဖြစ်ရပ်ပေါင်း (၄၆၅၆)ခု တို့ကို ကောက်ယူရရှိခဲ့ပြီး၊ မြေပြင်အခြေအနေနှင့် ဆန်းစစ်အတည်ပြုနိုင်သည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရေး ချိုးဖောက်မှုဖြစ်စဥ် စုစုပေါင်း (၆၅၇)ခု ကို မှတ်တမ်းတင်သိမ်းဆည်းထားနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ထိုဖြစ်ရပ်များထည်းမှ အင်တာဗျူး၊ ဓာတ်ပုံမှတ်တမ်း များအပါအဝင် အချက်အလက်များရရှိပြီး မှန်ကန်ကြောင်းခိုင်မာစွာ အတည်ပြု နိုင်ခဲ့သည့် ဖြစ်စဉ်ပေါင်း (၃၂၂)ခု ရှိခဲ့သည်။ IIMM နှင့် နိုင်ငံတကာသို့ ဖြစ်စဉ် (၁၆၅)ခု ပေးပို့နိုင်ခဲ့သည်။
ထိုကဲ့သို့ စစ်တမ်းကောက်ယူထားရှိသည့် အချက်အလက်များအား အောက်ဖော်ပြပါ အစီရင်ခံစာတွင် ခေါင်းစဉ် (၇) ခုဖြင့် ပိုင်းခြားသတ်မှတ်၍ ပြည်သူသို့ လေးစားစွာ တင်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။
လူ့အခွင့်အရေးဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာနအနေဖြင့် ပြည်သူတစ်ရပ်လုံး တန်းတူညီမျှမှုရရှိရေး၊ ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးနှင့်တရားမျှတမှုရရှိရေးတည်းဟူသော ဦးတည်ချက်များကို ခိုင်ခိုင်မာမာလက်ကိုင်ဆွဲထား၍ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်တပ်၏ ကျုးလွန်မှုများကိုအပြစ်ပေးအရေးယူနိုင်ရေး အစွမ်းကုန်တာဝန်ယူဆောင်ရွက်မည်ဖြစ်ကြောင်း ကတိသစ္စာပြုအပ်ပါသည်။..."
Source/publisher:
Ministry of Human Rights
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-03
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
6.19 MB
more
Description:
"The National Unity Government expresses profound sadness upon learning about the earthquake that struck the central region of Japan on January 1, 2024, and the potential threat of a subsequent tsunami.
We extend our heartfelt condolences for any loss of life and express ongoing concern for all those who may be affected. We want to assure the government of Japan that, during this critical time, the people of Myanmar stand in solidarity with them, and our thoughts are with the entire nation.....ဂျပန်နိုင်ငံအလယ်ပိုင်းတွင် ၁ ဇန်နဝါရီ ၂၀၂၄ ကလှုပ်ခတ်ခဲ့သောငလျင်နှင့် နောက်ဆက်တွဲ ဆူနာမီဖြစ်နိုင်ကြောင်း သတင်းကို ကြားသိရသည့်အတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အထူးပင်တုန်လှုပ်မိပါသည်။
ငလျင်ဘေးဒဏ်သင့် ဂျပန်တိုင်းသူပြည်သားများ၏ အသက်အိုးအိမ်များ ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးရမှုအတွက် အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် အထူးပင်ကြေကွဲဝမ်းနည်းရပါသည်။ မြန်မာပြည်သူပြည်သားများက ပူဆွေးသောကရောက်နေရသောဂျပန်နိုင်ငံသူနိုင်ငံသားများနှင့်အတူ နွေးထွေးစွာအတူရှိနေပေးပါကြောင်း ဂျပန်အစိုးရအား ထပ်လောင်းပြောကြားရင်း ဤသဝဏ်လွှာကိုပေးပို့အပ်ပါသည်။.....統一致政府
ミャンマー連邦共和国
2024 年 1 月 2 日
挙国一致政府は、本日日本の中部地方を襲った地震と、それに伴う津波の可能性について、深い悲しみを感じています。
私たちは、命が失われたことに心から哀悼の意を表するとともに、影響を受ける可能性のあるすべての人々に引き続き懸念を表明します。私たちは日本政府に対し、この危機的な時期にミャンマー国民達が思いを共にしていることを保証します。
ミャンマー統一致政府..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
974.13 KB
more
Description:
"NUCC and NUG Issue Joint New Year
Statement for 2024.....Spring Development Bank to Open
First Branch in Kawlin Township.....Ministry of Defence: Resistance Forces Take Over the Military Base in Thabeikkyin Township.....Cabinet: Acting President Urges People to
Escalate Perseverance for the Success in 2024.....Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration....Acting President States to Respect
for Justice and Human Dignity in His Christmas Greeting Message.....Central Committee for Implementation
of Interim Local Administration.....Ministry of Defence: Officers of Myanmar Military Council Desert Naung Gyi Ine Police Station in
Ayadaw Township.....Interim Board for Heritage Administration.....National Unity Consultative Council
(NUCC).....December 2023 Military Affairs Brief Review.....New Year Greetings..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.15 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"NUCC and NUG Issue Joint New Year Statement for 2024.....Spring Development Bank to Open First Branch in Kawlin Township.....Ministry of Defence: Resistance Forces Take Over the Military Base in Thabeikkyin Township.....Cabinet: Acting President Urges People to Escalate Perseverance for the Success in 2024.....Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration....Acting President States to Respect for Justice and Human Dignity in His Christmas Greeting Message.....Central Committee for Implementation of Interim Local Administration.....Ministry of Defence: Officers of Myanmar Military Council Desert Naung Gyi Ine Police Station in Ayadaw Township.....Interim Board for Heritage Administration.....National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC).....December 2023 Military Affairs Brief Review.....New Year Greetings..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-02
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
4.78 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"1။ ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်၊ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရသည် ပြည်သူကို ဗဟိုပြုသည့် စံတန်ဖိုးများကို ဖော်ဆောင်သော ဖယ်ဒရယ်ဒီမိုကရေစီ ပြည်ထောင်စုကြီး တည်ဆောက်ရန် ရည်မှန်းထားသည်နှင့်အညီ လွတ်လပ်၍ တက်ကြွပြီး ဘက်မလိုက်သော နိုင်ငံခြားရေးမူဝါဒကို ချမှတ် လိုက်နာကျင့်သုံးလျက်ရှိသည်။
2။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံတို့သည် နှစ်နိုင်ငံအကြား သမိုင်းကြောင်း အရ အလွန်ခိုင်မာ၍ နီးကပ်သည့်ဆက်နွှယ်မှု အစဉ်အလာများရှိသည်သာမက တရုတ်နိုင်ငံသည် ကမ္ဘာ့အင်အားကြီးနိုင်ငံ တစ်နိုင်ငံ ဖြစ်သည့်အားလျော်စွာ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွက် အထူးအရေးပါသည့်နိုင်ငံဖြစ်သည်ဟု ခံယူသည်။
3။ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံနှင့် တရုတ်ပြည်သူ့သမ္မတနိုင်ငံတို့သည် နယ်နိမိတ်အားဖြင့် ကီလိုမီတာ နှစ်ထောင်ကျော် ထိစပ်လျက်ရှိပြီး၊ ကမ္ဘာတည်သရွေ့ အတူယှဉ်တွဲ နေထိုင်သွားရမည့် အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများဖြစ်သည်နှင့်အညီ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအနေဖြင့် နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား စစ်မှန်သည့် “ဆွေမျိုး-ပေါက်ဖော်” ဆက်ဆံရေးတည်ဆောက်သွားမည်။ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံအတွက် အိမ်နီးချင်းကောင်း ဖြစ်ရေး မြန်မာနိုင်ငံက အမြဲ ကြိုးပမ်း၊ ရပ်တည်မည်။
4။ တရုတ် တစ်နိုင်ငံတည်း မူဝါဒကို ဆက်လက်ထောက်ခံကျင့်သုံးမည်။
5။ တရုတ်နှင့်မြန်မာ နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား ပြည်သူနှင့်ပြည်သူ ဆက်ဆံရေးကို အလေးထားလျက် အပြန်အလှန် ချစ်ကြည်မှု၊ ယုံကြည်မှုနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို အစွမ်းကုန် မြှင့်တင်၊ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။
6။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား လူမှုစီးပွားအရ အကျိုးတူ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများကို အစဉ်သဖြင့် ထိန်းသိမ်း၊ မြှင့်တင်၊ ဆောင်ရွက်သွားမည်။
7။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံပြည်သူများ၏အကျိုးစီးပွားဖြစ်ထွန်းရေးကိုမျှော်ရည်လျှက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်းရှိ တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ၏ စီးပွားရေးအရ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံမှုများနှင့် အခြားလူမှုစီးပွားလုပ်ငန်းများ၏ လုံခြုံရေး ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းကာကွယ်မည်။
8။ အိမ်နီးချင်းနိုင်ငံများ၏ နိုင်ငံတော်လုံခြုံရေးကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်နေသည့် မည်သည့် အဖွဲ့ အစည်းကိုမျှ မြန်မာ့ပိုင်နက်အတွင်း အခြေချခွင့်မပြု။
9။ ၂၀၂၁ ခုနှစ် စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းမှုမတိုင်ခင် နှစ်နိုင်ငံ နယ်နိမိတ်သတ်မှတ်မှုစာချုပ်များ အပါအဝင် နှစ်နိုင်ငံကြား သဘောတူချုပ်ဆိုခဲ့သည့် စာချုပ်များအားလုံးကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှ တာဝန်ယူ ဆက်ခံမည်။
10။ နှစ်နိုင်ငံ နယ်စပ်တည်ငြိမ်ရေး နှင့် လုံခြုံရေးသာမက ဒေသတွင်း တည်ငြိမ်ရေးနှင့် လုံခြုံရေးကိုပါ ထိခိုက်စေသည့် ကျားဖြန့် အွန်လိုင်း လိမ်လည်မှုနှင့် လောင်းကစားလုပ်ငန်း၊ လူကုန်ကူးမှုလုပ်ငန်း၊ မူးယစ်ဆေးဝါးလုပ်ငန်းများအပါအဝင် နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ကျော် ရာဇဝတ် မှုခင်းများကို တရုတ်နိုင်ငံ အပါအဝင် ဒေသတွင်းနိုင်ငံများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်း၍ တိုက်ဖျက်သွားမည်။..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2024-01-01
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
692.43 KB
more
Sub-title:
How HRW Documents Wartime Abuses, Advocates to Protect Civilians, and Promotes Justice
Description:
"Armed conflict dominates the headlines, from the hostilities in Israel and Palestine, to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, to the militaries and militias committing atrocities in Sudan. For nearly four decades, Human Rights Watch (HRW) researchers have investigated international armed conflicts and civil wars, reporting on violations of human rights and the laws of war, and working to protect civilians caught in the crossfire. But what exactly does this look like?
We sat down with Human Rights Watch’s Executive Director Tirana Hassan to discuss how the organization – which has been defending human rights since 1978 – operates in times of armed conflict and how teams of people specializing in research, communications, and advocacy work together to compel world leaders to protect civilians and push for justice.
What does Human Rights Watch do when conflict erupts?
We seek to keep civilians safe during fighting by pressing warring parties to respect international humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war, which are the rules that guide and limit warfare. Human Rights Watch’s job is not to say whether war should be waged or not, but to make sure the conduct of warring parties respects the law.
It’s clear what humanitarian organizations do during conflict – they work to get civilians food, water, and shelter, and help those at risk to be protected. What is our role?
We have worked in armed conflicts for decades, from the civil wars in the Americas in the early 1980s to the current hostilities in Israel and Palestine today. We have warned the international community of potential armed conflicts and the risks that violations of the laws of war pose for civilians.
Our researchers document the conduct of the parties to the conflict and any laws they have violated during the fighting. We analyze this evidence and bring it to the warring parties, using our findings to lean on them – or convince governments around the world to lean on them – to change their conduct and protect civilians caught in the middle, as is their legal duty. We also campaign for justice and accountability before national courts and global courts, like the International Criminal Court, when violations amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide.
Your answer leads me to another question – can Human Rights Watch’s work prevent conflict before it starts?
Our work can help prevent armed conflict by shining a spotlight on the human rights abuses that are the root cause of so much fighting in the world. When security forces abuse the populations they are meant to protect, when governments repress ethnic, national, or religious groups, when free media or the internet is shut down and when journalists are killed, allowing disinformation to flourish, when weapons flow into places that lack governance. Our research on violations like these, and our advocacy to get governments to change course and respect rights, can help stem tensions that often lead to armed conflict.
What type of laws-of-war violations do we look at?
The laws of war that we use today to protect civilians – also known as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its additional protocols – were created in response to the atrocities and inhumanity of World War II. These laws have been adopted by all countries and govern how a war is fought to limit civilian suffering as much as possible.
Warring parties – including national armed forces and non-state armed groups – don’t have carte blanche to do anything they want. They must respect international humanitarian law as well as international human rights law, which remains in effect.
International humanitarian law says that the warring parties are required to distinguish between civilians and combatants when carrying out attacks. Detainees are also protected from mistreatment and torture. The laws make sure civilians have access to food, water, and somewhere safe to live. International humanitarian law also protects essential civilian institutions and services, including hospitals, medical staff, markets, schools, and aid workers delivering life-saving assistance. Taking hostages is a violation, as is recruiting children to fight. Places of worship, such as mosques and churches, and key cultural and historical sites are also protected.
For example, when Taliban forces detained and then summarily executed some members of the former Afghan government’s security forces, that was a serious violation of the laws of war.
We have people with different research specialties across Human Rights Watch. When conflict hits, who does what?
We deploy multidisciplinary teams because conflict affects people in different ways. We have teams of country experts who have been working in and on these situations for a very long time. So, for example, when covering the conflict in Sudan, our Sudan researcher helped gather evidence on the ground and led our efforts to push governments to do more to stop abuses and protect civilians. For the conflict in Ukraine, our researchers specializing both in Ukraine and Russia are essential. The overwhelming majority of abuses are by Russian forces in Ukraine, but some also take place in Russia.
Human Rights Watch also has a Crisis and Conflict division, with researchers who are trained for and have experience working in conflict zones and crisis situations. This year they documented abuses in Sudan, Ukraine, Haiti, and Israel/Palestine.
Armed conflicts also affect different groups of people differently. In Ethiopia’s Tigray region, we documented how Ethiopian and Eritrean military forces, as well as local militias, used sexual violence, including rape, mainly against women and girls. Our Disability Rights Division documented that civilians with disabilities and older people in Gaza were unable to flee the Israeli government’s bombing and faced difficulties accessing necessities and aid under Israel’s blockade. Our health and human rights experts can speak to the health effects of sieges and blockades, which are violations of international law if they are used to deny civilians food and water. Children, we know, are disproportionately affected by conflict, and our colleagues specializing in children’s rights have documented how schools have often been used by warring parties as bases or weapons depots. Our work has led to soldiers vacating schools in Thailand, Somalia, Yemen, the Central African Republic, India, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Increasingly in conflict, our researchers can’t get close to where the abuses are happening because it’s unsafe or they are blocked from entering the country. Thanks to our Digital Investigations Lab, we can use technology to corroborate and strengthen our on-the-ground research and eyewitness testimony we’ve been told over the phone or a messaging app. These researchers scrape the internet for open-source evidence from photos and videos that people post on social media. They also conduct digital analyses to confirm that what they find is true, and they triangulate photos or videos depicting abuses with satellite imagery and geospatial analysis to confirm their accuracy.
We used satellite imagery in Myanmar in 2017 to help show the torching of 700 buildings in an ethnic Rohingya village in Rakhine State. The images show large burn scars and destroyed tree cover consistent with widespread destruction, corroborating accounts from refugees who described killing and arson by Burmese military, police and ethnic Rakhine mobs.
Our Arms Division specializes in all-source weapons analysis and treaty compliance monitoring. Among other activities, they conduct field investigations, book-research, and collaborate with technical sources and research teams to identify the specific type of weapons used by analyzing any remnants, impact craters, and other information that munitions leave behind after they are used. The division also monitors and documents when controversial weapons are used, including incendiary weapons like white phosphorous, which leave people with severe thermal burns. We report on new use of cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines, which are banned internationally because they are inherently indiscriminate against the civilian population.
In addition, the division advocates for stronger international law to better protect civilians from problematic means or methods of warfare in future armed conflicts. And our advocates campaign to stop weapons transfers to armed forces or groups that are likely to use them in violation of the laws of war.
What types of research have we done recently?
We have been documenting unlawful attacks by Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza and Israel. Israeli forces have apparently unlawfully struck hospitals and medical facilities in Gaza and put civilians at risk by using white phosphorus in populated areas. They have also used explosive weapons in densely populated areas on a massive scale. These strikes have caused large-scale destruction and loss of civilian life. In Lebanon, Israeli forces have killed a number of civilians in unlawful attacks amounting to apparent war crimes. We have also documented that Palestinian armed groups have deliberately killed civilians, taken hostages, and launched rockets indiscriminately into Israel’s civilian areas, which are war crimes.
The Israeli government has also cut off basic services, like electricity and water, to the civilian population in Gaza as collective punishment, blocked all but a trickle of aid and food, and used starvation as a weapon of war. These acts amount to war crimes.
We use our research to push for justice. Human Rights Watch was the first human rights organization to publish in-depth research on the issue of forced transfers and deportations of Ukrainians. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants against Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and his children’s rights commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, for alleged war crimes involving the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia.
How do we get our research in front of key people?
Part of our strategy is through the media and strategic communications. We share our unique research with journalists, who cover our work in the news. We leverage new and sometimes local communications channels to get the information not only to those in power, but also the communities who are affected. Our reports are based on detailed investigations, which are more important than ever in a world rife with disinformation. When the world has forgotten about certain armed conflicts, we work to keep them in the news and on policy makers’ agendas.
We advocate with people who are in positions to make the changes we want to see. For example, if we document an armed group using cluster munitions, we will go to the warring parties and say these are illegal under international law. If we can identify who manufactured and sold these weapons, we can go to those countries, show them our evidence, and tell them they may be complicit in war crimes.
We have also focused on identifying the leaders – like senior commanders in the armed forces – who are responsible for the abuses taking place. Then we can work with governments to implement targeted sanctions or travel bans. For example, we are now pressing the European Union to use sanctions against those responsible for grave violations in the armed conflict in Sudan.
It is our job to hold governments and their leaders accountable when they violate their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, no matter how powerful they are. When a military coalition including the United States and United Kingdom invaded Iraq in 2003, we documented their laws of war violations, including indiscriminate airstrikes that killed civilians and the torture of detainees. We also reported on Iraqi violations. Many years later, that work isn’t over. Righting wrongs is usually a marathon, not a sprint.
But it can take time. Human Rights Watch’s documentation of abuses in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s contributed to the creation of war crimes tribunals and the prosecutions of leaders for war crimes. These trials began in the 2000s and continue in 2023.
When it comes to our advocacy, where are our advocates located and what does their work look like?
Our advocates take our research and engage with people in power to influence the political response to fighting on the ground. Sometimes they are engaging with the warring parties themselves, and sometimes they are urging change among those funding and supporting the warring parties. Our advocates’ goal, in the most general sense, is to make sure human rights are centered in these policy responses.
We advocate with multilateral institutions at the global and regional level, whether it be the United Nations, the African Union, or the European Union, or other local and regional bodies that have responsibilities to protect civilians.
We have a research presence in about 100 countries, and our advocates and researchers can advocate with governments in each of these countries.
We have other advocates based all over the world, including in Tokyo, London, Washington DC, and Johannesburg, and in Australia, Brazil, and across Europe.
Here’s an example of what our advocacy looks like. Starting in 2014, we worked to expose the violent crackdown on dissent by Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro government, which led to a spiraling humanitarian emergency and the exodus of millions of people. We shared our research at the UN Security Council and pushed for a UN response, and the pressure we helped generate ultimately resulted in more aid reaching people. Our research was cited by the Biden administration to grant temporary protected status to Venezuelans living in the United States, and by the Brazilian refugee agency to grant thousands of Venezuelans legal status.
In short, our research, communications, and advocacy all work together in an incredibly effective way, ensuring that we deploy information in a way that compels those in power to take action.
Who does Human Rights Watch work with during conflict?
Our advocates and researchers work closely with partners – local human rights and other civil society groups, like humanitarian organizations, labor unions, and faith communities.
For example, after armed conflict broke out in Sudan in April 2023, we knew we needed more power behind documenting – and preserving evidence of – the atrocities. Sustained advocacy by Human Rights Watch, combined with the power of the voices of Sudanese and regional partner organizations across Africa, helped lead the UN Human Rights Council to establish an independent international fact-finding mission for Sudan.
What are the challenges you face? Today we see a number of conflicts raging where one side or the other – or both – shows little respect for these laws.
I know some people can be skeptical of whether international humanitarian law and human rights law helps while a conflict rages. There are armed conflicts where the warring parties don’t seem to be showing any restraint – they seemingly flout these laws without consequence.
We’ve seen this in the Horn of Africa since 2020. Government forces and allied militias in Ethiopia’s Tigray region have used rape as a weapon of war and destroyed infrastructure critical to civilians’ survival. They also had cut off the region from food, power, and communications for almost two years. This year, in neighboring Sudan, war has broken out – despite consistent warnings about escalating abuses by the country’s notorious security forces. Eight months later, we’ve documented ethnically motivated attacks on civilians in Darfur, how explosive weapons repeatedly used in urban areas have killed civilians and damaged critical infrastructure in the capital, Khartoum, and widespread obstruction of aid.
In both countries, perpetrators of the crimes have faced very few consequences. In Ethiopia, after warring parties signed a cessation of hostilities agreement, international investigations into conflict-related atrocities were jettisoned as Ethiopia’s international and regional partners sought to normalize relations with the federal government. In Sudan, despite investigative efforts, accountability for crimes is just not being made a priority in political discussions.
That doesn’t mean we give up. And the laws of war do matter, as they give us a framework to render meaningful judgments against combatants, affording victims and their families a measure of justice.
Also, we know that when the laws of war are enforced, including through trials, they can help prevent atrocities by breaking cycles of violence and impunity. Our research shows that, all too often, when justice is scrapped to protect the powerful, these crimes just recur, creating new generations of victims. We’ve seen this in Afghanistan, when warlords granted themselves immunity, and when the International Criminal Court downgraded investigating US abuses in its investigation of alleged war crimes. We’ve also seen this in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
If you want to stop recurring abuses, you need justice. And sometimes justice in a courtroom is a long time coming.
In Syria, Human Rights Watch and many other groups spent years painstakingly documenting human rights violations and war crimes while those responsible were seemingly getting away with murder. Over 10 years on, though, we see that prosecutions for these crimes are gaining steam.
You mentioned that we also campaign for support for justice, including before courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).
One of our ultimate goals is justice and accountability for abuses. This includes shaping investigations and pressuring governments to arrest people wanted for serious crimes. We also push for effective war crimes courts, and work to secure financial and political support for accountability efforts. We sustain these campaigns for justice over many, many years. This often starts by making sure our published reports are brought to the attention of the international community and to authorities working before national courts, international courts – including the International Criminal Court – and hybrid courts, which are domestic courts containing international elements.
Human Rights Watch has also advocated for national authorities to put in place the laws and expertise needed to support the practice of “universal jurisdiction,” under which national judicial authorities investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed in other countries, regardless of the nationality of the suspects or their victims. Over the course of 2020-2022, a German court held a trial on state-sponsored torture in Syria, ultimately convicting a former Syrian intelligence officer of crimes against humanity. A Human Rights Watch report documenting torture in Syria’s detention centers was referenced by the court during the trial.
Any last thoughts?
If I could wave a magic wand and stop conflicts around the world and bring people to an understanding, I’d do it. But that’s not reality. This is what we do instead. We document war crimes and other abuses. We make sure the world knows what’s happening, and we push for change. It’s not a perfect system, and sometimes it’s a long road to justice. But Human Rights Watch has done this work for decades, and we know from experience that justice is possible, and we do everything we can to make it probable..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-22
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Local URL:
more
Sub-title:
Abductions, Forced Recruitment Violate Laws of War
Description:
"(Bangkok) – An ethnic armed group in northern Myanmar has abducted and forcibly recruited civilians fleeing fighting in Shan State, Human Rights Watch said today. Myanmar’s military also has a long record of using adults for forced labor and recruiting children, but getting recent information about unlawful practices in junta-controlled areas is difficult.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group, should immediately end its abusive practices against civilians, and take all available measures to protect them during hostilities against Myanmar’s armed forces and pro-junta militias.
“The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army is violating the laws of war by abducting and forcibly recruiting civilians, putting them at grave risk,” said Elaine Pearson, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Civilians should be able to seek safety from fighting without fearing that the Myanmar military or ethnic armed groups will force them into their armies.”
On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance – a coalition of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army – began Operation 1027, an offensive targeting Myanmar military outposts in northern Shan State. The offensive triggered attacks by opposition armed groups elsewhere in the country. Since late October, fighting between opposition forces and the military has displaced more than 600,000 people, including almost 100,000 in Shan State.
Tens of thousands have fled Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Special Autonomous Zone in northern Shan State, in advance of an anticipated MNDAA assault on the town, which the group formerly controlled. Although the MNDAA assisted those fleeing by opening up previously closed forest roads, the armed unit also confiscated mobile phones and detained an unknown number of people as they left Laukkai, local media and witnesses said.
On November 24, the MNDAA abducted seven men as they traveled from Laukkai to Chin Shwe Haw, near the Myanmar-China border. Relatives told the Shan News Herald that the men’s friends last saw them detained on the roadside just outside Chin Shwe Haw, before Alliance Army fighters took them away. The Shan News Herald reported that an MNDAA spokesperson said that Sai Ai Naw, 18; Maung Nyi Ka, 19; Sai Lianghan, 20; Sai Ilaw, 26; Maung Nor Goon, 26; Sai Aung Heng, 27, and a seventh, unnamed 20-year-old man would be assigned to military service.
On November 25, a doctor who left Laukkai along the same route said he witnessed many young men pulled over and detained by MNDAA fighters outside Par Hsin Kyaw, a village between Laukkai and Chin Shwe Haw.
“They [MNDAA fighters] were pulling over men who were on motorcycles in groups of twos and threes,” he said. They did not pull over couples, and I had one of the female nurses riding pillion, so we didn’t get stopped. But there were scores of young men pulled over and I saw them being rounded up. I was too afraid to stop and look but they were being gathered together and taken away somewhere.”
On December 12, the parents of seven other young men who did not arrive home after fleeing Laukkai in late October issued a letter to the MNDAA, pleading for their release. The families wrote, in the letter obtained by Human Rights Watch, that they last saw their sons being led away by MNDAA fighters near Chin Shwe Haw. All those abducted were of Ta’ang ethnicity and came from Man Khite village, Namhsan township, in northern Shan State.
The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army operates in northern Shan State along the China-Myanmar border. It was founded as the Communist Party of Burma collapsed in 1989 and agreed to a ceasefire with the Myanmar military later that year. The ceasefire ended in 2009, when a military-aligned faction of the Alliance Army became the Kokang Border Guard Force and was put in charge of Laukkai, where illegal activity, most recently cyber scam centers, has thrived. The MNDAA has attempted multiple times to regain the territory, including Laukkai, that it lost in 2009.
Some ethnic armed groups, including the MNDAA, impose quotas requiring villages or households to supply a recruit, who in some cases may be willing to serve. Myanmar’s military and pro-junta militias also use forced recruits, including children, to bolster their armed forces or for other roles such as porters, cooks, or cleaners.
In a widely shared video dated December 5 that Human Rights Watch reviewed and verified, an MNDAA official in uniform warns families not to shirk their responsibilities and to ensure those recruited were at least 15 years old and younger than 50.
“If [you don’t] have a boy … if you have a girl … if you have three [one must serve],” the official tells a crowd gathered at a monastery in Pang Hseng village, Monekoe township, in northern Shan State. “If you have five, two of them must serve. Got it? If you have five males at home, two of them must serve.”
He continued: “So, if you’re thinking about not bringing your sons and daughters because you’re concerned, don’t do that. … One day when they come back because things are peaceful, we are going to collect household registrations and we will know that they did not serve, and we will arrest them for it.”
Under international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, applicable to the non-international armed conflicts in Myanmar, warring parties are prohibited from arbitrarily depriving anyone of their liberty, including through abductions and forced recruitment. Parties must treat all civilians humanely; arbitrary deprivation of liberty is incompatible with this requirement.
In September 2019, Myanmar ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which obligates non-state armed forces not to, “under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18.” The 2019 Myanmar Child Rights Law also forbids recruiting anyone under 18 into the armed forces or non-state armed groups.
In 2023, the United Nations secretary-general's annual report on children in armed conflict identified the Myanmar military as responsible for the majority of the cases the UN had verified as recruiting and using children the previous year. However, the report also named the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army as having recruited up to seven children and separately, abducting up to seven others. The UN special rapporteur on Myanmar, Tom Andrews, has also received various reports that the Myanmar military’s recruitment and use of children has increased since the 2021 military coup.
“Governments with any influence over opposition and ethnic armed groups in Myanmar should impress upon them that violations by the Myanmar armed forces never justifies abuses by their own forces,” Pearson said..."
Source/publisher:
Human Rights Watch (USA)
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-21
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory, Human Rights and international relations, Burma: Internal displacement/forced migration of several ethnic groups., Armed conflict in Burma - attacks on civilians
Language:
Local URL:
more
Description:
"၁။ အဖက်ဖက်က မရှုမလှ ရှုံးနိမ့်လျက်ရှိသော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၎င်းတို့ သက်ဆိုးရှည်စေရေးနှင့် ပြည်သူလူထုကို အကြမ်းဖက်သတ်ဖြတ်ရန် အရေးတကြီးလိုအပ် နေသော နိုင်ငံခြားငွေ ဖြည့်ဆည်းနိုင်ရန်အတွက် ယင်း၏အမည်ခံ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ စစ်ကောင်စီဗဟိုဘဏ်၊ စစ်ကောင်စီထောက်တိုင်ဘဏ်များပူးပေါင်း၍ ပြည်ပရောက် ရွှေ့ပြောင်း အလုပ်သမားများ၏ သမ္မာအာဇီဝချွေးနှဲစာအား အတင်းအဓမ္မ ခေါင်းပုံဖြတ်ရယူရန် နည်းလမ်း ပေါင်းစုံဖြင့် ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်ရှိပါသည်။
၂။ ထို့အပြင် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီသည် ၃၀-၈-၂၀၂၃ ရက်စွဲဖြင့် ညွှန်ကြားစာ တစ်စောင် ထုတ်ပြန်ခဲ့ပြီး ရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ မိသားစုလွှဲပို့ငွေအဖြစ် အခြေခံ လစာ၏ အနည်းဆုံး ၂၅ % ကို လစဉ် သို့မဟုတ် သုံးလလျှင် တစ်ကြိမ် ၎င်းတို့ သတ်မှတ် ထားသော ငွေလွှဲဝန်ဆောင်မှု လုပ်ငန်းများမှတဆင့် လွှဲပို့ကြရန် ပြည်ပအလုပ်အကိုင် အကျိုးဆောင် အေဂျင်စီများကို ဖိအားပေးညွှန်ကြားခဲ့ကြောင်း တွေ့ရှိရသည်။
၃။ သို့ပါသော်လည်း မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများသည် တရားဝင်မှု အလျဉ်းမရှိ သော အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီ၏ အမိန့်အာဏာဟူသမျှကို တော်လှန်လိုစိတ်ပြင်းပြစွာဖြင့် ဆန့်ကျင်အန်တုခဲ့ကြသည့်အတွက် ယခုအခါ ပြည်ပနိုင်ငံများတွင် ရောက်ရှိအလုပ်လုပ်ကိုင် နေသော မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအတွင်းသို့ ပြန်လည်လွှဲပို့ငွေ များသည် ယခင်ကထက် ၁၀ ပုံ ၁ ပုံခန့်သာ အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီထံသို့ ရောက်ရှိတော့ ကြောင်း လေ့လာသိရှိရသည်။
၄။ မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများ၏ စိတ်အားထက်သန်စွာ အာဏာဖီဆန်မှုကြောင့် အကြမ်းဖက်စစ်ကောင်စီအတွက် နိုင်ငံခြားငွေရရှိမှု သိသာစွာလျော့နည်းခဲ့ပြီး အကြမ်းဖက် လုပ်ရပ်များ ဆက်လက်ကျူးလွန်နိုင်ရန် အကြပ်အတည်းဆိုက်ရောက်စေခဲ့ပါသည်။ ယခုကဲ့သို့ မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်း အလုပ်သမားများအနေဖြင့် မိမိတို့ ကျရာနိုင်ရာအခန်းကဏ္ဍက အကြမ်းဖက် စစ်ကောင်စီထံ လွှဲပို့ငွေများ မရောက်ရှိစေရန် အချိန်ကိုက်ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းသည် ဘဏ္ဍာရေး တိုက်စစ်တွင် တတပ်တအားပါဝင်ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါ၍ မိမိတို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရအနေဖြင့် နိုင်ငံအသီးသီးသို့ရောက်ရှိနေသော မြန်မာရွှေ့ပြောင်းအလုပ်သမားများအား အထူးကျေးဇူးတင် မှတ်တမ်းတင်ဂုဏ်ပြုအပ်ပါကြောင်း ဖော်ပြအပ်ပါသည်။ ..."
Source/publisher:
National Unity Government of Myanmar
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-20
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
National Unity Government (NUG), Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.17 MB
Local URL:
more
Description:
"Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Magway Region, Bago Region, Rakhine State, Shan State, and Kayin State from December 8th to 14th. 7 civilians including a child who liked and shared the posts about against Military Junta on social media, were arrested and charged. Military Junta arrested 8 locals from Ywangan Township, Southern Shan State, as hostages on December 12th. Military Junta Troop forced to plant the sunflower to the farmers in Ayeyarwady Region.
16 civilians died and over 20 were injured within a week by the Military’s heavy and light attacks. 6 underaged children were injured and 5 died when the Military Junta committed violations. Over 80 civilians were arrested and over 30 were tortured within a week by the Military Junta..."
Source/publisher:
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-19
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Human Rights and international relations, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf pdf pdf
Size:
210.36 KB 199.99 KB 614.52 KB
more
Description:
"Myanmar faces a protracted learning crisis where the COVID-19 pandemic was compounded by a coup in February 2021, which furthered school closures. Save the Children created Catch-up Clubs (CuCs) to support children’s remedial learning in a matter of weeks and address barriers to children’s successful return to school in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. An innovative model that offers community-led, play-based literacy instruction to children grouped by ability, not age, CuCs assess children’s foundational literacy and Social and Emotional Learning (SEL), while addressing child protection and economic barriers to education. CuCs were piloted with over 3000 children in upper primary to lower secondary grades across 36 communities in the conflict-affected states of Rakhine and Kayin in Myanmar. This quasi-natural experimental impact evaluation investigated the cause-and-effect relationship between CuCs and children's literacy outcomes and SEL competencies. The study was contextually adapted to consider children affected by conflict, gender, socioeconomic status, and ethnicity. The results show that children who participated in CuCs had significantly higher literacy level and SEL competency than children who did not participate. Children participating in CuCs also showed greater self-confidence and educational aspirations to remain in education or continue their schooling to a higher level..."
Source/publisher:
Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies
Date of entry/update:
2023-12-18
[field_licence]
Type:
Individual Documents
Category:
Education in Burma/Myanmar - general, Human Rights Education, Politics and Government - global and regional - general studies, strategies, theory
Language:
Format :
pdf
Size:
1.09 MB
more